THE VIETNAM SITUATION: AN ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A001800130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 219
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate
JCS review completed.
State Department
review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
ON TO ARCHIVES & RfC01IS PAIiE1
~NNOIATEL7 AFTEII USE
38
23 May 1967
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CONTENTS
South Vietnam
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam
II. The Enemy Forces in the South
III. The State of the Communist Infrastructure
IV. Political Developments and Prospects in
South Vietnam
V. South Vietnam: An Economic Appraisal
VI. The Pacification Program
North Vietnam
VII. North Vietnamese Intentions in Regard
to the War
VIII. The Effect of the Bombing on North Vietnamese
Thinking
IX. The Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder
Program and Enemy Countermeasures:
1 January 1966 - 30 April 1967
X. North Vietnam: An Economic Appraisal
International Aspects
XI. Chinese Attitudes Toward the War in Vietnam
XII. Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the
Vietnam War
(Special National Intelligence Estimate
11-11-67)
XIII. North Vietnamese Political Capabilities
in the Non-Communist World
XIV. Implications of the Vietnam War for the
US International Position
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The Military Situation in South Vietnam
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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Summary
The course of the war over the past two
years has been marked by Communist efforts to
offset the impact of the allied military build-
up and the allies' military successes which have
accompanied that build-up. Since early 1966,
the allies have gained the initiative, carrying
the war to enemy base areas, frustrating his of-
fensive plans, and breaking his grip on the popu-
lace in portions of the central coastal provinces.
Although we now possess substantial advan-
tages in tactical mobility and awesome firepower,
the enemy has more than kept pace with our build-
up in terms of infantry units, and has managed
also to improve his fire support capability.
Communist losses in the first quarter of this
year have risen 70 percent above the monthly
averages for last year. US losses have in-
creased by over 90 percent, however, and GVN
losses, which had declined during 1966, are now
rising markedly. Moreover, the enemy has demon-
strated the capability to replace his enormous
losses, although probably at some cost in qual-
ity. Despite growing attrition from our attacks
on his depots and lines of communication, an im-
provement in the enemy's logistical posture is
reflected in the growing rate of ammunition ex-
penditures. The expansion of the enemy's posi-
tional warfare threat in northern I Corps has
forced major allied redeployments in the face
of apparently reinforced enemy capabilities in
the highlands and III Corps. On balance, the
enemy's strategic posture in the main force war
appears to have improved somewhat during the past
year despite the allied build-up.
On the other hand, the Viet Cong's position
in the countryside has been eroded in many areas.
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The upgrading of guerrilla elements undertaken
to accelerate the expansion of his main force
capabilities has weakened the enemy's grip on
the rural populace. Allied military pressure
in some areas disrupted the enemy's organiza-
tion, and the attendant lowering of Viet Cong
morale has been reflected in increased Chieu
Hoi rates. To check this deterioration, the
enemy evidently has altered his strategy to
achieve a better mix of his conventional and
guerrilla activities. Since the first of the
year, he has mounted an intensive guerrilla
campaign against the pacification program, in-
flicting serious losses on RD cadre, and has
attacked a large number of population and ad-
ministrative centers as well as major allied
military installations. This campaign is de-
signed not only to check the momentum of the
pacification effort, but also to divert some of
our conventional forces to protect our rear
areas, thus enabling the enemy's reinforced main
force units to cope more readily with our re-
duced offensive potential. The enemy's thrust
in northern I Corps is designed to contribute
to this thinning out of our mobile forces.
lans and intentions
ap-
parently involve an intensive, griming posi-
tional warfare campaign in the northern prov-
inces, where ready access to logistical sup-
plies, replacements, and substantial artillery
and antiaircraft support enhance his capabili-
ties. Over the next two months, this activity
is to be supplemented by coordinated offensive
thrusts in the central coastal provinces and
the western highlands, combined with major ac-
tions in the III Corps area. These actions are
to be supported by intensive guerrilla action
elsewhere to tie down as many allied forces as
possible. Although the enemy hopes to overrun
a number of allied field positions, his princi-
pal aim is to inflict maximum attrition on our
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forces at whatever cost to his own, and to check
the momentum of the pacification effort. Hanoi
thus is seeking to shake our confidence in ulti-
mate military success by demonstrating that our
build-up to date has not decisively altered the
balance.
In the final analysis, the current campaign
constitutes a crucial test of our ability to
prevent a stalemate and maiiztain the momentum
of our recent successes. The enemy's military
capabilities are such that he seems likely to
achieve some of his objectives, although the
allies almost certainly will be able to blunt
his anticipated offensives, inflict heavy losses,
and prevent decisive erosion in most pacified
areas during the next few months. The situation
thereafter will largely depend, as it has in the
past, on the question of the will to persist
of either side rather than on the attainment of
an overwhelming military victory.
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The Setting
1. The course of the war in South Vietnam
over the past two years has been marked by Com-
munist efforts to offset the impact of the al-
lied military build-up and the allied military
successes that have accompanied this build-up.
US intervention in 1965 staved off the immi-
nent collapse of the Vietnamese armed forces
(RVNAF) and deprived the Communists of certain
victory as clearly as did our intention in Korea
15 years before. The allied build-up was ini-
tially more rapid and effective than the enemy's
response, and by the end of 1965 the enemy's
offensive campaign had been contained. Allied
forces moved to the offensive in 1966, carrying
the war to the enemy's base areas and driving his
main forces from the populated plains in the
coastal provinces. The Communist position de-
teriorated throughout 1966 as its leaders sought
for the means to regain a favorable balance. By
the beginning of 1967, however, the enemy seemed
to have settled on a strategic course which he
hoped would reduce the advantages gained by the
allies and might produce at least a stalemate.
Since January, the Communists have mounted a cam-
paign of intensive military action which threat
ens to stall progress in pacification and has
forced major redeployments of allied ground forces.
Military actions in the months ahead will show
whether the enemy has successfully found means
to absorb the introduction of over a half-mil-
lion US and free world forces or whether the
military situation will continue to go against
him.
Build-Up Factors
2. In terms of infantry units, the enemy's
build-up has kept pace with that of the allies.
The number of identified Communist infantry bat-
talions has increased 2.5 times, rising from 61
at the end of 1964 to 154 at the present time
(May 1967). Allied infantry battalions have
increased from 123 to 255, or by a factor of about
2.1. The ratio of enemy to friendly infantry bat-
talions has grown from the level of 1 to 2.16 to
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about 1 to 1.65.* Because of the relatively larger
size of US and free world battalions, however,
the ratio of strength in maneuver battalions has
remained approximately the same--about 1 to 1.
3. With respect to combat support, the enemy
has not been able to match the allied build-up
quantitatively, yet his position again shows some
relative improvement. Since the end of 1964, he
has introduced larger quantities of recoilless
rifles and mortars, including the 120-mm. type
which he previously lacked, as well as artillery,
of which he previously had only a handful, and
artillery rockets, a recent addition to his ar-
senal. These weapons have multiplied the fire-
power of his units and increased the range at
which he can strike at sensitive targets. These
weapons have also multiplied the number of at-
tacks which he can mount simultaneously. The Com-
munists have also shown the ability to provide in-
creasingly effective support in a number of areas.
Allied forces, however, are able to concentrate over-
whelming firepower in support of selected operations.
For example, allied tactical air sorties have in-
creased by a factor of ten since 1964, and, although
not directly measurable, air strikes have had an im-
pact on Communist forces
4. Firm data on the enemy's logistical pos-
ture are lacking. We have little knowledge of
the size of the stocks on hand in the south, and
no precise information on the types and quanti-
ties of supplies being delivered by land and
sea. We have noted substantially increased ex-
penditures of ammunition of all types -- par-
ticularly mortars and recoilless rifles -- in
all sectors, and a more plentiful supply of
heavy weapons, including new types. These have
occurred despite an intensive sea blockade,
the overrunning of substantial arms and ammuni-
tion caches, and apparently effective air at-
tacks on some depot areas. The continuing troop
reinforcement from the north implies confidence
in the ability to provide adequate logistical
'The ratio may actually be less favorable if the
enemy has introduced units not yet reflected in MACV's
order of battle.
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support. We estimate that current interdiction
means are incapable of reducing the capacity of
overland lines of communication below the current
requirements of forces that the enemy now has in
the south, or even a slightly larger force level.
Moreover, we are not confident that the blockade
is effectively interdicting the movement of sup-
plies by sea, despite several instances of in-
tercepted shipments. The intensity and per-
sistence of enemy operations suggest that, al-
though our operations may temporarily disrupt
his logistical system locally, it is generally
adequate to support actions on a scale and
tempo at least as great as any mounted in the
past.
5. Communist losses have increased
dramatically during the past two years, but have
not prevented the Communists from increasing
their forces. In the first quarter of 1967
almost 24,000 Communists were reported as killed,
and this is 70 percent greater than their aver-
age loss rate for 1966. Losses of this magnitude
substantially exceed the Communists' estimated
recruitment capability in South Vietnam (some
7,000 men per month)
What
important is that the Vietnamese Commun
istsls
have the capability to replace manpower losses
at a rate higher than the present loss rate be-
ing inflicted on them, although probably at some
cost in their overall quality.
6. US losses increased by some 90 percent
in the first quarter of 1967 over the 1966 aver-
age, and RVNAF losses, which had declined during
the first half of last year, have since risen
toward the previous high levels of 1965. Hence,
fluctuations in our losses roughly parallel those
of the Communists, although not always in a di-
rect ratio. Any significant and sustained in-
crease in the losses inflicted on the Communist
forces would most likely be accompanied by a similar
increase in US losses as well.
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7. The enemy's morale has obviously suffered
considerably over the past two years: the deteriora-
tion has been particularly noticeable at the lower
levels. It is difficult, however, to measure Commu-
nist morale precisely. The only statistical measure
available is the Chieu Hoi rate, which has risen
appreciably since mid-1966. This rise has generally
occurred in areas where allied operations have had
a direct impact on local Viet Cong guerrilla and
self-defense forces, whose personnel make up the
bulk of the returnees. Although not insignifi-
cant in the near term, the immediate military ef-
fect of such losses may not be critical. Over
the longer term, however, such losses not only de-
prive the Communists of manpower but, more impor-
tant, strike at the heart of the Communists'
strength -- their political and rice-roots infrastruc-
ture.
these
attitudes have not noticeably altered the combat ef-
fectiveness of main force units, which continue to
mount near-suicidal attacks when called upon. We
are unable to predict when morale might become a
decisive issue in the Communists' strategy concern-
ing the war. We suspect, however, that it it not
likely to become so in the near term unless the
war takes a decidedly more adverse turn for the
Communists.
Impact on the Operational Situation
8. The evolution of the situation since the in-
troduction of US and free world forces has varied in
each Corps area. In some, the allied position has im-
proved markedly, while in others there has been no ap-
preciable change. Nonetheless, since the introduction
of US troops the overall military initiative has largely
shifted to the allied side, and in the process the Com-
munists have suffered a heavy number of casualties
with precious few victories for their side. They
may take solace in the fact that they have inflicted
increased casualties on the US, but they have paid a
heavy price in doing so. Recent developments, however,
suggest that their strategic posture -- after ebbing
throughout 1966 -- may have improved slightly, although
it certainly is not yet as favorable as during late
1964 and early 1965.
A
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9. In I Corps, the deployment of US Marines
initially altered the balance in the allied favor.
Enclaves were established around major bases, and
intensive pacification operations were begun. The
Viet Cong soon vigorously began to contest these
efforts, and in mid-1966 began to develop a con-
ventional threat in the DMZ area and the northern-
most provinces. Although initially rebuffed with
heavy losses to his forces, the enemy has persisted
in his build-up in the North, and the growing threat
in that sector has necessitated the deployment of
US reinforcements from other sectors. At least
four, and possibly five, enemy divisions, enjoying
artillery and air defense support from the DMZ and
North Vietnam, are in this area. Two other divi-
sions threaten the southern portion of I Corps. The
enemy's military position in I Corps with its
proximity to his logistical base in North Vietnam,
is significantly'more favorable than it was two
years ago, when he had very few forces in the area.
10. In II Corps, the deployment of
US forces to the coastal provinces resulted i
n a
series of offensives which broke the recently ac-
quired grip of the enemy on the densely populated
plain, and his main force units have been driven
back into the foothills. Despite heavy losses, the
enemy forces remain intact, however, with one divi-
sion lurking in the boundary area between I and II
Corps, and another division in the Phu Yen-Khanh
Hpa-eastern Darlac province area. In the highlands,
Up forces have generally parried the thrusts of
sizeable enemy forces in Kontum and western Pleiku
provinces, but have been unable to neutralize their
sanctuary along the Cambodian border. At least
five enemy regiments there -- possibly about to be
reinforced from the north -- appear to be preparing
for new offensive action. The movement of two US
brigades from II Corps to reinforce I Corps will
reduce our ability to contain this threat.
11. In III Corps, there has been a net
improvement in the allied position over the past
two years. Although the enemy has built up to a
strength of three divisions, and has enhanced his
ability to recuperate from heavy losses, the pres-
ence of more than three US divisions in the area
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inhibits the significance of this enemy threat.
Allied forces have been able to mount major thrusts
into key enemy base areas, disrupting command and
logistical functions, and keeping the enemy's main
forces off balance. At the same time, significant
gains have been made in bringing populated areas
under government control. The loss of one US
brigade to I Corps has not significantly altered
the favorable force ratio. Although the Communist
forces may mount significant sections on their own,
or in reaction to friendly operations, these can
be contained, albeit with heavy fighting.
12. In the Delta, the situation remains
essentially unchanged. Pacification has progressed
in some areas, but Communist bases remain essen-
tially intact and the force balance is roughly the
same as it was two years ago. The deployment of
one US brigade to Dinh Tuong Province has not yet
had significant impact on the situation there.
Elsewhere, the Communists have intensified their
military activities over the past six months, and
particularly since the first of the year, in an
effort to stall pacification progress. The combat
effectiveness of Communist forces in the Delta
decreased during 1965 and 1966, but government
forces were unable to exploit this effectively.
13. With respect to pacification, the greatest
progress has been made in areas where US and free
world troops have been deployed -- i.e., in the
Marine and ROK enclaves along the coast, and in the
vicinity of Saigon in III Corps. Nationally, the
population under GVN control has increased by 13
percent since the end of 1964, while the population
under Viet Cong control has decreased by eight per-
cent. This gain was made during the period when
the enemy was attempting to adjust, both psycho-
logically and physically, to the introduction of
free world forces. His reaction thus far has varied
in different regions; in I Corps and III Corps, he
soon began to contest hotly the security forces in
the pacified areas, while in the coastal provinces
of II Corps he has seemed to withdraw. The reasons
for this are not clear; nevertheless, since the
first of the year the enemy has mounted a major
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counteroffensive against the pacification program
in all parts of the country, inflicting heavy losses
on the RD teams, and repeatedly demonstrating his
capability to strike at province and district cap-
itals. While it is too early to gauge the results
of his campaign, he has clearly demonstrated that
current security arrangements for pacified areas
are not adequate in most parts of the country.
Enemy Strategy, Plans and Capabilities
14. The strategy adopted by the enemy in the
latter part of 1964 was to accelerate the develop-
ment of conv
ti
en
onal military forces in the south
in order to mount operations which would cause the
coll
apse of the Vietnamese armed forces.
in 1965, and again in early-1966,ydespite11theCiin-
troduction of US and free world forces. The enemy's
plan entailed the commitment of North Vietnamese
army forces in order to achieve the necessary force
equilibrium. The scope of this commitment has
increased progressively to counter the allied build-up.
Asa further means of accelerating the build-up,
the command in the south in mid-1965 directed the
upgrading of up to one-half of its local guerrilla
elements. This "extraordinary" step was justified on
the basis of its short-term contribution to a poten-
tial early victory. In the absence of such a victory,
however, it weakened the Communists' control in rural
areas and reduced their ability to counter the
pacification effort; they have not yet recovered
from this short-sighted action.
15. As the situation evolved favorably for the
allies during 1966, the enemy's confidence in his
strategy was shaken. The subject was debated at
length during the last half of 1966 in party and mil-
itary journals in the north, with one faction calling
for more emphasis on guerrilla warfare, and another
pressing for a further build-up of conventional mili-
tary forces.
By the first of this year, however, the
debate appa ently was resolved in favor of developing
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a more balanced mix of guerrilla and conventional
capabilities. Thus, we have seen an apparent rein-
forcement of guerrilla capabilities by local force,
and, in some cases, main force uni
16. By reinforcing his guerrilla potential,
the enemy has been able to intensify attacks on
pacified areas, population and administrative cen-
ters, and allied base installations. The purpose of
this activity is to divert some of our main force
units from offensive operations to the protection
of rear areas. By maintaining -- and reinforcing --
his main force potential, his conventional units
will then be in a better position to cope with our
reduced offensive potential. This advantage is
further enhanced by the creation of a new conven-
tional threat in the northern part of I Corps,
which was calculated to draw off some of our mobile
forces from other regions. While his hopes for an
early victory have disappeared, the enemy apparently
believes that his modified strategy will at least
produce a stalemate, enable him to check pacifica-
tion and frustrate our offensive plans, and impose
an ultimately unacceptable level of attrition on our
forces.
17. In evolving its strategy, Hanoi has
rationalized it within the context of the dogma which
led to its victory over the French. Indeed, the
nature of the plans for the current spring-summer
campaign bear the earmarks of General Giap's 1953-54
campaign against the French. From Hanoi's point of
view, the circumstances of 1966-67 bear a striking
similarity to those of the earlier period. Then,
General Navarre had brought a new offensive spirit
to the French Expeditionary Corps. He relegated ARVN
to the task of pacification, using ARVN units to
replace those of the Expeditionary Corps in static
missions, and grouping the latter to form an un-
precedentedly large general reserve whose mission
was to engage the Viet Minh's main battle force.
Navarre used his mobile force in a number of dra-
matic raids into Viet Minh base areas -- including
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the seizure of Dien Bien Phu -- and creating an
atmosphere of confidence in ultimate French success.
He also planned -- and launched -- a major offensive
in the south designed to roll up the Viet Minh and
pacify Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces. But Giap
countered with a series of thrusts which caused the
French to deploy most of their general reserve to
protect previously unthreatened areas, so that the
French were left with inadequate reserves to deal
with the main Viet Minh effort when it developed at
Dien Bien Phu. All of these main force operations
were accompanied by intensified guerrilla warfare
throughout the country aimed at immobilizing the
maximum number of French-Vietnamese troops to pro-
tect pacified areas and bases. This strategy suc-
ceeded before, and Hanoi apparently believes that
it will again.
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In the initial
phase -- now under way -- the plan apparently is to
draw additional allied forces to the DMZ area,
where by waging positional warfare with their backs
to their logistical base in the north, the Communists
hope to inflict maximum sustained attrition on our
forces at minimum (albeit heavy) cost to themselves.
Later in the campaign -- June or July -- other forces
farther south are supposed to mount operations in
the coastal plain, exploiting whatever opportunities
exist, but still with the aim of inflicting losses
on our main forces rather than of seizing specific
terrain objectives. This phase may be preceded or
accompanied by major attacks in Quang Ngai and Quang
Tin provinces, and by large-scale operations in
Kontum and Pleiku provinces, combined with lesser
actions in Phu Yen, Darlac and Khanh Hoa provinces.
Depending on the status of US operations in III Corps,
major engagements are also planned in that region.
Throughout the country, enemy provincial, district,
and village units are to attempt to maintain a rela-
tively high degree of pressure by attacking outposts,
RD teams, and village, district and provincial
administrative centers, while sapper units attack key
base installations.
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19. The Communists would hope to overrun some
allied field positions, but they might consider the
campaign a success if it produced record allied
casualties and if one or more of the engagements
could be depicted as a "victory" in terms of anni-
hilating a battalion here, or causing us to abandon
a strongpoint there, whatever the cost to them. If,
at the same time, they could demonstrably check our
pacification progress in some areas, they might
gain the psychological boost necessary to overcome
the discouragement which afflicted them toward the
end of 1966. In their eyes, they would have demon-
strated the "correctness" of their doctrine, and
their ability to cope with our forces despite our
technological superiorities. They would also have
shaken the confidence of the Vietnamese populace in an
allied victory. At the end of the campaign in July,
they might then feel able to match any further
reinforcement of our effort and would be disposed
to follow their strategy for at least another cam-
paign.
20. But should they fail to achieve their
aims and continue to suffer one defeat after an-
other on the battlefield, they might feel themselves
faced with a very bleak picture of their prospects.
This would be particularly true if in the process
some of their major units were effectively destroyed.
In effect, the Communists have not had any appreciable
successes for over a year, and if this trend persists
despite their increased efforts to cope with the sit-
uation, we could see the beginning of disintegration
among the Communist forces. They are paying a heavy
price to continue the war, and they, too, probably
get war weary. A strategy which continually postpones
the prospect of success and offers nothing visible to
sustain the hope of even ultimate success might be
palatable for a time, but eventually its appeal,
particularly in the South, might begin to wear thin.
Under these circumstances, especially if progress
is made in the pacification program and in political
development in Saigon, the erosion of mass support
for the Communists would mount, perhaps to critical
proportions. Once such a process began it would be
hard to arrest, and ultimately it would be as crit-
ical to Communist success as the more headline-
grabbing main force military battles.
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21. Thus, the current campaign will provide
a crucial test of our ability to prevent a military
stalemate and maintain the momentum of our successes
in 1966. We are unable to estimate with any degree
of confidence how the military situation will develop
during this period. Nonetheless, at this stage the
odds seem about even that the Communists will achieve
some of their minimum objectives, although certainly
at a heavy cost to their own forces. The enemy's
capabilities are such that his chances of an occa-
sional -- if isolated -- tactical success must be
considered good. But we would expect that the allied
military forces will largely contain the anticipated
enemy offensives and prevent any substantial erosion
of the pacification effort in the months ahead. In
the final analysis, the situation appears likely to
hinge, as it has in the past, more on the question
of Communist versus allied will to persist than on a
clear-cut and overwhelming military success by either
side.
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II
The Enemy Forces in the South
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THE ENEMY FORCES IN THE SOUTH
Summary
Despite increasingly effective "search and
destroy" operations by the allies, the Vietnamese
Communists have continued to expand their Main
Forces, both by infiltration and by local recruit-
ment. Part of the expansion has been at the ex-
pense of lower-level Viet Cong military formations
and of the so-called Viet Cong "political infrastruc-
ture." In spite of the drain, however, the Viet
Cong paramilitary and political structure is still
large
we nave been unable as
yet to compute the full strength of the Viet Cong
paramilitary, combat support, and political ele-
ments with any real precision. The evidence on
the numbers of such personnel, and on their exact
duties in relation to Communist military operations,
has been extremely scant
the strength
in all these categories is almost certainly much
higher than it had appeared to be in the past.
In most cases, however, the evidence is still in-
sufficient to indicate more than a broad range
for strength in these categories.
In the case of the irregular forces, for ex-
ample, - 1 is -F
their stren th at 113,000
although
a final judgment has not yet been made. The
strength of the so-called "administrative service"
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forces (staffs and non-combat support troops) are
now listed at 25,000, but may be sev-
eral times higher -- possibly in the neighborhood
of 75,000-100,000. The number of Viet Cong politi-
cal personnel, listed at 39,000 may
be well over twice as high. Part of the diffi-
culty in estimating the strength of the above cate-
gories is that we are not sure to what degree
political cadre, for example, can be clearly de-
lineated from irregulars
In any event, it appears that strength of the
insurgent apparatus in South Vietnam
may actually be in the half-million range. If the
Communists have an organized manpower base of any-
where near this size to draw upon for their combat
units it is hard to visualize how they can get into
serious trouble in the tear future in obtaining the nec-
essary replacement personnel, particularly when their
capacity for recruitment in South Vietn
"their or anized a aratus is considered
Current losses may be mounting
close to this figure, but are probably not above it.
While it appears that the Communists can con-
tinue to sustain their overall strength during the
coming year, it us unlikely at current loss rates
that they can add much to it, except in northern
South Vietnam where the availability of manpower
from the North provides a seemingly plentiful
supply. If, on the other hand, the Communists
check the erosion of their manpower base and
possibly even make inroads into allied-controlled
areas as a result of military developments this
year they may succeed in significantly expanding
their overall force.
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1. The Viet Cong - NVA Main and Local Forces
have expanded considerably since early last year.
In January 1966 listed 25X1
85,000 in these categories. As of mi -May this
year the =figures had increased 36 percent, to 25X1
over 115,000.
2. The VC/NVA who comprise the Main and Local
Forces are, for the most part, serving in 196
battalion formations, of which 102 battalions
are clearly North Vietnamese Army units. One
hundred and eight of the total 196 battalions
are subordinate to 36 regimental formations --
24 NVA and 12 Viet Cong -- which in turn are
subordinate to the seven accepted NVA divisions
and two Viet Cong divisions. The units above
include those in the DMZ area
In each
case, they are either operating in South Viet-
1.nam or in an adjacent area following opera-
tions in the South. In addition to the above
units, t 2n7 _qinn to companies and 69
platoons all of which are Viet
Cong units.
DISTRIBUTION OF VC/NVA COMBAT FORCES (SVN)
Strength
Division Regiments
Batt
al
io
Sep Co
n (VC)
Sep Pla-
toon (VC)
I CTZ
31,780
4
11
6
1
42
(21,340)
(4)
(43)
II CTZ
33,045
2
10
5
7
56
31
(22,650)
(2)
(10)
(4
4)
III CTZ
31,652
3
13
5
6
38
27
(8,590)
(1)
(5)
(1
5)
IV CTZ
19,240
2
22
71
11
'Main Force troops are those subordinate to the
Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) or to one
of the Viet Cong's military regions, or to command
elements in the North. Local Force troops are sub-
ordinate to Viet Cong provinces and districts.
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3. It is likely that the mid-May 1967 ~
figure of 115,000 men in the Main and Local Forces
is somewhat lower than the actual Communist force
in the field.
Administrative Service Units*
t e number of adminis-
trative service troops -- listed at about 25,000
is probably substantially
*Administrative Service Units are composed of
military personnel in COSVN, military region,
military subregion, province, and district staffs
and rear service technical units of all types
directly subordinate to these headquarters.
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below their real strength, perhaps by as much as
50-75,000 men.
although the admin-
istrative service designation encom
pas
province and district staffs
We know,
however, tha t he Viet Cong have a total of 36
provinces broken down into over 200 districts.
Since there are almost certainly administrative
service staffs in the large majority of these
districts, their inclusion would raise this
category substantially. In sixteen provinces we
have no detailed information at all on Communist
administrative service troops, although it seems
certain that some of them are present in each
province.
7. There are, moreover, other non-combat
military personnel such as the medical personnel
subordinate to national, regional, provincial
and district headquarters, smaller signal units,
and personnel working in Viet Cong base areas
uc personne inc u e those performing ordnance
and quartermaster functions, repair and mainte-
nance personnel, and troops engaged in running
such facilities as recruit depots, training
centers and POW camps. These individuals, as
more information becomes available, will be in-
cluded under the administrative service category.
8. MACV is now reviewing its estimate of
administrative service personnel and attempting
to include at least some of the additional
elements. It is believed that the MACV estimate
of enemy strength in this category will be sub-
stantially raised, but that it will still, due to
the lack of precise information, be well on the
conservative side.
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. An unofficial estimate
suggests that total strength in the administrative
service category may be in the neighborhood of
100,000, a figure roughly equivalent to Main and
Local Force strength. This ratio for full-time
service and staff personnel to combat forces would
not seem unreasonable for a military apparatus of
the present sophistication of the Viet Cong/NVA.*
irregulars**
it is apparent that our pre-
vious estimates of Communist irregular strength
are also too low. Pending complete examination
of this information, the MACV order of battle
continues to list some 113,000 irregulars. This
figure was arrived at over a year ago and has
remained unchanged since that time. Studies of
the evidence by MACV as of March 1967 tentatively
arrived at what was thought to be a slightly
conservative figure of 198,000 irregulars.
11. The basic problem in estimating irregular
strength is that the irregular force structure does
not lend itself to the precise measurements which
can be made for conventionally organized military
*The ratio of US combatant to US service and
staff personnel in South Vietnam is at least six
to one in favor of service and staff. That US
forces should have proportionally so many more
service and staff troops than the Communists can
be explained by the relatively high sophistica-
tion of US equipment and the higher standard of
living enjoyed by US troops.
**Irregulars, by MACV's definition, are or-
ganized forces composed of guerrilla, self-de-
fense, and secret self-defense elements subordi-
nate to village and hamlet level VC organizations.
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units based upon unit nomenclature, command struc-
ture, and unit historical data. Many of the cap-
tured Viet Cong records are available for some
provinces are obviously estimates rather than sta-
tistical tabulations of strengths for irregular pla-
toons and squads. In the absence of more precise
data, MACV's estimates of VC iregular strength are
derived primarily from the estimates provided by
allied provincial officials, These estimates con-
sider the type of VC infrastructure, the density
of population, the scale of enemy military activity,
and the extent of VC control in the various districts,
villages and hamlets comprising each province.
12. The unofficial MACV estimate of about 198,-
000 irregulars is the result, in part, of a new coun-
trywide collection effort focussing on the sector
level. Estimates and supporting information devel-
oped at the sector are fowarded to Saigon for re-
view and comparison with information available there.
we are still not confident that the figure
of 198,000 is accurate. The number of irregulars
is probably not less than the 198,000 figure, but
it could be considerably more.
14. In any case, it is expected that the cur-
rent OB figure of about 113,000 will rise consider-
ably in the near future.
Political Order of Battle*
15. The MACV Order of Battle lists 39,000 VC
political cadre in South Vietnam, but this estimate,
*The Political OB is defined as the strength,
and disposition of the command, and administrative
organization of the Viet Cong infrastructure, which
embodies the Communist control structure, and the
Leadership and administration of a parallel front
organization (National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam), both of which extend from national
through the hamlet levels
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like those for administrative service and irregular
personnel, is probably also too low. The 39,000
figure, arrived at in early 1965, did not, partly
because of the scanty information available, in-
clude those political cadre at the hamlet level
where the largest number would normally be ex-
pected to serve. If hamlet cadres are included
in the Political OB, an unofficial MACV extrapolation
from the available data shows the number of politi-
cal personnel is between 80,000 and 120,000. Un-
official ARVN estimates put the number of politi-
cal personnel as high as 150,000.
the current figure
of 39,000 political cadres is too low. This study
concluded that there are probably at least 20,000
VC security personnel alone in South Vietnam.
Other personnel which belong in the Political
OB include those assigned to the Propaganda/Cul-
ture and Indoctrination, Civilian Proselyting
Military Proselyting, Postal Transport, and Com-
munications and Civil Health elements of the Viet
Cong apparatus.
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18. Excluded from the Order of Battle alto-
gether have been the Viet Cong Assault Youths, whom
the Communists created in early 1965, after their
decision to emphasize "mobile warfare." Many Assault
Youths from COSVN to district level appear to be
full-time personnel, expected to perform logistic
functions in support of the Communist Main and Local
forces. Their tasks include the transportation
of supplies. Partially armed and often uniformed,
they have the secondary function of acting as a man-
power pool for Communist regular units. There are
also Assault Youths in Viet Cong-controlled villages
and hamlets, but these are clearly part-time person-
nel.
19. As yet no attempt h
b
as
een made to esti-
mate their aver-all numbers but
in the low tens of t ousan s ,11G1 "'~a1 strength is
Input Capabilities
20. There are two basic input factors to Com-
munist strength in South Vietnam--recruitment of
indigenous manpower and infiltration from the North.
We cannot be precise in our estimate of Communist
capabilities and present rates for either of these
factors.
21. MACV has developed what is believed to be
a better estimate than in the past of the maximum
rate per month at which the Communists can obtain
and train manpower in South Vietnam for their armed
forces -- currently 7,000 men per month. This estimate
is based on an assessment of the percentage of the
male population available to the Communists and on a
limited number of documents discussing indigenous
recruitment from which an extrapolated rate for all
of South Vietnam was developed. It represents input
both to the regular and irregular forces. Whether or
not the Communists are actually attaining this rate,
or perhaps exceeding it, is unknown. No numerical
documentation, it should be noted, was available for
the delta in making the estimate. The delta, of
course, has long served as a main reservoir of man-
power for the enemy.
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22. The average monthly rate of infiltration
into South Vietnam cannot determined withoany real
degree of confidence after
September 1966
it does appear, however, that the rate
dropped substantially in the last months of 1966 and
in early 1967, although the exact extent of this and
the reasons for it are not clear at present. sThongly
er,
evidence, as indicated earlier in the papn
suggests that infiltration has againnbincreassedainve
the last few months and is now probay ober the prior -average a the tim from
i filtrationtbegan --
of 1965 wheen heavy period, the maximum
to the present is taken as a baseprobable
infiltration reported (including confirmed,
and possible) works out to a rate in excess of 6,900
per month.
23. Applying this rate of infiltration, together
with the 7,000 per month estimated internal recruit-
ment rate would v19t0i30CmenuPertmonthetaWhenpthis
capacity of around
is measured against estimates of the Communist overall
loss rate, it appears that the Communists are still
able to add substantially to their overall strength
in the South. It should be noted, however, tht our
estimates of enemy losses are in many respectsjustr, enemy input.
Mor eove
as tenuous as our inputafromoinfiltration in the
much of the enemy
last year has been into northern South Vietnam and,
while it has greatly increased the threat in that
area, has not added directly to the enemy strength
from II Corps southward.
24. Enemy losses involve his killed in action,
his permanently disabled (the woindddsandesicknwho
do not return to combat du' by friendly troops.
defectors, and those captured nld oopes
In the case of KIA"s, the average rep
for the same period over which infiltrationasper
computed above amounted to slightly over 5,000 tpe
month. There is simply no way
accuracy of KIA estimates. There are both infla-
tionary and deflationary factors; however, t
generally felt in the intelligence community that
if KIA are taken to include both killed al a d perma
nently disabled, the resulting estimate
certainly must be on the conservative side.
