PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A000700060003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MF

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29 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT Preliminary Appraisal of the National
Intelligence Daily
Overview
1. Before attempting to write its study of the NID,
the committee spent a good deal of time discussing the
newspaper as a group and a still greater amount of time
querying OCI people. This report reflects those conversa-
tions as well as the committee's judgments. Although there
were clear differences of opinion on certain issues, the
committee itself--and the people with whom it. talked--did
agree on a number of questions. All recognize that the
newspaper is still young and is in an experimental stage;
it is an evolving publication and OCI attitudes Loward it
are still being shaped.
2. The general attitude at the division level toward
the NID seems to be one of somewhat grudging acceptance of
the paper as a fact of life. Some members of OCI, including
some at the division level as well as most of the NID staff,
find the newspaper an effective intelligence publication and
are enthusiastic about it. Others believe it is ineffectual
and an effort that has had a negative impact on OCI's other
responsibilities. For the most part, OCIers were neither
extremely critical nor highly laudatory; rather, a kind of
ambivalence and even indifference toward the NID as a vehi-
cle to communicate ideas to the policy makers seems to pre-
vail. This attitude--which is shared not just by working
analysts but also by some supervisors and production offi-
cers--may be the result of several factors or circumstances,
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some of them interlocking. Uncertainties about the NID
are part and parcel of other uncertainties relating to
the office as a whole and to its mission under the-Nixon
administration. These uncertainties are compounded by the
fact that decisions about the IC Staff's "family of publi-
cations" are still pending and that the NIB is still an
unknown quantity. Further, the NID was born during a very
uncomfortable period. Considerable frustrations had de-
veloped in OCI as a result of shakeups occurring last
year--personnel cuts, the creation of OPR, rapid high-level
management changes, Watergate and the CIA, and the bad press
accorded the Agency: -
3. Nonetheless, even critics of the newspaper see
merits in it. Some see the NID as more flexible in certain
respects. The deadlines for submission of items are less
rigid and formal coordination is unnecessary in every case.
Although there are differences of opinion on this point,
certain analysts feel that there is also flexibility in the
length of items and in the depth and breadth of coverage.
Feature items were singled out as particularly praiseworthy.
Some analysts also welcome the chance to formulate their
views in writing more often. Many feel that the discipline
of having to put thoughts down on paper more often promotes
better conceptualization and leads to sharper intelligence
judgments. The NID has also encouraged the office to make
more use of DDO production and thereby discouraged their
dissemination of raw intelligence.
4. On the plus side, too, is the fact that some of
the potential problems envisaged before the NID actually
went into print have not materialized. Night staffing ar-
rangements, which vary considerably from division to division,
seem to be working out reasonably well. And, at least for
the moment, the NID has not imposed an unacceptable workload
on any one office component.
5. For a good many in OCI, however, these positive
points are outweighed by negative futures. Broadly speak-
ing, a number of people are concerned over what they see as
a conflict between the concept of the NID as an intelligence
publication and as a newspaper. And they perceive a corollary
conflict between the attempt to publish a journal of first
record and a publication of reasoned analysis. This conflict
is not a new one for OCI. The same issue--reporting versus
analysis--was raised in regard to the CIB and many felt that
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vehicle, too, suffered because analysis sometimes took a
back seat to reporting. But this conflict assumes a new
and somewhat more serious dimension with the NID because
of the tendency to emphasize total timeliness. In some
developments, the important aspect is not that the news-
paper carry an immediate announcement that such-and-such
has happened but that at some point the analyst put that
development in perspective. In other words, the emphasis
should be on quality of thought, analysis and projection
and it should be timely as aoT)ron riate--not competitive
with the daily newspapers. The emphasis--not always con-
sistent--on the reportorial aspects of the-NID has cont.ri-
?buted to a further blurring of the concept of intelligence.
The conclusion is, then, that the NID has not yet fully
come to grips with the problem of blending its three guises:
a journalistic, timely publication; a purveyor of hard
intelligence; and a journal of reasoned analysis.
