DICK:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A000600070003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 18, 1972
• Content Type: LETTER

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OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File
18 November 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
REFERENCE: D/ CI Memo dtd 17 Nov 72, Subject: DOD
Study of the Watch Committee, Operations
Center, etc.
Dick:
14. I admit that I am not as well versed in the intricacies of
the matters dealt with in the Henderson paper and your suggested
alternative, as many others around here, but I can't help feel
that even your suggestions tend to downgrade the Director's general
position and the Agency's proper preeminence in this area. Coming
at a time when articles are being published, books are being written
and general allegations are being made that the Agency's analytical
and estimative functions are too heavily influenced by the military,
I think we would be well advised strongly to resist the general thrust
of the Henderson paper and it would be my guess that we would have
firm support in this not only from the White House but also from
the State Department. A move to superimpose a national center
over the CIA center, even though the national center is considered
under the DCI's authority and control, would downgrade the CIA
center and would constitute the beginning of a development which
could result in the separation of the DCI from the Agency. I would
consider this a disaster. I think what we need to do is'get Colonel
Henderson's attention and tell him and Dr. Hall that what seems to
be needed here is a better organization within the Department of
Defense on these matters and not an attempt to move in on the
Director's legislative and NSC responsibilities.
Thom H: jramessines
ems" puty Director for Plans
E 2 IMPDET
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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT DOD Study of the Watch Committee,
Operations Centers, etc.
1. Herewith a draft Agency position on Henderson's
paper. Please give me your comments or concurrence by
COB Monday, 20 November.
2. I have not attempted to assess Community attitudes
toward our proposal, but am fully aware that this is not
a simple question.
3. Henderson has slightly revised his draft. The
changes muffle somewhat his assault on the service opera-
tion centers, waffle his language on the relationship of
ASD (I) and DCI, make considerably more explicit his plan
to center collection guidance in NMIC, and introduce more
advertising material for NSA.
25X1A
Attachment: a/s
CIA INIT[ U? L Ur7 ONLY
RICHARD LEHMAN
Director of Current Intelligence
Distribution:
DD I a%
DDP(-*--
f
D/OSRCn-.--G, DDS
D/OER all- DD/IC ai
D/IRS
C/OPCEN Ali
C/COMIREX oi
DDS&T ( w4-
D/PPB oK
Mi-~-~--~+l3
Classified by . 0 0 S' W ~;L-
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11 ;2, exennption category:
5B (1),r 2) or (1) (circle one or more)
Auternn.i :';; ., Ltooifed on
DATE lr." (l l)ETEr~MINE
(unless hn.p,,:,..... i.isert date or event)
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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
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l- 00-1--7IO--7 L+
17 November 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT DOD Study of the Watch Committee,
Operations Centers, etc.
1. Herewith a draft Agency position on Henderson's
paper. Please give me your comments or concurrence by
COB Monday, 20 November.
2.. I have not attempted to assess Community attitudes
toward our proposal, but am fully aware that this is not
a simple question.
3. Henderson has slightly revised his draft. The
Changes muffle somewhat his assault on the service 'opera-
tion centers, waffle his language on the relationship of
ASD (I) and DCI, make considerably more explicit his plan
to center collection guidance in NMIC, and introduce more
advertising material for NSA.
Attachment: a/s
25X1A
Distribution:
DD I Y'.'
D/OSR /
D/OERV
25X1A D/IRS /
" E C/OPCEN
q t COMIREX
e ~a DDS&T,
loe~0
25X1A
RICHARD LEHMAN
Director of Current Intelligence
1 ,7
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 Approved For Release 2001/osi&ff 4RDP79BO1737A000600070003-9
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT DOD Study of the Watch Committee,
Operations Centers, etc.
1. Herewith a draft Agency position on Henderson's
paper. Please give me your comments or concurrence by
COB Monday, 20 November.
2. I have not attempted to assess Community attitudes
toward our proposal, but am fully aware that this is not
a simple question.
3. Henderson has slightly revised his draft. The
changes muffle somewhat his assault on the service opera-
tion centers, waffle his language on the relationship of
ASD (I) and DCI, make considerably more explicit his plan
to center collection guidance in NMIC, and introduce more
advertising material for NSA.
Director of Current Intelligence
Attachment: a/s
Distribution:
fl DDI
/?i~1rr D/OSR
D/OER
D/IRS
C/OPCEN
25X1A C/COMIREX
DDS&T
25X1A D/PPB
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5B (i) 2))(2) or (9) (circle one or more)
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The National Alerting Structure
Introduction
Dr. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
has commissioned a study of the "interface" between strategic
and tactical warning. The study is being prepared by an inter-
agency committee chaired by Colonel Wallace Henderson.
Henderson has produced a draft report (attached to this
paper as Annex A) which calls for a drastic restructuring of
the Watch Committee, National Indications Center, and the
whole complex of agency operations and intelligence centers.
His proposal identifies a number of weaknesses in the present
structure and makes several useful suggestions, but goes far
beyond this to recommend that major elements of the DCI's
authority and responsibility be transferred to ASD (I) and the
military authorities.
Henderson's draft is his own. He puts it forward knowing
well that State and CIA are strongly opposed. (NSA's position
is less clear.) Nonetheless, he is speaking for and with the
encouragement of those elements in the military who have never
accepted the civilian role in intelligence. Moreover, many
of his proposals, taken individually, will find support in a
number of quarters beyond the Pentagon. Thus, although they
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reflect an Alice-in-Wonderland view of present power relation-
ships in Washington, they must be taken seriously. They must
be read as a direct and deliberate assault by Hall on the po-
sition of the DCI.
This paper is intended as the background for a CIA response
to Hall's initiative. It attempts to analyze the Henderson
recommendations against the broad background of other develop-
ments in intelligence and in the bureaucracy. Based on this
analysis, it develops a counter-proposal which would:
--Override Henderson's proposal with a broader one
in a truly national context;
--Preserve and strengthen the DCI's authority;
--Rectify some obvious shortcomings in the warning
system;
--Provide a framework for solutions to a number
of emergent problems in the national intelligence
field.
