COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B01709A000800020004-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 21, 2003
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 23, 1969
Content Type:
MIN
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COMIREX-M - 61 25X1 A
23 January 1969
Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)
Page 19 NRO Satellite Launch Schedule, KH-4B,
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COMIREX-D-13, 16/2 --
Note--this paper was is ributed as 14. 6/2 in error)
Section VI (Other Business)
Page 22 Changes in COMIREX Membership
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Tabs
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Page 23 Tab B - Coverage of North Vietnam
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23 January 1969
Section I (Approval. of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)
Approval of Minutes
1. The Executive Secretary apologized for the fact
that COMIREX-M-59 and 60 had not been disseminated in time
for the 23 January meeting.
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Operational Briefing--Satellite
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2. 1 reported on satellite operations 25X1
and scheduling as lollows:
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CORONA
1106 - Scheduled 5 February 1969
Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 13 February 1969, 1730L
Estimated 2iad bucket recovery - 20 February 1969, 1730L
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23 January 1969
Film processing/distribution:
Estimated arrival 1st bucket at Eastman Kodak - 14 Feb, 13001,
Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 17 Feb, 11001,
Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 2 in D. C. - 18 Feb, 1100.1.,
Estimated arrival 2nd bucket at Eastman Kodak - 21 Feb, 13001..
Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 1 in D. C. - 24 Feb, 11001,
F..st;mated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 2 in D. C. - 25 Feb, 11001,
Projected stereo coverage:
1st bucket - Land area - 1. 68 million sq. n. in.
Targets - 2,400
2nd bucket - Land area - 1. 68 million sq. n. m.
Targets - 2, 400
1050 - Scheduled 19 March 1969
Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 27 March 1969, 1730L
Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 4 April 1969, 1730L
Film processing /distribution:
Estimated arrival 1st bucket at Eastman Kodak - 28 March, 13001..
Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 31 March, 11001,
Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 1 April, 11001,
Estimated arrival 2nd bucket at Eastman Kodak - 5 April., 13,001,
Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 1 in D. C. - 8 April, 11001_.
Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 2 in D. C. 9 April, 11001.
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Projected stereo coverage:
1st bucket - Land area - 2.80 million sq. n.m.
Targets - 2, 400
2nd bucket - Land area - 2, 80 million sq. n. m.
Targets - 2,400
1051 - Scheduled 7 May 1969
Estimated lst 'bucket recovery - 15 May 1969
Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 23 May 1969
1107 - Scheduled 9 July 1969
Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 18 July 1969
Estimated 2nd. bucket recovery - 27 July 1969
Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East
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3. The DIA and CIA members reported a continuing 25X1A
standdown of FOOD FAIR and IDEALIST/TACKLE missions over
GIANT SCALE activity between 17 and 23 January.
4. In the 17-23 January period, nine low-level BUMPY
ACTION missions were flown without a single loss. Details are
shown below:
the mainland of China. added that there had been no
COMIREX-M-61
23 January 1969
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DATE MISSION NO.
17 Jan Q822 I(Low)
18 Jan Q865 (Low)
19 Jan Q878 (Low)
19 Jan Q874 (Low)
20 Jan Q871 (Low)
COMIREX-M-61
23 January 1969
AREAS/TARGETS RESULTS
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DMZ, Rte lA Successful, MARS
Kep Afld, Haiphong Naval Base,
Haiphong Port Fac, Haiphong RR
Sta & Yd Successful, MARS
DMZ, Rte LA, Dong Hoi Afld Successful, MiUS
SAM Sites 55, 253, 70, 66 Successful, MARS
SAM Son Coastal Def Site,
Bai Thuong Afld, Thanh Hoa
Transp Pt, Rte 1A, Vinh Afld Successful, MARS
22 Ji'.i Q872 (Low) Ha Tau Boat Rpr Fac, Hon Gai
Port Fac, Haiphong Port Fac,
Haiphong RR Sta, Kien An Afld Successful, MARS
22 Jan Q869 (Low) Ben Thuy Transp Pt, Seg 5,
Vinh Wtwy, Wtwy 5A and 5B,
Rte IA, Rte 15, RR 7,
Dong Hoi Afld
Successful, MARS
23 Jan Q857 (Low) Seg Rte lA, Nam Dinh Tpp,
Nam Dinh Transp Pt,
Ninh Binh RR Br, Thanh Hoa Cply Successful, MARS
23 Jan Q874 (Low) SAMs 55, 253, 70, 66
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Successful, MARS
5. Mr. Moyer indicated that, as a follow-up to a recent
question from about the improved record of the drones, he
had checked with JRC and was told that they are still getting reaction on
these missions although maybe not trying as hard.
