NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A001600110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 96
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 21, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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SEc.
21 October 1959
No. 5401/59
Copy No.
NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
(CIA Contribution to Senate Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery)
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE QF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-'
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES
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THE NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Table of Contents
Page
I . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. THE PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Policy Formulation
The Supremacy of the Party . . . . . . . . . 3
The Party Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Central Committee . . . . . . . 6
The Central Political Bureau . . . . . . . . 7
The Standing Committee of the Politburo . . 8
The Special Position of Mao Tse-tung . . . . 9
Factors Favoring Bold Policy . . . . . . . . 10
Policy Execution
The Party Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . 11
Central Organs of the Party _
III. THE PARTY AND THE ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . 15
IV. THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . 16
The National People's Congress . . . . . . . 16
The Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic 17
The State Council and the Premier . . . . . 17
Foreign Affairs IQ
V. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Role of the State Council . . . . . 22
Annual Planning--National Economic Commission 22
Long-run Planning--State Planning Commission 23
Specialized Planning Commissions . . . . 25
Economic Staff Offices, Economic Ministries,
and Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . 25
Agricultural Policy . . . . . . . . . 26
Objectives . . . . . . 26
The Pace ofAgricultural,Socialization . . . 28
Some Effects of Policy Shifts on Government
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
VI. SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
ANNEX I. Peiping's 1958 Shift in Foreign Policy
ANNEX II. Adoption of the Commune Program
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THE NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a study of Communist China's machinery for
formulating national policies and for implementing those
policies by appropriate executive decisions. The open-
ing chapter describes the all-important role of the party,
both in the formulation of policy and in monitoring the
execution of policy. Succeeding chapters set forth the
role of the government, which is to draw up detailed na-
tional plans consistent with the policy guide lines
prescribed by the party and to see they are carried out.
The last two chapters describe how this party-
government apparatus of policy-making and execution has
worked in two rather specialized fields--in economic af-
fairs and in scientific affairs. Two separate papers
along these same lines have been included as annexes.
The first, which deals with a 1958 shift in foreign pol-
icy, is a free-hand reconstruction of how the machinery
was manipulated by the authorities in this instance. The
second deals exhaustively with the decision to set up
communes in China.
On the whole, the distinctive features in Communist
China's policy machinery we would emphasize are:
1. The theoretical formulations of Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung give a sense of direction and
purpose to Chinese Communist policy-makers.
2. Broad national policy is not formulated in the
government, but by the party. Within the party, it is
the Politburo--and particularly its Standing Committee-
which is the real center of national policy formulation.
3. The party also has organs to monitor the execu-
tion of policy. The powers of these organs are not merely
to coordinate but to direct and enforce..
4. Policy implementation is further controlled by
the assignment of individuals to interlocking positions
in party and government.
5. National viewpoints are represented in Commu-
nist China's top policy-making council. The responsi-
bilities of the individuals in the Standing Committee of
the Politburo cut across departmental lines.
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6. No effort is made to assure the representation
of disparate political viewpoints in the Standing Com-
mittee. The Communist Party is of course supreme, and
the party is dominated by Mao Tse-tung and his long-
time associates.
7. Mao Tse-tung occupies a special position of au-
thority in policy-making. He considers the views of his
associates, but he has on occasion authorized policies
that did not meet with their whole-hearted approval.
8. Mao considers that his responsibility for pol-
icy-making requires time for reflective thinking and
freedom from administrative details. He holds no gov-
ernment post..
9. The top leaders in China have had long experi-
ence in policy-making roles. They are knowledgeable
and confident to the point of cockiness.
10. Survival of the fittest is the rule in Commu-
nist politics; only the boldest and most ruthless reach
the top. This fact tends to make for aggressive pol-
icies.
11. Consonance with existing public opinion is not
an all-important criterion for deciding whether policies
are workable. The feasibility of public indoctrination
and exhortation--i.e., of making public opinion follow
policy--is regarded as more significant. The mass prop-
aganda campaign is-an invariable ingredient of policy
implementation efforts.
12. A prominent role in this process of indoctrina-
tion and exhortation is taken by organs of the party and
government which are ostensibly loci of power. Actual-
ly they serve primarily as sounding-boards-for informing
lesser officials and generally popularizing new policy
lines.
It will be observed that not all the features in this
listing relate to methods and organizational forms. Per-
haps the most significant derive from intangibles such
as philosophical doctrine and individual personality.
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CENTRAL
POLITICAL BUREAU
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION
UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL PARTY
CONGRESS
With a membership above 1000, it
functions in practice mainly as a
sounding board for previously de-
termined policy.
Precluded from major policy formu-
lation role by size - above one hun-
dred ninety - and infrequent meet-
ings. Serves to clarify previously
determined policy and reward out-
standing Party service.
Elective responsibility
Responsibility for policy
formulation and execution
CENTRAL ORGANS
Organization Dept.
Propaganda Dept.
Social Affairs Dept.
General Political Dept.
United Front Dept.
Rural Work Dept.
Industrial Work Dept.
Finance and Trade Dept.
Communication Dept.
Liaison Dept.
Military Affairs Committee
Other central organs
Consists of twenty-six high level
Party members. It has as import-
ant, practical role in national policy
formulation.
STANDING COMMITTEE
OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL
BUREAU
Consists in October, 1959 of the
seven top men on the Central Po-
litical Bureau. They constitute
the apex of national policy formu-
lation in Communist China.
Staffed by top Party personnel, it
moniters the execution of policy on
a daily basis through the Party cen-
tral organs, bureaus and committees.
for provinces, autonomous areas,
regions and localities.
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A very potent force in the present-day organiza-
tion for policy-making in Communist China is the im-
plicit set of objectives arising out of the philosoph-
ical context of Marxism-Leninism and the writings of
Mao Tse-tung.
Rightly or wrongly, the Chinese Communists hold
the abiding conviction that they are unswerving Marxist-
Leninists. They are motivated by Marxist faith in the
redemptive historical process and the Leninist concept
of the Communist Party as the only reliable agent of
that process. There is thus no need to reconcile the
disparate political biases that are accepted in any
multi-party state.
The outlook of Communist China's policymakers is
strongly conditioned by the Leninist doctrine of im-
perialism, ?,which holds' that'' imperialism is a
phenomenon peculiar to a certain stage of capitalism.
This forces Chinese policymakers into a posture of
antagonism to the West and gives them a sturdy philo-
sophical link with the general Asian resentment of
Western colonialism.
Chinese Communist Party leaders are all committed'
to the dogmas of the triumph of "Socialism," the need
for bloc "unity" against the West, the need for party
monopoly of power, and the need for rapid development
of the economy (including the military establishment).
Thus their policies can vary only within the limits set
by these points of dogma.
The Supremacy of the Party
Basic to an understanding of the present-day organ-
ization for policy-making and execution in Communist
China is an appreciation of the all-powerful position
of the Chinese Communist Party. At the end of 1958, it
numbered 14,000,000 members, whose position--explicitly
defined in the country's constitution as "the vanguard
of the Chinese working class"--juridically entitles them
to lead the worker-peasant alliance, the theoretical
basis of the Chinese People's Republic.
As further insurance that it will continue to domi-
nate the country's policy-making apparatus, the party
makes use of two other principles. The first involves
the organic structure of the Chinese Peoples Republic;
no provision is made for a balance of powex between
legislative, executive, and judicial organs of govern-
ment to check undue concentration of authority. Rather,
authority is merged in a system of overlapping and inter-
locking organs, which makes effective control from the
center possible.
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The other principle, that of "democratic central-
ism," requires that "the minority shall obey the major-
ity, lower organizations shall obey higher organizations,
and organizations shall uniformly obey the control or-
ganization." This principle is illustrated, for ex-
ample, during party conferences. Whenever a party unit
convenes, there is present a representative of the next
higher organ who is expected to tell the conference
what it ought to achieve. This is very often done when
he addresses the conference at its opening session. He
may then sit through all other sessions and even take
part in the deliberations. Occasionally he may be called
on to explain the wishes or policies of the higher par-
ty organs. Finally, he is expected to sum up in a con-
cluding address the outcome of the conference and his com-
ments. The Chinese Communists call these "conclusions,"
and they cover practically all of the major decisions
the conference is supposed to reach. When the confer-
ence is over, the representative has to report back to
his own organ on the proceedings of the conference, add-
ing his own observations and recommendations. In other
words, this representative serves as a party whip for
the conference, whose duty it is to see that the party
line is strictly observed.
As the central nervous system of the entire body
politic, providing direction and purpose, and coordinat-
ing many diverse activities, the party accomplishes its
task by placing a host of members throughout the govern-
ment. These individuals serve as catalytic agents, im-
parting momentum, guiding and goading the government
bureaucracy.
The party is thus the activating and directing
force, but Communist theoreticians stress that it must
remain organizationally distinct from government agencies,
to which is delegated the actual work of administration.
Ordinarily, the presence of party members in governmen-
talorganizations assures the implementation of policy
at all levels without formal orders to the agencies
concerned. The system requires a party apparatus rough-
ly parallel, in its organizational hierarchy, to the gov-
ernmental apparatus. The duplication extends to local
areas.
The Party Constitution makes a point of delineating
the policy-formulation role of the central and local
units.
All questions of a national character or
questions that require a uniform decision
for the whole country shall be handled by
the central party organizations so as to
contribute to the centralism and unity of
the party. All questions of a local char-
acter. . .shall be handled by the local party
organizations,.,?
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Despite this apparent separation of power, control re-
mains ultimately at the party center, for its is con-
stitutionally stipulated that "decisions taken by lower
organizations must not run counter to those made by
higher organizations." And, of course, the power to
decide whether the decisions are in conflict resides
in the "higher organizations."
The Party Congress
The present constitution of the Chinese Communist
Party ordains that the National Party Congress is "the
highest leading body of the party." As such, its con-
stitutional functions include the duty to "hear and ex-
amine" reports of central party organs, to determine
the party's mass line and policy, to revise the Party
Constitution, and to elect the Central Committee. It
is nominally, but not really, the principal policy-
making organ.
The party constitution provides that the convoca-
tion of a Congress may be postponed indefinitely by the
Central Committee elected in the previous session. In
other words, the congress does not meet until the par-
ty leaders have formulated the party line for the con-
gress to approve. The fact that no National Party Con-
gress was convened from 1945 to 1956 illustrates how
readily the Chinese Communist Party found force and
direction for policy formulation in other quarters.
The National Party Congress is in fact a rubber stamp
organization convened as a sop to party "democracy."
The position of the National Party Congress is
well illustrated by the 1956 meeting. Delegates,
elected at lower levels, totaled slightly over 1,000
when assembled in Peiping. Such a large-scale convoca-
tion is in itself evidence of ineffectiveness; fruit-
ful debate and positive policy-making can scarcely be
carried out in such a meeting.
The size of that congress dictated the election of
a Presidium to coordinate and direct activities. It is
in the composition of this body that a picture of effec-
tive control by an elite, higher echelon of party mem-
bers begins to emerge. The 63-man Presidium of the
Eighth National Party Congress contained all the full
members of the Central Committee, save four of minor
importance. This Presidium then elected a Standing
Committee, which was identical with the membership of
the powerful Central Political Bureau, or Politburo,
the group at the heart of Chinese Communist policy
formulation.
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A number of special reports were delivered to the
Congress on foreign affairs, economic planning, mili-
tary organization, and other topics of national inter-
est, but these reports had been first reviewed and ap-
proved by a plenary session of the Party Central Com-
mittee held shortly before the Congress. The reports
were also discussed by-delegates in preliminary meetings
before the opening of Congress.
When it came time to pass on the composition of a
new Central Committee, the power of the higher party
echelon again appeared. Through a complex series of
straw votes the elections were carefully rigged so
that, with one exception, all the old Central Commit-
tee membership was re-elected and ranked in proper
order of precedence.
Thus, the Congress itself did not formulate pol-
icy; it merely listened to explanations of previously
formulated policy and gave its stamp of approval. To
any serious observer it was clear that major Chinese
Communist policy originated at a level no lower than
the Party Central Committee.
Like the National Party Congress, the Central Com-
mittee is equipped with a constitutional basis for ma-
jor policy formulation and execution. Its task is de-
fined as one of directing the entire work of the par-
ty, representing it in relations with other parties
and organizations, setting up and directing new party
organs, and supervising and allocating party cadres.
While the Constitution provides that the Central
Committee shall meet in plenary session at least twice
a year, it suffers a legal limitation on this preroga-
tive, as does the National Party Congress, since it is
called into session at the convenience of the Politburo.
Furthermore, just as the Central Committee acts for the
National Party Congress when that body is not in ses-
sion, so the Politburo exercises the powers and func-
tions of the Central Committee when it is not convened.
The fact that only seven plenary sessions were
held between 1945 and 1956, and four years elapsed be-
tween the third plenum in 1950 and the fourth in 1954,
illustrates the limited role of the Central Committee
in policy formulation. Moreover, meetings from 1945 to
1956 occurred only in connection with the inauguration
of new policy lines. At these meetings the policy to
be decided upon was served up ready-made. For example,
the plenum of October 1955 decided on the rapid collec-
tivization of agriculture, admitting its action was
"based on the speech of Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the
meeting of provincial secretaries." In actual fact,
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accelerated collectivization was well under way-be..f re
the October "decision" of the Central Committee.
In line with the'pdst-1956 emphasis:on a great-
er display of democratic forms in party affairs, the
Central Committee has since met at least twice a year.
However, the short sessions and the enlarged size of
the body, which reached 192 members in 1958, suggest
that as a deliberative group the Central Committee may
be a trifle unwieldy to be useful in direct policy
formulation. It is possible, however, that an issue
on which the topmost party leaders were seriously di-
vided could be referred to the Central Committee for
decision.
While the Central Committee as an organization has
been relatively unimportant in the formulation of broad
national policy, many of its members are responsible for
policy execution at a lower level of party and govern-
ment. The present membership of the Central Committee
is drawn in roughly equal proportions from four major
groups: central party organizations, provincial party
organizations, central and provincial government organ-
izations, and the armed forces. By approving party
policy as elaborated to them while in session, the mem-
bers of the Central Committee are better equipped to
implement it at their own official level.
The exact relationship of the Central Committee to
government, mass organizations, and the armed forces is
spelled out explicitly in the party's 1956 Constitution.
The Central Committee is charged with guiding "the work
of the central state organs and people's organizations
of a national character through leading party members'
groups within them." This task is partly accomplished
by the election of four smaller executive agencies, com-
posed of Central Committee members, who exercise daily
supervision over party affairs. One of these, the Cen-
tral Control Commission, has no policy-making function.
The remaining three--the Central Political Bureau, the
Standing Committee of the Central. Political Bureau, and
the Central Secretariat--are:.examiiled below.. !They cori-
stitute the central core of the policy-formulation. and
policy-implementation machinery in Communist China.
The Central Political Bureau
The Central Political Bureau (Politburo) is au-
thorized by the Party Constitution to exercise the pow-
ers and functions of the Central Committee when that
body is not in session. This is a sweeping grant of
power to the top of the party hierarchy. As of Auguot
1959, the Politburo consisted: of 26 men, all long and
faithful party members. Twenty were full (voting) mem-
bers, and six (non-voting) alternates. A variety of
background and talent was represented, providing. the
competence for decisions cutting across many fields.
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t
The position of Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the
party is of paramount importance and has been singled
out for discussion below. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-
ping, and Peng Chen seem to have special responsibil-
ity for party affairs. Chou En-lai and Chen Yun appear
primarily concerned with governmental affairs. Chou
and Chen Yi carry special weight in foreign policy de-
cisions, while Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien,
Tan Chen-lin, and Po I-po are the party's most prominent
economic specialists. Lin Piao seems to be the prin-
cipal military leader. A range of collective experience
in propaganda, minority affairs, military affairs, dis-
ciplinary concerns, and ideology--all important questions
for the regime--are represented in the remaining Polit-
buro personnel.
The Politburo is very important as a discussion
group and perhaps also as a voting body with respect
to major policy decisions. It seems highly probable
that a definitive stand by Mao on any major issue pre-
vails, since there is little evidence that the members
will not vote with the Chairman on those questions where
his position is known. In the absence of a definitive
personal stand, however, Mao probably is responsive to
counsel from different groups in the Politburo. The
strongest apparent group, of "party-machine" leaders,
is headed by Liu Shao-chi. The group is so called be-
cause its members are linked by long and close associa-
tion in key party posts, as distinguished from those
who have made their mark primarily as government admin-
istrators or army leaders. Should conditions be right
(e.g., in the selection of a successor after Mao's death),
the various groups in the Politburo might struggle for
power.
Once policy has been formulated, its execution is
readily promoted through the interlocking system of
concurrent key posts held by many Politburo members in
the government. Politburo Vice Chairman Liu is concur-
rently chairman of the government and thus the formal
head of state. Chou En-tai, third-ranking Politburo
member, is Premier, while 16 other members serve con-
currently as Vice Premiers.
The Standing Committee of the Politburo
Before 1956, a Politburo Standing Committee was not
provided for in the Party Constitution. In its place
there was a Secretariat which attended "to the daily
work of the Central Committee, according to the decisions
of the Politburo." Composed of the five ranking Polit-
buro members, this Secretariat became an inner cabinet,
lending a final degree of centrality and exclusiveness
to party policy-making and execution.
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In the Party Constitution of 1956, this locus of
real power was formally identified as a Standing Com-
mittee, practically identical in membership with the
pre-1956 Secretariat. Presumably it acts on the many
occasions when Mao does not choose to convene the full
Politburo, and its decisions have the force of full
Politburo decisions. The leadership, however, appar-
ently considers meetings of the entire Politburo de-
sirable to consider and sanction major policy shifts.
For example, the Chinese party line which took issue
with the Soviet criticism of Stalin was announced after
an April 1956 meeting of the Politburo.
With few exceptions, the same handful of men have
remained at the top of the old Secretariat or on the
Standing Committee since 1949. A high degree of con-
sistent force and direction has thereby been supplied.
The small size of the body and the continuity of mem-
bership probably facilitates policy decisions without
intricate formal machinery for reaching consensus. A
conversation between members would in effect constitute
a meeting. Personality factors are of extreme importance
at this level, in particular the traits and methods of
Mao Tse-tung.
The Special Position of Mao Tse-tung
At the present time Mao is unquestionably the su-
preme authority in Communist China. Within the confines
of Marxist philosophy he has exercised considerable im-
agination and originality in applying principles to
indigenous Chinese conditions. The personal factors
which brought Mao to the top and allowed him to maintain
his position include great self-confidence, ability to
evoke strong loyalties from subordinate party members
and the military, and an ability to maintain a balance
of power among competing individuals and factions. Rec-
ognition that Mao is the ultimate arbiter minimizes
serious factional disputes.
While consolidating his control in earlier years,
Mao did resort to the liquidation of rivals. More re-
cently the Chairman has treated opposition more magnani-
mously, preferring as a rule (not always) to reindoctri-
nate and thus rehabilitate opponents, or, as he puts it,
"treat the disease and save the patient." As a result,
the Chinese Communist Party has attained a degree of
unity and stability at its higher levels which is un-
equaled by other major Communist parties.
Mao's reputation as national leader was slowly ac-
quired. By the mid 1930s he had outdistanced most of
his major rivals for party leadership, although he was
still to consolidate his leading position. In the
1940s he followed the world Communist tactic of the
"united front" and thus appeared as the sponsor of
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resistance against Japan. Chinese Communist guerrilla
operations during the war added to his reputation. Later,
especially following the death of Stalin, his writings
on doctrine have been hailed as significant "enrichments"
or "additions" to Marxist theory.
Mao feels that his all-important position in pol-
icy formulation requires freedom from the administrative
and ceremonial tasks that beset the top men of many
countries. Currently, he holds no position in govern-ment and allows himself almost full time for the observa-
tion and reflective thinking he regards as the essential
prerequisite to sound policy formulation. In recent
years he has apparently made very little attempt to in-
tervene in matters of detail and has, in the main, left
the execution of programs to his trusted subordinates.
Very little reliable information exists on the de-
gree to which Mao accepts subordinate opinion in his con-
sideration of policy issues. It is asserted that he per-
mits and even encourages private expression and polite
argument against his views. Reportedly, he likes to
listen to the comments of people outside the Politburo.
Certainly it can be said that Mao's actions as Chair-
man of the Chinese Communist Party have not been lim-
ited to simple affirmation of policy recommendations
from the Standing Committee or the full Politburo. On
several occasions he seems to have taken a position
quite apart from the policy recommendations offered
him. For example, the "one hundred flowers" campaign
of intellectual liberalization from early 1956 to mid-
1957 was apparently initiated and insisted upon by Mao,
despite the disagreement of other major figures like
Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. He abruptly reversed
the Central Committee on the cooperativization of agri-
culture in 1955.
Factors Favoring Bold Policy in Communist China
Survival of the fittest in the Communist political
system allows only the boldest and most ruthless to reach
the top. These are men, moreover, who are indoctrinated
with the need to maintain an atmosphere of struggle to
inspire accomplishment and are therefore disposed to
formulate policies that present continually fresh chal-
lenges to the Chinese people.
The party's inclination toward bold policies is en-
hanced by the freedom it enjoys from harassment by press
and parliamentary bodies, since both are the practical
and obedient tools of the party. The Communists cannot
disregard public opinion entirely, but they do not com-
promise with it to the extent necessary in other coun-
tries. Policies are adjudged practical not so much by
their consonance With existing public opinion, but by the
feasibility of influencing and directing public opinion.
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CONCURRENT POSITIONS OF
POLITBURO MEMBERS IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Politburo Member
Mao Tse-tung
Liu Shao-chi
Chairman, Chinese People's Republic; Chairman,
National Defense Council and Supreme State Con-
ference.
Chou En-lai Premier, State Council,
Chu Te Chairman, Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress (NPC).
Chen Yun Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, State
Capital Construction Commission.
Lin Piao Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman,
National Defense Council; Minister of Defense;
Marshal, People's Liberation Army,
Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National
Defense Council.
Vice chairman, Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress,
Tung Pi-wu Vice chairman, Chinese People's Republic,
Peng Te-huai Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National
Defense Council; Marshal, People's Liberation Army.
Peng Chen Vice chairman and Secretary general of the Standing
Committee, National People's Congress.
Lo Jung-huan Vice chairman, Standing Committee NPC; Vice
chairman, National Defense Council; Marshal,
People's Liberation Army.