1. A number of developments in recent years have
come together to make the time ripe for a re-examination of
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the Community's Operations Center/Strategic Warning/Current
Intelligence structure.
a. Perhaps the most important of these is that
it is costing more to stay in the game. Systems are more
expensive, salaries are higher, and the political authorities
are demanding economies.
b. The authority of the DCI has been substantially
strengthened. As a member of the various NSC Committees--
SRG, WSAG, 40, NSCIC, DPRC, Verification Panel, VSSG--his
position as the President's intelligence officer and the
spokesman of the Intelligence Community to the political
authorities has been institutionalized. In particular,
through the WSAG he carries the central intelligence re-
sponsibility in crisis management. Equally important, his
position has been further reinforced by the President's re-
organization of last November. He has instructions to organ-
ize the Community more efficiently and, above all, to save
money.
c. New collection systems are forcing the Community
toward more centralized control. In particular
are expensive, demand 24-hour manning and
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steering; any: affect one another. In the near future they
will impose their own requirements on processing, analysis,
and control, but these requirements cannot yet be fully defined.
d. Competition among services and agencies and the
uncontrolled application of outmoded doctrine have led to the
development of a bewildering maze of operations centers, warning
centers, and current intelligence periodicals. The NSC has
never issued a clear directive on who shall do what in this
field, which transcends the NSCID's. There does, however,
seem to be a general, if unarticulated, feeling in the Com-
munity that the system needs rationalization.
e. In the atmosphere thus engendered, the long-
term trend toward centralization of national security affairs
in the White House has extended into the intelligence field.
The White House situation room now receives a considerable
volume of raw intelligence, some of which is disseminated
nowhere else. The NSC staff officer is thus forced to do
some of his own intelligence analysis.
f. White House obsession with secrecy, reaction
to some devastating news leaks, bureaucratic jealousies, the
development of new and sensitive collection systems and
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opportunities, the survival of outmoded compartments, and
worries stemming from the broadcast of current intelligence
by the military have set up serious barriers to information
flow and have subverted the intent of the National Security
Act of 1947. In no place except the White House does all
sensitive information come together, and it is not equipped
to handle what it gets. Under such conditions, no matter
how strongly the NSC Staff resists in principle the idea of
developing its own internal intelligence support, it tends
to hire more and more people to do just that.
g. "Strategic warning"* continues rightly to carry
the highest priority, but the expensive resources which may
provide it and which are justified for that reason have be-
come--ninety-nine percent of the time--vastly more important
for other reasons. It is no longer possible to devote major
resources solely to strategic warning. In fact, it might be
*In simplest terms, warning of enemy preparations for and
intent to launch a nuclear attack. "Tactical" warning is
warning that such an attack has been launched. The former
is uncertain as to time, heavily dependent on analyst judg-
ment, and may be acquired in any form. The latter is immediate,
concrete, and detectable by sensors designed for this specific
purpose.
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more realistic to consider strategic warning as the most im-
portant single element of all national intelligence objectives,
rather than as the first objective standing by itself.
h. "Warning", indeed is such an imprecise and
ephemeral concept that the development of systems to handle
it has been exceptionally difficult. Tactical warning
systems have thus outrun strategic, and it is generally agreed
that the Community's present arrangements for the latter are
not adequate. This is particularly strongly felt in the
Department of Defense, but efforts for improvement have foundered
on the tendency of Defense to think in terms of machine solutions
and wiring diagrams, rather than the human judgment and experience
emphasized by the civilian agencies.
i. Both sides agree that the National Indications
Center as presently constituted is obsolete. It was set up
when arrangements in the USIB agencies were primitive, but its
24-hour watch functions are now carried out much better by
the CIA and DIA centers. Furthermore, the advent of new
systems will soon price it out of its remaining analytic func-
tions. On the other hand, its functions as an inter-agency
body providing the national conscience on warning, and as a
research organization on warning are underdeveloped.
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j. The present state of the warning business is
symptomatic of a larger problem, the need for better use
of intelligence by the operational side. This need is
reflected in a trend toward the merger of operations and
intelligence centers--the NMCC/NMIC, the closer integration
of INR with the State Operations Center, and the evolution
in the NSC staff described above. But because in each of
these establishments operations are top dog, intelligence
produced there is likely to be less objective and independent
and its impact more muffled than it is at present.
k. In the last year, two new personalities have
begun to affect the rules of the game. Hall is pushing for
economy and centralization under the JCS and ASD M. Marshall,
through the NSCIC, is criticizing the Community performance
in crisis management, in particular the diffusion and blandness
of intelligence reporting.
"The Henderson Proposal
2. Into this complex and unsatisfactory situation,
Hall has unleashed Henderson. Henderson was initially
asked to see what money could be saved on tactical warning,
but he progressed to the "interface" of tactical with
strategic warning, thence to strategic warning itself,
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thence to the Operations Center complex, and finally to a
synthesis which would restructure the national intelligence
business and put the military in the driver's seat.
3. Henderson begins with the proposition that
"Strategic early warning is vital to the U.S.", and then
argues, citing some of the considerations listed above,
that present arrangements are inadequate. "Without a systems
approach at the national level for coordination and correlation
of separate intelligence systems and center inputs, costs
will continue to increase and confidence in the availability
of strategic warning will decrease." He recommends that:
a. "The DIA NMIC should be assigned unequivocal
responsibility for the provision of national
strategic early warning intelligence to national
command authorities, the world-wide military
command system and the various national intelli-
gence activities. To accomplish this task the
NMIC should be collocated with the NMCC and it
must be operated on an all-source basis. No
usable intelligence should be denied the NMIC
on security grounds .... Day-to-day management
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of the national strategic warning system should
be vested in the NMIC with the Watch Committee
setting standards."
b. The Watch Committee should continue to produce
judgments on strategic warning and to exercise some sort of
broad overview, not further defined, of the "national
strategic warning system." It should also foster research
on warning topics.
c. The military department command/intelligence
centers should be reduced to satellites of the NMIC.
d. "The NIC should be abolished with personnel
assigned to the NMIC. State, CIA and NSA....
representatives must be responsive to the
operational needs of the NMCC/NMIC and have the
means or responsibility of effecting immediate
authoritative warning judgments to support
NMIC operations especially on "hot" items.