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25. Our estimates of enemy military deserters
and defectors are very tenuous.
there may
have been in the neighborhood of about 40,000 mili-
tary defectors and deserters from Communist forces
in 1966. It is entirely possible, nevertheless,
that the Communists recovered up to one half of the
deserters so that the net loss to the enemy may have
been on the order of 25,000 men from both desertions
and defections, or about 2,000 per month. The number
of enemy soldiers captured during military operations
appears to constitute a negligible loss to the Com-
munists.
26. Thus we are able to compute overall esti-
mated losses of about 7,000 per month for enemy
forces (KIA, plus desertions/ defections). This
would be well below the enemy's current theoretical
input rate. It is probable, however, that his dis-
abled and wounded add substantially to his losses.
Moreover, in the last few months his battle casual-
ties have risen substantially. During the first
three months of 1967, for example, reported enemy
KIA ran at a rate of almost 8,000 per month. De-
fections also rose substantially in the first few
months of 1967, strongly suggesting that desertions
are probably also higher, perhaps double those of
1966. If losses of this magnitude continue to be
sustained by the enemy in 1967 they would probably
bring his input capacity much closer into balance
with losses.
27. There are, in addition, other aspects to
enemy losses which are not computable, but which must
rise apace with his other difficulties. It would
seem reasonable, for example,, to subtract somewhat for
all enemy wounded, in terms of lost man-days at least,
even though the wounded, aside from permanently
disabled, may eventually return to combat. More-
over, there must be some enemy troops who leave ac-
tive service because of old age or other personal
reasons. In the force the size of the Communist mili-
tary apparatus in South Vietnam, this might be a
significant loss.
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Outlook
28. If the Communists continue to sustain heavy
losses and to lose control of the population at the
rates experienced during 1966, it seems unlikely that
they will be able to do much more than maintain the
strength of their overall political and military
apparatus during the balance of this year. They prob-
their Main
in
k
g
eep
ably will put major emphasis on
Force structure up to current strength throughout
1967, both by juggling personnel from less sensitive
units and areas to formations and regions threatened
d bt'
by the allies, by in-country recruitent, an
increasing infiltration.
in addition, to check
are able
If the
,
y
29.
the erosion of their population base, they may be
able to or significantly increase their overall
strength. In either case, they are likely to accom-
plish their minimum strategic goal of protracting
the war.
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III
The State of the Communist Infrastructure
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THE STATE OF THE COMMUNIST INFRASTRUCTURE
Summary
The infrastructure is the Viet Cong's political
and administrative organization, embodying the Com-
munist Party and the leadership and administrative
apparatus of the National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam (NLF), from national to hamlet levels.
Unofficial estimates of its strength range from 80,000,
regarded as a rock bottom minimum, up to 150,000.
Nevertheless, it is probably not as big as it once
was. There has been, according to captured Viet Cong
documents, a significant erosion of the Communist-
controlled population base since mid-1965. In some
areas, such as in parts of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen prov-
inces and certain parts of the Delta, the infrastruc-
ture has partially disintegrated because of allied
military pressure. In other areas, however, in I Corps it appears to be as resilient and asrstrongrly
as ever.
Although the Viet Cong infrastructure is large,
its overall quality has gradually declined since 1964.
Part of the qualitative decline has been the result
of growth. A second, and perhaps more significant,
reason for the decline in quality of civilian offi-
cials has been the Viet Cong's emphasis, since early
1965, on the military side of the conflict. Moreover,
morale apparently has become a serious problem in
some areas as a result of allied military pressure
and related hardships.
The party's initial response in early 1966 to
the decline in the infrastructure's quality was to
increase the number of reindoctrination courses and
emulation campaigns for its cadres. More recently,
the Communists have attempted to tighten up their
control apparatus in the countryside. There are also
indications that the Viet Cong are assigning high-
level cadres to lower echelon positions.
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This down-shifting of gears may tend to exacer-
bate the morale problems of infrastructure, since
and
it could be construed as a partial step backwards
thus a tacit admission that the past strategy has
failed. The infrastructure's morale and the quality
of its personnel are not so low, however, that they
cannot be buoyed up, particularly by a series of suc-
cesses, real or apparent. Although shaky in some areas,
the infrastructure remains largely intact at middle
and higher echelons, and poses a formidable obstacle
to the pacification program.
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Composition and Strength
1. The infrastructure is the Viet Cong's politi-
cal and administrative organization, embodying the
Communist Party and the leadership and administra-
tive apparatus of the National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam (NLF), from national to ham-
let levels. Its highest level is the Central Office
of South Vietnam (COSVN), a large and complex com-
mand organization located in the forests of northern
Tay Ninh province. The status and structure of
COSVN exemplifies that of much of the rest of the
Viet Cong apparatus. Not only is it a supra-regional
Party committee; it is also an administrative bureauc-
racy, with all the trappings -- budgets and reports,
departments and agencies, typewriters and carbon
paper -- of a government apparatus.
2. Similar but progressively smaller Party-controlled
bureaucratic entities exist at the regions, provinces
districts and villages in Communist-run portions of
South Vietnam. Even hamlets have small management
organs which execute and implement policies coming
from above. At all levels, the Party and the bureauc-
racy are intertwined, with Party members holding..all
the most important positions. Paralleling the Party
apparatus -- but not possessing a line of command of
its own -- is the NLF, which has committees at all
levels down to district. These committees provide
a facade for the Party management machinery, but ex-
ercise no real control over the activities of the
hundreds of thousands of members in Front associa-
tions in the villages and hamlets which receive direc-
tion from the Party element at that level. Also en-
twined in the infrastructure is the Viet Cong's mili-
tary organization, including the guerrilla and para-
military elements at the lowest levels. This com-
plex organization makes for considerable confusion in
identifying a person's position within the Viet Cong
organization. A deputy head of a hamlet Party cell,
for example, might simultaneously be chief of the
hamlet guerrilla squad, and head of the local Front
Farmers' or Youths' Association.
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3. No systematic study of the size of the Com-
munist infrastructure has yet been published. Re-
search indicates, however, that it has far more than
the 39,000 members carried in current political or-
der of battle estimates. Unofficial estimates of
its actual strength range from 80,000, regarded as
a rock bottom minimum, up to 150 000.
They exclude those who are only
cassia y connected to the Viet Cong, such as mem-
bers of Front associations.
4. Although the infrastructure is far larger
than listed in the OB, it is probably not as big
as it once was. There has been, according to cap-
tured Viet Cong documents, a significant erosion
of the Communist-controlled population base since
mid-1965. Many members of the infrastructure have
fled, been killed, captured or faded away. In
some areas, such as in parts of Binh Dinh and Phu
Yen provinces and certain parts of the Delta, the
infrastructure has partially disintegrated because
of allied military pressure. In other areas, how-
ever, particularly in I Corps it appears to be as
resilient and as strong as ever.
Quality and Morale
5. Although the Viet Cong infrastructure is
large, its overall quality has gradually declined
since 1964. Part of the qualitative decline has
been the result of growth. With the expansion of
the infrastructure, recruiting has necessarily
been less selective, so that political and adminis-
trative officials who acquired their jobs in re-
cent years are, on the average, inferior to the
hard-core cadres of earlier vintage,
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6. A second, and perhaps more significant,
reason for the decline in quality of civilian of-
ficials has been the Viet Cong's emphasis, since
early 1965, on the military side of the conflict.
In order to fill the expanding Liberation Army,
the Viet Cong instituted what came to be called
the "Reduction in Administrative Personnel." This
involved a large-scale transfer of bureaucratic
functionaries to the army, particular) the ma
force, as officers and noncoms
7. The gradual qualitative deterioration of
the civilian infrastructure has varied widely both
by area, and by level of assignment. Generally speak-
.ing, the decline has been most pronounced at the
lower levels, but the Viet Con hierarch has al
been affected.
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fections were most common among the lower level per-
sonnel.
8./ Z some 25 percent
of the ralliers listed in weekly defector reports
as "civilians" had cadre status. The percentage of
civilian (or "political") cadres by their level of
service was found to be as follows:
Regional Level 1%
Provincial Level 3%
District Level 13%
Village/Hamlet
Level 83%
9. It is also evident that the deterioration
has been more rapid in the Delta, for example, than
it has been in I Corps.
not only have the number
civilian ralliers in the Delta increased consider-
ably in recent months, but the length of service
with the VC among the ralliers has gone up as well.
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The number of civilian ralliers in I Corps, on the
other hand, is so small as to be statistically in-
significant.
10. Morale apparently has become a serious
problem in some areas as a result of llied
Doctrinal disputes
on strategy, and bureaucratic wrangling on its
implementation have also created problems. But
deteriorating morale does not yet seem to be a
serious problem in areas where the Viet Cong have
not yet been forced into a retrograde situation.
Communist Countermeasures
11. The Party's initial response in early 1966
to the decline in the infrastructure's quality was
to increase the number of reindoctrination courses
and emulation campaigns for its cadres. Although
politically helpful, from the Communists' point of
view, the courses did little to solve the basic
lem.
although the courses had been partially effec-
tive, there was still "weakness" in leadership and
that "the status of desertion always prevals, ~Sic
12. More recently, the Communists have at-
tempted to tighten up their control apparatus in
the countrvside_.
personnel, administrative and
territorial reorganizations, and, in some cases,
introduction of North Vietnamese political cadres
to supervise or replace local Party agents.
some regional and provincial eve s
have been told to tighten up their organizations
and to remove or replace those local cadres who
are not considered reliable or sufficiently en-
thusiastic in their jobs.
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commvittee's section leaders
sere at district level.
was an attempt by the VietyCong
paratus at th
e lower echelons.
14. s down exacerbateTthe moraleh
may tend to
f
ei
problems
of
nf
since it could be construed as a partialtstepuback-
wards and thus a tacit admission that the past
strategy has failed. The infrastructure's morale
and the quality of its personnel are not so low,
however, that they cannot be buoyed up, particu-
larly by a series of successes, real or a parent.
shaky in some areas, the infrastructure
remains largely intact at middle and higher eche-
lons and poses a formidable obstacle to the pacifi-
cation program.
13. There are also indications that the Viet
Cong are assigning high-level cadres to lower echelon
positions./
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IV
Political Developments and Prospects
in South Vietnam
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Summary
Although the military establishment has a vir-
tual monopoly on the levers of real power in South
Vietnam, it has shown a steadily increasing degree
of political wisdom and sophistication since assum-
ing political control in May 1965. The military gov-
ernment has successfully coped with the kinds of
crises that toppled its predecessors, and has taken
South Vietnam a significant way down the road toward
constitutional government. Though South Vietnamese
politics are still marked by stress, fragmentation,
and potential discord, the last two years have wit-
nessed a notable improvement in political stability
and the initiation of a process at the Saigon level
which holds promise of leading to the evolution
of the kind of national political institutions which
are needed to make South Vietnam a viable modern
state.
For over a year, the military establishment has
been quietly exploring ways of creating,a political
apparatus capable of ensuring continued military
domination within a constitutional and representa-
tive system (though no such apparatus has yet been
built or is likely to be constructed before the elec-
tions). This effort has been carried on primarily
by Marshal Ky (and his immediate associates), who
has made overtures to and developed some measure
of support among a wide range of civilian groups.
Political thinking, within the military how-
ever, has been premised on the assumption that there
would be only one military candidate in the forth-
coming elections, a candidate to which the mili-
tary establishment could give unified support.
This assumption, in turn, has been based on the
recognition that military unity and cohesion is
essential to continued political progress and stabil-
ity, for the generals are well aware that the prime
contributor to the political achievements of the
past two years has been the unity displayed (so
far) by the military establishment. This unity
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is now threatened -- though not yet -jeopardized --
by the sharpening rivalry between Ky and General
Thieu. Ky has formally announced himself a candi-
date for the presidency and Thieu has indicated
that he also plans to run.
The civilian political opposition to the mili-
tary establishment is fragmented and almost cer-
tainly could not develop the kind of organized
effort that would be necessary to defeat a candi-
date with undivided military backing. If Ky were
the only military candidate, his chances for win-
ning a comfortable plurality would be considerably
better than even. If Thieu actually runs, prog-
nosis will be uncertain until we can see the ac-
tual effect of Thieu's candidacy on unified mili-
tary support of Ky.
The strongest of the civilian candidates is
Tran Van Huong, who is almost certain to run. As
a southerner and a staunch advocate of southern
causes, Huong would draw heavy support from this
area. While he gives lip service to the need for
military-civilian cooperation, compromise with
the military, would be difficult for Huong as
president. The chairman of the Constituent Assembly,
Phan Khac Suu, may also run, but is unlikely to
gain significant support outside the southern
area.
In casting about for issues, civilian candi-
dates are certain to raise the themes of corrup-
tion, peace and foreign (i.e., US) domination. The
militant (Tri Quang) Buddhists have already launched
at least a trial run of an anti-war, anti-US campaign.
The injection of such themes into the electoral cam-
paign will receive wide play in the international
press but we doubt if they will become (or that
the GVN will let them become) burning, divisive
issues in Vietnam. Though the US has some vocal
and highly articulate critics among the Vietnamese
intelligentsia, and though the sheer magnitude of
the US presence in Vietnam makes some friction
and resentment inevitable, by and large the US
is well regarded by politically conscious Vietnam-
ese, most of whom are grateful for American support
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and recognize that without it, South Vietnam could
not survive as an independent political entity.
Similarly, though many Vietnamese are under-
standably tired of strife, there is widespread
acceptance of the fact that the only alternative
to continued struggle is the unacceptable one
of Communist domination. The GVN is not likely
to allow much discussion of reconciliation or
rapprochement with the NFL during the forthcoming
campaign, but here it will be running with, not
against, the prevailing climate of non-Communist
opinion since the NLF's claims to potential inde-
pendence of view and indigenous political roots
are given much less credence within Vietnam than
they are given abroad.
Over the past two years the trends in South
Vietnamese political life have been favorable
and encouraging, but the unity and stability
achieved, though significant, is fragile. Over
the weeks ahead there will be real and constant
risks that electoral ambitions and stresses
will inject divisive strains sufficient to de-
stroy this stability and arrest the progress
achieved to date, particularly if the Thieu-Ky
rivalry splits the unity of the miltary estab-
lishment. There will also be the risk that Ky
or his associates (e.g., General Loan) will suc-
cumb to temptation and try to rig the election
in a politically disastrous manner. Predictions,
thus, cannot be offered with confidence. It re-
mains the case, however, that South Vietnam's
record of political achievement has been.impres-
sive, that in the process now in train there
are signs of genuine political development,
and that events, so far, are moving in the right
direction.
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The Setting
1. Since its independence in 1954, South
Vietnam has been in the throes of political evolu-
tion, the course of which has been erratic.and often
convulsive. In particular, the pace of political
activity quickened following the overthrow of the
Diem regime, although such activity often occurred
in extra-legal channels more than in legal ones.
Under the present military regime, however, politics
have tended to shift from the streets and back rooms
toward more conventional political modes and forums.
To have come this far is no mean achievement, given
the country's political history, and represents
more progress than anyone expected when the military
assumed control in June 1965.
2. But the crucial question is,what happens
next? South Vietnam has poor clay with which to
build a national political structure. Endemic polit-
ical fragmentation is still the rule, and politics
tend to be dominated by narrow-based, usually con-
tentious, factions reflecting regional,. religious,
or, simply personal loyalties with little considera-
tion for broader national interest. Not only is
there nothing resembling a national party, but even
the political fragments are badly splintered. Thus,
the upcoming presidential and legislative elections
will test the ability of the Vietnamese to form a
government that is both reasonably effective and
relatively representative; that is' a government
that reflects, and is cognizant of, the necessity
for balancing personal liberty and national order.
There can be no assurance that this goal will be
realized; the attempt itself might once again plunge
the country into political paroxysms.
3. In any event, the divisive nature of
Vietnamese politics will have to be attenuated,
and eventually subsumed, by a broader political
framework if continued political progress is to be
realized. Although broadly based political group-
ings are not an early prospect, there are encourag-
ing indications that the elections are stimulating
cooperation among diverse political factions. This
is of great significance for Vietnam and for the US
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because, if handled well, this process could cause
political life in South Vietnam to move in the general
direction of stability and order. The following
paragraphs will assess the factors and forces now in-
fluential in South Vietnamese political life.
The Military Establishment
Composition, Attitudes and Loyalties
4. Since assuming open control of the govern-
ment in May 1965, the military establishment has
displayed a remarkable degree of cohesion. This
cohesion derives in large measure from the similar
backgrounds of the senior officers--regional, reli-
gious, military, educational and experience--and
their fairly acute awareness and understanding of
the political realities in Vietnam. As a result,
there is at least some willingness to subordinate
personal ambitions to the collective interests of
the military and an apparent consensus among the
military hierarchy concerning the major policy issues
facing Vietnam. In light of the past performance of
South Vietnam's civilian politicians, the military
has no confidence in the ability of the civilians to
administer effectively, to maintain national cohesion,
to pursue the war vigorously, or to refrain from
interference in professional military matters. The
military leaders share a common aspiration for polit-
ical stability, but they interpret this as requiring
military dominance in any government in the near
future.
5. The military leadership has faced many
thorny issues, but the most serious potential threat
to the cohesion of the Directorate since its incep-
tion two years ago has come from within, on the
issue of which of its two principal leaders would
become the military candidate in the presidential
elections. Early on, General Thieu seized the ini-
tiative by saying that while he thought that he would
be a candidate, he would defer the public announcement
of his decision while he reflected on his chances for
success. This position evoked from General Ky a
promise of support if, in fact, Thieu chose to run.
But as months rolled by and Thieu continued to
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vacillate, Ky who quite obviously wished to run and
saw his chances as infinitely better than those of
his senior colleague, became highly restive.
16. Since the two men were apparently unable
to resolve the problem face-to-face, Ky began to
exert pressure on the other members of the Directo-
rate to choose between the two by vote. Having
reached the top by not having made many bad guesses
in the Saigon arena of internal military politics,
the senior generals were understandably chary of
making such a selection, even by secret ballot. Both
contenders launched a variety of stratagems and ploys
to see the issue finally resolved. Suspicions and
divided loyalties among the other Directorate members
were major by-products of this prolonged -.infighting.
The 8 May announcement by the Minister of Defense,
General Vien, that the armed forces would not put
forth, as such, a military candidate, broke the im-
passe. In this statement, Ky saw absolution from
his pledge of support to Thieu, enabling him to an-
nounce his candidacy at once.
7. If the weight of Ky's confident bid for
power is sufficient to convince the indecisive
General Thieu that he should abandon all thoughts
of his own candidacy, the prognosis for unanimity
among the high command is good. Ky and his closest
supporters should be able to paper over the problems
in the Directorate that the delay has caused, and a
closing of ranks in support of Ky can be expected.
If Thieu also chooses to run, however, the dilemma
that has so far been fairly well contained within
the Directorate itself will be extended throughout
the ranks of the entire officer corps. Such a move
on Thieu's part could have divisive effects through-
out the country. Corps, provinces and districts
are almost exclusively administered by military
officers. The power of these officials, which was
admirably used in last September's Constituent
Assembly elections simply to get out the vote, may
well be abused in the presidential elections in
support of the military candidate whom they feel
deserves their loyalty. Within ARVN proper, down to
the platoon level, military commanders will be hard
pressed to decide how they should counsel their
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A
troops to vote. This conundrum cannot help but
distract the military and adversely affect the vigor
with which the war is prosecuted during the months
of the campaign.
8. Though remote, the possibility exists that
General Thieu, who has stated that the military
establishment ought to withdraw from politics, may
decide to ally himself with a civilian running mate
and campaign on a platform which advocates the return
of power to civilian hands. This would have obvious
appeal to the large civil element who might see in
Thieu's candidacy an opportunity to reduce sharply
the chances of front runner Ky. But inherently Thieu
has minimal voter appeal, and no extra-military or-
ganizational base of national scope. Moreover, the
Army, spearheaded by the "baby Turks," would see in
Thieu's move a betrayal and a threat to the destiny
to forge the nation which they believe is theirs.
These predominantly northern and pro-Ky officers
ht
would be able to dilute the army loyalty g
be counting on. The effect would still be devisive,
of course, but much less so than if Thieu chose to
run as an avowed military candidate.
Political Strategy and Assets
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10. Loan, who will manage the Ky campaign,
feels that it is too late to create the viable po-
litical coalition originally planned as a front for
the military candidate. With less than four months
until election, such a fr
t
on
now would only be window
dressing.
th
military esta is ment as ;'1 11
t
s
antia
assets at its disposal. It controls theofiitical
nancial
coffers of the country; it is the dispenser of
governmental favors, jobs and sinecures; it has the
organization, manpower, and trucks to see that the
voters get to the polls. In short, the military is
the only (non-Communist) body whose power and sway
extends throughout the country, and this gives it
tremendous advantages in organizing grass roots
support. In particular, the Revolutionary Develop-
ment (RD) program and cadre provide the regime with
a potentially formidable political instrument with
which to get to the people. The RD teams were used
for political purposes to get out the vote for the
Constituent Assembly elections last September, and
will undoubtedly be even more active in the presi-
dential and legislative contests this fall.
11. In addition to the RD cadre, the military
hierarchy can count on the support of most of the
armed forces, the civil administrative apparatus,
and provincial and district
ffi
o
cials (most of whom
are military). These groups not only have a vested
interest in the present system, but they are sus-
ceptible to persuasion and pressure from the govern-
ment. Thus, as election day approaches, it can be
assumed that considerable emphasis will be placed on
these groups delivering the vote. Officials whose
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response appears less than enthusiastic will run
the risk of being replaced.
Civilian Support
12. In addition to the substantial assets the
military has from its own resources, the establish-
ment leaders will probably be at least moderately
successful in garnering support for their presiden-
tial candidate from a number of the traditional
civilian political factions. It is generally accepted
in Vietnam that military support is essential for
the survival of any government, and many believe that
at this time the only way to insure military support
is to have a military man in the top executive post.
Moreover, the military's support of a faction's
Such consid-
legislative ticket could be decisive.
erations, plus the fact that most Vietnamese observers
believe that the military will win anyway, tend to
provide considerable incentive to cooperate with the
military and thereby get on the bandwagon and share
the rewards and spoils of victory.
13. The military establishment will hhaveito
make strong overtures to these groupings, but must be stressed that endorsement of a candidate by
a political faction does not mean that the candidate
will receive full support from the faction's adher-
ents. There is such a mishmash of conflicting some
s
interests within the many political groups will
l
seepage is inevitable. Indeed, some groups
attempt to be involved to some extent in each of the
contending camps so as to insure their interests no
matter how the election comes out.
14. Chief among the military establishment's
political targets will be the following groups:
a. The Hoa Hao Sect. In the Delta, the
Hoa Hao religious organization, which carries more
political weight than the sect's stallmpiolitical
parties, appears to favor backing
candidate. Such leaders as Van Phu and Le Phuoc
Sang, once a special assistant to Ky and now the
leader of the Democratic-obablyeseeomore toegain
stituent Assembly (CA), pr
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in aligning the sect with the military than in
following southern regionalist sentiments and backing
a candidate such as Tran Van Huong or Phan Khac Suu.
In fact, the sect's strength as a southern faction
gives it particular appeal to the GVN, which is weak-
est in this area.
b. The Cao Dai Sect. No longer much of
a Political force outside of certain enclaves such
as Tay Ninh Province, the Cao Dai Sect has been
amenable to GVN persuasion in the past. The presi-
dential candidacy of civilian Phan Khac Suu (a Cao
Dai member) notwithstanding, the odds are slightly
better than even that most of the Cao Dai leaders
will follow the GVN's lead.
c. The VNQDD Party. Truly a many splint-
ered thing, some of the VNQDD factions, whose strength
is primarily in I Corps area of central Vietnam, will
back the military; to do otherwise would risk having
the military opt to work exclusively with the Dai
Viets; the VNQDD's arch rivals in I Corps. During
the "struggle" movement last year, the VNQDD leaders
apparently cooperated with the GVN. Ky has been in
frequent contact with VNQDD leaders and other military
leaders have probably had similar contacts.
d. Northern Catholics. Plunged into dis-
millarrayonfo)llowing em
northern Catholic t element has steadily g (almost one
re-
asserted itself as a strong and cohesive political
force that must be reckoned with in the nation's
political future. Sharing very similar goals with
the military, many of whom are northern Catholics,
the northern Catholics have had cordial relations
with the military regime. In particular, the northern
Catholics favor the military's policy of a vigorous
prosecution of the war. The candidacy of Tran Van
Huong, however, might draw some support from the
northern Catholics because of his anti-Buddhist
background, but the southern regionalism that Huong
also personifies would work against him. Moreover,
the northern Catholics were undoubtedly more im-
pressed by the military's forthright squashing of
the militant Buddhists last year than they were by
Huong's overthrow by the Buddhists. In any event,
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we believe that the bulk of northern Catholic support
will go to the military establishment's candidate.
e. Northern Buddhists. The northern refu-
gee Buddhists are led by T is Tam Chau and are
strongest in and near Saigon. Following the open
break between Chau and militant Buddhist Thich Tri
Quang in the wake of the "struggle movement" last
year, Chau has been cooperating with the military
government, with General Loan serving as the regime's
principal contact. The regime has been aiding Chau
in his efforts, as yet unsuccessful, to create a
national Buddhist organization free from the influ-
ence of Tri Quang. In return, Chau will probably be
expected to back the military's presidential candi-
date, and although he might not formally endorse the
candidate, we believe that he will deliver the vote.
Indeed, if Tran Van Huong is the main civilian candi-
date, or if Tri Quang takes an active role in the
election, we believe the odds are fairly good that
Chau will openly back the military's choice.
f.. Labor. Tran Quoc Buu, prominent leader
of Vietnam's major labor organization, appears to
have switched his allegiance from Tran Van Huong to
Premier Ky. The labor vote in Vietnam is not large,
but in the Saigon area it is of some consequence.
Buu claims to be working with Dan Van Sung, an old-
line Dai Viet, and Hoa Hao leader Le Sanresg
forming a front to support Ky. Buu, o be a political force, has apparently concluded that
no civilian candidate can hope to win and that it
is smart politics to back a winner.
The Veterans' League. Under the lead-
ership of General CC'YieuVeterans' League, which
has limited political potential, should be
in the military's camp. The League plans
about 30 candidates for the legislature oand will
en-
probably receive governmental support
deavor. Apart from the general value ofsorganizednt
support, the League gives the military
some organized support in the south--the weakest
link in the military's chain of support, tandGthe
area from which the major opposition
will come.
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The Civilian O osition
15. Phan Khac Suu. Chairman of the Constituent
Assembly and former chief of state (October 1964 -
June 1965), Phan Khac Suu apparently has decided to
stand for the presidency with Phan Quang Dan, CA
member and president of the Gia Dinh Provincial Coun-
cil, as his vice-presidential running mate. Suu has
had a long, if not particularly distinguished, polit-
ical career in South Vietnam. And although his age
(62) and lack of dynamism are considered liabilities
by some, he is nationally known and may even be some-
thing of a "father image" in a country where venera-
tion of the elderly is a strong, common emotion. In any
event, Suu, who is a southerner, would run strongest
in the Delta area and might also get some support from
VNQDD elements in central Vietnam. The presence of
Dan on the slate would draw votes in the populous
Saigon area. The Suu-Dan ticket makes some attempt
at a regional balance, but unless a centrist is added
as the prime ministerial choice, it does not seem
likely to obtain significant support outside of
southern region. Unless it does obtain such support,
its chances of seriously challenging the military's
candidate are very small.
16. Dan, and perhaps Suu as well, recognize the
odds against their ticket. Indeed, Dan has indicated
that he believes the military will win the election,
and there were indications that he was trying to
persuade Suu not to run for the presidency but to
head up a legislative slate. We do not know what lies
behind Suu's decision. He may feel that his time is
running out to play an important role in Vietnamese
politics, and he would prefer to play it in the main
arena, not in a legislative side show. Or he may
feel that, whatever his chances are, he has something
to contribute to a presidential campaign and the
country's political future. In any event, Suu?'s
presence in the race will have the effect of split-
ting southern strength, and there is a possibility
that the GVN had a surreptitious hand in persuading
Suu to run.
17. Tran Van Huong. The strongest civilian
candidate is Tran Van Huong, who, despite not having
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yet formally declared his candidacy, is almost
certain to run. Huang, unlike Suu, is both forceful
and determined. He has not forgotten his past dif-
ficulties with the military and the Buddhists who
were instrumental in his ouster as premier in January
1965. As a result, he harbors much distrust for
both. Thus, while Huong gives lip service to the
need for military-civilian cooperation, compromise
with the military would tend to be difficult for
him. Huong believes in a strong executive and is
frankly of the belief that the majority of the Viet-
namese people are not ready for democracy and do not
necessarily need or want it. US officials have
stated that Huong, who has expressed admiration for
Diem's "good qualities," appears to have some of
the late dictator's characteristics, namely honesty,
courage, a sense mission, a capacity for stubborn-
ness, and a basically confucian-mandarinal view of
government and society.
18. Huong, a southerner, is a staunch champion
of southern regionalist sentiments and would draw
heavy support from this area. Even some southern-
born military officers have expressed interest in
Huong's candidacy. Former youth minister Vo Long
Trieu, who was one of the dissident southern minis-
ters that resigned in last October's "cabinet crisis,"
is currently acting as Huong's campaign manager and
is a member of a "brain trust" that is plotting
Huong's political strategy. Trieu is the acknowl-
edged leader of the Movement for the Renaissance of
the South, a militantly southern separatist group,
which is solidly in Huong's camp. Huong would
probably obtain the bulk of southern Catholic and
Buddhist support since these politically inchoate
groups generally follow the lead of the southern
political organizations; he would also pull some
votes in the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai areas.
19. Huong realizes that if he is to have a
real chance of challenging the military's candidate,
he must broaden his political base outside the
southern region. Initially, Huong appeared to
favor an alignment with the VNQDD. But since the
military (or more specifically, Ky) seems to have
gained a rather secure lock on VNQDD support, Huong
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has explored the possibility of an alliance with
Revolutionary Dai Viet Party (RDVP) leader Ha Thuc
Ky, who at the moment claims to be running for the
presidency himself.
20. Huong would probably garner some northern
Catholic votes because of his previous strong stand
against the Buddhist Institute. Trieu is one of the
key leaders of the Catholic Liaison Office in Saigon,
which has played an important role in promoting
Catholic cohesion, and can be expected to lobby for
Huong in this group. Trieu has also said that Tri
Quang's militant Buddhist following in central Vietnam
would not oppose Huong's candidacy. Indeed, it is
not at all out of the question that Tri Quang might
enter into an open alliance with the southern region-
alists in support of Huong, especially if Huong
should take a strong stand against the military and
a somewhat anti-US tack.
21. Politics, as is generally recognized,
produce strange bedfellows, particularly in South
Vietnam. Precisely because Huong appears to be the
strongest likely civilian candidate, particularly in
light of his southern ties, Ky seems to be weighing
the idea of seeking Huong's cooperation, perhaps as
his (Ky's) running mate. At first blush this might
seem an improbable ticket, but it would be a very
strong one, particularly since Huong's and Ky's
relative strengths and assets are very complementary.
Huang might rebuff the offer, but it is far from
certain that he would do so, particularly if he felt
Ky sure to win anyway (illegally, if necessary) and
thought that by joining forces with Ky he could not
only share the spoils of victory but, by his partici-
pation, temper the military cast and orientation of
Ky's government.
22. Ha Thuc Ky. Although RDVP leader Ky has
made no secret of his presidential candidacy, he may
really be fishing for a deal in which he "withdraws"
and throws his support to another candidate in re-
turn for the vice-presidential slot or some other
prestigious position in the new government for him-
self and his party. It remains to be seen whether
Ky will forge an alliance with Huong. Indeed, the
odds are as good or slightly better that the mili-
tary establishment can win the RDVP over to its side.
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Many of the military leaders have a Dai Viet back-
ground, e.g., Thieu, Tri, and Vien. (Thieu's
brother, Kieu, was an influential Dai Viet leader,
and two of Ky's closest advisers, Dinh Trinh Chinh,
and Bui Diem, were connected with the party.)
Finally, of course, Ha Thuc Ky may not be able to
make a deal with anyone; if so, he would almost
certainly remain in the race despite his neglible
chances.
The Elections: Issues and Pitfalls
23. Marshal Ky will run on the accomplishments
of his government's two years in power. The stability
he has provided Vietnam will be less an issue than
the social revolution which has been begun. Ky
sees himself as one of the few leaders sufficiently
concerned with raising the living standard above its
present subsistence level with the power and deter-
mination to do something about it. He believes, with
some justice, that the progress made in just a year
toward elective representative government based on a
constitution has been heartening and impressive,
particularly in a nation at war. If Ky is able to
make clear in the villages and hamlets what the im-
plications of this new structure can be, he may do
much more than just insure his election -- he may
cause the Vietnamese to start thinking of themselves
as a nation. Reportedly, the main thrust of his
campaign will be conducted in the countryside, where
he will attempt to identify himself with a social
revolution in which the government (i.e., his govern-
ment) has joined forces with the poor. Hardly revo-
lutionary in Western eyes, a direct appeal to the
peasantry, in itself, would be a major change in
the traditional mandarinal Vietnamese way of life.
24. Ky has shown more skill than most people
gave him credit for in his informal dealings with
the Constituent Assembly members in an effort to see
the government's thinking reflected in the constitu-
tion. He will undoubtedly continue his efforts
within this group, many of whom will be candidates
for the legislature. A presidential victory would
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be incomplete without substantial majorities in
both houses of the legislature. To accomplish
this, General Loan plans to spend the majority
of his election funds in direct support of in-
dividual legislative candidates. Loan feels
that the average Vietnamese politician lacks the
breadth of vision to understand the principle of
reciprocal political power. He thinks only: of his
own political fortunes rather than in terms of
tying his fortunes to that of any other power
element. The concept of log-rolling is largely
foreign in the Vietnamese political milieu. Po-
litical "deals," which are a basic practice in
sophisticated Western democracies, have little
appeal or meaning in the relatively primitive po-
litical context of Vietnam, where only money has
political value at this time.
