REQUIREMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE OXCART OVER SOUTH CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002300020009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 15, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT : Requirement for Employment of the OXCART
over South China and North Vietnam
REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41. 14/286 (COMOR-D-25/209)
11 March 1966, Special Limited Distribution
b. Memorandum for Holders of USIB-D-41. 14/286
15 March 1966, Special Limited Distribution
c. USIB-D-41. 14/281 (COMOR-D-25/206)
1 March 1966, Limited Distribution
1. The attached memorandum on the subject from the Chairman,
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), containing the COMOR
response to paragraph 1. b. of reference a. , is circulated herewith for
consideration by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) of the
Recommendations in paragraph 13.
2. Accordingly, the attached report is scheduled on the agenda
of the USIB meeting for 17 March 1966.
Executive Secret y
Attachment
NSAppSvooievv(sprcoMpgpeZ1:04WAF: 6ZIRME 0170
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MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
Requirement for Employment of the
OXCART over South China and
North Vietnam
1. Beginning in August 1964 the Chinese Communists began to
build up their air forces in South and Southwest China. Although this
buildup appears to have leveled off, some increase may occur later
this year when airfields on which construction was started in early 1965
are completed.
2. In June 1965 the Chinese began to introduce ground forces
into North Vietnam. So far this deployment does not appear to have
involved combat forces. The personnel are apparently engineering and
support troops with appropriate staffs and some AAA elements.
3. The foregoing actions may be either defensive or offensive
in nature. We do not have a4equate intelligence to provide the basis for
a sound interpretation. Furthermore, our intelligence is insufficient to
tell us what other actions may have been taken by the Chinese Communists
in preparation for military contingencies.
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 Chinese military activities in South China and North Vietnam
and aerial photography, However, Chinese Communist
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I and our aerial reconnaissance of the areas of con-
cern has been severely limited by a series of factors. These include:
a. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles
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4. The only sources of firm intelligence available to us on
in North Vietnam which significantly limits the area to which
the U-2 has access.
b. Conventional anti-aircraft defenses in
North. Vietnam are exceptionally strong and place a severe
limitation on the reconnaissance that can be conducted by
tactical aircraft.
c, MIG-21 aircraft deployed to bases
in South China have attempted intercepts on U-2
aircraft daring the past year, At least one reason for
this deployment is the interception and destruction of
U-2 aircraft, To date all intercepts have been unsuccessful
but have interfered with several missions by causing the
pilot to deviate from planned track. . Their increased
proficiency at high altitude intercepts presents a slightly
increasing threat
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aircraft flight over South China
has taken place since 28 November 1965. An official stand-
down was in effect from mid-December to 4 March 1.966.
V. KH-4 has been employed against: South China
and North Vietnam and has yielded some useful intelligence,
but its resolution is not. sufficient to provide the required
details concerning Chinese ground forces.
The OXCART reconnaissance vehicle has
not been used. This is an intelligence asset with excellent
photographic capabilities, and like the U--2, can react in
response to favorable weather opportunities.
5. Other forms of intelligence col.l.ection, including both clan-
destine and overt means, have very littl.e capability of providing infor. -
mati.on concerning Chinese military preparations in. South China and
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North Vietnam. If the Chinese have decided to introduce combat forces
into North Vietnam or if they feel that they may have to make such a
decision in the future, we would expect the Chinese Communists to
initiate a series of actions to facilitate the rapid deployment of sizeable
forces into North Vietnam should they believe this step necessary.
Based on our current experience it is possible that even large scale
preparatory actions may not be identified and defined on a timely basis
without high resolution photography.
6. Our most pressing requirement, therefore, is for a
current base of high resolution photography of South China and related
parts of North Vietnam to determine whether the Chinese Communists
are taking steps to facilitate a large scale introduction of combat forces
into North Vietnam. We have selected reconnaissance objectives that
should be covered (see Tab A). It is al s esseri
lance of key areas at frequent intervals to detect changes that might
indicate changes in the Chinese military position.