In addition, such representation should have
the authority or capability to task, or query
directly, subordinate elements of their
principals. In this regard, the NMIC should
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orchestrate the entire strategic warning system
in support of the NMCC with individual components
responsible for subsystem integrity and perform-
ance...."
e. The NSA NSOC system should be used as a model
for an all-source automated national warning system centered
in the NMIC. All collection systems would apparently be
subjected to a "single executive approval at the NMIC level".
f. "The national strategic warning system should
be designed so as to provide current intelli-
gence data for crisis management, strategic
warning judgments and information to all users
simultaneously so that the world-wide military
command system, national command authorities,
and intelligence activities are in the same
levels of warning knowledge...."
"The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
within the defined relationship with the Director,
Central Intelligence should be made executive
agent for the fulfillment of these recommendations."
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4. Henderson describes these recommendations as a
device "to get our attention." They do. They are hard-
hitting and superficially most attractive to the reader
in, say, 0MB because they promise to simplify the structure,
save money, and provide a solution to a number of developing
problems. They are also almost entirely unacceptable.
a. They require that the DCI relinquish his
authority over much of national intelligence to the ASD (I).
b. They subordinate control of all major intelli-
gence collection to the NMIC, and thus to the JCS and the
ASD (I), at least under conditions of tension.
c. They place the intelligence flow to the
President and the NSC at times of crisis under the control
of the JCS and ASD (I).
d. They call for the provision to a large and
unwieldly military apparatus of all sensitive information.
e. They repeat the error of making strategic
warning the pillar which holds the structure up. Current
s : i
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intelligence and, by inference, crisis management become
appendages to the warning system. (As noted above, the
high priority assigned to warning is difficult to translate
into organization and resource management.)
f. They deal only with the "center" aspects of
warning, not with the analytic. The center is only the
tip of the iceberg. For each officer in a center there
are in each agency tens of specialized analysts, and these
professionals--for whom warning is only a part of the job--
are the ones we trust to make the basic judgment on enemy
intentions. (The warning analyst has to play devil's advocate;
he is valuable when indications are mostly negative, but
dangerous when they are ambiguous.) CIA and State are fortunate
in having their analytic base and operations center in
the same building. DIA is severely handicapped by having its
base at Arlington Hall. Henderson would compound the problem
by placing all the responsibility on the center with the
weakest immediate analytic back-up.
g. They place their faith in machines rather than
people for the critical warning judgment. Henderson seems
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under the impression that a CRT can display even the political
factors which are crucial to a judgment of enemy intentions
and that a duty officer can derive strategic warning there-
from. Machines can assist many aspects of warning more than
they do; the NSOC system is such a development. They cannot,
however, show what is in the minds of the enemy's political
leaders. Henderson's view on this is implicit in his distinction
between strategic and tactical warning only in terms of time--
before launch and after launch. Our distinction is more com-
plex. (See footnote to Paragraph lg.)
5. Henderson finds his opening in a serious ambiguity in
the national directives by which we live, one that has long
been recognized but never rectified. The JCS are clearly
responsible to the "National Command Authorities"* for tactical
warning: the detection of missile launch and a recommendation
what to do about it. The DCI, now with the "advice" of USIB,
is clearly responsible to the President and the NSC, including
the Secretary of Defense, for assessment of enemy strategic
*Which they define as the President and Secretary of Defense.
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6. The essence of the analytic problem presented at
the conjunction of strategic and tactical warning can be
put simply: should evidence of missile launch derived from
less than perfect sensors be accepted or questioned when
reaction time is short? The answer depends on what strategic
warning has been given: direct intelligence on enemy intentions
if any; the level of international tension; the state of enemy
military preparations, etc. In the military view these
questions tend to merge with tactical warning. Thus in the
crucial last 24 or 12 hours, the definitions of responsibilities
overlap. The JCS (and Henderson) simply assume that their
mission is overriding, but they offer no point at which to draw
the line.*
7. We must recognize, however, that present arrangements
do not permit the DCI to provide the JCS with the kind of
immediate measurement of strategic warning which they need,
*This assumption is in fact concretely illustrated: at the
relocation sites where that last 12 hours might be spent there
are a seat and a bed for the DCI as Presidential advisor, but
there is no provision for staff support or communication with
his Agency. It is assumed that DIA will provide support to
all.
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and which it is his responsibility to provide. The NIC is
isolated and obsolete and cannot do the job. If we do not
improve these arrangements, the JCS has considerable justifi-
cation for acting unilaterally. The Community can provide the
kind of continuous national judgment that is required when a
nuclear exchange is threatened. The problem is to make the
necessary readjustments which will enable us to respond to
such a situation without permanently distorting the structure
established by law and NSC directives. The DCI's responsibilities
when nuclear exchange is not threatened are quite unambiguous,
and this fortunately is most of the time.
A Counter-Proposal
8. Taken as a whole Henderson's proposals serve as a
catalyst in an environment which badly needs one. Some of
them are in fact highly desirable. Nonetheless they do distort
the bureaucratic structure in unnecessary and destructive ways.
We must find a way to modify them to reflect the true lines of
power and authority in Washington and to preserve the integrity
of intelligence reporting.
9. Formulation of a counter-proposal involves going back
to first principles:
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a. The concept of national intelligence has three
parts: bringing all the intelligence resources of the govern-
ment to bear on a question; providing an answer which is ob-
jective and independent of any operational filter; avoiding
duplication and contradiction.
b. This concept is embodied in the National
Security Act of 1947, in the body of doctrine that has
developed since, and most recently in the President's
reorganization directive of November 1971. These establish
the DCI as the President's intelligence officer, responsible
for producing national intelligence.
c. One of his explicitly stated tasks is the
provision of current intelligence to the President and the
NSC. Under normal conditions he does this by providing the
PDB (his personal communication) to the President and the
CIB (a national publication) to the NSC, and its supporting
staffs.
d. Under the "special case" of crisis, he supple-
ments these publications with briefings of the NSC and WSAG
(speaking personally as DCI) and with situation reports
(prepared unilaterally by CIA). It is at least partly be-
cause these are unilateral that current reporting in crisis
situations seems diffuse.