25. These machinations and other local deals,
patronage, etc., Marshal Ky will leave to General
Loan who will function in the murky, behind-the-
scenes, atmosphere. Ky will stay in the public
eye, hammering home the broad themes of social
justice and nation building.
26. One major issue on which Ky will undoubt-
edly take a hard line will be on the question of
a coalition government or of discussions with the
Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front. The
generals are adamantly on record on this score,
but have shown some willingness to consider talk-
ing to their Hanoi counterparts. For all practical
purposes, however, a strong anti-Communist posture
and a resolute determination to prosecute the war
will probably be the strongest plank in the platform.
27.. As electioneering picks up steam, we an-
ticipate a rising chorus of criticism against the
military establishment and its performance in of-
fice. This could become particularly bitter if
the civilian candidates decide that their only hope
of rallying the people is to pull out all the stops
in attacking the military. The military establish-
ment will be charged with attempting to perpetuate
itself in power and thereby flaunting the people's
"desire" for a civilian government. General Loan,
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long a target of southern civilian ire, will al-
most certainly be bitterly assailed and accused
of intimidating and suppressing civili-an opposi-
tion to the military regime. And as is usually
the case in politically underdeveloped states,
the "outs" will be predisposed to charge that
the "ins" have rigged the elections.
28. The civilian opposition will undoubtedly
hammer away consistently at the themes of inef-
ficiency and corruption within the military estab-
lishment. The GVN is vulnerable on the score of
corruption and is itself embarked on an anti-
corruption crusade. Nonetheless, the opposition
will get some mileage from this issue. The mili-
itary (and the US) will also be blamed for the in-
creased cost of living, inflation, and other dep-
rivations occasioned by the war. Finally, the
military will almost certainly not escape being
labelled as a "US-puppet."
29. Beyond these issues, such potentially
explosive questions as peace and the US role in
Vietnam are certain to be broached during the
election campaign. The opposition groups, feel-
ing themselves in dire need of some emotionally
dramatic issues to offset the military's advan-
tageous position, may come out for peace and neu-
trality and may attack the US presence in Vietnam.
Indeed, there are signs that the militant (Tri
Quang) wing of the Buddhist movement is trying
to launch just such a campaign. Tri Quang may
hope to make common cause with non-clerical
southern groups who, partially reflecting their
closer affinity and contact with the French,
have generally taken a more compromising attitude
toward ending the war and have tended to be more
vocal about the allegedly deleterious effects
of the US presence on the country's economic,
social, and moral fibre. Even if this recently
surfaced Buddhist campaign does not catch on,
there will at least be significant undertones
of anti-US and neutralist sentiments in the cam-
paigning.
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Potential Pitfalls
30. The most obvious pitfall, of course, is
that the electoral process will somehow set off
forces which destroy the substantial, but as yet
fragile, progress made thus far. This could come
about in a number of ways,. e.g., a serious split
in the military establishment that resulted in a
military coup, or a situation in which the cam-
paign became so bitter that the security of the
country was so threatened by demonstration,.riots,
and the like that the military felt compelled to
suspend the elections and resort to suppressive
measures. However, both of these possibilities
are unlikely at the present time.
31. Somewhat more likely is the possibility
that the military will attempt to rig the elec-
tions or engage in flagrant activities that would
destroy their integrity. Getting out the vote in
the Constituent Assembly elections was one thing,
getting it out in support of a particular candi-
date requires more sophisticated tactics. General
Loan has said that he could rig the elections but,
with the foreign press looking over his shoulder,
not without detection. Although he claims he has
consequently discarded any thought of rigging. Loan
may be irresistablytempted to shore up soft spots
as a matter of expediency, particularly since
time is so short. Loan, despite the assets at
the government's command and his confidence that
Ky will win, does not see victory as automatic.
In effect, he is running scared. His current esti-
mate gives Ky 60 percent of I Corps, and he is
sure of II Corps, but he believes that in III
Corps and the Delta provinces, the nation's popula-
tion center, southern support favors Phan Khac
Suu. Though by no means the crude hatchet man
his opponents depict him to be, General Loan, may
be impelled by excessive zeal to resort to politi-
cally counter productive intimidation of his opposi-
tion, particularly in the critical southern prov-
inces.
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32. Equally serious and perhaps more damaging,
if exploited by the civilians, will be the sources
of funds developed to support for the Ky campaign
and the method Loan uses to raise such funds. He
estimates 50 million piastres will be needed for
the presidential race and 70 million will have to
be expended on legislative candidates. This sum --
the equivalent of one million dollars -- he sees
as the absolute minimum required. Given the loose
fiscal practices of the government, Loan could
easily raise such a sum quietly if he had more
time. But pressed, he is quite likely to turn to
methods not easily concealed which, in turn, could
tie Ky directly to the major issue of governmental
corruption, a charge from which Ky has been free
up till now. In short, Loan is an active man,
and, now, an impatient one as well. He has may
talents but little experience and sorely needs
political guidance if he is not to kick over the
traces.
33. Yet another potential pitfall lies in
the danger that the military will not be particu-
larly concerned to make an effort to include a
significant civilian element in the new government.
Some in the military do not sufficiently appreciate
the political need for the new government to look
like something new, or at least to avoid having
it look as if the political process now in train
has been designed only to give a constitutional
and electoral veneer to the same old political
arrangements. This is important for both the
domestic and international image of the new gov-
ernment. On balance, however, the top leadership
in the military is aware of the importance of
the coupling of the military and civilian ele-
ments in the government, and they will be recep-
tive to US advice in this direction. Thus, the
odds are better than even that the new government
will contain enough of a civilian aura to give
credibility and substance to a claim that it does
represent a real step forward.
Prospects
34. Considering the assets that the military
establishment already possesses and the potential
0%
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support that it may gain through political deals,
chances are considerably better than even that if
the military remains unified, whomever it supports
for the presidency will win comfortably. No oppo-
sition group can rival the nation-wide apparatus
and potential Tammany-like influence that can be
utilized by the military establishment.
35. Should the opposition campaigns become
bitter, as they might, a number of abrasive issues
may be raised which will. involve the US. Should the
government try to insure the success of their candi-
date through fraud or bulldozer tactics, its victory
may be so sullied as to destroy the value of the
election itself.
36. Should Ky and Thieu both run and carve
each other up, or should a particularly heinous case
of government election fraud be revealed -- or per-
haps simply through an act of God -- a civilian
candidate may squeak through in September. Should
this happen, the basic differences between the mili-
tary and the civilians will soon be manifested. In
discussing such a possibility, General Loan felt
that the military establishment would not surrender
any of its decision making prerogatives on the con-
duct of the war to the civilians. (He included in
this the military budget.) He predicted that given
a repitition of the civilian ineptitude of the past,
such a government would soon be toppled by a mili-
tary coup. Loan freely admitted the retrogression
this would represent for the nation and saw, as well,
the impossible position in which this would place
the US, but still felt the clash would be inevitable.
37. In the more likely event of a victory for
General Ky, even with fair support in the legisla-
ture, politics in the new government would generally
resemble the present situation. Most of the same
problems would still exist, and the government would
still be faced with the same vulnerabilities. The
civilian-military relationship in general, and
regionalism in particular,,would continue to be the
major stumbling blocks. Regardless of the extent of
civilian participation in the new administration,
there are certain to be strains and stresses in
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executive-legislative relations. Compromise and
political give and take are not firmly rooted in
Vietnamese political life, and the disparity of
power between the civilians and military tends to
result in the civilians being over-sensitive to
real or imagined faults of the military while some
of the military leaders tend to take a rather
cavalier attitude toward the civilians and the need
to cooperate with them. Because of the fragile
nature of the system, judgments concerning longer
range developments must be highly tentative. There
will be crises, any of which could prove to be the
ultimate undoing of the whole system.
38. The forthcoming national elections -- if
they are held, result in a winner with a reasonable
plurality (say, 40 percent or better of the total
vote), and are reasonably free from suspicion of
fraud -- will be an important political achievement
and milestone. Even successful elections, however,
will not insure continued political progress in
South Vietnam. The stability and effectiveness of
the present regime and any elected successor cannot
be separated from the three principal determinants
of Vietnamese political life: the conduct of the
war, the development of representative national in-
stitutions, and the engagement of the bulk of the
populace in a GVN-oriented political process. No
Saigon government will be able to develop and sus-
tain a viable national base without stimulating
popular engagement or identification with its
fortunes. No government will be able to stimulate
such engagement without freeing itself from pres-
ently powerful commercial and landed interests and
adopting a stance that, in Vietnamese terms, has
genuinely revolutionary elements.
39. Ky himself has already begun paying
articulate lip-service to this need for a "genuine
revolution." Incorporation of such sentiments
into his political platform and program may well
help carry him to an honest victory. If he wins,
however, he will have to match words with deeds if
he and his colleagues are to generate any real
political momentum or develop a real base of rice-
roots support.
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40. The prognosis for political development
in Vietnam is uncertain but the record of the past
year is encouraging. Despite'the obvious stresses,
strains and potential pitfalls, the possibilities
for genuine progress are there and, at the moment,
events are moving in the right direction.
41. Finally, it should be noted that the
course of political evolution in South Vietnam will
inevitably be influenced by the stance adopted by
the US and the actions the US engages or does not
engage in. A majority of the politically articulate
and concerned elements in South Vietnam believes the
US has and exercises substantial political influence
(a view also widely held outside of Vietnam). Thus,
the US will be presumed to be playing a direct role
in Vietnamese political life even if it endeavors
to remain aloof. At a minimum, US advice will be
sought and US support solicited by most of the major
contenders for electoral office. The US, in short,
will inevitably be dealt a hand and its play of that
hand will have a significant impact on the outcome
of the game.
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V
South Vietnam: An Economic Appraisal
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SOUTH VIETNAM: AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL
Summary and Conclusions
The economy of South Vietnam, which has been
greatly distorted by the war, must further endure
strains in 1967, as the demand for goods continues to
exceed the supply. The gap could be substantially
widened by increases in US forces larger than cur-
rently planned, except in the unlikely event that
MACV can repeat its remarkable achievement of 1966,
when spending by the US military was reduced while
US troop strength increased.
Since mid-1965, the growth of demand in South
Vietnam, fed by increasing expenditures on the part
of both the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and the
Allied military forces, has greatly outstripped
the growth of local production. Overall industrial
output has increased, but the production of major
war-related commodities such as cement and textiles
declined in 1966. Agricultural production has
fallen, particularly the output of the major crops,
rice and rubber. Imports have risen sharply, al-
most doubling in value in 1966, but not enough to
prevent inflation. Port bottlenecks, especially
in Saigon, inefficiency in domestic trade, and cor-
ruption and lack of strong economic leadership in
the GVN, have all contributed to inflation.
In mid-1966, the GVN enacted a series of re-
forms, the most important of which was the devalua-
tion of the piaster. These reforms generally re-
lieved inflationary pressures during the remainder
of the year. The growth of the money supply was
slowed and prices held reasonably steady after
rising, as was expected, immediately following
the devaluation. Renewed pressures, however, be-
gan to appear late in the year and are still pres-
ent.
Domestic output is not expected to increase
significantly in 1967. The production of rice in
the 1966/67 crop year is down by 10 percent, and
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imports of rice in 1967 are expected to equal about
one-third of total domestic production. Imports
of all goods may be lower than planned in 1967, if
the present low rate of import licensing continues.
Retail prices were originally expected to increase
by 15 to 25 percent, but larger increases are likely.
Prices in Saigon at the end of April were already
16 percent higher than at the beginning of the year,
and rice prices were up about 50 percent. The growth
of the money supply has also quickened. The pres-
sure for substantial additional wage increases is
already evident and will intensify as more workers
demand increases to match the increase in the cost
of living. Strenuous efforts by both the US and
the government of South Vietnam will be necessary to
hold inflationary pressures within acceptable bounds.
The Viet Cong continue to interdict internal trans-
port and to exercise control over extensive rural
areas, draining off manpower, commodities, and rev-
enues that otherwise would be available to the gov-
ernment. The Viet Cong are able to mobilize from
within South Vietnam most of the funds, rice, and
other non-military supplies required to support the
Communist insurgency.
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I. Introduction
The economy of South Vietnam is primarily agri-
cultural, with roughly 85 percent of the population
engaged in farming, fishing, or forestry. Most of
the productive land is planted to rice and cultiva-
tion is heavily dependent on hand labor. Two-
thirds of rice production comes from the delta.
Agricultural activities account for about one-
third of GNP while manufacturing and domestic trade
together account for another third. The recent
growth of GNP is difficult to determine. It is
estimated that during 1959-62, the annual rate of
real growth did not exceed 3.5 percent, and the
rate has probably declined since then.
The country is poor in industrial resources.
Manufacturing is on a small scale, mainly in in-
dustries that use agricultural materials and pro-
duce for the domestic consumer market, such as
textiles, beverages, and tobacco. There are short-
ages of electric power, long-term capital, and
skilled managerial and technical personnel. Another
major factor hindering economic development is the
inadequacy of land transportation. All transporta-
tion and communications networks are centered in
Saigon, the major port and hub of economic activity.
There are only about 12,500 miles of highways,
half unsurfaced, and about 840 miles of railway,
most of which are insecure at present. The opera-
tion of the most important transportation facility,
the inland waterway system, of which 80 percent is
located in the Mekong delta, is constantly threatened
by military activities.
South Vietnam's dependence on imports is increas-
ing. Some raw materials and foodstuffs are exported,
but the country relies on imports for many basic com-
modities and manufactured consumer and capital goods.
Imports from the US far exceed those from any other
country, while France remains South Vietnam's largest
customer.
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II. Recent Economic Developments
Agriculture, still the largest sector of the Viet-
nam economy, has suffered greatly from the war. The
movement of farm families to secure areas, the in-
creased demand for labor in urban areas, low returns
to the farmer, and the disruption of transport have
lowered productivity and reduced the acreage under
cultivation. Rice, by far the most important crop,
has suffered the most. It is estimated that the out-
put of paddy declined 7 percent in the 1965/66 crop
year and a further 10 percent in the 1966/67 crop
year. South Vietnam has moved from a substantial
net export position in 1963 to an even greater net
import position in 1966. Imports of rice in 1967
are expected to be around 870,000 tons, an amount
equal to about one-third of rice production and
probably to the bulk of urban requirements for
rice. Table 1 shows production, imports, and ex-
ports of milled rice in South Vietnam for the years
1963-67.
South Vietnam: Production, Exports,
And Imports of Milled Rice
1963-67*
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967**
Production 3,123 3,120 3,111 2,893 2,600
Exports 323 49 0 0 0
Imports 0 0 130 470 870
*Data are for crop years ending in the year indicated.
**Estimated.
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South Vietnam has had similar though less serious
problems with most of its other food and commercial
crops. The production of fish and meat has declined
somewhat and has not been adequate to satisfy the
demand in urban areas. The production of rubber, three-
fourths of which comes from French-owned plantations,
has fallen because of insecurity, the interdiction of
marketing routes, and the movement of laborers to bet-
ter paying work. Once a major earner of foreign ex-
change, the export of rubber fell from 71,600 metric
tons in 1964 to 43,600 in 1966. Earnings declined
proportionately more, because of falling world prices.
The production of vegetables, by contrast, probably
has increased, but interdiction of the main trans-
port route between Dalat and Saigon has kept market
prices high.
South Vietnam's industry produces primarily light
consumer goods and. processed agricultural products
and plays only a minor role in direct support of the
war effort. Although overall industrial output grew
during 1966, the production of some important com-
modities declined, including textiles and cement.
The output of cotton yarn and cotton cloth declined
by 30 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Almost
all military and civilian clothing requirements of
the Vietnamese are still met from indigenous produc-
tion, but dependence on imports is increasing. Ce-
ment production, important to the large military and
civil construction effort, was almost 30 percent less
in 1966 than in 1965. The production of such goods
as paper, beer, soft drinks, refined sugar, glass,
and pharmaceuticals rose mainly in response to grow-
ing demand in Saigon. The production of electric
power rose by 15 percent in 1966 but still did not
meet all needs. The Saigon area accounted for 85
percent of the total.
The war has produced a great increase in demand
in South Vietnam, and has drastically changed its
composition. Personal expenditures by Free World
forces and expenditures on the military construction
program have required large quantities of labor and
locally produced goods and services, thus pushing
up their price. The increase in income among the
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Vietnamese has created an additional demand for goods
and services and put further pressure on prices. US
and Government of Vietnam (GVN) rural development
and pacification programs, and the military and civilian
programs of the GVN, also involve large expenditures
for already scarce labor and materials. GVN budgetary
expenditures grew by 38 and 21 percent, respectively,
in 1965 and 1966. The budget for 1967 calls for ex-
penditures of 75 billion piasters, about 20 percent
more than in 1966, but this total is likely to be
exceeded.
In the face of rapidly rising demand and declines
or stagnation in the output of many important prod-
ucts, South Vietnam has required massive imports of
commodities. US-financed imports, not including mili-
tary aid, totaled $414 million in 1966 (based on im-
port licensing) and were equivalent to 23 percent
of South Vietnam's estimated GNP of $1.8 billion.
Total commercial imports, including GVN-financed
imports, amounted to about one-third of GNP. Even
imports of this magnitude did not meet the demand.
Imports were limited not by lack of funds, but
principally by the inadequacies of South Vietnam's
ports and of its transport and distribution systems.
These inadequacies were compounded by the interdic-
tion of truck transport and the disruption of rail
services by the Viet Cong, which restricted the move-
ment of goods out of the ports to ultimate consumers.
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III. Principal Economic Problems
The enormous increase in demand in a war-
disrupted economy was bound to bring considerable
inflation. Compounding the problem have been port
bottlenecks, the absence of strong economic leader-
ship in Saigon, and rural insecurity, which are
discussed below. By mid-1966, inflation had reached
critical proportions. Compared with January 1965,
retail prices in the capital were up almost 75 per-
cent, and the money supply had nearly doubled.
On 18 June 1966 the GVN adopted a series of
economic reforms designed to control inflation and
to reduce the high profits being made by importers.
These reforms included increases in imports and taxes
and the devaluation of the piaster by 50 percent.
At the same time, the GVN was forced to grant 20 to
30 percent wage increases to civil servants and to
the military who had suffered declines in real income
as a result of rising prices. The devaluation brought
a swift and substantial improvement in the govern-
ment's financial position. Customs receipts and
piaster counterpart funds* rose sharply, and GVN
borrowing from the national bank, which had been the
main source of monetary expansion, was nearly elim-
inated.
The economic reforms of June 1966 generally
relieved inflationary pressures during the remainder
of 1966. As was expected, retail prices rose in the
period immediately following the devaluation and
then held reasonably steady until late in the year.
At the end of December, prices in Saigon were about
25 percent above the level prevailing just prior
to the devaluation but only three percent above the
average level during the two months following de-
valuation. Some success was achieved in slowing
the growth of the money supply, which rose by six
percent during the last half of 1966 compared with
*Counterpart funds are generated by the commercial
import program financed by the Agency for International
Development and are deposited in a special account for
use within South Vietnam.
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29 percent during the first half. Moreover, confi-
dence in the piaster was restored, and the black
market rates for dollars and gold held fairly steady
at levels well below those prevailing in June and
July.
It became necessary, however, during the
last half of 1966 to carefully control monetary
expansion in the private sector. The pressure for
higher wages increased throughout the economy. As
a result of the rising level of imports and the price
effects of the devaluation, importers were forced to
turn to the commercial banks for financing. Private
bank credit more than doubled during the last half
of 1966, as the source of monetary expansion was
shifted from the government to the private sector
of the economy.
Inflationary pressure has picked up consid-
erably in 1967 as a result of increasing wages and
accelerating military and civilian spending, coupled
with declining domestic production. There may also
have been a shortfall in planned imports. During the
first two months of 1967 the growth of the money sup-
ply equaled that during the last six months of 1966.
The cost of living (including rent) for working class
families in Saigon began to move up again late in
1966 and continued to rise through the first two
months of this year, the latest period for which data
are available. From the beginning of January through
the end of April the USAID weekly index of retail
prices in Saigon rose by 16 percent; the price of
rice consumed by the working class went up by 53 per-
cent. Prices were relatively stable in April, and
the black market rate for dollars and gold declined
substantially, but the prospects for continued price
stability are not good. The accompanying charts
show the cost of living index for Saigon and the
size of the money supply from 1963 through February
1967.
The inflation since mid-1965 has affected
the real incomes of various groups of the population
differently. Although current wage data are not
available for any group, the real income of South
Vietnam's military personnel and civil servants has
almost certainly not increased and has probably
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Saigon Cost of Living Index *
(For Working Class Family)
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declined. Since their wages were increased in June
the cost of living has risen while wages for GVN
employees have remained almost stationary. Real
incomes in the private sector, by contrast, have
made rapid gains, especially in construction and
services. The impact of inflation on urban dwellers
has been cushioned by the increase in income per
family produced by more family members taking jobs,
but this trend has probably reached its limit. The
real income of farmers probably declined until mid-
1966, but has risen somewhat since then because
higher agricultural prices have more than offset
recent increases in consumer prices in the provinces.
Inflation has significant implications for
political stability in South Vietnam. The effects
of inflation probably fall most heavily on the urban
lower and middle classes, who are the most likely
sources of protest in any event. Although there has
been no overt action against the government over
economic issues, serious inflationary pressures, and
especially higher rice prices, could cause trouble.
The decline in morale and the rise in corruption
among underpaid government workers are well known.
Moreover, during the next few months the country
may well be faced with a series of strikes as the
current pressure for wage increases intensifies.
More broadly, inflation has increased the dissatis-
faction of the population with its government, and
has provided the Viet Cong a ready-made propaganda
issue to use against the GVN and the US.
B. Congestion at the Port of Saigon
In order to combat inflation, the US and the
GVN have attempted to absorb excess purchasing power
by flooding the market with imported goods. Total
commercial imports increased from $357 million in
1965 to an estimated $600 million in 1966. Ninety
percent of these goods, as well as sizable amounts
of military cargo, come through the port of Saigon.
Congestion at the port has been a major problem. Al-
though some relief is in sight, congestion will prob-
ably continue to be a problem.
The congestion stems not only from a lack
of physical facilities but also from the unwillingness
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or inability of private importers to remove their
cargo from the port area. A cost-price squeeze
resulting from the June devaluation and the general
expectation that prices would rise reduced the
incentive for importers to move their goods to market.
Although the GVN adopted measures in mid-1966 to
force removal, almost nothing was done to enforce
them in spite of insistent prodding by US officials.
The result has been a shortage of space for new
cargoes being offloaded, a proliferation of barges
holding goods in the Saigon River, and a backlog of
ships waiting off Vung Tau and elsewhere to move up
to Saigon.
There is some hope for improvement in the
situation this year because the physical capacity of
the port of Saigon has been greatly enlarged and US
port experts estimate that during 1967 port capacity
will exceed expected cargo arrivals. The GVN adopted
several remedial measures in late March, including
the use of additional out-of-port storage areas for
unclaimed import goods, and is considering others--
for example, financial arrangements to permit im-
porters to borrow funds for paying customs duties.
It remains to be seen, however, how effective the
new measures will be,
C. Rural Insecurity
The lack of security in many rural areas has
disrupted economic activity and contributed greatly
to inflation, by restricting the flow of goods while
stimulating the movement of people from farm to city.
The maintenance of checkpoints by the Viet Gong and
acts of sabotage on roads, waterways, and the rail
system have sharply limited freedom of movement,
including that of farm produce to urban markets and
of urban products and imports to the countryside.
Goods that are permitted to flow do so only after
the payment of heavy taxes to the Viet Cong. Heavy
damage has been inflicted on all forms of surface
transportation.
Persistent insecurity in rural areas, Allied
military operations, and the growth of non-farm
economic opportunities have all stimulated a large
migration to urban areas in the last year and a half.
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about 1.8 million refugees
have come from rural areas since January 1964, of
which more than-700,000 came in 1966 and 110,000 in
January and February of 1967. The total migration
is considerably greater than this, because many of
those moving are not counted as refugees. If the
migration continues, as seems likely, there will be
a continuing adverse effect upon agricultural pro-
duction and a further increase in the urban demand
for food.
D. Leadership Problems
Efforts to halt inflation and to adopt and
carry out suitable economic policies have been
greatly hampered by the lack of responsible and
decisive economic leadership in the GVN. Prime
Minister Ky takes little interest in economic af-
fairs except in times of crisis, preferring to
leave such matters in the hands of various cabinet
members.
The chief economic post, that of Minister
of Economy and Finance, has changed hands three times
since February 1966 and was vacant from November
1966 to January 1967. Although responsibility for
economic matters is fragmented among a number of
ministries, a competent and decisive Minister of
Economy and Finance with the full confidence of Ky
could probably overcome this problem to a great
extent. Such a man would certainly be welcomed by
US Mission officials, who have had difficulty finding
anyone who will make a firm decision and act on it.
For example, the rice crisis of March 1967, when
stocks were at an all-time low and prices soared,
was greatly aggravated by the inability of GVN of-
ficials to make adequate and timely arrangements
for the import of rice, which the US had been urging
since December.
The appointment in mid-March of Governor
Hanh of the National Bank of Vietnam as the new
Minister of Economy and Finance should be a major
forward step in providing economic leadership in the
GVN, if the Governor can be persuaded to remain in
the post longer than the three months to which he
has reportedly agreed. Hanh has long been a major
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force in GVN economic circles, but has previously
declined to accept a cabinet position. He is reputed
to be an able administrator and, although strong-
minded, has worked well with US officials in the
past. Several knowledgeable assistants came into
office with him, and US officials hope for greater
efficiency in the management and planning of economic
affairs in the future.
E. Rice Policy
The basic economic problems of South Vietnam --
inflation, rural insecurity, and the lack of strong
leadership -- have all contributed to the disruption
of rice production and distribution. The output of
rice has declined since 1964 while consumption has
increased. South Vietnam, which exported 323,000
metric tons of rice in 1963, is expected to import
about 870,000 metric tons in 1967, mostly from the US.
The GVN has failed to establish a rice policy
that would give adequate price incentives to the
farmers or provide them with the fertilizer needed
to increase yields. During the last few months
the paddy price received by the farmer has increased,
but this was the result of a decline in rice stocks
and high retail prices for rice, rather than of ac-
tion by the GVN. The GVN and the US signed an agree-
ment in March for the import of fertilizer which
called for the adoption of a new system of distribu-
tion. Judging by past experience, however, it is
far from certain that the imported fertilizer will
actually be made available to rice farmers at a
price they can afford.
The delivery of rice from the delta to Saigon,
from where it is distributed to'rice deficit areas,
has declined more rapidly than production. Part of
the reason is interdiction and taxation by the VC.
In addition, the GVN heavily regulates this traffic,
by prescribing routes and using a series of check-
points, mainly as a means of tax collection. These
checkpoints provide an ideal setup for corrupt
officials. The result of the interference from both
sides is to reduce the incentive of the provincial
rice merchants to deliver rice to government stock-
piles in Saigon and also to drive up the price of
rice that reaches the retail market.
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Large-scale military activity in the delta
is likely to have a short-term negative effect on
rice production, but to the extent that operations
are designed to secure transportation routes through-
out the area, military activity could be beneficial.
Higher yields are essential, because the area sown
to rice cannot be enlarged greatly until pacification
is well along. Higher yields, in turn, depend on
the application of greater quantities of fertilizer.
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IV. Prospects for Economic Stability
Prospects for stability are poor, because demand
will almost certainly continue to outpace supply,
with a resulting upward pressure on prices. The
military operations of both sides will have an in-
creasingly disruptive effect on economic activity,
especially if force levels are raised. Moreover, the
government's failure to accept responsibility for
making and carrying out realistic economic policies
will hamper efforts to curb renewed inflationary
pressures. In view of the fact that the 1967 sta-
bilization plan proposed by the US, which contained
tight ceilings on expenditures and relatively opti-
mistic goals for revenues, was expected to result in
price increases estimated at 15 to 25 percent, it
seems probable that actual price increases in 1967
will be greater.
Persistent US attempts to obtain GVN agreement
to an economic stabilization plan for 1967 have
failed, partly because of GVN unwillingness to accept
a US request that the GVN spend a larger amount of
its own growing foreign exchange reserves during
1967. Proposed GVN budgetary targets would have
meant a deficit amounting to about one-fourth of
total expenditures in 1967, compared with one-half
in 1965 and a planned one-third in 1966. Nonethe-
less, US officials report that the GVN has not exer-
cised the budgetary restraint it had initially
pledged. There has also been a proliferation of
extra-budgetary accounts, causing serious concern
that GVN expenditures will substantially exceed the
amounts originally planned.
A further cause for concern is the low level
of import licensing for the first three months of
1967. Although US officials expect that licensing
will gain momentum as goods clear more rapidly
through the port and stocks of goods on hand are
used up, even a temporary decline in imports below
planned levels would not only reduce government
revenues but also result in a shortage of goods
later in the year.
The most recent US stabilization plan for 1967
provides for some increase in US troop strength in
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South Vietnam. Should a more sizable increase in
force levels occur this year, US military spending
would probably also rise beyond planned levels.
During the last half of 1966, MACV succeeded in re-
ducing spending while troop strength was increasing
and prices were generally rising. It is not certain,
however, that this remarkable achievement can be
repeated. The US stabilization plan projects a gap
between demand and supply of some 20 billion piasters.
An increase of say 100,000 troops over the planned
level could increase the gap by as much as 50 percent.
Excess demand of this magnitude would probably lead
to higher prices, because domestic output is not
expected to increase significantly, imports may be
lower than planned, and the MACV miracle is unlikely
to be repeated.
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V. The Viet Cong Economy
The Viet Cong have mobilized from within South
Vietnam the bulk of the funds and the nonmilitary
supplies needed to support the Communist insurgency.
Taxation, self-initiated economic activities,
seizures, and clandestine operations are the prin-
cipal means for obtaining the necessary financial
and material resources. The Viet Cong exercises con-
siderable control over the production, processing,
and movement of many commodities essential to South
Vietnam's economy, including rice, salt, timber,
charcoal, and rubber, and have limited the avail-
ability of these goods and caused their prices to
increase. Viet Cong economic activities, carried
out both overtly and through coercion, bribery, and
clandestine operations, combined with military
operations against economic targets, have denied
considerable financial and material resources to
the government.
Taxation is by far the most important source
of Viet Cong revenues. Viet Cong tax revenues are
estimated to have been within the range of 2.0
billion to 2.9 billion piasters for 1965, compared
with GVN internal tax revenues of about 9.4 billion
piasters. Agricultural taxation remains the most
important single source of Viet Cong tax receipts,
accounting for about 80 percent of the total. The
remaining 20 percent is collected from taxes on
transportation, business, and commercial activities.
The collection of revenues is clearly dependent
on continuing Viet Cong access to or control over
the rural population. During 1966 and early 1967,
the Viet Cong have tried to expand the base of
their tax collection activities in order to meet
their increasing financial requirements.
they have been forced to 25X1X1
use more coercive measures, and as a result, peasant
dissatisfaction with the Viet Cong has increased.
There is no indication, however, that this dissatis-
faction has reached a level great enough to impair
significantly the continued collection of funds and
non-military supplies.
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The Viet Cong are nearly self-sufficient with
regard to rice and most other non-military supplies.
They currently exercise predominant control over
roughly 25 to 30 percent of the area cultivated to
rice in South Vietnam. The annual consumption of
rice by Communist regular forces in South Vietnam
theoretically would be covered by an average tax of
about 3.5 percent on total production in the areas
controlled by the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong actually
tax rice production at rates ranging from 10 to 15
percent, which yields supplies substantially greater
than consumption requirements. The surplus is used
to build up reserves for the increasing number of
Communist troops, to replenish stocks destroyed by
Free World military operations, to help feed the
large number of non-main force troops, and to cover
the purchase of other food and non-food commodities.
Clandestine business operations by the Viet
Cong, and the involvement of legitimate enterprises,
wittingly or unwittingly, in Viet Cong procurement
operations, are common in many district and provin-
cial capitals. These operations yield essential
indigenous and imported supplies for the Viet Cong
from areas controlled by the central government. At
local levels, the Viet Cong use the civilian popu-
lation under its control to make discreet purchases
of required goods.
At present, the population under Viet Cong
control and in contested areas is estimated at 40
percent of South Vietnam's population (see Table 2).
This percentage represents a slight decline since
January 1966. There will probably be a further
decline during 1967, as a result of military opera-
tions, a more effective implementation of the
Revolutionary Development program, and increases
in defections and desertions among the Viet C
during 1966 and early 1967, more
effective Free World/GVN military operations have
placed a greater strain on the Viet Cong's ability
to maintain adequate food supplies and to recruit
manpower for their military units and civilian
labor force.
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Population of South Vietnam, by Controlled Area a/
1 January 1967
Total
Controlled by GVN
Contested
Controlled by
Viet Cong
Million
Persons
Percent of
Population
Mi
Pe
llion
rsons
Percent of M
Population P
illi
erso
on Percent of
ns Population
Million Percent of
Persons Population
Total
16.52
100.0
9.91
60.0
3.8
5
23.3
2.76
16.7
I Corps
2.73
16.5
0.97
35.5
1.1
1
40.8
0.65
23.7
II Corps
2.85
17.3
1.41
49.6
1.0
0
35.0
0.44
15.3
III Corps
1.93
11.7
1.17
60.5
0.4
1
21.1
0.35
18.4
IV Corps
5.71
34.6
3.16
55.4
1.2
4
21.7
1.31
22.9
Capital Special
Zone b/
3.30
20.0
3.20
97.1
0.1
0
2.9
Negl. c/
Negl.
a. Total population figure from US Mission in Vietnam and percentage distribution from MACV
population and area control data. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals
shown.
b. Including Gia Dinh Province and the cities of Saigon and Cholon.
c. Less than 1,500 persons.
