COMIREX MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY WORKING GROUP MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 1D918 PENTAGON 0930-1145, 20 JUNE 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A000500010041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: June 20, 1968
• Content Type: MIN

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COMIREX MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY WORKING GROUP lX'i
Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 1D918
Pentagon
0930-1145, 20 June 1968
PRESIDING
Deputy Chairman
MEMBERS OR ALTERNATES PRESENT
Purpose of Meeting - General
1. The announced purpose of the meeting was to review the four items
forwarded members by Memorandum dated 14 June. commented that it
would not be possible to discuss the Minutes of the last meeting since they
had not been received, indicated that the Minutes were avail-
able in draft form, but because the secretary normally responsible for this
had resigned there was a delay, but the minutes would be distributed within
the next few days. Anyone needing information in the Minutes could obtain
such from DIA.
Copy J of 2b copies
GROUP 1
Excluded loom a~~omo~ic
dow -din and dscl...llico -
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Recommendations for KH-4B Mission 1104 for Improving Positioning Accuracies
2. Copies of a Memorandum for the MC&G Working Group, Subject: Report
of Subcommittee for Mission Planning, dated 17 June 1968 (see enclosure 1),
signed by Chairman of the Sub-Working Group for Mission 25X1
Planning was distributed for members' review, stated that an 25X1
extended effort had been made to place as much important substantive informa-
tion as possible in the memorandum which would not only set forth the stated
requirement and detailed proposal, but also point up the possible penalties
to general intelligence caused by variations in mission parameters from those
established by optimizing the mission for highest priority intelligence
objectives. In this regard, indicated that he had received 25X1
good cooperation from the NRO, and it was possible to include in the paper
an indication of those tradeoffs that would be involved if the inclination
of Mission 1104 were moved to 720. However, since there seemed to be com-
parable or possibly greater benefits to MC&G positioning by holding the
normal inclination and changing the launch time, a request had been made by
DIAMC to the NRO to provide computer data which would indicate possible
differences in results achievable. It was explained and confirmed by 25X1
that some additional time would be required to obtain such results 25X1
for evaluation. With respect to enclosure 1, there was very little discussion
resulting in any changes in the substantive information in 25X1
memorandum. In support of the MC&G objective being sought
felt that the intelligence PI-Analysts might accept the changes that could
be caused by different sun angles over prime objectives. In further dis-
cussion, he brought out that the difference in sun angle would probably not
be significant, and that in his opinion it could have the added advantage
of enhancing intelligence exploitation through obtaining a different sig-
nature because of the shift in sun angle, indicated that he 25X1
thought the same intelligence targets could be covered by a change in launch
time with the principal change being not so much a matter of sun angle
change, but a given target would be covered on a different day during the
mission. In any event, the Working Group was encouraged by the apparent
indication at this time that changes in mission parameters to help the
positioning problem seemed to have little, if any, detremental affect on
the accomplishment of prime intelligence objectives, indicated 25X1
that he would make further studies at NPIC and make available to all con- 25X1
cerned the analysis information resulting from different mission parameters,
expressed satisfaction with what was being proposed, and= 25X1
stated that the short are technique was very important from the 25X1
standpoint of the Air Force, in that it represented the only major improve-
ment in positioning prior to implementing whatever the NRO proposes to
meet the 450 foot horizontal and 300 foot vertical, 90% assurance accuracy
requirements for world-wide positioning--which could be one to two years
away. It was brought out in the discussion that a significant reason for
Copy of
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Nor
proceeding with the short arc technique at this time would permit saving 3
to 6 months' time in data reduction to meet the 450 and 300 foot requirements
at some later date. indicated that while the Working Group was 25X1
waiting on further analysis information from NRO and NPIC to complete a paper
for forwarding to the Chairman of COMIREX, it would be important to clear up
any other ouestions about the paper as soon as possible. In this connection,
indicated that DIA could possibly add further to the require- 25X1
ments statement and that he would like to have discuss 25X1
enclosure 1 with representatives of their office to identify further questions
on the requirement, objectives and possible penalties. This early action was
