RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION ON RECOMMENDATION 6.A. AND B. OF THE NSAM 156 COMMITTEE REPORT OF 11 JULY 1966 (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050030-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 4, 1966
• Content Type: MF

Approved For ReIe se 2004/'1'V7,; A0i' l 1709AOW000050030-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Recommended CIA Position on Recommendation
6.a. and b. of the NSAM 156 Committee Report
of 11 July 1966
1. The NSAM 156 Committee recommends guidelines and principles
to further the activities of the NASA and other Government agencies
in the non-military applications of satellite earth sensing. Recom-
mendations 6.a. and b. of the report asks USIB to review:
a. The matter of lifting codeword controls over
references to a US operational satellite reconnaissance
program in order to permit explaining at the SECRET or TOP
SECRET level to Government personnel concerned with non-
military satellite earth sensing programs the reasons for
certain limitations on the areas in which they should concern
themselves.
b. The matter of either selective removal of certain
photography from codeword control for classified use by
selected NASA and other cleared personnel or, alternatively,
the clearance of an increased number of personnel for code-
word materials.
2. After consideration of a wide range of Agency opinions on
these questions, we recommend that, for the time being, both the
fact of an operational satellite reconnaissance program and the
photography derived therefrom should remain within the TALENT-KEYHOLE
compartment and that additional clearances be granted to NASA or other
agencies as needed for understandings of the programs or for use of
the product.
3. Within the Agency, three distinct positions emerge: one,
(primarily OCI) favors downgrading to SECRET or TOP SECRET both the
existence of and products from satellite reconnaissance. A second
position (O/DD/I) proposes decontrol to TOP SECRET of only the fact
of satellite reconnaissance while retaining the imagery product
within the T-KH security compartment. A third position (primarily the
Office of Security) is for retention of the existing procedures and
controls.
NRO review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2004/07.~,gZ I-~p~Z9BD ' " -
11 ~~((~1 LL~~'' 1K[~L~rr~ _
I.--L_ COP Of env
25X1
25X1A
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004 : J f .F1 Q1709A0UQ00050030-3
4. The downgrading to SECRET or TOP SECRET of both the existence
of the program and its products would permit publication of the
product without resorting to sanitization processes. The proponents
of this position argue that the product derives from a program about
which much already has been published in the press. However, relax-
ation of security limitations on the product to this extent presents
too great a risk regarding possible compromise of the accomplishments
of the collection system. Decontrol only of the fact of the program
would permit briefing of personnel holding a TOP SECRET clearance
and thus provide some limits on speculation about the existence and
use of the satellite reconnaissance program. However, limiting the
downgrading to the TOP SECRET level would not open the reconnaissance
door to a significantly greater number of Government employees, and
to downgrade to the SECRET or below level imposes an unacceptable
degree of risk of compromise. The retention of both the fact of
and product from satellite reconnaissance programs within the T-KH
compartment offers the greatest assurance of continuing protection
of this valuable intelligence source and of fulfilling the Director's
responsibility for protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Additional T-KH clearances to NASA and other agencies will assist in
controlling speculation and in furthering understanding of reasons
for limits on unclassified earth sensing programs without destroying
a means for continued application of the need-to-know principle.
We believe the CIA position on this question must place greater
weight on the Director's statutory responsibility for protection of
the system, rather than on the greater convenience which downgrading
and decontrol would provide.
5. It is pertinent to report at this point that during the
concurrent COMOR considerations of these problems, a NASA repre-
sentative stated that although decontrol of the fact of the program
would help them within the Government and with a few of their con-
tractors, NASA's major problems with classification stem from work
with non-cleared (and perhaps unclearable) foundations, universities
and the general scientific and academic communities. Therefore, any
compromise measure, other than complete declassification,will not
really solve NASA's principal problem.
6. This memorandum has been concurred in by the DD/S&T, the
Office of Security for the DD/S, the CIA Director of Reconnaissance
DD/I Collection Guidance Staff
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2UWOW6~ET