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VI
The Pacification Program
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THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM
Summary
The magnitude of the task ahead -- and the
extent of progress to date -- is reflected in
statistics derived from the new Hamlet Evalua-
tion system implemented in January. Tentative
results of this new system reveal that of 12,000
hamlets in South Vietnam, roughly one-third are
controlled by the Viet Cong, and government in-
fluence is marginal to negligible in another
third. Real progress toward pacification and
nation-building goals exists in only 14 percent
of the hamlets, and only fair progress is re-
flected in another 25 percent. These figures
include about 500 hamlets added to the "secure"
category last year. About 1,100 hamlets are
scheduled for development by RD teams this year,
and a few hundred others may have their status
improved through ad hoc local arrangements. The
500 RD and Montagnard teams now deployed in the
field have been directed to take a more methodi-
cal, deliberate approach to their tasks this
year in order to avoid some of the shortcomings
of last year's over-hasty operations.
Even these modest goals for 1967 may rep-
resent an overextension of available resources
in the face of Viet Cong counterpressure. The
Communists have reinforced their guerrilla poten-
tial in rural areas, and are mounting an inten-
sive attack on RD teams and administrative and
population centers in the countryside. On the
whole, the teams have held up fairly well, al-
though replacing their heavy losses will impose
a drain on the planned output of new teams from
the training center at Vung Tau.
The Viet Cong campaign has revealed serious
weaknesses in the security of pacified areas.
Although more than 50 ARVN battalions have been
committed to direct support of pacification, their
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performance has been spotty, and they have not been
able to check the Viet Cong guerrilla campaign.
Only one-third of the Popular and Regional Forces
are committed to direct support of pacification,
and their efforts have not been effectively coordi-
nated with RD activities; our Mission is review-
ing local arrangements to improve this situation.
The National Police generally lack the strength
to carry out effective countersubversion activi-
ties in the villages and hamlets, and the Police
Field Force is generally being misused in static
security functions rather than in direct support
of RD as reflected in the intensity of the enemy's
counterthrust.
In sum, little progress has been made in pacifi-
cation so far this year and prospects for signifi-
cant improvement in the near term future are not
very bright. If the Vietnamese Armed Forces can
be effectively directed to provide requisite local
security, however, the longer term prospects will
be favorable.
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1. Little progress has been made in pacifica-
tion so far this year, and prospects for signifi-
cant improvement in the near-term future are. not
very bright. Planning delays, conceptal changes,
new command, administrative and procedural arrange-
ments, and preoccupation of GVN officials with
other tasks have inhibited progress. Moreover,
the intensive Viet Cong campaign of guerrilla pres-
sure since the first of the year has set back the
program in some provinces, and has revealed gen-
erally inadequate security arrangements elsewhere.
There have been improvements in terms of bureau-
cratic streamlining (particularly on the US side),
and an ever-broadening understanding of the im-
portance of the program and its concepts and tech-
niques. But at best we are still laying the basis
for an effective program which -- even with a
respite from Viet Cong pressure -- offers only
limited prospects for attaining real momemtum be-
fore the end of the year. If the RVNAF can be ef-
fectively geared to provide the requisite secu=
rityihowever, the conceptual base and organiza-
tional tools which have been evolved will enable
us to gain momentum over the long term.
Nature of the Problem
2. By its very nature, pacification is a very
complex, slow-moving program -- one in which his-
tory has amply demonstrated that haste most decidely
leads to waste. The fundamental aim is political:
aligning the people against the Viet Cong and en-
ganging them in support of the government. To
achieve this aim requires close integration of a
wide variety of political, psychological, economic,
social, military and paramilitary programs conducted
jointly by a number of GVN and US agencies. The
effective meshing of such programs would sorely tax
the most efficient of organizations, requiring as
it does the comprehension of sophisticated con-
cepts and a universal sense of cooperation, con-
fidence, and dedication. The operational milieu
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of Vietnam has thus far offered few of these at-
tributes.
3. Pacification involves a contest between
the opposing political mechanisms of the Viet Cong
and the GVN, each supported by military and para-
military forces whose function is to protect and
support their respective political structure while
destroying that of the opposition. The security
problem for the GVN is compounded by the essentially
clandestine and subversive character of the Viet
Cong's mechanism -- the Communist party apparatus --
and its reliance on terrorism. The Communist ap-
paratus, including its guerrilla and local force
support elements, is flexible and mobile. It evades
military operations by refusing battle and dispers-
ing or temporarily going underground; it presents
feW fixed targets. The government's political ap-
paratus and its support elements, on the other
hand, operate overtly with fixed facilities. It
is by nature less flexible and hence presents vul-
nerable targets. The establishment of a secure
environment for the government's political mechan-
ism -- which is a sine qua non of the pacification
effort -- must therefore be addressed on two fronts:
security against military attack, and security
from subversion and terrorism.
Security Aspects
4. Security against local military pressure
is a function of counter-force operations aimed at
neutralizing or destroying those Viet Cong elements --
local force and guerrilla units -- whose primary
mission is to disrupt Revolutionary Development
activity and to protect the Viet Cong political ap-
paratus. Protecting pacified areas against attack
requires more than passive or "screening" action.
While saturation of pacified areas by friendly
patrol and ambush activities can contribute to the
task, it requires a disproportionate number of
security forces, and leaves the enemy free to ex-
ploit patterns of defensive activity. Only by ag-
gressive combat action aimed at eliminating those
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enemy units which pose the most direct threat can
pacified areas remain secured. Destruction of the
Viet Cong's "concentrated units" operating at vil-
lage and district levels will eliminate this threat,
and deprive larger units of the local support they
require to mount operations against the RD program.
5. Security against subversion is essentially
a function of political actions aimed at aligning
the people with the GVN. Military and political
security are complimentary, since attainment of popu-
lar support will enhance the prospects for obtain-
ing information on impending Viet Cong military ac-
tions. Countersubversion potential is developed
through intelligence activities, including census
grievance operations, police informant and agent
operations, and more importantly by organizing the
populace into various groups which engage in activi-
ties contributing to the self-defense of the hamlet.
Concepts
6. Current concepts for pacification are re-
flecting in the planning documents which divide the
process into three phases: the military offensive,
securing (or Revolutionary Development), and develop-
ment (or nation-building). In the first phase,
regular military forces conduct operations to clear
an area of enemy main force units larger than
company in size. In the second phase Revolutionary
Development teams, normally comprising 59 men, are
introduced into cleared hamlets to identify and
eliminate Viet Cong cadre, re-establish effective
hamlet government, organize the populace for self-
defense, engage in immediate impact civic action
projects based on the "self-help" principle, and
stimulate political support for the GVN. During
this phase, Vietnamese military and paramilitary
forces are expected to provide security for the
teams. In the third phase, further civil programs
are undertaken to improve social and economic
standards in the hamlet. During this phase, re-
sponsibility for security is expected to pass to the
National Police when feasible. These phases are
to be carried out essentially in terms of the
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"oil spot" concept, working gradually outward from
secured and developed areas into insecure areas.
The distinction between the second and third phases
has been muted during the planning cycle for 1967,
so that "developmental" or "nation-building" tasks
will be undertaken more or less simultaneously with
the "securing" or "Revolutionary Development" task.
7. The current program represents a substan-
tial improvement over those in the past, drawing as
it does the best features of most of them. The
program enjoys unusually perceptive, dynamic and
aggressive leadership on the GVN side. In the
short year since he assumed responsibility for the
program, General Thang has focussed on developing
an awareness of the concepts by Vietnamese offi-
cials at all levels. The program has attained
status and its importance is being increasingly
acknowledged. Nevertheless, there are some areas
for concern. The fundamental importance of the
essentially political objective is not fully ac-
cepted by many responsible officials, both Vietnam-
ese and American. Another danger is the tendency
to inhibit flexibility in selecting areas for
local pacification emphasis by insisting on rigid
adherence to priorities established by successive
layers of authority. Current priorities generally
seem to be based more on exclusively strategic mil-
itary considerations than on political feasibility
or desirability, i.e.., the political fertility of
the human terrain.
GVN Weaknesses
8. The Vietnamese administrative structure
has generally been very weak, especially in terms
of its ability to execute programs as complex as
pacification and nation-building. The entire ad-
ministrative apparatus suffers from an inadequate
reservoir of trained and dedicated talent. Inef-
ficient methods have compounded the inadequacies
of outmoded laws and regulations. The military
establishment is only slightly less inefficient
than the civil structure. Both have been submerged
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under a plethora of complicated, interrelated proj-
ects with competing priorities which would tax the
capabilities of a relatively efficient organization.
Competing and overlapping chains of command,. between
and within the civil and military establishments,
have further reduced efficiency. Vietnamese adminis-
tration is characterized by the issuance of decrees
and policies which are often ignored in the field.
With the assumption of power by military officers
at most echelons, lower priorities have been ac-
corded to civil and political tasks. The entire
structure is afflicted with rigidity, and is gen-
erally unresponsive to pressures from below and di-
rection from above.
The 1967 Plan
9. The 1967 Provincial Pacification Plans re-
flected the weaknesses in the Vietnamese administra-
tive and military structures. The GVN's Ministry
of Revolutionary Development, which is charged with
overall pacification responsibility revised, as
necessary, the provincial plans emphasizing the themes
"consolidation" and "quality rather than quantity"
in developing the 1967 national pacification program.
A major change in approach for 1967 was made when
ARVN was assigned the task of neutralizing and de-
stroying the capabilities of local Viet Cong forces
to disrupt Revolutionary Development activities.
Apparently recognizing the limitations of the GVN
administrative and military structure the nation-
building or third phase of pacification has been
combined with the Revolutionary Development phase
where it has been programmed, but in general in 1967
the essential nation-building activities and follow-
up of Revolutionary Development are not included
in the pacification plan. The Ministry of Revolu-
tionary Development and OCO are alert to this limita-
tion and are working with the other ministries to
initiate nation-building programs through the vil-
lage structure.
10. The magnitude of the task ahead -- and the
extent of progress to date -- is reflected in sta-
tistics derived from the new Hamlet Evaluation system
implemented in January. Tentative results of this
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new system reveal that of 12,000 hamlets in South
Vietnam, roughly one third are controlled by the
Viet Cong, and government influence is marginal to
negligible in another third. Real progress toward
pacification and nation-building goals exists in
only 14 percent of the hamlets, and only fair prog-
ress is reflected in another 25 percent. These
figures include about 500 hamlets added to the
"secure" category last year. About 1,100 hamlets
are scheduled for development by RD teams this
year, and a few hundred others may have their
status improved through ad hoc local arrangements.
The 500 RD and Montagnard teams now deployed in
the field have been directed to take a more methodi-
cal, deliberate approach to their tasks this year
in order to avoid some of the shortcomings of last
year's over-hasty operations.
11. Even these modest goals for 1967 may rep-
resent an overextension of available resources in
the face of Viet Cong counterpressure. The Commu-
nists have reinforced their guerrilla potential in
rural areas, and are mounting an intensive attack
on RD teams and administrative and population centers
in the countryside. On the whole, the teams have
held up fairly well, although replacing their heavy
losses will impose a drain on the planned output of
new teams from the training center at Vung Tau. The
Viet Cong campaign has revealed serious weaknesses
in the security of pacified areas. Although more
than 50 ARVN battalions have been committed to di-
rect support of pacification, their performance has
been spotty, and they have not been able to check
the Viet Cong guerrilla campaign. Only one third
of the Popular and Regional Forces are committed to
direct support of pacification, and their efforts
have not been effectively coordinated with ac-
tivities;
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Prospects
12, While the short-term outlook is indeed somber,
prospects over the long-term are not so bleak. We
have come a long way during the past few years in de-
veloping our understanding of the problem, and in de-
vising the concepts, techniques and organizational
tools necessary to a successful program. That our
endeavors thus far have been properly oriented and
successfully implemented is reflected in the inten-
sity of the enemy's counterthrust. If the RVNAF can
be effectively engaged in providing the requisite
security, the other problems can be surmounted through
evolution, and the prospects for long-term progress
will be favorable.
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VII
North Vietnamese Intentions in Regard to the War
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NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS IN REGARD TO THE WAR
Summary
The Vietnamese Communist leadership clearly
retains its high level of motivation and displays
every intention of continuing the war. Ho Chi Minh
and his lieutenants are convinced that they can
outlast the US in Vietnam and have programmed their
tactics accordingly.
It is unlikely that the Communists will attempt
to launch a direct, conventional ground attack across
the Demilitarized Zone or that they will commit their
assets in South Vietnam to. one large campaign at any
time in the near future. They are more likely to con-
tinue along basically the same lines as at present,
attempting to wage a grinding war of attrition, which,
they believe, will sooner or later force major con-
cessions on the part of the US. To this end, they
will probably continue to infiltrate sufficient re-
placement personnel to keep existing units at com-
bat effective levels and they will also move addi-
tional units to South Vietnam as needed to counter
the introduction of more allied units.
There seems little chance in the foreseeable fu-
ture that Hanoi will seek the commitment of large num-
bers of foreign combat troops for South Vietnam. It
is always possible that, for propaganda purposes, an
"international brigade" will be formed and sent South
but only the Chinese Communists have troops readily
available in sufficient strength to pose an actual
threat. Hanoi probably does not believe that for-
eign volunteers will be needed in South Vietnam and
apparently is not convinced the Chinese Communists
would make troops available to fight in South Viet-
nam even if they were needed.
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the North Vietnamese believe that they can initiate a
local offensive in the northern half of South Viet-
nam. Their experience over the past several years
has undoubtedly confirmed their belief that the al-
lied forces, with the men now in South Vietnam or
with even a considerably expanded force, will not
be able to drive the Communists from the field.
They seem to believe that they can continue to fight
taking
rs
l
,
yea
as they have over the past severa
heavy casualties but inflicting increasing casual-
a military-stalemate will eventually result in a po-
litical victory for them because they believe the
US will not be able to tolerate such a stalemate as
long as they can.
however, are unlikely to
mese
t
i
,
na
e
The North V
call for foreign ground troops unless a US invasion
should threaten the heartland of the DRV, the Red
River Delta. There is a possibility that Hanoi would
ask for Chinese troops to man defensive positions in
the strategic delta area if the bulk of the North Viet-
namese Army had to be committed in the southern area
of the DRV. On balance, however, it is more likely
that Hanoi would not deplete its own forces in the
delta for operations farther south. In numerous ar-
ticles over the past several years, North Vietnamese
military leaders have discussed the possibility of a
US invasion and have laid out the general outlines of
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the DRV response. The plan calls for the North Viet-
namese to wage almost the same type of war that is
being fought in the South, a mixture of conventional
and guerrilla warfare. They belive that such tactics,
together with the war in the South, would force the
US to commit more men to the war than it would consider
acceptable.
Should such tactics fail, the North Vietnamese
leaders would undoubtedly call for the Chinese Com-
munists to come to their aid. Despite the age-old
antipathy of the Vietnamese for the Chinese, Hanoi's
actions thus far in the war indicate that the present
leaders would much prefer to see the Chinese enter
North Vietnam in force than to suffer defeat by the
US. When faced in early 1965 with the problem of
whether to call for Chinese Communist help to off-
set US air strikes or to negotiate an end to the war
as the US requested, Hanoi decided to invite the
Chinese to send logistic and antiaircraft troops to
North Vietnam to meet the attacks. Faced with the
reality of an invasion by the US, there is little
doubt that the North Vietnamese would appeal to the
Chinese again.
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North Vietnam: Motivation and Intentions
1. The decision as to whether or not the Viet-
namese Communists will persist in the war in South
Vietnam rests with the 11 men who form the politburo
of the Vietnam Workers Party. The determination shown
by this small group in pursuing a war that has brought
great destruction to North Vietnam as well as heavy
losses to the ranks of Communists and their supporters
in South Vietnam stems largely from two factors.
2. One is their complete and militant dedication
to the precepts of Communism, including the most doc-
trinaire revolutionary aspects of Communist theory.
In numerous public statements, the official party
journals and leading party spokesmen have made it
clear that the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) rejects
the Khrushchevian notion of "peaceful coexistence"
as far as South Vietnam is concerned and that it op-
poses the "modern revisionist" advice that political
methods are preferable to violent means in "wars of
liberation." In the area of Communist ideology, the
VWP has left no room for doubt that it is far closer
in viewpoint to the philosophy of the Chinese Commu-
nists than to that of the USSR.
3. Ho Chi Minh and his top lieutenants are bat-
tle-hardened revolutionaries who fought and defeated
the French. They are convinced that their success
was due in large measure to the fact that they cor-
rectly interpreted and properly applied Communist
ideology to the situation in Vietnam. These men
genuinely believe that the "immutable" laws of his-
tory, as interpreted by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao,
have assigned them the duty--and the glory--of leading
the Vietnamese people in a struggle for independence.
They also see themselves as the battle front command-
ers in the world-wide struggle against the "number
one imperialist," the US.
4. The second chief factor influencing Hanoi's
determination is a strong spirit of nationalism,
which finds its expression in bitter anti-Americanism.
Ho and his aides are thoroughly convinced that the US
deliberately set out to undermine the 1954 Geneva
agreements and the provision therein for national
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elections in Vietnam in July 1956. The VWP hierarchy
remains convinced that had those elections been held,
Vietnam today would be united under a government
headed by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Workers Party.
They lay at the feet of the US the entire blame for
the situation which developed after 1954, including
the success of Ngo Dinh Diem in creating a viable
government and particularly his increasingly effec-
tive campaign to roll up the Communist cadre left
behind in the South after 1954.
5. The Vietnamese Communist leaders believe
deeply that they were the victims of US duplicity in
the years after 1954. They believe that they were
fully justified in turning to the use of force in
order to overthrow Diem and unify the country after
the repeated refusal between 1954 and 1956, and even
later, of Diem to respond to North Vietnamese offers
to hold meetings preparatory to national elections.
In their eyes, they had little choice but to take up
arms once again against what they termed "My/Diem,"
roughly translated as "US-Diem." They do not see
themselves as aggressors attempting to seize control
of a neighbor nation but rather as the legitimate
authorities of a national government denied control
over half their country by a foreign invader. The
initiation of US air strikes against North Vietnam
in February 1965 and the introduction of US combat
forces into South Vietnam in 1965 further inflamed
the Hanoi leaders' feelings and reinforced their
view that the US was bent on denying them their
rightful place at the head of a unified Vietnam.
Current Attitudes
6. That the North Vietnamese leaders are still
fanatically devoted to their goal is indicated b
all the current evidence on the sub'ect.
three additional regiments from
the 325th Division have moved across the Demilitar-
ized Zone since March. The continued dispatch by
North Vietnam of combat units to South Vietnam in-
dicates that, at least over the next few months,
Hanoi intends to stay in the fight. Moreover, the
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increased use in northern Quang Tri and the DMZ o
Communist mortars and artiller
adds further evidence of an in-
tention to continue the fight.
8. The negative results of US efforts to ar-
range peace talks with Hanoi further indicate Hanoi's
intention to keep the war going. The North Vietnam-
ese have consistently stuck to their refusal to offer
some quid pro quo in return for a cessation of the
bombings. Hanoi's release on 21 March of the ex-
change of letters between President Johnson and Ho
Chi Minh was the act of a nation which had decided,
at least for the time being, to reject the role of
secret diplomacy in regard to a negotiated settle-
ment
North Vietnamese regard them pri-
marily as a tactic to be used in conjunction with
continued warfare in order to extract maximum con-
cessions from the US.
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9. It is, perhaps, inherent in the very fanati-
cism of the Vietnamese Communist leadership that they
should prefer to make the war a test of wills. They
are convinced that their motivation is stronger than
that of the Americans. Thus, they have programmed
their effort to take over South Vietnam to be a
grinding war of attrition. They believe that a mili-
tary stalemate in South Vietnam will suffice for their
purpose, whereas, in Hanoi's assessment, the US must
either win quickly or settle on terms favorable to
the Communists.
10. Given this long range strategy, it appears
unlikely that the North Vietnamese intend to make
any dramatic military move such as an overt invasion
across the DMZ in the near future. They are more
likely to continue the same basic approach as in the
past, infiltrating sufficient replacement personnel
to keep existing units at combat level and intro-
ducing additional combat units to the South as
needed to maintain or perhaps gradually exceed a
relative balance with US and allied forces.
(Communist plans for
e upcoming year inc u e a mayor military campaign
in the western highlands of Kontum and Pleiku. This
is to be coordinated with two other moves in the
northern half of the country. One will be a thrust
in northern Quang Tri and Thua Thien and the other
will be in the coastal areas of Binh Dinh and Phu
Yen. The North Vietnamese must realize that their
successes, if any, in these campaigns will be rela-
tively modest. They will probably be satisfied if
these campaigns result in heavy US casualties, even
at the cost of heavier Communist losses.
12.1 larticles in
the press by North Vietnamese military leaders, dis-
close that there has been considerable concern among
Vietnamese Communist leaders over the way the war
in South Vietnam has been going. This concern has
been manifested in a lengthy debate among the Commu-
nist military leaders over the proper military tac-
tics to be used against US forces in South Vietnam.
One group advocated a policy emphasizing large unit
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offensive actions directly against US units. Another
group believed that the role of guerrilla warfare was
being underplayed in the South.
13. For the present, judging both from Communist
action in the field and from recent articles in the
DRV press, a compromise solution has been reached--
although some aspects of the debate appear to be
continuing--with heavier emphasis being given to the
guerrillas than in the past two years but primary
weight is still being given to large unit actions.
14. One of the major points of dispute within
the Vietnamese Communist military establishment has
been the relative number of casualties the Communists
believe they can afford to take in comparison with
the losses of the allies. For example, Politburo mem-
ber General Nguyen Chi Thanh, chief military and politi-
cal officer for Communist forces in the South, in July
1966 criticized those who claimed that the Communists
needed a two to one troop superiority in order to de-
feat an ARVN unit and at seven or even nine to one to
defeat a US unit.
15. Complicating this problem for Hanoi is
the difficulty in getting accurate de
battlefield situation in the South.
local Communist commanders report
their own losses accurately. There are some indi-
cations, however, that local commanders grossly exag-
gerate the number of casualties their units have in-
flicted on US units. Hanoi has several means at
hand to overcome this problem.
strength figures are available to Hanoi not only
through battlefield commands but also through an
extensive and very competent intelligence network
which seems to have penetrated all levels of the
South Vietnamese Army. At present, therefore, it
seems likely that Hanoi has a fairly good appreciation
of the actual situation in the South.
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Foreign Volunteers for South Vietnam
16. It is unlikely that Hanoi or its National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)
will at any point seek substantial help from Commu-
nist China, the Soviet Union, or the rest of the Com-
munist bloc in the form of combat personnel for the
war in South Vietnam. In part this is because the
Vietnamese Communist leadership appears confident
that the manpower available to them in North and
South Vietnam is sufficient to carry on the war.
L the Commu-
nist High Command anticipates that the US may raise
its force level in South Vietnam to one or one-and-
a-half million men. The Communists are confident
that they can defeat even that large a force, accord-
ing to the notebook, and no mention was made of for-
eign volunteers.
17. In part, Hanoi's attitude probably stems
from a realization that no significant foreign ground
combat force is likely to be made available for fight-
ing in South Vietnam. Although there is always a
possibility that at some point an international bri-
gade type of volunteer unit will appear in South
Vietnam at the behest of the NFLSV, such a unit would
be primarily for propaganda rather than combat pur-
poses.
18. Certainly Hanoi is under no illusions that
the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country is
going to send substantial ground forces to South Viet-
nam. The North Vietnamese. also appear to believe
that there is little prospect of significant Chin s
Communist intervention in South Vietnam.
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the Chinese would enter the com-
bat "if the war is expanded to North Vietnam," im-
plying that China will not enter as long as the war
is confined to the South. Thus, it is clear the
leadership did not want to raise any hopes that the
Chinese would step in to save the day for the Viet-
namese in South Vietnam.
21. Hanoi's handling of the subject of foreign
volunteers in its propaganda also suggests that it
does not intend to raise any hopes among Viet Cong
supporters in the South of massive Chinese inter-
vention on their behalf. On 22 March 1965, the
Central Committee of the NFLSV issued a statement
containing a warning that it would call for foreign
volunteers if the US and its allies continued to
send troops to South Vietnam and continued "to
expand the war to the North and Laos." When Hanoi
rebroadcast this NFLSV statement, however, it added
the caveat, "when needed." From then on, both the
NFLSV and Hanoi inserted that or a similar caveat
whenever referring to the possibility of foreign
volunteers.
22. Moreover, after the summer of 1965, Hanoi
appears to have attempted to lump the threat of for-
eign volunteers for South Vietnam together with the
possibility of volunteers for the North. Hanoi spokes-
men and news media now use such terms as "the Viet-
namese people" will call for foreign volunteers
"when needed," thus blurring the issue as to which
half of Vietnam these volunteers would be sent. At
no time have Vietnamese Communist spokesmen specified
any point at which foreign combat personnel would be
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requested, and all available evidence suggests that
Hanoi does not expect that point ever to be reached.
23. Even in the event that Communist main forces
in South Vietnam were defeated and the guerrillas
and political infrastructure destroyed, it is un-
likely that Hanoi would call for Chinese Communist
assistance in the form of combat personnel for the
South. This is due, if for no other reason, to
the fact that Hanoi undoubtedly understands that Pe-
king would not respond favorably to such a request.
Lin Piao's famous September 1965 treatise, "Long
Live the Victory of the People's War," stated in
unmistakable terms the Chinese position that op-
pressed peoples must wage wars of liberation--and
Vietnam was held up as the prime example of such a
war--largely with their own resources.
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30. If US air strikes continue to hit key
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the North Viet-
namese can be expected to request an additional
commitment from their allies for air defense. This
could include an appeal for Soviet and East Euro-
pean "volunteer" pilots, regular Soviet SAM units,
a Cuban jet pilot contingent and Chinese Communist
jet interceptor units as well as additional Chinese
AAA.
31. There is little likelihood that US air
strikes will bring the Hanoi regime to such straits
that it will request the introduction of Chinese
Communist ground combat forces into the war. The
North Vietnamese have made extensive preparations
for the evacuation of their government offices from
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Hanoi and have already begun to disperse some offices
to the countryside. Even under the heaviest bombing
attack, the regime could probably continue to func-
tion well enough to continue to support and direct
the war in South Vietnam. After more than two years
of intensive bombing, the North Vietnamese are still
capable of moving substantial quantities of goods
and men to South Vietnam and there is little reason
to believe that this capability will diminish enough
as the result of air strikes to end the war. More-
over, captured documents such as the notebooks
mentioned above, state Hanoi's intention to confine
the war to South Vietnam. Le Duan particularly
dwelt on this aspect, calling it a duty of the Viet-
namese Communists to contain the conflict within
that area.
32. North Vietnam probably would not rule out
a call for foreign ground force help (in practice
this would have to be primarily Chinese) in the
event of an invasion of its territory by US ground
forces. The aforementioned lecture by Vinh* to Com-
munist cadre in South Vietnam stated flatly that the
Chinese Communists will enter the war if it is ex-
tended to North Vietnam. It should also be recalled
that in 1965 Hanoi was faced with the decision of
whether to ask for Chinese help, including the presence
of large numbers of Chinese personnel, to cope with
the effects of US air strikes. At that time, despite
its ingrained antipathy to having large numbers of
Chinese in their country, the North Vietnamese de-
cided to invite in the Chinese. Faced with the even
greater threat posed by a US invasion, it is likely
that Hanoi will take the necessary step of inviting
further Chinese presence. It is possible that Hanoi
would call for Chinese troops to replace North Viet-
namese forces sent to counter a US invasion of the
southern DRV but it is more likely that Hanoi would
wait until it determined whether the US forces
intended to remain near the DMZ or whether they
intended to move farther north. Hanoi would also
wait until it made certain its own forces could not
contain the US troops before calling in the Chinese.
33. Hanoi might also call for volunteers from
other countries but only the Chinese could offer an
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effective ground combat force. Any Communist ground
force operating in North Vietnam would be almost
totally dependent on supplies coming through China.
34. In the event of a US invasion of North
Vietnam, Hanoi could decide to opt for negotiations
as proposed by the US. It is more likely, however,
as long as Hanoi is convinced it can rely on the
Chinese for support, ultimately including the com-
mitment of ground troops, that the North Vietnamese
would continue to fight. A number of articles
written over the past several years by top-level
North Vietnamese military leaders have addressed the
question of how North Vietnam would handle an inva-
sion by the US. They all indicate an intention to
fight rather than negotiate in such an event. Ac-
cording to these articles, the North Vietnamese
intend to use tactics similar to those used in South
Vietnam.
35. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in an
article published on 22 December 1964 stated that
"if the enemy wages an aggressive war against North
Vietnam... standardized warfare and guerrilla warfare
will be simultaneously used in the war launched by
our people to protect the fatherland?" The deputy
chief of the North Vietnamese Army's General Staff,
Hoang Van Thai, wrote in December 1964 that "in
case of war in North Vietnam," both "conventional
and guerrilla warfare will be used." These and
other such articles also stress the fact that Hanoi
will wage a "protracted war" in its own defense,
just as in South Vietnam. Other more recent articles
by leading North Vietnamese echo this theme.. They
all reflect a determination on the part of the North
Vietnamese leadership to fight such an invasion and
the tactics they say will be used suggest that they
believe, in combination with the war in South Viet-
nam, they can effectively wear down the US as they
did the French.
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The Effect of 'the Bombing on
North Vietnamese Thinking
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THE EFFECT OF THE BOMBING
ON NORTH VIETNAMESE THINKING
Summary
Twenty-seven months of US bombing of North Viet-
nam have had remarkably little effect on Hanoi's
over-all strategy in prosecuting the war, on its
confident view of long-term Communist prospects,
and on its political tactics regarding negotia-
tions. The growing pressure of US air operations
has not shaken the North Vietnamese leaders' convic-
tion that they can withstand the bombing and outlast
the US and South Vietnam in a protracted war of at-
trition. Nor has it caused them to waver in their
belief that the outcome of this test of will and en-
durance will be determined primarily by the course
of the conflict on the ground in the South, not by
the air war in the North.
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Hanoi's View of US Aims
1. The reaction of the Hanoi leaders to the
bombing cannot be separated from the broader ques-
tion of their assessment of US objectives in this
conflict. Their determination to endure and defy
the air attacks has been reinforced by their convic-
tion that the US is seeking a clear military vic-
tory involving the destruction of Viet Cong forces
and political apparatus, the partition of Vietnam
on the Korean pattern, and the indefinite presence
of American forces and bases in South Vietnam.
With this perception of US policy, the North Viet-
namese see no advantages in undertaking a serious
exchange of views with the US and no prospects for
formal negotiations on terms acceptable to them.
2. The bombing has not weakened Hanoi's con-
fidence that time is still on the side of Communist
forces in the South and that the US eventually will
be compelled to scale down its objectives and modify
its terms for negotiations. The air strikes, more-
over, have had no discernible effect on Hanoi's abil-
ity and intention to maintain at least a rough mili-
tary stalemate in the South--which the North Vietnam-
ese view above all as the essential prerequisite to
forcing an eventual adjustment in American policy.
Effects of the Bombing on North Vietnamese Determination
3. There is no evidence that the bombing has
had any significant effect in impairing the morale
of either the Hanoi regime or the population.
The Air Strikes and Hanoi's Attitude Toward Negotiations
4. The bombing has heightened Hanoi's unwilling-
ness to contemplate negotiations from a position of
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In view o is constant preoccupy ion wit
maintaining an image of resolution and confidence,
Hanoi almost certainly will continue to reject ne-
gotiations unless and until the US should agree to
an unconditional cessation of bombing. The North
Vietnamese have consistently held that "discussions"
are out of the question as long as air strikes continue
and that they are unwilling to "pay a price" to achieve
their cessation.
5. There is no reason to believe that North Viet-
namese Foreign Minister Trinh's late January statement
that "there could be talks" between the US and North
Vietnam if the US unconditionally halted the bombing
and "all other acts of war against the DRV" represented
a retreat forced on Hanoi by the air strikes alone.
This statement, in fact, was the culmination of a se-
ries of steps which began last fall toward more flexi-
ble political tactics. Since November 1966, North Viet-
nam has invited or admitted a procession of non-Commu-
nist journalists and public figures with the clear pur-
pose of waging more effective political warfare against
the US.
6. This shift in tactics may have been partly
influenced by repeated advice from the USSR and from
Eastern European delegations, which visited Hanoi in
October and November, to the effect that North Vietnam
must make greater efforts to win the battle for world
opinion. The Trinh "offer" was calculated to appear
responsive to statements by Ambassador Goldberg in
the UN General Assembly last September and October
and, particularly, to efforts by U Thant and others
to find a way to break the impasse on negotiations.
Hanoi's "offer" was designed to give the appearance
of meeting the US position of early 1966 which seemed
to indicate readiness to halt the bombing in return
for a clear signal of North Vietnam's desire for
talks.
7. In addition to the obvious aims of discredit-
ing US policy and stimulating greater foreign pressure
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for a unilateral American concession, Hanoi's shift
in tactics may also have been conceived as a means
of deterring new US escalatory measures such as an
invasion of southern North Vietnam which Hanoi appar-
ently anticipated in the weeks following the Ameri-
can election last November.
8. It is possible that the concern over the
dangerous implications of the growing disorder in
China in late 1966 also influenced Hanoi's decision
to modify its public stance on negotiations in
January. Over the longer term, the situation in
China will certainly have an important effect on
North Vietnam's attitude toward negotiations. In
addition, the North Vietnamese may have entertained
a modest hope that the US might be obliged by the
foreign and domestic response to Trinh's statement
at least to curtail the pace and scope of its bomb-
ing operations.
Hanoi's Attitude Toward A De-Escalation of the
Bombing
9. Hanoi's reaction to a de-escalation, short
of a cessation, in the bombing program probably
would be to interpret it as a sign of weakness on
the part of the US. North Vietnam has been throwing
its entire air defense strength against recent US
strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. A de-escalation
coming after these attacks would almost certainly
appear to Hanoi as a sign that its defenses had
cost the US more than it was willing to expend.
North Vietnam would seek to make the most of such
a de-escalation by making extensive repairs to dam-
aged facilities and by stockpiling supplies in case
the air war should again be escalated.