6. There is a general feeling that the NID is being
shaped by too many non-substantive considerations--space to
fill or not fill, headlines which are sometimes misleading,
the "competition"--particularly in terms of timeliness--
from the Washington Post and the New York Times, and the
inaccuracies and distortions resulting from a search for
style or an attempt to fit an item into a certain amount
of space. In an effort to "sell" OCI's intelligence pro-
duct--an apparent result of a perceived lack of access to
or impact on policy makers--the vehicle risks becoming more
important than the message--information, intelligence,
analysis--the office is trying to impart. The vehicle seems
to be shaping the intelligence product rather than the other
way around.
Specific Problems and Concerns
7. More specifically,, the committee has identified
problems which fall into four general categories: the con-
flict between analytical and reportorial functions; the
absence of clear guidelines; the negative impact of the NID
on other OCI duties, especially the responsibility for other
intelligence publications; and the flaws in the system of
editing and processing the paper.
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8. One quite basic and frustrating problem is that
of finding the proper mix between the analytic and the
reportorial functions. The newspaper should--and in many
instances does--give more opportunity for that blend of
analysis and reporting, in part simply because there is
more space. And there are a number of times when purely
reportorial items are called for regardless of the hour
or the adequacy of information. But there are also times
when there is no urgency whatsoever and a great need for
the time to take a more reflective approach. Many feel,
however, that the office has tended to lean too much toward
the merely reportorial--with feature articles constituting
a major exception. There is concern that too many items
contain superficial analysis and really are nothing more
than a gist that there is
too little speculation and too much o_ a tendency to be
reactive rather than premonitory. And the seeming need to
fill four pages regardless of the flow of events or infor-
mation means that some of the.reportorial items--already
less valuable because they are skimpy in analytic content--
are marginal at best. The principle of selectivity does
not appear to operate as much as it should because of the
NID's voracious appetite for copy. (There is recognition
that one man's marginal item is another man's meat, but
even with this distinction in mind, some still feel that
the NID runs some items which are of questionable value to
policy makers). And too often the paper seems to carry
merely a series of announcements. The NID is seen as satu-
rating its readers with a blow-by-blow coverage without pro-
viding the necessary perspective.
9. There is also some problem of balance in the NID--
and in the CIB as well. Given the high level of readership,
items that emanate from the functional offices in growing
proliferation--economic, scientific, technical and military--
too frequently appear without any obvious effort to provide
an essential "meaning."
10. Most analysts recognize that the functions of re-
porting and analysis are not mutually exclusive and should
in fact go hand in hand. But, as indicated earlier, certain
constraints seem to be operating which make it difficult to
achieve the proper blend. Because the newspaper offers a
unique opportunity to achieve a timely mix of hard intelli-
gence, informed speculation, and fact and analysis, the NID
should continue to strive toward that ambitious goal.
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11. The committee assumed--as did those it queried--
that what was in fact wanted was that special mix. But that
raises the problem of the absence of clear guidelines. Al-
though there have been discussions between the front office
and the divisions, there is still a great deal of confusion
over the general philosophy behind the paper. The question
arises whether the DCI has in fact given any guidelines.
Is the NID what it is because it reflects the Director's
wishes or because the NID staff thinks this is what is
wanted? Or is the staff more or less operating on its own
with some front office guidance? Whoever is calling the
shots, the signals are unclear. Although the NID staff
does not see this as a problem, most analysts are still
confused as to what is wanted, in what proportion, with
what blend of fact and analysis, with what end goal and
directed at whom'.
