RECOMMENDATIONS 18(6)(A) AND 18(6)(B) OF THE 11 JULY 1966 REPORT OF THE NSAM 156 COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002300010033-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 17, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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USIB-D-41, 12/ 23
(COMOR-D-7/51)
17 August 1966
Limited Distribution
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT : Recommendations 18(6)(a) and 18(6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee
REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41. 12/21 (COMOR-D-7/48)
14 July 1966, Limited Distribution
b. USIB-D-41, 12/22 (COMOR-D-7/49)
29 July 1966, Limited Distribution
1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),
meeting as an ad hoc group to study the subject recommendations
(circulated to USIB Principals by reference a.) in response to
paragraph 8 of reference b. , has submitted the attached report for
consideration by":the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
2. Recommendations by COMOR for Board action are
contained in paragraph 6 of the attached memorandum, along with
the footnote thereto on page 6 in which the State Member of COMOR
concurs in Recommendation 6 c. but does not concur in Recommendations
6 a. and 6 b. for the reasons set forth in Tab A hereto.
3, The attached report will be scheduled on the agenda of
the USIB meeting for 25 August 1966.
NASA Review Completed.
NRO review(s)
completed. Attachment
Executive Secret y
TOP SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
State Dept. review
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Recommendations 18(6)(a) and 18(6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee
1. COMOR, meeting as an ad hoc group for the purpose of
studying recommendations 18(6)(a) and 18(6)(b) of the NSAM 156 Committee's
report, has recognized that the intelligence community is facing a rapidly
evolving situation.in which it must continue to conduct the necessary
reconnaissance in support of priority national intelligence requirements.
This new situation is created in part by the following:
a. The successful execution over a period of
approximately six years of a satellite reconnaissance
program that has resulted in repetitive coverage of the
entire Sino-Soviet bloc and in at least one-time coverage
of over ten and a half million square miles of the earth's
surface outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The impact of a
program of this size is felt far beyond the confines of the
intelligence community.
b. The implementation of a large-scale program
leading to the establishment of a highly accurate world-wide
geodetic net which has resulted in coverage of most of the
earth's surface by DAFF photography and other applicable
photography taken by the index camera systems of recon-
naissance vehicles. .
c. The successful acquisition of spectacular
photography of large portions of the earth's surface by the
NASA GEMINI program operating on a completely unclassified
basis.
d. Publication of other unclassified photography
of the earth, moon, and Mars as a result of unclassified
programs conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union.
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e. A considerable increase in interest on the part
of other Government departments and agencies, and on the
part of the United States scientific community, in the contri-
butions that can be made to scientific and technical problems
by the use of earth sensing devices carried in satellite platforms.
This interest has led to and has been encouraged by unclassified
discussion by NASA of some of the applications that might be
considered in a NASA-operated program.
f. The growing awareness that the Soviets are
conducting a satellite reconnaissance program.
g. The publication of numerous articles in scientific
and technical journals, and in the public press, describing or
purporting to describe various aspects of the United States
satellite reconnaissance program.
2. Against this background the intelligence community has
operated a security system which appears to have been successful in
preventing the Soviet Union from adequately assessing the successes
achieved by the United States reconnaissance program. The intelligence
community has also developed an elaborate set of procedures which has
made it possible to use the information obtained by satellite reconnaissance
for a wide range of purposes without undue security risk. In view of our
success in achieving widespread use of our reconnaissance products while
at the same time maintaining essential security, we are reluctant to
recommend steps that would increase the security risk to our national
reconnaissance program without having a very clear idea of the benefits
to be obtained by such an increased risk.