10. Present evidence suggests, however, that
the North Vietnamese are preparing against a further
escalation of the air strikes. They are unlikely
to change their current stand on negotiations even
if faced with more extensive damage. It is always
possible that other factors such as the internal
situation in China or developments in the war in
South Vietnam will bring about soomeevchange intHaHanoi's
attitude, It does not appear,
air strikes alone will accomplish such a change.
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The Bombing and Hanoi's Strategy for a Settlement
110 In addition to the impact of bombing in
reinforcing Hanoi's suspicions of US war aims and
of the genuineness of the American interest in nego-
tiations, the air strikes have complicated North
Vietnam's political strategy concerning the shape
of an eventual settlement. From Hanoi's vantage
point, the bombing has served to dramatize US in-
sistence that the war is essentially a war of aggres-
sion by the North against the South, rather than a
civil conflict in South Vietnam. Thus, Hanoi cannot
agree to a reciprocal de-escalation in the South in
return for a cessation of bombing without appearing
to validate the US portrayal of the fundamental
issues at stake. North Vietnam has consistently
denied any direct intervention in the South and it
apparently continues to attach great importance to
maintaining this pretense for this position has a
direct bearing on Hanoi's aim of winning an equal
voice for the National Liberation Front in any fu-
ture negotiations and political settlement. Hanoi
has taken the line that any peace negotiations must
be confined to the parties directly involved--the
Saigon government, the US, and the National Libera-
tion Front--and that Hanoi would be limited, at
least at the outset of a negotiating process, to
playing a mediatory role in getting talks started.
Hanoi contends that the only subject of any bilateral
US - North Vietnamese talks would be the cessation
of bombing and "other acts of war" against the DRVC
Thus, any formula which equates US bombing of the
North with North Vietnam's military presence in the
South is seen by Hanoi as endangering vital political
objectives in any future settlement,
12. One final effect of the bombing should be
noted--the increased dependence of North Vietnam on
both China and the Soviet Union for vital air defense
weapons and equipment, food, and a vast array of
other war-related supplies. This dependence inevita-
bly has drawn Hanoi into deeper involvement in the
Sino-Soviet antagonism and the extremely delicate
problem of maintaining good relations with both pow-
ers has imposed further inhibitions on North Vietnam's
freedom of maneuver.
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IX
The, Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder Program
and, Enemy Countermeasures
1 January 1966 -30 April 1967
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
AND ENEMY COUNTERMEASURES
1 January 1966 - 30 April 1967
Summary
The Rolling Thunder program has made some
progress in meeting its current two-fold objective:
(1) To limit, or raise, the cost of sending
men and supplies to South Vietnam.
(2) To make North Vietnam pay a price for
its aggression against the South.
The recent expansion of the bombing pro-
gram has had some positive effects relative
to these objectives, particularly in the modern
sector of the North Vietnamese economy. Increased
disruptions to orderly economic activity and sus-
tained pressures on North Vietnam's limited human
and material resources are evident, The damage to
economic and military target systems has not been
sufficient, however, to cause a meaningful degrada-
tion of North Vietnam's ability to support the war,
at least at current levels of combat, There are
no signs that the determination of the regime to
persist in its aggression has abated; despite in-
creasing hardships, popular morale has not eroded
to the point where widespread apathy and war wear-
iness are threatening the control of the Hanoi re-
gime.
The bombing program has forced North Vietnam
to divert from 575,000 to 700,000 individuals, about
equally divided between full-time and part-time
workers and troops, to air defense activities and
to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs.
The cost of physical and military damage has been
growing. Total damage resulting from air attacks
through April 1967 is estimated at over $233 mil-
lion. More than 70 percent of this damage was in-
flicted on economic target systems.
Despite the increasing costs and burdens result-
ing from the air attacks, North Vietnam, aided by
an increased flow of imports from the USSR and Communist
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China has managed to maintain, and in many respects to
improve, its organized support of the war. The
electric power industry has been the most heavily
damaged sector of the economy, and its neutraliza-
tion may paralyze almost all of the modern indus-
trial sector. However, the modern sector makes
only a marginal contribution to the war effort since
virtually all war-supporting materiel is imported.
Other important targets which have been subjected
to heavy attack -- particularly transportation and
petroleum storage facilities -- have successfully
employed countermeasures so that their overall per-
formance and support capabilities remain as high
as, if not higher than, they were when the bomb-
ing programs started.
The attacks on military target systems through
April 1967 had not significantly reduced the capa-
bilities of the military establishment. These capa-
bilities have, in fact, been greatly expanded through
large infusions of military aid from the USSR and
Communist China.
The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the
pressures of air attacks is explained by several
factors. The economy is essentially agrarian and
provides little direct input, other than manpower,
into the war in the South. The increasing flow
of essential economic and military aid into North
Vietnam far surpasses the total damage resulting
from air attacks. This aid provides North Vietnam
the necessary materials to continue the war; it also
implies that the USSR and Communist China will un-
derwrite the damage sustained and the eventual re-
construction of the country, as they did in the
case of North Korea. Finally, the North Vietnam-
ese have devised and employed an elaborate and
highly successful system of countermeasures -- dis-
persal of industry, mobilization of labor units,
evacuation of population and the like -- which
negates most of the desired impact of air attack
on the vital flow of men and supplies to the war
in the South.
The results to be expected from a further ex-
pansion of the bombing program, with the possible
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exception of a mining program, are limited, ruling
out attacks on dikes or population centers. Ex-
perience indicates that the remaining land trans-
portation targets will be extremely difficult and
costly to interdict. The few lucrative economic
targets remaining do not make a significant con-
tribution to the war effort, and their loss can
be compensated by additional foreign aid. The neu-
tralization of the remaining military targets, such
as airfields, SAM sites, and radars, would reduce
losses to US aircraft but would have virtually no
effect on the ability of Hanoi to support the war
in the South.
In summary, no bombing program alone is likely
to create sufficient pressures or problems to prevent
Hanoi from sustaining the flow of essential military
materials and continuing its support of the war in
the South. While the mining of Haiphong and other
ports would impose greater hardships on North Vietnam
and raise further the cost of sustaining the insur-
gency than would other alternatives, such action,
by itself, would probably not have a decisive impact
on North Vietnamese thinking.
Virtually all of the remaining economic targets
are concentrated in densely populated and heavily
defended areas of North Vietnam. Their neutraliza-
tion could be very costly to US air forces. The
recent attacks on targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area indicate, for example, that the combat loss
rate for US aircraft could be as much as 10 times
greater than that experienced in the air campaigns
over other areas of North Vietnam.
Continued harassment and attacks on the road,
rail and trail network in the southern portion of
North Vietnam and in Laos will not prevent or stop
infiltration but will make it more costly and will
force North Vietnam to pay a continuing price on its
own territory for its continued support of the war
in the South.
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I. Physical Effects
The extension of the Rolling Thunder program
during 1967 to include attacks against major indus-
trial facilities in former sanctuary areas, and
against important military targets such as airfields,.
has given new dimensions to the nature of US air
operations. However, the program remains prepon-
derantly an interdiction campaign against lines of
communication and logistic targets of opportunity
in the southern part of the country.
The changed scope of the bombing program
has been sufficient to erode significantly North
Vietnam's limited industrial and military base. The
increased damage inflicted on North Vietnam undoubt-
edly will have unfavorable repercussions, particu-
larly in the modern industrial sector of the economy.
Many of the achievements of a decade of industrial
growth have been neutralized, if not lost. Programs
for orderly economic development have been forgone.
The allocation of limited human and material re-
sources has been a particularly disruptive problem.
The cumulative measurable damage,to economic
and military target systems through April 1967 is esti-
mated at over $233 million.* Over 70 percent of the
cumulative damage has been inflicted on economic
targets. A comparison of total measurable damage
'''These estimates are based on bomb damage assess-
ments using post-strike photography available to this 25X1
Agency as of 7 May 2967. This photographic coverage.
with minor exceptions, includes all major targets
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to economic and military target systems for 1965,
1966, and January-April 1967 is as follows:
Million US $
Jan
ua
ry-April
Type of Target
1965
1966
1967
Economic
36.2
93.3
36.2
Military
32.5
19.1
16.0
Total
68.7
112.4
52.2
The cost of damage to both economic and
military target systems has increased as the US air
campaign has been directed against the more lucrative
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North Vietnam.
Economic damage in the first four months of 1967 has
been at an average monthly rate of $9.1 million,
compared with rates of $3.6 million during 1965 and
$8.5 million during 1966. Military targets have
sustained damage at an average monthly rate of $4.0
million during January-April 1967, compared with
rates of $3.3 million during 1965 and $1.7 million
during 1966.
The estimated value of damage to the economic
and military facilities and equipment attached under
the Rolling Thunder program through April 1967 is
as follows:
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Economic Facilities and Equipment
Direct Losses Million
US $
Transportation
equipment
Railroad/highway
bridges
Electric powerplants
Manufacturing
facilities
Petroleum
Railroad yards and
shops
Maritime ports
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
Military Facilities and Equipment
Million
Direct Losses US $
41.4 Barracks
20.5 Supply depots
11.8 Ammunition depots
7.4** Naval craft*
3.5 SAM sites
1.4 Radar sites
1.4 Naval bases
Airfields
Communications sites
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
Subtotal, direct
losses 112.2
Indirect Losses
Exports 20.2
Agriculture 25.5
Fishing 7.8
Subtotal, indirect
losses
Total, direct and
indirect losses 165.7 Total
*Previous assessments of the value of aircraft and naval craft
damaged or destroyed by air attack were calculated on the basis of
US production costs for comparable equipment. The assessment in
this report is made on the basis of Soviet foreign trade prices
(prices charged for similar equipment sold to less developed
countries) as those most closely approximating the true value of
this equipment.
*'Midpoint of the range at $7.Z million to $7.8 million.
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Despite the rising costs inflicted by the
Rolling Thunder program, the damage to North Vietnam
has apparently been within acceptable limits, and
the regime has continued its hard-nosed stand on
negotiations. No vital part of Hanoi's military
establishment has been neutralized nor has its war-
supporting capability been significantly reduced.
With the exception of electric power generation, the
North Vietnamese have been able to devise and exe-
cute adequate countermeasures to keep most essential
economic war-supporting activity going. The loss
of electric power facilities is having unfavorable
repercussions throughout most of the modern indus-
trial sector. But modern industry does not play a
vital part in sustaining North Vietnam's ability to
continue with the war. The USSR and Communist China
are underwriting most of the costs of the war by
providing the military and economic aid necessary
for the defense of North Vietnam and its aggression
in the South. The North Vietnamese regime shows no
apparent weakening in either its determination or
its ability to continue with the war. Although
reports of food shortages, distribution problems,
and increasing hardships being borne by the people
are received more frequently, popular morale is
judged not to have eroded significantly.
B. Economic Damage
1. Direct Effects
The cost of direct damage inflicted on
economic target systems in North Vietnam through
April 1967 is estimated at over $112 million. (For
a chart showing total damage--direct and indirect--
see Figure 1.) More than one-fourth of this damage--
$28.9 million--occurred in the first four months of
1967, as shown in the following tabulation:
Million US $
January-April
1965 1966 1967
Damage to economic
facilities and
equipment 26.8 56.5 28.9
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ECONOMIC DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
BRIDGES
11.0
1965
36.2
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, Fish ing
& Exports)
L 9.4
POWER
PLANTS
\ 6.2
1966
94.3
BRIDGES
12.1
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, Fish Fishing
& Exports)
36.9
POWER PLANTS
6.3
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
5.9
`PETROLEUM 1.6
`MANUFACTURING FACILIT
IES 1.2
MARITIME PORTS 0.7
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
29.8
MISC. ARMED RECCE 1.2
PETROLEUM
\ 5.2 A
'RAILROAD YARDS 1.2
MARITIME PORTS 0.8
MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 0.9
Figure 1 o Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
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The emphasis on the Rolling Thunder
program as an interdiction campaign is reflected in
the losses sustained by the several economic target
systems. More than one-fourth--$41.4 million--of
the estimated direct damage is accounted for by
the destruction or damage of transport equipment. es
Destruction or damage of railroad and highway bridg
amounts to almost $25 million. In terms of value,
the greatest amount of damage to industrial target
systems was inflicted upon the electric power in-
dustry, which lost about 70 percent of its power-
generating capacity at an estimated cost of over $20
million. The recent emphasis in attacks on modern
industrial facilities such as the Thai Nguyen iron
and steel complex and the Haiphong cement plant is
reflected in the estimates of damage to manufacturing
facilities. Direct damage to manufacturing facili-
ties is estimated at almost $12 million. More than
85 percent of this damage was inflicted during the
first four months of 1967.
The most heavily damaged target system
in terms of loss of capacity has been the petroleum
storage system, which has lost about 85 percent
of the major bulk storage facilities existing prior
to the Rolling Thunder. This loss amounted to an
estimated $7.4 million. The disruptive effects of
the loss of storage facilities have been offset by
an elaborate system of dispersed storage and distri-
bution of petroleum stocks.
None of the remaining economic target
systems has sustained direct bomb damage to any
significant extent. The physical effects of the
direct bomb damage to each of the major economic
target systems are discussed in the following
sections.
2. Electric Power
Air strikes against electric power fa-
cilities in North Vietnam have put out of operation
about 131,000 kilowatts of power-generating capacity,
or 70 percent of the national total. The cost of
restoration of these facilities is estimated at $20.5
million.
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About percent reduction in the main power network, which iscenter
on Hanoi and Haiphong, has resulted from attacks ed
during 1967. Damage to central generating facili-
ties has reduced the serviceable capacity of this
network from 136,000 kw to 32,500 kw, about 24 per-
cent of the pre-strike level. The air strikes during
January-April 1967 inflicted severe damage on power-
plants at Hon Gai (with an original capacity of
15,000 kw), Thai Nguyen (24,000 kw), and Viet Tri
E(1as6,t00(70
and Haiphong
The time required kw),
t)
operation of these plants will be a minimum restore
of fourial
months, with the exception of the Haiphong East plant
which will require at least one year. Complete res-
toration in every instance will take one year or more.
Damage inflicted by two strikes on the
Dong Anh transmission substation, the most important
in the network, will prevent operation of the instal-
lation for at least two to three months. The results
of a 4 May strike on the substation are not yet known.
An additional powerplant at Bac Giang (12,000 kw),
which is outside the main power network, was put out
of operation for a minimum of three months.
Loss of the generating capacity at Hon
Gai, Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen has eliminated the
supplementary supply of power formerly received by
Hanoi and Haiphong from the main transmission network.
The neutralization of the main power network means
that Hanoi now is dependent on one local powerplant
with a capacity of 32,500 kw, which is believed
capable of serving about one-half of its normal needs.
Haiphong is without a central power supply and must
rely on whatever mobile or stationary diesel-generat-
ing equipment that is available in addition to a
small amount that can be supplied from Hanoi for high-
priority needs.
The degree of curtailment of electric
power supply is difficult to quantify. The loss of
generating facilities undoubtedly has created a se-
vere shortage of power and disrupted activities that
normally depend on a reliable central power supply
in addition to the small amount that can be supplied
from Hanoi for high-priority needs.
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It appears almost certain that non-
essential consumption by residences, as m been cialimi-
establishments, and street lighting h
nated. Curtailment of the industrial power supply
probably has caused fragmentation of industrial
processes in some cases, and in other cases has
caused complete shutdown. The few heavy or contin-
uous-process industries, such as the Viet Tnt plant,* and paper complex or the Haiphong ctmem ls
will probably be forced to stop o e aat io n made
es the
some provision for power supply as by
installation of diesel-generating units larger than
those currently estimated to be available. In sev-
eral instances there is no ready substitute for the
industrial process steam formerly furnished by the
central powerplants. Industrial or manufacturing
processes that can be divided into small segments
(such as machine shops, truck repair facilities?b-
coal mining, or port loading operations) can p
ably be furnished sufficient power by small diesel-
generating units, but not without some loss of effi-
ciency.
There are some signs of strain and bottle-
necks in North Vietnamese attempts to rebuild damaged
power facilities. Progress in reconstruction during
1966 was largely thwarted by restrikes that tookkrp ace
during the year. Repair of the Thai Nguyen po
plant was rapidly accomplished in the latter part of
1966 after damage was inflicted in July.
Bi plant, damaged in August 1966, showed little sign
of reconstruction in January 1967. The Thanh Hoa and
Ben Thuy plants were apparently still unservicceableed
in April 1967. Work on the Nam Dinh plant p g
steadily until late 1966, and then apparently halted.
Although some of the boilers at Nam Dinh currents .
are serviceable, it is estimated that the plant
cannot generate electricity. Reconstruction of small
plants at Co Dinh and at Ban Thach apparently has
been abandoned. The North Vietnamese iea~m owilliig
to restore damaged powerplants to p rt
where limited damage permits equipment to be readily
salvaged. Some evidence indicates that they are
willing to abandon plants for which a major recon-
struction effort would be required.
*Thie plant alao sustained bomb damage in April
2967.
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3. Petroleum Storage Facilities
On 1 January 1965, North Vietnam had a
combined petroleum storage capacity of about 128,000
tons* at 13 fixed facilities that were JCS-targeted.
By the end of 1966 about 85 percent of this capacity
was destroyed. There were eight air strikes against
JCS-targeted facilities during the first four months
of 1967. The only identified damage was inflicted on
Do Son, where all of the residual capacity was de-
stroyed -- an additional one percent of the original
capacity. Damage to the Haiphong terminal as a re-
sult of an attack in April 1967 was restricted to
rail facilities and buildings in the terminal. No
damage to tankage was observed.
1967, therefore, a combined capacityof onlyoabouutil
18,000 tons, or 14 percent of the original capacity,
remained at seven JCS-targeted facilities.
The ttal of e,
and related facilitiesvdestroyedhattJCSatargetedents,
sites is estimated at about $6.7 million to $7.4
million. In addition, an estimated 5,000 tons of
storage capacity -- including contents -- tank sites were destroyed during 1966 withaa vvaluuersed
of about $0.4 million. Although the 55 gallon drum
inventory also has been attacked since 1965, no ade-
quate assessment of the damage inflicted can be made.
Thus the measurable damage to all petroleum facili-
ties and contents through April 1967 is estimated
at about $7.1 million to $7.8 million. r strikes leum facilities undoubtedly against
have JCS-targeted been effective vetro-
measured in terms of the storage capacity and petro-
leum destroyed. Although the cost and difficulty of
importing and distributing petroleum have been in-
creased, the bombing has not effectively reduced
North Vietnam's capability to maintain petroleum
supplies. This capability stems principally
the development of dispersed bulk oil storage ca-
pacity before extensive attacks against JCS-targeted
facilities began.
'Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout
unless otherwise indicated.
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By the end of April 1967, there probably
were more than 100 dispersed petroleum storage tank
sites in North Vietnam with a total estimated ca-
pacity of between 30,000 and 40,000 tons. The
eoac-
cumulation of 55 gallon drums also tralgiven
stoath
Vietnam increased flexibility in pe
and distribution. The storage capacity represented ed-
by the drum inventory at the end of April 1967 prob-
,
ably was between 35,000 and 40,000 tons. In addition,
there is an indeterminate amount of "floating toraon
,
capacity" represented by oil barges, rail tank tank trucks, and a newly assigned small tanker for
use in North Vietnamese waters. Soviet willingness
to modify petroleum delivery procedures by shifting
from supply sources in the Black Sea -- almost 30
days' sailing time from North Vietnam -- to sources
of supply in the Soviet Far East -- only 5 days'
sailing -- also has eased the burden on available
petroleum storage capacity in North ieamtank . Tsetes
relative invulnerability of the dispersed will sites
ad-
and drums makes it improbable that bombing
versely affect the North Vietnamese capability to
import and distribute petroleum.
There is no evidence that the bombing of
petroleum targets has seriously weak nedethe eeconomy,
produced significant shortages of petr,
diminished North Vietnam's capability to support
military activities or the infiltration of men and
supplies into Laos and South Vietnam.
4. Manufacturing
The small manufacturing sector of North
Vietnam has suffered important setbacks as a result
of US air strikes during the first four months of
1967. Not only is North Vietnam's industry now faced
by a general electric power shortage, but the Thai
Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine and the Haiphong Cement
Plant -- North Vietnam's largest industrialvfacili-
ties -- have been damaged by bombing? h
direct bomb damage to North Vietnamese manufacturing
facilities through April 1967 is estimated to total
$11.8 million, of which $9.5 million isiaccounted
for by damage to the Th~abugat n ion. Plant 1967 as
shown in the following
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Million US $
1965 19966 Jan-Apr 1967 Total
Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Combine -- -- 9.5 9.5
Haiphong Cement
Plant
Nam Dinh Textile
0.3 0.3
Mill 0.8 0.2 0.4 1.4
Cam Pha Coal
Treatment Plant -- 0.1
Viet Tri Paper
Mill -- 0.1
Lang Chi Explosives
Plant 0.4
1.2 0.4 10.2 11.8
The indirect costs of the bombing to the
manufacturing sector are also substantial. These
costs, in terms of lost production and the resulting
loss of foreign exchange earnings, probably will
amount to tens of millions of dollars annually. Most
of North Vietnam's major chemical facilities have
probably been forced to curtail operations because
of the damage to electric powerplants. The more
intensive use of capital equipment and the inclusion
of additional women in the labor force have mitigated
some of the losses to production. Nevertheless, ap-
parently the best that North Vietnam could claim for
the chemical and coal industries -- even in 1966 --
was that they "continued operating" and for light
industry that it "increased the production of neces-
sities and turned out new varieties of goods."
The effect of the air strikes on North
Vietnam's manufacturing facilities has been uneven.
It is not possible at this time, for example, to
make a firm estimate of the effects on production
of the 12 attacks against the Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel Combine. This plant is primarily a producer
of pig iron and coke. It has also engaged in the
fabrication of barges, small watercraft, pontoons,
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petroleum storage tanks, and construction materials
from imported steel. Most of these products are
inputs to North Vietnam's transportation and logistics
system. Much of this fabrication work undoubtedly
has been disru ted b the bombin . Available pho-
tography' ~shows no
direct damage to the blast furnaces. Therefore, the
production of pig iron may be possible unless it has
been affected by damage to associated facilities such
as the steam plant.
The Haiphong cement plant is estimated to
be inoperative both because of the air strikes on
20 and 25 April 1967 and because of the loss of elec-
tric power from the damaged Haiphong Thermal aPower
aerut
plant
Plant West. Partial operation of the
85 percent of its original capacity (600,000 tons a
year) could probably be achieved in 90 days. It is
highly unlikely that the plant would be restored to
full capacity until after the cessation of the bomb-
ings. The loss of cement output will deprive North
Vietnam of one of its few earners of foreign exchange.
If the bomb damage is not restored quickly, North
Vietnam will also be forced to import cement, probably
from Communist China.
It is not possible to quantify the effect
on production at most of the remaining manufacturing
facilities. No effort has been made to repair the
Nam Dinh textile mill, which accounted for half of
North Vietnam's weaving capacity in 1965. Much of
the equipment from this mill was dispersed after the
first inadvertent strike in July 1965. The Cam Pha
coal treatment plant has been inadvertently struck
three times. Although damage to this plant has been
minor, this damage in combination with a shortage of
power normally supplied from Hon Cai apparently was
the reason for a sharp drop in coal exports during
April. The Viet Tri paper mill, the largest producer
of paper in North Vietnam, was inadvertently struck
in July 1966 and the damage was repaired by the end
of 1966. Production may again have been disrupted
by the damage to the Viet Tri powerplant in March
1967. The Lang Chi explosives plant remains in-
operable from the heavy damage inflicted by air
strikes in July and August 1965.
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The damage already inflicted to North
Vietnamese industry by the bombing undoubtedly has
crushed North Vietnam's once promising hopes for a
high rate of economic growth, and has added to the
heavy burden on economic management. Still, North
Vietnam has always been a predominantly agricultural
nation with an important local industry and handi-
craft sector providing for a large degree of self-
sufficiency. Moreover, industry has played only a
small role in support of the military effort, with
a great part of military and military-associated
materiel being imported from North Vietnam's Commu-
nist allies. Thus the destruction of the remainder
of North Vietnam's major industrial facilities --
mainly the large chemical, fertilizer, and engineer-
ing plants and the large undamaged part of the cement
plant -- would not add significantly to the problems
of the civil population or detract significantly
from the military effort. Added imports would be
required, but not at a level beyond North Vietnam's
present import and distribution capability.
5. Transportation
Air strikes against the transport system
of North Vietnam during the past two years have not
significantly affected North Vietnam's transport
capability or its ability to move supplies in support
of the economy or the war effort. There have been
no indications of serious supply shortages or bottle-
necks. Interdictions have been effectively repaired,
and the use of rail ferries, pontoon bridges, by-
passes, and shuttling facilities has been effective
in reducing time lost due to damage caused by air
strikes.
The capacity of nearly all major transport
routes continues to be greater than the volume of
traffic to be moved on the routes -- thus traffic
delayed due to bombing is moved after repairs are
made. A comparison of performance estimates for the
entire transport system indicates that, while total
ton-kilometer performance has declined slightly, the
total amount of tons carried has increased from year
to year (see Table 1). Performance on the rail lines
has decreased from the high in 1964, when tons car-
ried were 4.13 million and ton-kilometers equaled
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927 million. In 1966, it is estimated that 3.3
million tons were carried and ton-kilometers reached
620 million. The decline in rail performance is
attributable for the most part to the loss of apatite
exports normally carried by rail to Haiphong and to
the ending of Chinese rail transit traffic through
North Vietnam.
Performance on the highways has increased
slightly, and waterway and coastal transport have
shown the largest increases. The increased use of
these modes of transport reflects North Vietnam's
increasing reliance on means of transport which are
less vulnerable to air attack.
Table 1
North Vietnam's Transport Performance, 1963-1966
Million Ton-Kilometers
1963
1964 1965 1997
Railroad
847
927
770
620
Highway
164
179
200
200
Inland waterway
448
490
540
590
Coastal waterway
142
156
170
190
Total
1,601
1,752 1,
700
1,600
Million Tons Carried
1963
1964 1
965_
19
Railroad
3.86
4.13
3.7
3.3
Highway
6.71
7.18
7.9
7.9
Inland waterway
6.56
7.01
7.7
8.5
Coastal waterway
0.35
0.37
0.4
0.5
Total
17.48
18.69
19.7
20.2
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The data on performance make it clear
that the transport network is still providing ade-
quate service to meet the country's economic and
military needs.
a. Railroads
The Rolling Thunder program has had
some adverse effects on the railroad system of North
Vietnam during the past year, but in general the
network is still capable of fulfilling the country's
requirements. The destruction of the rail bridge at
Viet Tri in the summer of 1966, the most significant
result of the program against lines of communication
during the year, reduced the capacity of the Hanoi-
Lao Cai line from 3,000 to 600 tons each way per day.
The line south of Hanoi has been repeatedly attacked -
reducing capacity from 1,800 to 500 tons each way per -
day and heavily damaging the rail yard facilities at
Vinh, Thanh Hoa, and Nam Dinh -- but this line ac-
counted for less than five percent of the total rail
performance in North Vietnam prior to the initiation
of the Rolling Thunder program. Infrequent attacks
against the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen and Rep-Thai Nguyen
lines have disrupted through traffic for only a day
or two at a time. However, attacks against the Thai
Nguyen rail yard in the first quarter of 1967 have
created more severe problems for the movement of
traffic on the Rep-Thai Nguyen and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen
lines.
Highway Bridge April
Rapidesowasastruck.
A
h
t
p
o
o
are destroyed and that the rail jline unorth of Utheans
bridge is interdicted. This destruction cuts Hanoi's
connection with the Lao Cai and Dong Dang lines and
should effectively limit operations until the bridge
is reconstructed or bypasses are built. The impor-
tant line between Hanoi and Haiphong, on which most
of North Vietnam's import and export materials enter
and leave the country, has been open for through
traffic most of the time during the Rolling Thunder
program. The Hanoi-Dong Dang line, the other major
import-export rail line in North Vietnam, has been
only intermittently attacked during much of the
Rolling Thunder program. However, during the last.
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two weeks of April 1967 the level of air strikes
against the line increased, probably disrupting
traffic for a few days. The key rail yards at Vu
Chua, Kep, Bac De, and Cao Nung were attacked, as
were the bridges at Bac Giang and Dap Cau.
Despite two years of bombing, there
n the
have been no significant, adverse effects Indeed
North Vietnamese rail system as a whole`
the system has been extended and improved. The
network is still able to move adequate supplies to
meet the country's requirements, although hindered
at times by interdictions, shuttling, and damaged
yard facilities. In terms of total capacity on all
lines, the system has improved slightly during the
past year as the Kep-Thai Nguyen line has been com-
pleted and dual-gauging is in progress.
b. Highways
Air strikes against the highway
system of North Vietnam have had no sustained effects
on motor truck operations. The road system serves
primarily as a short-haul feeder service for the
railroads and connects areas not served by oter
transport facilities. The majority of the air
strikes have been concentrated in the region south
of Thanh Hoa, with Routes 1A, 15, and 7 receiving
the heaviest damage. Although traffic has been
interrupted and slowed by frequent interddiCtions
North Vet-
and the need for shuttling operations,
namese repair efforts have been effective and suf-
ficient to maintain traffic at required, levels. has been
Route 15, near the Mu Gia Pass,
repeatedly attacked and seeded with delayed action
bombs, and maintenance of traffic on this route
has probably been difficult.
Nevertheless, average truck traffic,
as reported by ground observers, has increased sig-
nificantly during the first quarter of 1967 compared
with past years. It is estimated that the tonnage
delivered daily by truck into Laos along Routes 7
and 15 during the current dry season is considerably
higher than that delivered during the 1964-65 and
1965-66 dry seasons.
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c. Waterways
Attacks against the waterway system
in North Vietnam have not appreciably affected op-
erations on the inland waterways or along the coast.
While important transshipment areas such as Quang Khe,
Dong Hoi, and Vinh have been repeatedly attacked,
causing supplies to be off-loaded "over-the-beach"
in many instances, the system remains very flexible
and capable of meeting the country's requirements
because of the ability of the North Vietnamese to
restore, improvise, or relocate their transfer op-
erations.
The mining of the Kien Giang, Song
Ca, Song Giang, and Song Ma rivers, all key waterways
in the southern portion of the country, has probably
impaired operations in these areas. Sightings of
watercraft in the mined areas declined, but did not
cease, after the mining. Through the use of counter-
measures, operations are now being maintained at
fairly normal levels. Total sightings of watercraft
by pilots and naval observers have remained at fairly
constant levels -- with some minor fluctuations --
throughout the bombing.
d. Railroad Yards and Shops
Eight comparatively important railroad
yards have been attacked since the beginning of the
Rolling Thunder program, four of which are JCS tar-
gets. Two of these yards, at Gia Lam and Thai Nguyen,
also have railroad repair facilities in the complex.
In addition, many small yards and sidings have been
attacked under miscellaneous armed reconnaissance.
The key rail yard and repair facility
at Gia Lam was attacked in April 1967 and is one of
the most significant air strikes against rail yards
thus far in 1967. An initial readout indicates that
numerous buildings and some rolling stock were de-
stroyed. Sixteen percent of the rail car repair
shop floor plan is estimated to be destroyed, as well
as 27 percent of the floor plan area of support build-
ings. In general, more than 5 percent of the na-
tional capacity of North Vietnam's railroad repair
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shops and over 20 percent of its rail yard capacity
had been neutralized as of 8 May 1967. The cost of
restoration of the damage inflicted on railroad yards
and shops from January to April 1967 is estimated at
$2.2 million, bringing the total of such damage by
the Rolling Thunder program to about $3.5 million.
Most of this estimate stems from the cost of repair-
ing or reconstructing warehouses and other buildings
rather than yard track. Air strikes have resulted
in only temporary disruption to through service, and
damage has usually been restored in about 24 hours
after each attack.
Six North Vietnamese ports, repre-
senting 88 percent of the country's total maritime
cargo-handling capacity, have been selected as JCS
targets. Ben Thuy -- which represents 4 percent of
the total capacity -- and Ham Rong -- which accounts
for only 1 percent -- were struck in 1965. During
1966, Ben Thuy was restruck and Cam Pha -- which
represents 16 percent of the total capacity -- was
attacked for the first time. Ben Thuy was the only
port struck during the first four months of 1967.
Damage to port facilities through 1966 is estimated
at $1.4 million. Information is not available to
assess the damage done in 1967.
The direct impact of this damage on
North Vietnam's economy is not significant, although
significant indirect export losses have resulted,
particularly from the attacks against the port of
Cam Pha. Twenty-one percent of the cargo-handling
capacity at Cam Pha has been destroyed, representing
a nominal cost of only $160,000. During the attacks,
however, Cam Pha's coal-washing machinery and rail
facilities were also hit, reducing the port's capacity
for producing washed and graded coal. The damage to
these facilities resulted in coal export losses of
more than $6.8 million through April 1967.
f. Transport Equipment
Destruction and damage of all types
of transport equipment by air strikes increased during
the first quarter of 1967, compared with the same
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period in 1966. However, the extent of destruction
and damage was significantly lower than the quarterly
average in 1966. Destruction and damage of trucks
and watercraft increased significantly in the month
of April and reached the peak levels obtained during
the summer of 1966. Table 2, which is based primarily
on pilot reports and includes some duplication,*
provides a general indication of the damage inflicted,
by type of equipment.
The estimated cost to the North
Vietnamese of replacing or repairing transport equip-
ment damaged from the initiation of air strikes
through the first four months of 1967 is estimated
at $41.4 million.
While the level of damage inflicted
during 1966 and 1967 was significantly higher than in
1965, there has been no evidence of serious transport
problems resulting from equipment shortages. Imports
of trucks have been sufficient to maintain the in-
ventory at previous levels. Imports of railroad
rolling stock have not equaled attrition
rate,** but there is no indication of any problems
associated with rail equipment shortages. In addition,
Chinese rail equipment is available in sufficient
numbers to compensate for any shortages. Destruc-
tion and damage of watercraft have not been signifi-
cant in relation to the North Vietnamese watercraft
inventory.
