REPORT OF STUDY GROUP ON OPERATIONS CENTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A000700020002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 13, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 April 1973
Report of Study Group on Operations Centers
1. The Study Group was charged with examining
Agency 24-hour activities and related message flows
with a view to consolidation and rationalization.
(See Annex A) Our recommendations are contained in
this report. A separate report will deal with the
role of the "reports" function in handling Agency-
collected raw intelligence.
2. We took as our objective the creation of a
24-hour system which would provide a single, central
point for:
--Scanning of electrical narrative traffic
arriving in Headquarters from all sources
for items of immediate concern.
--Alerting of senior Agency officials, ac-
tion officers, and external consumers.
(This function, of course, is usually car-
ried out through command channels during
duty hours.)
--Selection of important traffic for senior
Agency officers.
--Response to queries from other government
agencies when no established channel exists.
--Crisis management and task force activities.
--Monitoring of all Agency activities in
non-duty hours.
Present Arrangements
3. By this yardstick, the present situation is
not.too bad. The Agency has a number of, more or less
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autonomous duty officers and other activities, but
cooperation among them is good. The present Opera-
tions Center: scans most incoming traffic; alerts
some Agency officers and most external consumers;
selects some important traff c, is the point of
reference for other agencies; houses DDI crisis ac-
tivities, but not those of the other D ri ectorates;
monitors most Agency 24-hour activities but controls
none. More important, however, is the fact that all
these activities take place within the tradition al
framework of the Agency; the individual baronies pre
their frontiers.
4. The Operations Center is the most compre-
hensive and most nearly "central" of the Agency's
24-hour activities. The DDI is executive agent for
the Operations Center. DDI and DDO have duty offi-
cers there, each of whom answers to his Deputy. The
DDI officer as the senior represents the DCI to a
limited, but undefined, degree. Each is generally
cognizant of most out-of-hours activities of his
Directorate. The DDI officer in addition controls
some housekeeping functions of the DDM&S.
5. In addition to the Operations Center, there
are nine other centers, three stand-by centers, and
three computer centers, as well as housekeeping
functions. Four of these (IW,- FMSAC, SSOC) STATSPEC
are highly specialized processing facilities that
make their results available to the Operations Cen-
ter. Two (OSP* and NPIC* Signal Centers) are inde-
pendent duty facilities. NSO is a support function
that cooperates with the Center. The OC headquar-
ters complex, the Signal Centers and Cable Secre-
tariat, receives and routes traffic to all the others
except NSO. Several of these centers are located
with their parent component away from the Headquar-
ters Building. (An inventory of centers is included
as Annex B.)
*'Man.ned by OC
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STATSPEC
6. There is no obvious duplication of functions,
although several centers may deal with the same traf-
fic. There is, however, a division of the scanning,
alerting, and selection functions among several centers.
--Scanning is done: in the Operations Cen-
ter and FMSAC by broadly qualified substan-
tive officers, aware of current activities
on an all-source basis; in Cable Secretariat,
IW and - by substantive officers with
limited access to other information; and
in the other centers by technicians working
by SOP.
--The Operations Center selects from NSA
and press traffic; Cable Secretariat from
CIA, State and DOD traffic; the various
DDS&T offices and NPIC from "project" traffic.
--Alertin : of the DDO is divided among
the DDO DO in the Operations Center, IW,
and the OC Complex; of the DDI between Op-
erations Center and NPIC; of the DDS&T
among OC (for several offices), FMSAC,
and.SSOC; of the DDM&S among the Opera-
tions Center, NSO, and OC Complex.
At no one point is there. full knowledge of what is
going on, and there is ample room for matters to
fall be tween two stools.
7. Some of the anomalies noted above are his-
torical carry-overs. Others-are the results of com-
partmentation. Compartmentation is necessary for
some of the operational traffic of the DDO and DDS&T.
Protection must be given to sensitive intelligence
collected by other agencies. There must be privacy
for the personal concerns of the DCI and DDCI, and
for the medical and security activities of the DDM&S.
To meet these requirements, there has grown up a maze
of improvised special procedures for particular cate-
gories of sensitive traffic. No two are alike and
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no one element is aware of them all. Such a system
maintains security, but at a considerable cost to
efficiency. Eight years experience with the co-lo-
cation and cooperation of the DDI and DDO Duty Of-
ficers, however, demonstrates that an Operations
Center can do its job while maintaining compartmen-
tation. But the more cable traffic is shared, the
less chance of error.
8. Another weakness of the present system has
been surmounted in the past largely by good will.
This is the lack of clearly defined relationships
among the centers. During duty hours the Agency has
an established chain of command, but when senior of-
ficers are not on board its various parts operate
with relative autonomy. The Operations Center is
first among equals, but its relations with the others
are largely consultative. The DDI and DDO duty of-
ficers speak (within certain limits) for their Depu-
ties. at night. No one speaks for the DCI or for the
other Deputies.
New Considerations
9. The DCI has stated his desire to integrate
the activities of the Agency and to eliminate bar-
riers between Directorates. Present arrangements
do not serve his purposes.
10. The DCI has ordered a much more intensive
effort in support of the NSC Staff and the White
House Situation Room. To achieve this, the OCI PDB
Staff, located in the Operations Center, has been
expanded and redesignated White House Support Staff.
Its activities are hampered, however, because the
Operations Center as now constituted cannot provide
the full information flow it requires. Moreover,
present Agency methods for transmission to the White
House are not fully compatible with the WHSR data-
handling system.
11. The Agency is developing a consolidated,
computer-based system for dissemination of narrative
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electrical traffic within Headquarters.
systems. No singe center exists in Washington, much
less in the Agency, where such a process can take
place.
in managing the
add a new dimension to Agency night activities. The-
Headquarters terminal will be located in the Opera-
tions Center. This will not only bring in a new flow
of information, but will also present new problems
13. The NMCC/NMIC and State Operations Centers
are in process of modernization. To stay in the game,
CIA must modernize too.