sought in order to expedite the forwardin of the proposal to the Chairman,
COMIREX. This was important since had pointed out that the 25X1
NRO would normally begin cutting the tape for Mission 1104 by approximately
15 July.
Justification for the KH-9 System
3. While not on the Agenda, all members were aware that the Chairman,
COMIREX had been asked to respond to the question as to why the KH-9 was
needed in view of the capability of the KH-4 and the KH-8. Copies of= 25X1
first draft had just been r particularly because of 25X1
the interest of the MC&G communit in major concern was expressed. 25X1
It was indicated that covered high points of the justification 25X1
in behalf of MC&G, but that constructive comments could be made to strengthen
the justification from the MC&G point of view. It was concluded that prompt
attention would be given to provide constructive revisions of the draft to
Progress on Meeting World-Wide Positioning Requirements
4. The purpose of this item was to obtain an up-to-date status report on
NRO's proposals to meet the world-wide positioning requirements. 25X1
indicated, speaking broadly, that there was no "requirement" for the NRO to
respond to. summarized the critical actions, known to all, which 25X1
included USI approval o the 450 and 300 foot horizontal and vertical posi-
tioning requirements, 90% assurance in June 1966, which carried with it the
indication that the MC&G community could meet the requirement from existing
data, the later statement of July 1967 that informed the Chairman of COMIREX
that it would in fact not be possible to meet the 450 and 300 foot require-
ment with existing data, the personal request of the Chairman, COMIREX to
the NRO staff that solutions to meet the requirement be proposed, and the
up-to-date action whereby the NRO is trying to finalize their proposal as to
how the 450 and 300 foot requirement can be met. indicated 25X1
the up-to-date status to be that a final report was scheduledto be forwarded
to the Director of NRO the following week which revised an initial report
which led to the need for additional data. pointed out that 25X1
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additional data relating to Doppler capability had been obtained from DIA
and Navy, and that it should be possible to make the proposal to COMIREX
within the next week or two. Members reaffirmed the need for early submission
of NRO proposals for meeting the positioning requirement. This is especially
significant when it is recognized that detailed planning for overt geodetic
systems for the next five years is now being attempted in the CIP without a
firm indication of the vital complementary activity by the NRO.
KH-4 DISICS
5.
mentioned that NRO had indicated that the 1 September
25X1
KH-4 Mission (CR 5) would not include a DISIC and that tentatively Missions
CR 8 and CR 14 would not include a DISIC camera. raised 25X1
10
,
CR
DISICS in
ernin
d
g
conc
the question as to the requirement guidance expresse
the last MC&G Working Group meeting, and particularly what was being done to
improve the accuracy of the ephemeris which was a tradeoff cited in this
guidance. reply was that some improvements were underway
(SGLE) and that, of course, there were plans to improve the ephemeris as
part of the proposal that NRO would make to meet the world-wide positioning
requirement. The NRO reduction in DISICS was just one of a number of steps
held necessary by"the NRO as economy measures. expressed that
while NRO had its reasons as to which missions wou not ude DISICS,
there were also major factors from the standpoint of the MC&G requirements
which would require consideration, and that the question of which missions
would not include DISICS should be considered by the MC&G Working Group.
Other Business
6. a. mentioned that since UTB was being considered
for the prime camera, the NRO wanted that it also be considered for the DISIC
camera of the KH-4 system. He indicated a memorandum to this effect would be
initiated. All agreed it deserved careful review.
b. The other two items on the Agenda, that is, KH re-coverage for
areas of firm stereo photogrammetric production and KH-4 collection program
to meet USGS requirements were not treated because of lack of time; it is
planned that they be included in the next MC&G Working Group meeting.
Copy of
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
COMIREX MC&G Working Group
1 Enclosure a/s
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CONTI,
DEFENSE INTELLi tq-E AGENCY
MEMORANDUM FOR MC&G WORKING GROUP 17 June 1968
SUBJECT: Report of Sub-Committee for Mission Planning
1. The Sub-Committee for Mission Planning was formed to consider the
geodetic application of the frame materials from the KH-4B systems on
an event-by-event basis. Although the specific purpose was to consider
the question in terms of the next event, which is 1104 scheduled for August
1968, we have investigated the overall problem of acquiring data to meet
the criteria for a short arc solution. Also, we have explored possible
penalties which might be incurred in the intelligence collection program
should changes be required in the planned mission parameters..