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e. Strategic warning is a sub-discipline of
current intelligence, and depends largely on the current
intelligence apparatus for its analytic base. Under normal
conditions, the DCI meets his responsibilities in this field
through the daily publications and the weekly Watch Report,
a national issuance, roughly parallel to the CIB. A crisis
which involves a large measure of strategic warning is in
turn a special case of foreign policy crisis in general.
Under crisis conditions, of this sort, the Watch machinery
can, in theory, produce frequent special reports. In fact,
for a number of reasons well put forth by Henderson, this
arrangement is no longer fully satisfactory.
f. State and DOD have national responsibilities
for operations, departmental responsibilities for intelligence.
Integration of their operations with their intelligence
centers is intended to provide better departmental support.
There is little need for separate service centers, for the
services no longer have operational responsibilities.
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g. CIA has no national operational responsibilities,
but is responsible for national intelligence. Its present
Operations Center, however, is departmental. There is no
national intelligence center.
h. If it proves necessary to provide central
management of collection systems individually managed by
various agencies, it should be done under control of intelli-
gence authorities, and specifically under the DCI. But the
DCI has no mechanism, short of USIB itself, where this can
be done.
10. This statement of principles itself identifies
several organizational shortcomings. It also points the
way to improvement in our handling of a number of the
problems laid out in para 1 above. A possible solution is
outlined in the following recommendations:
a. CIA support Hall/Henderson fully in their
departmental efforts to simplify the military structure
and develop a strong NMIC. (With NSA remaining a national
service of common concern.)
b. We superimpose on the CIA Operations Center
a National Intelligence Operations Center, with representation
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from State and DIA. A unilateral CIA element would be re-
tained. The NIOC would initially be skeletal. Under normal
conditions it would be the instrument for coordinating and
issuing the CIB, perhaps retitled the National Intelligence
Bulletin. Under crisis conditions it would be augmented
by an interagency task force to produce "National Intelligence
Situation Reports", replacing the reports now issued indi-
vidually by DIA, State, and CIA. The DCI would continue to
brief the NSC and WSAG unilaterally, but would use these
national reports as a base, as the PDB uses the CIB.
c. The NIOC would move immediately to exploit
and would be the
It would also develop
better links to collectors of "strategic-tactical" intelli-
25X1D gence,
In the future, it would expand to
provide whatever eventually appears necessary in central
T ih s paper does not attempt to judge whether NSOC can
deliver as advertised or whether it is worth the money.
It exists, and can deliver some of the elements of warning
in something close to real-t mie.
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direction of collection systems. (Its existence would make
it the logical place for such operations.)
d. The present NIC would be reconstituted as a
branch. of NIOC devoted to strategic warning, as a "special
case" of current intelligence. It would be collocated within
and supported by NMIC, but answering to the DCI through
NIOC. It would represent a USIB presence in the NMIC,
prepared to provide the NMIC that continuous judgment
on strategic warning which tactical warning demands. It
would have a small research component on warning methods,
but its analytic base would be the current analysts of
the USIB Agencies. It would not deal in reporting informa-
tion, which would be furnished by NIOC and NMIC, but in
interpretation.
e. Under normal conditions, the new NIC would
serve as a duty-hours secretariat for the Watch Committee.
The present 24-hour watch function would be handled by
NIOC and NMIC. The Watch Committee would function as at
present.
f. Under crisis conditions which raise a serious
threat of general war, NIC would be augmented to task force
status in support'of NMCC/NMIC. It would, in close coordination
with its parent USIB agencies, be prepared to revise strategic
-20-
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R pir
warning judgments continuously as new information is received.
It would also provide a channel for intelligence from all
agencies to NMCC and for requirements and operational de-
velopments to flow from NMCC. The relative weight of resources
and activities assigned to NIOC and NIC would vary according
to the scale and imminence of hostilities.
11. This proposal would rationalize USIB's crisis
management structure, while rectifying many of the shortcomings
which Henderson identifies. In relation to the developments
listed in Paragraph 1, it would:
a. Be less expensive for the government as a
whole than present and projected programs.
b. Strengthen and clarify the authority of the DCI.
c. Provide for whatever centralized control of
collection is necessary, but retain this control under the DCI.
d. Simplify, at least to some degree the current
intelligence and alerting system.
e. Provide a mechanism for serving White House needs
which might at least slow the growth of the NSC Staff.
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f. Provide a small, tightly controlled central
mechanism in civilian hands for handling sensitive intelli-
gence.
g. Link strategic warning more closely to tactical.
h. Rejuvenate the National Indications Center.
i. Maintain an intelligence voice independent of
operational considerations.
j. Provide some of the improvements Marshall is
seeking in general crisis management.
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ATTACH-11\1ENTS
National strategic warning processes are centered about the
USD3 Watch Committee operation and the DoD Indications and Warning
W
System with heavy involvement by 'the CIA Office of Current Intel-
ligence (OCI), the State Department Operations Center, the NSA
Current SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC), and various military
current intelligence activities. A description of these strategic
warning activities are contained in the following attachments.
1. USIB Watch Committee/National Indications Center (NIC)
2.. DIA National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the
_DOD -Indications System
A. DoD Indications System
_ B. Field Indications Centers
? Physical relation with Field Command Centers
C. Field Indications Centers - Reporting Mechanisms
D. Field Indications Center - Personnel
E. Field Indications Center Secure
Voice Communications Links
F. Field Indications Center - Secure Communications
G. Field Indications Center - ADP Systems
3. CIA Operations Center
4.
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5. U. S. Navy Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC)
6. DIA Strategic Posture Display Program
A-
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13 November 1972
SUBJECT: The Warning Study
1. The attached study was produced by the Chairman of
an interagency group which has been examing warning, and
specifically the interface between strategic and tactical
warning, for the past several months.
