OSR COMMENTS ON DIA SUMMARY STATEMENT CONCERNING WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 1997
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/19: CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570013-5
/ I 1
OSR Comments on DIA Summary
Statement Concerning Warsaw Pact Capabilities
in Central Europe After the Crisis
Paragraph 3: The DIA comments conclude--
apparently from the fact that the Czech forces have
resumed training--that they have."made a marked re-
covery." Our evidence suggests that the Czech forces
are demoralized and understrength.
Paragraph 4: The DIA comments seem to suggest
that oviet acquiescence in the continued Czech
occupation of the Western border regions is a sign
of confidence. More likely, it reflects Soviet
reluctance to write off the Czech'forces as a viable
contribution to the Pact. To do so would amount to
admission of failure of the USSR's Warsaw Pact mili-
tary policy, and could oblige the Soviets to take
drastic steps to fill the void. The Soviets are pro-
bably astute enough to recognize that NATO's apprecia-
tion of the Czech threat is what really counts and
so long as they can maintain the semblance of that
threat, the general NATO-Warsaw Pact balance should
remain reasonably stable.
Paragraph 5: The Soviet deployment in Czecho-
slovakia is not even remotely similar to that in East
Germany. In East Germany the GSFG is nearly four
times the size of the indigenous force and clearly
in full control of the tactical situation.
Paragraph 6: The OSR memorandum did not suggest
that the Czechs would not defend themselves; it was
carefully limited to a judgment as to their usefulness
for Soviet initiatives.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/19: CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570013-5 25X1
Paragraph 8: Rumors of additional Soviet forces
in Germany and Hungary have been endemic since last
summer. They have apparently been spawned by the many
unusual troop movements through these countries attend-
ant on the Czech crisis and by the rather extensive
Soviet construction program which has been in progress
for the past 3 or 4 years. The construction program
seems to be largely aimed at replacing delapidated old
prewar facilities, along with a rather large-scale pro-
gram for providing dependent. housing. We are watching
this one closely, but so far we've seen no convincing
evidence of any reinforcement in either country.
Paragraph 9: We now have evidence that six of the
10-13 divisions estimated to have been mobilized are
now in Category II status. One other has apparently
remained in Czechoslovakia. There is no evidence at
all that any units in the USSR remain mobilized. We
consider that the evidence supports a firm estimate
that demobilization is complete.
Paragraph 11: The evidence on CGF order of battle
is essentially the same as it was when the Memorandum
was published. Perhaps will shed some 25X1
Paragraph 12: We do not consider that VESNA-69
gave any indication of the CGF's primary role. The
exercise was probably intended mainly to demonstrate
that the Czech forces were still in the Pact. In
any case, we have very little information as to what
the exercise was really about and are not even certain
that the Soviets participated.