3. Both the State Department representatives and the NASA
representatives consulted by COMOR have stated that they would derive
considerable benefit in the conduct of their business if they could discuss
the fact of reconnaissance at SECRET or TOP SECRET level. It is clear,
however, that all of NASA managerial problems in this regard could not
be met unless the fact of reconnaissance could be discussed on an
unclassified basis. State Department representatives also point out that
there is a risk to both the U. S. political position and to the security of the
U. S. reconnaissance program as a result of inadvertent error on the part
of personnel who are not aware of the fact of our reconnaissance program
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or the requirement to keep it secure. The Department's representatives
feel that if the necessary U. S. officials could be informed of and could
refer to the fact of reconnaissance on a SECRET or TOP SECRET basis,
they would be prevented from making these inadvertent mistakes. The
State Department's position is supported to some extent by the practice
of TALENT Security Officers who warn uncleared intelligence personnel
who may have engaged in dangerous speculation concerning the U. S.
program. The warning amounts to tacit confirmation of the fact of the
existence of a U. S. reconnaissance program.
4. At the present time the Department of State (less ACDA
U. S. satellite reconnaissance program. NASA has a total of 124 cleared
for these same categories. Since the admission of the fact of U. S. recon-
naissance at the SECRET or TOP SECRET level is an action that cannot
be reversed, we believe that it would be advisable first for the State
Department and NASA to see if the internal managerial problems causing
them to favor the release of this information could be handled by granting
an increased number of T-KH clearances to key personnel in their
departments. If after an adequate practical test this approach does not
solve the problem, we believe that the intelligence community should
consider authorizing TALENT Control Officers to brief selected personnel
at the TOP SECRET or SECRET level concerning the fact of U. S. recon-
naissance. This has already been accomplished in the case of briefings
given to NATO members and certain heads of State.
TALENT-KEYHOLE information and thus have some knowledge of the
and AID) has a total of 173 personnel who are cleared for
5. Recommendation 18(6)(b) concerns the use of T..KH photography
by NASA and asks that the problem be examined in terms of the selective
removal of appropriate photography from codeword control or, alternatively,
clearance of an increased number of NASA personnel in order that they may
use the photography under existing codeword controls. In our examination
of this problem we have concluded that it is too early to decide the optimum
manner for NASA to exploit KH photography. We have concluded instead
that the problem should be approached on a step-by-step basis and that the
nature of the final step should be determined at a later date on the basis of
experience acquired in the completion of the intervening steps. We can
foresee at least the following at this time:
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a. Clearance of a panel of personnel, selected by
NASA, representing all of the various disciplines of interest
to NASA, this panel to be thoroughly briefed in the material
now under codeword control and on the various exploitation
efforts currently being employed by cleared personnel.
b. If after Step No. 1, NASA and the intelligence
community conclude it to be desirable, Step No. 2 would be
the establishment of a TALENT-KEYHOLE center at NASA
headquarters and possibly at the NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center at Houston. This would permit NASA to receive its
own, copy of reconnaissance materials collected within the
KEYHOLE system and would enable them to request the
clearance of additional numbers of personnel to study the
products and to become thoroughly familiar with both the
products and exploitation procedures under codeword control
to determine if further exploitation by NASA is desirable or
feasible.
c. Step No. 3, the exact nature of which cannot
be determined at this time, would be developed on the basis
of experience required under Steps 1 and 2 above and might
include the development of procedures for the sanitization,
decontrol, downgrading, or declassification of certain types
of KEYHOLE material, the actual sanitization or downgrading
to be accomplished by NASA within the TALENT-KEYHOLE
centers established under Step No. 2 above as approved by the
DC I.
6. >'-c* Recommendation. It is recommended that:
a. To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156,
18(6)(a), the Department of State and NASA select an increased
*It should be recognized that any relaxation of strict security controls to
accommodate NASA would also apply to other Government agencies who
have similar needs for wider use of reconnaissance products.
**See footnote on following page.
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number of key personnel for clearance in the TALENT-
KEYHOLE system to see if the risk of uninformed
discussion can be controlled by this means.
b. COMOR review the situation at the end of
six months to determine whether the problem has been
solved or whether there should be a briefing of additional
persons at the TOP SECRET or SECRET level.
c. To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156,
18(6)(b), NASA be invited to select a panel representing those
scientific and technical disciplines of interest to NASA to be
cleared for access to TALENT-KEYHOLE information in
order that they may study current TALENT-KEYHOLE materials
at NPIC and exploitation procedures used by NPIC, the Mapping,
Charting, and Geodesy community, etc., and make recommen-
dations to NASA concerning the desirability of increased NASA
participation in the TALENT-KEYHOLE program.
