PERONISM IN POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010086-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: June 21, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
21 lute 1973
d the Pet rani;
Fewer and poUties for almost I
a a stanatio exct union fro governwe9tnt,
ZMO&t myctioat holy On Argentina. an
edited as a tjjraent and mor at d4aesne:
kind of a fork hero. person has mans.
,d Argentina,, from tong Years of ex"
throe h earefut manipulation of his foiioto
ship him and his philosophy of 2ooiat dr stl
J;oe$ resti: ious fsrvor and by Area ino a
iialona?7-si that has broad appeal. Parents
akecs for resin,, Hector Caere
opposition in a note shish shores that many more Argon-
tine. than just the Psrontst hard Dore Want What Peron
eF to offer.
promo
Program wi Z t area
"at of Latin Areri
Argentina should r
0 and Shift its aZ
nose interests at home and to beoomee an outspoken
taken office
modarat. Zino, but the
e prob teems for the us
Peron has tong preach o
its takes to the "limper
to the "Third wortd% Argentina
thus be ex,poetsd to take aetion against some US
3so oe of protest against US "domination' abroad.
$raoit ZZ aiso oo in for its share of abuse fro
:rgoa tine, although Peron has boon pushing for Latin
America to unite against the super oos .
Psronis 's future d.ponds in large part on f~ae:
Welt CaMPora c do before the almost fit ;
passes on ?hear" are strains within Peron ter. that may
defy campora once Peron is no longer around to hold
has ?
P
.n lasd'rl d,
who Veer-
vi th an
brand of
and-piok.d
awed his
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F
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things together--s trains that may press Campora toward
more extremist policies. Yet? Carpcra has the advantages
of natural Argentine wealth and a program of wide popu-
Zaritt to keep him going. Even a modicum of success
oouUd insure his survival, and Peron's place in history.
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Juan Peron and the Peronist movement are returnin
to power in Argentina after 18 years of political
exile for "El Lider" himself and the systematic
exclusion of his :followers from the mainstream of
Argentine politics. Yet, throughout those 18 ye ars ,
the weight of Peron's strength was always present and
could not be ignored by either the country's civilian
politicians or military officers who alternated in
holding power. How is it that Peron, apparently dis-
credited in 1955 as a ruthless fascist, as a man who
plundered the Argentine treasury, as a sexual deviate,
could be so enshrined in the hearts and minds of an
advanced, sophisticated, and highly cultured society?
How is it that Peronism, a vague concept of social
justice in some ways more akin to a religion than a
political movement, could so dominate Argentine politi
when Peron first came to power in 19 46 , Argentina
had had only a brief fling between 1919 and 1930 with
the ideas of modern European social democracy. Before
1919, Argentina had been run by wealthy landowners and
business interests centered in Buenos Aires. By 19 30 ,
the conservatives, seconded by the military, had rejected
the radical intellectuals and returned to the tradi-
tional system, Peron was a product of this background---
a- professional but ambitious military officer, trained
in part in Mussolini's fascist Italy--but he came to
power in quite a different way.
Peron rode to power on the backs of Argentina's
working class. He organized and politicized them, and
gave them a voice in government they had never had
before, even under the Radicals. In the early days,
Argentina's young people and its large middle class
were uncertain, even frightened of Peron. His style
of rule, much in the manner of the typical Caudillo,
gave therm no cause for relief. Nevertheless, the workers
found in Peron a cha ipion, and were willing to forgive
ctatorial style.
Peron added another ingredient--the mystic and
almost religious veneration of his wife, Evita.
She was the High Priestess of Peronism during her life
with Peron, and became a saint in the religion of
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Peronism after her death in 1952. While Peron's
image began to fade in his last years of rule, hers
remained untarnished.
By the time of his ouster in 1955, Peron had
polarized the Argentine people. Many hated and revi led
him, others worshiped him. A succession of governments
that followed, suffering in part from his economic
mistakes and systematically excluding his followers
from politics, made the Peron era look increasingly
good. Thus some people gradually forgot Peron's
excesses in their nostalgia for the good times under
his rule and their veneration-of the man himself.
Now, Peronism is back--but it is quite a different
Peronism than that which first brought victory in 19 46 .
it has evolved from its fascist beginnings into a move-
ment that embodies a variety of philosophies, some of
them reminiscent of the early days, but most more
leftist in nature. Peronismk is really an evolution of
the radical philosophy in Argentina, with an orientation
away from the intellectual middle class toward the
working class. The central theme stem from Peron's
own concepts of Social Justice, or Justicialismo--an
ideology that is more pragmatic than prec[ -, kept which
pr: bably represents the political philosophy of more
half of all Argentines. PeronistR believe that
the government should have control over the national
econy and should not suffer the dictates of inter--
natio4i or foreign business interests. They believe
that a state should run the major industries and
should control the national financial community.