Chen I Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National
Defense Council; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal,
People's Liberation Army.
Li Fu-chun Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, State Planning
Commission; Director, Office of Industry and Commu-
nication.
Liu Po-cheng Vice chairman, National Defense Council; Marshal,
People's Liberation Army.
Ho Lung Vice premier, State Council; Vice chairman, National
Defense Council; Chairman, Physical Culture and
Sports Commission; Marshal, People's Liberation
Army.
Li Hsien-nien Vice premier, State Council; Director, Office of Finance
and Trade; Minister of Finance.
Ko Ching-shih None.
Li Ching-chuan None.
Tan Chen-lin Vice premier, State Council,
Ulanfu Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, Nationalities
Affairs Commission,
Chang Wen-tien None.
Lu Ting-i Vice premier, State Council,
Chen Po-ta None.
Kang Sheng None.
Po I-po Vice premier, State Council; Chairman, State Economic
Commission; Deputy director, Office of Industry and
Communication.
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The breadth of responsibility entrusted to the men
in the nation's top policy-formulation council--the
Standing Committee of the party Politburo--means that
there is less tendency toward "least common denominator"
policies. Men like Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and
Premier Chou En-lai have responsibilities which cut
across departmental lines, and they do not bring to
policy-making sessions the parochial views of particu-
lar departments. Despite the misgivings of "conserva-
tives" from economic ministries and the military estab-
lishment in 1958, for example, the regime decided on a
crash economic program to achieve a "great leap for-
ward" under a slogan of "let politics take command."
The Party Secretariat
The Secretariat created by the 1956 Constitution
operates "under the direction" of the Politburo and
its Standing Committee in attending to "the daily work
of the Central Committee." Supervision and coordina-
tion of policy, rather than formulation, appears its
primary responsibility. The political stature of its
membership suggests that the Secretariat's powers ex-
ceed the mere monitoring and reporting of measures to
implement party policy; it can and does enforce its
decisions on party personnel responsible for carrying
out policy directives. The Secretariat is directed
by Teng Hsiao-ping who, as Secretary General of the
party, has over-all responsibility for translating
Politburo directives into action and for supervising
the subordinate departments. Teng is the only top
leader concurrently a member of the three most impor-
tant central organs--Politburo, Standing Committee,
and Secretariat. The second through fifth ranking
secretaries are also full members of the Politburo.
Central Organs of the Party
At least nine central (organs) function under the
Secretariat. From the party standpoint, the Organiza-
tion Department is probably the most important. In the
past it was entrusted with many aspects of party person-
nel administration, including recruitment, training,
promotion, allocation of cadres, and maintenance of per-
sonnel records. With regard to the party's top person-
nel, it has almost certainly given up some of its func-
tions to the higher-level Secretariat; but it probably
is still very important in party personnel matters any-
where below the top level.
The Propaganda Department is responsible for super-
vising and directing a part of the training--principally
indoctrination--of party members through the organization
of programs, schools and the like. In the main, however,
it acts as the nerve center for a large system of prop-
aganda and thought-control activities carried out at
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lower party levels and in the government apparatus. Its
activities extend to the whole range of literary and ed-
ucational work.
The Social Affairs Department remains one of the
most shadowy of the central organizations. It is be-
lieved to exercise the function of investigating the
loyalty and security of party members, and it probably
directs some intelligence, counter-intelligence, and
public security work. This department exercises close
control over the governmental Ministry of Public Securi-
ty and keeps its separate social affairs or security
units in operation throughout the government and the
armed forces. Army loyalty is a concern of the General
Political Department, empowered by the Party Constitu-
tion with taking "charge of the ideological and organ-
izational work of the party in the army."
The United Front Department is concerned with the
puppet political parties that exist in China's democratic
facade, important non-Communist figures, national minor-
ity groups, and Overseas Chinese. The department and
its local branches are responsible for maintaining lia-
ison with these individuals and groups and enlisting
their cooperation and support.
The tasks of the Rural Work Department and the
Industrial Work Department are parallel. Rural con-
ditions are investigated by the former, and party pol-
icy in the field of agriculture is implemented by it.
The Industrial Work Department seems responsible for
activities in industrial enterprises, and branches of
it may exist for heavy, light, and local industry.
The Finance and Trade Department has apparently
been newly raised to departmental status. Finance
and trade committees existed on the provincial level
for some years, and the establishment of a department
was probably necessitated by the increasingly complex
problems in these fields. The department's main con-
cern would be with party committees which supervise
governmental activities in finance, trade, taxation,
banking, and food distribution.
Also relatively new is the Communications Work De-
partment, organized in 1956. This organ replaced the
party's older political departments in the ministries
of railways, communications, and posts and telecommunica-
tions.
There is also a Liaison Department for contacts
with other Communist parti es.
Under the Party Constitution, departmental organs
are authorized at the local as well as the provincial
level of party hierarchy. For example, the Central
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Committee of a province has departments responsible to
it-.which are roughly parallel to the organs considered
above, and serve to implement party policy at the pro-
vincial level.
In addition to the party's Central Departments,
various party committees operate under the guidance
of the Secretariat. Whereas the departments are Stand-
ing bodies, the committees appear to be convened ir-
regularly to enunciate Policy. For example, the Women's
Work Committee periodically states party policy in the
realm of women's activities.
Branches of the party reach into every government
office. The party groups work in two ways: first by
stating party policy in the office; and second by send-
ing reports to higher party organizations which can
give any necessary instructions to the higher level
government office. Such a system must inevitably re-
sult in complex and difficult relations between higher
and lower governmental offices. This in turn must in-
volve the Communist regime in an even sterner struggle
against rank growth in the bureaucracy'than"_is the case
in states where the party is not so closely identified
with government. However, it does promote continuing
vigilance to ensure that executive decisions are con-
sistent with party-formulated policy.
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III. THE PARTY AND THE ARMED FORCES
Although Party supremacy over the Army is a car-
dinal Communist doctrine, the "military viewpoint" in
China does carry some weight in the formulation of na-
tional policy. Five members of the party Politburo
made their mark as combat leaders, other attained prom-
inence as political officers in the armed forces. Con-
tinuous indoctrination of military personnel is designed
to promote viewpoints in line with party thinking on ma-
jor issues.
The party Politburo, or Standing Committee acting
for the Politburo, is the ultimate' arbiter of military
policy. At a lower level in the party, the Military
Committee may make policy recommendations. The commit-
tee which meets irregularly is important in articulat-
ing policy and has explained major policy lines in sev-
eral long sessions. One meeting ran from late in May
to late in July 1958. Construction work by the army
was checked, policies for strengthening the army were
reviewed, and discussions held on "national defense
vis-a-vis the current international situation," Mao
spoke at the session, as did a number of army marshals.
Aside from its role in policy formulation, the com-
mittee may also take an occasional direct hand in de-
ciding on particular details of military work. For ex-
ample, a "directive" of the Chinese Communist Party
Military Committee "stipulated" the integration of the
militia and the reserves in 1957.
In the government, the Ministry of Defense imple-
ments the general directives issued by the party's Mil-
itary Committee and engages in the routine business of
operating the military machine on the mainland. Such
weight as the ministry carries in actual policy forma-
tion derives from the high party rank of its officials.
The present minister is a member of the inner core of
power, the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
Under the government Constitution, one other or-
ganization, the National Defense Council, is concerned
with military affairs. It has at most an advisory role;
more likely it exists as a purely honorific body. It
has been convened only four times for sessions of two
days each since 19549 Many of its members are not Com-
munists. Almost one third of its members are former
Chinese Nationalist generals and it includes a fairly
large number of party faithfuls who have been, so to
speak, put out to pasture.
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CHINESE 15T GOVH NMENl 0*C4j Iv loN
Staff Office for
Foreign Affairs
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Commission for
Cultural Relations
with Foreign
Countries
SUPREME PEOPLES
PROCURATORATE
SECRETARIAT OF THE
STATE COUNCIL
Staff Office for
Political and
Legal Affairs
Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Ministry of
Public Sgcurity
Ministry of
Education
Ministry of
Public Health
New China
News Agency
Bureau of
Broadcasting
Affairs
Meets for a few weeks annually.
Consists of over 1,000 important
Chinese citizens. It provides an
effective method for publicizing
national policy previously deter-
mined by the Party.
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS
Consists of over sixty Party and
non-party members who meet
regularly. It provides an effec-
tive method for explaining Party
policy to important non-Party in-
dividuals.
Headed by the Premier and at present,
includes thirteen vice premiers.
Many of the vice premiers head
government ministries or bureaus.
The State Council is the most im-
portant center for executive deci-
sion-making in the Government.
Staff Office for
Industry and
Communication
First Ministry of
Machine Building
Second Ministry of
Machine Building
Ministry of
Coal Industry
Ministry of
Petroleum
Industry
Ministry of
Agricultural
Machinery
Ministry of
Textile Industry
Ministry of
Light Industry
Ministry of
Labor
Ministry of
Metallurgical
Industry
Ministry of
Chemical Industry
Ministry of
Geology
Ministry of
Construction
and Engineering
Ministry of
Railways
Ministry of
Communications
Ministry of Posts
and
Telecommunication
Offices are ceremonial. However,
the Chairman is number two man
Membership above 300 of varied
vocational and governmental re-
sponsibility. Its infrequent meet-
ing serve to disseminate policy
previously determined by the Party.
Peoples Bank
of China
Ministry of
Aquatic Products
Ministry of
Land Reclamation
Central
Meteorological
Bureau
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Staff Office for
Culture and
Education
Infrequent meetings, and a mem-
bership above 100, many of advance
age and varied political background,
mark it mainly as an honorific body.
State Capital
Construction
Commission
Central Adminis-
trative Bureau of
Industry and
Commerce
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IV. THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT
Insofar as broad national policy is concerned, the
government in China is clearly subservient to the par-
ty. As the Chinese put it, "In all departments of
state, all decisions on important questions are made on
the proposal and according to the directives of the par-
ty." The correct policy line having been indicated, it
becomes the general duty of the government to formulate
and execute plans for the implementation of policy. Par-
ty committees both inside and outside the various organs
of government monitor performance to ensure compliance
with policy directives.
The National People's Congress
In theory, ultimate governmental authority resides
in a system of people's congresses on the village, county,
provincial, and national level. Popular election is
constitutionally provided at the village level, while
at higher levels delegates are elected by the next lower
congress. But the democratic patina is thin, since
all candidates are screened by the party prior to elec-
tion so that only "safe" candidates stand and are elected.
At the apex of the congressional pyramid is a
body known as the National People's Congress, defined
in the 1954 Constitution as "the highest organ of state
authority" in Communist China and the "exclusive legis-
lative authority in the country." In practice, the Na-
tional People's Congress has no real power and acts
primarily as aisounding board for Communist policy state-
ments and as a channel for transmitting party policy
to the nation. An examination of the Congress to date
bears this out. Sessions have been short, voting has
been characterized by "unanimous decision," and speeches
have parroted the party line after it has been explained
to the session.
When the National People's Congress is not in ses-
sion, its Standing Committee acts for it in conjunction
with the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic. Con-
stitutionally the Standing Committee is empowered to
interpret laws, issue decrees, ratify treaties, declare
war, proclaim martial law, and order mobilization. It
appoints or removes, on'the Premier's recommendation,
vice premiers, ministers, and heads of commissions. On
its own initiative it can appoint or remove many other
less important state officials. It is also empowered
to supervise the State Council and can annul decisions
of this body when such contravene the Constitution or
other laws and decrees. All such powers appear to be
formal rather than actual, however; there Is no evidence
that the Standing Committee has contravened any previous
action of the State Council.
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The Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic
The formal head of state is the Chairman of the Re-
public, elected by the National People's Congress. This
office is invested by the Constitution with broad admin-
istrative and appointive powers. These include nomina-
tion of the Premier and members of the National Defense
Council, together with the right to preside over that
body and sessions of the Supreme State Conference. Most
of the Chairman's rights are procedural, however, and
require the concurrence of the National People's Congress
or its Standing Committee. The Chairman has no direct
control over the State Council or the ministries which
comprise the day-to-day administrative centers of gov-
ernment. The office of Chairman of the Republic in
itself, therefore, is unimportant either for the formu-
lation or implementation of policy. The office has
been reserved for the highest ranking members of the
party, Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, and the party
attaches great symbolic importance to the post, since
its occupant can be cast in the traditional paternal
image of the emperor.
Two bodies are directly responsible to the Chair-
man of the Republic: the afore-mentioned National De-
fense Council, and the Supreme State Conference. The
Supreme State Conference is theoretically an advisory
body consisting of the ranking personnel of all major
agencies of the central government. It is convened
whenever necessary by the Chairman, and sessions are
usually attended by more than 300 government officials.
The Supreme State Conference, as in the case of many
of the other organizations described above, appears
to provide merely another convenient sounding board
for the explanation and publication of policy formu-
lated by the party.
The State Council and the Premier
The State Council supervises the formulation of
national plans to implement party directives and makes
the necessary high-level decisions for carrying out
policy. Envisioned by the Constitution as the "high-
est administrative organ of the State," it is made up
of the Premier, 16 vice premiers, and over 30 ministers
and heads of commissions, together with the secretary
general. The high-level membership of the State Coun-
cil includes a wide range of occupational backgrounds.;:
thus experience and competence characterize Communist
China's top executive personnel.
A plenary session of the State Council is sched-
uled monthly to include all the above-mentioned of-
ficials, There is, however, an informal Standing Com-
mittee or "inner cabinet"--composed of the Premier,
vice premiers, and the secretary general as available--
which appears to meet much more often. Premier Chou En-lai
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and 12 of the vice premiers belong to the Politburo
of the party and the other vice premiers are important
Communists. In this inner group, the Premier seems
to carry by far the most weight. It is likely that
in making executive decisions, the Premier is guided
but not bound by the advice of his associates in the
council.
The formal administrative purview of the State
Council is very broad, including such diverse fields
as the development of defense forces, conduct of for-
eign relations, formulation and execution of the na-
tional economic plan, and direction of governmental
activity in the fields of culture and education, na-'
tionality affairs, and Overseas Chinese.
In carrying out its duties, the State Council
directs and coordinates the work of 30 ministries,
plus a number of commissions and special agencies.
The power of the State Council to annul or reject
any "inappropriate directives" issued by the agencies
for.which it is responsible gives it effective con-
trol over the entire central administrative structure
of government.
To date, the operation of the State Council sug-
gests that it has in fact as well as in theory carried
out its constitutional function and is the most im-
portant and active agency in government engaged in
the execution of national policy. Administrative co-
ordination by the State Council is exercised primarily
through six staff offices and secondarily through
the personnel in a secretariat and a premier's office.
Two of the staff offices are headed by members of
the Politburo, and the remainder by members of the Cen-
tral Committee. The areas of concern for the staff
offices are: foreign affairs, internal security and
related judicial matters, education and culture, fi-
nance and trade, industry and communication, and
agriculture and conservation. These staff offices
are supervised by central departments of the party
Central Committee. Several party leaders in effect
supervise themselves, holding concurrently the cen-
tral department and staff office posts.
Below the staff-office level, an extensive re-
organization of the various ministries and commis-
sions, as well as the bureaus and special agencies
under the State Council, was commenced in 1957. The
reorganization apparently was designed to streamline
a governmental apparatus which had become increasing-
ly top-heavy and bureaucratic. Superfluous staff has
been reduced by reassigning cadres to more "produc-
tive" jobs at lower levels. From a high point of 48
ministries and commissions, the number has been re-
duced to 39, The majority--some 23--are concerned
with economic matters, four with social matters, two
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with political affairs, and one with military affairs.
Reorganizations of this sort have been fairly fre-
quent since the regime was established in 1949, as the
Communists keep striving for better machinery to
carry out the policy lines het by the party.
Foreign Affairs
The especial importance of foreign policy in Com-
munist China is indicated by the fact that until 1958,
Premier thou En-lai was his own Minister of Foreign
Affairs. It is believed that the Premier still takes
a direct hand in activities of the ministry, despite
his withdrawal from the post. His rank of number three
man in the party assures him of a continuing role in
foreign policy formulation.
The Foreign Ministry itself is probably the ex-
ecutor rather than the formulator of general policy
lines, but it is possible that the recommendations
of the ministry carry considerable weight. The tem-
porary recall of diplomats just prior to important
party conferences suggests that Foreign Ministry view-
points are solicited by the party.
Party respect for Foreign Ministry views probably
has grown over the years with the increase in experience
and competence of ministry officials. In organization,
the Foreign Ministry seems to have undergone a steady
growth in complexity during the Communist decade. It
is divided into five offices on a geographical basis
and seven departments on a functional basis. The de-
tailed structure of this organization reveals a mature
administrative concept of departmental responsibility.
Geographically, there is a department for the USSR
and Eastern Europe which is primarily concerned with
Occidental bloc affairs. The Department for Asian
Affairs is split into the First Asian Department,
concerned with non-Communist Oriental countries, and
a Second Asian Department with responsibility for
relations with Oriental Communist countries. There
is also the West Asian and African Department, concerned
with the Middle East and Africa both north and south of
the Sahara. The West European Department is responsible
for non-Communist Europe, and the American and Austral-
asian Department is concerned with the western hemis-
phere, Australia, and New Zealand.
Functionally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
contains a General Affairs Office, apparently of a
coordinative nature, a Protocol Department, an Infor-
mation Department, a Treaty and Law Department, a Con-
sular Department, or International Department--apparent-
ly concerned with international organizations--and
a Personnel Department.
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In March 1958, Peiping announced the apparent
organization of a new office whose duties appear to
overlap in some degree those of the Foreign Ministry.
Called the "Office in Charge of Foreign Affairs,"
it has been given the status of a staff office under
the State Council. It is headed by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, but most of its top personnel do not
appear to have been previously associated with the For-
eign Ministry. All, however, are ranking Communists.
The composition of the office indicates that its res-
ponsibility involves coordination of international
activities among all ministries whose work touches
the international areas. This includes the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, perhaps the Overseas Chinese Af-
fairs Commission, and the Committee for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries. One could surmise
that failures in the coordination of foreign policy
programs which cut across ministry lines occasioned
the formation of this new staff office.
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Economic policy in Communist China is formulated by
about ten.leaders of the Communist Party and is based on
the,Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist aims of (1) socialization
of private property, (2) expansion of heavy industry,
(3) restriction of increases in consumption in order to
channel. a maximum of increases in output into investment,
and (4) maintenance of large armed forces for protection
in a hostile capitalistic world.
The greatest possible increase in output is a basic
objective of economic policy decisions in Communist China.
Just as the Soviet Union has its "storm" and "Stakhanovite"
tactics, so Communist China has its "struggle targets" and
its "leap forward" programs. Maintaining a balance in out-
put is generally..a secondary but nevertheless important
consideration. The endeavor is to use every possible resource
in. order to drive the economy forward at a rapid pace, but
the drive is not evenly sustained, as there are periods of
ebb and flow in the energies of the drivers and the driven.
.The formal method of carrying out party policy decisions
on economic matters is through the government structure. In
a command economy such as Communist China?-s, broad policy
decisions of the party are translated into specific programs
of action by the formulation of a national economic plan. A
party structure paralleling and sometimes interlocking with
that of the government, it should be noted, provides to the
top leadership of the party an effective means of overseeing
the,economy at all levels and of exerting pressure on admin-
istrators and workers alike in order to spur them on in carry-
ing out their economic tasks.
.The division of labor between the party and the government
organization in the formulation and execution of. economic pol-
icy may be compared with that between the prospective homeowner,
the architect, and the contractor in the building of a new
home. The party has the same role as the homeowner in telling
the government in general terms how it wants the building of
the economy to be carried oat for the next year or periodof
years. The government, in its role of architect, draws up the
plans and, in its role of contractor, accepts the task of
building the economy for the given period. At any stage the
party may step in and revise the plans or complain about the
manner in which the work in being done, but if the party inter-
feres too often, the final product may be more costly and take
more time to complete than originally planned. Of course, the
analogy falls down with respect to the punishments that' can.
be meted out if the construction comes off poorly.
The following, sections describe in some detail the role of
government organizations in the formulation and implementation
of economic plans.
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Role of the State Council
The State Council, the highest executive organ of
the government, is responsible for preparing and carry-
ing out the national economic plans. The State Council
has established three economic planning commissions--
the State Planning Commission, the National Economic
Commission, and the State Capital Construction Commis-
sion--which function as staff departments for planning
purposes. A fourth, the Scientific and Technological
Commission, has important ramifications in the economic
field. The actual transformation of party policy deci-
sions into annual and long-run plans is accomplished in
these commissions of the State Council. Some of the
officials of these commissions, in their role as party
members, have also participated in the formulation of
economic policy in high-level party councils. The com-
missions themselves have no direct authority over execu-
tion of the plans. The State Council hands down to the
lower units its instructions.on the execution of plans
through economic ministries of the central government
and through local governments.
Annual Planning -- National Economic Commission
The annual national economic plan, which is a basic
element of a planned economy, governs the operation of
the economy for the year. In Communist China this plan
is prepared by the National Economic Commission. Formu-
lation of the annual economic plan commences when the par-
ty sets forth the major economic objectives for the year.
These objectives, which may include targets for key com-
modities, have been established only after considerable
consultation with the many regional officials and economic
ministries and within the planning commissions of the
State Council. Once determined they provide the broad frame-
work within which the National Economic Commission prepares
the annual economic plan.
The process of formulating the annual plan is as
follows: The National Economic Commission establishes,
ideally in July or August of the preceding year, aggre-
gate targets for all sectors of-':the economy, such as the
level of production for major commodities, the amount and
types of capital construction, and the allocation of labor
and materials. These control figures--so called because
in all stages of planning and execution they serve as bench-
marks?for the evaluation of production and the revision of
plans--are sent down to the operating units through the vast
economic control structure under the direction of economic
ministries and local governments. On the way down, specific
details are filled in by each intervening administrative
level. Ministries and local governments break down the as-
signed figures and add new and additional ones of their own.
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They may-add targets for commodities which are not of na-
tional concern, and they determine standards for output per
worker, total value of production, cost reduction, and
trial manufacture of new products.
Aftbr the plan has reached the producing units them-
selves, the procedure is reversed and the plans of indi-
vidual enterprises are forwarded back up through the ad-
ministrative hierarchy to the National Economic Commission.
Lower levels of the planning structure--especially the pro-
ducing units which know that fulfillment of targets rests
there--may seek acceptance of targets easy to carry out.