14. The Agency has developed, and is preparing
to put forward for National Security Council approval,
a proposal for a National Intelligence Operations
Center. The primary purpose of NIOC is to pull to-
gether Community current intelligence support for the
national authorities.
15. We believe the Agency needs a true central-
ized Operations Center. We believe it is feasible to
modify the present system immediately to bring this
about in a somewhat jury-rigged fashion. Finally, we
believe that over the next 2-3 years the center can
and should be transformed into a modern computer-
based facility.
16. Taking the initial steps can be done cheaply,
with a modest increase in personnel. The subsequent
ones, however, will take money and space. (A pre-
liminary estimate of initial resource requirements
is included as Annex C.)
17. We have re-examined the NIOC prospectus
(Annex E) in the light of what we propose below. The
two appear compatible. Some changes in detail will
be necessary for NIOC, and the need for compartmenta-
tion of Agency internal activities should be reaffirmed.
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18. We recommend that the following steps be
taken in the first 120 days after approval of this
report.
a. That DDI remain Executive Agent for
the Operations Center; that the DDI
Duty Officer be senior in non-duty
hours.
b. That DDS&T place a duty officer in
the present Operations Center, at least
during off-duty hours; that, at least
initially, DDM&S delegate its off-duty
responsibilities to the other Direc-
torate duty officers; that DDM&S be
prepared to.install a duty officer in
crisis situations.
c. That each Directorate duty officer
be responsible for activities of and
alerting in his Directorate. (For
relations with other centers see
Annex D.) That the DDI Duty Officer
normally be responsible for the needs
of the DCI and DDCI in non-duty hours.
d. That during crisis periods a senior
Agency duty officer representing the
DCI be placed over the four Direc-
torate duty officers.
e. That the OC complex make available
to the Directorate duty officers all
incoming narrative traffic received
by the Agency (after screening out
low precedence and administrative
cables); that each message be seen
by at least one duty officer; that
the duty officers maintain necessary
compartmentation; that exceptions to
this provision be permitted only by
specific direction of the DCI or his
Deputies.
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f. That State NODIS and
traffic, the only important category
not usually received electrically,
be routed through the appropriate
duty officers in the Operations Center
by LDX, if State will agree.
g. That the alerting and "call-in" func-
tions of the OC complex, including
those on behalf of DDS&T, be trans-
ferred to the appropriate Directorate
duty officers in the Operations
Center.
h. That all selection, including that by
the OC Complex, be moved to the Opera-
tions Center; that the volume of
cables selected be reduced; that the
Night Journal and Cable Summary be
combined, and issued on an all-source
basis 2 or 3 times daily.
i. That to the extent possible with
present facilities all dissemination
of electrical narrative traffic with-
in the Headquarters Building be trans-
ferred to the OC Complex.
j. That approximately 3,000 square feet
of additional space adjacent to the
Operations Center be made available
as soon as possible.
k. If this space is on the 6th floor,
that a connecting staircase be con-
structed as soon as arrangements can
be made.
1. That the Agency obtain inter-Agency
agreement on NIOC.
19. While these steps are underway, study
should begin on the following problems in the de-
sign of a future Operations Center.
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a. Should FMSAC and SSOC be physically
consolidated with the Operations
Center?
25X1A b. How should the Headquarters terminal
be configured and staffed?
c. How should the Agency, or NIOC, manage
the interaction of collection systems?
d. How to adapt CDS to an Operations
Center fully meeting the objectives
of Paragraph 2, and make it compatible
with the systems of the WHSR, NMCC,
and State Operations Center?
20. The additional space (paragraph 18j) will
make it possible to move into Phase IT. In Phase II
we assume that NIOC has been approved. Thus the
additional space will be used for:
a. Offices and communications for inter-
Directorate and inter-Agency crisis
task forces.
b.. Offices for State, DIA, and NSA per-
manent representatives.
c. Moving the IW into the operations
Center, where its officers can be
more aware of current priorities.
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ANNEX A
MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee
SUBJECT
7 Mardi 1973
Management Committee Study Group on Watch,
Indication and Warning Procedures
1. The following officers are appointed to a Study Group;
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DD /I : Richard Lehman (Chairman)
DD/O .
DD/S&T: Sayre Stevens
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DD / S
2. The Study Group will review the structure and function of all
Agency 24-hour "watch" operations and situation rooms and make
recommendations for their consolidation and rationalization. It will
study the activity of these. centers in initial handling of incoming iraior-
mation of all degrees of sensitivity from all sources, with a view to
improving the processes of alerting, selection, and assignment of
action. Finally, it will examine the role of these centers, and related
activities in the field and at Headquarters, in the receipt, processing,
and dissemination of raw intelligence acquired by the Agency from all
sources.
3. On the basis of these findings, the Study Group will recom-
mend any changes it believes necessary in the existing proposal for a
National Intelligence Operations Center. Its recommendations with
regard to Agency activities should not be dependent, however, on the
establishment of an NIOC.
4. In general, the Study Group should work toward maximum
simplification and centralization of Agency operations by the integration
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Qi related activities of the individual Directorates. In so doing, it
should seek a reasonable balance among the conflicting objectives of
effectiveness, security, and economy.
5. The Study Group's report will be submitted by 15 April 1973.
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W. E. Colby ~
Executive Secretary
CIA Management Con mittee
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RESOURCES
SUMMARY
PHASE I - Minimum costs.