Data have been adjusted downward to eliminate
duplication whenever possible.
losses of railroad rolling stock have
included many small, makeshift cars used on the rail
line south of Hanoi which are not included in the
inventory estimate of mainline freight cars.
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North Vietnam: Destruction and Damage of Transport Equipment
1965-66 and First Quarter 1967
1965 - 10 Months 1966 - 12 Months Average 1966 First Quarter 1967
y2e of Equipment Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Destroye Damage
Locomotives 6 6 10 14 2.5 3.5 0 0
Rail freight cars 227 592 1,101 935 275 234 61 84
Trucks 318 487 1,935 1,801 484 450 178 172
Ferries 53 56 67 131 17 33 0 1
Barges 263 487 2,520 4,289 630 1,072 453 1,313
Other watercraft 144 210 867 1,372 217 343 79 234
Total 1,011 1,838 6,500 8,542 1,625 2,135 771 1,804
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g. Bridges
The number of attacks against JCS-
targeted bridges increased slightly in 1966 compared
with 1965, but the number of such bridges attacked
was slightly less than the total in 1965, as shown
in the following tabulation:
1965 1966
January-April 1967
S
tr
ikes Bridges Strikes Bridges* Strikes Bridges*
Rail and
rail/highway 6
7 14 110 16
34 10
Highway 7
7 30 76 23
42 13
Total 14
4 44 186 39
76 23
Including *_no bridges struck initially before the time period.
In the first four months of 1967, 76 strikes were
conducted against 23 bridges, all but two of which
had been previously attacked. The number of strikes
against highway bridges decreased slightly during
1966, while strikes against rail and rail-highway com-
bination bridges increased. During the first four
months of 1967, this trend was reversed.
The total number of bridges, (both
JCS-targeted and non-targeted) confirmed by available
photography to have been damaged or destroyed by the
Rolling Thunder program now stands at 410. In this
total, which includes both original and bypass bridges
there are 303 highway, 77 railroad, and 30 combina-
tion railroad/highway structures. These figures un-
derstate somewhat the number of smaller bridges (pri-
marily highway) that actually have been damaged or
destroyed because photography may not be available
for some of these bridges. The estimated cumulative
cost of completely restoring the confirmed damaged
or destroyed bridges to their original condition
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through March 1967 would be $20.7 million -- an in-
crease of 9 percent since 31 December 1966 and double
the estimate of 1965.* It is estimated that at
least $4.1 million have been spent already on tem-
poorrarr repairs to bridges through March 1967, of
wwhich an estimated $0.8 million were spent during
the first quarter of 1967. Estimated cost for tem-
porary repairs to the number of unre aired bridges
at the end of March 1967 is $1.2S-million.
Although estimates of what it would
cost the North Vietnamese to restore bridges to their
original condition or how much they have spent on
temporary repairs are of value, they do not give
any qualitative answer to the effects of bomb damage
on bridges. Thus a survey of the 410 bridges con-
firmed by available photography to have been damaged
or destroyed showed that 377 bridges have had one
or more "serious damage occurrences" (SDO's).** There
have been a total of 598 SDO's since the beginning of
the bombings in February 1965 through March 1967.
The number of SDO's by year and the average number
of times each of the 377 bridges were interdicted
are as follows:
The estimate costs for restoring bridges to their
original condition as of the end 1965 and'1966 were
$10.1 million and $19 million, respectively.
**A "serious damage occurrence" consists of initial
hits and re-hits and is defined as damage sufficiently
severe that a crossing is denied to users until a sig-
nificant amount of repairs has been performed -- re-
quiring considerable time, materials, and labor. For
example, serious damage would include a dropped span(s),
a destroyed pier(s), or a destroyed abutment(s). Holes
in a deck, cratered approaches, twisted superstructure,
or a slight shifting of spans is not considered serious
damage.
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Number of Average Number
Bridges with of Interdictions
Year SDO's SDO's Per Damaged Bridge
1965 218 177 1.23
1966 334 185 1.81
1967 (first
quarter 46 15 3.07 a/
-
*The high figure for the first quarter of
t
h
2967
is
not
comparable
o t
e earlier two periods because the time
a meaningful comparison.
span
is
too
short
for
i.'nile a specific bridge may be interdicted an increas-
ing number of times, in most cases the crossing is
bypassed in a variety of ways. Bypass bridges, more-
over, have not been damaged as extensively as the
original bridges. Of the 129 bypass bridges observed
in aerial photography, only 30 have sustained 46 SDO's.
B. 2. Indirect Effects
The air campaign has also resulted in
sizable losses to the economy of North Vietnam, which
are indirect results of the bombing. The principal
indirect losses result from shortfalls in production,
disruptions of normal economic activity, and the
impairment of foreign exchange earnings through de-
creases in the quantities of goods available for
export. Many of these losses cannot be quantified.
The few that can -- reductions in agricultural
output and the fish catch, and the loss of export
earnings -- totaled $53.5 million through April
1967, or almost one-third of total economic damage.
The unquantifiable losses -- production inefficiencies,
the costs of dispersing industry, civil defense measures,
production losses due to lack of power, the realloca-
tion of manpower, and the like -- undoubtedly total
in the tens of millions of dollars.
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a. Agriculture and Fishing
Although agriculture and commercial fish-
ing have not been direct targets of the air strikes
against North Vietnam, the bombing campaign has had
significant indirect effects on production. These
indirect effects have resulted from the disruption
of normal farming and fishing schedules, the loss
of some managerial cadres and labor due to transfer
to war-related activities which has intensified man-
power problems during peak loads in the crop cycle,
and disruptions in the manufacture and distribution
of fertilizers. Since it is not possible to separate
the effects of the bombing campaign from the effects
of adverse weather on agriculture, the estimates of
losses in agricultural output also include those
resulting from adverse weather.
The cumulative losses in agriculture
and fishing through the first four months of 1967
are estimated at about $33.3 million as shown in the
following tabulation:
Million US $
Losses from
1965
1966
January-April 1967 Total
Rice Production
3.5
22.0
N.A.
25.5
Fishing
1.7
3.3
2.8
7.8
Total
5.2
25.3
2.8
33.3
The shortfall in rice production is
estimated to be about 300,000 tons below the normal
average of about 4.5 million tons. Although all of
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this loss occurred in 1966, $3.5 million is attributed
to the effects of bombing in 1965 because the spring
rice crop was planted in that year. The final outcome
of the 1967 spring rice crop -- normally about one-
third of the annual harvest -- cannot yet be evaluated.
However, the acreage planted was less than usual and
transplanting of the crop was delayed, so that the
harvest probably will be below normal. The loss in
the salt-water fish catch resulted primarily from
the interruption of normal fishing activities because
of the threat of air attack.
Recent information indicates that agri-
cultural and fish shortages have toritributed to a de-
teriorating food situation in North Vietnam. Salt-
water fish, fish sauce, sugar, and meat are. reported
to be in short supply. Prices of many food items have
risen, and known seaborne imports--of bulk foods during
the first four months of 1967 -- about 100,000 tons --
are nearly nine times the volume known to have been
imported by sea during the same period in 1966. How-
ever, these imports amount to about two percent of
the normal annual production of rice, and has become
critical. Fresh-water fish and vegetables are adequate
in many areas, and the rice ration -- albeit frequently
mixed with corn and other subsidiary crops -- has been
b. Export Losses
The cumulative measurable value of re-
ductions in seaborne exports attributable to the bombing
25X1
25X1
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through April 1967 was about $20.2 million,* as shown
in the following tabulation:
Apatite Cement Coal Total
Thousand US $
2nd quarter 665 192
3rd quarter 1,043 324
4th quarter 1,554 395
Subtotal 3,262
857
1,367
1,949
4,173
1966
1st quarter 1,554 205 0 1,759
2nd quarter 1,554 40 1,476 3,071
3rd quarter 1,457 244 2,192 3,893
4th quarter 1,554 243 1,060 2,857
Subtotal 6,118 733 4,729 11,580
1967
lst quarter 1,554 199 1,273 3,026
April 518 113 835 1,466
Total 11,452 1,956 6,837 20,245
Estimate ollar equivalents at f.o.b. prices.
Seaborne exports of apatite ceased
abruptly after the interdiction of the Hanoi-Lao Cai
rail line in July 1965 and when stockpiles at Hai-
phong became exhausted early in August. It is pos-
sible, however, that some apatite has been exported
by rail from the mines near Lao Cai to China. Al-
though known seaborne exports of cement declined af-
ter the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program,
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no direct connection between the program and the
decline can be determined. It is possible that ce-
ment has been exported to China without being detected.
Coal shipments decreased rapidly after the coal-process-
ing facilities at Cam Pha, North Vietnam's major coal
port, were damaged in April 1966, and huge stockpiles
were drawn down. After a slow recovery to over half
the pre-strike level, exports declined sharply again
in March and April 1967. This decline apparently
resulted from the combined effects of damage to the
Hon Gai powerplant, which supplies power for both
the Hon Gai and Cam Pha port areas, and direct dam-
age to coal-processing facilities. Seaborne coal
shipments in April were the lowest recorded in the
last 16 months.
C. Military Damage
The damage to military target systems through
April 1967 is estimated at $67.6 million (see
the chart, Figure 2). Losses of aircraft and damage
to barrack complexes comprised most of the damage,
each accounting for 29 percent of the total. The
damage inflicted on military targets has had no sig-
nificant impact on North Vietnam's military capabili-
ties. The ammunition depots are the only military
target system to have been attacked in depth. Yet
the loss of about 70 percent of ammunition storage
capacity has had no measurable impact on the avail-
ability of ammunition. No other military target
system has lost as much as 25 percent of its pre-
strike capacity. Although 24 percent of the capacity
of barrack facilities has been destroyed, most of
the barracks attacked had been inactive by the end
of 1965, the years when they were first attacked.
Despite the air attacks the North Vietnamese have
been able to strengthen and improve the capability
of most military target systems since the bombings
started. Fighter aircraft facilities in North Viet-
nam are still sufficient to meet requirements. The
inventory of SAM sites and radar and communications
facilities has increased markedly since the bombings
-27-
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MILITARY P-AMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
.1965
33.6
1966
35.6
MISC. ARMED RECCE
2.3
--RADAR and
COMMO SITES 1.0
Figure 20 Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
NAVAL BASES 1.2
SAM SITES 0.6
A FIELDS 0.4
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started. Although fighter aircraft losses have in-
creased in recent months, the fighter inventory has
been maintained at about its level at the end of 1966.
The effects of the damage inflicted on mili-
tary target systems are discussed in. the following
sections.
1. Barracks
North Vietnam had a total barracks capacity
for about 443,000 men at the beginning of the bombing,
of which JCS-targeted barracks had a capacity for
182,000 men. About 75 percent of the JCS-targeted
barracks had been attacked by the end of April 1967,
with a loss of capacity -- either destroyed or in-
active -- for about 107,000 men. This loss. represents
about 24 percent of the total barracks capacity in
North Vietnam, compared with nearly 23 percent at the
end of 1966 and about 18 percent at the end of 1965.
In addition, non-targeted barracks also have been struck
under the miscellaneous armed reconnaissance program,
but the loss of capacity resulting from this program
cannot be estimated.
Air strikes against JCS-targeted barrack
complexes during the first four. months of 1967 ex-
ceeded the total flown during all of 1966. The return
from these strikes has been disappointing, yielding
damage of only $1.3 million compared with $2.5 mil-
lion in 1966 and about $16.0 million in 1965. The de-
creasing returns reflect the fact that most of the
strikes are against already damaged or inactive com-
plexes.
The loss of both targeted and non-targeted
barracks capacity in the outlying areas -- primarily
in the southern part of the country, along the border
of Laos, and in the northwestern provinces -- undoubt-
edly is causing much inconvenience. Damage to barrack
complexes in these areas has not been repaired and the
remaining barracks have usually been vacated. The
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troops apparently are being quartered with civilians in
nearby villages, in tents, or in other makeshift shelters
in the surrounding area. The North Vietnamese have
had sufficient time to adjust to the loss of barracks
in these areas, however, and the housing problem probably
is less inconvenient now than it was at the end of 1965.
2. Airfields
No significant change in the capability
of targeted airfields in North Vietnam has occurred
since 1965, when as a result of air strikes, about 19
percent of airfield capacity was judged to be destroyed
or inactive. This estimate does not include the re-
sults of the April strikes against the airfields at Kep
and Hoa Lac, because of the lack of photography with
which to make a reliable damage estimate. The confirmed
damage to date is estimated at only $0.4 million. The
attacks on airfields have probably had only a limited
military or economic impact. Although the airfields at
Kep and Hao Lac both had jet handling capabilities,
their complete loss would not seriously impede North
Vietnam's capability to mount air operations.
In fact, fighter aircraft facilities in
North Vietnam, which were inadequate at the beginning
of the bombing, have been expanded significantly --
even outpacing the MIG inventory. The gradual ex-
pansion of the basic airfield and control apparatus
apparently has been tailored to specific air defense
needs to counter the Rolling Thunder program. At
least four airfields -- Hanoi/Gia Lam, Phuc Yen, Hai-
phong/Cat Bi/Kien An -- could support MIG operations at
the end of April 1967, and an additional airfield
under construction at Bai Thuong will be able to ac-
commodate jets when it is completed. The airfields
at Kep and Hao Lac also had jet capabilities at the
end of March but their present status is unknown.
North Vietnam now has the capacity for expanding
the MIG inventory and preparing for more aggressive
air operations. In the event of attacks on the ma-
jor airfield at Phuc Yen, the North Vietnamese can
still sustain a fighter force, although less effec-
tively, in the Hanoi area.
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3. SAM Sites
From July 1965 through April 1967, approxi-
mately 450 air strikes were directed against SAM in-
stallations in North Vietnam. The assessment of the
effects of these strikes has been severely limited by
the lack of post-strike photography.
The following tabulation reflects the
minimum damage estimated to have been inflicted on
SAM facilities:
Thousand US $
1965
1966
Jan-7 May
1967
Total
SAM Facilities
Firing sites
310
900
130
1,340
Support facilities 1,600
170
300
2,070
Total
1,910
1,070
430
3,410
The attacks on the SAM sites have not sig-
nificantly affected the total number of active SAM bat-
talions, which have increased steadily and by spring
1967 totaled from 28 to 32 units. In addition, the
number of prepared or pre-surveyed sites now totals
at least 162.
By 7 May 1967, over 2,250 SA-2 missiles had
been fired at Allied aircraft, resulting in the destruc-
tion of 55 airplanes (43 confirmed and 12 probable)
and 29 reconnaissance drones.
4. Naval Bases
By the end of April 1967, nearly 20 per-
cent of North Vietnam's naval base support facilities
were destroyed or inactive, compared with about 15 per-
cent at the end of 1965. The cumulative cost of repair
for the damage inflicted is estimated at nearly $1.6
million. It is doubtful that the damage to the naval
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bases has seriously affected the operations of the
small North Vietnamese navy. Restoration of the dam-
aged facilities can be accomplished quickly and
without foreign assistance.
5. Radar*
North Vietnam expanded its radar system
considerably during the first four months of 1967.
At the end of April the country had over 160 known
early warning and ground control intercept radars
at 60 sites, compared with 149 known radars at 50
sites at the end of 1966. Five of these sites are
JCS-targeted because of their strategic locations
along the coast.
During 1965-66 the targeted sites at
Hon Matt and Hon Nieu were totally destroyed, those
at Vinh Son and Bach Long were damaged, and there
was no significant damage to the site at My Duc.
The cumulative cost of damage to these sites is
estimated at $2.6 million. The destroyed site
at Hon Nieu was reactivated during the first quarter
of 1967, and the sites at Vinh Son and My Duc were
strengthened appreciably by the deployment of ad-
ditional early warning, searchlight control, height-
finding, and fire control radars. There were no
known attacks against these radar sites during Janu-
ary-April 1967.
*Excluding radar associated with SAM sites.
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7. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Four of North Vietnam's JCS'-targeted mili-
tary supply and ordnance depots were attacked during
January-April 1967, two for the first time. The most
significant strike during the period was against the
Thai Nguyen Army Supply Depot North which serves the
area north of Hanoi and represents nearly 4 percent
of the total national capacity.
Only about 17 percent of North Vietnam's
supply and ordnance storage capacity was destroyed
or inactive as a result of air strikes through April
1967. The damage inflicted is estimated at about
$5.0 million. Except for the depot at Thai Nguyen
and those at Vinh and Yen Bai (which were struck
prior to 1967), the depots attacked are of rela-
tively minor importance to the North Vietnamese Army.
However, the functions that were performed by these
depots are essential to maintain the infiltration
system in support of activities in South Vietnam and
Laos.. The requirement to operate from a,.dispersed
logistics base has probably resulted in increased
management problems and reduced efficiency.
8. Ammunition Depots
During January-April 1967, five JCS-tar-
geted ammunition depots -- Hon Gai,.Vinh Yen, Haiphong,
Bac Giang, and Cam Ly -- were attacked for the first
time, and the ammunition depot at Phu Qui was re-
struck I The cost of restoration of the depots at
Hon Gai and Haiphong is estimated at $100,000 each.
There was no loss of capacity at the Phu Qui and Bac
Giang depots, and there is no information available
on which to base an assessment of damage inflicted on.
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the Vinh Yen and Cam Ly depots. By the end of April
1967, at least 70 percent of the capacity of North
Vietnam's JCS-targeted ammunition storage facilities
had been destroyed or was inactive. The cumulative
cost of the damage inflicted through April is esti-
mated at about $4.9 million.
The loss of ammunition depots has been in-
convenient to the North Vietnamese and probably has
resulted in temporary delays in distribution. The
loss apparently has not, however, caused prolonged
shortages of ammunition in the areas where the de-
pots are located. More than 60 percent of the tar-
geted depots (all of which have been attacked) are
inactive, and airstrikes during the past year appar-
ently have not significantly affected the overall
storage of ammunition in North Vietnam.
9. Naval Craft
The destruction of eight North Vietnamese
naval craft* has been confirmed as of April 1967:
four Swatow-class gunboats in 1965 and three PT boats
and one SO-1 subchaser in 1966. The cost of these
losses is estimated at $3.8 million. The small North
Vietnamese navy currently is estimated to include
12 Swatow-class gunboats, 13 PT boats, 3 SO-1 sub-
chaser
10. Aircraft
The North Vietnamese lost 17 MIG-21's
and 29 MIG-17's through April 1967 from attacks by
US aircraft. Eleven MIG-21's and 8 MIG-17's were de-
stroyed during the first four months of 1967. The
cost of all aircraft losses is estimated at $19.4
million, of which $10.4 million is attributed to losses
during January-April 1967. The MIG inventory-of-30
*Excluding the 8 and 20 naval craft destroyed by
the Pierce Arrow attacks in August 1964 following the
Gulf of Tonkin incidents.
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The North Vietnamese have replaced all but those air-
craft lost during the latter part of March and April.
North Vietnam's air force has taken an increasingly
aggressive role in air defense systems when vital
targets are attacked, and it apparently plans to keep
the jet fighter inventory at least at the present level
or increase it in the future.
D. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed Reconnaissance
Most of the damage resulting from the armed
reconnaissance program has been discussed in earlier.
sections. of this memorandum under the major cate-
gories of targets. Pilot reports, however, have in-
dicated a variety of miscellaneous targets -- prin-
cipally transport and military facilities -- as de-
stroyed or damaged and which cannot be included in
the major target categories.
Because of the nature of air operations, it
is difficult to provide a definitive evaluation of
the results of air strikes based on pilot reports.
There is some double-counting in the reports and a
tendency for pilots to overestimate the amount of
destruction or damage inflicted. In addition, the
description of the targets is usually imprecise.
The cost of damage can thus be based only on an as-
sumed level of damage to a typical target in each
category. With these limitations in mind, the total
cost of replacement or restoration of the miscel-
laneous targets destroyed or damaged by armed recon-
naissance strikes is estimated at about $7.8 million,,
as shown in the following tabulation:
Million US $
1965 1966 January-April 1967 Total
Economic facili-
ties and equip-
ment N.A. 1.2 0.2 1.4
Military facili-
ties 0.7 3.1 2.6 6.4
Total 0.7 4.3 2.8
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E. Manpower Effects
The effects of the Rolling Thunder program on
North Vietnam's manpower resources are twofold -- the
loss of manpower as casualties to air strikes, and
the diversion of substantial amounts of manpower to
tasks associated with air defense and civil defense
programs and to repair, reconstruction, dispersal,
and transport programs.
1. Casualties
Preliminary estimates of casualties for
the first quarter of 1967 demonstrate the stepped-
up rate of the Rolling Thunder program. The monthly
casualty rate increased from an average of 2,200
during 1966 to 2,800 in early 1967 (see Table 3).
Markedly greater armed reconnaissance strikes in
heavily populated Route Package IV were chiefly re-
sponsible for the increase in the casualty/sortie
ratio from 0.32 in 1966 to 0.40 in January-March
1967. In addition, fixed targets selected for ini-
tial strikes in early 1967 were situated in heavily
defended areas of greater civilian population density.
North Vietnam: Estimated Casualties 1965 - March 1967
First Quarter
1965
1966
1967*
Total
Civilians
Fixed targets
2,000
900
300
3,200
Armed reconnaissance
4,000
18,000
6,000
28,100
Subtotal
6,000
19,000
6,300
31,300
Military
Fixed ta
rgets
4,300
400
700
5,400
Armed re
connaissa
nce
2,900
7,300
1,300
11,500
Subtotal
7,200
7,700
2,000
16,900
Total
13,200
26,700
8,300
48,200
*Based on pre iminary data.
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The estimates of casualties resulting from
the bombing of North Vietnam are subject to unknown and
conceivably large margins of error.. Information from
Hanoi has generally been of little value in estimating
casualties. Two recent reports, however, make us
reasonably confident that our estimates are of the right
order of magnitude.. The first report, a detailed state-
ment from Hanoi,."Report of US War Crimes in Nam Dinh
City," released a number of statistics and allegations.
concerning the US bombing of Nam Dinh during 1965-66.
The information presented in this report. seemed to be
accurate when measured against detailed studies made
on the basis of post-strike photography. The casualties
claimed by the North Vietnamese were also consistent
with independent casualty estimates made b this
A encv, using Nam Dinh as a pilot study.
We have reviousl esti-
mated
that a out percen o e o a casua ies are
killed and the remainder wounded. On this basis
we would estimate that slightly more. than 19,000
of the total casu through March 1967 were killed,
Although the monthly rate of casualties
continues to increase and to be heavily weighted
with civilians, the total casualties are small in
relation to. total population. Civilian casualties
continue to be primarily those involved in war-sup-
porting activities such as the repair of bomb damage
and the operation in maintenance of logistic supply
lines.
2. Diversion of Manpower
Air strikes against North Vietnam have
required the services of 575,000 to 700,000 in-
dividuals -- about equally divided between full-time
and part-time workers.
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Task
Loc repair and reconstruction
Transport and dispersal
Civil defense
Air defense
Coast defense
Full-Time
Part-Time
72
100 to 200
100 to 120
25
--
150
83
25 to 30
20 to 25
Total 275 to 300 300 to 405
Most of the full-time workers repairing LOC's are de-
ployed in the four Route Packages south of Hanoi which
have borne the brunt of the Rolling Thunder program.
In addition to these Vietnamese workers, up to 34,000
Chinese engineering troops are employed north of Hanoi
to repair and reconstruct the two rail lines to China.
Additional 19,000 North Vietnamese workers are esti-
mated to be in the Laotian Panhandle expanding and re-
pairing the infiltration corridors to South Vietnam.
Although the total manpower requirements
stemming from the air war may have limited somewhat
North Vietnam's capability for sustained large-scale
operations in South Vietnam, and to some degree con-
tributed to a shortfall in agriculture, the diversions
have not placed a relevant ceiling on North Vietnam's
ability to infiltrate troops into South Vietnam. For
example, the full-time requirement for 172,000 to
192,000 civilians for LOC repair and transportation-
dispersal operations is only about 4 percent of the
estimated 4.3 million males in the 15 to 49 age
group. only in relatively lightly populated but
heavily attacked Route Package I does the labor
force required to counter the bomb damage account
for a significant -- up to one-fourth -- share of
the labor force. In this area substantial numbers
of laborers have probably been imported from other
areas of North Vietnam to repair roads and speed
the transport of goods.
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Most of the workers perform only manual
labor requiring no special skills, and they can easily
be recruited from city evacuees, farms, and fishing
villages with a minimum of dislocation to the economy.
Other tasks such as the operation of construction
machinery, bridge repair, bypass construction, and
rail repair do require higher skill levels. Permanent
crews to perform these types of functions impose
a burden on the economy in two important ways. Be-
cause personnel possessing modern skills such as
heavy equipment operation are in short. supply in
North Vietnam, a step-up in the bombing spreads a
thin resource even thinner. Second, the logistical
needs of the full-time construction personnel place
an additional requirement on North Vietnam's economy
for food, housing, medical services, and the like.
In addition to skilled and unskilled full-
time workers, part-time personnel are used on a
stand-by basis to repair LOC's, transport supplies,
and serve as civil defense workers. Typically these
jobs -- such as repair of craters or transloading
a boxcar -- require a low-skill worker and are es-
sentially of a "one shot" nature. The temporary
absence of such laborers from their primary jobs
for several hours or days causes small losses to
the economy.
Although the total number of and the skill
requirements for full- and part-time workers are
well within tolerable limits, the shortage of ex-
perienced cadre to plan, coordinate, and direct the
ambitious and imaginative system of countermeasures
which North Vietnam has devised is a more serious
problem. The need for experienced and aggressive
cadre in the North competes directly with the need
for military cadre in the South. The neutralization
of North Vietnam's modern industrial facilities will
probably free some of this scarce talent, but ac-
celerating needs for technologically skilled person-
nel for operating repair services, transportation
crews, and civil defense programs will probably in-
tensify the shortage. On the other hand, after
more than typo years of bombing, the North Vietnamese
are much more experienced at countermeasures than
formerly, and as long as morale remains high and
imports of necessary equipment continues, North Viet-
nam will not be faced with a crippling shortage of
labor, either skilled or unskilled, unless losses
in the South increase sharply.
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11. Effectiveness of Countermeasures
The major effect of the air attacks against North
Vietnam has been to force Hanoi to cope with extensive
disruption to normal economic activity. The greatest
effort has been required in the fields of transporta-
tion and distribution, in order to keep.supply lines
open to the South and to maintain the distribution of
essential economic and military supplies. A consider-
able effort has also been required to maintain the es-
sential level of output from North Vietnam's limited
industrial capacity in order to counter the effects
of air attack and to sustain a capability to support
the war in the South. These programs have forced
significant reallocations of manpower and rapid in-
creases in the flow of military and economic aid from
other Communist countries.
Through the skillful and sometimes ingenious use
of a number of countermeasures the North Vietnamese
have met with considerable success in withstanding
the pressures of US air power. These countermeasures
are discussed in the following sections.
A. Civil Defense
The North Vietnamese have developed an ex-
tensive civil defense system characterized by in-
creased precautions to minimize casualties, an ex-
tensive shelter system, the dispersal of large parts
of the urban population, and radical adjustments in
school, work, and marketing hours to avoid large con-
centrations of people during daylight hours.
During the third quarter of 1966 there was an
intensified program to refurbish and to expand the
shelter system. According to. the North Vietnamese
press, some 55,000 shelters were built in Haiphong
during one 10-day period. In.the city of Vinh it is
claimed that every family has its own shelter. Al-
most every area of the country reports the construc-
tion of thousands of shelters and many kilometers of
trenches. Although the number of shelters and pro-
tective facilities cannot be quantified, a. new in-
tensification of the program during the first auarte
of I L167 '--
tensive.
make it obvious that e program is ex-
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In addition to the shelter program, North
Vietnam has vigorously pursued a program of urban
evacuation and industrial dispersal.* Urban evacua-
tion was accelerated after the air strikes on petro-
leum storage facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong in
mid-1966 and has acquired a new momentum after the
strikes in these areas during the past months. Most
-
cities appear to have evacuated a substantial por
ie
N
th
a..a.....- - r_ __ -
v
or
t.11G
Haiphong have probably evacuated half their popula-
tion. Ninety percent of the population of Hai Duong
city is reported to have been evacuated, and only
2,000 of Thai Binh's 19,000 residents are reported
to remain. Nam Dinh reportedly has reduced its popu-
lation of 95,000 to 20,000 or 30,000.
The urban evacuation that has been achieved
probably approximates the desired level. In fact,
recent North Vietnamese newspaper accounts of evacu-
ation appear to be more concerned with the problems
encountered in resettling than with encouraging fur-
ther evacuation. Unsanitary conditions, separations
among families, and a cool reception by residents
in resettlement areas continue to have an adverse
effect on evacuees. Moving people out of cities,
the mayor of Hanoi has conceded, is less a problem
than providing them with supplies, housing, schools,
and means for earning a livelihood. Despite the
difficulties of the program, the reduction of urban
populations is regarded by the regime as a prudent
measure and has been credited with limiting the num-
ber of casualties.
The North Vietnamese population is appar-
ently well disciplined and responsive to civil de-
fense measures. The intensification of US air at-
tacks has meant, however, that routine activities have
become increasingly disrupted. In an attempt to mini-
re-
mize the disruptive effect of air raidalerts Vietnam
ported to number as many as 18 a day --
has modified alert procedures for port workers in Hai-
phong and Hon Gay.
'Industrial dispersal is discussed in C.
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Similar steps have been taken in Hanoi to reduce the
harassing effect of air raids. Reportedly, no alarm
is sounded in the capital city until hostile air-
craft have entered within a 20- to 30-km. radius of
the city, tances
air raid alerts have coin-
cided wit the first bursts of AAA or the sound of
exploding bombs.
B. Air Defense Countermeasures
During the past three years the Hanoi regime
has developed North Vietnam's air defenses from a
relatively rudimentary state into a complex, sophisti-
cated system. The system now includes an integrated
network of radar sites, interconnected by filter
centers and communications facilities, and a wide-
spread deployment of SAM missiles, MIG aircraft, and
conventional antiaircraft guns. The number of AAA
guns of all calibers increased from about 1,200 in
February 1965 to about 6,000 two years later.
Since the introduction of the Soviet-sup-
plied surface-to-air missile system into North Viet-
nam in mid-1965, at least 162 SAM sites have been
constructed. SA-2 missile battalions currently are
deployed in from 28 to 32 of these sites, with the
remainder of the sites addin to the over-all flexi-
bility of the s stem.
Steppe -up employment of MIGs in
t eir air e.-ensive role, however, has been noted
in recent periods in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Al-
though enemy aircraft have not yet inflicted major
losses on US air forces, their presence has posed
a threat which has sometimes caused US pilots to
jettison ordnance short of the assigned targets.
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The growing threat presented by North Viet-
nam's air defense system is illustrated by defensive
activities encountered by US forces while carrying
out attacks against the Hanoi Transformer Station
during a nine-day period in April and May of this
year. Enemy air defense operations over this tar-
get, which is about seven miles north of Hanoi, in-
cluded multiple surface-to-air missile firings, har-
assing flights of MIGs, and heavy antiaircraft fire.
US forces, made up of a minimum of 56 strike air-
craft, suffered damage amounting to five aircraft
lost; one mission was forced to abort short of the
target; and several aircraft had to jettison their
ordnance in order to react to MIG attacks.
As shown in Table 4, the primary cause of
US losses over North Vietnam is conventional ground
fire. However, the threat imposed by SAM missiles
presumably accounts indirectly for an unknown per-
centage of these losses because it forces US air-
craft to fly at lower altitudes lying within the
range of the AAA guns.
Combat Losses of US Aircraft over North Vietnam,
by Cause
1965-April 1967
Cause Number
Percent
Ground
fire/other
453
a/
86
SAM
54
b/
10
MIG
20
f/
4
Total
527
100
a. An additional nine GVN aircraft were lost to
ground fire in 1965.
b. Including possible/probable downinge from
these causes.
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In view of the buildup in the enemy's air
defense system, US losses over North Vietnam have
remained surprisingly low, and the over-all ratio
actually has declined as the hostilities have pro-
gressed. The lower trend in US losses has been es-
pecially apparent since the spring of 1966. A
comparison of US loss ratios by year for operations
over North Vietnam is given below.
Total Losses as a
Attack Combat Percent of Total
Year Sorties Losses a/ Attack Sorties
1965 25,940 173
1966 82,170 284
1967 b/ 20,550 52
a. ExeZuding operational losses due to
f ai Zure .
b. January-March.
0.67
0.35
0.25
equipment
There are some indications, however, that the
favorable decline in the loss ratio may be reversed if
there is a major escalation in the number of US attacks
against the northern areas of North Vietnam. The loss
rate for the recent attacks on targets in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area is 3.7 percent compared with the 1967
average for all areas of about 0.25 percent. About 40
percent of US combat losses during 1967 to date were
over Route Packages V and VI, although only about 9
percent of total attack sorties were flown over these
areas. These route packages are defended by almost
67 percent of the enemy's inventory of 37 to 57-mm.
guns and more than 90 percent of the inventor of 85
to 100-mm. guns. Furthermore, an increasing threat
from SAM defenses is apparent from the followjng tabu-
lation, which gives SAM missiles fired by North Viet-
nam per 100 attack sorties flown over Route Packages
V and VI.
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Attack Missiles Missiles Fired
Year and Month Sorties a/ Fired Per 100 Sorties
March-April 900 64 7.1
May-June 770 65 8.4
July-August 2,900 389 13.4
September-October 2,350 144 6.1
November-December 2,030 384 18.9
January-February 1,130 394 34.9
As shown above, in the first two months of this
year, almost 35 SAM missiles were launched by the North
Vietnamese for every 100 attack sorties flown over the
northern route packages by US air forces. The effec-
tiveness of the SAM response to US attacks should be
increased by the recent indications that Soviet per-
sonnel have assumed more control over SAM operations.
C. Decentralization of Industry
Although North Vietnam asserted the importance
of local industry and called for its continued growth
long before the country was subjected to US bombing,
the country's main industrial objective before 1965
was to establish a heavy industrial base consisting
of large capital-intensive plants. The advent of US
air strikes in 1965 forced an admitted reversal of
these priorities and resulted in a renewed and sharply
increased emphasis on local industry, which was to be
expanded through the dispersal of industry from po-
tential urban target areas as well as through the
construction of small facilities supplied with new
equipment.