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6. reported efforts at coverage of
two priority South China North Vietnam requirements as follows:
a. Coverage of Lines of Communications
(LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces
into 'orth Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966).
The number of LOC priority targets in South China and
North Vietnam remains at 142. For the period 16-22
January 1969 no surveillance coverage was reported.
b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect
the possible introduction or deployment of offensive
missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967,
and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown
on the grid map at Tab B for the period 9-15 January 1969.
Two BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time
period and reported as successful have not been reported.
No SSM activity was observed.
Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba
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7. reported there had been no GLASS LAMP
missions flown during the period. I advised that
for the 56-day period beginning 28 November 1968, ten GLASS
LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 90 percent coverage
of the area. During this period 168 of the 179 targets in Cuba
were covered completely on cloud-free photography.
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8. The Chairman, ICRS, noted that there had been a standdown
of GLASS LAMP missions January 21, 22, and 23 at the request
of the JCS. I observed that because of the present level
of coverage this standdown was not a cause for concern. He requested
the Chairman, ICRS, to keep a close watch on the coverage figures
and to advise him should it appear that a special request for coverage
might be necessary.
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Section II (NPIC Report)
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Mission Highlights
1 ? I Ibriefed COMIREX on recent mission
highlights as follows:
a. North Vietnam. A BUMPY ACTION mission
on 24 December revealed two columns of troops, over
600 personnel, moving south on two trails in the vicinity
of Dong Hoi. The presence of a possible mortar training
range in the area suggests that this might be a training/rest
area for troops.
b. North Vietnam. A composite board made up
from several missions illustrates the well integrated logistics
network to move supplies from Vinh through Bai Duc Thon
to Mu Gia Pass. Evidence provided by photography shows
that supplies have been moved in unprecedented quantities
since the 1 November 1968 bombing halt. Extensive use
is made of water as well as truck and some rail transportation.
c. North Vietnam. Photography of 7 December
reveals considerable activity at the Cu Lac transshipment
point. Cu Lac is 10 nm southwest of Quang Khe on the south
bank of the Song Troc River. It is near the junction of route
101 and 137. Route 137 shares with route 15 the distinction
of being a major infiltration route into Laos.
d. North Vietnam. 12 December photography
shows a large transshipment point under construction near
the village of Xom Hoai. This village is 25 nm south of
Vinh at the confluence of the Ngan Sau and Rao No rivers.
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Provision of direct transloading from barge to rail
car will be a major improvement in the logistics
net between Vinh and the Mu Gia Pass.
e. Cuba. Photography of the entire port
and naval facilities at Havana shows the greatest number
of KDmars located here since the deployment to Santiago
de Cuba on 3 December 1968. Construction activity is
noted at the Mambisa dry dock and ship repair yards.
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23 January 1969
Section IV (Action Items)
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Planning Parameters to Assist NRO in Designing Satellite Launch
I ? observed that while he was 25X1A
appreciative o the detailed work done by EXSUBCOM in delineating
dates when the film from particular satellite missions should
arrive at Eastman, proceed to NPIC, and when various stages of
readout results should then be given to ICRS, he considered NRO
would react more satisfactorily to guidance cast in a different
form. NRO would like planning parameters simply identifyin NRO
such thin s as the number of days from CORONA recover 25X1
Jand a restatement of the desired
noted that it was apparen rom the
EXSUBCOM attempts at scheduling that this subcommittee had
paid full attention to previous statements but
sometimes other factors entered into planning which mig t make
it difficult if not impossible for NRO to know how it might jigger
schedules without upsetting the balance between exploitation and
writing new requirements. observed that the present
I scheduling looks fine to RS, just so long as NPIC can
handle incoming missions at the present irman,
ICRS, also commented that t is not
essential.