A. Space requirement - none.
B. Manpower for four 24-hour positions.
1. Four DDS&T Duty Officers.
2. Six clerical personnel in the Opera-
tions Center. These can be provided
by maintaining OCI's clerical strength
at its present 85. Otherwise it
would be reduced to about 80 in FY
74.
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3. Ten clerical personnel in OC. This
figure is tentative and may well be
substantially reduced as the mechanics
are worked out. In any case, the
need for these people will be elim- 25X1A
inated when CDS becomes operational.
C. One-time costs - Approximately for
construction and equipment.
PHASE II - all estimates extremely tentative.
A. Space - 3,000 sq. ft., plus an additional
2,000 if FMSAC/SSOC is moved.
B. Manpower - No requirement for additional
CIA personnel is envisaged, but needs of
headquarters - terminal have not been
established. NIOC will require personnel
assigned by DIA, NSA, and State.
C. One-time costs - for construc-
tion; - for a data link. to NSA/NSOC;
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O move T .~M e T
Phase I
I. Objectives
A. Establish a DDS&T duty officer position in
the present CIA Operations Center and pro-
vide for a stand-by DDM&S duty officer.
B. Rearrange traffic'flow as feasible to al-
low appropriate Directorate Duty Officers
to receive relevant traffic particularly
after normal business hours.
C. Transfer all alerting and selecting respon-
sibilities to the Operations Center.
II. Costs
A. Objective I.A.
S&T and M&S Duty Officer coverage in the
Operations Center.
1. Manpower
a. Maximum coverage in the DDS&T
woulp provide for Duty Officer
and assistant coverage and would
require assignment of 5 officers
and 5 assistants.
b. Minimum r u
coverage would provide
fo Dty Of f' s only (no
assistants) after normal business
hours Monday through,Friday and
around-the-clock Saturday and
Sunday and would require the
assignment of four duty officers
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plus the use of reserves to
cover schedule gaps.
2. Space Requirement
a. To support maximum DDS&T cov-
erage - 300 sq. ft. The 75 sq.
ft. additional space not now
available to Operations Center
would be needed, plus stand-by
space for DDM&S.
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3. Money
a. Personal services
b. To support minimum coverage - 150
sq. ft. Some 225 sq. ft. will be
available after revamping of pre-
sent Operations Center space al-
ready under discussion is com-
pleted. This will also provide
stand-by space for DDM&S.
Maximum DO coverage (DDS&T
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b. Construction
Construction costs for either max-
imum or minimu uld not
exceed of this
cost wi be incurred by some re-
structuring within the present
Operations Center to better al-
location of working space.
C. Equipment
The traffic distribution facilities
already in place in the Center would
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be used for servicing the expanded
Center during Phase I.
Minimum costs could be incurred
through the installation of addi-
tional secure phones and some
printer equi ment? robably would
not exceed
B. Objective I.B.
Rearrange traffic flow as feasible to per-
mit appropriate Directorate Duty Officers
to receive relevant traffic.
1. Manpower
a. No additional manpower will be
required in Operations Center
with the exception of some clerk/
typist augmentation estimated at
6 GS-06s.
b. The Office of Communications es-
timates that one additional posi-
tion may be required in the Signal
Center plus one additional posi-
tion in the Cable Secretariat.
Staffed around-the-clock these
two positions would require a
total of 10 personnel. The two
positions would be used to screen,
reproduce, sort, and dispatch to
the Directorate Duty Officers in
the Center all relevant traffic.
This would mean that about 60 to
70% of the total OC complex vol-
ume of traffic would require addi-
tional processing not now done.
The requirement for the two posi-
tions is tentative and subject to
modification as Phase I is im-
plemented. The traffic flow con-
templated here is one which can
be handled electronically with
the completion of the CDS.
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2. Space
No additional space requirements are
anticipated.
3. Money
a. Personal services
A total of 16 clerical personnel
at an estimated annual cost of
b. Construction
So minimal as to be insignificant.
C. Equipment
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Copy equipment and supplies
C. Objective I.C.
Transfer alerting and selecting respon-
sibilities to the Operations Center.
1. Manpower
Provided for in Operations Center
clerk/typist augmentation in Objective
I.B.
2. Space
None
3. Money
Some additional workload may be placed
on the printing facilities on the 7th
floor as a result of the more frequent
publication of the Journal and cable
summaries. Costs should be negligible.
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Phase II
I. Objectives
A. Physical expansion of the CIA Operations
Center.
B. Move the Ill, FMSAC, and SSOC into the opera-
tions Center.
C. Superimpose NIOC on the expanded CIA Opera-
tions Center.
II. Costs
A. Objective I.A.
Physical expansion of the CIA Operations
Center.
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1. The tangible costs connected with phys-25X1A
ically expanding the Center to include
space on the sixth floor immediate)
below the present Center would be
to construct and install a circular stair-
way to link up the two floors internally,
and a rough estimate of for
space rearrangement. 3-5,000 sq. ft.
would become available.
2. Expansion of the present Center also could
take. place on the 7th floor across the F
corridor from the present center. Costs
here would be only those incurred through
rearran ement of artitions, painting, etc.,
perhaps 1,835 sq. ft. would be
available. This arrangement would provide
no room for growth and is intrinsically
less desirable.
B. Objective I.B.
Move the IW, FMSAC, and SSOC into the Opera-
tions Center.
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1. The results of the study to be made
on this objective as part of Phase I
implementation will determine whether
or not any advantage is to be gained
by the proposed move.
2. Cost of movin the IW would be minimal,
say Engineering, wiring,
space renovation, construction for
the FMSAC and SSOC move to the 6th
floor space made available in II A,
I, above is estimated at
C. Objective I.C.
Superimpose NIOC on the expanded CIA Opera-
tions Center.
1. Achieving this objective requires man-
power augmentation from other USIB
agencies, over the number already as-
signed to other Operations/Command
Centers.