They believe that Argentina should have an independent
foreign policy, free from ties to the super-powers,
and should-,.be able to exert its natural position
of leadership in Latin America.
Beyond these major maxims, it is hard to define
Peronisn. bike'' many political movements, Peronism knows
what it does not want--but has not bee specific about
where it is going. It claims to be an --Cozme~unist, yet
many of its young members have a certaf, Marxist-Leninist
it claims that it is not fascist,,,, yet, among older
adherents there is a significant current of right-wing
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ultra-nationalist fanaticism. Coupled with this vague
political philosophy is the religious mysticism of
vement and the adulation of Peron, which grants
him a certain aura of infallibility.
Part of the secret to the magic of Peron li
the peculiar nature of the Argentine people and the vast
?iches of Argentina itself. Argentina is a European country
that just happens to be attached to the land mass of
South America. It is a unique combination of Spanish
d Italian peoples, with some small admixture of Other
groups,--Indians o, British, Jews, Arabs, Germans--that
has created for itself a way of life and a philosophy of
living that has no equal in the Western Hemisphere. This
way of life is the antithesis of the Calvinist ethic
of the United Mates and some parts of Europe. It rejects
hard work, it values leisure and the pursuit of pleasure,
and it can sustain this ethic because of the richness of
the pampas. This wealth has permitted. Argentina to
operate on the brink of economic failure for many years,
while its people eat well and enjoy TV sets and cars--
what one economist calls mini-prosperity with macro-
aos .
The nature of Peronism and Peron' s position within
ovement create a variety of problems for the Caaora
nment. After choosing Campora for his total loyalty,
on demonstrated his hold over the movement by imposing
a unpopular and obsequious figure on the rank and
pore's chief--and perhaps only---asset thus far
's blessing.
Argentina's major political failing in the 20th
century has been the inability of its politicians
to subordinate their individual differences and work together.
Now, because of the near-majority vote for Campora,~the
and the fact that the other major parties have similar
political goals, the Peronist leadership may actually
be able to put together a working coalition that
11 endure. In Peron's brief stay in Argentina
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he managed to bring together a diverse group that
,
, _ ncludes relatively conservative labor leaders, impatient
and radical youth, and moderate economic and business
figures.
There are several issues, however, that could severely
bl
b
a
y
this coalition, and the economic ones are pro
t important. Argentina has suffered over the past
invaaa t3 nt, erratic grain and cattle production, and
an inability to develop new export products at competitive
prices. The Peronists are in an enviable position--
they can probably impose a harsh and austere economic
program and get away with it for a while. They will be,
after all, the most popular government Argentina
has had in twenty years, and they have vowed to correct
the mistakes made by their military predecessors.
Unless they do something really extreme, which
seems =likely for the rent, the Peronists can probably
count on laaor,, business, and much of the middle class
to fall in line. Peronist youth, however, may not be
so easy to convince. They have gone with Peron because
he represents change and anti-militarism and has been
"revolutionary" things. They have been the moat
in their acceptance of the Peronist "religion,"
and they will probably be the first group to become
disenchanted.
they do. Campora could have a serious problem---
especially if frustration or dissatisfaction turns
them to revolution or terrorism. Some old guard Peronists
believe the youth have not bought Peronism at all and
primarily as a way to oust the military and as a possible
vehicle for more revolutionary politics. Whether this
is true or not, Campora may still have a serious
dilemma, since moves to satisfy the more revolutionary
aims of youth could alienate Peronism's traditional
power base.
Caanaora's initial moves have reflected his moderate
Lce. He has chosen a cabinet of old-guard Peronist
oiaans and avoided placing more outspoken extremists
ti
,
_ ,ra positions of influence. Yet, some sourced.-aand some
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Peroniat documents---clan, that this is but an interim
government, designed to hold the line until the Peronists
have consolidated their hold. These reports predict that
a more "revolutionary" government will be formed, per-
haps in six months.
e of Peroniafn hinges in great measure on
Peron himself, now almost 78 years old, and on the
ability of the Campora government to achieve a measure
of success before the old man dies. If Peron goes with--
out giving up at least some of his all encompassing
command to his surrogates in Buenos Aires, Peronism
could dissolve, in the traditional Argentine way, into
`oath and the skeptical
and satisfy y
r
th
,
e
things toge
middle class, the future of his government may be
assured, with or without the presence of Peron.
A large factor in Campora's success or failure in
post-Peron struggle for leadership will be his
start in the months to come. The
t
o
at is sure
m renaming of streets, plazas,, and buildings for Peron
and Evita--a re-enactment of things that were commonplace
during the first Peron era--will tend to sanctify
the image of Peron hirself. Campora, if he plays his
. _ _ _ e_ _ .s,.... t .a v.AzTnAi r as
%e chosen interpreter of ialisv" .