12. Then, too, there is concern that, over the longer
run, the NID could have a deleterious effect on other im-
portant OCI functions and duties. The NID, with its emphasis
on current news and provocative feature articles, consumes
analyst time and often disrupts other activity. It is true
that some NID items--again feature articles stand out in
this regard--are drawn from other production, including pro-
duction done over a time span that permits and encourages
reflection. But analysts still fear that there will not be
enough time to indulge in, the reflection, the in-depth read-
ing, the patient searching out of information and the brain-
storming with colleagues that ultimately produce sound
intelligence judgments. In most divisions, the production
of memoranda and special articles has declined (although it
is recognized that the NID is not solely responsible and
that the vacuum has to some extent been filled by the feature
articles). The Soviet Internal branch has faced a special
problem because of the pressures created by the NID, and
these pressures could be a factor at one time or another in
any denied area. Specifically, SRI and to a lesser extent
EE and SRE must routinely sift through large quantities of
published materials and intelligence reports to detect sig-
nificant new developments and policy shifts. But the NID,
with its unceasing demand for items, has obliged SRI analysts
to focus attention primarily on surface phenomena.
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13. Another key concern is the impact that the NID
will have on other regular OCI publications. Because the
relationship among the various publications is a very com-
plicated one, such Questions as when there should be over-
lap and duplication and how items should be tailored to
particular publications arise. In many divisions, the CIB
is seldom thought of independently of the NID. While in
certain instances the duplication may be healthy, there is
some feeling that the CIB should carry items of a slightly
different nature. With so many items being written for the
NID, however, it is all too easy for the CIB merely to feed
off that publication. Then, too, Staff Notes in some divi-
sions are looked upon as the logical--and best--basic source
for the NID. In other divisions, there is a conscious ef-
fort to keep the publications separate. The production of
ad hoc, longer publications also is affected--as mentioned
earlier--by the NID. Feature articles can only be a partial
substitute for the special articles and memoranda of which
OCI has always been rightfully proud in the past.
14. Finally, many feel that the editing process poses
major problems. Not all OCI analysts write clearly and
concisely and some are still a little unclear as to what
changes in writing style are necessary for a newspaper for-
mat. Divisions do not always meet NID standards and do not
always send items forward early enough to give the editors
sufficient time for review. 3Sdi.tors can and do perform an
invaluable service in some instances by transforming items
into readable prose and by catching errors made somewhere
along the line. But it is still difficult to see the need
for approximately six or seven layers of review: by the
branch chief, by the division production officer, by the
division chief, by the associate editor of the NID, by the
senior editor, by the editor-in-chief and, finally, by the
night editor. Although the bulk of items for the paper are
prepared during the day, some are not finally processed until
7-8:00 in the evening. The analyst, who to often sees his
article in print without having had a chance to make a final
check on it, feels he has lost an essential degree of control
over his work. This leads to a diminished sense of respon-
sibility and involvement and frustration over his inability
to perform the job properly. Most important to the office,
the NID staff, and the analysts, however, is that OCI's
reputation for accuracy is at stake.
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16. Although analysts have had varying experiences
with the NID staff and editing problems do not arise on
all occasions, certain themes tend to recur: that some
NID editors are more concerned with imposing an overall
style (even in the feature articles, which should allow
a greater flexibility) than with classic editing designed
to make items clear and accurate; that errors tend to creep
in because the items are massaged by so many people (and,
although egregious errors have been infrequent, even small
ones over time undermine the office's reputation); that
night editors are sometimes reluctant to change editing
done by the day staff even when the division representative
feels there are real problems; that analysts' speculation
is sometimes turned into hard fact; that some of the NID
staff are reluctant to make revisions in an item once it
is in galley form (and this failure to take account of
additional, even if not major, developments tends to defeat
the goal of being up-to-date); and that headlines are some-
times quite misleading.
Recommendations
15. Insofar as some of the problems cited in the
earlier section can be solved, the committee has come up
with some specific recommendations--ones, that will require
work and cooperation not only on the part of the NID staff
and the front office but also from the divisions as well.