DIA none
NSA 4
STATE 8
2. Space requirements can be met through
the physical expansion of the CIA
Operations Center.
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3. No attempt has been made to establish
the cost of personal services for NIOC
since the proposal at this stage does
not deal with grade structures. 25X1A
4. Equipment costs to link NIOC with NSA
NSOC have been estimated at
Other one-time equipment cost projec-
tions can be obtained only through the
feasibility/cost studies to be under-
taken as a result of approval of the
NIOC proposal.
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Phase III
I. Objectives
Installation of automated equipment for full
integration of the total system.
II. Costs
Not determinable at this time.
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Annex D
This annex deals with 24-hour centers and
standby facilities other than the Operations Center.
The language is subject to modification in the light
of Management Council decisions on the degree of
their subordination to the Operations Center.
A. Office of the Director
1. VASRAC. To be discontinued as soon
as conditions in Vietnam permit, and
its remaining functions returned to
the Operations Center.
STATSPEC
25X1A 2. Decision on should await
25X1A decision whether is to be trans-
ferred to the DDO. In any case,
traffic should be scanned by the
DDI Duty Officer at all times.
3. NPIC/IAS. To be under guidance of
the DDI D0. All cable traffic not
already routed to the Operations
Center by OC or NPIC should be so
routed.
1. DDO/DO. The existing DDO/DO should
be continued. He should be suf-
ficiently senior and be provided
with adequate guidelines to enable
him to speak for the DDO in non-duty
hours with only a minimum recourse
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outside for decisions in exceptional
cases. He should receive all the
sensitive traffic now handled by the
OC Complex, and the alerting and
"call-in" function should be handled
by him or by the other Directorate
duty officers as appropriate.
2. Intelligence Watch. The Intelligence
Watch should operate under the guid-
ance of the DDO duty officer. It
should be physically located in the
Operations Center in order to take
advantage of the information avail-
able there.
3. The Operating Divisions. The Ad Hoc
2 -hour task forces occasionally
established by DDO elements should
be housed in Operations Center fa-
cilities for crisis management, when
they are constructed.
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1. A DDS&T duty officer and necessary
supporting staff should be installed
in the Operations Center. He should
have the same relationship to his
Deputy Director and to the activities
of his Directorate as those of the
DDI and DDO duty officers.
2. The branch Signal Center on
the 6th floor which supports DDS&T
is in process of consolidation with
the main Signal Center. Its alerting
function should be transferred to
the DDS&T Duty Officer.
3. FMSAC. The FMSAC Center should be
monitored out of hours by the DDS&T
Duty Officer. Consideration should
be given to the possibility of moving
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this center and the adjacent OEL
facilities into the Operations Center.
4. OEL. SSOC should be handled in a
similar fashion to FMSAC.
25X1A 5. M The present standb OSA Con-
trol Center in the
should remain where it is, although
the DDS&T Duty Officer should see
its traffic. It is a reasonable
assumption that this program will
not survive much longer in any case.
1. OC. The OC Complex should be mon-
oored by the Operations Center Duty
Officer out of duty hours. There is
clearly no requirement for, and a
great deal of inefficiency in,
physically consolidating the Opera-
tions Center and the CIA Communica-
tions facilities.
25X1A
2. OS. The Night Security Officer is a
specialized function properly located
on the first floor. The NSO, how-
ever, should be monitored by the Op-
erations Center Duty Officer.
3. OL. The Operations Center Duty Officer
should maintain cognizance over the
out of hours motor pool, courier, print-
ing, telephone, etc., activities of OL.
4. OJCS. The consolidated computer
centers of OJCS should be monitored
by the Operations Center Duty Officer.
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Attachment i
A National Intelligence Operations Center
1. Twenty-odd years ago the CIA Operations Center
consisted of a graduate student sleeping by a telephone
at night. Twelve years ago the White House had no 24-
hour watch apparatus except its communications center, and
the Department of Defense had no central command center at
all. Today there exists an intricate network of round-
the-clock operations and intelligence centers, linked by
secure communications, and among them controlling virtually
all the essential national security activities of the
Federal Government.
2. Despite the progress that has been made, the
solution has never quite caught up with the problem. No
rationale other than individual agency interests has ever
been applied to operations center development. The true
lines of authority and responsibility within the National
Security Council structure have never been reflected in
organization. New developments in collection and communi-
cations have overtaken present operating concepts. In
recent months, a number of these matters have reached a
stage at which another quantum jump forward in Community
organization appears feasible and desirable.
A. Factors Bearing on Such a Reorganization:
3. The authority of the DCI has been substantially
strengthened. As a member of the various NSC Committees--
SRG, WSAG, 40, NSCIC, DPRC, Verification Panel, VSSG--his
position, first defined in the National Security Act of
1947, as the President's intelligence officer and the
spokesman of the Intelligence Community to the political
authorities has been further institutionalized. In par-
ticular, through the WSAG he carries the national intelli-
gence responsibility in crisis management. Equally important,
his position was reinforced by the President's reorganization
of November 1971. He has instructions to organize the
Community more efficiently and to save money. These changes
have not so far been reflected in Community organization
for crisis management.
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4. Existing and programmed SIGINT and photographic
collection systems provide powerful new capabilities for
warning and crisis intelligence and, in general, enhance
the flow of timely data into the current intelligence process.
No central facility exists, however, whereby these new capa-
bilities, in conjunction with conventional sources, may be
used to full advantage in response to national intelligence
requirements, particularly those which emerge in rapidly
moving situations.
5. NSCID #3 is permissive in its wording on the produc-
tion of national current intelligence. There is no clearly
defined responsibility, a lack especially felt under con-
ditions of crisis. The result is an uncontrolled, overlapping,
and sometimes contradictory outpouring of raw information as
well as current intelligence to the national authorities, a
problem under study by the NSCIC Working Group.