Considerable bargaining may go on before a compromise is
reached, but tbe::,relatively weak bargaining power of lower
units means their targets will be largely imposed from
above, By November, if all goes well, the National Economic
Commission has the information necessary to prepare the
draft of the national economic plan. The draft becomes the
plan of operation for the following year after approval by
the party. The approved plan is routed through government
channels to the State Council for execution.
The economic control structure in Communist China re-
quires periodic reporting on plan progress by all operating
units, These statistical reports are prepared according to
uniform standards and procedures established by the State
Statistical Bureau, which is attached directly to the State
Council and works very closely with the planning commissions.
The annual operating plan of each basic production unit is
broken down into semiannual, quarterly, monthly and even ten-
day periods. At the end of each time period the unit reports
to its supervising authority on the degree of fulfillment,
The individual reports, added together at the national level
by the State Statistical Bureau, provide central planners with
a periodic Urd's-eye view of how the plan is working out.
Armed with data of this type, the top-level administrators may
call for adjustments in the allocation of men and materials in
order to ensure fulfillment of the annual plan, or targets in
the plan may be revised. The key role of the party in the re-
vision of annual plans is demonstrated by the major downward
adjustment of targets of the 1959 plan in August 1959. These
revisions were made only after the Central Committee had so
decided.
Long-Run Planning -- The State Planning Commission
Long-run planning, the responsibility of the State Plan-
ning Commission, has generally been for periods of five years.
Designed to serve as a general guide for economic development,
a long-run plan is less detailed and more flexible than an an-
nual plan. Targets are frequently changed--China's Second Five-
Year Plan (1958-62) targets, for example, were in part outdated
by accomplishments in the very first year of the plan.
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Long-run plans reflect the manner in which the party
wants the economy to grow, General Communist aims such
as the emphasis on expansion of heavy industry relative
to light industry and agriculture show up in the five-year
plan primarily in the division of national product between
investment and consumption and in the allocation of invest-
ment among different sectors of the economy. The schedul-
ing of major investment projects is therefore the basic
element of five-year planning. These projects often have
lead times of five years or more and require fairly detailed
advance planning. Major construction projects such as
the Lanchow-Sinkiang railway, the double-deeked Yangtze
River bridge, and the Wuhan Iron and Steel Complex require
long-range scheduling of delivery of construction materials,
machinery and equipment from domestic and foreign sources,,
arrangements for domestic investment funds and for foreign
exchange, as well as the training of great numbers of spec
cialists of all,sorts.
The geographical distribution of industry is also a
concern. of five-year planning. The first section of the
First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) was devoted to the alloca-
tion of investment between the island and coastal areas.
In the Second Five-Year Plan period, emphasis on develop-
ing industrial bases in some seven economic regions has
resulted in organizing a regional planning authority in
each of these regions, although so far these authorities
have not been very important.
Long-run planning in Communist China also includes
plans for more than five years, although such plans are
often only a statement of general goals. Thus, the Twelve-
Year Plan for Agricultural Development announced in 1956
contains only targets for yields per acre for a few major
crops and general recommendations for the socialization
of agriculture. The plan does not provide additional re-
sources to agriculture; it simply exhorts low-level cadres
to accomplish the targets and to figure out for themselves
how it can be done. Where state investment funds are to
be devoted to a project, much more detailed plans are com-
piled. For example, the ten-year (1957-67) construction
program for control of the Yellow River (the first phase
of a 50-year multi-purpose plan for the major water net-
work) has specific targets for investment and construction.
Long-run planning activity in Communist China suffers
from a serious lack of personnel experienced in the planning
process and, to a lesser extent, from inadequate statistical
reporting. Deficiencies in long-run planning are indicated
by the experience of the drafts of the first two five-year
plans. The draft of the First Five-Year Plan was not pub-
lished until midway thru the plan period. Targets for the
second plan were presented publicly in September 1956 but
have never been compiled into a draft plan of the nature of
the First Five-Year Plan. The targets are already out of
date, but no new ones have been announced.
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As the leadership of Communist China becomes more
adept at setting long-term economic goals, and as the
number and quality of people experienced in the planning
process increases, long-run planning in Communist China
should approach much closer to the standards in the USSR
and the European Satellites. Two underlying factors,
however, make long-run economic Planning in Communist
China an inherently more difficult task than in other
bloc nations: (1) the great extent to which fluctua-
tions in Communist China's agriculture can upset the
best laid schemes of planners, and (2) the almost re-
ligious fervor with which the top leaders of Communist
China drive the economy forward, sometimes almost ob-
livious of the human and economic costs,
Specialized Planning Commissions
The other planning commissions of the State Council
--the State Capital Construction Commission and the Sci-
entific and Technological Commission--perform rather more
specialized functions. The State Capital Construction
Commission,as the name implies, plays a coordinating role
in the construction field. The central industrial min-
istries in Communist China are responsible for much of
their own capital construction work, and coordination of
their construction plans and activities has become an in-
creasingly complex task. It has been the responsibility
of the Capital. Construction Commission since the fall of
1958. The commission oversees preparation of the annual
capital construction investment plan, an important section
of the annual plan.
The Scientific and Technological Commission strives
to stimulate the introduction of new technology and at-
tempts to secure the balanced introduction of technological
change throughout industry and agriculture. For example,
it coordinates medical research with the trial manufacture
of new drugs and chemicals; agricultural research on seeds,
soils, and fertilizers with the introduction of new tech-
niques in agricultural production; geological prospecting
for new resources with the preparation of studies on the
formation of natural economic regions; and river surveys
such as the joint Sino-Soviet investigation of the Heilung-
kiang River Valley with plans to develop the area and improve
navigation.
Economic Staff Offices, Economic Ministries, and Local Gov-
ernments
Three economic staff offices--industry and communica-
tions, finance and trade, and agriculture and forestry--
have been set up below the State Council. These offices
are directed by high-ranking party members who enjoy either
Politburo or Central Committee status--a status which puts
them in close touch with the making of economic policy. The
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staff offices, responsible directly to the Premier, have
authority to resolve differences in their fields among
the economic ministries. It is believed, however, that
the economic offices perform more of a staff function
rather than serving as an operating echelon in the chain
of command. Governmental orders probably go directly
from the Premier and the State Council to the central eco-
nomic ministries and local governments.
In the formulation and the execution of annual eco-
nomic plans, therefore, the line of command is from the
State Council through either central economic ministries
or local governments to the lowest level economic unit.
In industry, for example, the major enterprises are di-
rectly subordinate to the ten industrial ministries of
the central government; most small-scale enterprises are
run by provincial and county governments. Orders to
these industrial enterprises are handed down through the
dual control structure. In the case of agriculture,the
line of authority goes directly from'the State Council to
provincial-level governments and thence on down to the
producing units.
Agricultural Policy
Agricultural policy is perhaps the most volatile of
all areas of Chinese economic policy-making. Some fea-
tures of its evolution deserve separate consideration be-
cause it remains the most fundamental problem of the
leadership and because it illustrates the extent to which
policy problems in China are subject to the personal dom-
ination of the leadership--and of Mao in particular. it
also illustrates some of the drawbacks for efficient ad-
ministration of "the continuous revolution."
Objectives
The Marxist-Leninist framework within which agricul-
tural policy is made in Communist China and the USSR has.
not prevented the evolution of differing national programs.
Both programs are designed to eliminate the peasant's at-
tachment' to his private plot of land and to mold him into
a proletarian wage earner. Policies of agricultural de-
velopment in both countries are aimed at mobilizing farm
resources in support of the priority development of heavy
industry as,the basis of national power. In many respects,
the agricultural sector's support of heavy industry is in-
direct: that is, agriculture is tapped for manpower and may
be severely limited in obtaining machinery and construction
and other materials needed by heavy industry. Nevertheless,
the Chinese Communist program of agricultural socialization
and development has differed radically from that pursued by
the Soviet Union.
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The USSR's first attempt at attaining these objectives
took place in the period of the First Five-Year 'Plan (1928-
32), In the interest of increasing productivity in Soviet
agricultural and at the same time increasing the industrial
labor force, a threefold program of mechanizing agriculture,
promoting large-scale farming, and transferring the farm
population into,the non-agricultural sectors was adopted.
The Soviet plan devoted one third of all state agricultural
investment to farm equipment and machinery, and by the end
of the plan period half of the total sown acreage in the
USSR was mechanized. The program succeeded in mechanizing
agriculture, in enlarging the industrial labor force,and in
transforming some of the peasantry into wage-earners, but
its disastrous effects on Soviet agricultural production de-
tracted from the program's effectiveness,
The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, working to-
ward achievement of the same over-all objectives, have em-
ployed different policies. With the view of raising agri-
cultural output through increasing yields rather than through
increasing output per worker and at the same time holding the
level on non-agricultural employment steady, the Chinese (1)
emphasized cultivation methods in which immense amounts of
labor were combined with relatively small amounts of capital
and land, (2) increased the extent and intensity of irriga-
tion, and (3) started a program for.,more effective employment
of both organic and inorganic fertilizers. In the period of
the First Five-Year Plan, expenditures on water conservancy
and irrigation were 30 percent of all state expenditures on
agriculture. The relative lack of interest in agricultural
mechanization was illustrated by the fact that only 2.7 per-
cent of the total sown area of Communist China was worked by
mechanized means by the end of 1957.
The differences between the Chinese and Soviet programs
arise from several factors. Soviet agricultural policies rep-
resented a radical departure from traditional Russian produc-
tion patterns. The Chinese program attempted to introduce new
and more intensive methods of cultivation within the framework
of established production patterns. The Chinese, although par-
tially motivated by the desire to avoid Soviet mistakes, also
had different economic resources to consider. First, a low
standard of living coupled with a high rate of population
growth made the raising of agricultural output imperative if
even the existing low level of subsistence were to be main-
tained. Second, Chinese industry did not need, and could not
absorb, an increased labor force, and the Chinese peasant--
unlike his Russian counterpart--remained on the farm. Third,
Chinese industry has been in no position, considering the many
pressing demands made upon it, to supply appreciable quantities
of machinery and equipment to agriculture.
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Mao appears to have recognized that institutional
changes which would accomplish the doctrinal objectives
of eliminating private property in the Chinese country-
side and transforming the Chinese peasantry into wage-
earners could provide an excellent mechanism for imple-
mentation of the Chinese program of agricultural de-
velopment. Thus the effectiveness of labor-intensive
measures implicit in the Chinese agricultural develop-
ment policies would be increased by institutional changes
giving the state greater control and direction over the
activities of the rural labor force. Mao's recognition
of these possibilities and his sense of timing in initiat-
ing changes is probably the chief reason Chinese Commu-
nist agricultural policies have been relatively more
successful than those of the Soviet Union at a comparable
stage of development in the late twenties and early thirties.
The Pace of Agricultural Socialization
Over the last eight years, private property in rural
China has been almost eliminated and there has been a
great increase in state control over human activity in
the countryside. Policy on agricultural socialization
over this period falls in a pattern in which sharp ac-
celerations of the pace are followed by qualifications
and consequent slowing-up of the speed of development.
Mao Tse-tung has been intimately involved in each in-
stance of speed-up and only inferentially associated with
the slow-up which has followed. Mao appears to have been
successful in his role as the most aggressive exponent of
moving into higher levels of socialization for, in each
case of slow-up after speed-up, some of the gain has al-
ways been maintained.
Mao personally made sharp changes in agricultural
policy twice in'the last four years, In July 1955 he
called a special conference of regional party secretaries
in order to speed up the rate at which peasant households
were moving from mutual-aid teams into agricultural-pro-
ducer cooperatives. Mao's insistence that the movement
had to be accelerated reversed the established gradualist
policy which had been eEtimated by the Central Committee
earlier in July. The effect of Mao's statement was almost
immediately translated into action by the organizational
and propgganda apparatus of the party, and five .:months
later--in January 1956--the regime was able to claim that
virtually all the peasant households in China were in ag-
ricultural-producer cooperatives or collectives- Again,
Mao's intervention was noteworthy in the 1958 headlong
rush into communes. The manner in which this radical sys-
tem was conceived, discussed and adopted bears a striking
resemblance to the policy-making process accompanying the
speed-up of agricultural collectivization in mid-1955. A
special regional party conference convened by Chairman Mao
and a plenary session of the party congress in the spring
of 1958 provided the forum for introducing and developing
in secret discussions the concept for the commune. (There
is an exhaustive study of this process in Annex II,)
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Again, as in 1955, there was a trial period of experimen-
tation before the policy was finally adopted and promul-
gated in the form of a Central Committee directive, At
this point, the organizational and propaganda apparatus
of the party again served as the transmission belt for
implementing the policy.
It is probable that, despite the party conference
forum for presentation and discussion of policy in these
two cases, the occasion for genuine debate on the merits
of the policy changes was an earlier meeting of the Pol-
itburo whose final decision was strongly influenced by
the views of Chairman Mao. ,
Some Effects of Policy Shifts on Government Operations
The concentration of decision-making power and of
the initial implementation of economic policy in the
hands of the top party leaders which enables them to
make these abrupt and often doctrinaire changes. of line
means that certain practical considerations are often
overlooked.. Operations of the government organs has
often been disrupted when changes in policy made obso-
lete portions of the other economic plans and operating
procedure.
One such problem was brought about by Mao's acceler-
tion of socialization in 1955. The subsequent movement
of almost all peasant households into collectives by early
1956 was accompanied by propaganda which held out several
advantages to peasants who allowed themselves to become
collectivized. Among these was increased eligibility for
agricultural loans, and the government organs--principal-
ly the Ministry of Finance and the People's Bank--made
arrangements to meet the large demand for loan funds which
followed. Loans such as these are normally fixed at spe-
cific levels which are set forth in the annual economic
plan. The actual amount of loan funds extended in 1956
.was double the amount set forth in the plan for that year,
and one of the regime's planners later admitted that this
had caused excessive depletion of state financial reserves.
Agricultural socialization was also supposed to bring
increased state aid to collectivized peasants in the form
of technological advice and designs for equipment. One very
highly propagandized measure was the development of a new
two-wheel plow to replace the traditional one. Much pub-
licity was given to the shift and the machine-building in-
dustry began to produce large numbers of the new plows. Al-
most three million were produced by the end of 1956, but a
combination of poor quality and peasant dissatisfaction
with their operation forced the regime to abandon the pro-
gram.
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The sudden conversion of collectives into communes
in 1958 also created great problems for government organs.
By the latter half of 1958, spokesmen of the ministries
of agriculture, finance, and commerce were extremely con-
cerned over the impact of communal changes in the alloca-
tion of rural labor on the plans of their respective min-
istries. Too great an emphasis on cultivation of main
food crops and the -neglect of subsidiary agticultural
production brought about shortages in consumer goods pro-
duction and declining tax revenues. Still later in the
year the large-scale shift of the rural labor force to
construction and operation of backyard blast furnaces
and a similar campaign for use of rural labor in trans-
portation to break the bottlenecks in the distribution
system resulted in shortages of rural manpower for har-
vesting the crops.
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Broad policy decisions in the field of science are
of course made at the highest level of the Communist
Party. Party leadership is manifested not only in for-
mulation of scientific policy, but control is exercised
down to the individual research institutions by party
members who frequently have little or no scientific or
technical background. The assignment of five members
of the party's Propaganda Department to the Scientific
and Technological Commission--the government's top
scientific body--suggests that the Propaganda Depart-
ment may be the party organ which has the responsibil-
ity for maintaining constant cognizance of scientific
affairs and for presenting to the top party leaders the
ideas originating in the scientific community.
Within the government, the Scientific and Tech-
nological Commission is directly subordinate to the
State Council. Its membership can be divided into two
separate and distinct categories: 1) officials repre-
senting the ministries and agencies of the government
with an interest in scientific affairs, and 2) offi-
cials and working members of the Academy of Sciences
and other research organizations. The first group,
representing the government, is composed almost entire-
ly of influential party members who know what the party
wants the scientific community to do. The second group
is made up of scientists, only a few of whom are known
to be party members. They consider the feasibility of
the party's proposals and make other scientific contribu-
tions. The Commission also gets advice from Soviet ex-
perts.
As the highest planning and supervisory organ of
scientific research and development, the commission
governs the programs of the Academy of Sciences, the
Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Academy of Medical
Sciences, ministerial research organs, and institutions
of higher learning. The Chairman of the Commission is
an old-line army man and a member of the party's Central
Committee. He very likely has access to the top-level
policy makers in the party.
The government's highest operational body in science
is the Academy of Sciences. It directs the activities
of some 70 scientific research organizations and employs
the majority of Communist China's thin stock of scien-
tists. It takes a leading role in China's research and
development within the framework of directives and ex-
ecutive orders issued by the party, the State Council
and the Scientific and Technological Commission.
Each technical ministry of the government carries
out research and development activities bearing on its
own area of responsibility. The institutions of higher
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learning under the Ministry of Education also conduct
some research, particularly in a few of the better
universities and technical colleges.
The history of China's scientific effort is rather
short. The initial landmark was a decision, probably
taken in late 1955, to increase sharply the research
and development effort. This involved doubling the an-
nual budgets for the purpose, taking a positive stand
on the value to the state of intellectuals (scientists),
even though their backgrounds made them politically
suspect, and the drawing up of a long-term plan for the
development of Chinese science. The decision appears
to have included a provision that China should strive
to free itself of its complete dependence upon foreign
technology (which had been coming largely from the So-
viet Union), in the belief that an indigenous research
and development capability was required for the party's
economic and military ambitions. It was decided that
no time was to be lost in launching the new program.
These plans for science were first broached in
early 1956. Public discussion was launched by Premier
Chou En-lai at a meeting in January 1956 called by the
Central Committee. Chou spoke of the party's concern
for the intellectuals, of its need for their services,
and of its intention to improve their opportunities to
contribute. Mao Tse-tung also spoke and called on the
party to redouble its efforts to absorb scientific
know-how, to bring nonparty intellectuals into the pro-
gram, and to strive to catch up quickly with the world's
most advanced levels in science.
In March 1956, a 12-year plan embodying the party's
policies was announced. Its broad outlines had been de-
termined at the top level of the party on the basis of
overriding political, military, and economic require-
ments although most of the country's top scientists--
plus 16 Soviet experts--had been called in to assist
with the details of the plan. The authority for re-
finement of the plan and the development of supporting
yearly plans has devolved onto lesser figures. By 1959,
fewer Central Committee members appeared to be taking
direct supervisory roles in the scientific and techno-
logical areas; however, lower ranking nontechnical party
men still fill all the leading positions in the govern-
ment's top scientific organs. The one reputable scien-
tist who once had planning responsibilities, Li Ssu-
kuang, was dropped when the present Scientific and Tech-
nological Commission was set up in 1959.
It can be assumed safely that any further important
national decisions on scientific matters will be made at
the top level of the party, although the Scientific and
Technological Commission can and will offer advice and
may even originate policy recommendations. The rela-
tively early stage of technical development in China
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permits the making of broad scientific policy decisions
with less consideration for purely scientific criteria
than is the case in countries with advanced technology.
Research and development work in China is still largely
of a "catching-up" type and does not yet involve much
venturing alone into new and uncharted realms, either
in pure or applied science.
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ANNEX I
PEIPING'S 1958 SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY
A free-hand reconstruction of the machinery employed
by the Peiping authorities in the shift. It is based for
the most part on information released by the Chinese Com-
munists themselves and on a series of inferences drawn
therefrom.
Page
Policy Toward Neutralist Countries . . . . . . . . 35
J
Policy Toward Pro-US Countries . . . . . . . . . . 36
Policy Toward Offshore Islands . . . . . . . . . 38
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PEIPING'S 1958 SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY
In the spring of 1958, Peiping felt the need
for a far-reaching foreign policy review. Relative-
ly conciliatory policies pursued since 1955 had not
succeeded in gaining recognition for the regime;
neither had they eroded US support for the Chinese
Nationalists nor softened the resolve of the Nation-
alists to resist "peaceful liberation." These were
some of the matters uppermost in the thinking of Mao
Tse-tung and leading members of the party Politburo
when they called back their ambassadors to many bloc
and Asian countries in April.
For the preceding four months, Mao had been tour-
ing various provinces with several Politburo members
and provincial party first secretaries, reviewing do-
mestic policy and approving the dismissals of local
"rightist" party officers, Mao has insisted for years
that on-the-spot investigations were indispensable for
any policy-maker. As he put it, "If you have done no
investigating, you have no right to speak"; opinions
not based on such investigations are "nothing more than
groundless fantasies." With this predisposition for
first-hand examination of problems, he clearly felt
the need for briefings on foreign policy matters from
experts who had been in personal contact with problems
in posts abroad.
Following preliminary briefings from the envoys,
the Politburo informed the ambassadors through Foreign
Minister Chen Yi of Its decision to take a new look at
the government's foreign policy. At small, informal
meetings with officials in the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and the State Council's Staff Office for Foreign
Affairs, the ambassadors outlined what they considered
to be the best tactics for the immediate future.
Policy Toward Neutralist Countries
Future policy toward neutralist countries was
discussed first. The envoy to Cambodia, for example,
expressed confidence that Peiping was increasing its
influence in that country, and he suggested a continua-
tion of economic aid to Phnom Penh. He also suggested
that work at the grass-roots in the Overseas Chinese
community could be expanded considerably without arous-
ing suspicions among the members of Premier Sihanouk's
cabinet and without provoking the Premier himself.
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His suggestions were considered good by all offi-
cials present. A few, however, made the point that an
an economic aid program would not be generally appli-
cable to other countries in the area. They cautioned
against high hopes for Southeast Asia, noting that Thai-
land and Laos were still no less pro-US today than they
were several years ago. The recommended policy toward
Cambodia was conciliatory; the policy toward Thailand
would be less cordial, but not threatening; the posture
toward Laos, where the ".ruling circles" were seen as
moving closer to the United States, would be watchful
and--when necessary to inhibit measures against the
Pathet Lao--threatening,
Policy toward these countries, as well as toward
India, Indonesia, and the Middle Eastern and African
countries, was discussed by all presents After a few
days, the debates (the Chinese insist that every offi-
cial must speak out frankly in policy discussions) were
halted and the participants told by Foreign Minister
Chen Yi that they should take time off for a rest. He
invited the ambassadors to accompany him to the Ming
Tomb Reservoir--ostensibly to observe the progress there,
but primarily to give them an opportunity to relax and
clear their heads.
