OXCART DEPLOYMENT PROPOSAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A001900060032-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORT

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NRO review(s) completed.
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COPY OF
OXCART
Deployment Proposal
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I, There is a critical need for adequate intelli-
gence to detect possible Chinese Communist
strategic buildup in South China and North
Vietnam which might lead to their direct in-
volvement in the Vietnam war.
A. In order to obtain this intelligence we must
acquire coverage on targets in South China
and North Vietnam, chiefly ground force
installations, major complexes and key
lines of communication. In all, there are
166 targets, 137 in South China and 29 in
North Vietnam on which we need a data
base and thereafter selective periodic
surveillance coverage. (The highest pri-
ority area for coverage is shaded in red
on the accompanying maps,)
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II, What resources are we now committing to
this collection effort?
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III. Our present photographic reconnaissance ef-
fort is good, but not as good as it could be,
A. As you know, baseline coverage lies at
the heart of all photographic intelligence.
By photographing all key areas within a
given time frame, we can establish apoint
of departure for spotting possibly signifi-
cant changes at a future time in the same
areas. To date our baseline coverage
is by no means complete for South
China. What we do have is spotty in terms
of detail and resolution. For example we
may know that a particular military base
is operational, but we may not be able to
discern what equipment is parked around
the area.
1. Because the Chinese are increasingly
resorting to diversionarytactics such
as camouflage, dispersal, and the use
of dummies, the degree of detail in
our base line and surveillance pho-
tography is now more important than
ever.
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3. The BLUE SPRINGS program is
carried out by drone photographic
aircraft, operating over portions of
South China but primarily over North
Vietnam.
N. Despite their excellence, all of these systems
are limited.
2. The U-2 aircraft system, operated
by SAC under the program code name
TROJAN HORSE, is used primarily
over North Vietnam and is not au-
thorized to operate over Chinaproper,
although it occasionally obtains some
oblique coverage of South China from
across the border.
A. The tactical jets and the drones are vul-
nerable in varying degrees not only to
enemy fighters but also to both conven-
tional AAA and to SAMs.
B. The U-2s can be downed by SAMs and,
under some circumstances, by MIG-21s.
C. While the satellites are not vulnerable to
enemy attack, their success depends
largely on weather. They cannot seek out
breaks in cloud cover; our capability to
adjust their flight paths is limited.
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D. Let me summarize our experiencewiththe
four basic programs from October 1,1965
to April 23, 1966.
V, Adding the OXCART to the existing combina-
tion of systems would give us undeniable ad-
vantages.
A. The OXCART, like the satellites, is vir-
tually invulnerable to fighters and sur-
face-to-air missiles. It can cover high-
priority targets now denied to U-2s and
tactical photo reconnaissance aircraft.
g, Unlike the satellites, OXCART can pro-
gram coverage when there are sudden
openings during periods of sustained bad
weather-and weather is a prime con-
sideration in South China and North
Vietnam.
2. From this experience I conclude that
the reconnaissance tasks which we
need to accomplish in South China and
North Vietnam are unlikely to be
achieved successfully if we must con-
tinue to rely solely onthe assets which
we are currently using.
C. It is bad now, and will be particularly bad
from June through September.
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Chan-C1~ang o
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D. This map shows the number of days in May when the weatherman
predicts days with 25 percent or less cloud cover, in various
areas of China and Vietnam. The grey tone shows the area
where there will be three days or less in the course of the
month.
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 BURM.
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Gha~r-c~~ang
.--
SOUTH CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:
Days with 15/ or Tess Cloud Cover
in June
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the entire area promises
In June, with the onset of the monsoon, hoto ra h
less than three days of weather suitable for p g P Y?
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HHA~NNDLE V
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Chan-c Kiang ~`,~_
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FiAGAO
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HONG KONG
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SOUTH CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:
Mean Date of Onset of the Southwest
Monsoon
.'t~1
Shao-kuan
4GG
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E. This map shows the approximate time when the oncoming
southwest monsoon can be expected to preclude most possi-
bilities of photography over the various areas. From June
through September, there will be a little good reconnaissance
weather in the area,
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+ng-hsa
Nan-nin~
24 Hours inter
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12 Hours La~~r
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F. There may be one or two days a month,
however, when a large hole or "bubble"
will open in the overcast and permit
photography. These "bubbles" are rela-
tively predictable to the weathermen, and
this picture shows a hypothetical bubble,
at 12-hour intervals, as it is blown across
China from west to east.
1. In past years we have been able to
anticipate these peepholes and exploit
them with a U-2. The reconnaissance
satellites, with their predetermined
orbits, cannot be programmed to take
advantage of these bubbles. A manned
aircraft is the only vehicle that can
use these openings to gather some
data-base data and changes from
the base-on the Chinese military
posture.
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VI. In short, we are facing a period of over ~ all on his side-the
will have an importan y
potential enemy
weather. This weather screen will retard our collection of
knowledge on his homeland. There may bf the targge g we
weather days, however, to lbase f weraugment present assets
need for our photographic loft
with a reliable quick-reaction capability that can exp
limited weather openings.