6. Technical collection-analysis-dissemination systems
have been developed which provide tactical warning that a
strategic attack against the US is under way. The problem
of longer range ("strategic") warning is much more difficult
since it involves judgments on enemy intent in the absence
of clear-cut, unambiguous actions; technical systems are
unlikely to resolve the problem. Strategic warning can only
be the product of a continuing and comprehensive analysis of
all relevant information. The national military authorities,
however, have defined their needs for strategic warning in
terms parallel to those for tactical; they require a degree
of timeliness and specificity which the Intelligence
Community is unable to provide. The National Indications
Center, originally conceived for this purpose, is growing
obsolete and is increasingly isolated. It should be replaced
with a system more responsive to present military needs.
7. The ASD(I) is preparing to put forward a proposal
to solve some of these problems. He would concentrate all
crisis management activities in the NMCC/NMIC, in support of
the "National Command Authorities", defined as the President
and the Secretary of Defense. While we agree that there are
problems that need solving, and that a great deal of simpli-
fication and centralization within the DOD is desirable, we
find this specific solution unacceptable.
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a. It confuses the national military command line
(President-Secretary of Defense-JCS-NMCC) with the national
intelligence support channel (DCI-NSC-President), and in
so doing ignores the role of the Secretary of State. The
intelligence judgment is put in the hands of the military
authorities who must act on it.
b. It narrows the focus of crisis management to
the ultimate military threat. The problem of crisis management
is really much broader, and. involves equally important economic
and political considerations.
c. It relies on machine and organizational solu-
tions to the strategic warning problem, and gives no attention--
or even access--to the broad analytic base on which strategic
warning judgment depends. In so doing, it down plays the
political and economic factors essential to a judgment on
strategic warning.
.d. It does not reflect the actual authority and
responsibility of the DCI, and in particular his responsi-
bilities to the national authorities in all varieties of
crisis, political, economic, and military.
B. A Conceptual Framework:
8. In the national security field, operational or
command channels run from the President to the Secretaries
of State and Defense, and from them to their deputies or
to the State Operations Center and (through the JCS) to
the NMCC. The State Operations Center and the NMCC are
supported departmentally by INR and the NMIC. Although the
DCI does not stand in the command line for any major matters,
he nonetheless has national responsibilities for intelligence
support to the President, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, and the NSC Staff mechanism. National intelligence
channels run from the DCI to the President.
9. The DCI must thus supply current intelligence
support to the national authorities. This comes in three
phases:
a. Under normal conditions, the DCI represents
the Intelligence Community in the NSC and its subordinate
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bodies: SRG, Verification Panel, etc. He must provide
daily reporting on current events and their significance,
fuller analysis as required, a systematic and continuous
examination of the strategic warning problem, and a 24-hour
alert system. The first of these requirements he meets
through the Central Intelligence Bulletin, a national publica-
tion in all but name. The second Tie meets through National
Intelligence Estimates, fully coordinated, and CIA Memoranda,
unilateral. The weekly Watch RRe Report, coordinated and
national, is an effort to meet tide strategic warning
requirement, but one which is effective only when there
is no warning to give. An ad hoc 24-hour alert system
exists, but no center has clearly defined national intelligence
responsibilities.
b. Under crisis conditions, whether the primary
threat be political, economic, or military, the DCI repre-
sents the Community in the WSAG. In addition to his normal
responsibilities, he must supply the national authorities
with periodic situation reports. At present, he does this
unilaterally, as do other USIB agencies. There is no
mechanism for national situation reports.
c. Under the threat of general war (a particular
kind of crisis), t e DCI must supplement his situation
reports with a continuously reviewed judgment on enemy
strategic intentions, both for the national authorities and
for the military authorities responsible for interpreting
tactical warning. The present Watch Committee/NIC structure
is supposed to provide such a judgment, but is less and less
capable of doing so.
C. Proposed Reorganization:
10. There is clearly a need for an organizational
structure which will permit the DCI to carry out all these
responsibilities to the national authorities in a coherent
way and on a national basis. He therefore proposes to
establish a National Intelligence Operations Center in the
CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. The NIOC will be
organized as follows:
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i. To provide 24-hour national current
intelligence support to the President, the National Security
Council, the heads of departments and agencies involved
in national security affairs, and their supporting staffs.
(Hereafter referred to as the National Security Authorities.)
ii. To support the Director of Central Intelligence
in such others of.his responsibilities as he may from time to
time designate.
b. Functions
i. To scan, on a 24-hour, 7-day basis, all
incoming information available to the United States Government
on activities of foreign governments.
ii.' To alert the National Security Authorities,
through appropriate channels, to the receipt of significant
intelligence.
iii. To produce all-source national current
intelligence periodicals, coordinated among the USIB agencies
to the extent possible, for dissemination to the National
Security Authorities.
iv. To carry on a continuing analysis of in-
coming intelligence for indications that a foreign power in-
tends to engage in aggressive military action against the
United States or its interests; to provide through USIB and
its Watch Committee a status report, at least weekly, on
this analysis; to conduct research to improve techniques
in indications analysis.
v. To establish and administer a system of
"national intelligence alerts".
vi. When a crisis--be it political, eco-
nomic or military--occurs or is threatened, to estab-
lish an inter-agency task force in the NIOC to provide
intelligence support to the National Security Authorities.
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These task forces will produce, or as appropriate task others
to produce, national intelligence situation reports and such
other intelligence as is requested by these authorities.
