OVERHEAD IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM DURING A TRUCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002300040008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 17, 1968
• Content Type: MF

CORONA Copy No. of 77 241A
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HANULJ? VIA-1 l 1'f1Lr 1V 1 /
USIB-D-46.4/23
(COMIREX-D-25. 3/ 6)
17 October 1968
Limited Distribution
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT
Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance of
North Vietnam During a Truce
REFERENCES :
a. USIB-D-46.4/15 (COMIRE
X-D-25.3/3),
7 May 1968, Limited Dist
Memorandum for Holders
ribution and
thereof, 10 Ma
y 1968
b. USIB-D-46. 4/ 19 (COMIRE
X-D-25. 3/5)
19 July 1968, Limited Dis
tribution
c. USIB-D-64. 6/43, 16 Augu
Distribution
st 1968, Limit
ed
1. The enclosed memorandum on this subject from the Chairman,
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), and its
attachment which is a revision of the USIB-approved national requirements
for "Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance of North Vietnam during a Truce"
(reference a. ), are circulated herewith for Board consideration.
2.1 notes that the principal change to the previously
approved requiremen is is in paragraph 5. a. where the need to maintain
coverage of Route Package I and the DMZ is specified as opposed to selected
indication targets and the DMZ. He explains that this change could in the
future have a marked effect on the level of reconnaissance summarized by
COMIREX in its analysis of systems available during a truce (reference b. ).
3. This revision of national requirements for overhead imagery
reconnaissance of North Vietnam during a truce was proposed by DIA
after coordination with the JCS and has been approved by COMIREX. The
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17 October 1968
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Committee in submitting this revision also notes that the CCPC has been
charged in reference c. with developing a comprehensive intelligence plan
for the Vietnam theater under either a total bombing halt or a general cease
fire. Recognizing that these different conditions could result in a need for
COMIREX to provide an entirely new statement of requirements within its
responsibility, comments that it is possible that, after the
Board has studied the CCPC paper, a further revision may be in order.
USIB ACTION REQUESTED
4. Board Members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close
of business 25 October 1968 of their concurrence or other views on the
statement of national requirements on the subject in the attachment to
I Imemorandum, to supersede the previously approved state-
ment in reference a.
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(COMIREX-D-25.3/6)
17 October 1968
Limited Distribution
MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance
of North Vietnam During a Truce
REFERENCES: a.
USIB-D-46. 4/ 15 (COMIREX-D-25. 3/3)
7 May 1.96&, and Memorandum-for Holders
thereof, 10 May 1968, Y,inhited Distribution
b. USIB-D-46.4/19 (COMIREX-D-
25. 3/5), 19 July 1968,' Limited
Distribution
c. USIB-D-64. 6/43, 16 August 1968,
Limited Distribution
1. Attached is a revision of the national requirements for
imagery reconnaissance of North Vietnam during a truce, prepared by
COMIREX in May 1968 and approved by the Board on 10 May (reference a).
The revision was proposed by DIA, after coordination with the JCS, and
has been approved by COMIREX.
2. The.Chairman, COMIREX, notes that the principal difference
between the original paper and the revision is the omission of the require-
ment for near daily coverage of specific indicator targets. Paragraph 5 a.
is revised to specify the need to maintain coverage of Route Package I and
the DMZ, as opposed to selected indicator targets and the DMZ. The
Chairman, COMIREX, considers the Board should be aware of this change
as, if at some future date it is necessary to cover indicator targets not
contiguous to the DMZ, it could have a marked affect on the level of
reconnaissance, as summarized by COMIREX in July 1968 in its analysis
of systems available for reconnaissance during a truce (reference b).
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3. In submitting the attached revision, COMIREX is aware
of the 16 August charge laid on CCPC by the Board (reference c) and the
preliminary efforts of the CCPC to provide a comprehensive intelligence
plan for the Vietnam theater under either a total bombing halt or a general
cease fire. It is recognized that different conditions under a bombing halt
or cease fire could result in a need for COMIREX to provide an entirely new
statement of requirements for those aspects of overhead reconnaissance
within its responsibility; and it is possible that, after the Board has studied
the CCPC paper, a further revision may be in order.
4. It is recommended that the attached revision to the May 1968
requirements be forwarded to the Board for consideration.
a.irm nana
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
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.17 October 1968
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SUBJECT: Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance of North
Vietnam During a Truce (TS)
1. This memorandiin addresses the national requirements for
imagery reconnaissance over North Vietnam during a truce. Specifically,
the purpose of this memorandum is to recommend to USIB a statement of
the intelligence requirements upon which the level and mix of U. S. recon-
naissance required during a truce would be determined.
2. While certain political guarantees might be offered or truce
commissions designated as a means of policing the truce, past experience
has indicated that overhead imagery reconnaissance is an important means
of detecting non-compliance with truce provisions. In the event the U. S.
and North Vietnam enter into a truce agreement, U. S. reconnaissance
must be maintained at a level sufficient to detect any significant attempt
on the part of the North Vietnamese to take advantage of the truce to
introduce new or improved capabilities, redeploy forces, or prepare for
a surprise offensive. Such actions need to be identified soon enough to
permit necessary and timely counteraction, whether political or military,
to be taken.
3. In developing this memorandum, COMIREX has accepted, the
following assumptions as the minimum necessary to complement the level
of overhead reconnaissance of North Vietnam regarded as essential to police
the truce:
a. Reconnaissance coverage will continue over
Laos as at present.
b. No restrictions will be placed on aerial or
surface reconnaissance conducted on or over international
waters adjacent to North Vietnam.