16. We did not include in our recommendations a call
for increased hiring at this point.* There is a recognition
that we are being asked to do more while our ranks are thin-
ning, that perhaps too many responsibilities have been placed
on an already creaking apparatus. Over the longer run, there-
fore, the office may have to hire more people, part ci dlarly
if OCI takes on any additional responsibilities and if the
One point the committee feels should be made: as a
result of the shakeups last year, there is among some people
a great sensitivity on the issue of job security. The pro-
spect of hiring additional people is seen as a distinct
threat, and some OCIers would rather be overburdened than
take the chance of being declared "excess" at some future
point.
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NIOs increasingly levy demands on the office.- (This is
already the case in Western Europe). We may be able to
continue to carry out all of the tasks assigned us but at
a price: a decline in the over-all quality of the work;
a lack of time to break new analytic ground; less and less
attention to phenomena--other than strictly military, po-
litical, and economic questions--that should also shape
intelligence judgments; diminished production of longer
memoranda mind special projects of an analytic nature; and
a growing unwillingness to release analysts for such re-
vitalizing and necessary activities as orientation trips,
TDYs, outside training, rotational tours, special programs,
and so forth.
-that the PLAID staff hold a series of discussions
on a branch by branch basis to offer a thorough
review of NID procedures and to answer any ques-
tions or clear up any misunderstandings. As
necessary thereafter, additional ad hoc, informal
sessions could be held. The divisions and NID
staffers should be encouraged to communicate on
a more regular basis to resolve problems. The
staff, for example, could pass on comments as to
why items weren't used,. what items were particu-
larly good and why, what changes would be help-
ful, what guidelines they are operating on at
the moment, what kinds of spot developments
should be covered and what kind ignored. The
divisions, in turn, could cite their grievances
on editing, priorities assigned items, selection
of articles, and so forth. In short, every ef-
fort to break down the "we" - "they" feeling
should be made.
--that information on the purpose, the distribution
and the composition of other publications be cir-
culated so that office personnel can have a clearer
idea of the total publication effort and how the
NID fits into it. There is, for example, a great
deal of confusion regarding the role of the Staff
Notes in relation to other intelligence publica-
tions. Should items in the CIWR, for instance,
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be duplicated in the NID or the Staff Notes?
Are various OCI publications going to different
audiences? What is distinctive about any of
the publications?
--that the front office make another effort to
communicate whatever guidelines exist on the
NID. The D/OCI and might consider
another round of talks with the divisions and
address such issues as the relationship between
the NID and OCI's overall mission (and the con-
tours of this mission under the Nixon administra-
tion with its heavy reliance on Dr. Kissinger
and the NSC staff); how they feel the paper can
be improved; to what extent does the NID reflect
the DCI's views or those of OCI; are resources
that could better be expended elsewhere going
to the NID; is a staffing reorganization under
consideration?
--that the front office, in addition to the sur-
vey of consumers, try to obtain some feedback
on a regular basis from the NID's high--level
readership. Apart from a more regular querying
of the readers, the front office might want to
bring together others--such as NIOs, DDO, the
IC Staff--who deal with these readers to obtain
their views on how.well the NID is serving the
top officials.
--that the results of any studies done on the NID
be circulated throughout the office. This would
include the studies and comparisons the NID staff
is now preparing, the report on consumers being
prepared by the D/OCI, and any other future
studies. Release of such information should
give all a clearer picture of the NID, its func-
tions, and how well it is performing its mission.
--that, insofar as possible, analysts have the
right of final review of their items. To achieve
this, the bottleneck created by the three-layer
NID review system--associate editor, senior editor,
and editor-in-chief--must be eliminated. Insofar
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as is possible, items sent up during:the day
should be back to the analyst for a final check
by close of normal business hours or shortly
thereafter.
--that divisions accept a concommitant responsibility
for processing items efficiently and sending them
forward in good time. To that end, divisions
should review their procedures on NID production
and, if necessary, reallocate their resources to
ensure a. thorough but speedy review. A closer
scrutiny of 'items by branch chiefs would help in
this matter.
