NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A001900010002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 29, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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MEM,RANDUM FOR:
(DATE)
FORM GN 54 101 WHICH RELACES
MAY FORM
I AU
BE USED.
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QF 1) 7t
S-
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MdWiffi=
VIl'!`UMUS INT.
r
Recent communist moves suggest more flexibility
in North Vietnam's negotiating position than has men
dent its the past. Hanoi say be preparing for a negotiat#-*d
settlement which stops short of full communist control, but
which assures then opportunities to obtain a dominant role
for the Communists in South Vietnam.
Nevertheless, in the absence of substantial, US
concessions, do not belie=ve that the waists are yet
prepared to agree to measures restricting their future
military actions. The current military lull may have been
designed in part for political effect, but it also in being
used to prepare for another round of Communist attacks.
the Communists are prepared to scale down their
demands for a settlement* they are unlikely to give any
clear indication of this until the results of further mili-
tary efforts are known.
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Discuss trot
More than a year a" the communists set out on an
l March speech encouraged Hanoi to believe its strategy was
working. The North Vietaamese came to Paris to exploit this
situation. During the first month they matched a hardline
political stance with stepped up military pressures in South
Vietnam. They a,-:petted to obtain a full bombing halt with-
out committing themselves to measures of restraint. When
this failed, they modified their tactics and made several
moves designed to create conditions more favorable to US
concessions.
able to a negotiated political settlement in late 1968 or
early ne:,t year. Whatever the specific terms Of such a
settlement, they had hoped to achieve a solution which gave
them a dominant positioi in South Vietnam, or at least
clear opportunities to achieve such a position over time.
2. The growth in anti-war sentiment in the US, the
situation in South Viet r, after 'het, and president Johnson
conditions in the United States and in South Vietnam
t `t n .ve military/political Offensive aimed at create
Le Duc Tho's arrival in Paris on 3 June marked the
in Paris and Washingtoi
beginning of the shift. As a result of Tho's conversations 25X6
in Moscow, Premier Kosygin sent his private letter to Presi-
dent Johnson and the Soviots assumed a more active role both
bombing issue. The Soviets have
d strongly that Hanoi
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SECRET
is flexible on handling the matter
in
raid-June, Communist military activity in South Vietnam was
cut back sharply. Communist units needed a respite both to
refurbish and to work on growing problems of morale and dis-
cipline. This may have been the primary factor in causing 25X6
the lull. But more than seven weeks of unusually light
enemy activity during a period when Hanoi has been trying
to induce US concessions also suggests that the Communists
have limited combat operations in order to assist their
current political tactics. 25X6
6. Hanoi's decision to release three more American
pilots was another maneuver to improve the prospects for
US concessions .
they contrasted the release with alleged n ens ca on
of the war. Hanoi wants the US to respond, at least with
some reduction in US military operations. The delay in
the pilots' return may be intended to underscore this point.
7. Finally, a North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry memo-
randum on 17 July formally modified the condition that a
settlement should be in accordance with the program" of
the Liberation Front. Despite attempts to obscure the point
since then, Hanoi has softened the single feature of its
basic position which the US considered most objectionable.
S. Hanoi is sustained by a conviction that pence
sentiment in South Vietnam and the United States, potential
discord between Washington and Saigon, and a mix of military
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r f ++'
25X1A
and political pressures will open the way for a settlement
acceptable to the Communists.
9. If, as seems evident, the Communists are hoping
for a relatively early end to the war, they now face some-
thing of a dilemma. They have failed to "collapse" the
GVN or to win the anticipated concessions from the US. If
they launch another major offensive, they could have no
certainty of making major gains. The military cost might
be disproportionate, and the offensive might provoke a
re-escalation of the bombing. Yet without further military
pressures, Hanoi may doubt its ability to gain whatever
concessions it considers essential.
10. It US concessions are not forthcoming, the commu-
nists almost certainly will again try to force the issue.
Preparations for another major Communist military effort
in South Vietnam have been under way for over a month.
Its timing will depend in part on purely military factors
and in part on Hanoi is judgment of how best to exploit the
political situations in the US and in South Vietnam. A
firm decision on when and how to conduct this next round
may not have been made yet.