The discussion was resumed after a few days, and
for the next two weeks the policy toward the neutral
countries was debated further. The question of the level
of economic aid became a center of contention as each
country in the underdeveloped areas of the Middle East,
Africa, and Asia was discussed.
The participants finally submitted a report to the
Central Committee Secretariat recommending economic-aid
levels for each country and detailing the political and
diplomatic effort to be carried out in the future. The
Secretariat was asked to submit the report to the full
Central Committee later in the month for a decision. In
practice this meant it would be submitted first to the
Politburo, and the Politburo's decision would be ratified
by the Central Committee.
Policy Toward Pro-US Countries
Foreign Minister Chen Yi was joined by several other
members of the party's Politburo when the meetings with
the ambassadors and Foreign Ministry officials turned to
consider the question of Peiping's policy toward pro-US
governments. The Politburo members offered the view that
it was time for China to take a harder line against these
governments; there had been few diplomatic successes under
the soft line, which had sought to use low-level economic
and cultural contacts as preliminary moves toward the es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations. They suggested "struggle"
--political warfare--over the long haul to compel these gov-
ernments to change their alignment with the United States and
eventually accept the necessity for formal recognition of the
Peiping regime.
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The ambassadors and other Foreign Ministry personnel
added their comments, all of which concurred with the
views advanced by the Politburo members. These comments
were reported to a session of the full Politburo at which
Mao and his top lieutenants put the final stamp of ap-
proval on the hard line.
A Politburo report detailing the hard line was one
of several general policy reports read to the Central
Committee plenum which met in late April prior to the
convening of the larger body, the National Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party. Discussion of the foreign
policy report resulted in minor changes in the text. The
report was then expanded for presentation to the National
Congress.
The presiding officer of the Central Committee's
Secretariat, Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, read the
draft report on foreign policy to the National Congress
at its first meeting on 4 May. He stated that a trade
embargo might have to be imposed on Sino-Japanese trade
if a strongly pro-US government were put into power as
a result of parliamentary elections, urged that an "un-
compromising" diplomatic and propaganda attack be waged
against the Yugoslavs, who had criticized the Soviet Com-
munist Party at their April Congress, and declared that
all "imperialist" states should be subjected to bitter
criticism in China's propaganda. Officials on lower par-
ty and government levels were instructed to adhere "strict-
ly without variation" to the new concept, which totally
modified the "be reasonable" approach of the 1955-58 period.
During the following two weeks, delegates to the Con-
gress commented on the draft report in compliance with the
suggestion of the Presidium (presiding committee) of the
Congress. "Reasonable":;amendments and alternative sug-
gestions were taken into account when the draft was finally
revised and "unanimously" approved by the delegates in late
May.
Chinese propagandists--following a briefing from their,
superiors, who had discussed the new line with members of
the Central Committee's Propaganda Department--began to'
stress the need for the Communist bloc to "struggle" against
the major capitalist states, "headed by the United States'."
Peace must not be "begged", and if war comes, the "peoples
of the world" should not doubt the outcome--a victory of the
bloc over the "imperialist" states.
Foreign missions in Peiping were subjected to petty
harassment. Chinese employees in the missions went on tem-
porary strikes, and food became difficult to obtain. The
situation became even worse for the British mission follow-
ing US and UK landings in the Middle East in July.
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Policy Toward Offshore Islands
In consonance with its policy shift toward a hard-
er line in foreign affairs, the Politburo during this
period considered the advisability of a new initiative
in the Taiwan Strait. The Politburo called on Peiping's
military leaders to begin a series of round robin policy
discussions on "national defense in the light of the
current international situation" and the future develop-
ment of the armed forces. The Military Committee of the
party's Central Committee met in an enlarged conference
between 27 May and 22 July. Outside the conference,
those politburo leaders concerned with formulating mili-
tary policy met to decide on a tactical course. US and
UK landings in the Middle East were viewed by Politburo
members as providing the Chinese with an opportunity for
a new initiative to probe US determination to help the
Nationalists defend the offshore islands, particularly
since the US was "committed" in Lebanon, Defense Min-
ister Peng Te-huai "summed up the discussion," Which led
to a decision calling for preparations for shelling of
the Chinmen complex, naval harassment of this complex
and the Matsus, and attacks against any Nationalist air-
craft penetrating mainland airspace. The military com-
mittee "approved" the politburo's decision.
China's major military ally--the USSR--was probably
informed of the decision in late July at the top-level
meeting in Peiping with Khrushchev and his military ad-
visers. Mao and Khrushchev engaged in a four-day series
of meetings (31 July - 3 August), during which decisions
were presumably made on how to coordinate the Chinese probe
with Soviet diplomatic efforts against the West. The USSR
was to lend its support to the Chinese move indirectly by
suggesting to foreign diplomats that the Nationalists were
becoming "provocative" in the Taiwan Strait and were being
encouraged by the United States. Moscow was to direct
other Communist regimes to follow a similar line,
As Chinese Communist air activity began to increase
in the Strait, Peiping's propaganda machine stated that
the "liberation" of the offshore islands and Taiwan was an
"urgent" matter, A belligerent article in the Chinese the-
oretical journal Feed Flag in mid-August boasted that the
Communists were noT-a ra d Of US A-bombs, while the Commu-
nist newspaper in Hong Kong warned that the South China
Fleet was prepared to attack the Chinese Nationalist Navy.
On 23 August, the day of the first major barrage
against Chinmen, Foreign Minister Chen Yi assured foreign
diplomats in Peiping, "We will take those offshore islands!"
Chou En-lai in September deliberately attempted to create
the impression that unless the United States forced Chiang
Kai-shek to withdraw his troops from Chinmen, the Chinese
Communists would attack the islands and any US military
forces seeking to support the Nationalists, Chen Yi's state-
ment and Chou's effort were clearly intended to carry out
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the Politburo decision to probe US willingness to stand
firm in defending the Nationalists. The precise timing
of the first major barrage may have reflected another
Politburo decision, that is, the decision to push ahead
in the program to form communes. This decision was ap-
proved by a Central Committee plenum which ended in late
August. By 6 September the slogan "Liberate Taiwan" was
being used by local Communist cadres to convince the
people they should enter military-type communes and work
for the coming war effort, The slogan was a key theme
at the Supreme State Conference, convened on 6 September,
which called for nationwide "mobilization."
A series of statements by top American officials and
the "beefing-up" of the Seventh Fleet made it clear to
the Politburo that if they ordered an attack against one
of the offshore islands, the United States would commit
its forces. Peiping decided to backtrack. Premier Chou
En-lai was designated by the. Politburo to state in his 6
September reply to Secretary of State Dulles' 4 September
statement at Newport(which implied the United States would
regard an attack on Chinmen as preparatory to an attack on
Taiwan and therefore a reason for war) that Peiping was
ready to resume ambassadorial talks with the United States.
The decision to agree to reopening talks was made by the
Politburo after consultation on the night of 4 September
and at resumed consultations and discussions on 5 September.
The Politburo acted itself in a fast-developing situation;
it did not convene a Central Committee plenum to inform
the Central Committee members formally of the decision to
avoid a military clash with American air and naval units.
There was simply not sufficient time for round-robin dis-
cussions, the hearing of various views, and the drafting
of lengthy reports.
The peaceful overtures were combined with warnings de-
signed to head off a military clash with the United States.
The Chinese leaders probably sent a communication to Moscow
through their ambassador Liu Hsiao. Pravda stated on 5
September that the Soviet Union would not quietly watch
United States military operations in the Pacific, "whose
waters also wash Soviet shores." Soviet Premier Khrushchev
wrote President Eisenhower on 7 September that an attack on
China "is an attack on the Soviet Union." Later, another
communication from Peiping to the Soviet leader resulted on
19 September in the strongest official Soviet statement
ever directed against the US Government: Khrushchev wrote
Eisenhower that "may no one doubt that we will completely
honor our commitments" to China as stipulated in the 1950
Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance; if China falls victim to
nuclear attack, "the aggressor will at once get a rebuff
by the same means."
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In addition to invoking the Sino-Soviet alliance as
a deterrent to attack by the United States, the Chinese
on 4 September proclaimed a 12-mile territorial limit,
placing.the offshore islands clearly within Chinese Com-
munist jurisdiction. On 8 September the Foreign Ministry
was directed to start its numbered "serious warnings" of
US "intrusions" into claimed waters. The Politburo was
convinced that one way to avoid the risk of engagement
with American forces was to discourage the United States
from allowing its naval vessels to escort Chinese Nation-
alist resupply ships to the offshore islands.
The party leaders, at Politburo meetings in late
September and early October, delineated in some detail
a policy of political rather than military struggle
against the United States without agreeing to a cease-
fire. Odd-day shelling, they decided, permitted them to
use artillery as a political weapon--to prevent the status
quo from appearing "frozen" while keeping hostilities at
a minimum. Above all, it was to be made clear to the
United States that Peiping had no intentions of starting a
major war, Foreign Minister Chen Yi was directed to com-
municate this attitude to the United States through a visit-
ing Canadian journalist. At a five-hour interview on 30 Oc-
tober, Chen told the journalist that "peaceful means" of ap-
proaching the Nationalists would prove effective.
The effect on local cadres of this backdown in the
Taiwan Strait situation became a matter of concern to the
Politburo, which had operated without keeping the Central
Committee fully informed. It was agreed that Chou Enlai
should present a rationalization designed to make the re-
treat look more like a rebuff to the United States. Members
and alternate members of the party Central Committee and
heads of national governmental and party organizations, as
well as provincial and municipal propaganda chiefs, rushed
to Peiping to attend the hastily convened meeting of the
party's Propaganda Department, To help cadres to a "correct
understanding of the present struggle in the Taiwan Strait,"
Chou discussed Mao's new book, "All Imperialists and Re-
actionaries are Paper Tigers." Chou cited a series of events
going back to World War II "to prove" Mao's thesis that im-
perialist nations are really hollow shells which will "even-_
tualiy"collapse. Follow-up commentary in People's Daily--
the daily organ of the Propaganda Department--carriee `the
key statement that, as Mao has put it, "Strategically we
should despise all enemies; tactically we should take them
seriously"--or in other words, the United States is a "paper
tiger" that "can still bite."
When the Central Committee was called together in late
November, the Politburo informed the members that China deed-
ed at least "ten years of peace" in order to develop its econ-
omy. The Central Committee plenum then proceeded to consider
the reports read by Politburo members, which stated that with
the first phase of the "rush to communes" completed, the seri-
ous work of modifying commune procedures and commune
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organization must now be undertaken--together with the
work of relieving food shortages and transportation
difficulties. This concentration on the economic situa-
tion in the country facilitated the Politburo's effort
to minimize the Taiwan Strait backdown.
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ADOPTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNE PROGRAM
This study, originally prepared for another purpose, is
the most exhaustive work available on a national policy
sion in Communist China.
deci-
Page
INTRODUCTION
43
I. Socialist Construction, the First Attempt
(December 1955 - September 1956). . . . . . .
.
44
II. Socialist Construction and "Contradictions"
(September 1956 - September 1957) . . ... .
.
47
III. Socialist Construction, the Second Attempt
(September 1957 - December 1957). . . . . . .
. .
53
IV. Socialist Construction and the Transition to
Communism (January 1958 - March 1958). . . .
. .
60
V. The Commune Conceived
(March 1958 - April 1958) . . . . . . . . . .
. .
65
VI. The Commune and the "General Line of Socialist
Construction" (May 1958 - June 1958).. . . .
. .
71
VII. The Commune Revealed (July 1958), . . . . . . .
. .
80
VIII, Initial Organization of the Communes
(August 1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
88
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II. ANNEX
INTRODUCTION
The first sentence of the August 1958 Central Committee
resolution on establishing communes in Communists China de-
scribed their formation as "the logical result of the march
of events." Stripped of the Marxian connotation that the
communes were the inexorable result of the dialectical
process, this statement means simply that the origins of
the communes must be traced in the complex of problems con-
fronting the leadership of the Chinese Communist regime and
in the policies adopted in response to these problems in the
period leading up to the initiation of this radical program.
An intensive review of the record suggests that the cen-
tral problem of this background period was that of discover-
ing a method of building socialism suited to China's spe-
cific conditions--a backward, underdeveloped economy, and a
largely illiterate and untrained society, national character-
istics which Mao Tse-tung has classified under the terms
"poor" and "white."
The review also suggests that the process of discovery
began in late 1955 and early 1956, when the rudiments of
China's own "general line of socialist construction" first.
appeared and when one of the major themes underlying the
subsequent massive "rectification" campaign--that of mobi=.
lizing the energies of the Chinese people for socialist con-
struction--was introduced. In this sense, the Chinese Com-
munist explanation of the communes as an outgrowth of the
"general line" and the "rectification" campaign is essen-
tially correct.
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I. SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION, THE FIRST ATTEMPT (DECEMBER
1955 - SEPTEMBER 1956)
In keeping with the solemnity and importance of the
occasion Chairman Mao publicly assumed the leading role
in the winter of 1955-1956 in undertaking what in effect
was a new stage of the Chinese Communist revolution, the
stage of socialist construction. Elated with the success-
ful acceleration of the agricultural socialization program
which he had personally ordered in mid-1955, Mao pointed
out in a series of speeches and articles that the question
of socialist transformation of the economy had been settled
basically, and that the new problem confronting the party
and the people was that of economic and social construction
on a larger scale and at a faster tempo than originally
planned.
It was at this time that Mao coined the slogan which
figured so prominently in the "general line" of 1958--that
of building socialism by achieving "greater, faster, better
and more economical results"--and labeled rightist conserva-
tism as the political heresy which had to be constantly crit-
icized in all lines of endeavor. It was also at this time
that the Draft 12-Year Program for Agriculture was first pub-
lished. This program contained the ambitious and inspiring
targets of the doubling of food production, of the elimina-
tion of illiteracy in rural areas, of the gradual mechaniza-
tion and electrification of agriculture, and in general of
the transformation of the backward economic and cultural con-
ditions in the countryside. It was also at this time that
Chou En-lai introduced a new "soft" party line toward the
intellectuals which was designed to enlist the cooperation
of this suspect class in overcoming China's backwardness in
modern science. An ensuing 12-Year Plan for science called
for attainment of the advanced world levels in scientific re-
search by the end of the plan period. Thus the signal had
been given for the Chinese people to begin the march toward
the goal of achieving a prosperous and powerful socialist
society by 1967, the final year of the Third Five-Year Plan.
More was needed, however, than the signal to commence
the long march and the identification of a distant goal,
Chairman Mao apparently attempted to meet this need in a
report to the Politburo in April 1956 on the "ten sets of
relationships" involved in the formulation of specific eco-
nomic policies for China's socialist construction and in the
undertaking to enlist popular support and enthusiasm to en-
gage in this great effort. Although Mao apparently did lit-
tle more in this unpublished speech than call attention to
the existence of a series of problems requiring further
study and elucidation, there are indications that the pol-
icy of emphasizing construction of small- and medium-size
industry was foreshadowed. As such, the report represented
the first of a series of departures from the Soviet model
of economic development, culminating in the creation and
promulgation of a distinctive Chinese "general line of so-
cialist construction" in May 1958.
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The transition in Communist China's revolution in-
itiated at the beginning of the year was carried a step
further at the eighth party congress in September 1956.
It was claimed that the stage of socialist revolution
(the substitution of state and collective ownership for
private ownership of the means of production) was basi--
cally completed and that the current task was to under-
take socialist construction, "to build our country as
soon as possible into a great socialist country...unit-
ing all forces that can be united...." In contrast with
the ebullience and confidence which characterized the
speeches of Mao at the beginning of the year, however,
the tone of the reports at the party congress was one of
caution and indecisiveness. For the first time "leftist"
adventurism was attacked as a deviation which had appeared
in the course of socialist construction--specifically in
the failure to take into account objective conditions, the
limitations of resources, and the need to maintain ade-
quate reserves. As a result there had been a tendency to
"set too rapid a pace." This tendency was formally recog-
nized at a subsequent plenary session of the Central Com-
mittee when a policy of "suitable retrenchment" was adopted.
In retrospect, it has become increasingly clear that
a major consideration prompting this reversal of course was
the poor showing in agriculture in 1956. There were abun-
dant reasons why this factor was glossed over at the time.
Chairman Mao himself had publicly stated that the upsurge
of agricultural cooperativization in late 1955 would result
in a great liberation of the productive forces, or, as the
Draft 12-Year Agricultural Program put it, in an "immense
nationwide expansion of agricultural production."
In order that this production might be realized, an un-
precedented program of irrigation and water-conservancy con-
struction was carried out in the winter of 1955-1956. This
was followed by a mass movement in the countryside in the
first half of 1956 which in many respects was the prototype
of the frenetic campaign accompanying the agricultural pro-
duction upsurge in the spring 1958. It was a movement based
on propagandizing the Draft 12-Year Program which swept the
great majority of peasants into advanced agricultural co-
operatives (collective farms) ranging in size from 10 to 30
times larger than the lower stage, semisocialist cooperative
of the preceding year. To accomplish this revolutionary
transformation of rural society, the cadres held forth to
the peasants the glowing prospect of fulfillment of the 12-
Year Program far ahead of schedule, of the rapid mechaniza-
tion and electrification of agriculture of substantial in-
creases in agricultural production, and of a significant in-
crease in the remuneration and consumption of the new collec-
tive farm members. In addition, nearly two million modern
farm plows were manufactured and rushed to rural areas in
the first half of the year as a major start toward the goal
of mechanizing agriculture.
What was the net effect of this forced draft program to
increase agricultural production rapidly? With respect to
the experiment in agricultural mechanization, first of all,
it was soon discovered-that the plows in many areas were
unsuited to the terrain and existing methods of cultivation,
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and ,that :nearly. half of them could not be used. This
was a classic illustration of adventurism which was to haunt
the Chinese leaderhip for many months to come. The prom-
ised substantial increment in agricultural production fol-
lowing collectivization did not materialized Claimed out-
put of food crops rose only some 4 percent over the previ-
ous year, and even this modest increase is open to doubt.
State grain collections fell below the level of the
pre-
ceding year and, what was more alarming, the exigencies of
state grain supply in the first half of 1957 necessitated a
substantial reduction of state grain reserves:
directive that 90 percent of the new collective vThe
e farmpartymreceive at least as high an income in 1956 as in 1955
meant there was little if any increase in the capital funds
available to the agricultural cooperatives for investment
purposes.
In light of the above, the party decision to slacken
the pace of socialist construction becomes more comprehen-
sible. It should be stressed that this decision was apparent-
ly'endorted by 811 the top leadership, including Chairman
Mao, at the November 1956 plenary session of the Central
Committee. tt is important to note this because of the con-
certed effort during the "great leap forward" in 1958 to
blame rightist conservatives for slackening the pace of
economic development during the "retrenchment"
lasted until September 1957, and for the policies o psrood, which
period, f that
One of the policy changes which occurred in the fall of
1956 was an increased emphasis on material incentives as a
means of raising agricultural outputs It is significant
that one of the rare discussions of Khrushchev's 1953 agri-
cultural development program which stressed material incen-
tives appeared in the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical
journal at this time. In particular, the article hailed
Khrushchev's program as having "guiding significance for Chi-
na," especially its provisions for increasing cash payments
to collective farmers. Specific measures designed to imple-
ment this new policy of greater material incentives were an
enlargement of the peasant's private plot, increases in state
procurement prices for agricultural products, the return of
hogs to private care, and the inauguration of a so-called
"free market" in which the peasant could sell secondary farm
produce.
The situation at the close of 1956 could be summar-
ized as follows: although the economy as a whole had ex-
perienced a general upsurge during the year, registering
impressive gains in both industrial
construction, the anticipated leap forwwardtinnagriicultural
production which was to result from collectivization had
not materialized. The implications of this shortfall for
the future development of what was an essentially agrarian
economy were not lost on the Chinese Communist leadership.
In a sense, China's first all-out effort to commence socialist
construction had proved to be a false start. It was a time
for a reappraisal of fundamental policies, for a new look
at basic problems or, to use the term so dear to the hearts
of the Chinese Communist ideologues, at basic "contradic-
tions" in the economy and in society,
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II. SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND "CONTRADICTIONS",(S?EP-
TEMBER 1956 -` SEPTEMBER 1957)
Mao's major address on "contradictions," delivered
in February 1957, at first glance appears to have had
little direct connection with the undertaking to chart a
new course of socialist construction in Communist China.
In part occasioned by the outbreak of antiregime violence
in Poland and Hungary, the speech sought to demonstrate
that similar disturbances could not arise in China, first
by admitting the existence of certain basic economic and
social problems (contradictions) and then by offering a
general prescription for resolving these problems before
they assumed critical proportions. A "rectification" cam-
paign was launched shortly thereafter which, in its early
stages, was aimed at improving the working style of party
cadres and at-bettering relations between party members and
the masses.
Mao and subsequent commentaries on the report were
quite explicit, however, in pointing out that a major pur-
pose of "rectification" was to unite and mobilize the peo-
ple of China for the great task of socialist construction.
In both his February speech and in another delivered in
March on the same subject, Mao adopted an optimistic view
of the cohesiveness and loyalty of Chinese society on the
point of formal entry into a new stage of the revolution.
As Lu Ting-i, a spokesman for Mao, put it at the time:
"Our country is already a socialist country, classes have
been basically eliminated, counterrevolutionary power has
basically been wiped out, intellectual elements have under-
gone ideological remolding, the people of the entire coun-
try have been organized." Lu added, again undoubtedly
speaking for Mao, that since the two stages of the demo-
cratic revolution and the socialist revolution had been
completed, it was time to devote full energies to the new
stage: "cultural and technical revolution (socialist con-
struction)." It was not until a year later, however--at
the May 1958 party congress--that this stage was initiated
officially by Liu Shao-chi.
It is important to note the reasons for this hiatus in
the timetable of Communist China's revolution. Apparently
this interruption of the revolution (to call to mind the
theory of the "uninterrupted revolution" advanced by Mao in
justification of the commune movement in 1958) for more than
a year was occasioned by two developments. The first was the
need for time to recover from the damaging "rightist attack"
in May 1957 which followed the invitation to nonparty peo-
ple and organizations to participate in the "rectification"
movement by criticizing the Communist party and the govern-
ment. The second was the even longer period of time re-
quired to solve the contradiction posed by Mao between "the
objective laws of development of socialist economy and our
subjective understanding of these laws."