2. The Chairman of the committee is Col. Wallace Henderson
of the ASD (I) office. There are two members of the committee
from CIA, two from JCS, one from DIA, one from State and one
from NSA.
3. Most of the committee's effort has been involved in
visiting warning and operations centers. Written inputs were
submitted by some members but were confined largely to
descriptions of how the warning process works.
4. The Chairman presented the attached study, written
mostly by the NSA member, as a means of "provoking discussion"
at the next meeting. None of these recommendations have been
discussed yet by the committee, and,the Chairman is aware that
some of the recommendations are strongly opposed by members.
5. We will convene to discuss this study in the Operations
Center Situation Room on Tuesday, 14 November 1972, at 2PM with
a view to developing an agency Position and formulating counter-
proposals. We request that each recipient of this memorandum
be represented at the meeting.
Director Current Intelligence
Attachment: a/s
cu "W" by flfP R27
Exempt from fsnorad d"larwipcvt#on achedulo
of IC. p. 116m, oxomplian category.,
6* 0) (4$)) t) or 44) (Cttoie one er mare)
Nfit""*Aft flrele"ttiad on
DA. 1M %WA L"l'f?RiNiN
OWN* irn/oxeible, Insert dete or event)
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Distribution:
M
R. Le W
or
E. roc
B. Clarke
J.J. Hitchcock
M. Erns
Chief, DDP
Chief, DDS&T
Chief, DDS
H. Jenne
Bronson Tweedy, IC
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Secret
Secret
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0~0
The The United States does not now have a truly effective national
system to provide National Command Authorities (NCA) with com-
prehensive credible warning information. Warning services currently
provided the NCA are too fragmented and asynchronous to adequately
support timely selection of the best possible course of national action
to achieve, or defend, in a responsible manner, vital national interests.
The problem does not result from the lack of resources allocated to
the warning problem. Rather, there is at present a sufficiency of
such resources. The difficulty lies in the proper direction, disposition
and netting of these assets. At the present time no single center is
the point of convergence for the continuous interaction of all-source
intelligence data, information on military or diplomatic operations,
tactical warning data and national policy information and direction.
All of these elements are essential for the proper workings of an
effective national warning system. Against these standards our
present warning process can best be described as marginal.
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2. A credible and responsive national warning system to service
the NCA is essential for the proper operation of the national control
mechanism.
a. Missile flight times vary from 25-30 minutes for an
ICBM to 10-20 minutes for an SLBM. These times are too short to
permit independent time consuming verification processes by the various
national strategic and tactical warning systems. The compressed time
available for action greatly reduces the range for innovative thinking
by the NCA concerning the selection of the appropriate response options.
b. Timely coupling of strategic early warning data with
tactical warning alarms in an operational environment is essential for
warning credibility. Properly applied, valid and useable warning will
increase force survivability and provide maximum achievable NCA
flexibility to select appropriate response.
c. Experiences gained from the netting of the strategic
and tactical warning processes will provide a real-world data bank
from which to conduct realistic force planning. In this context it is
noted that present force acquisition policy is based on the assumption
of no strategic warning but bomber defense planning assumes two days
warning and NATO planning 30 days. Realistic warning experiences will
permit a more balanced approach to force planning.
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PRESENT STRATEGIC WARNING OPERATIONS
1. For some years, the United States has been developing a Worldwide
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). It has established
as a part of this system, a National Military Command Center (NMCC)
to permit central direction of U.S. military forces by National Command
Authorities (NCA). The NMCC, operated by the J3 - JCS, is the
recipient of all. operational information on U. S. forces essential for
national-level decision making.
The NMCC can communicate directly
with national command authorities, subordinate military echelons and
laterally with Washington level agencies involved in operations and
intelligence.
2. Current intelligence operations are not so well structured. Indeed,
at the national level they are more diffused tlnnat lower echelons.
The National Indications Center (NIC) of the Watch Committee is the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agent for the continuous
receipt,
assessment and reporting of strategic early warning intelligence,
It does not have timely com-
munications directly with strategic intelligence producers nor with
tactical warning processors. It cannot task nor lay requirements on
intelligence producers except through the Watch Committee, which itself
does not operate continuously. The principal efforts of the NIC are in
"Strategic and tactical warning are diffei;entiated in time from the instant
an attack is launched. Strafe z tactical warrAARrqt~eO88E F3~teas ~0 ft
instant XIR0 17s37 kQ61,QQ6gQ97Q~0 19d
~;RE1
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support of the Watch Committee effort and it is not a viable factor in
the formulation and provision of strategic early warning information
to the NCA.
3. The USIB Watch Committee, itself, performs a valuable strategic
warning function through its multi-agency periodic review- of warning
contained in overall intelligence developments. This assessment is
generally conducted on a weekly basis and however valuable such
overview by the Watch Committee may be to the NCA and participating
intelligence agencies, it is not a direct factor in the provision of
strategic early warning to the NCA. Its utility to the NMCC during
a rapidly developing crisis situation is probably low.
4. The DIA National Military Intelligence Center. (NMIC)recently
renamed from the DIA Intelligence Support and Indications Center (ISIC)
operates continuously and has direct and timely communications with
U&S command intelligence centers and the NSA National SIGINT
Operation Center (NSOC). However, it must rely on others to perform
the essential functions of source correlation, assessment, judgment
and tasking. In addition, because of secures _!comp_pas_tments, the NMIC
analyst is denied the use of some intelligence data which bear directly
on the warning problem. It is not an all-source center.
See Attachment 1 for details on the Watch Conmittee/NIC process.
** See Attachment 2 for details on the NMIC/DoD INDIC System.
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5. The NMIC also participates in the DoD Indications S ste
Y m a
confederation of 21 field indications centers collocated with major
military commands While the DIA NMIC gives national-level
guidance to the system, it neither tasks nor controls individual
center operations.