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2. identified an immediate and
novel problem in scheduling as stemming from the decision of
authorities to update tracking station facilities. In reply to a
question frorri noted that the importance
of these tracking stations varies but I which is to be updated 25X1A
in the middle of summer, is extremely important. He noted that
so far compromises have been made, so as to minimize interference
with launches, but at about this point in time it seems to be necessary
for launch slippage of about two weeks for both May and July.
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with standard planning parameters for the guidance of NRO.
.These parameters should be drawn up in an order of priority
and with an adequate identification of the interrelationship of actions.
NRO should be able to apply these parameters to any need to warp
its schedule of launches in such a way as to make the change with
least damage to the harmony of the exploitation -to-collection- to-NRO
double play.
Soviet COSMOS Reconnaissance Missions As Potential Indicators
(Reference COMIREX-M-60, page 16, paras 1-4) 25X1A
4. Discussion of the use that might be made of early
reporting of anomalies appearing in the operation of Soviet
reconnaissance satellites was essentially broken down into consideration
of benefits of early readout of real time telemetry intercepts which:
a. might be of advantage to COMIREX in
programming its imagery satellites; and,
b. how to make information available to those
who might evaluate anomalies in terms of indications.
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3. Following some further discussion about what
slippages might do to mapping, charting, and geodesy coverage,
should slippages have impact 14 months from now, the Chairman
observed that the task force on launches which is headed by
is supposed to represent the entire gamut of
COMIREX interest. This coin has two sides. In the first place,
it means that suggestions to NRO from the task force presumably
have taken into account all COMIREX requirements; secondly,
it means that if any aspects of the task force recommendations are
unrealistic from the NRO standpoint should refer 25X1A
the problem immediately to COMIR C. The Chairman concluidel
with a request that I I and his task team come up
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It was the consensus that the National Indications Center, the
SIGINT Committee, and the Office of Current Intelligence of CIA
might all be in a position to analyze anomalies in terms of
potential indicators. It was also noted that the Strategic Warning
Working Group of had tangled with this
problem and that General Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence
Agency, might also have a keen interest in the indications type of
analysis.
5. The CIA member indicated that he would request
those agency elements already studying Soviet reconnaissance
satellite operations to identify potential targets to ICRS. The
Chairman advised that, with regard to indications, he would write
to the Watch and SIGINT Committees, making note of the general
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awareness of the indicator possibilities and the value of leads
to possible targets while volunteering COMIREX assistance as it
might be appropriate.
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8. The Chairman, SDWG, reported that in accordance
with the COMIREX assignment of October 1968 the SDWG had made
a preliminary review of the security problems associated with the
possibility that latent imagery might remain on stripped and
shredded film. Following this preliminary discussion, the
Exploratory Laboratory of NPIC made an analysis of the latent
imagery problem and on 5 December reported to SDWG that in
certain instances it was possible to restore an identifiable image.
NPIC also reported to SDWG that following the findings of the
Exploratory Laboratory it had opted to go to a system which
.employed a grinder producing chaff passed by 1/16th of an inch
screen followed by treatment in a caustic solution that is available
commercially and also permitted recovery of the silver. Following
silver recovery, the film was subjected to treatment which removed
all possibility of imagery recovery. added that there
is also a market for what is left of the film.
I
Latent Imagery and Security Problems Associated with Disposal of
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9. The Chairman, SDWG, reported that some members
of his working group had inquired as to how generally available
the NPIC process may be and whether it may be used readily at
various places around the world having a film disposal problem.