A-- force that has suffered greatlyn
The one ma
ang the resurgenc of Peroniem is the armed forces,
considered the final arbiter in politics. orced
out the Radicals in 1930 and have been deeply i
in politics ever since. They connived with Peron in
bringing "El Lider" to power in 19 46 , and gthe}{ n---when
d
t
__ _ - -
e
ey finally se~yec
than just a surrogate for the wealthy
ve been more
na Class, at least in the past-Peron era. in fact, most
4, r n,anv n f tile
y
within Percniam. What the
i
es
t tendenc
caalis
lves Peron himself--a man who disgraced
t to invo
uni form-rand the "rabble" that surrounds him.
ges still maintain the power to take
d fo
r
a
,- e
overnment, in a physical sense. They
f the
l
o
g
xa
ca>nv. have the tanks and guns. They would face, however, a
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populace that had rejected them at the ballot box,
and acme segments of the Peronist movement that would
take up arms against them. While Argentine military
forces have been willing to trade blows with each other
over their role in government, they have never been
enthusiastic about confronting the popular will. And
in the present state of public disillusion with the
military government, only some major break-down in Campora's
administration would prompt the people to call them back
from the barracks in the near future.
LIONS FOR THE US AND LATIN AMERICA
The changing nature of politics in Argentina will
have most of its impact at home. Nevertheless, a major
not of the Peronist philosophy involves a. shift in
elf either! a truly Latin American country or a close
R
ally of the United States. Its orientation has always
been toward Europe. Peron's own view of the world
World War-II ,~ by the pro-Nazism of much of the Argentine
War I
These experiences probably e behind a Peronist p
to shift Argentina away from the US toward an alignment
with the `Third World."
Mat this means is more likely to be a shift
toward better relations with such countries as Cuba,
East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam than th
The peronists hope to augment their trade relations
with Europe and bring in European capital to replace
US money. They also intend to take over at least some
US businesses and force out some US banking interests.
They do not intend so much to alienate the US as to
demonstrate their independence. In this regard, they
will be joining the governments of Peru, Chile, and
Mexico, which have already moved in this direction.
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Peron also is interested in developing friendly
relations with the Arab states. It is hardly likely,
however, that he would wish to see Argentina become
a haven for Arab--or any other--revolutionaries or
terrorists. Such a move could easily backfire. Yet
he seems to know that this is a sensitive area for
the US, and he has always enjoyed being able to stick
the needle in Uncle Sam.
A Peronist Argentina will thus be a nagging vexa-
tion for the US. Nevertheless, Campora says that he
intends to maintain friendly relations if he can.
He may at times try to use the US as a whipping boy,
but most Argentines are sophisticated enough to realize
that the US is not the reason for Argentina's problems.
Other countries in Latin America may be more con-
cerned about the impact of a return of Peronism. In
fact, Brazil is already beginning to see the Peronist
hand in all sorts of evil adventures. It seems to think
Argentina is going to become a haven for revolution-
aries, that Campora will attempt to overthrow pro-
Brazilian governments in Bolivia or Uruguay, and that
he will somehow be able to isolate Brazil from its
Spanish--speaking neighbors. The Peronist philosophy of
leftist nationalism, obviously anathema to President
Medici and his generals, adds a new aspect to the
traditional rivalry between the two countries-.
For its part, Argentina has always seen other
one in Latin America as somewhat inferior. It
Brazil's "mongrel" population, the Indians in
countries,, and Argentina's racial purity as reasons
Argentine superiority. Thus Argentina's economic
was have always stuck in Argentine craws when
tions with other Latin nations are at issue. Argentina
under Campora will probably attempt to be more aggressive
in Latin America, opposing Brazil and the US in inter-
national forums, and seeking a greater role in regional
economic activity. This will not sit well, with the
other states--they might accept Argentine equality, but
never Argentine hegemony. Nevertheless, Caampora will be
saying some things that will strike a responsive
chord in Chile, Peru, Mexico, and perhaps even Venezuela.
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n, Peroniam, and the Campora government could
Argentina's last chance to find politi
ce without turning to the extremes of leftist
lution or right-wing military dictatorship. More
[ely, if the Peronists come unstuck, Argentina will
avoid extremism and continue to fumble along, not
doing well, but not doing all that badly either. Thus,
Campara's chances of achieving a modicum of success
are better than even. And Juan Peron's chances of
fulfilling his deep ambition--to be enshrined as
the great modern hero of his people--are at an all-
time high.
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. iienry A. ltilssii~a~ r
1 coiamend this paper to your atten-