11. Meanwhile, Hanoi will continue pressing for a
unilateral US concession on the bombing issue. There is
no convincing evidence that Hanoi is ready to make any
meaningful concessions in return or to tie itself to specific
measures of restraint in order to achieve this. Some
further gestures or inducements short of such substantial
concessions, however, may appear over the next few weeks.
12. A more likely time for Hanoi to engage in meaning-
ful bargaining would be later this fall either durin or
after the next military effort. The next effort is likely,
fact, to be followed by new attempts to extract the con-
sions the Communists expect on the bombing issue. At
that point they may be ready for serious discussion of the
two-phase approach to solving the bombing/reciprocity problem.
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Top SECR T'
m , ea them opportunities
South Vi etuan.
17. There are several signs that Hanoi is preparing
greater ephani on political tactics in the
control in South Vietnam. The downgrading of the Fr
the creation of the peace Alliance concept, and streenuou
efforts to organize now. teal administrative structures' in
Co unist-.controlled areas of the South all point In this
di neti,n .
18. eceut Information confirm* that North Viet
Politburo member Phan Hung is now chief of the C
apparatus iii South Vietnam, Unlike his predecessor,
i L. px ia,rily a military man. His background during;
pat ten years h been mainly in internal party and
rnm.ent affairs In North Vietnam. After the 1954
va Agree=gents, he had a primary role iE preparin
uni.nt in the ou,th for a political takeover via the
elections ;>,cheduled for 1856. His presonee in South
Vietna during recent m uth suggests that Hanoi is again
looking toward such it period.
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?OP $WAHT
I40RTH TITTHAM 8 INT19NTI
Su ry
a
NeverLU@less, sa e
concessions, we do not believe that the Communists are yet
prepared to agree to measures restricting their future
been
military actions. The current military lull may have designed in part for political effect, but it also is being
used to prepare for another round of Ommunist attacks.
If the Communists are prepared to scale down their
demafde. for a settlement, they are unlikely to give any
clear indication of this until the results of further mili-
tary efforts are known.
for the Communists in South Vietnam.
bsemcn of substantial US
It th
29 July 1968
Recent Co unist moves suggest wore f le-I ibility
in North Vietnam's negotiating position than has been evi--
dent in the past. Hanoi say be preparing for a negotiated
settlement which stops abort of full Communist Control, but
which assures then opportunities to obtain a dominant role
SECRET
M6m,
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Discussion
1. More than a year ago the communists set out on an
intensive military/political offensive aimed at creating
conditions in the United States and in South Vietnam favor-
able to a negotiated political settlement in late 1968 or
early next year. Whatever the specific terms of such a
settlement, they had hoped to achieve a solution which gave
them a dominant position in South Vietnam, or at least
clear opportunities to achieve such a position over time.
2. The growth in anti-war sentiment in the US, the
situation in South Vietnam after Tet, and President Johnson's
31 March speech encouraged Hanoi to believe its strategy was
working. The North Vietnamese came to Paris to exploit this
situation. During the first month they matched a hardline
political stance with stepped up military pressures in South
Vietnam. They expected to obtain a full bombing halt with-
out committing themselves to measures of restraint. When
this failed, they modified their tactics and made several
moves designed to create conditions more favorable to US
concessions.
dent Johnson and the Soviets assumed a more active role both
3. Le Duc Tho's arrival in Paris on 3 June marked the
beginning of the shift. As a result of Tho's conversations
in Moscow, Premier Kosygin sent his private letter to Presi-
in Paris and Washington.
4. The North Vietnamese are still concentrated on the
bombing issue. The Soviets have implied strongly that Hanoi
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but which still assures them opportunities to obtain a
dominant position in south Vietnam.
17. There are several signs that Hanoi is preparing
for greater emphasis on political tactics in the struggle
for control in South Vietnam. The downgrading of the Front,
the creation of the peace Alliance concept, and strenuous
efforts to organize new, local administrative structures in
Communist-controlled areas of the south all point in this
direction.