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It was for this latter reason that Mao eschewed lengthy
discussion of economic questions in his February speech on
"contradictions." There were clear indications in his re-
port and in subsequent journal articles, however, that the
answer to these questions could not be found in the Soviet
model of economic development. In addition to the injunc-
tion against mechanical borrowing of Soviet experience,
there was a specific directive to keep in mind China's own
special conditions when drawing up plans or studying prob-
lems;... Foremost among these conditions were China's large
and rapidly growing population, the predominant role of agri-
culture in China's economy and the dependence of agricultural
production on the vagaries of weather, and the low technical
levels (level of mechanization) of production which precluded
rapid increases in output.
It was in light of these considerations that Mao in his
speech advocated greater emphasis on agricultural develop-
ment, advancing for the first time--albeit in somewhat ten-
tative form--the distinctive Chinese policy of "simultaneous
development of industry and agriculture, while giving pri-
ority to heavy industry." In a similar vein, Mao affirmed
the policy proposed nearly a year earlier of emphasizing the
construction of small and medium industrial enterprises as a
means of accelerating the process of industrial development.
In short, the speech revealed a new awareness of the gravity
of China's population problem when viewed from the existing
low levels of production--especially agricultural production--
and implied that the solution of this problem in whatever
form it might take would require a long time.
On the premise that production could not be expanded
rapidly, Mao then turned to the thorny problem of distribu-
tion of existing output among China's 600,000,000 people.
Although denying that the lot of the peasants was substan-
tially inferior to that of other segments of the population,
Mao did concede that the wages of some workers and government
personnel was "rather high," that "the peasants have reason
to be dissatisfied with this," and that it was necessary "to
make certain appropriate readjustments in the light of spe-
cific circumstances." In another section of the speech he
emphasized that with respect to every question, including
that of distribution, "we must always proceed from the stand-
point of over-all and all-round consideration for the whole
people." With these somewhat bland remarks Mao sanctioned
the initiation of a protracted and sometimes acrimonious de-
bate in party journals and newspapers on the sacrosanct so-
cialist law of distribution "according to work"--which was to
develop into one of the crucial issues in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute over communes 18 months later.
Many of the arguments advanced a year later to justify
tampering with this law appeared in a discussion in the offi-
cial Chinese Communist Party organ, Study, shortly after
Mao's speech in the spring of 1957. Although conceding that
the principle of distribution "according to work" was predom-
inant in determining payment to individuals in socialist so-
ciety, the author stressed that the problem of distribution
was very complex and could not be solved by relying on this
one law alone. More specifically, he cited a number of
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precedents in the historical development of the interna-
tional revolutionary movement to demonstrate that this law
had not always been applied in determining payment for gov-
ernment workers. The first example was one of particular
relevance to the subject of this paper--the Paris Commune.
He then Cited the distribution system in effect in the ini-
tial stage of the Russian Revolution and in the period of
military communism during the revolutionary war in China.
In his approach to the problem of payment of government
workers in the current period, the author introduced a
theme which was to be propagandized to all the people in
1958: the desirability and necessity of inculcating a high
degree of Communist consciousness among individuals so that
their labor enthusiasm would be animated primarily by this
consciousness and only secondarily by considerations of ma-
terial interest. Thus the policy of stressing material in-
centives as a means of raising production--a policy which
had been adopted at a plenary session of the central com-
mittee only a few months earlier--was already coming under
attack.
Although it was still too early to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of this policy in solving problems in the agricul-
tural sector, it was becoming increasingly clear that these
problems were manifold and serious. In the revised version
of his "contradictions" speech published in June 1957, Mao
admitted that due to lack of understanding "among some peo-
ple, a miniature typhoon was whipped up around what they
call the cooperatives having no superior qualities," That
this was a gross understatement was revealed in other more
candid discussions of conditions in rural areas during the
spring and summer months of 1957.
One basic difficulty was that peasant consumption and
living standards had not risen following collectivization,
as had been promised. Journal articles at the time referred
to the "unrealistic" expectations and demands of the peasants
for improved living conditions and pointed out that marked
? improvement in the rural standard of living could only come
about after the technical reform (mechanization) of agricul-
ture and after socialist industrialization. One can imagine
the peasant reaction to this rationalization, which stood
in direct opposition to the propaganda line accompanying
collectivization in 1956--that agricultural cooperativiza-
tion (the revolution in production relations) would result
in an "immense nationwide expansion of agricultural produc-
tion" (the liberation of the production forces). Neverthe-
less, this argument foreshadowed the new "hard" line which
was to be adopted in the last months of 1957, a line which
called for maximum austerity and sacrifice on the part of
the peasants in order to achieve agricultural mechanization
and the industrialization of the countryside.
The disappointing harvest in the autumn of 1956 aggra-
vated what would already have been a difficult problem of
income distribution to the new collective farm members in
the winter and spring of 1957. Since payment in the previ-
ous, lower stage, semisocialist cooperative had been largely
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based on land contributions, and since the land had been
distributed on a more or less equal per-capita basis, there
had been a marked tendency toward a fairly equal distribu-
tion of income. The new system of distribution under the
collective, however, was based entirely on the amount of la-
bor contributed--the socialist principle of distribution
"according to work." What must have proved to be both per-
plexing and distressing to the rural cadres was the fact
that in so many cases this principle simply did not work.
In some of the reported instances, as many as 30 to 40 per-
cent of the households were classified as "overdraft" or
"underdraft," terms which referred respectively to labor-
short families which had to be subsidized by the collective
in order to receive a subsistence income and to families
whose labor contributions exceeded the capacity of the col-
lective to pay according to the set standard. The ramifi-
cations of this experience were far-reaching and would ap-
pear to constitute one of the major factors shaping the
decision in 1958 to move away from the principle of dis-
tribution "according to work" toward the principle of dis-
tribution "according to need."
There were a number of lesser problems which further
detracted from the "superior qualities" of the new coopera-
tives. The larger scale of operation, the complexities of
calculating and recording work points, and the increased
demands for bookkeeping and record keeping exceeded the abil-
ities of the rural cadres, which in turn occasioned suspi-
cion and jealousies between the villages in the enlarged
cooperatives. The upshot was a wholesale dissolution of
the large cooperatives which Mao had called for at the outset
of collectivization. The example of Honan may be considered
fairly typical in this respect. Whereas at the height of
cooperatization in 1956 there were some 26,000 collectives
in Honan averaging 360 households, the corresponding figures
following the dissolution movement in 1957 were some 54,000
collectives and 180 households. This loss of confidence in
the "superior qualities" of the large collective continued
unchecked until early September 1957, when it was expressed
in dramatic form in a central committee directive calling
for a nationwide reduction in the size of the collective to
a suggested optimum of about 100 households.
The headlong retreat on the agricultural front in mid-
1957 called into question the viability not only of the 12-
Year Agricultural Program but also the larger program of
socialist industrialization and socialist construction in
Communist China. These doubts were expressed most effec-
tively in a paper presented to the July session of the
National People's Congress by Dr.-Ma Yin-chu, a noted Chi-
nese economist and president of Peiping University. The
mere fact that the paper, entitled "A New theory of Popula-
tion," was publicized at this time is significant. In the
course of his discussion, the author clearly implied that
he had been constrained from presenting these views for a
period of several years, but that Mao's recognition of the
population problem in his "contradictions" speech had re-
stored this formerly forbidden subject to a position of
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respectability. The burden of his argument was that un-
less China's population, already excessive and growing at
a rapid rate, could be brought under control, it would be
difficult if not impossible to extract the necessary amount
of savings from current production to industrialize the
economy and thus construct a socialist society. To buttress
'sis argument and to forestall the charge that he was prop-
agating the odious Malthusian theory of population, Ma
relied heavily on Soviet experiences in building a social-
ist economy and stressed that the existing two levels of
agricultural production in China could be raised only after
the mechanization and electrification of agriculture in ac-
cordance with the Soviet example, In a concluding section,
he touched briefly on the delicate and potentially explosive
problem of the relationship between population and food sup-
ply in Communist China, pointing out that the average per-
capita area of cultivated land had fallen during the period
of the First Five-Year Plan.
Although not included in Ma's article, confirmation of
the growing pressure of population on food supply at this
time was provided by the final figures on state purchases
and sales of foodstuffs during the grain year ending in
June 1957--figures which showed a substantial reduction in
the level of the state's grain reserves over the course of
that year. Judging from the results of the summer harvest,
there probably was already a growing realization that grain
production in 1957 would not increase significantly over
that of 1956.
In a sense, Ma Yin-chu presented in extreme form the
case of the senior government administrators and economic
specialists among the Chinese Communist leadership who had
been instrumental in formulating the "retrenchment" policy
adopted in November 1956 and who had figured prominently in
explaining and implementing this policy in the first six
months of 1957. Chief among this group was Chou En-lai, the
third-ranking member of the Politburo and premier of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. The senior economic specialist was
Chen Yun, fifth-ranking member of the politburo and senior
vice premier of the government, followed by three other
politburo members--Li Fu-chun (chairman of the State Planning
Commission), Li Hsien-nien (minister of finance), and Po I-po
(chairman of the National Economic Commission).
Furthermore, it is possible to find certain parallels
between the views of this group and those associated with
Khrushchev in the recent history of Soviet economic policy.
Foremost among these is the apparent predilection for ma-
terial incentives to elicit higher levels of labor produc-
tivity and output; another might be a preference for large-
scale industrial installations equipped with modern machinery
and utilizing modern techniques in production; a third might
be an appreciation of the complexities inherent in the opera-
tion and management of a planned economy. In this connec-
tion, despite the relatively minor roles assigned the mem-
bers of this administrator-specialist group in the "great
leap forward" and communalization movements which dominated
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the Chinese economy in 1958, these were the very persons
selected to explain and justify these revolutionary pro-
grams to the leadership and people of the Soviet Union--a
service which they performed in a series of conversations,
speeches,, and articles from May 1958 to February 1959.
As indicated above, the similarities in the views of
such an incongruous group as Ma Yin-chu (who was subsequent-
ly branded a "rightist conservative"), Chen Yun, and Khru-
.shchev probably should not be emphasized. It is enough to
note that such similarities probably exist and that the new
"hard" revolutionary line of economic development adopted
by the Chinese Communist leadership in late 1957 constituted
a flat repudiation of these views. Let us now examine this
new policy which represented a sharp turn to the left in the
development of China's own "general line of socialist con-
struction."
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.III. SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION, THE SECOND ATTEMPT (SEPTEM-
BER 1957 - DECEMBER 1957)
The situation which confronted the Chinese Communist
leadership as it met in the central committee plenum of
September-October 1957 was far from promising. Two major
domestic policies espoused by Chairman Mao during the pre-
ceding 18 months were in disrepute. The proposed answer
to China's agricultural problem--the Draft 12-Year Agri-
cultural Program and the rapid creation of large-scale
collective farms as the means for implementing the pro-
gram--had failed to provide either the promised incre-
ments in production or a stable organizational form in the
countryside. Mao's original conception of the "rectifica-
tion" movement as a means of improving the "work style" of
party members, who would thus be better equipped to lead a
united and dedicated people in constructing a socialist so-
ciety, had been blasted by the "rightist"'attack on the
party and government in May 1957. Moreover, the program
adopted in November 1956 of providing greater material in-
centives to the peasants was not proving any more effective
in raising either agricultural output or peasant consump-
tion. Faced with a rapidly growing population, with rela-
tive stagnation in food production, with dwindling food re-
serves, with a disaffected intellectual class, and with
mounting dissatisfaction among the peasants and rural
cadres, the leaders reacted by adopting a series-of rad-
ical measures designed to transform and develop at a rev-
olutionary pace the recalcitrant human and material re-
sources at their disposal.
The first measure was to extend the "rectification"
campaign, now merged with the "antirightist struggle," to
encompass all the people. The peasants and cadres in ru-
ral areas were a primary target of this expanded campaign
which would serve both to silence criticism and suppress
doubts and at the same time incite a great new effort of
construction and production in the countryside. In order
to prosecute the campaign at the desired tempo and degree
of intensity, it was necessary to admit that Mao had erred
in his earlier analysis that classes had been basically
eliminated from China's society and that as a result the
socialist revolution had been completed. The socialist
revolution was resurrected and described as having en-
tered a new stage of "political and ideological" revolu-
tion. The concept of class struggle was revived and
identified as the "main contradiction" which would endure
throughout the entire period of transition to socialism,
thus enabling the party to brand all critics and criticism
of the regime as capitalists or bourgeois inspired. In
another reversal of Mao's earlier judgment that intellec-
tual elements had completed "ideological ;remolding," the
plenum more or less abandoned the attempt. to convert.exist-
ing intellectuals--who were consigned to the ranks of the
bourgeoisie--in favor of a drive to foster a new group of
intellectuals drawn from the proletariat. This drive was
subsequently referred to as the movement to train cadres
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who were both "red and expert." This in turn was closely
linked with the "back-to-the-farm" drive, also decided at
this plenum, which was to send over a million cadres and
many of the intellectual class to rural areas to partici-
pate in the agricultural construction program.
Even the favored urban working class was included in
the expanded "rectification" movement. The objective here
was to promote a new "rational, low-wage policy" designed
to narrow the sizable gap between urban and rural living
standards and to strengthen the worker-peasant alliance.
In a revealing editorial comment on this decision, People's
Daily on 21 November made the following statement: "In our
wage policy in the past ...we have also overemphasized the
importance of material incentives, while inadvisably relax-
ing our political and ideological work among the workers
and employees." The editorial went on--in much the same
language employed by Mao in his February "contradictions"
speech--to make the following assertions: (1) that the
problem of distribution must be approached "from the stand-
point of 600,000,000 people"; and (2) that policy deci-
sions must be made "in accordance with the actual condi-
tions of our country, which has a large population and is
basically poor and whose production level is still rather
low." It was but a short step from this position to the
view which was soon to appear in the party journal that
the sacrosanct socialist principle of distribution "ac-
cording to work" must yield to the primary consideration
of guaranteeing an adequate livelihood for all.
It should be emphasized that the basic decisions to
redefine and expand "rectification" on a nationwide scale
were taken prior to the party plenum and in all likelihood
on the initiative of Chairman Mao himself, Indeed, Tang
Hsiao-ping, member of the Politburo Standing Committee and
chief of the party's secretariat, indicated as much in his
report on "rectification" to the plenum, citing the oc-
casion as a party conference held in July 1957. At this
time, according to Teng, "Comrade Mao presented an over-all
appraisal of the nature and status of the `rectification'
movement and the antirightist struggle and offered clear-
cut principles for the development of the movement." Grant-
ing this, it is instructive to note the extent to which Mao
felt compelled and was willing to go in conceding the errors
of judgments made in his speech on "contradictions" in Feb-
ruary--mistakes which were carefully excised from the pub-
lished version of the speech released in June. In referring
to a complex of views, nearly all of which can be fairly as-
cribed to Mao in only slightly different form in the unpub-
lished version of his speech, Tang Hsiao-ping was authorized
to make the following statement: "In the party there have
also existed for some time the serious rightist views that
the struggle between the two roads in the rural areas had
been completed, that the class line should not be arbitrari-
ly emphasized, that efforts should be devoted solely to pro-
duction, and that socialist education among the peasants
might be slackened." (Underlining supplied). In this
case, of course, Mao's retreat was facilitated by his abil-
ity to dissociate himself from previously held but unpubli-
cized positions.
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"Rectification" conceived as a means of isolating and
suppressing dissident elements in the countryside was only
a start. The more basic and difficult task was to devise a
new approach to the problem of agricultural development--a
new program which would be both feasible and capable of in-
stilling a much-needed revolutionary elan among rural cadres
and the peasantry. For this purpose, the Draft 12-Year
Agricultural Program, first formulated in January 1956, was
reintroduced to the September 1957 plenum by Tan Chen-lin,
who in 1958 was to become the regime's chief spokesman on
agricultural policy and the communes. The general tone of
this document was cautious, even defensive, no doubt .re-
flecting the conspicuous lack of progress toward achieving
the program's goals in the 18 months since initial publi-
cation. To cite the one example, the program specified
that "birth control and planned parenthood should be prop-
agated and encouraged." There were, however, indications
that the somewhat jaded provisions of the program were to
be implemented by strikingly different means than those pre-
viously employed--indications which were revealed in the new
emphasis attached to the "abundant labor force in the coun-
tryside" and in the call for "an agricultural mechanization
program adapted to the conditions of our country."
Although Mao's "summary speech" to this party plenum
was not and still has not been published, Chinese Commu-
nist spokesmen have since indicated that his remarks were
largely concerned with charting a new course of socialist
construction for Communist China--a course in which rapid
development..of the agricultural sector was considered indis-
pensable for achieving agricultural mechanization and so-
cialist industrialization. This was the import of the
slogan which elevated agriculture to a level of importance
almost co-equal to that of industry and which was widely
publicized for the first time in the fall of 1957: "simul-
taneous development of industry and agriculture, while giv-
ing priority to heavy industry." It was in support of this
policy that Teng Hsiao-ping in his published speech to the
plenum called for a redirection of the party's energies
from the industrial to the agricultural front and for a
campaign which would "emphatically publicize the importance
of developing agriculture." In order to translate this pol-
icy into a practical program, the regime took a new hard
look at the relative importance and potential contribution
of machinery and human labor in China's agricultural produc-
tion and construction. Since the Chinese Communists were
to cite this new approach to agricultural mechanization and
socialist industrialization as the major stimulus for es-
tablishing subsequently the communes, it is important at this
time to trace the origins of this new policy in the proceed-
ings of the party plenum.
Fortunately, the substance of the unpublished discus-
sions of this conference may be gleaned from a series of
articles and editorials appearing in Study, the party jour-
nal, and in People's Daily, the party newspaper, following
the close of the plenary session. First, the natural con-
ditions governing economic development in China were identified
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as a large territory, a large population, a small amount
of arable land, and a predominantly agrarian economy.
These were contrasted with the corresponding attributes
of the Soviet Union, listed as large territory, a large
amount of arable land, a small population and a predom-
inantly industrial economy.
Given these conditions, the only way to achieve sub-
stantial increases in China's national income and output
was to elevate the productivity of agricultural labor,
but the traditional method utilized by the Soviet Union
in raising productivity by means of agricultural machin-
ery was not a feasible short-term solution for China.
Indeed, the attempt in 1956 to introduce new-type agricul-
tural plows as a modest step toward mechanization of China's
agriculture had ended in failure. The conclusion to be
drawn from this analysis was clearly stated in a People's
Daily editorial on 11 November--shortly after the termina-
tion of the plenum:
"It should be pointed out that, since our country's
industry and technology are comparatively backward and with-
in a short period cannot supply agriculture with any large
quantities of modern machinery, our agricultural production
for a considerable period to come will still have to rely
mainly on comparatively simple tools and heavy manual la-
bor. This is an historical phenomenon of our country in
the transition to socialism. Our task is to change this
phenomenon and to change our country into a great, modern-
ized agricultural country. In other words, in the future
we will replace the present heavy manual labor by large-
scale mechanical power. To reach this goal, the people of
the entire country have to strive hard, suffer hardships
and endure fatigue, conscientiously perform agricultural
manual labor, elevate labor productivity, and increase the
volume of agricultural production."
Other articles developed the theme that China's abun-
dant labor supply was unique among socialist countries and
stressed that proper organization of labor was the key to
agricultural development. Huang Ching (since deceased),
minister of machine building and a leading spokesman for
this new approach to agricultural development, expressed
the idea succinctly in a November article citing Mao's
speech at the party plenum as a text. "We must have a
new approach to the problem of agricultural population and
mechanization. The basic problem in the countryside today
is the problem of unevenness in the utilization of labor
between the busy and slack seasons." And to demonstrate
that this leitmotiv of the plenary session had passed be-
yond the stage of academic discussion, a peasant labor
army some 100 million strong was already being organized
to undertake during the slack winter season a gigantic
program of water-conservancy construction and fertilizer
accumulation which would dwarf all such previous efforts
in the countryside.
It is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance
of this decision to exploit to the fullest possible extent
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the economic factor of labor power in the evolution of the
two fundamental programs which would dominate the Chinese
scene in 1958; the "great leap forward" in economic de-
velopment and the commune movement. The underlying prem-
ise was a simple one--that the solution to the problem
of economic development lay in the massive and intensive
application of China's abundant labor supply; or, to em-
ploy the jargon of the Chinese Communist leadership, in
the application of the "mass line," which had proved so
successful in the revolutionary struggle for power, to
the infinitely more complicated process of socialist con-
struction. Moreover, this tremendously augmented labor
effort would have to be secured without resort to material
incentives--a policy which had already been tried and found
wanting and which, in any case, was ruled out in order to
maximize sayings and investment for future growth. Given
these conditions, it became imperative to devise a mecha-
nism through which the party could most effectively mobilize
and control the rural labor force and at the same time re-
strict consumption; this mechanism would in time appear as
the people's commune.
The immediate problem in the final months of 1957,
however, was to formulate a whole new set of psycholog-'
ical and moral incentives to take the place of material in-
centives in mobilizing popular energies and maximum labor
enthusiasm among the people. An early, obvious example of
this new type of incentive appearing in November was the
slogan: "Catch up with and outstrip Great Britain in 15
years," This widely publicized slogan served both to ex-
ploit the hated image of China's traditional imperialist
foe and to hold forth an inspiring and not too distant goal.
A less obvious but more significant manifestation of
this new type of incentive was the concept of the "leap for-
ward" itself. At this stage there were widespread doubts,
bred by the experience of the preceding 18 months and ex-
tending into the higher echelons of the leadership, whether
China could sustain any more than a slow, painful rate of
growth in economic development. Mao's confident assertion
at the party plenum that China could build socialism at a
rapid tempo, as expressed in the slogan "Greater, faster,
better, and cheaper, (in which the operative word was "fas-
ter"), must have provided a tonic to the flagging spirits
of the party and populace. Subsequent events were to dem-
onstrate the intoxicating effect of this slogan upon large
segments of the party, appearing first in a frantic compe-
tition to raise 1958 plan goals in industry and agriculture
and resulting finally in the telescoping of the entire his-
torical process leading to socialism and then to Communism.