When requests are of a character that would call for estimative
treatment, as in a Special National Intelligence Estimate,
task forces will consult the DCI's Office of National Estimates
and the latter will initiate a SNIE according to its customary
procedures.
vii. When a crisis occurs which threatens to
involve the United States in hostilities with a foreign power,
to provide the National Security Authorities and the NMCC/NMIC
with a continuous analysis of, and judgment on, enemy intentions
with respect to military action, under the guidance to the
extent possible of the USIB Watch Committee.
viii. In support of these objectives, to provide
a centralized facility to act as the focal point for the
issuance of timely current intelligence requirements to all
major collection systems in rapidly moving situations. In
crisis situations NIOC requirements will be given precedence
by collection system managers as necessary to meet the immediate
requirements of the national security authorities.
ix. To be informed of US diplomatic and military
activities in order to improve understanding of the actions
and reactions of foreign governments and to achieve optimum
timeliness and relevance of intelligence support.
X. To maintain such briefing facilities as
may be required.
c. Relationships
i. The National Intelligence Operations Center
is a national facility established by the DCI, with the
advice and assistance of USIB, under the provisions of NSCID's
#1 and #3.
ii. The chain of command is from the President
to the appropriate committee of the NSC to the DCI to the
Director, NIOC.
iii. The NIOC's primary responsibility is to the
President and NSC Staff. It will normally be responsive,
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however, to requirements of the State Operations Center and
the NMCC/NMIC, and in certain circumstances (see para b,
section vii above) has specified responsibilities to the
NMCC/NMIC.
iv. The Director, NIOC will be designated by
the DCI. His deputy will be designated by the Secretary of
Defense with the concurrence of the DCI. The NIOC will be
jointly manned by CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA, and each agency
will maintain a senior representative accredited thereto.
Any task forces that may be formed will be jointly manned
by CIA, DIA and INR analysts assigned to augment NIOC for
this purpose, under the direction of an officer designated
by the DCI.
v. The NIOC will establish 24-hour liaison
with the White House Situation Room, the State Operations
Center, the NMCC/NMIC, and the National SIGINT Operations
Center. At least in the case of the NMCC/NMIC this liaison
will be maintained by an interagency team (CIA, DIA, INR, NSA)
on duty in the NMCC.
vi. All major collection categories will be
represented on a 24-hour basis in the NIOC.
vii. The Directorates of Intelligence and
Science and Technology, CIA, will furnish first-line
analytic support to the NIOC.
viii. CIA will supply the facilities, communica-
tions, funding, and other logistic support of the NIOC as a
service of common concern.
d. Organization
i. NIOC will be headed by a Director and
Deputy Director, as stated above. It will consist of six
groups: Watch, Collection, Liaison, Indications, Production,
and Support, plus the senior CIA, DIA, NSA and INR repre-
sentatives. The CIA representative will handle CIA's de-
partmental operations center responsibilities. (At least
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initially, some NIOC personnel will serve concurrently in
more than one position.)
ii. The watch group will consist of sufficient
watch teams to man the center on a 24-hour basis. Each team
will consist of CIA, INR and DIA duty officers, with the
CIA officer in charge, and a number of watch officers furnished
STATSPEC
iii. The collection group will consist of sufficient
teams to provide 24-hour representation for NSA, COMIREX, CIA
(Clandestine Service, DCS, - and DD/S&T), State, and DIA.
Representatives for other collection systems will be added as
required. The State, DIA and certain CIA positions will
normally be filled by the corresponding watch team members.
iv. The liaison group will consist of CIA
officers-on duty at the White House Situation Room and State
Operations Center (if a requirement for these jobs is estab-
lished), and round-the-clock USIB teams in the NMCC/NMIC.
These teams will consist of CIA, DIA, NSA and State members.
The CIA member will be in charge, and will be under control of
the senior duty officer in the NIOC. Team members may also
serve as departmental representatives of their agencies in
the NMCC.
v. The indications group will have two elements,
a USIB Watch Committee Secretariat and a research element,
manned jointly by CIA, DIA, and NSA. (State participation
will be invited.) The Secretariat will draft the weekly
Watch Report.
vi. The production group, furnished by CIA,
will consist of sufficient editorial, graphics, and publications
personnel to meet NIOC's requirements.
vii. The support group, furnished by CIA, will
supply administrative, data-processing, communications, and
logistic support as required.
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e. Organizational Changes
i. The National Indications Center will be
abolished and its functions and CIA personnel transferred
to the NIOC. (The USIB Watch Committee, however, will
continue to function; NIOC will furnish its secretariat.)
ii. The NIOC will absorb the present CIA
Operations Center, and most of its functions, facilities,
and personnel. The exceptions will be those functions which
must remain internal to CIA.
iii. The CIA chief of the NIOC representation
in the NMCC will also serve as the DCI's representative to the
Secretary of Defense.
iv. The Watch Committee Secretariat will absorb
the scanning functions of the CIA Indications Officer.
v. The Central Intelligence Bulletin will
become the National Intelligence Bulletin.
. vi. The USIB agency representatives in the
NIOC will serve as the coordination panel for the NIB,
under the guidance of the NIB chairman.
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Attachment 2
CIA Considerations for an NIOC
1. By definition, a National Intelligence Operations
Center must answer to the DCI. Much of its activity will
be in close support of the DCI and some of its instructions
will come from him. Provision must also be made for a
number of other unilateral CIA activities within the center.
Among others, these include operations of the Clandestine
Service, DDI production, and CIA representation on the
Watch Committee. Furthermore, the NIOC must retain the
present integration of the CIA Operations Center with its
analytic base. The center must be a service organization
with its analytic capability provided by the production
offices of the DDI and DD/S&T. This capability must, how-
ever, be available to the center around the clock and
on short notice, and must underpin all center activities
(and vice versa). These considerations argue strongly
that the exist g command relationships remain unchanged--
i.e., that the DDI be the executive agent for the NIOC on
much the same basis he is for the present Operations Center.