18. Recent information confirms that North Vietnamese
Politburo member Pham Hung is now chief of the Communist
apparatus in South Vietnam. Unlike his predecessor, Hung
is not primarily a military man. His background during the
past ten years has been mainly in internal party and
government affairs in North Vietnam. After the 1954
Geneva Agreements, he had a primary role in preparing the
Communists in the south for a political takeover via the
elections scheduled for 1956. His presence in South
Vietnam during recent months suggests that Hanoi is again
looking toward such a period.
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 29 July 1968
:~,
NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS ,
Summary
1. Recent Communist moves suggest more flexibility
in North Vietnam's negotiating position than has been evident
in the past. Hanoi may be preparing for a negotiated set-
tlement which stops short of full Communist control, but
which assures them opportunities to obtain a dominant role
for the CommunistSin South Vietnam.
2. Nevertheless, n 1 he absence of silks l ati f -1 al ITS
uunt~ess i tats , we tau do I. !,e I .i r,~n f,ha I. 1,11P (;()nuutin i s 1.s are '170L
prepared to agree to measures restricting their future mili-
tary actions. The current military lull may have been designed
in part for political effect, but it also is being used
prepare for another round of Communist attacks.
3. If the Communists are prepared to scale down their
demands for a settlement, they are unlikely to give any clear
i,nd.i cation of. 1:10 -, tinl,.iJ the 1-o" l Ls o f' Fur I'ller I t i I i.1,:a t?y
efforts are known.
SENSITIVE
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SENSITIVE
3. More than a year ago the Communists set out on an
intensive military/political offensive aimed at creating
conditions in the United States and in South Vietnam favor-
able to a negotiated political settlement in late 1968 or
early next year. Whatever the specific terms of such a
settlement, they hoped to achieve a solution which gave them
a dominant position in South Vietnam, or at least clear op-
portunities to achieve such a position over time.
4. The growth in anti-war sentiment in the US, the
situation in South Vietnam after Tet, and President Johnson's
31. Ma r?c:li speor.II on co II I-n,;o(I Il;rno i I o he I i c've I Is s ."It rgy was
1VtR! I,.i_n~ 'I'hc N''1 l11 V i''t f';,mn I- I'i ic; 1- niflI, -i I 1,111s
situation. During the first month they matched a hardline
political stance with stepped up military pressures in South
Vietnam. They expected to obtain a full bombing halt with-
out committing themselves to measures of restraint. When
this failed, they modified their tactics and made several
moves designed to create conditions more favorable to US
concessions.
SENSITIVE
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SENSITIVE
5. Le Due Tho's arrival in Paris on 3 June marked the
beginning of the shift. As a result of Tho's conversations
in Moscow, the Soviets were brought into the act
6. The North Vietnamese are still concentrated on the
bombing issue.
The Soviets have implied strongly that Hanoi
mid-June, Communist military activity in South Vietnam was
cut back sharply. Communists units needed a respite both to
refurbish and to work on growing problems of morale and dis-
cipline. This may have been the primary factor in causing
the lull, but its timing and duration indicate that it also
was influenced by political considerations.
SENSITIVE
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SENSITIVE
8. Hanoi's decision to release three more American
pilots was another maneuver to improve the prospects for US
concessions.
they contrasted the release with alleged US "intensification"
of the war. The message is clear: Hanoi wants the US to
respond, not necessarily with a full bombing halt, but at
least with some reduction in US military operations. The
delay in the pilots' return may be intended to underscore
this point.
9. Finally, a North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry memo-
randum on 17 July formally modified the condition that set-
tlement should be "in accordance with the program" of the
Liberation Front. Despite attempts to obscure the point
since then, Hanoi has withdrawn the single feature of its
s
basic position which the US considered mop; t; oh:jcc l.:i_ona.bl e .
North Vietnamese Motives and Objectives
10, Hanoi is sustained by a conviction that peace senti-
ment in South Vietnam and the United States, potential ciscord
between Washington and Saigon, and a mix of military anc.
political pressures will open the way for a settlement ac-
ceptable to the Communists.
