MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE 303 COMMITTEE, 11 MAY 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A001900060034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: May 12, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

S+' Y ' !:.... Li.'
Approved For Releal 04 4/1'3' A-RDP79$0' 109A0
12 May 1966
NRO review(s) completed.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 11 May 1966
Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Vance, and
Admiral Raborn
Also
Also resent were General Maxwell D. Taylor,
and Dr. Albert Wheelon
1. A wide ranging"discussion took place on various aspects o
dealing with the possible deployment of OXCART.
of these targets had not been attempted. The acceptability of the fact
North Vietnam was well summarized statistically, a qualitative analysis
2. It became apparent that although the target breakdown for
General Taylor felt that a statistical and qualitative
analysis should also be done for the South China targets in order to
b
in
o
ta
a more complete picture. General Taylor also made the point
question.of surprise attack by China rather than tactical improvements
4. Mr. Rostow raised the question of whether if the decision
Md
were made to bomb POL in North Vietnam, this would have the corollary
effect of raising Rur requirements for observation. Mr. Vance thouught
he
.
answer was yeas. General Taylor rest that the bombing of POL in
No
h
n
rt
Viet
am was not a consideration in the deployment of OXCART.
=insert: but pointed out that you would have
-to weigh;aaainst that need the increased risk
discussed in paragraph 5 of SNIE 10-2-66
"Reaction to Po ssibl pgr?yet f AeJ (A QQ44Q4/*13 :
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u
the Japanese aspects with his co eag
with its traditions pr p
Johnson said this was a puzzler, and he wanted to think and discuss
es
11
e
ments for emergency landing rights. L'"
1 o rietary interest in Okinawa. Ambassador
eminded the principals that they should
l
or r
ll. General Tay
not forget to address themselves to the basic question: Is now the
best time for deployment?
1 on did the meeting decide? First,
8. Ambassador Johnson made the point that the principals had.
not sufficiently addressed themselves to cover and contingency prob-
lems. The elaborate cover plans were to a'.certain extent self delu-
sory. It was one thing for, the pilot to have memorized a set story
but quite another for the U.S. Government to know exactly how 'it felt
and what it was going to say.
be a more propitious time?
ment is there any other better t me
30 day stretch as the sa --
Taylor raised the question: If we are going to make a covert deploy
i than right now? Will there ever
t
Admiral Raborn underlined the fact a
f t time factor for a deployment. General
ApproveCpr Releasj 4/ L1 tJ4-RDP79F 09A001
1 Ambassador Johnson raised the question: Why do we make
the decision now if the recommendation is for a September deployment?
h t he had always stuck to the
carrc+rarv queried whether the camera complex
now avaiiaDie was i,.,f- ?.a- o~-r----
. The retort was, yes, there was a marked improvement in
systems. in the OXCART system.
E five Secretary indicated a major factor in the
c
u
1Q.. The xe
deployment decision would be the negotiations with foreign govern
rticularly cited Japan
U
Amba %e .P qt (ease 2004/04/13:
12. What then, in cone usi , question in regard
there would be a qualitative judgment on the target q
, .,A .,,.a1 i restive iudament on the
to North Vietnam and a aLaulo- - ~--- z--- - Second, the
target problem in south China.
principals would do their homework on just what posture the USG would
s., ~osnrr~ to deployment of OXCART
and its planned uses. T r ,
ni,4,,ama that might arise with Japan.
take (i.e. contingency 3 tea. ~w~.. -
U-1 d Ambassador Johnson would explore the
e
would be in a better position to pos
problems surrounaing depivywc....
When the aforementioned problems have been assessed, then the Committee
thaentire problem to higher
authority.
Distribution
25X1