2. The following pages describe the resources that
would be required for an NIOC. They include charts showing
NIOC organization, a typical manning shift, and estimated
manpower, space and equipment requirements.
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DIR CIA Indications Staff Officer
(CIA Member Watch Committee)
DDIR
EXO
CIA DIA
SR. REP (EXO) SR. REP (DDIR).
WATCH COLLECTION
SR. DUTY OFFICER* HUMAN SOURCES
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STATE NSA
SR.REP GR.REP
INDICATIONS
PRODUCTION
SUPPORT
WHITE HOUSE WATCH COMMITTEE
EDITORS
ADP TECH
SIT ROOM (2)* SECRETARIAT
GRAPHICS
COMMO TECH
NMIC* INDICATIONS
CIA RESEARCH
PUB OFFICERS
CLERICAL
DIA
INR
TYPISTS
NSA
CIA INR**
INR CIA
DIA STATSPEC ~
WATCH OFFICERS*
SWO
AWO (I)
AWO
AWO
DDP
DIA**
COMIREX*
*positions
round-the-clock manning
requires 5 officers for
each position except WHSR
where 9 officers staff two
positions
**position covered
by Sr. Duty Officers
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 CIA Internal Use Only
SECRET Sensitive
SDO*
(CIA)
NMCC
LIAISON
CIA DO
rNSA STATE DIA
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STATE
LIAISON
WATCH
GROUP 4
STATSPEC
STATSPEC
* CIA SDO is responsible for DCI
special interests as well as for
collection guidance.
As indicated by asterisks,
CIA, State, and DIA Duty officers
have certain collection responsi-
bilities as well.
DIA DO***
OLLECTION GROUP
SDO (CIA)
[STATE] **
[DIA] ***
NSA DO
COMIREX DO
EDITOR
CIA
I CLERICAL
RAPHICS ETC.
SECRET Sensitive
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RESOURCES
MANPOWER
REQUIREMENT (tentative)
CIA
67*
DIA
16
NSA
13
STATE
11
*Does not include possible requirement for skilled ADP and
COMMO personnel.
SPACE REQUIREMENT (tentative)
WATCH/COLLECTION
BULLPEN (+50%) 1300
ADMIN 400
COMMO 1000
OFFICES 1200
SIT ROOM COMPLEX
(+50%)
WATCH COM. SECRETARIAT
The present CIA Operations
Center is allocated 4,900
sq. feet on the 7th floor,
F corridor, south. This
space together with 4,500
sq. feet in use by other
components immediately
below the Operations Center
on the 6th floor would
make available 9,400 sq.
feet for NIOC.
TASK FORCE SPACES
(2)
PDB SPACE
400
7000
Plus 10%
700
7700
Total one-time costs and an annual operating budget
cannot be forecast now. However, partial one-time cost
estimates can be projected for some of the following:
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CONSTRUCTION
a. Circular stairway to provide internal 25X1A
passage between 7th and 6th floor F corridor
south -------------------------------------------
b. Internal 6th and 7th floor space
realignment -------------------------------------- ? 25X1A
Room c. -- Additional furnishings for Situation -----
--------------------------------------
EQUIPMENT (not already present in CIA Operations Center)
a. OPSCOM console circuit with NSA NSOC
Ft. Meade ----------------------------------------
b. OPSCOM Teletype circuit with NSA NSOC
Ft. Meade and drop to OSR -----------------------
c. processing
facility
d. Other one-time cost projections:
Feasibility/cost studies to be undertaken
25X1A
on: 25X1A
- USIB community secure TV system
- ADP supported scanning system using
CRTs to eliminate insofar as possible
paper processing.
Query terminal to CRS ADP files systems
as they develop using printers and
visual display techniques.
*being staffed separately
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13 April 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee
SUBJECT Report of Study Group on the Re-
ports System
1. In addition to its charge to examine Opera-
tions Centers, information flows, etc., the Study
Group was asked by the Executive Secretary of the
Management Committee to examine the DDO reports sys-
tem, both field and Headquarters, with a view to
breaking down barriers or even transfer to the DDI.
This report is devoted entirely to that question,
and may be viewed as supplemental to the main Study
Group.
2. The report reflects the views of DDO and
DDI, as the organizations primarily affected. The
other members have abstained.
3. This is a split report. Section I is a
description of the present reports system. This
is DDO's and DDI's joint draft. Section II is DDI's
draft of an approach to this issue. Section III is
DDI's comment and Section IV is DDO's comment.
4. In princple, DDI favors the proposal as a
major step toward breaking down barriers between
the Directorates. As to the field activities, it
sees advantage in giving its officers more overseas
experience. On the other hand, it sees substantial
25X1C practical difficulties in providing enough quali-
fied officers, etc. At Headquarters, the
specific advantages lie primarily in the possibility
of personnel savings achievable through combination
of like functions. The disadvantages lie largely
in practical problems raised by the physical separa-
tion of DDI and DDO elements.
5. DDO distinguishes between the assignment
of individuals and the relocation of functions.
More importantly, however, it takes exception to
the proposal on philosophical grounds. It believes
that the involvement of CIA analysts in the process-
ing of raw information will raise doubts as to the
integrity of the CIA analytic function in the minds
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25X1 C
25X1 C
6. Thus the two Directorates fundamentally
disagree on the functional allocation of both Head-
quarters and field reporting. The DDI is willing
over time, to provide the personnel to fill all
field posts, on the understanding that some of the
present DDO reports officers will be assigned to the
DDI. (It should be understood that this assumption
carries with it the implication that the Headquarters
reports system is transferred to the DDI in any case.
Personnel management would be impossible if the Head-
quarters function were in one Directorate and the
field function in another.) The DDO is willing for
an increasing number of these posts to be filled by
properly. qualified DDI officers detailed as individ-
uals to the DDO for the purpose.