SENSITIVE
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SENSITIVE
11. If, as seems evident, the Communists are hoping for
a relatively early end to the war, they now face something of
a dilemma. They have failed to "collapse" the GVN or to win
the anticipated concessions from the US. If they launch
another major offensive they could have no certainty of
making major gains. The military cost might be dispropor-
tionate and the offensive might provoke a re-escalation of
the bombing. Yet without further military pressures, Hanoi
may doubt its ability to gain whatever concessions it con-
siders essential,
12. If US concessions are not forthcoming, the Communists
almost certainly will again try to force the issue. Prepara-
tions for another major Communist-military effort in South
Vietnam have been under way for over a month. I tS Liming w:i 7 1
dopoll i III Iris' L On 1)11 1-(' y 111i I i I.n I y fti~ I u~: :i iRl ill 1~. r 1 rill Ilanc~:i. ':;
judgment of how best to exploit the political situations in
the US and in South Vietnam. A J.'irm decision on when and how
to conduct this next round may not have been made yet.
13. Meanwhile, Hanoi will continue pressing for a uni-
lateral US concession on the bombing issue. There is no con-
vincing evidence that Hanoi is ready to make any meaningful
concessions or to tie itself to specific measures of restraint
SENSITIVE
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SENSITIVE
in order to achieve this. Short of such a US move, some
further gestures or inducements may appear over the next few
weeks.
14. A more likely time for Hanoi to engage in meaning-
ful bargaining would be later this fall either during or
after the next military effort. The next effort is likely,
in fact, to be followed by new attempts to extract the con-
cessions the Communists expect on the bombing issue. At
that point they may be ready for serious discussion of the
two-phase approach to solving the bombing/reciprocity problem.
Hanoi has been noncommittal so far, but Soviet lobbying in
favor of this approach suggests the Communists believe it is
a formula which can be used to satisfy minimum US require-
ments for "restraint."
15. Hanoi probably expects to follow some version of
I:he i.wn- pluuise a pprnar i~ ~,r n I i~~~ I I ti, , 110 i I i's ill 11,, Iwiw rv7 " I r.
elav 1. l'y its pusl L i.()n on second-phase s l.eps . The Cumntun i.- LS
believe time is working to their advantage. They hope that
rising election pressures on the Johnson Administration will
soon provide better opportunities for dealing with these is-
sues.
SENSITIVE
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SENSITIVE
16. Hanoi is unlikely to agree to measures which will
restrict its future military actions--such as restoration of
the DMZ--unless it is reasonably certain that the US is
willing to go all the way toward a settlement acceptable to
the Communists. Thus, the North Vietnamese want to see the
political, as well as the military provisions of the two-
phase package in order to have some idea of broad US terms
for a settlement.
17. Hanoi's outline for such a settlement remains murky.
It wants, of course, a dominant role for the Communists in a
postwar South Vietnam, The Cornmmunists will conl:inue to focus
Oil LIB Ls
aj.itl LIB''v l.''uv Llin ic Jni-? hL servie Lhein
better if they: could get around the bombing issue and into
discussions of crucial political matters where they believe
the GVN is vulnerable.
18. But there probably is growing recognition in Hanoi
that nothing the Communists can do is likely to win a dominant
role for. them in the near future, and that even the US elec-
tions offer little hope that: Washington will. accept such a
settlement. Therefore, Hanoi may be preparing for a negoti-
ated settlement which stops short of full Communist control,
but which still assures them opportunities to obtain a
dominant position in South Vietnam.
SENSITIVE
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0 0
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SENSITIVE
19. There are several signs that Hanoi is preparing
for greater emphasis on political tactics in the struggle
for control in South Vietnam. The downgrading of the Front,
the creation of the peace Alliance concept, and strenuous
efforts to organize new, local administrative structures in
Communist-controlled areas of the South all point in this
direction.
20. Recent information confirms that North Vietnamese
Politburo member Pham Hung is now chief of the Communist ap-
paratus in South Vietnam. Unlike his predecessor, Hung is
not primarily a military man. His background during the
pas L Lei! yE.'?!Y_'i; I1:Lt, hi-)-n II i i I1 I `r ill. i ii I t'riiit I Iii V' I V III(I P.Civ .-I'li
ment affairs in North Vietnam. After the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments, he had I pri+nary preparing the
Communists in the South for a political takeover via the
oieci;:i.ons 5chedLI ed J or 1956. Ili- presence i.n Son I.Ii \T i ei;na.m
during recent months suggests that Hanoi is again looking
toward such a period.
SENSITIVE
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