Dispersal of existing facilities report-
edly began early in 1965, just before the start of the
Rolling Thunder program. It is estimated that most dis-
persal has involved those facilities -- small factories
and cooperatives -- with easily moved machines and eas-
ily divisible production processes. Dispersal has
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been applied both to facilities in urban areas and to
those near probable targets in the rural provinces.
The extent of dispersal of even small fa-
cilities in 1965 and 1966, however, is unclear. Several
conflicting reports have been received on dispersal of
industry in Hanoi and Haiphong, some suggesting al-
most total economic dispersal of industry, others em-
phasizing the large numbers of facilities still op-
erating. The mayor of Hanoi, in an interview with
a Czechoslovak reporter in January 1967, said that,
although several enterprises were evacuated from
the city, there were still more than 200 industrial
enterprises of various sizes remaining. The North
Vietnamese press also has periodically criticized
the slow pace of dispersal. On the other hand,
there is little doubt that many small facilities
have been dispersed, and the movement probably
has been stepped up since the heavy raids in the
vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong in the spring of..
Only two large industrial facilities -- both
textile plants which accounted for about 75 percent
of the national weaving capacity -- are known to have
been extensively dispersed. Evacuation of the Nam
Dinh Textile Mill probably began even before it
was unintentionally damaged by an air strike in
July 1965, and all spinning and weaving equipment
probably was dispersed by the spring of 1966. Pho-
tography confirms the absence of equipment in a
sizable area of the plant. North Vietnamese films
show that the 8 March Textile Mill in Hanoi also
had a large part of its capacity removed by early
1966. The Hanoi Engineering Plant is the only
large plant reported to have dispersed some equip-
ment, but this plant also has had new equipment
installed at the original site.
North Vietnam's heavy industrial plants
generally are'not easily dispersed because of tech-
nological considerations and/or because of the
size of equipment involved. Photography has even
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shown recent construction activity at the 8 March Tex-
tile Mill in Hanoi, at the Hanoi Chemical Fertilizer
Plant, and adjacent to the Hanoi Engineering Plant.
This activity remains unexplained and conceivably is
not associated with industrial expansion. The psycho-
logical effects of the recent strikes near urban
areas cannot be discounted, however, and a determined
effort may be under way or in planning to disperse
parts of heavy industrial plants -- perhaps machine
shops from the large engineering plants and batch
operations at the large chemical plants -- which may
not have been affected heretofore. Nevertheless,
such industrial processes as the blast furnace op-
erations at Thai Nguyen, chlorine production at Viet
Tri, and the kiln operations at the Haiphong Cement
Plant still would not lend themselves to dispersal.
Little is known about the locations to
which the evacuated equipment is taken. Most North
Vietnamese commentary refers to movement to the "coun-
tryside." The return to Hanoi at night of many
evacuees from the city suggests that the facilities
dispersed from the city may not have been moved very
far. Some facilities, however, have been moved to
the mountainous northwest, reportedly to take ad-
vantage of the power potential presented by the
presence of numerous small streams. This movement
also fits in with North Vietnam's longstanding in-
terest in settling and cultivating the land in the
northwest. Several locations have been reported
as sites for dispersed equipment from the Nam Dinh
Textile Mill, ranging from near Nam Dinh to 50 to
100 miles distant. Caves, jungle, and other natural
protection or camouflage are utilized whenever pos-
sible in order to provide maximum protection against
air attack.
on balance the decentralization program
probably has been successful from North Vietnam's stand-
point. Efficiency of production and some pro-
duction per se certainly has been lost in the evac-
uation process as well as in the installation of
equipment in less than ideal circumstances. Prob-
ably more important, though, has been the accelerated
establishment of new machinery and repair shops,
new food-processing facilities, new irrigation fa-
cilities, and new handicrafts whTcT have added to
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the economy of the rural areas without detracting
from the economy elsewhere.
D. Countermeasures on Lines of Communica-
tion LOC s
1. Construction and Repair Activity
The main effect of the Rolling Thunder
program against lines of communication in North Viet-
nam has been a strenuous and successful effort. by
the North Vietnamese to keep all important transporta-
tion routes open to traffic. Besides diversifying
the means of transport to include greater use of
inland waterways and porter trails, the North Viet-
namese have constructed multiple bypasses at road
and railroad bridges on all important stream cross-
ings, built alternate roads, and upgraded the rural
road system to provide alternatives to heavily bombed
routes. The program of countermeasures has had equal
priority on LOC's in North Vietnam and the Laos Pan-
handle and has been accomplished at relatively low
cost because of a willingness and ability to use
primitive methods and materials. The net effect in
terms of logistic supply capability has been to make
North Vietnamese transport more flexible than before
the bombing by offering more choices of possible
crossings and routes by which to supply the Communist
war effort in South Vietnam. Added routes, moreover,
further reduce a rather low average daily tonnage re-
quirement per LOC.
The success of the North Vietnamese in
outpacing the damage inflicted on LOC's by air strikes
can be measured by the change in the number of bypasses
built over stream crossings.* A comparison of the
period from the start of the bombing through Sep-
tember 1966 with the period from October 1966 through
April 1967 shows that the average number of separate
bypasses for damaged bridges increased from 0.98 to
1.15 per highway bridge and from 0.51 to 0.86 per
*Bypasses include temporary bridges, fords/culverts,
ferries, and pontoon and cable bridges.
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railroad and combination railroad/highway bridge.
In addition, the Communists are in a less vulner-
able position because they have had time to put in
alternative crossings even at points not yet struck.
In addition to the construction of bypasses, the-
North Vietnamese often repair the original bridge
if the damage is not too extensive.
Greater speed in repairs during 1966-
67 can be directly attributed to an extensive de-
velopment of bypasses and to a variety of deception
techniques. To augment traditional bypasses such
as fords, ferries, and timber bridges, more use was
observed in 1966 of prefabricated movable spans,
steel cable bridges, and camouflage. The use of a
variety of multiple stream crossings suggests that
the only effective way for air strikes to render a
crossing unserviceable is to destroy the original
bridge and all bypasses simultaneously -- a very
difficult and costly tactic.
A slightly different but equally ef-
fective pattern of countermeasures emerges in the
Laos Panhandle where an interdicted bridge or ford
is usually bypassed by a construction of a short
road around the entire chokepoint. Crossings that
have been repeatedly bombed take on a cobweb pattern
of bypass roads, of which one is serviceable most
of the time.
New road construction and the upgrading
of rural roads and trails also provides the North
Vietnamese with additional supply routes to coun-
teract the effects of the bombings and reduce the
tonnage per road. In North Vietnam during 1966, a
system of alternative roads was built to bypass the
main coastal route 1A between Thanh Hoa and Quang
Khe, while a new border crossing road into Laos
was built as a supplement to route 15 through Mu
Gia Pass. The pattern of road construction in the
Laos Panhandle during the 1967 dry season has em-
phasized many short bypasses around heavily inter-
dicted points on the existing road system that was
so greatly expanded during 1966. The extension of
route 922 east into the A Shau Valley of South
Vietnam has been the most strategically important
new road built thus far in 1967 and the first time
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a part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail has been made into
a motorable road across the border into South Viet-
nam.
2. The Manpower Involved in Countermeasures
The most important resources employed
by the North Vietnamese in their countermeasures on
lines of communication have been mass labor and lo-
cal materials. Although the air attacks have forced
the diversion of many North Vietnamese workers to re-r6
pair LOC's, their ability to simultaneously continue
production in the limited industrial sector and de-
velop alternate LOC's indicates that the diversion
has not caused serious dislocations in the economy.
It is estimated that up to 125,000 workers and Chi-
nese engineering troops, the latter north of Hanoi,
are currently engaged in the full-time repair of
LOC's in North Vietnam and in the Laos panhandle
(72,000 North Vietnamese, up to 34,000 Chinese en-
gineering troops north of Hanoi, and 19,000 NVA/PL
in the Laos Panhandle). The use of. part-time workers
primarily from the agricultural sector has added at
least 100,000 to 200,000 additional day laborers for
road, rail, and bridge repair work as needed.
3. The Effectiveness of Bombing Bridges
The.bombing of bridges in North Vietnam
has been unsuccessful in reducing the flow of men
and material toward South Vietnam. Moreover, bridge
targets have been very costly in terms of planes lost,
and have been effectively and quickly bypassed when
they were destroyed.''-
A sample of 48 JCS-numbered bridges has
been analyzed in detail to determine the effective-
ness of bombing bridges in North Vietnam as a tactic
to interdict traffic. Since the start of the Rolling
Thunder program in February 1965, the US and the
South Vietnamese have bombed 48 out of a.total of
61 JCS bridges in North Vietnam. During the numerous
strikes and restrikes against these bridges, at
least 35 planes were lost.
The North Vietnamese have been able to
offset the effects of bomb damage to bridges by
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constructing multiple bypasses for every chokepoint
bridge in the country. They have been able to build
96 separate bypasses for 45 JCS bridges within the
immediate vicinity of the 45 JCS-targeted bridges
or an average of slightly more than two bypasses per
bridge. A single bridge is a very difficult target
to destroy by aerial bombardment, and construction
of multiple bypasses at a crossing site further re-
duces the probability of effectively interdicting
a LOC. The following tabulation shows a breakdown
of the North Vietnamese countermeasures used to by-
pass 45 JCS bridges:
Type of Bypass
Alternative bridges
Pontoon bridges
Cable bridges
Ferries
Fords
Total
The construction of multiple bypasses,
in addition to ensuring a flow of traffic for the
North Vietnamese, greatly increases the cost of the
bombing program to the US. In general it takes as
many sorties and as much ordnance to interdict by-
passes as to interdict the original bridge.* The
*If it is assumed, for example, that 10 tons of
supplies each day are moving over a LOC containing one
bridge, past performance suggests that one hit on the
bridge will be scored and traffic interdicted if 47
bombs are dropped. The average ordnance load carried
by aircraft over North Vietnam is just under two tons.
If the load consists of 500-pound bombs, it takes ap-
proximately six sorties to interdict a bridge. To
interrupt the same 10 tons of traffic which can be
handled by three possible crossings -- the original
bridge or each of two separate bypasses -- 141 bombs in
the 500-pound class must be expended and 18 sorties
flown.
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cost to the US of bombing, therefore, increases at a
much more rapid rate than the cost to the North Viet-
namese because the majority of the bypasses are low-
cost expedients which can be repaired rapidly.
E. Contingency Planning
Along with reacting to existing bomb damage,
the North Vietnamese have, since the inception of the
bombing, developed contingency plans -- countermeasures
taken before bombing occurs -- to cope with escalation
and shifts in emphasis of the Rolling Thunder program.
These contingency plans are difficult to separate from
other reactions to existing bomb damage, and thus often
not easily recognizable. In addition, contingency plans
and countermeasures to existing bomb damage must com-
pete for the same scarce resources.
The nearly complete civil defense evacuation
system in Hanoi and Haiphong and the elaborate system
of bridge bypasses are examples of ambitious contingency
planning. A civil defense shelter program is nearly
complete in Hanoi, despite the capital's relative im-
munity from air attack. In addition, a full half of
the populations of Hanoi and Haiphong are believed to
have been evacuated. A number of unstruck North Viet-
namese bridges have highway and rail bypasses already
in place in anticipation of future possible strikes.
Before the Hanoi Highway and Rail Bridge over the
Canal des Rapides (JCS 13) was struck in late April,
piers for a bypass span had been in place for a num-
ber of months, and bridge decking was stored on the
river bank. A 7,3-mile rail bypass and rail ferry
skirts the unstruck Hanoi "Doumer" Bridge (JCS 12).
Despite an ability to transport an adequate
level of supplies to the South with its existing al-
though constantly attacked transportation network,
North Vietnam has continued to expand the capacity
of the network. For example, the Dong Dang Rail Line
has been dual gauged and extended from Kep to Thai
Nguyen. An alternative road network to Route 1 A
is nearing completion south from Thanh Hoa. Presum-
ably Hanoi is preparing for the contingency that the
US will greatly escalate the LOC campaign or mine
Haiphong harbor, necessitating the use of this ex-
tra capacity.
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In other areas, Hanoi's contingency plans have
been less ambitious because of the strain placed on re-
source availability by countermeasures to existing
bomb damage. Although small portable diesel electric
power generators were received from the USSR in small
numbers during 1964 (22 in 1964), purchases did not
pick up to their present high rate until the US had
begun attacking thermal powerplants in the southern
route packages in mid-1965. Although partial dis-
persal of several textile mills and some handicraft
industry took place in 1965, other major, unstruck
plants appear to be in full operation despite their
vulnerability.
Some dike and road interdiction contingency
plans appear to have been put into operation. Steel
mesh for repairing breaches has been reported in
storage along dikes. Piles of stone and earth have
been observed along roadsides; local village "volunteer"
crews are ready to fill crater holes.
F. Imports and Foreign Aid as Countermeasures
1. Economic Aid
The sharp and continuing rise in eco-
nomic aid to North Vietnam in the form of imports
from the other Communist countries has been an im-
portant countermeasure to the bombing effort in
North Vietnam. This aid has risen from an annual
average of $50 million to $75 million for 1955-64
to an estimated $150 million in 1965 and $275 mil-
lion in 1966, and it seems to be increasing again
in 1967. Most of the aid extended through 1964 was
for North Vietnam's economic development program.
The more recent aid agreements make it clear that
the Communist countries have implicitly guaranteed
to finance the economic losses incurred by North
Vietnam in its war effort.
The value of this aid can be seen prin-
cipally in the rise in imports in 1965 and 1966,
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particularly the rise in imports of those goods sup-
porting the war effort.
The Communist countries have provided
substantial quantities of equipment for transporta-
tion, construction, power, communications, and main-
tenance programs. Furthermore, machinery and equip-
ment apparently have been made available for both
new and continuing aid projects which are not mili-
tary associated, although this category of aid goods
seemed to decline in 1966, and seems likely to de-
cline even further in 1967.
There have been sharp increases in im-
ports of machinery and equipment -- machine building
shops, repair shops, small manufacturing enterprises,
vehicles (road, rail, and water), heavy transport
and roadbuilding equipment, machine tools, small
diesel generators, and volumes of spare parts -- all
related to the repair and replacement of parts in the
transportation and power sectors of the economy and
to repair and reconstruction programs. The power
sector is particularly dependent on diesel genera-
tors because the regular electric power industry
has been so heavily damaged by the bombing and be-
cause of the decentralization of industry. Tele-
communications imports are another valuable but
small-volume category, with most military communi-
cations equipment supplied by Communist China, prob-
ably by rail.
Petroleum products are an extremely large
volume import -- imports by sea increased to 200,000
tons in 1966 compared with 170,000 tons in 1965. Early
1967 reports show another large increase. Petroleum
imports are essential to the transportation, con-
struction, and power sectors of the economy, par-
ticularly to the power sector since it has become
so dependent on diesel generators.
Almost all iron and steel products must
be imported because North Vietnam makes no steel,
although it does.produce pig iron at the Thai Nguyen
iron and steel complex. Products related to the war
effort, such as barges, POL storage tanks, pontoons,
building members, possibly bridge trusses, and other
structured shapes, are fabricated at Thai Nguyen and
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possibly at other locations. Most of these metal
products come from the USSR and Japan by ship, al-
though Communist China probably ships some steel
products by rail. Imports of these metals by sea
during 1966 were double the volume in 1965.
Bulk foodstuffs imported by sea have
increased sharply in late 1966 and early 1967. This
increase parallels the reports of losses of rice pro-
duction in North Vietnam in 1966, and it may also
reflect internal distribution problems. Food im-
ports could become important if the seeming food
shortage worsens. Another factor in the food sup-
ply has been the large and increasing imports of
fertilizers. Maintenance of the food supply may
be more difficult if the fertilizers are not re-
ceived and distributed properly.
The relative backwardness of North Viet-
nam's economy, however, makes it less vulnerable
than its dependence on imports might suggest. The
economy of North Vietnam is still basically one of
subsistence agriculture, with an essential self-suf-
ficiency in food, although continuation of the
shortages reported in late 1966 could bring about
a critical situation if imports are cut off. Denial
of imports to North Vietnam otherwise would have
minimal effect on the nonindustrial economic organ-
ization generally. Even the loss of transport equip-
ment could be compensated for in the domestic econ-
omy by the extensive use of manpower for the trans-
portation of necessary goods.
2. Military Aid
In addition to increasing their deliver-
ies of economic goods, the USSR and Communist China
responded to the Rolling Thunder program by increas-
ing sharply the levels of military assistance, as
shown in the following tabulation:
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Million US $ a/
Jan-March
1953-64
1965
1966
1967
Total
USSR
70
200
360
90
720
China
70
45
85
27
227
Totals
140
245
445
117
947
a. These values are based on Soviet foreign trade
prices (prices charged for similar equipment sold
to Less developed countries), which are believed
to most closely approximate the true value of
this equipment.
Deliveries of military equipment, which
previously had been on a very small scale, reached
an estimated $245 million in 1965 and $445 million
in 1966. Deliveries in the first quarter of 1967 have
been at a slightly higher rate than that observed
during 1966, and may increase even more during the
remainder of 1967.
Chinese military aid programs follow
well-established lines which reflect the capabilities
of the donors. The USSR has provided heavier and
more advanced equipment such as antiaircraft guns,
radar, tanks, artillery, SAM systems, and most of
the advanced fighter aircraft. The Chinese have
been the major suppliers of trucks, small arms
ammunition, and equipment for ground forces. A
breakdown of the major items of Soviet and Chinese
deliveries of military equipment is shown in Tables
5 and 6.
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Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam a/
1965-March 1967
t
1965
1966 January-March 1967
Quan
ity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value Quantity Value
(Million US $)
(Units) (Million US $)
200.0
360.
0
Surface-to-air missile
systems
Firin
batt
li
72.0
77.
0
40
0
g
a
ons
15
66.0
10
.
Replacement missiles
200
6.0
1,100
33.
5
0 600
22.0
18.0
Aircraft
I1-28 li
h
54
16.2
85
44.
5 0
0
g
t jet bomber
8
2.8
MIG-21 jet fighter
MIG-15
1
11
8.8
26
20.
8
/
7 jet fighter
Mi-6 h
li
32
4.2
42
5.
5
e
copter
Mi-4 h
li
6
12.
0
e
copter
U-
7
1
4
MIG-15 jet trainer
3
0.4
.
An-24 medium transport
3
2
8
I1-18 heavy transport
1
.
2.
0
Armor
20
0.5
20
0
5
PT-76 amphibious tank
5
.
0.3
5
0
3
BTR-40 APC
10
0.1
10
.
0
1
SU-76 assault gun
5
0.1
5
.
0.1
Artillery
1,250
37.9
3
444
75
9
100-mm. AAA
100
5
2
,
.
150
3.5
85
.
75
9
-mm. AAA
57-mm
AAA
315
12.4
620
25.0
.
37-mm. AAA
485
250
17.0
2
2
800
27.9
75
3.0
Field artillery
.
1,949
17.5
75
0.5
(76-152-mm.)
100
1.1
105
1.6
Radar
23
4.4
160
30.1
60
11.0
Trucks and vehicles
1,000
5.0
1
000
5
0
,
.
300
1.5
Small arms and infantry
weapons
2.0
4.0
1.0
Ammunition
17,000 tons
62.0
33,000 tons
123.0
9
000 t
3
,
ons
3.0
a.
Estimates o not Znc u e the va ue of ms zt
ary 2n rastructure an
rounding, subtotals may not add.
fact itTes. Because o
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 Total value
Aircraft
MSG-15/17 jet fighter
Naval craft
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Table 6
Chinese Communist Military Aid to North Vietnam a/
1965-March 1967
1965
Quantity Va ue
(Units) (Million US $)
8 1.0
F 1.6
1966 January-March 1967
Quantity Value Quantity value
(Units) (Million US $) (Units) (Million US $)
85.0 27.0
4 4.0
"T T.7
Shanghai-class PTF
Light cargo ship
300
5.3
100
3.5
Artillery
M
7.7
57-mm. AAA
To
77T
37-mm. AAA
200
1.8
33
112
9.0
10
Radar
5
0
200
0
5
100
.
hicles
d
000
1
.
ve
Trucks an
,
Small arms and infantry
10.0
weapons
0
38
4,000 tons 10.0
Ammunition
8,000 tons
20.0
15,000 tons
.
1171 111
a, Estimates o not include the value ue o military infrastructure an ace sties. Because of
rounding, subtotals may not add.
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III. Prospects of an Effective Bombing Program
A. The Success to Date
The objectives of the bombing program are
stated currently to be two-fold:
1. To limit or raise the cost of sending
men and supplies to South Vietnam.
2. To make North Vietnam pay a price for
its aggression against the South. '
To the extent that any degradation of enemy
capabilities or any penalties imposed on his aggres-
sive conduct in South Vietnam are indicative of
successful achievement of US objectives, the US
bombing program must be judged to be meeting with
some success. But the degree of success is limited.
The bombing program has undoubtedly raised the cost
and increased the burdens of maintaining the aggres-
sion in South Vietnam. These exactions appear to be
within acceptable limits to the Hanoi regime. Given
a continuing flow of economic and military aid from
Communist China and the USSR, North Vietnam remains
capable of maintaining and supplying its forces in
South Vietnam at both present and higher levels of
combat. The price of its aggression, with the
exception of manpower losses, is being assumed by
its Communist allies.
Despite the increased weight and broadening
of the air attack, North Vietnam has increased its
support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. There
was a three-fold increase in the level of personnel
infiltration in 1966 and additional thousands of
troops have been positioned in and around the DMZ.
The flow of material supplies to the VC/NVA forces
in South Vietnam during the current dry season is
at least equal to and may well exceed the volume
made available last year.
The North Vietnamese economy has suffered
increasing damage, but this has had no decisive
effect on the attitude of the regime toward the war,
nor has it caused a deterioration of popular morale
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to the point where the regime has lost the support
of its people. The performance of the domestic
transportation system exceeds that achieved before
the Rolling Thunder program; imports both by sea
and by rail have moved to increasingly high levels.
Deficiencies in domestic food supply are being met
by the USSR and Communist China and food shortages
have not attained serious proportions. The vital
petroleum storage system, as currently dispersed,
has survived the destruction of more than 85 per-
cent of its major bulk storage capacities, and
petroleum stocks have been maintained at essentially
early 1966 levels. The neutralization of 70 percent
of the country's electric power generating capacity
has created severe shortages of power and disrupted
much of North Vietnam's modern industrial economy.
It is unlikely, however, that the loss of electric
power can have a significant impact on military
operations.
B. Outlook
The outlook for marked success in achieving
the current objectives of US bombing programs is
not bright. The US bombing program had by the end
of April attacked 173 targets or more than 70 percent
of the targets on the JCS list. About 20 of these
targets received only minor damage, so that their
pre-strike capacity is relatively intact. These
targets and the 69 unstruck targets are grouped, by
category, as follows:
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Target System Number
Bridges 28
Airfields 7
Military barracks headquarters
and storage depots 17
Powerplants 9
Locks 7
Industry 6
Mineable areas 4
Miscellaneous 11
Total 89
In addition, there are seven non-targeted industrial
facilities that are significant to the North Viet-
namese economy and its war-supporting activities.
The returns that can. be realistically ex-
pected from the neutralization of the remaining
economic, military, and land transport JCS targets
is small. The two most promising target systems --
locks and mineable areas -- have been unacceptable
to date on humane grounds or because of the political
problems their neutralization would create. The
enemy's success in countering attacks on bridges
and in sustaining traffic movement is too well cata-
logued to warrant further discussion. Attacks on
military installations would have only limited ef-
fects. Many of these facilities are inactive, and
contingency plans to counter their loss are undoubt-
edly well developed. Even if North Vietnam were
denied complete access to its airfields, this alone
would be unlikely to significantly alter the regime's
attitude toward the war since it would have only a
marginal effect, through increasing costs, on the
flow of men and supplies to the South.
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The neutralization of North Vietnam's re-
maining industry would extract a high price in terms
of the elimination of the results of years of eco-
nomic development, loss of foreign exchange earnings,
and the displacement of the urban labor force, and
would add to the burden of aid from other Communist
countries. There is no apparent reason why such
losses would force Hanoi to the negotiating table.
The loss of its modern industrial sector is appar-
ently a tolerable burden in a country that has an
overwhelmingly agrarian economy. The contribution
of North Vietnam's modern economy to the war effort
is small and its loss can be countered as long as
essential economic and military supplies can be
obtained from the USSR and China.
The greatest possible impact on Hanoi would
result from a US strike program which would include
mining the major ports and inland waterways, to which
the remaining JCS transport targets, other than the
locks, would make a useful addition. It has pre-
viously been estimated that such a program would be
a matter of serious concern to the Hanoi leadership.
Some import programs would have to be forgone and
problems of supply and distribution would be acute.
However, even this program's successful execution
would be unlikely to dampen down the continued move-
ment of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the
South.
C. Costs to the US
The US would probably pay increasing costs --
both political and military -- in choosing any of the
available options for escalation of the air war. The
political costs in terms of both domestic US and
international reactions would vary with the options
chosen. US aircraft losses on the recent strikes in
the Hanoi-Haiphong area have been at a rate of more
than ten times those experienced during the 1966
campaign and in attacks on more isolated targets dur-
ing 1967. The preponderance of the targets yet un-
struck or warranting restrike are in the more heavily
defended areas of North Vietnam. Almost 90 percent --
86 targets -- are in Route Packages 4, 5, and 6. Of
these, eight are in Route Package 5, 69 are in Route
Package 6, which includes Hanoi and Haiphong, and
nine targets are in the buffer zone along the Chinese-
North Vietnamese border.
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x
North Vietnam: An Economic Appraisal
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Summary and Conclusions
The war and the bombings have significantly
eroded the North Vietnamese economy, but for the
following reason have not seriously affected North
Vietnam's ability to continue the war:
(1) The economy is at a comparatively primitive
stage of development; agriculture and small
plants and shops predominate, and the people
have simple needs, most of which are satis-
fied locally.
(2) Imports from Communist countries have en-
abled North Vietnam to make up shortfalls in
production and to take care of new needs, and
have provided large amounts of military equip-
ment. Identified seaborne imports in the
first four months of 1967 increased sharply,
and food imports were greater than for all
of 1966.
(3) The North Vietnamese have been able to com-
pensate for the bombing in various ways,
and have in particular shown considerable
ingenuity in keeping lines of communica-
tions open.*
Most of the important industrial plants and elec-
tric powerplants in North Vietnam did not become tar-
gets until this year, and the economy has not fully felt
the effect of the damage they have recently absorbed.
Production from the entire modern sector is sure to
fall considerably. Even if further bombing were to
eliminate modern industry entirely, however, the econ-
omy could still function at levels adequate to supply
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the bulk of the population's simple needs and to
service and repair lines of communication.
The overall level of economic activity prob-
ably did not change much in 1965 and 1966, although
production declined in some sectors. The output
of modern industry has been sharply reduced this
year by the bombings, but small-scale industry has
been little affected. North Vietnam's industry
produces little military equipment; its major con-
tribution to the war effort is in maintaining trans-
port equipment, most of which is imported, and in
helping keep open lines of communication. Food
production declined in 1966, partly because of poor
weather, and textile production also fell, but
imports have taken up much or perhaps all of the
slack. Some consumer goods are scarce, however,
and the price of some of them has risen beyond the
reach of the average consumer.
Efforts are underway to make the economy more
responsive to current needs. Local industries are
being developed to reduce the economy's vulnerability
to bombing, mostly with Communist aid. In addition,
industry is being dispersed somewhat, and non-essen-
tial civilians are being relocated from some urban
areas.
North Vietnam's chronic trade deficit increased
in 1966 as exports fell and imports grew, but the
trade deficit has been made up by aid from other
Communist countries. Economic aid deliveries from
Communist countries rose to about $275 million dur-
ing 1966, from a level of about $150 million in
1965.
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I. The Economy of North Vietnam in Early 1965
The economy of North Vietnam in early 1965 had
been affected only slightly by the war in the South.
Most of the population was living at near-subsistence
levels from agricultural production,.although the non-
agricultural economy was developing, The GNP was
roughly $1,6 billion, or something less than $100
per capita, The average annual rate of growth of
GNP was about 6 percent during 1958-63. Vague
claims of continued economic growth were made dur-
ing 1964 and 1965, but none has been made since.
Of a population of 18 million, about 9 million
were in the labor force, three-fourths of these in
agriculture. The labor force was predominantly un-
skilled and untrained, and included a large per-
centage of women. Seasonal unemployment and under-
employment were prevalent in agriculture. In the
15-49 age group, there were about 400 million males,
and an estimated 2 million were physically fit for
military service. Approximately 110,000 physically
fit males reached the age of 18 each year, Thus,
there was a considerable pool of manpower of mili-
tary age for the North Vietnamese armed forces.
Moreover, because of widespread underemployment
and the ready substitutability of women in many
occupations, a large proportion of the physically
fit males could be put into military service with
little noticeable impact on the economy.
Agricultural output had grown but slowly since
1954, in large part because of managerial short-
comings and peasant resistance to collectivization.
Rice is the principal crop. There are two rice
crops a year, one harvested in May-June and one
in October-November. Rice production remained
relatively constant from 1958 through 1965 at
about 4.5 million tons per year. Important crops
besides rice include corn, cassava, sweet potatoes,
soy beans, hemp, coffee, tea, and sugar cane.
In spite of the agricultural nature of the econ-
omy, small but important quantities of bulk foods,
mainly corn, rice and wheat flour, have been im-
ported to augment domestic supplies.
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Industry consisted of some modern plants, nearly
all located within 50 miles of the Hanoi-Haiphong
area, and a large number of small plants and handi-
craft shops distributed throughout the remaining
populated areas. The value of output of modern in-
dustry amounted to about 40 percent of total indus-
trial output. North Vietnam's modern industry in-
cluded the first phase of an integrated iron and
steel complex, three large machine building and
repair plants and many small repair shops, a cement
plant, and basic chemical and fertilizer plants.
Coal, clay, limestone, iron ore, apatite, and phos-
phate rock were produced. Separate grids provided
electric power to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and to
Vinh and Thanh Hoa, and the total prestrike capacity
was 187,000 kilowatts. Most of the electric power-
plants were thermal plants, but North Vietnam has
a large potential for hydroelectric power.
The two largest industries were food processing
and textiles. The important branches of the food-
processing industry were rice milling, sugar refining,
tea processing, and fruit canning. The textile indus-
try produced mainly cotton goods from imported cotton;
domestic output met only a small percentage of the
country's cotton requirements.
War-related industrial production was small.
North Vietnamese industries were able to produce
small quantities of crude small arms and ammuni-
tion, but no other types of military hardware. Air-
craft repair facilities were insignificant, but
the North Vietnamese were capable of constructing
and maintaining small coastal and inland watercraft.
Pharmaceuticals and some explosives were produced.
Almost all railroad rolling stock and other vehicles
had to be top although North
system1and toopro-
were able
vide some spare parts.
North Vietnam in early 1965 was heavily dependent
on foreign economic and military assistance. Al-
most $1 billion in economic grants and ccrredditsfaroe
known to have been extended during the decade
1955 to end fabout.48Cpercent, thetotal, _USSR 391st
China contributed
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percent, and East European Communist countries 13
percent. About 40 percent of all economic assist-
ance through 1964 was in the form of grants and
the remainder in the form of credits with low in-
terest rates and easy repayment terms.
The value of imports ($195 million) greatly ex-
ceeded that of exports ($102 million) in 1965. The
trade deficit had been running at a level of $40 mil-
lion to 90 million since 1960 and had been financed
by foreign aid from other Communist countries.
The most important imports were petroleum products,
machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, fertilizers,
and munitions. About two-thirds of total imports
arrived by sea; the remainder by rail, including all
major military imports.
North Vietnam's trade with the Free World ac-
counted for about 15 percent of its total trade
before 1965. Japan was the largest trading partner,
followed by France and Malaysia. Trade with Free
World countries provided a favorable balance of
about $10 million a year. Exports to the Free World
included coal, pig iron, apatite, and cement, while
the principal imports were thread and yarn, cloth,
chemicals, metal products, and machinery.
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II. The Economy in 1967
A. Economic Policies
Several changes in economic policy have been
made since 1965 in response to the bombing. When the
first five-year plan period ended in 1965, a two-
year plan was announced. The emphasis appears to
have shifted from developing larger scale modern in-
dustry to developing smaller scale local industry.
The 1966-67 plan called for increased agricultural
output and greater regional self-sufficiency. The
change will have a negligible impact on the economy
in the short run but will adversely affect long-range
development.
The US bombing also stimulated the mobiliza-
tion of manpower, the evacuation of urban populations,
and the dispersal of industry. Although North Vietnam
has no overall shortage of manpower, it does have
shortages of managerial cadres and skilled workers.
Programs to mobilize youth and women, including the
training of women as managers, have been in effect
since the start of the bombing in 1965. A "partial
mobilization" plan aimed at older men was announced
in July 1966, but there is no evidence that it has
been put into operation.
The evacuation of non-essential people from
Hanoi and Haiphong did not be in on a substantial
scale until June 1966. the
North Vietnamese press agree that Hanoi and Haiphong
probably have evacuated half of their population.
Some evacuation of smaller cities such as Nam Dinh
has also taken place. The evacuation program has
apparently been badly organized and not well coor-
dinated with the programs for relocating industry.
The dispersal of industry has been limited
and has focused primarily on moving light industry
and handicraft cooperatives from urban to rural areas.
Essentially, the program has two aims -- to reduce
industry's vulnerability to bombing and to minimize
transport requirements. A large number of handicraft
cooperatives apparently have been moved, but few
larger industrial installations. The two principal
textile mills at Nam Dinh and Hanoi as well as the
Hanoi Engineering Plant have been partly dispersed.