6. While the NMICs charged with providing strategic warning and
intelligence _. support to the NMCC it cannot be considered equal
the task.._. Its duty complement is spread too thin to
cover all world
areas adequately ~ _ ?
and its capability to rapidly survey target posture
is restricted to a review of Published reports or telephonic/telegraphic
consultations with other centers. If during a fast moving situation
the NMCC O '
Aerations Officer needs to know the current Soviet Navy
deployment and readiness condition his best sources for this information
are the all-source centers at either the Naval Ocean Surveillance
Intelligence Center (NOSIC) at Suitland, Maryland"
7. Indeed, this is the essence of the problem of establishing the NMI
C
s the focal
~_. point fc.a..;~Zelligence support to
the
r._. the
.._ ~.._.. _... _. _ ___
NMCC ach .
of
military departments I_as or is creating E its own center in the Washington
area - the Navy, NOSIC and FLAG PLOT; the Air Force, Crisis Manage-
ment Center; and the Army is establishing the Arm
25X1A Y Operations Center
(AO
c). The tales:
d re-'ources necessary to an effective NMIC will
I or details of Nca,,r- e
4 ` For. details of hment 5.
pp 11684 Id(qRptPii9B01737A000600070003-9
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be diluted and distributed in separate service centers. Further, each
of the services and NSA are creating or have in operation different
systems for the exchange and display of strategic warning information.
Systems commonality is essential to effect a smooth interface with
the WWMCCS system.
9. The CIA Operations Center is a continuous alert system for
receiving information and making dissemination of critical intelligence
to key CIA officials/offices, the National Indications Center and member
agencies of the USIB. The Center is staffed by a Senior Duty Officer
and three supporting Watch Officers on duty at all times plus supporting
clerical and editorial personnel. The OPS Center is housed in the
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CIA Office of Current Intelligence (OCI)= and it is responsible for
providing quick evaluation of worldwide all-source intelligence
information on a twenty-four hour basis. Incoming information
that might indicate a threat or potential threat to U. S. security is
processed immediately by the CIA Operations Center to the White
House, Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community.
In addition to the CIA Operations Center, OCI personnel are on duty
at the NIC, White House and NMCC.
10. The Department of State maintains an operations center which
is supported by a small staff of intelligence professionals. It is
postured to provide rapid intelligence /information from diplomatic
sources and is supported by a modern communications distribution
system which includes direct service to the Pentagon. A State Depart-
ment representative is available at the NMCC only during normal
working hours.
*For details of the CIA Operations Center see Attachment 3.
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PROBLEMS
1. Strategic early warning is vital to the U. S. in the preservation
and effective employment of its forces and crisis management.
Strategic early warning must derive from U. S. current intelligence
operations, but if these are not postured effectively to provide warning
or if data correlation and distribution is inhibited then we have no
assurance that strategic warning data will meet the information needs
of the NCA and of force commanders.
2. As explained earlier current warning (intelligence) operations at
the Washington level are conducted by various centers having disparate
systems, with varying levels of both timeliness and credibility. These
operations are asynchronous partly because of the nature of their
intelligence sources and partly because of center modus operandi or
capability.
3. Without a systems approach at the national level for coordination
and correlation of separate intelligence systems and center inputs,
costs will continue to increase and confidence in the availability of
strategic warning will decrease. Current and projected budget
constraints add emphasis to the fact that the United States can no
longer afford the luxury of permitting commands and agencies to
duplicate another's processes merely to assure their own credibility
or to preserve organizational prerogatives.
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4. United States strategic warning operations are hampered by the
lack of authoritative direction and established requirements. The
functioning of an effective national. warning system, however loose
or tight the administrative ties may be, depends upon the authoritative
formulation of common warning standards (including threat report
terminology and display) and a, constant review of sensor and intel-
ligence developments for application and use in the warning arena.
Unfortunately, this systems approach to the warning function does
not now exist.
5. Strategic early warning requirements are far more complex than
tactical warning requirements. The former deal with cap ilities
and intent, the latter with an act. While it has been possible to
translate specific tactical warning requirements directly into specific
intelligence systems,* the same has not been true, except very
indirectly, with strategic warning requirements.
6. When confronted with an incident with high crisis potential the
NCA and force commanders must know the disposition and readiness
condition of the opposing force and whether the prevailing situation
represents a deviation from previously observed norms. Knowledge
of enemy force readiness is one of the principal means of determining
possible intent. Intent is extremely difficult to sense and few intel-
ligence assets have been tied directly to satisfying this strategic
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ecause probability ranges broadscale,
many collectors, organizations and analysts are involved in the
strategic warning process with varying degrees of responsibility
and capability, and yet there is no single authority to'specify and
validate the warning requirement nor is there an identifiable system
tasked with the requirement. If significant improvements in capa-
bility or reductions in cost are to be made, such centralized system
management must be achieved. Finally strategic warning operations
are most efficacious when they are interacted in a timely face-to-face
manner with command operations. The present intelligence/operations
interface is plagued with security compartments, inadequate com-
munications and physical separateness to the detriment of both systems.
This must be rectified.
This has not deterred programming of resources for strategic early
warning requirements based on the most tenuous of rationale.
10
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The DIA NMIC should be assigned unequivocal responsibility far
the provision of national strategic early warning intelligence to
intelligence activities. To accomplish this task the NMIC should be
collocated with the NMCC and it must be operated on an all-source
basis. No usable intelligence should be denied the NMIC on security
_..
national command authorities, the LL""?
and the various national
grounds._ _
2. The USIB Watch Committee should continue to provide pez iodic,
authoritative judgments on broad strategic warning developments
and to serve as the sounding board where agencies can present for
review subjects having a warning connotation. Under ASD(I) DCI
guidance the Watch Committee should foster investigations leading
to the establishment of a credible strategic threat assessment
matrix to facilitate the simultaneous alarming of the nations command
and intelligence mechanisms.
Day-to-day management of the national strategic warning system ...................
NSWS) should be vested in the NMIC with the Watch Committee setting /
In this regard, we note the preliminary work done by the Rome Air
Development Center program to upgrade the DoD indications system
and the DLg Strategic Posture Display Program. See Attachment 6
for details.
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11.
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4. Military department command/intelligence centers should be
limited to a small fixed complement equipped with NMIC compatible
remote terminal displays to handle on a user basis that strategic
warning information necessary to fulfill service peculiar requirements.