Irequested that comment on this. 25X1A
I repeated that the caustic solution used in the NPIC
process is available commercially and observed that there has
been a considerable amount of discussion on film disposal problems
within the community. He would be surprised if departments and
agencies with film disposal problems were not aware of the process.
I confirmed that film disposal is a very current question
within the ERRAND community and he, like feels that 25X1A
the three services are quite familiar with the status of the NPIC
methods.
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10. COMIREX agreed that it would go on record that
there is a security problem involved if the stripping and shredding
technique is followed; but, with regard to alternatives, COMIREX
considered that each agency should make its own decision whether
to follow the NPIC route or whether to dispose of film through
burning or some other secure means. COMIREX agreed also
that any agency with further questions should approach EXRAND
for information and guidance.
COMIREX-M-61 25X1A
23 January 1969
Use of Sanitized KH-4 Photography for SAC Contingency Plan in China
(T-KEG
11. The Chairman, SDWG, advised that in accordance
with USIB approved action DIA had requested approval of a SAC
request to use sanitized KH-4 photography for a SAC contingency
plan on China. reminded COMIREX that the USIB
authorization (USIB-D-46. 2/7, COMIREX-D-2. 7/7, 19 September 1968)
required referral of such requests to COMIREX on a case-by-case basis.
The Chairman, SDWG, advised that his working group had studied the
request and recommended approval. suggested that
his working group be responsible for maintaining files on such
requests /this will actually be done by DIAL and that they not be
forwarded to COMIREX in detail unless there was some question
which need be discussed at COMIREX.
the contingency plan submitted by DIA
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12? COMIREX approved the SDWG recommendation that
SAC be permitted to use sanitized KH-4 photography in support of
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23 January 1969
Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)
NRO Satellite Launch Schedule, KH-4B, T. I
((COMIREX-D-13.1 Z---Note--his paper was ZT-Isurioured
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1. Both the CIA and DIA members requested more time
to consider this paper. After questioning NRO on its timing with
regard to the requirement to submit draft guidance for its financial
program and observing that the Chairman and a number of member-
would not be in town on 6 February, it was agreed that this paper
should be rescheduled for reconsideration 30 January.
Approve
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5. I Inext raised the question of EEIs,
reminding COMIREX that NRO still wishes to have defined to it
what objects may be photographed satisfactoril
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as compared to those requiring In reply to a
COMIREX-M-61
23 January 1969
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question from the Chairman as to how he is coming on his EEI
25X1A task, ladvised that he has defined those categories
25X1A requiring and has farmed these out to analysts within
CIA w' that specific targets be designated. Referring
25X1 NRO to the criteria, I ladvised that his work was
not bro en. own in quite that fashion. He had been responsive to
25X1A I I request simply to indicate those categories of
25X1A targets requiring the The Chairman, ICRS, expects
to submit his EEI study to ICRS after analysts have provided him
with targets for his categories.
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Section VI (Other Business)
1. The Executive Secretary noted that as the COMIREX
Directory is only updated approximately every six months he would
resume the practice of announcing changes to membership at
COMIREX in order to make such changes part of the record
in the Minutes. noted that Lt. Colonel Raymond N. Barry,
present, had replaced Colonel Charles C. Clayton and that the
Navy member and first and second alternates now are, respectively,
Captain Lloyd W. Moffit, Cdr. James A. Richardson, and
Cdr. H. Kelly Sims. Cdr. Richardson was at the table acting for
Captain Mo:Pfit.
Changes in COMIREX Membership
Need for Ljensor on GIANT SCALE
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2. The Chairman, ICRS, reported that his subcommittee
had been asked to address a message from DIA on the removal of the
from GIANT SCALE. DIA felt that had not added
anything to intelligence not duplicated. by other sensors. ICRS feels
that it has no requirement from a national point of view, but all DoD
elements (e. g. CINCPAC) have not been heard from. It was enerall
agreed that COMIREX would go on record as stating that the
has not made any unique contribution to intelligence and we do not
have any requirements for continuing its use. _
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xecu ive Secretary
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
Attachment
Tab B
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