7. To me, it would appear we present the Com-
mittee with four distinct choices, two on functional
responsibilities and two on manning:
--Leave arrangements as they are.
--Transfer the function, both in the field and
in Headquarters, to the DDI in toto, allowing
a considerable degree of flexibility in timing
and in disposition of personnel.
--Leave the system essentially unchanged
and allot a limited number of field reports
slots to the DDI (say, WE-4, NE-4, AF-2,
FE-4, WH-4).
--Leave the system essentially unchanged but
consider individuals for field reports slots
without regard to directorate affiliation.
25X1A
!chard Lehman
Chairman
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n erna se n
I. CIA Clandestine Reports System
1. This section describes the Agency's present
clandestine reporting system, including the role of
the Intelligence Watch and the functions of reports
officers.
25X1 C
General
2. CIA's present reporting system is structured
such that the preparation and processing of clandes-
tine reports are performed totally within the Opera-
tions Directorate. The Intelligence Directorate
participates only to the extent that DDI analysts
are occasionally consulted for opinions as to the
suitability of information prior to dissemination.
The DDI does participate in the reports process by
providing requirements and contributing to the eval-
uation of reports.
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Summary:
25X1 C
1. The transfer of the headquarters reports
processing and dissemination responsibilities to
the DDI would contribute to integration of the
Agency's information handling and editorial activi-
ties. Less delay would occur in making reports and
other substantive information available to the
analyst. The chance of the Agency's speaking with
more than one voice would be reduced. In the field,
the reports function would remain unchanged, with
DDI officers gradually filling the reports special-
ist slots that are retained. In the long run these
procedural and personnel changes would encourage
cooperation between the DDI and DDO, particularly
among those elements working on the same geographi-
cal areas. DDI officers would of necessity be ex-
posed to operational information of the clandestine
services. This presents no particular problem.
They are accustomed to handling other kinds of
sensitive information with full discretion.
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Headquarters: Pros and Cons
7. The adjustments required to assign the
headquarters reports responsibility to the DDI should
not be extremely complex, once familiarity with pro-
cedures is gained. The DDI officer's writing skills
and analytical expertise would be brought to bear on
the preparation and processing of reports. OCI coun-
try desks and branches, with assistance from OER and
OSR analysts, would be appropriate units to perform
the reports duties. An additional officer in each
branch could probably handle the increased workload
in most instances, particularly if the anticipated
shift to direct dissemination occurs. A centralized
reports staff would be less effective because it
would lack the substantive expertise. There are
similarities between many of the activities of the 25X1C
analyst and the substantive functions of the reports
officers, e.g., evaluation of reports, formulation
of requirements, and briefing. Thus, a substantial
reduction in headquarters personnel might be realized.
Reads all source traf-
fic for substantive
content
Prepares analysis for
various publications
Prepares comments on
TDCS reports and other
traffic for White House
support
Drafts intelligence
memoranda and briefing
papers
Briefs senior officers
in CIA and other
agencies
CIA Internal Use Only
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 Approved For Release 2000$@W: WA.rRDP79BO1737AO00700020002-4
CIA Internal Use Only
25X1 C
Prepares requirements
for field collectors
Maintains contact with
counterparts in CIA and
other agencies
Participates in assess-
ments of reporting by
DDO and other collectors
Represents DDI in sub-
stantive discussions
Maintains reference
files
8. The preparation of requirements is already
an important part of the analyst's work and one for
which he is well equipped because of his familiarity
with developments in his area of responsibility and
his awareness of policy needs. He has readily
available a wide variety of collateral information
to assist him in identifying gaps.
Approved For Release 2000/r.-n, ' ;P79B01737A000700020002-4
 Approved For Release 2000/ ETCI ?P79B01737A000700020002-4
CIA Internal Use Only
9. A number of problems would have to be
solved. For example, some of the non-sensitive 25X1C
information that does not now reach the DDI would
have to be channelled to the DDI desks if the in-
formation were not to be lost to the intelligence
community.
25X1 C
111-5
Approved For Release 2000/0 &nt4MLRDR79B01737A000700020002-4
SECRET Sensitive
 25X1 C
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79BO1737A000700020002-4
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79BO1737A000700020002-4
 ApproVVgcO"WAgffqNq/Ct WSWIPR7Alpf U ,1 0020002-4
SOURCES
25X1A
FBIS NSA REGULAR
AP (2) END-PRODUCT LIMDIS
UPI OTHER
REUTERS CIA INTELLIGENCE
ADMIN/ACTION
3RD WATCH OFFICER
SCREENS PRESS FOR:
SECRET
CABLE SECRETARIAT (TUBE)
STATE EXDIS-LIMDIS
STATE REGULAR
MILITARY CABLES
25X1A
ACTION
2ND WATCH OFFICER
SCREENS COMINT FOR:
SENIOR WATCH OFFICER
SCREENS ALL OTHER FOR:
LDX
MILITARY
STATE
NSA
WHITE HOUSE
SENIOR DUTY OFFICER, WHO:
"SELECTS"
ALERTS
(up, down, laterally)
DISTRIBUTION OCI DIVISIONS PDB
OSR/RAD INDICO
OE R/CSS CS/DO
VAS/RAC SITUATION RM
TASK FORCES
DCI
D/OCI
USIB SECT'Y
DDCI
D/OSR
CHMN. WATCH COM.
EX DIR
D/ONE
OCI DIVISIONS
DDI
D/OER
PDB
DDP (CS/DO)
SAVA
INDICO
DDS&T
OSR/RAD
C/IRS
DDS
CIA/DOD
OTHERS
TASK FORCES
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79BO1737A000700020002-4