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OXCART AIRCRAFT
..Knots
~R ~~i~u~e ..__~___-----=--------~. X4,000 Ft. Plus
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VII. The quick reaction reconnaissance asset that could do much
to help us is the OXCART, shown in this photograph.
A. This is an aircraft that can fly over denied areas at
more than three times the speed of sound, and at alti-
tudes in excess of 84,000 feet.
1. It has demonstrated that it can provide high-
resolution photography of a swath 50 miles wide.
B, There are three of these aircraft ready to go, manned
by qualified civilian pilots, under CIA control.
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? 2 HANGARS
? EQUIPMENT 8~ CAMERA LAB BLDG.
? OPERATIONS COMPLEX
? COMMUNICATIONS COMPLEX
? HOUSING MESSING FACILITIES
? FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES
? ALL FACILITIES ARE OPERATIONALLY READY
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C. We have pre-positioned
pounds of equipment at Kadena.
D. The operational, housing and messing facilities are ready.
Shop equipment, spare parts, motor vehicles, and POL
supplies are in place.
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DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
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E. This chart shows the time required to begin operations after
the authority is given to proceed. We estimate that on author-
ization to use the OXCART, the aircraft could begin operations
over target areas in about 3 weeks.
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 Total Time
4x49. Hrs,
Total Distance
5427 NM
Time over Denied Terr.
:45 Min.
Target's covered: i2
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SOUTH CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:
Sample Flight -Track over DRV
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F, Here is a sample flight path for the OXCART, restricted to
North Vietnamese territory. This one covers 12 critical
targets in 45 minutes over the denied area.
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Total Time 4:D2Hrs:
Total Distance 4316 NM
Time over Denied Terr. :2b Min.
Time over China :05 Min.
Ta~'~!e~s covered.? 33
?,Critical target
r
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SOUTH CHINA/NORTH VIETNAM:
Sample Flight Track
o`v'er Communist China and DRV
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Statute Miles
30G
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1. With a minor penetration of South China, a flight track could
cover 33 targets in just 26 minutes over North Vietnam and
five minutes over South China.
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VIII. The OXCART aircraft is virtually invulnerable
to enemy action, and it has the capability to
react quickly to meet the few good weather
openings-like the "bubble" effect-that we
are going to have to depend upon if we are to
continue our surveillance of the Chinese from
June through September.
A. We believe, therefore, that the use of
OXCART affords the best possibility of
obtaining early warning on any Chinese
Communist intervention in Southeast Asia.
IX. We have considered the probable reactions of
other countries to the use of OXCART. The
problem has been studied specifically by the
United States Intelligence Board, and a Special
National Intelligence Estimate has been pub-
lished on this subject. A copy is available for
your perusal.
A. In Summary, the estimate concludes that
the Chinese Communists would not take
any drastic new military action. They
might think at first that the United States
was seeking target intelligence to be used
at an early date. We feel, however, that
the Chinese Communists would soon come
to regard this vehicle as merely another
vehicle in the continuing United States
collection program.
1. The Chinese would probably refrain
from revealing the successful over-
flight of Chinese territory, as they
have done in the case of successful
U-2 flights. If an aircraft came down
in China, however, there would be a
major political and propaganda out-
cry.
B. We believe that the North Vietnamese also
would show no significant reaction to the
use of OXCART.
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C. The primary concern of the Soviets would
be to forestall the use of the aircraft over
Soviet territory. Theywouldprobablysup-
port any Chinese Communist or North
Vietnamese propaganda campaigns, but
would certainly not make it the cause of
a major crisis in US-Soviet relations.
D. Japanese leftists would probably try to
arouse fears of Japanese involvement in
North Vietnam or in direct action against
China. The Japanese Government could
probably deal with the situation, but if an
aircraft were brought down and Peking
exploited the incident intensively, Tokyo
might feel forced to ask the United States
to discontinue the program.
F, In other countries around the world, there
would be some sharp criticism if an air-
craft were lost, but nothing approaching
the outcry over the U-2 affair in 1960.
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X,
It is my recommendation that, as a first step,
OXCART be deployed to Kadena, and that it
be employed to acquire photography of North
Vietnam.
C.
D,
I believe that the need to proceed with
OXCART is clear and demonstrable.
in closing: The
Let me simply say
OXCART is the best reconnaissance sys-
et of the
t
cisiononthis recommenda-
rable de
f
arg
tem we have. China is a
To use less than thebes
it
A,
avo
A
'n the near future will give us
tion now or i
uire experience in
an opportunity to acq
operational use of the aircraft, andtotest
Chinese Communist reaction to its pres-
y.
highest prior
this restless potential
now in observing
enemy would be incautious. To use ess
than the best would not be commensurate
with the existing degree of our national
ence in the theater.
B. If, as now appears likely, the U-2 pro-
gram will not succeed in acquiring the
necessary coverage of the targets within
South China, a further recommendation
will be submitted concerning the use of
OXCART in that area.
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involvement and risk in Vietnam.
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