To ensure achievement of this objective, the intelligence functions
and associated personnel of the Army (AOC), the Navy (NOSIC/FLAG
PLOT) and the Air Force (CMC) should be reassigned to the DIA
NMIC as its initial complement.
The NIC should be abolished with personnel assigned to the NMIC.
State, CIA and NSA Phdul'cl participate in the NMIC as they do (did in
the case of State) in the NMCC except that suca..: epresentation should
not be restricted to a liaison capacity. The s(representatives must
be responsive to the operational needs of the NMCC/NMIC and have
the means or responsibility of effecting immediate authoritative
warning judgments to support NMIC operations especially on "hot"
items. In addition,. such representation should have the authority
or capability to task, or query directly, subordinate elements of
their principals. In this regard, the NMIC should orchestrate the
entire strategic warning system in support of the NMCC with
individual components responsible for subsystem integrity and
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`f." The national strategic warning stem
,.._ _ system ('W&44S4 should be designed
so as to provide current intelligence data for crisis management,
strategic warning judgments and information to all users simultaneously
so t iat: the _
._....
nd intelligence activities are in the same
alert posture and can take action from the same levels of warning
knowledge., competition between agencies to be first to the NCA
With S7 flhotu ;t i
- _ ~ T j
__
- -
s
ot
t
jme Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)with the guidance
and consent of the Director, Central Intelligence should be made
executive agent for the fulfillment of these recommendations.ft
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ATTACHMENTS
National strategic warning processes are centered about the
USIB Watch Committee operation and the DoD Indications and Warning
System with heavy involvement by the CIA Office of Current Intel-
ligence (OCI), the State Department Operations Center,
and various military
current intelligence activities. A description of these strategic
warning activities are contained in the following attachments.
1. USIB Watch Committee /National Indications Center (NTIC)
2. DIA National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the
DoD Indications System
A. DoD Indications System
B. Field Indications Centers
Physical relation with Field Command Centers
C. Field Indications Centers - Reporting Mechanisms
E. Field Indications Center. - Secure
Voice Communications Links
F. Field Indications Center - Secure Communications
G. Field Indications Center - ADP Systems
3. CIA Operations Center
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5. U. S. Navy Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC)
6. DIA Strategic Posture Display Program
2
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The.. h-a r-tle r /&I I G 6 ~' C ' ! T LS ~v S
The - -d "ami ion of trategic w r.ning s sp ~lled out
e up the W ch Co mit -e s is
in the docum settin p a,t tc strategic
ing intellig nce mec anismj ,~, I'he intelligence com-
munity's legal ch rter (DCID 1
Watch Committee to follow strategic warning, and defines
the terms of reference as follows:
A. Name
Watch Committee of the USIB
13. Mission
To provide the United States Intelligence Board
with the earliest possible intelligence warning of
and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet Bloc
intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular
or irregular armed forces.
C. 'Functions
To obtain from all USI$ members and from
other. departments as appropriate the information
and intelligence. required by the mission of the
Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collec-
tion requirements and recommending priorities
necessary.
(2) To carry on a continuing analysis of
information and intelligence from all sources to
identify developments, patterns and trends in
Sino-Soviet Bloc activities which could provide
indications of intentions to engage in aggressive
action.
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(3: Based on the foregoing, to develop con-
clusions or provisional estimative judgments as
necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage
in aggressive action; to consider current and
prospective situations and developments which could
lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to
report promptly to the USIB the Committee's find-
ings in these matters including such divergent
views as may be recorded; and, following USIB
action to provide for dissemination to other
recipients as appropriate.
2,. With this as guidance, the Watch Committee normally
summarizes its findings, in its regular report, in the
following language:
Based on available evidence we conclude that
neither the USSR, China nor North Korea will
initiate major military action in the near future
against the US, its overseas forces or its Allies.
II. Mechanics for Handling Strategic Warnin
As noted above, the Watch Committee/National Indications
Center. (NIC) structure provides the formally established
USIB framework for handling strategic warning.
One oza-bst- &--ng feature of this structure should
be noted from the start. By and large it constitutes an
intelligence reporting mechanism superimposed on existing
current intelligence units, and it draws upon the expertise
of these units in order to arrive at its strategic warn-
ing judgments. The system t avoids the establishment
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of any sizable analytical "empires," and instead -2~ C,
upon capable and experienced analysts in existing
current intelligence offices to "take a second look,"
in the warning context.
? Thus, the Watch Committee, aided by its small staff
at the NIC, sets up a "parallel reporting circuit," a
sort of devil's advocate reporting discipline. This
"satelliting" system is designed to prod intelligence analysts in the USIB community into narrow-
ing their concentration and directing it toward one
goal -- the analysis of intelligence specifically related
to warning of enemy attack. This system includes
eliciting intelligence from appropriate analytical. units
in the field.
(s The system provides for a regular reporting dis-
cipline, through the weekly meeting of the Watch Com-
mittee which produces a regular report, and through the
system of approval of this report each week by the USIB
principals. In addition, special meetings have been
called when necessary to review more urgent indications
of, hostilities.
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IV. The Watch Committee and NIC Reporting Structure
Nature of the Committee
M7,, The Watch Committee was formed in January 1951,
shortly after the Chinese intervened in Korea. it
replaced several more limited warning groups in the
separate agencies. The National Indications Center
(NIC) was set up as its executive staff in 1954. The
goal was to create one committee/center where warning
information would come together for quick analysis.
CIA by charter provides the Chairman of the Watch
Committee. Over the years this position has always
been filled by a high-ranking CIA official, either by
the Deputy Di.rector,.or_ one of the top assistants to
the Director. Currently the Acting Chairman is Richard
Lehman, Director of Current Intelligence (the head of
OCI). He replaced Gen. Robert Cushman a year ago at
the head of the Committee.
The Committee working membership, at roughly the
Colonel level, is two members each from CIA, DIA, NSA,
and State, and one each from the FBI and the AEC. The
Director NIC has a full voice at the table, and NIC
staffers as well as officers from the service intelligence
organizations attend the meetings-as observers.