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c. Satellite programs will continue to provide
minimal coverage of North Vietnam on the order of 265, 000
square statute miles per year with the 7-12 foot ground
resolution system (KH-4) and
Satellite coverage alone would not be sufficient to meet
our requirements during a truce.
d. Coverage of indicator targets in South China
will continue to be accomplished primarily by satellite means.
4. The extent and frequency of airborne imagery reconnaissance
directed against North Vietnam during a "cease fire" or truce period must
be consistent with the detection of five major categories of activitlr:
a. Logistical support to, and build-up of communist
forces throughout North Vietnam.
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b. Deployment of infiltration forces toward South Vietnam.
c. Introduction into North Vietnam of new offensive
weapons or other advanced systems.
d. Third party involvement.
e. Compliance with specified provisions of any truce
agreement.
5. In addition to minimal coverage expected from satellites, it
is essential that airborne imagery reconnaissance be conducted over North
Vietnam as follows-
a. It is necessary to maintain coverage of -/
Route Package 1 and the DMZ, as often as weather and operational
factors permit., during the initial period of a truce until we are
confident of North Vietnam's probable military posture as well
as during any subsequent period in which other sources indicate
the possibility of significant change in that military posture. 25X1A
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b. ' For the same reasons, it is necessary to
maintain at least weekly coverage of selected highways,
railways and border areas of the Panhandle south of 20?
north.
c. It is also necessary to obtain weekly coverage
of selected high priority railyards and ports in the northern
segment of North Vietnam which could give preoperational
evidence of the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles
or other weapons into North Vietnam.
d, For the remainder of North Vietnam, at least
twice monthly coverage of military and logistical targets to
support intelligence assessments of the nature and extent of
any baild-up in other areas of North Vietnam.
e. Monthly coverage of selected Air Defense
Facilities.
f. Coverage obtained in meeting the preceding
requirements should be programmed to meet current area
coverage requirements needed to search for the introduction
of new weapons into North Vietnam.
6. Based on past experience, weather poses the most difficult
problem in the orderly acquisition of photography of North Vietnam. It
has a particularly serious impact upon satellite coverage and, to a lesser
and varied degree, upon manned and drone reconnaissance coverage as
well. The major factor limiting high altitude photo reconnaissance is
cloud cover at the middle altitudes. While high altitude reconnaissance
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over the Hanoi area, for example, is possible only two days in June,
low altitude reconnaissance is possible on:20 days in June. Similar
anomalies between high and low altitude cloud patterns are found for the
Panhandle area and the northwest mountainous region. The average number
of days each month which are suitable for high and low altitude reconnaissance
over North Vietnam are shown in Annex A.
7. A comparison of these requirements with the expected days
of suitable weather shown in Annex A indicates that we will almost certainly
not be able to meet them in all areas for all periods of the year by high-
altitude reconnaissance alone. During periods of worst climatology, there-
fore, we should retain the capability to conduct reconnaissance below cloud
level or be prepared to accept the weather degradation to the adequacy-. of
our imagery reconnaissance.
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Average number of days each month suitable
Lao Kay Hig
h
Jan
4. 0
Feb
4. 0
Mar
7. 0
Apr
10.0
May
6.0
Jun
3.0
Jul
2.0
Aug
3.0
Sep
5.0
6.o
8.0
10.
(NW mountains) Lo
w
6. 0
5.0
9.0
11.0
12.0 9
.0
9.0
14.0
14.0
18.0
12.0
1.3.
Hanoi
Hig
h
5.3
3.5
3.8
3.6
2.8 2
.0
1.9
1.8
4.0
9.1
5.9
9.'
Lo
w
8.5
4.0
4.7
9.7
15.1 20
.1
21.3
18.7
19.5
20.5
15.5
15.:
Dong Hoi
Hig
h
5.0
6.0
7.0
10.0
5.0 3
.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
7.0
7.0
5.(
Lo
w
8.0
8.0
11.0
17.0
20.0 20
.0
21.0
19.0
14.0
15.0
11.0
10.1
Vinh
Hig
h
4.0
3.0
4.0
7.0
6.0 3
.0 .
4.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
5.1
Lo
w
6.0
8.0
4.0
11.0
18.0 17
.0
16.0
15.0
8.0
9.0
6.0
13.1
*Low Altitude: Less than 3/10 cloud cover at 3, 000 feet
-High Altitude: Less than 3/10 overall cloud cover
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USIB-D-46.4/23 25X1A
(COMIREX-D-25. 316)
17 October 1968
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Annex A
for high and low altitude photography*
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF US'IB-D-46. 4/23
SUBJECT : Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance of North Vietnam
During a Truce
REFERENCE : USIB-D-46.4/23 (COMIREX-D-25. 3/6),
17 October 1968, Limited Distribution
The attached map with the following explanation of Route Package
Number One which was referred to in the reference has been submitted by
DIA at the request of State for information in connection with consideration
of USIB-D-46. 4/23:
"In order to determine to what extent the enemy uses the
period of negotiations to improve the strength of his forces, it is
necessary to maintain, as often as weather and operational
circumstances permit, coverage of Route Package Number One
(see map). Within Route Package Number One, the two specific
road segments requiring such coverage are: (1) a portion of
Route IA along the coastline north from the DMZ to 170471 N/
106?26' E; and (2) a short segment of Route 15 leading southwest-
ward from 18?04' N/105?50' E to the Mu Gia Pass at the border with
25X1A
Laos.
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NORTH VIETNAM SOUTH OF THE 20th PARALLEL
Ban Chieng
Ha Tinh
Xom Hoai
ROUTE
PACKAGE
1
Linh
1 Ha
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