DISPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST COMBAT UNITS IN SOUTH LAOS, SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM, AND SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY REGION 1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002000010007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 3, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Disposition and Strength
of Communist Combat Units in South Laos,
Southern North Vietnam, and South Vietnam's
Military Region 1
Secret
3 February 1971
-olay
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 February 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Disposition and Strength of Communist Combat
Units in South Laos, Southern North Vietnam
and South Vietnam's Military Region 1.
This memorandum describes the current disposition
and strengths of Communist ground combat units in the
immediate environs of Tchepone and the adjacent areas
of the Lao Panhandle, southern North Vietnam, and
South Vietnam's Military Region 1 from which the enemy
could reinforce the Tchepone area. The time required
to deploy troops to the Tchepone area could vary from
several days to as much as a month depending on a
unit's place of departure, its combat readiness, the
availability of trucks, the amount of disruption from
bombing, and the weather. However, given optimum
conditions, it is believed that most of the units
discussed could be redeployed within a week. Obviously,
iuuiiy of the N VA units could not be used to reinforce
the Tchepone area because of the Communist need to
maintain a viable military posture elsewhere. Given
the.limited data available on the location and strength
of enemy units, many of the locations ascribed to
specific units are approximate and the strengths
assigned to most units are orders of magnitude only.
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BACKGROUND
1. The Tchepone area in Savannakhet Province is
the hub of the Communist-logistical supply system in
the upper Panhandle of Laos. Logistic units-in this
area receive supplies from North Vietnam via several
entry routes -- the Mu Gia Pass about 100 miles to the
north, Ban Karai Pass 65 miles to the north, and the
western DMZ corridor about 35 miles to the northeast.
The general Tchepone area, which bears the Allied
designator of Base Area. 604, is also the operatin
location of an important NVA command center.
SOUTH LAOS
2. Within south Laos* there are an estimated
28,000 combat troops -- about 22,000 NVA (including ad-
visors and fillers) and more than 6,000 PL*
About 11,000 of the NVA combat troops are located within
the environs of Tchepone.
3. Distance factors would not prevent the assembly
in the Tchepone area of some considerable proportion of
the remaining 11,000 combat .troops located elsewhere in
_.._
southern Laos within a week or so. The large concentrations
of NVA forces in the adjoining provinces of Saravane and
Khammoua.ne could probably make the move in a few days I
Ins cludes the area from the northern-border of.Khammouane
Province south to the Lao-Cambodian border.
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Disposition and Strength of Communist Combat Forces -1 February 1971
thin Nape 1, A
Pass NORTH
HA TINH
QUANG BINH `.\
San Karr,
Pass
Muong
Phalane
SA VA NNAKHB t ' a
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
VINHUNH
SPECIAL ZONE
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4. As yet, however, we. have seen no evidence of
any such movement despite the evident Communist concern
over an attack toward Tchepone by the ARVN. It may be
that they.. are constrained by the threat posed by friendly
guerrilla units operating in South Laos. Any large-
scale deployment of NVA forces.out of an area inlwhich
such forces are currently operating seems un e y.
5. It seems unlikely at this time that the
Communist would willingly-reduce-their pressures- on
the Bolovens Plateau or-leave-the rest of South Laos
vulnerable to friendly assault. We cannot predict
.with any accuracy the extent to which Hanoi would be
willing to redeploy these forces. But barring the
prospects of a calamitous defeat in the Tchepone area
we would judge that Hanoi would tend to draw its
reinforcements from North Vietnam or Military Region I
in South Vietnam.
NORTH VIETNAM
6. There are nearly-40,000 NVA combat forceSThe
located between Vinh and the DMZ.
Vinh- cut-off-is somewhat arbitrary. It was c osen
because of the large number of NVA forces south of Vinh,
It is-from this area _._ m
s P t inforce -its forces _-- -
o
A
in --Laos if the nee aLose. There are. currenl L.1 LV V
Infantry Divisions
located within this area, an elements of a 1.t xeo-Have.-
had combat experience against Allied forces. In addition
to these units, there are a number of independent NVA
infantry and artillery regiments in--the area, which also-
have had some experience against Allied forces and which
could be used for reinforcement.
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8. Despite the fact that there is a relatively
large pool of units in North Vietnam which Hanoi
could draw upon,. Hanoi clearly does not-haves an.
unlimited capability to reinforce the Tchepone area.
This has-become pa-rticularly evident in recent weeks
with North Vietnam's increasing concern about the
possibility of Allied incursions -'into'the homeland
9. The size of the commitment Hanoi is willing to
make cannot be quantified with high assurance. Hanoi
is obviously determined to fight and to make things as
difficult as possible for the South Vietnamese. Hanoi
could,. for example, decide to send some troops directly
across the DMZ in a flanking.mane:uveragainst the forces.
deployed along Route 9. But'assuming a decision to
reinforce Tchepone, we would estimate, given the large
number of forces currently deployed north of the DMZ,
that a reinforcement of as much as a division
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equivalent -- some 10,000 men -- could be made without
seriously impairing North Vietnam's.defensive capabilities.
Whether Hanoi would be willing to raise the ante even
further depends on a number of considerations. Foremost
among-these are Hanoi's view of the urgency of keeping
the Laotian supply route operative and its readings of
US intentions north of the DMZ.
SOUTH VIETNAM
10. Within the physical borders of South Vietnam's
Military Region (MR) 1, there are nearly 19,000 NVA and
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several thousand troops in independent companies and
platoons, who are assumed to be unavailable for rein-
forcement principally because of their essentially
defensive role and their relative lack of combat readiness.
While the Communists in MR 1 have the, capability to
reinforce the Tchepone area with additional forces, they
already have dispatched some 6,000 during roughly the
last half of 1970. If they are to maintain any kind of
a military posture in MR 1 against the Government of
Vietnam's pacification efforts, it seems unlikely that
they would draw down much further on their force levels
and we see no indication as yet that they intend to do so.
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11? YYC 11aVe liL)L alloWeL ,I,VL L 1.1e u.77_.LkJ_L_L_LL of all
reinforcement from MR 2 to the Tchepone Area.
Because
of this and tmime factor involved in deploying MR 2
forces up to the Tchepone area and considering the
large number of the forces more readily available, any
further drawdown on the remaining relatively small MR 2
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SUMMARY
12. The current deployment of enemy forces in
the immediate Tchepone area and the adjacent areas of
the Laos Panhandle, southern North Vietnam, and GVN
MR 1 is given below:
Strength and Disposition of Combat Forces
Tchepone areas Total 11,000
Adjacent areas Total '70`,00-0 -
South Laos
(outside Tchepone
areas) 11,000
Southern North
Vietnam 40,000
GVN MR 1 19,000
If Hanoi.. is, to maintain a. viable- military .presence- in
Military Regioi I and ensure adequate security for its-------
logistics system in south Laos, few of the troops in
these areas could be used to reinforce the Tchepone
area. Thus, the-major-burden--of reinforcement would--
seem to fall on the 40,000 combat forces-deployed in
southern North Vietnam. Given the strengthof these
forces, probably the equivalent of a division, or-10,000
men could-be-quickly-redeployed without seriously
weakening North Vietnam's defensive capabilities.
Whether Hanoi would be willing to commit additional forces
depends on whether it sees itself capableof maintaining
a viable supply` system in. Laos- and' its -reading of the -
likelihood of Allied ground-incursions into North
Vietnam.
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