It should be stressed at this point that the "rapid"
development policy was conceived not as one of several al-
ternatives, but as the sole course open to the Chinese if
they were to achieve socialism. In an authoritative dis-
cussion of the new construction policy, an editorial in
People's Daily of 12 December 1957 made the following state-
ment:
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"We are a country of huge population with relatively
scarce arable land, both backward in economy and culture
and weak in foundation. To build a powerful socialist
material foundation in such a country, catapulting its
economic level to that of the advanced nations of the
world within several decades and bringing great improve-
ment to the life of the people, we have to hasten the
tempo of construction by adopting a policy of industry
and thrift in order to move it forward with gigantic and
rapid strides. No other paths are open." (underlining
supplied)
In a major report at this time on the progress of the
"rectification" campaign, Hsi Chung-hsun, secretary gen-
eral of the State Council, made the same point in strik-
ingly similar language. "Without a number of revolution-
ary sudden progressions," he said, "it would be impossible
to build socialism in China," He went on to give as exam-
ples of such "progressions" the nationwide "rectification"
campaign and the forthcoming "upsurge" in socialist con-
struction in rural areas.
It is important to note at this early date the firm,
almost desperate resolve to "press ahead consistently" in
economic development and socialist construction, for this
resolve permits one to understand the "sudden, revolution-
ary progressions" in the development of Communist China's
economic, social, and political policies throughout 1958.
Furthermore, it is suggested that herein lie the seeds of
the daring theoretical innovation advanced by Mao Tse-tung
to rationalize and justify the headlong pace toward the
goals of socialism and Communism--the theory of "uninter-
rupted revolution" which would prove so unpalatable to
Moscow.
The third and final incentive was the electrifying
vision of a Communist society which the leadership was to
hold before the people as the ultimate and not far distant
goal of their bitter struggles Although this theme was
not widely publicized until the summer months of the fol-
lowing year, it is apparent that the inspiration for this
bold, calculated propaganda campaign derived from the in-
ternational conference of Communist parties which convened
in Moscow in November 1957 to celebrate the 40th anniversary
of the October Revolution. It was on this occasion that
Khrushchev announced the entry of the Soviet Union into
a "new stage"--of "favorable conditions... for the transi-
tion to a higher stage... 11 He also asserted at this time,
in language which the Chinese Communists would incorporate
almost verbatim into the August 1958 party resolution an-
nouncing the establishment of communes, that "Communism
is no longer a matter of the distant future." The remain-
der of his remarks on this subject were vague and perfunc-
tory, hardly substantiating his claim that the Soviet people
were "solving the historic task of the transition to Commu-
nism." Khrushchev advocated the launching of a campaign to
educate the broad masses in the spirit of Communist con-
sciousness and to inculcate a new Communist attitude toward
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labor. This must have aroused the immediate interest of
Mao and the other top Chinese leaders in attendance, for
an almost identical campaign was undertaken in Communist
China within two months.
Another major document emerging from the Moscow con-
ference with important implications for subsequent develop-
ments in Communist China was the joint declaration of policy
signed by all Communist parties of the bloc. Although
designed to present a solid facade of unity among bloc
parties following the Polish and Hungarian incidents of
1956, the propositions advanced to guide the development
of the international Communist movement were so nebulous
that widely divergent interpretations of the provisions
were possible. Indeed, this is precisely what was to hap-
pen a year later when the Sino-Soviet dispute over the
commune program was to erupt into public discussion, with
both parties citing the Moscow Declaration in support of
diametrically opposed positions.
Thus it is reasonable to conclude that Mao viewed
Khrushchev's speech as a sanction for exploring the road
leading to a Communist society in China and the Moscow
Declaration as a mandate for undertaking a distinctive
program of socialist construction adapted to the national
characteristics of China and incorporating such unusual
"forms and methods of building socialism" as the people's
commune. Additional confirmation of this conclusion is
provided by the fact that almost within a month after the
termination of Moscow Conference, the Chinese Communist
party newspaper, in a keynote New Year's Day editorial,
laid out for the first time a timetable for the transition
to a Communist society in China. It is to this new stage
in the evolution of the communes in Communist China that
we now turn.
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IV. SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE TRANSITION TO COM-
MUNISM (JANUARY 1958 - MARCH 1958)
The New Year's Day editorial of People's Daily ushered
in 1958 with a great flourish. After a summary and ap-
praisal of the major developments of the preceding year,
the editorial foreshadowed a number of the developments
to come. The "rectification" campaign for the first time
was firmly linked to China's economic development program;
the regime for the first time revealed its determination to
promote this latter program at top speed--in other words to
"leap forward"--in all branches of the economy; and the Chi-
nese Communists for the first time published a timetable
presenting their estimate of the periods of time required
to complete the transition not only to a socialist society
but also to a Communist society.
Since the time factor is crucial in interpreting the
plans and expectations of the Chinese Communist leadership
throughout 1958, it is necessary to present the following
lengthy extract from this editorial bearing on the transi-
tions to socialism and Communism:
The completion of the First Five-Year Plan
is only the first step in the long march to build
our country into a powerful socialist country.
Counting from the present, it still requires 10 to
15 years to establish a modern industrial base and
a modern agricultural base in our country. Only af-
ter 10 to 15 years of comparatively adequate devel-
opment of.our social productive forces, can we con-
sider that our socialist economic system and political
system has a comparatively adequate material base (at
present this base is far from adequate) and that our
state (the superstructure) is sufficiently consoli-
dated. Only then can we consider that we have basic-
ally completed construction of a socialist society.
Within a period of approximately 15 years, we shall
catch up with and surpass Great Britain in the output
of iron and steel and other major industrial products.
After that, it will still be necessary to develop fur--
ther our productive forces and make preparations dur-
ing-The ensuing 20 to 30 years to catch up with and
surpass the United States economically, in order to
carry out the gradual transition from socialist so-
ciety to Communist society. This is the great, glo-
rious, and arduous task of our people.
Since our people have successfully overthrown the
three big mountains which held sway over us in the
past--imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic cap-
italism--and since we have within a very short period
made such rapid development in economic and cultural
construction, we have full reason to believe that our
people will surely build our country into a strong
to a sac a s society an a Communist society. Our
country Is large , has ric, resources and large pop-
ulation, our people are industrious and courageous,
and our country has the most advanced socialist sys-
tem. There is no reason why we should not exert our
utmost tor the realization o our great Ideal.
(Underlining supplied)
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Aside from the calculated tone of "revolutionary optim-
ism" permeating this passage, there are several specific
ideas which deserve elucidation. The first concerns the
criteria for measuring the achievement of socialism in 10
to 15 years, here given as "a comparatively adequate ma-
terial base" and a consolidated state structure. Attain-
ment of this objective would then enable the regime to claim
that it had "basically completed construction of a socialist
society," This then would correspond to the stage reached
by the Soviet Union in 1936 when Stalin asserted that social-
ism had been "basically" constructed, despite the relatively
low level of development of the Soviet economy at that time.
The second idea is the implication that at least the
material prerequisite for a Communist society in China could
be satisfied by "catching up with and surpassing the United
States economically," a process which would require from 30
to 45 years-. To demonstrate the close attention paid this
editorial by the Soviet leadership, it is worth while to an-
ticipate developments by noting that Khrushchev was to re-
pudiate this proposition in his 21st Party Congress speech
delivered more than a year later. In language, so similar as
to be more than accidental, Khrushchev made the following
statement: "It would be an oversimplication to assume that
when we catch up with the United States economically,we will
complete Communist construction. No, this is not the end of
the road... (but) only the initial stage of Communist construc-
tion."
The final characteristic of this editorial which deserves
special attention is the amalgamation of socialism and Commu-
nism into a single "great ideal"--an early example of blurring
these two separate historical stages which was to be such a
bone of contention in the Sino-Soviet dispute over the com-
munes,
The first steps toward the realization of this "great
ideal" were taken at a secret party conference held during
the middle of January at Nanning, the capital of China's
southernmost province. This was the first of three top-level
Chinese Communist party conferences which were to play a
dominant role in policy formation during the first six months
of 1958. Chairman Mao is known to have delivered a major
address at Nanning under the pedestrian title "Sixty Methods
of Work." Although this address has never been reported and
is rarely cited, there is reason to believe that many of the
innovations in theory and practice which were to appear dur-
ing the first half of 1958 were introduced at this time.
It was at this time, as subsequent provincial party re-
ports were to demonstrate, that Mao advanced the concept of
"uninterrupted revolution" (which Marx had introduced more
than a century before to urge that the German "bourgeois-
democratic" revolution be continued into a "socialist" rev-
olution) as a theoretical justification of the accelerated
tempo of socialist construction in Communist Chinas A for-
mal explanation of this daring theoretical innovation was
not forthcoming until Liu Shao-chi?s work report at the
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Central Committee party congress in May. The concept was
reflected, however, in the major reports to the National
People's Congress session held in early February immediately
after the Nanning Conference and in an editorial in People's
Daily on 3 February.
In his annual budget report to the congress, Li Hsien-
nein likened this principle of continuous advance to the
motion of "waves driving each other forward" and called it
"the law of progress of our cause." The editorial stipulated
that socialist construction must demonstrate the same pattern
of advance as that which had characterized past struggles dur-
ing the period of democratic revolution--that is, a continuous
advance by leaps and bounds. The following little-known quo-
tation of Lenin on the eve of the October Revolution was
cited in support of this stand: "Either we face destruction
(by the advanced countries) or else we must... overtake them
economically.... Either it is destruction or else it is an
advance forward at full speed. This is a question posed by
history." Thus at this date Mao was already searching the
early canonical writings of Marxism-Leninism:for doctrinal
authority which would support a program of socialist construc-
tion differing sharply from the Soviet model.
Another theme of Mao's speech at Nanning was the need
to combat the "rightist" conservatism existing in the minds
of a number of party comrades. This was of pressing urgency
at this time, when the rate of advance was to be accelerated
much more rapidly than in 1956, and was made particularly dif-
ficult because the party was already on record as having con-
demned the pace of 1956 as an example of "rash advance."
The problem was stated succinctly in the People's Daily ed-
itorial on 3 February: "Some people fail to understand that
by leaps and bounds is different in principle from rash ad-
vance." It is apparent that Mao was unable at Nanning to
dispel the doubts of these comrades who were referred to
throughout the ensuing months by such epithets as the "tide
watchers," the "tide blockers," and as those "waiting to set-
tle accounts after the autumn harvest."
More was needed to step up the pace, however, than
more theoretical expositions and admonitions. This was pro-
vided by Mao at Nanning in a 14-point program for agricul-
tural development which he epitomized in the slogan "Three
years of bitter struggle to basically change the appearance
of the countryside." This was conceived as a three-year
period of maximum effort and sacrifice (1958-1960) which
would permit most areas to complete the Draft 12-Year Agri-
cultural Program by 1962, or five years ahead of schedule.
Again, the key to success in this forced-draft program was
the massive and intensive application-of peasant labor
power, which Li Hsien-nien hailed in February as the "pri-
mary decisive factor in agricultural production and con-
struction." The necessary investment funds were to be pro-
vided by the collectives themselves rather than by the state,
thus demanding additional sacrifices from an already heavily
burdened peasantry.
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Mao apparently advanced still another, although re-
lated, goal at Nanning--that the various provinces strive
to make local industrial output (as distinct from the out-
put of industrial enterprises under central government
control) exceed the value of agricultural output by 1962.
This process would be facilitated by the implementation of
a series of "decentralization" measures which had been de-
creed in November 1957 and which were designed to give
more authority and incentive to local governments in ad-
ministrative, financial, and industrial matters. Local
industrial development at this time, however, was still
considered to be largely an adjunct of agriculture and did
not assume the character of a mass campaign in its own right
until after the Chengtu Conference in March.
In order to present a comprehensive discussion of the
origins of the commune, it is necessary at this point to
anticipate the major policy decision reached at Chengtu--
the adoption of a mass line for industrial development which
greatly enlarged the scope and objectives of the local in-
dustry program. No longer considered a mere adjunct to the
agricultural sector, this undertaking to construct thous-
ands of small-scale industrial installations in rural areas
was now hailed as a major means of accelerating socialist
industrialization for the economy as a whole and as a dis-
tinctive feature of China's program of socialist construc-
tion. Of even greater significance, it was decided at
Chengtu to transform the program into a mass campaign which
would penetrate beyond local levels of government to exploit
the underemployed labor force of the agricultural producer
cooperative. Following the decision at the September 1957
Central Committee plenum to organize a huge peasant labor
army to engage in agricultural production and construction,
this decision at Chengtu to initiate a mass movement in
rural industrial construction appears to be the second de-
cisive factor leading to the establishment of communes in
China. Indeed it is possible to argue plausibly, as the
Chinese Communists have done, that the communal organization
was a necessary corollary of the rural. industrialization pro-
gram.
To return to the Nanning Conference in January, it is
fair to conclude that the basic purpose of Mao's speech
on that occasion was to arouse revolutionary optimism and
fervor among the party leadership at all levels and to ex-
hort them to draw up a series of advanced plans and ambitious
goals. This was to be accomplished by means of a new Com-
munist working style of "daring to think, speak, and act
with courage"--a working style both exemplified and advo-
cated by Mao in his address. At first directed principally
at the party leadership, this undertaking to inculcate rev-
olutionary attitudes and approaches to problems was soon to
assume the proportions of a mass campaign and become, to use
the expression of Liu Shao-chi in his party congress speech
in May, "a Communist ideological emancipation movement.,,
among the broad masses of the people." As early as January,
an article in the party journal devoted to the "red and ex-
pert" and "down to the farm" movements called for the organ-
ization of a Communist education campaign to propagandize a
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"new Communist spirit" and a "new Communist viewpoint" so
that these two movements might succeed. Another journal ar-
ticle at this time advocated that the workers receive an
"education in the spirit of Communism" as an antidote for
individualism and discussed in somewhat slighting terms the
socialist principle of remuneration "according to work."
Still another example of this development appeared in the
People's Daily editorial of 31 January, shortly after Nan-
n nng, in the reference to "the task of using the spirit of
Communism in the education of our younger generation and
the currently developing high tide of industrial and agri-
cultural production in our country."
Thus it was becoming increasingly clear that the Chi-
nese Communists intended to exploit the shimmering ideal of
a future Communist society in China by directing the fervor
aroused by this goal into an immediate program of socialist
construction conducted at top speed and demanding maximum
sacrifice. This, in brief, was the situation just prior to
the convocation of Communist China's leadership at the Cheng-
tu Conference in March 1958, the party conclave in which the
commune as the chosen instrument of China's distinctive pro-
gram of socialist construction is believed to have been con-
ceived.
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V. THE COMMUNE CONCEIVED (MARCH 1958 - APRIL 1958)
Little more is known of the secret proceedings of
the Chengtu conference than of its predecessor in Nan-
ning. It was later described as having been convened
by the "Central Committee and Chairman Mao" and as hav-
ing brought together "responsible comrades of provincial
and municipal party organs and of the concerned depart-
ments of the central government." There are several in-
dications, however, that the conference outranked its
predecessor in the quantity and quality of leadership
in attendance and in the significance of the policy de-
cisions adopted. For example, Chou En-lai remained in
Peiping for at least part of the period during which
the Nanning conference was in session, but he unquestion-
ably participated at Chengtu. Of the full membership
of the politburo, only the relatively unimportant Chen
Yi and Ho Lung were left in Peiping to greet visiting
delegations during the period of this conference. The
second clue bearing on the relative importance of these
two conferences is that the one at Chengtu was of long-
er duration, lasting through much of the month of March.
Mao is known to have arrived in this southwestern pro-
vincial capital on 5 March; his departure, in company
with a number of prominent party leaders, did not take
place until 28 March.
If the basis purpose of the Nanning conference was
to arouse revolutionary optimism and promote the draw-
ing up of a series of advanced goals, the objective at
Chengtu was to devise ways and means of realizing these
goals. Support for this view is provided by an editorial
on 27 April in People's Daily stating, "If several months
ago /Nanning7 the question was to think of things none
dared to thTnk of in the past, do things which were con-
sidered to be impossible in the past, combat all sorts
of rightist conservatism and draw up advanced plans and
advanced targets, then the question today / hengtu7 is
to put into effect the advanced plans and advanced tar-
gets already compiled...."
Among the major policy decisions reached at Chengtu
to carry out these ambitious goals was the adoption of
a mass line for industrial development which enlarged
greatly the scope and objectives of the local industry
program. No longer considered a mere adjunct to the
agricultural sector, this undertaking to construct
thousands of small-scale industrial installations in
rural areas was hailed as a major means of accelerating
socialist industrialization for the economy as a whole
and as a distinctive feature of China's program of so-
cialist construction.
Of even greater significance, it was decided at
Chengtu to transform the program into a mass campaign
penetrating beyond local levels of government to exploit
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the underemployed labor force of the agricultural pro-
ducer cooperatives. Since this was the last element
of China's own "general line of socialist construction"
to be adopted, it is interesting to note that at least
one of the reasons for its belated appearance was the
resistance of a number of "economic workers and tech-
nical personnel" who questioned the feasibility of
applying the mass line to the industrialization proc-
ess.;. Mao himself was to attack these skeptics as
late as October 1958, citing their contemptuous ref-
erences to the mass movement in industry as "irregular,
"of rural style," and "analogous to the practice of
guerrilla warfare."
Following the decision at the September 1957 Cen-
tral Committee Plenum to organize a huge peasant labor
army to engage in agricultural production and construc-
tion, this decision at Chengtu to initiate a mass move-
ment in rural industrial construction appears to have
been the second decisive development leading to the
establishment of communes in China. Indeed, it is pos-
sible to argue plausibly on purely deductive grounds
that the communal organization was a necessary corollary
of the rural industrialization program, as the Chinese
Communists themselves contended in subsequent explana-
tions of the derivation of the people's commune.
The events and published discussions following the
close of this conference provide external evidence to'support
the conclusion that the commune itself was conceived
at Chengtu. That the decision was not made earlier is
suggested by a Study article appearing while the con-
ference was still in session. In a very strong plea
that the socialist principle of distribution "accord-
ing to work" must not be changed, the author cited the
early experience of the Soviet Union with agricultural
communes, concluding that the Russians organized "a
communal system in the spirit of equalitarianism...but
soon found that this system was not suited to produc-
tion relations under socialism and changed to collec-
tive farms." Such views would not have been disseminated
by the party organ after the decision to establish com-
munes had been reached.
The best evidence that the concept of the commune
originated in the March party conference is that a cam-
paign to merge small agricultural producer cooperatives
began immediately thereafter, principally in the two
provinces of Honan and Liaoning, which had been selected
as the vanguards in the communalization movement. The
record indicates that cooperative mergers were performed
in two ways:
The first way was a relatively modest undertaking
to double or triple the size of the cooperative and, in
effect, was no more than an effort to regain the ground
lost during the widespread dissolution of agricultural
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producer cooperatives in 1957. Liu Shao-chi, who was
to play a leading role in the commune movement, was re-
ported as advocating cooperative mergers of this type
in Szechuan Province almost immediately after the close
of the Chengtu conference.
The second method was the experimental formation of
greatly expanded "large cooperatives," which represented
the amalgamation of 20 to 30 of the existing collectives.
The best known example of this second type was the pre-
cursor of the famous Sputnik Commune, which was to serve
as the model for all China during the high tide to com-
munalization in September.
In addition to the quantitative change in size, a
number of qualitative changes in April indicate that
this new type of "large cooperative" was in fact the
embryo of the commune. There was the intensive devel-
opment of small-scale industry; the incorporation of
handicraft, supply and marketing, and credit coopera-
tives into the large collective; the formation of com-
munal dining rooms and nurseries, although described
as merely temporary during the busy farming season;
the establishment of primary and middle schools to be
run by the cooperatives; and the concerted effort to
train large numbers of cadres and activists who would
be both "red" and "expert." All of these characteristic
features of the commune were introduced in April in
the pilot provinces of Honan and Liaoning, and to a
lesser extent in other provinces as well. This period
of experimentation, which has marked the preparatory
stage in all previous mass movements undertaken by the
Chinese Communists, was to extend through the month of
June. It should be emphasized that these early pro-
totypes of the commune were described as collective
farms at the time; the identity of this revolutionary
social organization was not revealed to the peasant
membership until the end of this trial period.
There have been elaborate, if not farcical, efforts
by the Chinese Communist leadership to present the com-
mune movement as having been from its very inception the
product of a spontaneous and irresistible demand raised
by the broad masses of the people. In the voluminous
Chinese Communist literature which purports to trace
the origins of the commune, all but one article call
the early cooperative mergers a spontaneous development.
In an account appearing in People's Daily on 2 Septem-
ber describing the April-May movement to establish large
cooperatives in Liaoning Province, the author committed
the indiscretion of admitting that the cooperative mer-
gers resulted from a "directive of the Central Committee
of the party," a directive which must have been issued
shortly after Chengtu. The almost invariable explana-
tion, however, was that the large cooperatives were es-
tablished to satisfy the urgent demands of the masses,
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who, according to some accounts, were determined to ef-
fect these large-scale mergers even if the authorities
refused to honor their requests.
Although the commune was yet to be revealed as a
vehicle for accelerating the advance to Communism,
there were a number of indications during April that
the rate of advance toward this distant goal had been
stepped up. Since most of the top leaders were tour-
ing the provinces--a practice which would occupy much
of their time and energies throughout 1958--it remained
for lesser figures to present these new perspectives
to a National Conference of Young Workers' Representa-
tives meeting in Shanghai. Lu Ting-i, Director of the
Chinese Communist Party's propaganda department, em-
ployed this occasion to assert that "the young gen-
eration. . .will personally build a Communist society
in China." Hu Yao-pang, secretary of the Young Com-
munist League, developed this theme at great length,
inciting his audience to cultivate the same lofty
ambitions as those displayed by Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Mao Tse-tung, and concluding with the following
peroration:
We are people living in the era of Mao Tse-
tung, and youth of the era of Mao Tse-tung.
Our revolutionary forerunners have created a
new country for us and established a bright
avenue for Communism... Comrades, let us close-
ly unite to contribute our efforts for the
fatherland, the people, and Communist under-
takings under the leadership of the great par-
ty and Chairman Mao.