--that basic analytic decisions on items--what to
publish, when to publish, what to include, and
so forth--should be left insofar as possible to
the division where the expertise rests. If there
are differences of opinion, these should be re-
solved during the day if possible so that division
experts can have their say. These decisions should
not then be reversed by the NID staff except in
unusual circumstances and only with the concur-
rence of the division representative.
--that an effort be made to clarify and define the
relationship between the NID and the CIB. Guide-
lines should be drawn up to cover such questions
as: must an item appearing in the NIB also run
in the NID, particularly if the item is one pre-
pared elsewhere in the intelligence community
which OCI thinks is lacking in real merit but
which is not incorrect? What constitutes "com-
munity" intelligence? (Both the NID and NIB are
"national" but one is fully coordinated and the
other is not). Must items running in both publi-
cations be exact duplicates?
--that divisions accept the responsibility for en-
suring that coverage of their areas is complete.
The divisions should be reminded and charged with
the task of ensuring continuity, selectivity and
infusion of analysis and not expect the NID staff
to assume those burdens. The NID staff should,
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however, rely on division judgments as to when
follow-up items are necessary.
--that the question of the extremely limited
distribution of the NID, particularly within
the Agency, be reconsidered. Restricted dis-
tribution may well be a deterrent to gaining
the cooperation of others in the DDO, in the
NIO offices and on the IC staff who could help
make the newspaper a better product. One way
of gaining their cooperation would be to ensure
that they had easy and regular access to the
publication.
--that divisions be encouraged to indicate when
possible to the division night representatives
what to avoid in composing headlines and what
aspects of an !item might usefully be highlighted.
--that the front office and divisions and staffs
take a hard look at the allocation of resources
within the office to determine if people are
being used in the most efficient and meaningful
fashion in light of the new burdens imposed by
the NID. An age-old OCI problem has been that
some people are overworked while others are
underemployed. But at a time when the office
is doing more work-with less people, rigid ad-
herence to existing structures and procedures
is particularly damaging.
--that divisions be given wide leeway to adopt
flexible schedules when necessary. Too strict
an observance of the 8-4:30 schedule makes little
sense when the office is operating more and more
on a round-the-clock basis. Divisions should
also be given wide latitude on such matters as
overtime.
--that the NID staff be strongly encouraged to leave
blank spaces or even pages if the copy is not of
sufficient interest to high-level consumers.
Despite frequent assurances as to the willingness
to publish less than a four page paper if the
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situation warrants it, there have been few in-
stances when the paper has contained :Less than
.that amount.
--that the divisions he encouraged to work out
some kind of arrangement with CRS so that pictures
of people for potential articles are on hand in
the evening (pre-selected during the day by CRS
and sent forward) so that the night representa-
tive is freed for more important duties. The
office should also try to work out some sort of
regular arrangement with NPIC so that other
graphics suitable for use with NID items are
on hand in the evening.
--that the NID office be better organized to en-
sure that night representatives can work smoothly
and effectively. Supplies (such as paper, type-
writer ribbons, etc.) should be readily available
and desks assigned to specific divisions and of-
fices so that people can be more easily identified
for coordination purposes.
--that consideration be given to replacing the
summary with a space for simply recording spot
developments that merit attention but that for
good reason--lack of urgency, need for further
information, or complexity--can be better treated
at length in a follow-up item.
Attachments: A-F
Comments on NID
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QCI's PUBLICATIONS: Priorities and Relationships
1. The first thing to be said on this complex sub-
ject is that there are no absolute rules. The peculiarities
of our business force us to make ad hoc decisions, to im-
provise, and occasionally to contradict ourselves. This
said, it is still possible to put forth some useful general-
ities.