Chairman
*The State Member concurs in recommendation 6c as a means of providing
further clarification of NASA needs and closer coordination with the
intelligence community. He agrees to this first step without prejudice to
the Department's previously stated position concerning the selective decontrol
of satellite reconnaissance products. For reasons set forth in Tab A, the
State Member does not concur in recommendations 6a and 6b, believing that
removal of the fact of a U. S. satellite reconnaissance program from codeword
control would enhance our political and security interests.
Attachment:
Tab A
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Tab A
Department of State Comment on
Recommendation 6a of NSAM 156 Committee Report
The State Member believes it is increasingly clear that the system is
diverging from its original purpose, and that the divergence is likely to
grow in the next five years or so.
At the time of the September 1960 Presidential Directive there was a
critical need to hold very closely all evidence of the operation and the
product in order to conceal the existence of the program. At that-time.the
U-2 incident was still fresh, and it was prudent to impose elaborate controls
over products in order to keep the fact that the program was getting under
way from becoming another international cause celebre. At the time the U. S.
was concerned lest any revelation of the fact of a satellite reconnaissance
program lead to Soviet efforts 1) at interference, 2) at camouflage, or 3) to
use it to bring pressure on the U. S. to desist or to embarrass the U. S. at
international forums. Thus, the objective of the elaborate measures begun
in 1960 was to exercise careful control over the knowledge of the fact of
satellite reconnaissance in order to prevent leaks and premature disclosures
from interfering with a long range goal of getting the Soviets to accept
satellite reconnaissance as a fact of life, and ul timately as a legitimate and
perfectly legal activity.
Thus, the original purpose for elaborate control of the fact that the
program existed was to protect the program from adverse foreign, and
especially Soviet, reaction. Today that purpose would be better served by
a far less restrictive classification on the fact that the program exists. The
danger today is not of clandestine compromise of the simple fact of space
reconnaissance, but of ill-considered public statements. The Soviets know
we have a program; no one is concealing the fact from Brezhnev or from the
readers of his speeches. It is important to protect the program from public
statements which could elicit adverse foreign reactions or generate pressures
for disclosure of detailed information.
A large and growing number of American officials who are not privy
to the T-KH system know or can very reasonably infer that there is an
American satellite reconnaissance program. What they do not know is that
they are not supposed to talk about it, and they may not understand how
considerations arising from that program bear upon their own work.
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Tab A
One suggestion mentioned at the COMOR meeting was to clear many
more people. This seems imprudent, and even self-defeating to the purpose
of compartmentalization. Many of the people in the increasing number of
civilian agencies which are developing an interest in satellite photography do
not have a need to know the highly sensitive aspects of the T-KH system.
And some may for a variety of reasons not qualify for clearance to T-KH
materials.
It seems much more logical to adjust the classification to meet the
needs. Namely, the State Member suggests a SECRET classification for
these three propositions: 1) the U. S. has a classified satellite reconnaissance
program, 2) because this program is a valuable national security asset,
details are kept highly classified and are not available to personnel without
special clearances, and 3) it is a matter of national policy that the subject of
satellite reconnaissance not be discussed in public by American officials.
Another suggestion made at the COMOR meeting was for a sort of
junior T-KH clearance, consisting of a statement about the fact that the
program exists, to be read to individuals whose names would be recorded.
Upon reflection, we are convinced that this would be needlessly restrictive.
We believe that it would be much more useful to permit reference to the
existence of the American program to appear in classified papers as
required. This will be useful here in State as well as in other agencies
where considerations of how certain programs or policies may touch upon
the reconnaissance program will have to be reviewed. We believe that
clarity in internal government papers at the SECRET level will be extremely
useful in assuring that the national interest in the reconnaissance is borne
in mind by those who might otherwise neglect that consideration. The fact
of satellite reconnaissance is already known at the SECRET level; the State
Member believes that we are not contributing materially to security by
keeping specific reference to the existence of a U. S. program from being
made at that level, so much as we are risking muddling questions on which
we have the greatest interest in clarity.
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