Hu's remarks were important, not only because
they treated "Communist undertakings" as an immediate
concern for the Vouth of China, but also because they
foreshadowed the impending revival of a "cult of per-
sonality" built around Mao Tse-tung. The ensuring
adulation of Mao, already linked in Hu's speech with
the classical founders of Marxism-Leninism, was soon
to dominate Chinese Communist discussions of revolu-
tionary theory and practice. As a parallel develop-
ment, references to the Soviet model and to the ap-
plicability of Soviet experience to China's program
of socialist construction were to disappear almost
completely from Chinese Communist publications.*
That Mao was in fact, as well as in name, the
driving force behind the headlong advance toward. so
cialism and Communism was already becoming clear in
*During the spring of 1958, Soviet theoretical dis-
cussions of the commune took the line that even in the
advanced USSR the commune was a distant prospect.
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April. An editorial in the party newspaper of 27 April
provides striking evidence of this: "We have already
erred twice in 'opposing rash advance'--in the coopera-
tivization high tide of 1955 and in the production-con-
struction high tide of 1956--and we absolutely cannot
make the same mistake again." By invoking two major
campaigns which Mao had sponsored in 1955-56, a fact
known to all, the editorial managed in one sentence to
emphasize the leading role of Mao in the current cam-
paign and to serve notice on skeptical party elements
that they should mend their ways.
The final clue to the momentous decision taken at
the Chengtu conference is to be found in an article
written by Chairman Mao for the first issue of Red Flag,
a new theoretical journal of the Central Committee. In-
retrospect, it appears that a major objective of this
new publication was to launch and promote the communal-
ization movement. Although the first issue did not ap-
pear until 1 June, Mao's article, entitled "Introducing
a Cooperative," was written on 15 April and took as its
text a report presented by a cooperative director on 20
March, presumably at the Chengtu conference. Only two
paragraphs in length and couched in cryptic language,
the article nevertheless qualifies as an important
document in the chronology of the communes.
Aftern pointing out that "the Communist spirit is
surging forward throughout the country," Mao went on to
assert that "China is forging ahead in its socialist
economic revolution" (where transformation of the rela-
tions of production has not yet been completed)," Since
the transformation of production relations in the stage
of cooperativization had already been virtually com-
pleted, this passage suggests an intention to move into
a more advanced stage of production relations--that of
the commune. But a more revealing passage was the fol-
lowing:
Apart from China's other characteristics, its
600,000,000 people are first of all 'poor' and
secondly 'white.' This seems a bad thing, but
in fact it is a good thing. Poor people want
change, want to do things, want revolution. A
clean sheet of paper has nothing on it, and so
the newest and most beautiful words can be writ-
ten and the newest and most beautiful pictures
painted on it.
This statement was to serve as a theme of many sub-
sequent discussions of the commune movement, both dur-
ing its early organizational phase and during the latter
phase of rationalization and justification of this auda-
cious experiment. With the advantage of-hindsight, it
is fair to conclude that the inspiration for this flight
of poetic imagery was in fact the commune, conceived as
"the newest and most beautiful picture" which would soon
be painted in China.
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The cooperative introduced in Mao's article deserves
separate mention.* One commendable feature was the prog-
ress already achieved by this cooperative in implement-
ing Mao's call at the Nanning conference: "Struggle
hard for three years in order to basically change the
appearance of the countryside." A more interesting
feature was the novel system of income distribution
adopted by the cooperative following a period of ex-
perimentation. The essence of this system was that in-
come payments would be made on a monthly basis in ac-
cordance with a dual standard of work performance and
of need. If individual households were unable to ful-
fill their quotas of labor days for acceptable reasons,
their livelihood requirements would still be met through
this method of advance payments. Moreover, the coopera-
tive was preparing to introduce a "fixed-wage system"
for its members in 1959, when public reserves would have
risen to the necessary level. Thus Mao was on record at
this early date as favoring a distribution system based
partly on need and oriented toward the payment of wages,
two distinctive characteristics of remuneration under
the people's commune.
*T a report describing the experiences of this co-
operative, which Mao recommended as a model for all the
remaining 700,000 agricultural producer cooperatives in
China, has never been translated.
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VI. THE COMMUNE AND THE "GENERAL LINE OF SOCIALIST CON-
STRUCTION" (MAY 1958 - JUNE 1958)
The last of the three major party conferences during
the first half of 1958 was the second session of the
eighth party congress which met in Peiping from 5 to 23
May. Unlike those at Nanning and Chengtu, two of the
principal speeches delivered at the congress were pub-
lished in full and a third was summarized. As in the an-
tecedent conferences, however, a major address by Chairman
Mao was not reported, and no public reference was made to
the almost certain discussion of communes at this party
gathering. The published reports of Liu Shao-chi and Tan
Chen-lin, although purporting to deal extensively with
the party's future tasks, were remarkably reticent about
future developments in the countryside. Thus, in spite of
the expanded coverage, it is still necessary to resort to
newspaper and journal discussions in order to understand
the proceedings of this congress.
One aspect of the session was clear almost at the
outset--the new dominant role of the party and of the
leaders of the party organization, both in the formula-
tion of economic policy and in the implementation of
that policy. In place of the senior government adminis-
trators and economic specialists (Chou En-lai, Chen Yun,
Li Fu-shun, Li Hsien-nien, and Po I-po) who had figured
prominently in the discussions of the first session of
the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 and who had
been instrumental in formulating the "retrenchment"
policies of the period from November 1956 to September
1957, a new cast of.characters, together with Chairman
Mao, dominated the proceedings of the May party congress.
They were to continue to dominate and control the two
principal campaigns of 1958, the "great leap forward,"
and the commun movements. These men, Who have
been described as the "party-machine" leaders
and, in the context in 1958,as the "exhor.ters,44
were--in order of importance--Liu Shao-chi (second only to
Mao in party leadership and'Mao's heir apparent), Teng Hsiao-
ping (chief of the party's secretariat) and Tan Chen-lin (the
secretariat's specialist since 1957 in rural policy. and agriculture).
The rationale for the party's arrogation of authority
and control over China's economic-development program was
provided by Liu Shao-chi in the following passage from his
speech to the congress:
Ideological and political work is always the soul and
guide of every kind of work...It should be realized
that machines are made and operated by men, and ma-
terials are produced only through the efforts of men.
It is man that counts; the subjective initiative of
the masses is a mighty driving force....Some people
say that ideological and political work can produce
neither grain nor coal nor iron. This is like failing
to see the woods for the trees. One may ask: Have we not
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produced more grain, coal, and iron by formulating
and carrying out correct political lines, by cor-
rectly handling contradictions among the people,and
by raising the socialist consciousness of the work-
ers and arousing the enthusiasm of the masses, and
are we not going to produce more and more Ty -so
doing? (Underlining supplied)
Thus "economic work," by definition a highly complex activ-
ity involving economic planning, cost accounting, calcula-
tion of work norms, and provision of material incentives
based on work performance, was being displaced by "politi-
cal and ideological work," by definition an undertaking
to arouse "the subjective initiative of the masses" and
the "enthusiasm of the masses" to a maximum production ef-
fort through a program combining political persuasion and
coercion. Among the factors prompting this new applica-
tion of the "mass line" to economic development must have
been the opportunity it afforded the top leaders of the
Chinese Communist Party to exert an even greater measure
of control over China's program of socialist construction.
Liu Shao-chi's report to the congress, while inten-
tionally vague on future developments, provides an indis-
pensable source for understanding the genesis and evolu-
tion'of China's own "general line of socialist construc-
tion" from December 1955 to the congress session in May
1958. Since-much of the discussion in earlier portions
of this study is devoted to this subject, it is sufficient
here merely to reproduce the "general line" as enunciated
in final form and to describe certain of the new features
and implications of the "line" which were noted at this
time by Liu and other commentators. The official formu-
lation of this key Chinese Communist policy was as fol-
lows:
In the light of practical experience gained in the
people's struggle and of the development of Comrade
Mao Tse-tung's thinking in the past few years, the
party Central Committee is of the opinion that the
following are the basic points of our general line,
which is to build socialism by exerting our utmost
efforts, and pressing ahead consistently to achieve
greater, faster, better, and more economical results:
To mobilize all positive factors and correct-
ly handle contradictions among the people;
To consolidate and develop socialist owner-
ship--that is, ownership by the whole people and
collective ownership--and to consolidate the pro-
letarian dictatorship and proletarian interna-
tional solidarity;
To carry out technological revolution and a
cultural revolution step by step, while complet-
ing the socialist revolution on the economic, po-
litical, and ideological fronts;
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To develop industry and agriculture simul-
taneously while giving priority to heavy indus-
try; and
With centralized leadership, over-all plan-
ning, proper division of labor, and coordination,
to develop national and local industries, and
large, small, and medium-size enterprises simul-
taneously.
Through all this we will build our country, in the
shortest possible time, into a great socialist coun-
try with a modern industry, modern agriculture, and
modern science and culture.
One of the most striking features of the formal promul-
gation of China's "general line of socialist construction"
was the almost immediate claim appearing in both Study and
People's Daily that the line constituted a new development
of the arxist-Leninist theory of socialist construction
and as such was."significant... for the other fraternal states
engaged in building socialism." This assertion was re-
markable on two counts: first, that it was advanced with-
in a month after the "line" was formally announced; and
second, that it should have been advanced at all, since
there was a good chance that it would incur the displeasure
of the Soviet Union, always jealous of its leadership pre-
rogatives in the bloc. As an explanation for this novel
development, it is suggested that the Chinese Communists
were convinced that the "general line" had already proved
itself in practice and therefore deserved serious study
and possible emulation by other bloc countries, especially
those Asian countries faced with problems and difficul-
ties similar to those already surmounted in China.
Two reports delivered by Tan Chen-lin in East China
in June support this conclusion. After revealing that the
Chengtu conference in March had estimated an increase in
1958 grain production of 10 to 20 percent, he noted that
a more recent estimate of the increment was in excess of
50 percent, thus constituting a victory of "historic
significance" which would basically solve China's food prob-
lem. As such, it represented "the application of dialec-
tic materialism and the 'mass line' to production and con-
struction and a new development of Marxism on the question
of socialist construction." More succinctly, Tan asserted
that the production increase in agriculture had demon-
strated once and for all that "Marxism can produce grain."
China's spectacular achievements in socialist con-
struction were not confined to agriculture. In a series
of articles beginning in May, the claim was advanced and
reiterated that Communist China's estimated increase in
industrial production in 1958 would be the "largest in
the world" and, specifically, would rank "first among so-
cialist countries." This was attributed in large part to
the widespread development of local industry consisting
of small- and medium-size industrial installations, a dis-
tinctive feature of China's own "general line,"
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One of the articles lauding the local industry pro-
gram deserves special mention. In effect, it denied the
argument subsequently advanced by Khrushchev (in late
1958) that socialist industrialization, a prerequisite
for completing the building of socialism, required a high-
ly modern, technical, and automated industrial base.
Citing the early scriptural writings as his authority, in
this case a quotation from the works of Lenin, the author
asserted that industrialization on an extensive scale,
rather than large-scale industry per se, was all that was
required to complete the stage of socialist construction.
It should be emphasized that this apparently innocuous
formulation provided a theoretical justification for re-
ducing drastically the period of time necessary to com-
plete the socialist stage and enter the higher stage of
the transition to Communism. In this sense, it offers a
significant clue for understanding the time factor as ex-
pressed in the planning and policy statements surrounding
the "great leap forward" and commune programs in the
latter half of 1958.
The classic example of telescoping the passage of
time appeared in Liu Shao-chi's congress report, in which
he characterized the age as one when "twenty years are
concentrated in a day." There were more specific indica-
tions, however, that the tempo of advance to socialism
and Communism was being greatly accelerated. In place of
the earlier estimate (as, for example, in the 1 January
1958 People's Daily editorial) that a 10-to-15-year period
would be required to complete basically the construction
of a socialist society in China, the "general line" now
specified that this would be accomplished "in the short-
est possible timed" The implications of this change were
spelled out in a People's Daily editorial of 4 May in the
following passage: "Successes-in the great leap for-
ward in production show that we shall not only be able to
build socialism, but complete this work ahead of schedule.
Since this is so, the day of constructing Communism /In
China/ is not very far off."
Replacing the original timetable, which had called
for completion of the Draft Agricultural Program in 1967,
Tan Chen-lin confidently informed the congress session
that most of China's provinces would achieve by 1962 the
targets set forth in the program. The mechanization of
agriculture, rural industrialization, and the electrifi-
cation of the countryside, goals which had appeared re-
mote only a few months previously, were also to be real-
ized in a number of provinces by the end of the Second
Five-Year Plan in 1962.
In a rare early reference to the estimated period of
time necessary to "complete our country's transition from
socialism to Communism" (underlining supplied), a People's
Daily editorial on 1 June implied that China would achieve
a Communist society before the end of the century. These
were the heady dreams inspired by the successes already
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claimed for the "great leap forward" in socialist construc-
tion in 1958 and by the confident belief that China had
indeed discovered a shortcut to socialism and Communism.
The leap forward on the production front demanded,
according to the dialectic, a leap forward on the ideo-
logical front. This was to be accomplished by a campaign
initiating the masses into the mysteries of Marxist-Lenin-
ist theory which, appropriately, was launched on the 140th
anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx--the eve of the May
party congress. The medium for promoting the campaign was
a series of theoretical magazines to be published begin-
ning 1 June by party committees at various levels, includ-
ing the new theoretical journal of the Central Committee
entitled Red Flag.,
Although the purposes of this campaign were variously
stated, it was apparently designed to accomplish two ob-
jectives.. The first was to sustain the "heaven-storming
enthusiasm" of the masses during the trials and tribula-
tions experienced during the,initial period of their "three
years of bitter struggle" .(1958-60). This aim was stated
succinctly in a May journal discussion denying that a pol-
icy of material incentives was the only way or even the
best way to stimulate production. Rather, the article
continued, "To raise the class consciousness of laborers
and establish their Communist ideology is the best way
of raising their production activity," The second pur-
pose, perhaps only implicit at the outset of the campaign,
was to prepare the peasants for the impending organization
of communes. The two purposes were reflected in a provin-
cial party secretary's report appearing in People's Daily
on 18 May:
It is, necessary to develop the Communist ideologi-
cal liberation movement and raise up the Communist
work style among the masses so that everyone will
have ideals 'and ambitions, dare to create, and strive
to become advanced. Then with the initiative of the
600,000,000 people sufficiently mobilized... this
will quicken the process of completing the building
of socialism and moving ahead tc Communism.
It is important to note the substantive content of
this mass indoctrination campaign. In general the tone
of the new theoretical magazines might be described as
radical and chauvinistic. The term "radical" refers to
the pronounced tendency of the theoreticians to go to the
early writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in search of
doctrinal authority for Communist China's innovations in
theory and practice. The chauvinistic aspect was mani-
fested at the very outset of the campaign by the revival
of a concept which had not appeared in Chinese Communist
literature since 1953--the concept of "Mao's ideology."
The reappearance of.this concept, which had proved dis-
tasteful to the Soviet Union in the past, was a good in-
dication that.the Chinese Communists intended to proceed
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on a distinctive Chinese road of socialist construction.
What is more, the concept clearly implied that the Chi-
nese regarded Mao as the ranking Marxist-Leninist theo-
retican of the day and, as such, eminently qualified to
provide theoretical guidance in their audacious commune
experiment.
Indeed, as the campaign unfolded,it was not uncommon
to see "Mao's ideology" given precedence over "Marxism-
Leninism," and on occasion seemingly equated with the en-
tire body of Marxist doctrine. The following extract from
a 31 May issue of Study provides a good illustration of
this development:
Following the development of the all-people "recti-
fication" campaign, there has universally appeared
throughout urban and rural areas a torrential leap
forward movement... In order to enable our ideology
not to lag behind the situation which is developing
at the pace of 1,000 miles per day, we must destroy
superstition, liberate our ideology, and firmly over-
come subjectivism. The basic method /af liberating
our thinking7 lies in the thorough study of Chairman
Mao's-ideology and in studying the policies of im-
portant resolutions of the party. Chairman Mao,
combining the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism
with the specific practice of China's revolution,
and using the methods, viewpoint, and stand of
Marxism-Leninism, creatively analyzes and solves
the problems of China's revolution synthesizes
China's revolutionary experiences, elevates them
to the level of Marxist-Leninist theory, and there-
by enriches and develops Marxism-Leninism. Chair-
man Mao's works are discussions of the various
basic problems of our country's revolutionary prac-
tice and employ the freshest, liveliest, and most
correct language. Quite a few of these problems
transcent the limits of our own national experience.
The study of Chairman Mao's work is the best way
for us to receive and grasp the weapon of Marxism-
Leninism. Chairman Mao's ideology concentratedly
reflects our people's most basic ideals and most
urgent aspirations. Chairman Mao's working method
is to proceed from the masses and return to the
masses. By studying Mao's ideology, we can then
become intimately linked with the masses and can, in
the complex conditions of actual life, ascertain the
proper direction and develop unlimited wisdom and
power.
The presentation of Mao as the outstanding Marxist-
Leninist theoretician of the age was unprededented. The
claim for Mao's pre-eminence was to appear overtly on at
least one occasion--in the 13 September issue of People's
Daily. Full credit for the forumulation of China's own
""-general line of socialist construction," already hailed
as a contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory, was given to
Chairman Mao. The party organ Study published a special
issue in mid-June marking the anniversary of Mao's "con-
tradictions" speech, which a number of authors characterized
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as "a great, creative contribution to the development of
Marxist-Leninist theory." It was still another theoretical
innovation of Mao, however, his version of "uninterrupted
revolution," which was to dominate the theoretical discus-
sion of the party and, to a lesser extent, the mass indoc-
trination campaign throughout the remainder of 1958.
As analyzed in a definitive discussion appearing sub-
sequently in the 10 October issue of Study, Mao's concept
of "uninterrupted revolution" sought to provide theoretical
justification both for the commune program and for the head-
long advance to Communism. An early formulation advanced by
Marx and Engels to sanction the rapid transformation of
"bourgois-democratic" revolution into the stage of social-
ist revolution, the idea was expanded by Mao to become a
principle governing the entire course of revolution in China,
encompassing the stages of new democratic revolution, social-
ist revolution, socialist construction, and the transition
from socialism to Communism. This concept was an ingenious,
if heretical, argument for accelerating China's revolutionary
process.
The time was not ripe for revealing the true dimensions
of this theoretical innovation at the May party congress,
Liu Shao-chi's published discussion of "uninterrupted revolu-
tion," though suggestive, confined the application of this
doctrine to the past revolutionary history of the Chinese
Communist movement and to the immediate future tasks of tech-
nological and cultural revolution in the stage of socialist
construction. Yet there were indications in party newspapers
and journals during and immediately following the congress
that the concept had already matured into final form and had
been the subject of extensive private discussion during the
party conclave.
In a series of articles by provincial party secretaries
published in People's Daily while the conference was still
in session, there appear the following statements.
Chairman Mao's instructions on "uninterrupted revolu-
tion , on abandonment of superstition," on ideological
liberation, and on the line of socialist construction
have a far-reaching and inestimable bearing on Commu-
nist undertakings in our country.
The future of the development of worker-peasant re-
lations and urban-rural relations must lead to the
removal of differences of a basic character between
the workers and peasants and between the cities and
the countryside. This is naturally a long-term process.
During the current transitional period, however, we
must be ideologically prepared for it, and in our
practical work we must gradually create the spiritual
and material conditions for the eventual goal,/Com-
munism/o If we say that during the past stage of the
democratic revolution there were already found the
factors and rudiments of the socialist revolution, then
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in the current transitional period there must necessar-
ily also emerge the factors and rudiments of the stage
of Communism.
The latter passage refers unmistakably to the premise
of "uninterrupted revolution"--that rudiments of a higher
revolutionary stage will. appear in a lower stage--and fore-
shadowed the introduction of such "Communist factors" as the
free-supply system under the people's communes.
The final indication of the maturity of Mao's concept at
this time is provided by a People's Daily editorial on 10 June
firmly linking "uninterrupted revolution" with the ultimate
goal of a Communist society. The editorial observed: "In
order to attain the great ideal of Communism, revolutionaries
must grasp this law /of 'uninterrupted revolution'/, constant-
ly set new tasks for themselves, and carry on revolution with-
out interruption."
The commune was yet to be revealed as the chosen instru-
ment for China's "uninterrupted revolution," but it was be-
coming increasingly evident in June that some such revolution-
ary change in social organization was imminent. A lengthy
article in the 18 June issue of Study alluded to this in a
general discussion of production relations in China. Taking
as his text Mao's earlier "contradictions"speech, the au-
thor attempted to 'demonstrate that China was ready for a
more advanced type of production relations despite the ex-
isting low level of production, thus playing fast and loose
with the traditional Marxist dogma that production relations
are necessarily determined by the level of development of
the productive forces. Less sophisticated discussions at
the time implied that the "great leap forward" had already
elevated the productive forces to a point where changes in
the relations of production were necessary.
More concrete evidence of the impending transformation
of rural society was provided by a People's Daily article
on 2 June written by the secretary of the All-China Women's
Federation. Here for the first time the intention to col-
lectivize the rural household economy, a cardinal feature
of the commune, was clearly revealed. After documenting
the growing labor shortage in the countryside and advanc-
ing as a solution the liberation of female labor to engage
in production, the author lauded the advanced experiences
of Honan and Hunan provinces in establishing public mess halls,
nurseries, and kindergartens as a means of releasing this ad-
ditional source of labor power. As an indication that this
was to become a general practice, the author stated: "Ac-
tivities performed by household labor--such as bringing up
children, processing food grain, preparing meals, and sewing
clothing--are gradually becoming collective enterprises in so-
ciety." To round out the discussion, Lenin was cited as the
architect of this policy in a passage which would become a
standard reference in subsequent explanations of this dis-
tinctive feature of the commune. The quotation, taken from
Lenin's article "The Great Beginning," was paraphrased as
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follows: "The setting up of public mess halls, children's
nurseries, and kindergartens is the beginning of the great
Communist enterprise."
Thus the record suggests that the commune, conceived
at the secret party conference at Chengtu in March, was a
major topic on the agenda of the formal party congress in
May. The record also suggests that the leadership of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union was still blissfully
ignorant of this startling development on the eve of the un-
veiling of the people's commune. As evidence of this, a
Pravda editorial on 10 June contained the following lauda-
tory appraisal of the recently concluded Chinese Communist
Party congress:
The Soviet people and all loyal friends of the
Chinese people rejoice over the successes achieved
by the Chinese people under the brilliant leader-
ship of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese
Communist Party, basing itself on the teachings of
Marxism-Leninism, creatively applies international
experience in socialist construction to the condi-
tions in-China and unswervingly leads the Chinese
people on the road of socialist construction,
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VII, THE COMMUNE REVEALED (JULY 1958)
The commune was formally unveiled by Chen Po-ta,
traditionally a spokesman for Mao Tse-tung, in two ar-
ticles appearing in the 1 and 16 July issues of Red Flag,
the new theoretical organ of the Central Committee.