2. OCI's priorities come in the following order.
a. The President's Daily Brief, which is prepared
specifically for the President and Kissinger and sent
only to them. It is the only intelligence publication
regularly read by the President; Kissinger also sees
the National Intelligence Daily but probably does not
read it regularly. Memoranda requested specifically
by the President or Kissinger have a priority equal to
that of the PDB. Despite the importance of this top
category material, it requires a relatively small ex-
penditure of manpower.
b. The NID is produced for the members of the NSC
and its subcommittees, their senior staff officers and
the NSC Staff, a total of about 40 people who are the
major formulators of national security policy. This
priority also covers NSSM's, NIE's, NIAM's, and other
assessments produced for the same audience. The pub-
lications in this category require the greatest share
of our time and attention, because this audience (and
that of the PDB) is the group that OCI--and indeed CIA--
is in existence to serve. All other activities are
secondary.
C. The National Intelligence Bulletin, prepared
for operating and staff officials--largely in State,
Defense, and CIA-
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d. Staff Notes. The primary audience for the
Notes is the area specialist at whatever level, but
the Notes are available to and often requested by
generalists.
3. Three aspects of our activity do not fit easily
into a list of priorities--the weeklies, special. reports
and memoranda not specifically prepared for the senior
policy maker, and the WHSR series.
a. The CIWR/CIWS has won wide respect for its
finely tuned weekly intelligence round-up. The weekly
is aimed at a "general audience" broader than the NIB,
including many whose jobs require only limited current
intelligence input.
b. OCI continues to issue general interest, pub-
lished memoranda and special reports, although these
are less frequent than in past years. It also pub-
lishes self-initiated, uncoordinated papers on important
controversial issues. The latter, which may or may not
receive distribution outside OCI, are welcome and should
continue to be a staple of our production.
c. White House Spot Reports are the initial, analyst's
first, quick response to important events on incoming in-
telligence, especially in rapidly-moving situations. They
are prepared primarily for the White House Situation Room,
where they are a major input to periodic briefing notes
for the President and Dr. Kissinger, and are furnished as
an additional service to the Department of State Operations
Center, the NMCC, and the Treasury Department. Especially
sensitive material is sent only to the White House.
4. In practice the priorities of our periodicals are
modified by their overlapping content, by the requirements for
coordination, and by the timing of their production cycles.
Again, some generalities are possible, but it is important to
treat priorities, content, coordination, and timing separately
if one is to understand the relationship of the various periodi-
cals. (See also Attachment A).
5. Content.
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b. The NID is also the DCI's publication, in this
case speaking to the NSC-level audience and giving more
weight to Community views. Its content is governed by
the concept that its readers should not have to read
any other general intelligence periodical,. As OCI's
greatest devourer of words, it will normally contain:
--Virtually all items from the NIB, often modified
in length and wording but not in substantive judgment.
--materials which cannot be used in the NIB for
reasons of sensitivity or classification.
--Late material, with analysis included when feasible.
--Precis or summaries of important USIB issuances and
other memoranda.
--Feature articles and current reporting prepared
especially for the NID, or drawn from CIA memoranda.
--Selected material from Staff Notes, the CIWR,
OER's Weeklies, etc.
c. The NIB represents the Intelligence Community
speaking to the operating level audience. It will
normally contain the dozen or so developments or reports
at its classification level which the participating USIB
agencies consider of national importance. The NIB is a
new publication, still working out its procedures, but
in general the principles which have governed Red CIB
content in the past will apply.
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d. The regional Staff Notes series vary in concept,
periodicity, and classification, but each reflects what
the preparing Division believes would be most useful to
its customers, at Assistant Secretary level and below.
Senior members of the NSC Staff receive the NID and all
other Staff Note customers have access to the NIB. The
Staff Notes should be viewed as regional supplements to
the NIB, although for various reasons some of the same
material often appears in both. A regional specialist
should be fully served if he reads the NID or NIB and
the appropriate series of Staff Notes; he need read no
other intelligence periodical.
e. The CIWR/CIWS is CIA speaking to the general
audience. Its content must be selected on the assumption
that the reader does not have access to the other publi-
cations, even though many readers do. The general reader
whose needs are less immediate should be fully served by
the Weekly. It cannot be assumed, however, that our most
important consumers read one of the weeklies. The Weekly
is often only scanned or not read at all when a reader is
busy. When we do a post-mortem, appearance of an item in
the Weekly gives evidence that the analyst has done half
of his job, i.e. he has spotted a trend. But he has
failed to do the other half, warning our most important
consumers, unless the same warning appears in the dailies.