7. COMOR is advised with regard to clixr t~ology that there
is a significant longitudinal variation in weather, best described by an
East-West separation at 107?E longitude. West of 107?E (Southwest China)
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weather deteriorate, from eight to fifteen good days in April to six to nine
days in May and one day in June. East of :107?E (Southeast China) it
deteriorates from three to five. good days in April and May to one day in
June, A good weather day is described as Category I-II conditions, less
than 25 per cent total cloud cover at local noon. The best period for
photographic coverage of the area is from October through March and the
worst June through .August. April and May like September are transitional.
months when transient good weather areas may occur and need be exploited
on a short notice,
8. The targets of concern to this problem are spread over
such a large area and the number of expected days of good weather is so
few that. all means of acquiring high resolution photography must be
employed,
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10, The required photography could be collected by the OXCART.
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Because of its relative immunity to enemy defenses the OXCART is the only
vehicle that can be expected to collect the desired photography of the
heavily defended main routes leading from South China into the Hanoi area'
It is expected that most of the targets within the priority areas could be
covered by approximately two to three missions but that as many as six or
eight missions in Category II or better weather might be required to achieve
substantially complete coverage.
11, could be used to supplement photography obtained
by the OXCART, particularly in portions of South China where defenses
are the weakest. If the U-2 only was to be employed, it could cover the
bulk of the accessible targets in approximately three missions, but as many
as six or eight might be required in Category II or better weather to achieve
substantially complete coverage. It is not anticipated that the U-2 would be
used in North Vietnam due to the SAM threatb
aThe State COMOR member while concurring in the unique ptility of OXCART
for coverage of this target area, noted COMDR had stated in the recommen-
dations of COMOR-D-25/208 (USIB-D-41, 14/285) that: "SAC U-2 and drone
programs and theater tactical reconnaissance assets be used to provide base
line coverage of targets along the rail and road lines leading from Hanoi to
the Chinese border and to maintain continued surveillance of these lines at
approximately weekly intervals thereafter. " He believes that the above
assets could provide some of the desired intelligence though he notes that at
present there is no survivability estimate on fighter-type reconnaissance for
this immediate area.
bThe State COMOR member notes that 26 U-2 China missions have been
conducted since the last lQss to em ction, 21 of these missions being in
South China. He believes ay still serve a primary role.
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12. Conclusions: After a thorough review of the reconnaissance
objectives involved in this intelligence problem, the defenses available to
the Communists, and the reconnaissance assets available to the United
States, we believe that the problem of collecting the necessary high
resolution photography falls into three categories:
a. An important portion of the task from an
indications standpoint and the most urgent from the stand-
point of timing is to acquire coverage of the main routes of
access from Communist China into the Hanoi area. These
routes fall in large part in areas defended by surface-to-air
missiles and anti-aircraft artillary. Based on operational
factors and photographic capabilities the OXCART is the
only reconnaissance resource that can assure us of optimum
coverage of this portion of the problem during the period of
relatively favorable weather.
b. The second portion of the problem is to acquire
coverage of those reconnaissance objectives in South China
related to the activities of Chinese Communist ground forces.
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These objectives in the main lie between Kun Ming
and the North Vietnamese border and between Nan Ning
and the North Vietnamese border. A number of related
objectives, however, are spread over a wide area of
South China.
If these defenses are relatively unchanged from their
November 1965 status, most objectives in South China
could be covered by the U-2. If, however, there has
been recent improvement in defenses, the OXCART would
be the only vehicle capable of acquiring photography of the
protected areas within the time frame of the current period
of relatively good weather.
c. Once a current base of high resolution
photography has been acquired, it will be necessary to
continue a program of periodic reconnaissance to collect
photography of substantial portions of the target network
in North Vietnam and South China to keep our knowledge
current. Again the OXCART has the highest degree of
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photography. As additional knowledge of Chinese defenses
is acquired, however, it may be possible to employ the
U-2 to get much of the required photography.
13. Recommendations:a On the basis of the preceding
analysis of the problem, it is recommended that:
a. The OXCART be used immediately to acquire
the necessary current high resolution photography of North
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assurance of being able to get most of the required
Vietnam.
1).
/I'J(~L~~ sWVS/ Gi~~r.~rZp~7~ Rya IICi .
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s The OXCART an the -2 be employed in a
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i ,a-ather will allow,
a The State C M Mein Member believes t at p ans for use o
should be de cti.- th
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KH-4 be employed to the maximum
to supplement the coverage obtained under a through c.
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissancg 25X1 D
exa.mj.nation of the results of
and preparations of survivability studies on
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