ENEMY STRENGTH IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A001500040007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 12, 1968
• Content Type: MF

"Approved For Ruse 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79B01WA001500040007-8
12 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry Kissinger
SUBJECT : Enemy Strength in Vietnam
1. The "official" figures on Communist troop strength
in South Vietnam are as follows:
Combat Forces
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Main & Local Forces
North Vietnamese Army 97, 809 - 100,800
Viet Cong 37,450 - 40,450
TOTAL MAW FORCE 138, 259
Administrative Services 35, 2 2 5
Guerrillas 77,971
TOTAL 251,455
2. V e have not included them on the chart because
they are under intensive review by DIA, .ACV, and ourselves
at the present time. So far, all we have agreed is that North
Vietnamese Army strength in the South is in the range of
130, 000 - 14 t, 4200, considerably higher than the 97, 809 -
100, 800 previously estimated. The CIA position is that the
other figures in the table above should be raised similarly.
This difference is now under negotiation between [A ashington
and Saigon.
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 Approved For Rewe 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79B01OA001500040007-8
3. If you use any of these figures and they were to
leak out, you would inevitably be faced with yet another con-
troversy over the Vietnamese numbers game. I recommend
strongly that instead you speak in terms of Communist
regiments. There are 60 Communist regiments in the South;
the usual figure used for these regiments is between 2, 000 -
3,000.
R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
P. S. I would be happy to discuss this matter with you over
the phone if you want more, background.
RJS:yd
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1-DDI
1 - SAVE
1 - DD / OCI
OCI, STATINTL
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US ABM Program
The US ABM program currently involves the deploy-
ment of the Sentinel System. This ABM system has a
projected force lvel of 480 Spartan long-range missiles
and 192 Spring short-range missiles. The first missiles
of the system are planned to be operational about 1972;
the total force is scheduled to be operational by the end
of 1976. An ABM force level of this size is intended to
defend the continental US, Alaska, and Hawaii against a
light ballistic missile attack from Communist China.
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SUBJECT: Questions Posed Last Night By Mr. Eagleberger
For Mr. Kissinger's Briefing
25X1A
1. Strategic Balance
a. Are the Soviets trying to get ahead of the US
in strategic weapons or is Moscow seeking parity?
(Answer: Moscow would like to get ahead in cer-
tain areas but a lot depends on US attitude; if
we agree to limitations Soviets might be more
interested in parity.)
h. Comparison of strategic strike force capabili-
ties for USSR/US in October 1962, June 1967.
(Answer: Bruce Clarke gave rough order of magni-
tude for IRBMs, bombers, and sub-based missiles.)
c. Are Minuteman III and Poseidons AMIRVs?
(Answer: Yen.)
c. Bow many subs do Soviets have with Polaris-type
missiles?
(Answer: Irrelevant question because Sovs have
a I C I B 71
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11 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR :
25X1A
SUBJECT Information Mequested by
1. Significant Soviet general purpose (i.e.,
conventional) forces include 1.3 million men in 70
combat-ready divisions plus another 83 divisions at
lesser levels of readiness. In addition, the Soviets
have 3,500 fighter and light bomber aircraft in tac-
tical aviation. The Soviet navy has about 300 torpedo
attack and cruise missile submarines, over half of
them medium- and short-range diesel types of limited
usefulness.
2. The East European countries have about 40
combat-ready divisions and about 2,600 tactical
combat aircraft.
3. NATO and Warsaw Pact M-Day forces are roughly
equal in numbers of men available on each side. The
Soviet stance vis-a-vis NATO has improved over pre-
intervention days as the result of the movement of
four divisions forward from the USSR into Czechoslovakia
and beefing up their logistic forces.
BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research
25X1A
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