2. Since Et is generally agreed that a short-arc solution (SAR) will not
meet the requirement unless additional control is available inside the
Sino-Soviet Bloc,-the question as to why go the short-arc route at all
was discussed. One advantage is that such a solution would provide a
capability to improve the position of targets to an accuracy of 550-600
feet (Air Force feels that you could possibly do better) prior to the
operation of a direct targeting system such as Doppler on the KH-4 system.
Informal discussions with NRO suggests that such a system could be opera-
tional by August 1969. An additional advantage results from the fact
that a SAR geometric network could be analytically adjusted to the direct
system solution to shift the computed target positions simultaneously.
In this manner the accuracy requirements for those targets contained in
the SAR could be met without the necessity for additional mensuration.
This would enable a considerable amount of the photo mensuration to be
accomplished prior to the operational deployment of a direct system.
Specifically, it would be possible to position 290 priority one targets
now over 750 ft and complete the photo mensuration for 535 now over 450 ft.
3. In considering the photographic coverage to meet SAR requirements
several points were brought out. Arcs should be flown so as to cover areas
of geodetic control on both entrance to and exit from the Sino-Soviet Bloc
and form a pattern of intersecting cross flights internal to the bloc.
Arcs from a mission flown at 82? inclination with a 220OZ launch time and
an perigee-apogee of 85-135 n.m. do not cover areas of geodetic control
on entrance to and exit from the Sino-Soviet Bloc nor do the intersecting
cross-flights occur. Preliminary investigations on the part of ACIC in-
dicate that an inclination of 72? with a launch window of 0130Z would pro-
vide the optimum control coverage (Europe and Southeast Asia, Japan) with
the required intersections. An inclination of 820 with a launch window
of 0130Z would provide control coverage (North America and Southeast Asia)
although the resultant arcs would be longer. Although this is a less
desirable situation, the criteria for control as well as intersecting
GROUPpasses are met. Whether the inclination is changed or pot it would be
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necessary to alter the launch time in order to get the intersecting passes.
''4. Since the next KH-4B mission is scheduled for a launch time of
2130Z +15 minutes, the minimum criteria for a short-arc geometric net-
work would not be met. To meet optimum conditions both the inclination
and launch time would need to be altered although the minimum criteria
could be met with a change in launch time only. From informal discussions
with CIA and NRO it appears that a change in the inclination would be of
more concern, especially at this time of year. As an example six targets
are missed if the inclination is changed from 82? to 751. NRO has also
indicated some concern about the ability to insert updated weather infor-
mation into the satellite at a lower inclination. On a few occasions the
vehicle would be out of range of telemetry stations for up to 5 revolu-
tions. This could result in a 5?-8? percent loss in coverage. because of
weather. Additionally it is estimated that some time in orbit (one day
approximately) would be lost due to the extra fuel expendature requirement
to achieve the lower inclination from the Western Test Range. While a
change in inclination appears to be of definite concern a change in launch
time, to 0130Z,does not appear to be serious. Essentially it means that
photography will be acquired generally four hours later. As an example,
the time over Moscow ranges from 1230 - 0930 for a 2130Z launch while the
time for a 0130Z launch is from 1530 - 1230. The later launch time means
that, on decending passes, the minimum sun angle is reached at higher
latitude. However, at no time would this be higher than 100 south. Since
the intelligence data has always been collected on the defending passes
and no Northern Hemisphere coverage is lost, this does not appear to be
a problem. If intelligence data is collected on ascending passes the
scale will be somewhat smaller because of the higher altitude. Another
area which has to be reviewed is the different thermal (heating) conditions
caused by a change in launch time. This does not present a problem, but
requires some time for evaluation.
5. The estimates of required launch time and inclination for obtaining
SAR data and possible penalties involved are based on our analysis and
informal discussions with NRO and CIA. Although it is believed that our
analysis is valid.NRO has been formally requested to provide more accurate
estimate as to the effects of a change in launch time and a specific
recommendation concerning the most optimum mission parameters for meeting
the SAR requirements with minimum impact on the intelligence mission.
6. Based on our investigations it is recommended that the launch time of
the KH-4B mission scheduled for August be changed to meet the SAR require-
ments as explanied above. It should be pointed out that the August mis-sion
will be the last opportunity before next spring to collect the necessary
r_-
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