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The NIC
1i.C'The National Indications Center (NIC) itself is
a small complex located at 1E821 in the Pentagon. Its.
area houses the large conference room used by the Watch
Committee, offices for use of the analytical staff, and
ing Army and Air but no Navy rep), 9 from?CIA and 4 from
NSA, but there are none from State. Including the CIA
a Watch Center manned 24-hours.
'The NIC has a small interagency staff. There are
approximately 30 people, including 15 from DIA (includ-
civilian Director and DIA Deputy. (a Colonel), there are
12 analytical personnel. Ten people are assigned to the
24-hour Watch function.
' .,--~ The equipment consists of secure grey phone and
KY-3("green") connections, wire services, ,,a pneumatic
tube to the DIA (the relay point at the Pentagon for
much of NIC's traffic), and a COINS outlet. Other equip-
ment such as LDX, can be used at the NMCC or DIA-NMIC.
The primary function of the analytical staff is to
review indications intelligence and prepare the draft
Watch Report. The staff also carries out some research
on warning topics.
1L The NIC also produces, and disseminates widely in
the warning community, the Watch Officers' Notes (WWONS),
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a daily collection of warning intelligence items.
Most of these items are reproduced in the WONS with-
out further NIC comment.
The Reporting Cycle
/. The Watch Committee meets regularly-on Wednesday
mornings, and special meetings are called periodically--
at any time of day or night--to discuss urgent items
of warning intelligence.
~(. The reporting cycle is kicked off on Fridays by
the NIC, which sends out a Preliminary Agenda calling
attention to various developmen.ts.of possible interest
for the next week's report. This agenda is circulated
widely within USIB agencies, and DIA cables it to certain
field commands'and warning centers.
~7 The agencies turn in their contributions to NIC on
Monday, and NIC drafts the report and circulates it by
Tuesday noon. The agencies grey-phone their changes to
NIC late Tuesday.
Wednesday morning the Committee meets at NIC and
reviews the text and debates the recommended changes.
It may also discuss other warning items which are not
included in the report.
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Ve% Thursday the Watch Report is reviewed as the first
order of business of the meeting of USIB. If USIB is
not meeting, the report is coordinated telephonically.
This may take some anguished hours, because USIB prin-
cipals have to be tracked down in order to get their
personal agreement.
`U/ The final version of the report is cabled to some
field stations by CIA and to various major commands by
DIA, and disseminated in Washington Friday morning.
The Product
In Washington the report is circulated to policy
level officials within the USIB agencies and the parent
organizations. Its warning message, by nature of the
present, world situation.,.is obviously often a negative,.
"all--clear" signal, so the report.is probably not in
most'cases shown to the highest policy level officials.
On some.recent occasions, however, the report has been
shown to the Secretary of State
'7-"T'In any case, the warning message does require the
reading and concurrence of the principals of USIB--the
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tential surprise military attack on the US and intelli~-
gence concerning broader enemy strategy in any ongoing
fighting which involves US troops. _
-"I tIn addition, the system always provides the option
to USIB member agencies of calling a special meeting of
the Committee to review some possibly alarming indicator.
In the days of Colder War, those special meetings were
held at least several times a year; none have taken
chiefs of the various intelligence agencies. This
system therefore at the very least assures that the
report, bland as it may often appear, at least tells
the intelligence chiefs that the USIB's Watch Committee
has once again reviewed intelligence bearing on a po-
place since 1970.
The report seems to be well--received by certain
field elements as a good capsulized regular roundup of
potentially scarey situations.
also tend to be generally appreciative of the report as
a uniquely USTB community weekly report, and often are
quick to note nuances in the tone of the reporting.
Generally the bland quality of the report is one
of its greatest weaknesses.. This invariably results
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from the need to fall back on compromise language to
paper over major differences between agency "positions."
There can be footnotes but there usually are not.
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On occasion the TTasl Forces
a Task Force wo ked out
have also, worked directly
the summer of 1969, for ;example,
the Operations
the: reporting on the Sino-S viet dispute.
also took part di ectly in a
cussion of this siyuation, as
of a Special NIE on the t Pic
ell as in later\ONE discussions
CIA Operations Center eQ
ji The CIA Ops Center can be described as follows:
The CIA Operations Center is a continuous alert system
for receiving information and making dissemination of
critical intelligence to the Director and Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, to on-call officials in CIA, National
Indications Center (NIC), member agencies of the United States
Intelligence Board, and to such other persons as the Director
of Central Intelligence may designate.
The CIA Operations Center is set up to:
1) Operate on.a round-the-clock basis (twenty-four
hours a day, including ' Saturdays, ,Sundays, and holidays).
(With a Senior Duty Officer and three supporting Watch Of-
ficers on duty at all times.) (Plus clerical and editorial
personnel.)
2) Maintain a current record of the availability of
on-call officials in order that prompt action in the ful-
fillment of CIA mission may be -taken upon the receipt of
critical intelligence, including, as necessary, the intro-
duction of critical int.rlligence received through regular
communications channels into the CRITICOM (critic communica-
tions) system.
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Center and reviewed
hree-day Watch 'committee d,is--
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In addition to the above, the Center is responsible for:
?
A. Providing nine trained Duty Officers for
the White Uouse Situation Room, five for
the CIA desk in the NMCC, and one for NIC.
B. Maintaining a Situation Room in CIA for
presentation
U. ~. Supporting CIA's current intelligence analytic
and reporting responsibilities.
D. Providing space, facilities
and support to the Clandestine Service bDuty tOfficer.
E. Providing space, facilities and"Subst
support to crisis task forces when-suchtare
established by the DCI.
F. Providing a single round-the-clock CIA point
of contact for other US Government Operations
Centers.
The Center receives incoming cable traffic from CIA
and State Department posts directly in the Center, and has
press service tickers including FBIS. it uses LDX extensive)
and the four secure phones lines: Y,
CIA internal red line,
.grey phone, KY--3 "green," and the Air Forcer KY-9. A di
rest
telex connection i",` ~1
-ed.
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current information on US
and friendly operations and force deplc Inents.
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Secret
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