These articles constitute one of the best sources of in-
formation for documenting the origins of the commune pro-
gram.
Chen's initial article, entitled "New Society, New
People," commenced with an enthusiastic discussion of
China's "general line of socialist construction," includ-
ing the assertion that it had "thoroughly solved the
problems of the general upsurge of our national economy
and its high rate of growth...'.' In agriculture the mass
water-conservancy and fertilizer-accumulation campaigns
of the winter of 1957-58 had already paved the way for
bumper crops. Chen placed greater emphasis, however,
on industry and on the mass movement under way to con-
struct small- and medium-size installations as the key
to rapid industrialization of the economy. According
to the author, this new approach to industrialization
would permit the iron and steel and certain nonferrous
metals industries to achieve greater increases in capacity
within one year than they had attained during the entire
period of the First Five-Year Plan.
At this point Chen turned to the major theme of his
article--the role of the peasantry in this new approach
to industrialization and the best organizational form for
mobilizing the rural population to undertake this role.
As Mao had done three months earlier, Chen held up the
experiences of an advanced agricultural cooperative as a
model for emulation by all others in the country. In
Chen's example the model cooperative had pioneered in
promoting small-scale industry, in training "all-round
men," and in solving the problem of combining agricul-
tural and industrial administration in rural areas, thus
"demonstrating the role that local and mass creativeness
will play in the industrialization of our country." In
the process, this cooperative had been transformed "into
a basic-level organization of both a people's commune in
which agriculture and industry are combined" (under-
lining supplied). This led in turn to the following
rhetorical question:
Can it be said that this cooperative has actually
pointed out the correct road whereby our country
can develop the productive forces of society at a
rate unknown in history and can relatively quick-
ly eliminate the distinctions between industry and
agriculture and between mental labor and physical
labor, thereby cretaing advantageous conditions for
our country's transition from socialism to Commu-
nism? I think it can be said.
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Thus the "people's commune" was revealed for the first
time in a Chinese Communist publication, albeit in somewhat
tentative and incomplete form. It is of considerable impor-
tance in tracing the evolution of the commune program to
note Chen's heavy emphasis in this initial -discussion on
the commune as an instrument for achieving rural indus-
trialization. Also of interest is the author's identi-
fication in this article of one of the principal sources
in Marxist-Leninist theory for the concept of the commune--
Engels' "Principles of Communism," Although the article
does not say so specifically, the term "people's commune"
apparently derives from the following sentence in this work
of Engels: "The citizen's commune will engage in both
industrial production an agricultural production as a
matter of course and will combine the advantages of urban
and rural ways of life while avoiding the one-sided
tendencies and shortcomings of each." (underlining supplied)
Chen's second article, appearing in the 16 July issue
of Red Flag, provided a considerably longer and more detailed
discuss n of the commune concept presented as the latest
in a series of "creative developments" of Marxist-Leninist
theory by Mao Tse-tung. This article, entitled "Upder the
Banner of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," was the most extravagent
eulogy of Mao as a Marxist-Leninist theorist yet to appear.
At the same time and partly for the same reason, it was a
remarkable exercise in chauvinism which could not but give
offense to the Soviet Union,
As a point of departure, Chen asserted that Marx and
Engels had pointed out only the "general direction of the
struggle" and had not pretended to "write out a prescription
for each nation... (to) ensure the victory of the revolution
and the realization of Communism," Moreover, Marx, Engels,
and Lenin had stressed that "Marxist theory could not be
allowed to remain where it was but should be constantly
enriched and developed according to life and different histor-
ical conditions,"
Chen went on to argue that the development of Marxist
theory had been a particularly urgent task for Asian coun-
tries, which were characterized by "special conditions un-
known to the European nations," and that Chairman Mao had
accomplishes:this task of enrichment and development in
the course of.' the Chinese revolution, The implication was
strong that Mao had.solved the special problems of socialist
revolution and socialist construction not only for China
but for other Asian countries as well. This claim, whether
regarded as asserted or implied, was so audacious as to
merit expression in. Chen's own words:
"If we recollect, what. :Lea.in .told 'the Communists
of the East during 1919, we will understand that the
complex problems confronting us here /in-socialist rev-
olution and construction7 were not encountered by the
Communist movements of The past, and we will realize
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how important it is to the international Communist
movement as a whole to solve these problems.*
Lenin said: 'You are confronted with a task
never before encountered by the Communists of the
world. That is, you must, in the light of special
conditions unknown to the European countries, apply
the general Communist theory and Communist measures
and realize that the peasants are the principal
masses... This is a difficult and special task as
well as an extraordinarily noble task.'...
Comrade Mao has achieved this extremely momentous
task courageously and magnificently in the Chinese
revolution.
In order to demonstrate this conclusion, Chen recounted
a series of struggles through the course of the Chinese rev-
olution in which Mao's ideology had invariably emerged trium-
phant, culminating in.the victorious conclusion of the "recti-
fication" campaign and in the vindication of China's own
"general line of socialist construction" in the "great leap
forward" of the economy in 1958.
Then followed a discussion of the integral relation-}
ship between "rectification" and the "leap"' and of their
combined influence in the creation of the commune. The
text for this discussion was provided by a quotation from
Marx: "Theory, once it has a grip on the masses, is instantly
transformed into a material force." In this instance the
"theory" consisted of Mao's ideology on "rectification" and
his formulation of the party's "general line," and the
"material force" was China's vast labor army, which had
already performed miracles in production and would soon
achieve even greater successes in socialist construction.
The masses, gripped by Mao's theory, had confounded the
"so-called experts and scientists" by their high yields
from experimental plots in agriculture and their demonstrated
ability to mount a program of industrialization in rural
areas. The development of industry by all the people--on
country, township and collective farm levels--was the begin-
ning of the combination of industry and agriculture" which
Marx had predicted. And a parallel development of education
on a mass basis indicated the beginning of the "combination
of education and productive labor," a two-way process wherein
the illiterate masses would become "cultured" and the intel-
lectuals would learn from the "surging enthusiasm and devel-
oped mental endowments Of the masses."
Thus the stage was set for introducing in the following
passage a new development of Mao's ideology, his conception
of the commune as the basic unit of Chinese society.,
T nins address was to Communist organizations of East-
ern Russia, not of Asia. Chen admitted this, but held that
the tasks presented by Lenin were "likewise placed before the
Communists of Eastern countries."
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Karl Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto
listed the last two of the ten measures to be taken
after the realization of the proletarian dictatorship
as follows: 'combine agriculture and industry and
facilitate the gradual elimination of distinctions
between town and country'; and 'combine education and
material production.' The general line for socialist
construction and the basic points contained therein
as proposed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and adopted by
the second session of the Eighth National Congress
of our party are, in China's actual practice at pre-
sent, clarifying the conditions and concrete forms
for realizing these two measures. Comrade Mao Tse-tung
said that our direction must be gradually and system-
atically to organize 'industry, agriculture, commerce,
education, and the militia' into a big commune, thereby
to form basic units of our society. In this commune,
industry, agriculture, and commerce are the material
life of the people; culture and education are the
spiritual life reflecting the material life of the
people; militia will protect such material life and ..
spiritual life. The militia is absolutely necessary
pending the complete elimination of exploitation of
man by man in the world. This conception of the commune
is a conclusion drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from
actual life.
It is obvious that under the direction of Mao Tse-
tung's ideology, under the banner of Comrade Mao, and
at a time when the national economy and culture are
developing at such a rate that 'twenty years are con-
centrated in one day,' the people already can see that
the time is not far off for our country's gradual transi-
tion from socialism to Communism...
Mao Tse-tung's banner is a banner which combines
the Chinese Communists and the people, a banner integrat-
ing the universal truiths of Marxism-Leninism with the
concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, and a ban-
ner which creatively develops Marxism-Leninism under
the conditions of China...
Mao Tse-tung's banner is a red flag held aloft
by the Chinese people. Guided by this great red flag,
the Chinese people will in the not distant future
continue victoriously on to reach the great Communist
society.
This key passage in Chen's article is revealing in sev-
eral respects. It firmly identifies Mao as the architect of
the commune program and suggests that he discussed his concep-
tion of the commune at the party congress in May. It asserts
that Mao's concept, while inspired in some measure by the
Communist Manifesto, was a conclusion drawn primarily from
practical exper ence in China. It implies that China had
discovered its own special road to Communism, that this road
was to be a shortcut which would bring China to the ultimate
goal at a relatively early date, and that this road, as a
"creative development" of Marxism-Leninism, was relevant to
bloc countries other than China. These implications were
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later to be developed into contentions, and the set of
contentions was to put a significant strain on the Sino-
Soviet alliance.
The next step in the unveiling of the commune was per-
formed by ranking leaders of the Chinese Communist Party
who, on tour through the provinces in July, explained and
promoted the commune concept in a series of on-the-spot
conferences with local party cadres. 'A striking example
of this is afforded by a lengthy report of a discussion
between Liu Shao-chi and a number of young party cadres
on 12 July (published in People's Daily on 30 July). Liu
revealed boundless optimism in estimating the future rate
of growth of China's economy, characterizing the process
as a series of "great leaps forward" continuing at least
through 1960. He also had high hopes for the local small-
scale iron and steel plants, stating his belief that they
would in time "approach the advanced levels of the world."
He then elaborated Mao's concept of the commune, although
not identified as such in the published version, in the
following passage:
An agricultural cooperative must not merely en-
gage in a single occupation but must develop in an
over-all manner in various ways. (He counted on his
fingers as he spoke.) (1) You can operate industry,
and run more small factories of a local nature. )
In operating agriculture, you must attend to water
conservancy, fertilizer, tool reform, and seed se-
lection. Production must take one leap after an-
other, and there must be no peak set. (3) You can
also operate commerce--socialist commerce-- and
combine credit c o eratives and supply and marketing
cooperatives with the agricultural cooperatives. (4)
You can also take up education, rid yourselves of
illiteracy, and let all children attend school, (5)
You can also take up physical culture. .Generally
speaking, (1) industry, agriculture, (3) commerce,
(4) education, and (5) militia must all be developed.
(Underlining supplied)
It should be noted that in this formulation the "militia"
aspect of the commune is equated with "physical culture,"
perhaps indicating that the purely military function of
the commune has been exaggerated in subsequent discussions
by some Western observers,
Even more noteworthy was Liu's assessment of the period
of time required for China to achieve Communism, certainly
the most sanguine view put on record by any of the top Chi-
nese leaders. This appeared in the following statement:
He went on to unfold before us the future of
the motherland, saying: 'Communism will definitely
be realized in China. We now do not need 15 years
to catch up with Britain; we can overtake her in a
very short time. We must go right ahead to reach
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Communism. .Now : we Mhust _ nbt =.think' that' ' Com-
munism will only be realized very slowly. So long as
we work properly, the time will be very soon when we
realize Communism. (underlining -supplied
Chu Te, Vice Chairman of the People's Republic of
China, was also on tour during the month of July. The
published account of his activities in northwest China,
although meager, indicates that he too was engaged in
promoting the commune, advocating the establishment of
public dining rooms and nurseries, and describing the
future happy life of the Chinese people in a Communist
society. He was quoted as saying: "We must run the
country with more, better, faster, and cheaper results,
for otherwise the arrival of Communism will be delayed,"
On his departure from an agricultural cooperative, the
members all agreed that "we must do our bit for Communism."
A third party leader active in promoting the communes
in. the month of July was Tan Chen-lin, who addressed his
remarks to an audience of rural cadres attending a region-
al agricultural coordination conference for North China.
It is important in developing the chronology of the com-
mune movement to note that at a similar conference for
East China held in late June, Tan had postponed discuss-
ing the subject of the agricultural cooperative (their
organization, operation, and management) until a later
conference session. Now in mid-July, according to a sub-
sequent account in Red Flag, he explained to the North
China delegates the reasons prompting the decision of
"comrade Mao and the party Central Committee to estab-
lish large communes embracing 'industry-agriculture-
commerce-education-militia."' The account of the con-
ference given in the 19 July issue of People's Daily
indicated that this revolutionary organization-
rgan zation was soon
to move beyond the experimental stage:
"The conference then discussed in detail the revolu-
tionary change which had appeared in rural areas follow-
ing the bumper harvest--the fact that in some places
a type of more advanced communal organization has ap-
peared. Although these are still not very numerous at
present, we must anticipate this development and in
timely fashion undertake surveys,. research, and prepara-
tions."
There were no other references to the commune in
Communist China's mass media throughout the month of
July. Three key editorials in People's Daily, however,
provided further indications thatundamen al policy
change was in the offing. The first of these, appearing
in the 1 July issue under the title "The Peasant Ques-
tion Is Still the Fundamental One," stressed that mobiliza-
tion of the peasantry was indispensable if China's program
of socialist construction was to succeed. The increase of
60 percent in the summer grain harvest--"unprecedented in
the history of the world"--had already demonstrated the
mighty creative force of the peasants. The next step was
to mobilize fully this peasant initiative in order to
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"usher agriculture, industry, and the whole national econ-
omy and national culture into a golden age."
The manner in which this would be accomplished was
indicated in a 22 July editorial entitled "Can Manpower
Be Increased?" Here for the first time appeared the:,pos-
itive declaration that "the great development of produc-
tion relations," a clear indication of ~.,an impending
change in social organization. Whereas previous dis-
cussions of the labor shortage in rural areas had pre-
scribed improvement of farm tools as the solution, the
answer now lay in the improvement of labor organization.
Only by stressing manual labor at the present stage would
it be possible to achieve ,semimechanization and then the
final goal of agricultural mechanization. The editorial
did not identify the commune as this improved form of
labor organization, but merely alluded to certain of its
characteristic features by recommending "the serious and
systematic organization of the household labor power of
women and the labor power of other services and trades
into a large-scale collective economic enterprise."
The last of these illuminating editorials appeared
in the 28 July issue under the title "New State of Af-
fairs on the Theoretical Front." Referring to the cam-
paign to indoctrinate the Chinese people in Communist
dogma, the editorial asserted with unconscious humor
that "the study of Marxist-Leninst theory, especially
the study of Camrade Mao Tse-tung's writings.. ,has be-
come the rage among the masses." More to the point, it
listed a number of new theoretical problems which had
come to the fore following the "great leap forward"
in socialist construction, including "the question of
combining industry and agriculture; the question of how
to improve production relations in line with the devel-
opment of the productive forces; and the question of
how to create rapidly in China the conditions for the
transition from a socialist society to a Communist
society." Then followed the bizarre conclusion that
these problems were already being solved by the people
who were "implementing the principle of combining the
general truths of Marxism-Leninism with the specific
practice of China." Thus the groundwork was laid for
subsequently attributing to the creative wisdon of the
masses both the theoretical basis and the organiza-
tional form of the commune.
Khrushchev's visit to Peiping--31 July to 3 August
1958--marks a decisive point in the evolution of the
commune movement. Mao had been put on record two weeks
earlier--in Chen Po-ta's article--as favoring the es-
tablishment of communes as the basic units of Chinese
society, but the program was still in the experimental
stage, had not been publicized in mass media, and had
not been officially launched. In other words, it was
not too late for Mao to draw back from his program or
at least make important modifications.
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It is impossible tojudge how well informed about
the commune program Khrushchev was, either when he ar-
rived or when he departed. The presence in the Soviet
delegation of Boris Ponomarev, a theorist who has been
concerned inter alia with problems of "building Com-
munism," might be taken as evidence that Khrushchev
came prepared to discuss the commune program; however,
Ponomarev is also a specialist in intraparty rela-
tions and might have come in any case. Mao might have
been frank about his plans, but he might equally well
have been evasive.
Whatever the content of the Khrushchev-Mao talks,
Mao., after bidding Khrushchev farewell on 3 August,
left Peiping the very next day to initiate the mass
campaign to organize communes throughout China.
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VIII, INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNES (AUGUST 1958)
The first phase of the organization of the commune
movement was, appropriately, dominated by Chairman Mao.
Whereas the activities of other top leaders had been
featured during the month of July, national attention
throughout August was focused on Mao as he toured the
provinces and assumed personal leadership of the commune
program.
As noted above, this first phase commenced immediately
after Khrushchev's departure from Peiping, when Mao paid
a visit to a cooperative in Hopei Province on 4 August.
Although only a brief account of this visit is available,
Mao is known to have described the happy prospect of com-
munal living in the following terms: "When you have an
adequate surplus of grain, you can grow less the following
year. You can work half the day on crop production and
devote the other half to culture, science, and recreation."
Inspired by his message, the members shouted "Forward to
Communism faster and sooner" and on that very evening trans-
formed their cooperative into a commune.
After an extensive three-day survey of Honan, one of
the two provinces where communes had been established on
an experimental basis for some time, Mao arrived in Shantung
Province on 9 Augusta It was here that he issued the famous
directive: "It is still better to establish people's communes.
They can combine industry, agriculture, commerce, education,
and military science and thus facilitate management." With
the issuance of this directive, the organizational phase of
the commune movement was formally launched. It should be
noted that even in the advanced province of Honan, communali-
zation did not achieve the status of a mass movement until
word was received of Mao's instructions. For the country
as a whole, the effect of this directive, according to the
Peoples Daily editorial on 10 September, was "to generate
an upsurge in establishing people's communes" throughout
China.
Certainly Mao's directive.was the signal for, the9announ:c,e?
ment of the commune program to the Chinese people as a whole
and to the world at large (as distinct from the small audi-
ence, both domestic and foreign, of Red Flag), Oi 11 Aug-
ust, Mao's conceptual formulation of fl a commune (as basic
units of society combining industry, agriculture, commerce,
education,. and militia) appeared for the first time in
People's Daily and on the same date.was transmitted abroad
by the New China News Agency. In an article nominally de-
voted to the summer grain harvest and carried on the front
page of People's Daily, Tan Chen-lin introduced the commune
as, by implication, the latest example of Comrade Mao's
creative development of Marxism-Leninism. A key passage
in the article stated:
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These new things (communes) and new men are emerg-
ing under the illumination of Comrade Mao's ide-
ology. They represent the great dream of the 500
million peasants for building socialism rapidly and
advancing towards Ccmmunism,..The Chinese people
have taken big strides and will resolutely forge
ahead to the happy and beautiful Communist era,
One week later, on 18 August, the commune movement
became headline news in its own right. On this date, the
lead article in People's Daily discussed in some detail
the large-scale formation ''people's communes in Hsinyang
District, an administrative area of Honan Province. Here
for the first time the commune was expressly linked to
the transition to Communism. Indeed, this occurred in the
very first sentence of this first discussion of the commune
to be given prominence in a Chinese Communist mass medium:
"Under the stimulus of the over-all great leap forward of
the fatherland, a great social reform moving from socialism
to Communism--the movement of establishing people's communes--
is now in full swing in the Hsinyang District of onan o-
vincea" (Underlining supplied).
It is necessary to underline the fact that the com-
mune was publicized among the Chinese people from the very
outset as a device which would permit the early realization
of Communism. As a corollary, the two stages of socialism
and Communism were consciously blurred from the start, as
exemplified by frequent references in the mass media to the
"upsurging enthusiasm of the masses for socialism-
Commu-nism." This major propaganda theme was to endure through-
out the entire organizational phase of the commune program,
only to be repudiated abruptly in the party's second reso-
lution on communes in December 1958--a direct result of
Soviet displeasure,
Also appearing in the 18 August issue of People's
Daily was a detailed discussion of the organization and
operation of a specific commune located in the Hsinyang
District. This was the famous Sputnik Commune, which
was to serve as the model in the process of establishing
communes throughout China. A feature of this discussion
was the novel system of distribution employed by this
commune, a system combining elements of "free supply"
and the payment of wages, It is interesting to note
that this heretical distribution system was an integral
feature of the commune program from its inception.
During the latter half of August, the top leader-
ship of the Chinese Communist Patty met in an enlarged
session of the Politburo to compile and ratify a formal
resolution on the establishment of "people's communes"
in rural areas. Shortly before the conclusion of this
conference, Chou En-lai made one of his rare appearances
in the role of publicizing the commune movement. On a
visit to Tsinghua University in Peiping, he called on
the students to make economical construction designs
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suitable "for-the communes and hailed an experimental,
low-cost motor vehicle designed by the students as "a
contribution to the cause of Communism." More striking
was the reaction of the students, following his departure,
who vowed; "We must always remember the party's teachings.
Advance, advance, and advance again toward Communism."
At this point it is necessary to note briefly another
development during the month of Augusta This was the
growing body of evidence that the dominant leaders of
the party, partly because of inflated statistical report-
ing of the lower levels and partly because of the heady
effects on their own propaganda, were losing touch with
the hard realities of China's economy. This was particu-
larly evident in Tan Chen-lin's discussion of future agri-
cultural development appearing in the 11 August People's
Daily. After claiming a rate of increase of 69 per` ce`ntn
in the summer grain harvest, Tan maintained that the fall
harvest would show an even greater increment and would be
followed by still greater leaps forward in 1959 and 1960.
This led to the following staggering assertion: "The day
is not far off when China will catch up with the most ad-
vanced capitalist countries in per capita consumption of
grain, meat, oil and fats, sugar, anc Toth," (underlining
supplied).
A similar strain of delusion was present-in a People's
Daily editorial on 8 August lauding the crude native b_1_a`sT_
furnaces and converters constructed in rural areas as the
answer to high-speed development of the iron and steel in-
dustry. Implicit in the discussion was the goal of doubling
steel production in 1958 by a mass campaign, a campaign
which was destined to disrupt the rural economy in the
latter months of the year and result in an enormous waste
c of manpower and materials.
The, third indication in August that rational processes
of economic planning had been displaced by political slogan-
eering was the mass movement for improving farm tools, cen-
tering on the introduction of ball bearings. According
to the People's Daily editorial of 21 August, this campaign,
in which Mao took a -personal interest, was expected to
bring about the "semimechanization of agriculture" in China
before the end of the year.
These, then, were the extravagant expectations for
economic development which help to explain the high hopes
of the Chinese Communist leadership for a rapid advance
to Communism following the successful establishment of
the communes.
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