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B. Agriculture
Rice production in North Vietnam fell about
300,000 metric tons in 1966, or about 7 percent. The
decline resulted from the indirect effects of the
bombing and from unfavorable weather conditions.
Problems in the distribution of fertilizer and the
diversion of farm labor to military and war-related
work also contributed.
The food situation has not, however, become
critical. There have been large increases in imports
of food through April of 1967; .known seaborne imports
of food totaled 108,500 tons, compared with 77,000
tons in all of 1966.. The regime has for some time
been calling for an increase in the acreage devoted
to secondary crops such as sweet potatoes and manioc,
which are more resistant to weather conditions and
require less labor and processing. The production of
these food crops may have increased in 1966.
There has been no indication of a cut in food
rations. The minimum rice ration remains at about
13 kilograms per person per month. In some areas,
however, a portion of the rice ration is actually made
up of less palatable substitutes, and in 1967 these
substitutes may have accounted for a larger part of
the diet. While the official meat ration has probably
not been cut, the supply of meat has apparently de-
clined, especially in urban areas, and prices have
risen. The production of fish has declined, and the
price has risen, probably because the bombings inter-
fered with fishing operations.
C. Industry
Industrial output in 1966 appears to have
increased in some sectors and declined in others;
the data for estimating the overall change are lacking.
In 1967 the bombing has had a direct effect on the
output of some industries and has probably indirectly
affected the output of most modern plants. Handicraft
and local factory industries, however, which account
for almost half of industrial output, were probably
affected little if at all.
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North Vietnam's industry still makes little
direct contribution to the war effort. It provides
tools, some spare parts, and repair equipment. Cement
is produced for military as well as civilian construc-
tion, and uniforms are made by the textile industry.
The chemical industry may produce small quantities of
explosives. Coal, apatite, and pig iron are impor-
tant exports. They have been earning about $23 mil-
lion annually in foreign exchange since 1964, which
has been used to purchase goods in the Free World.
It is estimated that the output of electric
power in 1966 declined some 9 percent, to about 550
million kilowatt hours. One-fourth of total output
is normally used by non-industrial consumers, who
absorbed part and perhaps all of the decline. Thus
far in 1967, there has been a substantial further
reduction of output, with a serious impact on many
consuming industries. Out of a national capacity of
187,000 kilowatts (kw), 131,000 kw were out of opera-
tion as of the end of April. About 104,000 kw of the
capacity destroyed was in the main electric power
network which serves most of the urban areas and the
modern industrial sector. Only one electric power-
plant in Hanoi remains intact; it accounted for about
one-fourth of the capacity of the main network before
the bombings. North Vietnam has imported an esti-
mated 2,000 diesel generators of varying sizes over
the past few years. The estimated capacity of these
generators is about 15,000 to 20,000 kw, or some
10 to 15 percent of the capacity destroyed to date.
The output of these generators is consumed primarily
by agriculture and small local industries.
The output of North Vietnam's two largest
textile plants -- the Nam Dinh Plant and the Eighth
of March Plant in Hanoi -- is believed to have
fallen in 1966. The Nam Dinh Plant has received
bomb damage and both plants have been dispersed to
some extent. Fragmentary data show that imports of
cotton in 1966 were only one-third those in 1965
but that the import of textiles almost doubled,
which suggests that the output of textiles fell in
1966.
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Exports of apatite dropped from about 318,000
tons in 1965 to 10,000 tons in 1966, of coal from
1,150,000 tons to 906,000 tons, and of pig iron from
47,000 tons to 40,000 tons (see Table 1). Since much
of the output of these goods is exported, the fall
in exports strongly suggests a fall in production.
The recent bombing of the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Complex may further reduce the output of pig iron,
and a shortage of electric power may adversely affect
the output of coal.
The machine building industry, although
partially disrupted by dispersals during 1966, prob-
ably maintained or expanded output with the help of
greater foreign aid. The major contribution of the
machine building industry to the war effort is in the
repair and maintenance of transportation and construc-
tion equipment. An increasing number of small metal
workshops are engaged in this work. Some of the
machinery required is produced by the Hanoi Engineer-
ing Plant, the Tran Hung Dao Engineering Plant, (also
at Hanoi), and the Duyen Hai Machinery Enterprise in
Haiphong. Although the loss of electric power in
1967 will restrict the output of some of the modern
machinery plants, particularly the Hanoi Engineering
Plant, it will have little effect on regional machine
shops that utilize small generators.
There was a three-fold increase in known
imports of steel sheet and plate, metal tubes, bars,
and wire in 1966. This large increase probably
reflected a growth in the output of fabricated metal
products, but could have been the result of a deci-
sion to stockpile the items against the time when
seaborne imports might be unobtainable.
The output of cement probably increased in
1966. Cement is used for constructing airfields,
military fortifications, civil defense shelters, and
the like, but the fact that seaborne exports of cement
rose about 25 percent over 1965 indicates that it
was in good supply. The bombing of the Haiphong Ce-
ment Plant, which provides about 95 percent of total
production, and of the electric powerplant which serves
it, will almost certainly reduce domestic supplies of
cement during 1967.
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North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade
1964-66 and First Quarter 1967
Thousand
Metric Tons
1964
1965
1966
First Quarter 1967
Total
2,203
2,410
2,061
Imports
638
697
926
339
Petroleum
142
170
201
80
Fertilizers
140
162
227
73
H
Grain and bulk food
162
119
78
71
Timber
32
15
14
7
Miscellaneous
162
231
406
108
Exports
1,565
1,713
1,135
274
Coal
950
1,150
906
209
Apatite
338
318
10
None
Cement
140
78
99
22
Pig iron
44
47
40
18
Miscellaneous
93
120
80
25
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D. Transportation
North Vietnam's transport system remains
adequate for current military and economic needs.
The railroads have suffered some damage from the US
bombings, including the destruction of the rail
bridge at Viet Tri, the Hanoi Railway/Highway Bridge
over the Canal des Rapides, and other rail facilities
at Hanoi and Thai Nguyen. At the same time, some of
the bombed lines have been partially reconstructed,
and one of the lines leading to the Chinese border
is being converted to dual gauge to facilitate the
movement of goods from China.
The bombing of the highway network has caused
extensive cratering, but quick repairs and the
availability of alternate routes have prevented any
sustained effect on motor truck operations. The
truck inventory is estimated to total about 11,000
to 12,000 made up of over 30 different models.
Maintenance is a serious problem, primarily because
of the lack of skilled mechanics and spare parts.
In some cases it has been easier to get new trucks
than the parts needed to put vehicles back into
service. Imports of trucks in 1965 and 1966 totaled
about 7,000.
The waterway system does not appear to have
been seriously affected by US bombing or by the
mining of rivers in some parts of North Vietnam.
E. Construction
Construction activity has increased consid-
erably since 1965. The construction and repair of
bridges, highways, and railroads has required at
least 72,000 full-time and from 100,000 to 200,000
part-time Vietnamese workers. Improvements in the
transportation network have mainly a military purpose
but have also contributed to the civilian economy.
Some war-related construction such as civil defense
shelters and shelters for vessels along inland water-
ways has been observed. Construction is continuing
on projects not related to the war. Dams are being
built, and Communist aid projects for industry are
continuing.
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F. Fore i n Aid and Trade
As a result of declining food production,
declining output in some industries, and the greatly
increased demands produced by the war, North Vietnam
has become increasingly dependent on assistance from
Communist countries. Foreign aid deliveries exclusive
of military goods are estimated to have increased to
about $275 million during 1966, compared with about
$150 million in 1965.
Before the bombing, aid projects included a
number of large industrial complexes. New aid
agreements were negotiated with most of the Communist
countries in 1965 and 1966. Most of the new economic
aid is made up of industrial materials, manufactured
goods, and machinery for small light industrial
plants, small electric powerplants, and machine shops.
In addition, the regime appears to be continuing
forward-looking aid projects, such as those for
mineral exploration and exploitation. Some new eco-
nomic aid projects contribute more or less directly
to the war, particularly those pertaining to truck
repair, machine shops, and pier construction, as well
as the dredging of the Red River and the harbor at
Haiphong. Most of the construction activity on Soviet
aid projects in 1966 was focused on the Thac Ba elec-
tric powerplant, small irrigation pumping stations,
state-farm projects, and mining. Economic aid from
Eastern European countries during 1966 included food-
processing and refrigeration plants, truck repair
or machine shops, and small electric power projects.
Little is known about Chinese Communist project aid.
The USSR and Communist China have since 1953
provided military equipment and supplies valued at
'about $947 million,* including deliveries in 1966
estimated at $445 million. The USSR provided $720
million of this total. Soviet military assistance
has been mostly in the form of surface-to-air mis-
siles, aircraft (including helicopters and MIG
*T eee va:ues are based on Soviet foreign trade
prices (prices charged for similar equipment sold to
less developed countries), which are believed to most
closely approximate the true value of this equipment.
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fighters), armor, trucks, artillery, radar, small
arms, and ammunition. Communist China has provided
a small number of MIG fighters, naval craft, artil-
lery, radar, small arms, and ammunition,
Petroleum products, imported almost entirely
from the USSR, are essential to the war effort.
Estimated imports during 1966 exceeded 200,000 tons.
Military and civil transport together consumed 150,000
tons in 1966, industry consumed about 20,000 tons, and
the remainder went to agriculture and household use.
The North Vietnamese trade deficit grew in
1966. Identified seaborne imports rose more than
30 percent over 1965, while identified seaborne ex-
ports fell more than 30 percent. The same trend has
continued during the first four months of 1967, with
imports rising about 52 percent and exports falling
by about 37 percent as compared with the corresponding
period in 1966. In 1965, the DRV was running a large
trade deficit with other Communist countries -- about
$100 million out of total imports of $180 million --
but had a small trade surplus with Free World coun-
tries. In 1966 the decline in seaborne exports of
apatite, coal, and pig iron reduced the trade surplus
with the Free World. Exports to Communist countries,
almost half of which are textiles and processed
foods, also declined, while imports rose sharply.
All of the trade deficit has been made up by credits
or grants from the Communist countries, and there
have been no apparent limitations on imports because
of the adverse trade balance.
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III. Prospects
The North Vietnamese economy has not yet fully
felt the effects of the bombings already undertaken
in 1967. Production from modern plants is sure to
fall considerably. Nevertheless, even if further
bombing were to eliminate modern industry entirely,
the economy could still function at levels adequate
to supply the bulk of the population's simple needs
and to service and repair lines of communication.
The elimination of modern industry would leave
unaffected the half of the country's industrial
capacity which is in small factories and handicraft
shops capable of supplying simple farm tools, some
machinery and spare parts, and processed foods and
textiles. The domestic output of cement, fertilizer,
chemicals, pig iron, and machine tools would be
virtually eliminated, with some effect on low-
priority construction and possibly on agriculture.
High-priority needs could be met from imports,
which would have to be vastly increased, but not
beyond the ability of the Communist countries to
supply. Imports of bulk products would rise sharply,
and imports of finished metal products, vehicles,
and machinery would have to be increased. At pres-
ent, North Vietnam's ports and railroads have ample
capacity to handle any foreseeable need for imports.
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xi
Chinese Attitudes Toward the War in Vietnam
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CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR IN VIETNAM
1. China has a substantial stake in the conduct
and outcome of the war in South Vietnam, and a vital
interest in the preservation of a friendly Communist
regime in Hanoi. From the beginning of the Viet Cong
insurgency, in the late 1950's, China has provided
political support and encouragement to Hanoi, and in
later stages direct military aid. Vietnam has been
the testing ground for one of China's principal
ideological theses: that in the present era wars of
national liberation can be successfully and safely
pursued not only in Southeast Asia but throughout
the underdeveloped world. By late 1964 and early
1965, Communist successes promised early vindication
of this thesis which Mao had made a major issue in
the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Chinese were urging
Hanoi to move on to the final stage of mobile war-
fare.
2. US intervention with ground forces thus
threatened a major blow to Chinese aspirations in
Asia and the Communist world. A'second factor
affecting Chinese attitudes was the USSR's direct
reengagement in the situation in 1965. As a result
of these two developments, the Chinese position has
changed somewhat.
3. Since the US intervention and the bombing
of North Vietnam, the Chinese have gradually begun
to attribute a new strategic significance to the
war. In the Chinese portrayal, US intervention was
not only a desperate effort to retrieve a local
defeat, but might also be a preliminary for an
aggressive war against China. The Chinese were thus
forced to give increasing attention to the chances
that out of the Vietnam war would come an attack
on China. Consequently, China's fairly clear and
explicit expressions of military commitment to Hanoi
became progressively qualified. References to
Chinese volunteers and comparisons with the Korean
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War declined in 1966, and in the Chinese formulas
both Hanoi and Peking would decide what Chinese
actions were deemed necessary." And at critical
junctures, in late 1965 and mid-1966 (the bombing
of Haiphong POL), the Chinese reminded Hanoi that
a principal virtue of people's war was self-reliance.
4. In such circumstances, it might have been
prudent for China to advise Hanoi to seek a political
solution before the US buildup could be accomplished.
But, in fact, China's hostility to negotiations of
any kind has become more and more rigid, even to the
point that Peking has been openly at odds with Hanoi
on the question of whether a cessation of the bombing
could be followed by US-North Vietnamese talks.
5. China's intransigence reflects several
factors. The Chinese leaders, particularly Mao,
probably still have faith that even in the new mil-
itary circumstances the US can be defeated provided
that Hanoi pursues a strategy of protracted conflict
relying on the proper guerrilla warfare tactics. But
even if Peking recognizes the diminishing chances of
success for Communist aims, there are other compelling
political reasons for Chinese insistence that the war
continue. Peking probably realizes that the USSR
would play a large role in any political solution in
Vietnam, and that in peaceful conditions the USSR's
economic and military assistance to Hanoi would pose
a major threat to Chinese influence there. In its
efforts to limit the influence of the USSR in Vietnam,
China has already paid a high price in its relations
with North Korea, the Japanese Communist and other
sympathizers. To yield at this point would, in the
Chinese view, not only be a defeat for Peking's
general line of revolutionary strategy, but would
represent a major gain for the USSR.
6. We believe the Chinese are prepared to exert
considerable pressure, to increase types of military
and economic aid, and, if requested, to station
combat troops in North Vietnam in order to sustain
Hanoi's will and ability to prolong the war in the
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South. Even so we do not believe that Peking is
fully committed to a Communist success in South
Vietnam at any price. The Chinese have allowed
themselves room in their public position, especially
in recent months, to accept the failure of the mil-
itary effort in the South. If faced with a situation
where only their own intervention could save the
situation in South Vietnam, we feel that their
fear of a US attack on mainland China would be the
commanding factor. Rather than accept this risk in
these circumstances, we believe that Peking would
be inclined to accept a termination of the fighting
without negotiations, in hope that this might permit
some level of resistance to continue. They would
say that the setback was owing to deviations from
Maoist doctrines and to Soviet perfidy.
7. Actions against North Vietnam, however,
are an entirely different matter. We continue to
estimate that Peking wishes to avoid a confrontation
with the US, which could result in a nuclear attack.
We are certain, however, that China would fight if
the US launched a deliberate and sustained air at-
tack on Chinese bases and supply lines in South China.
There are two other situations which would probably
bring some form of Chinese intervention: a major
invasion of North Vietnam, and the disintegration of
effective Communist authority in Hanoi.
8. If the US extended ground operations to
North Vietnam, the Chinese reaction would not neces-
sarily be precipitate. It would depend on Peking's
view of the extent and nature of the military threat
to the Hanoi regime. If Peking judged that the
threat to Hanoi was not a critical one, e.g., if it
involved a US landing just north of the DMZ to out-
flank the NVA troops there, the initial Chinese
military reaction would probably be limited to a
rapid and conspicuous buildup of combat forces in
South China and perhaps in the northern parts of
North Vietnam as well. This action would be accom-
panied by strong verbal warning. But when and if
they thought it was necessary in order to preserve
the Hanoi regime, the Chinese would be prepared to
engage US forces in North Vietnam.
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9. A more ambiguous situation would be a
threatened collapse of the Hanoi regime. It would be
extremely difficult for either the North Vietnamese
leaders or the Chinese to decide at what point a
large deployment of Chinese forces in North Vietnam
was necessary to maintain internal security. And
this might be a gradual process, wherein Chinese
forces were gradually introduced to free North
Vietnamese forces for combat or public security.
Even so, once having secured North Vietnam against
an internal breakdown it is unlikely that Chinese
forces would then move into South Vietnam.
10. Any estimates concerning Chinese actions
must be qualified because of the uncertain situa-
tion in Peking. We cannot be sure what the impact
of the internal struggle has had or will have on
Chinese policies. It is conceivable that under some
circumstances a foreign war might appear to certain
leaders or factions as a desperate way out of a
political impasse. It seems more likely, however,
that the Chinese leadership would seek to avoid a
major external crisis so long as internal affairs
remain in disarray.
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XII
Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War
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XIII
North Vietnamese Political Capabilities
in the Non-Communist World
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NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CAPABILITIES
IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD
Summary
The North Vietnamese expend a great amount of
effort attempting to encourage among non-Communist
nations support for their cause and opposition to
US actions in Vietnam. To this end, Hanoi invites
sympathetic foreigners to North Vietnam, sends high-
powered delegations to leftist front meetings, and
provides "documentary" evidence to interested parties
showing US "atrocities." The major channel through
which Hanoi pumps its propaganda to each non-Commu-
nist country is provided by the local Communist party.
Wherever possible, of course, influential newsmen
are used by the North Vietnamese to carry their story
to the free world.
The North Vietnamese, however, are hampered by
several factors in their effort to elicit such sup-
port. One inhibiting factor is the paucity of per-
manent North Vietnamese representation in the non-
Communist world. Another is the fact that Hanoi's
policy toward negotiations has been far too in-
flexible to stimulate much support. Even its So-
viet bloc allies have found it difficult to argue
North Vietnam's case on negotiations persuasively.
On balance, it appears that Hanoi's cause is best
served in the non-Communist world not by the sympathy
it has been able to generate but by the fact that
many non-Communist nations, fearing the war will
grow larger, apply pressure on the US to bring the
war to a close.
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The Hanoi Apparatus
1. Hanoi's own ability to get its message on
the war across in the non-Communist world is extremely
limited. The North Vietnamese diplomatic and gov-
ernmental apparatus abroad is quite small, comprising
in the free world around 150 officials in 15 countries.
2. The North Vietnamese are also able to promote
their cause by inviting sympathetic foreigners--par-
ticularly from the US and its allies--to the DRV,
where they are given guided tours designed to provide
them with "hard evidence" of US "war crimes" which
they can publicize on their return home. in addi-
tion, Hanoi devotes a significant amount of its
limited resources to radio propaganda broadcasts
which are beamed to audiences in Southeast Asia.
The number of listeners, however, is believed to
be fairly limited.
3. Aside from their own foreign apparatus,
the North Vietnamese profit from the propaganda
efforts in the free world of the other bloc coun-
tries, mainly the Soviet Union and China, which
basically complement Hanoi's own line on the situa-
tion in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese political
capability in the free world, however, is con-
fined mainly to propaganda dissemination, for
Hanoi has virtually no political or economic lever-
age which it can exert on any country outside South-
east Asia.
4. Probably the strongest "bonus" factor
which the North Vietnamese have working for them
in the free world is the concern which has de-
veloped over the course of US policy in Vietnam.
This has been stimulated by factors completely
apart from North Vietnamese political operations
abroad. Involved are such things as revulsion
over the destructiveness of the war and fear over
a possible widening of the hostilities. The
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North Vietnamese have naturally sought to exploit
these concerns, but it is impossible to measure
the effectiveness of their efforts.
Various DRV Foreign Posts
5. Not all of the North 'Vietnamese representa-
tives are equally active in promoting and publiciz-
ing Hanoi's policies abroad. Among Hanoi's diplo-
mats currently most active are those in New Delhi
and Cairo. Both of these representatives fre-
quently call press conferences, maintain active
contact with foreign office officials of the host
government, and actively seek out local press in-
terviews.
6. In India, the DRV representatives have
apparently sought to work partly through the rival
Indian Communist factions, both of which view the
Vietnam issue as a useful lever for their own
purposes in domestic politics. In the UAR, the
press has given wide coverage to the war, almost
always biased in favor of Hanoi's position. How-
ever, efforts by the leftist organizations to stir
up support for Hanoi by mounting public rallies
have not aroused much enthusiasm.
Africa
7. Algeria provides one of the widest and most
sympathetic audiences for the DRV in Africa. The
Algerian press regularly features articles favorable
to Hanoi's position and the government permits and
encourages anti-US demonstrations. The DRV represen-
tative in Algiers formerly sought extensive public
exposure, but with the Algerian coup and the simul-
taneous replacement of the DRV ambassador in mid-1966,
activity at this post has declined.
8. In general, North Vietnam's ability to ob-
tain a ready hearing on the African continent is
limited to a greater degree than is generally ap-
preciated. The North Vietnamese maintain a diplo-
matic presence in only five African countries: Al-
geria, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Congo (Braz-
zaville). With the exception of these countries,
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the receptivity of the remaining African states to
the DRV position on the war is marginal at best.
Their attitude ranges from almost complete indif-
ference to an ill-defined general reluctance to
become embroiled in what they consider to be a
"big-power" conflict.
9. To a large extent, the impact of the
DRV's position depends upon the stratum of society
which is addressed. Among the educated elite in
Africa, for example, the Tunisian weekly Jeune
Afrique probably does as much to influence attitudes
as anything else. The paper, published in Paris
and probably subsidized by the French, is highly
critical of the US and gives considerable cover-
age to the North Vietnamese position.
France and Western Europe
10. One of the most effective diplomatic as-
sets Hanoi has anywhere in the world is its rep-
resentative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. France is the
only major free world power in which the DRV has
representation, and although Mai Van Bo has only
quasi-diplomatic status, he apparently has easy
access to French Foreign ministry officials and
commands extensive publicity from an interested
and sympathetic press. Bo has at times been
chosen by the DRV Government to make the first
announcement of important official statements,
particularly on the subject of a negotiated set-
tlement of the war or DRV relations with the US.
11. The January 1967 DRV offer to talk with
US officials in exchange for a cessation of the
bombings, for example, was first discussed by Mai
Van Bo in a press interview some three weeks be-
fore it was officially announced as DRV polic
by the foreign minister.
The French Communists, who have relatively goo
relations with Hanoi, have carried on a campaign
to drum up support for the DRV, but the response
to such appeals has been apathetic and unimpres-
sive--even though public opinion polls indicate
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that the average Frenchman believes the US to be
principally responsible for the war.
Southeast Asia and the Far East
13. The most important of the DRV posts in
Southeast Asia at the present time is located in
Phnom Penh. The Sihanouk regime has given quasi-
diplomatic status to Hanoi's representative. Both
the DRV and local National Liberation Front offi-
cials are quite active within the Cambodian Viet-
namese community and through them probably have
contacts with the local left. Although Hanoi's
use of Cambodian territory for refuge and resupply
in the Vietnamese war would seem to offer possibili-
ties for exerting political leverage on Sihanouk.
to support Vietnamese Communist policy, it appears
that Hanoi is extremely circumspect in this regard,
preferring instead to take advantage of Cambodian
antagonism toward US Asian policy generally in
pushing North Vietnamese interests.
14. A similar situation exists in Laos,.
where North Vietnam, by virtue of geographic con-
tiguity, also has the potential for considerable
leverage with the Royal Laotian Government. Vien-
tiane, nonetheless, has remained reasonably sym-
pathetic to allied policy interests. The DRV
diplomatic establishment in Vientiane, in fact,
seems relatively inactive in the propaganda field.
15. Formerly, the North Vietnamese and the
Liberation Front were quite active among govern-
ment elements in Indonesia. This situation changed,
however, with the anti-Communist uprising there
and the subsequent cooling in Hanoi's relations
with the Indonesians. Although the Vietnamese
Communists remain in contact with some official
elements, they do not appear to be active among
Indonesian leftist groups.
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16. The DRV has no representation in Japan,
but Japanese leftists have been of considerable
assistance in facilitating Hanoi's contacts with
business and communication sectors in Japan. The
Japanese Communist Party has also worked closely
with Hanoi to help build up Japanese support for
the Bertrand Russell war crimes tribunal.
The Western Hemisphere
17. The DRV has no representation in Latin
America and the public remains largely indiffer-
ent to the Vietnam war. Most politicians have
avoided taking a public stand on the issue in or-
der to prevent local Communists from exploiting
the question against the government. Cuba, of
course, represents a special case and, partly
through the efforts of the local Vietnamese Com-
munist representatives, the DRV's views are given
wide dissemination.
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XIV
Implications of the Vietnam War for the
US International Position
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
INTERNATIONAL POSITION
1. The US international position with respect
to the Vietnam war is unique in modern American
experience. Not within memory have we been so heavily
engaged with so few active allies and so much strong
criticism, both at home and abroad. Because so much
of the world considers itself affected, or likely to
be affected if the war is prolonged and intensified,
developments affecting the war have become a major
concern of many friendly nations. Moreover, because
of the world role of the US as the strongest and
leading power of the non-Communist world, the way in
which the war is conducted and terminated is widely
felt to involve great significance for the future of
the free world itself.
2. There was indeed bound to be a certain
ambivalence in the attitudes of others toward any
policy which the US chose to follow in Vietnam. In
the abstract, there was certain to be support for the
idea of protecting small nations from aggression and
an accompanying fear that this might lead to an un-
controlled and dangerous conflict. In any case of
big power intervention there will always be those
who applaud and those who object. If US intervention
had been brief and quickly decisive, much of this
ambivalence would have dissolved. The objectors
would have been routed by success and the fears of
the sympathetic dissipated. The US problem has
arisen largely because the conflict has been pro-
longed and success appears dubious, at least by
means considered acceptable in many parts of the
world. This has removed much of the world's approach
to the problem from the abstract to the specific.
It is no longer for many foreign observers and gov-
ernments a question of principle, but a specific
case to be examined on its merits.
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Current Attitudes and Policies
3. Western Europe. Generally speaking,
articulate opinion in Europe actively disapproves
US intervention in Vietnam and US military strategy
in Vietnam. With certain exceptions (Spain and
Portugal and, to some extent, West Germany), it is
an almost universal view that the US has blundered
in the fact and the extent of its involvement.
Moreover, among intellectuals, youth, and organized
labor there is a strong moral revulsion against
the bombing policy and against what has come to be
thought of as the US objective, namely, to impose a
puppet militaristic regime upon a people trying to
establish their own national identity.
4. These views contrast strongly with the
official policy of most governments, one which might
be described as support for our general objectives
and sympathy for the problems and difficulties we
have encountered. But even the governments which
quite honestly make these pronouncements of support
often maintain grave reserve about the wisdom and
content of our policy. This reserve is not often
expressed to US representatives, but it nevertheless
exists. It seems to have deepened during the past
several months -- in contrast to most of 1966, when
our military progress was noticeable, our willingness
to negotiate accepted at face value, and the re-
calcitrance of our enemy easy for all to see. But
with intensification of the bombing campaign, an
apparent slowdown in military progress on the ground,
and a growing suspicion about the actual US willing-
ness to negotiate, the misgivings of government
leaders have intensified.
5. These misgivings have not reached critical
proportions, nor do they seem likely to do so short
of major intensification of the war. But Socialists
in the governments of Britain, Italy, and Scandinavia
would have great difficulties -- and some cases
might fail -- in holding the support of their par-
liamentary contingents and local organizations if
certain types of military escalation occurred or if
it appeared that the US was refusing what they con-
sidered to be reasonable terms for a political
settlement.
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7. In Europe generally there has been a conse-
quent decline in US prestige and a growth in anti-
Americanism. To some degree this anti-Americanism
is a normal reaction to the discomfiture of a great
power, all the more because the Europeans have not
enjoyed their past dependence upon it. But it is
primarily the consequence of the widespread apprehen-
sions over the wisdom of US policy and the morality
of US military policy. The US is believed to have
become involved in something it cannot bring to a
satisfactory end, to have been successfully defied
by a small country, and to have been caught up in a
militaristic approach not justified by or appropriate
to the problem. This has been of very considerable
help to the USSR. In the context of the present
phase of',Soviet policy, in which the USSR has sought
to project itself as flexible and moderate, there
has been some reversal of images; the US now appears
less charitable and more self-righteous, while the
USSR appears more peace-loving and less intransigent
than in the post-war period.
8. The specific effects of this reduced pres-
tige are difficult to measure. The preeminence
which the US enjoyed in Europe was on the decline in
any case, for a variety of reasons. What the US
involvement in Vietnam has done is to accelerate the
process and to provide additional talking points to
those who have wished to reduce the US role. US
involvement has reminded the Europeans, especially
the West Germans, that the US has other problems
besides Europe in which it is interested, and this
has encouraged Europeans to take more things into
their own hands. This in turn has made De Gaulle's
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policies more palatable and contributed to our
difficulties with the Kennedy Round, the NPT, and
proposals regarding international liquidity. Without
the Vietnam war and with the time and opportunity to
develop a new atmosphere for treating with European
security and international economic relations, we
might have been able to cope more readily with our
problems in Europe, but one cannot be certain. What
is clear is that the war has complicated the already
difficult problem of exercising the kind of US lead-
ership which the free world and the Europeans would
like to have.
9. Asia. The Far Eastern and South Asian
countries constitute a special case because of the
significance and future impact of the Vietnam con-
flict upon power relationships in the area
Even the countries not allied with us wish to block
Communist expansion and wish to see the US effort
succeed, but some have been cautious; they do not
wish to be in an exposed position in case of a
compromise political settlement.
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11. Other Areas. Most Latin American, African,
and Near Eastern countries have problems of their
own and simply do not feel that Vietnam is related
to their concerns. Most would like the war over with;
many feel that the US has lost interest in them or,
in Latin America especially, takes them for granted.
Those with useful bilateral relations with the US
want to avoid endangering those relations by criti-
cizing the US. Those with poor relations with the
US -- and these are largely the more radical of the
new, post-colonial regimes -- feel free to vent their
criticisms of the US. Many of these countries have
a natural disposition to dislike or fear large ad-
vanced nations which deploy their power against other
small former dependencies. How much this has hurt
US policy in a specific sense is difficult to judge.
The Vietnam war has probably added to the deteriora-
tion of relations with those who are antagonistic
anyway; for the others, while they are doubtful and
uncomfortable, it has not in itself provided the
occasion for attacks upon US policies.
Future Problems and Implications
12. A great deal of the loss to US prestige
and much of the legacy of opposition to US policy
would probably be dissipated by an early termination
of the war. There would be general satisfaction
that the conflict was ended, especially if it came
to an end in a fashion which preserved the integrity
of both South and North Vietnam. As time went on
and the world became interested in other things,
even those who have been especially bitter critics
of US policy would find fewer and fewer listeners.
13. Nevertheless, there would remain certain
residues which could not easily be overcome. These
would be of two types. The first would be in terms
of the respect accorded US leadership. Especially
in Europe, something has been lost which will take
time to recover; because of the widespread belief,
even among those who support us, that the US has
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blundered and refuses to recognize its blunder, the
US will have greater difficulties in procuring sup-
port for its policies. On European questions US
leadership will particularly suffer, since it is now
widely suspected that the US is not really interested
in Western Europe anyway and is prepared to sacrifice
European interests to broader considerations of US
interest. A longer-lasting damage to US influence
would come from disillusionment, especially among
European intellectuals and youth, with US morality.
European youth is preoccupied with questions of po-
litical morality and has the time and the disposition
to worry about the bombing and about the correctness
of the US intervention. Rightly or wrongly, it has
been highly critical of both, and this will plague
us for many years to come.
14. The longer the war lasts, the more in-
tractable our problems will become. Some of these
will be related to the conduct of the war itself.
Considering the depth of feeling expressed by oppo-
nents of the war and reservations maintained by
those who support US policy, it is important to
recognize that the tolerance of our friends is not
unlimited. There is little doubt that the US could
make some increases in the level of military action
in Vietnam without suffering serious and immediate
damage to its international position, and it is
impossible to judge precisely what would precipitate
such damage. Certain steps, such as the use of
nuclear weapons, would of course do so. So might
also an accumulation of minor escalations. There
would be a number of specific actions which might,
but would not necessarily, push some nations over
the edge toward open disavowal of US actions. These
include not only conceivable steps in military es-
calation, but circumstances surrounding efforts to
achieve a political solution.
15. Whatever might be the reaction to the play
of events while the conflict is in progress, much
will depend upon its outcome. A long and intense
conflict would intensify fears of Chinese involvement,
would be widely regretted, and would bring heavy and
direct criticism upon the United States, including
criticism from new quarters. But if the outcome were
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such as to encourage people to believe that East
Asia had been stabilized and Communist expansion
blocked, many people and most Asians would conclude
that the effort had been justified.
16.. On the other hand, if finally the US
terminated the conflict on terms which clearly con-
stituted an abandonment of its objectives, the US
would suffer very serious losses of prestige. If
the US withdrew from South Vietnam on the basis of
an ambiguous solution, the reaction would be mixed;
in Europe there would be approval that the US had
found a "face-saving" way out, but in Asia there
would be much apprehension and a considerable loss
of respect for the US. The final Asian reaction
would depend fundamentally upon what followed in
terms of the actual relations of power in Asia. If
the Communists were able to utilize the solution
to obtain a dominant influence,in the neighboring
states of the area, the US position in Asia proper
would be severely strained, if not permanently
damaged. It should be recognized, however, that
events in China, actions taken by the US to shore
up other countries, and the capacities and interests
of the threatened states would also play important
roles in the ultimate outcome.
17. In sum, the problem presented to the US
is not only the immediate one of dealing with
responses to particular phases in the military
conflict and its political surroundings, but with
the less immediate and less concrete effects upon
the future US role in the world and the fortunes
of itsfriends abroad. Nearly all international
actions invoke support in some quarters and oppo-
sition in others. In this case the principle
underlying the US action has become submerged by
ambiguities and doubts regarding the wisdom and
correctness of the specific action. Some damage
to the US has already been done. How much more
damage will occur and how much is recoverable will
depend upon how long the war lasts, how we fight
it, and how it comes to an end.
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op secret
Top Secret
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