REQUIREMENTS FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A001900060013-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 5, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Relea
5 December 1967
SUBJECT: Requirements for Photographic Reconnaissance of
North Vietnam
1. For some time the intelligence community has been
maintaining a special watch for evidence of the introduction of
offensive missile systems including cruise missiles with a capability
against U. S. Naval Forces into North Vietnam. Concern for this
problem became so great in the Spring of 1967 that the BLACK
SHIELD Project was authoriz(-d in an attempt to meet what were
considered to be the essenti Ll requirements for the collection of
photography pertinent to this problem. The requirement originally
envisaged coverage of nine targets in North Vietnam and on the
North Vietnamese-Chinese border on as near a daily basis as
possible and the weekly coverage of the rest of North Vietnam.
Although all available reconnaissance assets including BLACK
SHIELD were employed against this requirement, it was never
actually met. The BLACK SHIELD Project did acquire photography
of substantial portions of North Vietnam on several occasions, and
coverage was so extensive that it far outweighed the contribution
made by all other reconnaissance systems on this and other
intelligence problems.
2. Recently COMIREX reviewed the requirements for
coverage of North Vietnam and revised them somewhat. The
results of this review were noted by USIB on 24 November 1967.
The revised requirement reduced to five the number of targets
requiring near daily coverage, listed four targets requiring weekly
coverage, and selected two broad areas of North Vietnam for
priority coverage weekly. It was believed that the remainder of
North Vietnam should be covered every three weeks. Although this
is a reduction in the formal requirement, there will probably be
substantial periods during which it will not be met by all combined
reconnaissance assets.
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3. The employment of BLACK SHIELD and other
reconnaissance assets - especially BLACK SHIELD - against the
offensive missile problem has caused a substantial increase in
the confidence with which ,.%.!e can evaluate information bearing on
this critical problem. In view of the course of the war and the
posture of the Soviet Union and Communist China in support of
North Vietnam, the possibility of the introduction of offensive
missiles remains an attractive communist option that we must
guard against.
4. In addition r., the search for evidence of the intro-
duction of offensive missiles, we remain concerned with the presence
of large numbers of Chinese Communist engineers and anti-aircraft
troops in North Vietnam,
rW- - _
the evidence, however, might well come from photography of the
main lines of communication from Communist China to Hanoi. The
rail transfer points and storage areas on the North Vietnamese-
Chinese border are critical targets in this problem. These targets
also provide useful current information concerning the shipment of
war materiel from Communist China into North Vietnam.
5. The broad coverage provided by the BLACK SHIELD
Project has not only provided photography pertinent to the problems
described above, but it has also provided unique support to tactical
operations. It has been possible to observe the status of the great
majority of the surface-to-air missile firing units in North Vietnam
in the course of a single BLACK SHIELD mission. This information
is now process ed on a priority basis because of its value in
assessing North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile capabilities and
AOB for use in planning U. S. strike operations. The photography
has also been of great value in providing current information on the
status of U. S. strike targets in North Vietnam. The BLACK SHIELD
photography has reduced the requirement to expose vulnerable
reconnaissance aircraft to collect necessary bomb damage assessment
photography and has made it possible to assess the status of target
systems rather than individual isolated targets. For example, BLACK
SHIELD photography made it possible to learn that North Vietnamese
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railroad rolling stock was considerably more numerous than our
previous estimates had indicated.
6. Our requirements for coverage of the SAM defended
portion of North Vietnam will not be met by any combination of
reconnaissance assets without the inclusion of BLACK SHIELD.
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ILLEGIB
the attached was prepared by this office as a
result of the State Department's stand at the
303 Committee. he State Department wishes
restatement of the validity of NVN require
xtents in order to weigh these against the possible
political repercussion of trespasses over China.
This is an open memorandum, without addressee,
as it does not purport to be a consensus but was
a means of conveying some information to OSA.
I I
CO i w , a
Room 6E22 6 Dec 6?
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