Our current intelligence record is made in our daily pub-
lications.
6. Coordination. In general, the PDB, NID, and NIB
should present the same substantive judgments on the same
major items each day, to the extent that classification
permits. Departures in judgment should have the approval
at least of the D/OCI.
b. Coordination requirements for the NID are flex-
ible. Material should be coordinated in general substance,
not in precise language, and should express major dif-
ferences of view. This means that any material withheld
from the NIB for reasons of sensitivity must be coordinated
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in substance at least with the agency of primary concern.
Drafts of all other material, time permitting, must be
provided to the agency of primary concern for comment.
Suggestions should be requested but need not be accepted.
Signed feature articles need not be coordinated, except
those on military subjects.
c. The NIB will be "fully coordinated" in language
as well as in judgment, to the extent that time permits.
(It is not yet clear precisely what this entails.) Dif-
ferences of view, unless trivial, will be expressed
textually (and important ones will of course carry over
to the NID and PDB).
d. Staff Notes and the Weeklies will be coordinated
only within the Agency.
7. Timing and Procedure. The analyst should only have
to draft a particular story once, although he may have to
adapt it to new information. Virtually all material must be
prepared with the possibility of NID use in mind. Thus standard
current "items" should be written as much as possible in news-
paper style--paragraphs in descending order of importance. The
following is an idealized version of the daily production cycle-
we all know it cannot work in such a rational way much of the
time. (See also Attachment B).
a. Priority does not govern the order in which OCI
does things; efficiency and receipt of information do.
In some Divisions all daily material is first prepared
in Staff Notes form and is progressively winnowed out
for the major publications. In others, material is pre-
pared primarily for the NID, and filters downward to the
NIB and Notes. Whatever the order, analysts should re-
member that the NIB process is the most time-consuming.
All drafts should go to the PDB, NID, and NIB staffs as
early as possible in the day.
b. During the day the PDB Staff will Select, edit,
and assemble drafts for review by the D/OCI, DDI, and
DCI or DDCI. Occasionally an NIO will be involved as
well. When this review process is completed the NID
Staff will take over responsibility for the PDB.
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c. Simultaneously, the NIB Staff will assemble,
edit and ensure coordination of an NIB text,. At
conclusion of the working day this text will be turned
over to the SDO for updating, any further coordination
required, and final production. The SDO will work in
consultation with the NID editors and the night regional
representatives attached to the NID Staff.
d. Meanwhile, the NID Staff will have assembled and
edited a body of material for their next issue. The NID
Staff is responsible for seeing that changes made in PDB
versions of these drafts in the senior review process
and in NIB versions in the coordination process carry
over in substance to the NID version.
e. From this point on, the NID Staff and night
shift analysts are responsible for updating the PDB
and NID and keeping them in step. They will cooperate
with the SDO in updating the NIB. Coordination with
other agencies will continue, according to the rules
for each publication, as long as the other agencies
are willing. As a general rule only important new items
will be added to the PDB and NIB; thus new reportorial
material prepared for the NID need not appear in the
other publications the same morning. Furthermore, be-
cause the NIB will be put to bed well before the PDB
and NID, late information or makeup problems may force
other departures from parallel treatment.
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STAFF NOTES
External
Internal
USSR - Soviet Developments
24
112
W. Eur - International Organizations
39
68
42
92
MEA
Western Hemisphere - Latin American Trends
39
80
41
110
E. Asia
32
106
Chinese Affairs
Developments in Indochina
36
112
253
680
Total
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