BRIEFING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON PREPARATIONS FOR SALT
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00972A000100530021-0
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RIFPUB
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S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 16, 1997
Sequence Number:
21
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Publication Date:
July 8, 1969
Content Type:
REPORT
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%. ' July 8, 19 69
BRIEFING NE"MBERS OF CONGRESS
ON PREPARATIONS FOR SALT
Informing Congress of our preparations for SALT will require
the closest cooperation among ACDA, State, Defense, CIA and the
White House. The subject is complex and sensitive, the risks
of leaks and misunderstandings high, and an effective briefing
will require authoritative statements from several parts of
the Executive. Timing will be important; the briefing must be
early enough to give Congress some sense of meaningful consul-
tation and. late enough to insure basic issues are clearly in
focus. (If the USSR does not reply soon to our proposal of
July 31, or makes a counter-proposal, the Congressional brief-
ing schedule suggested here would have to be revised.)
If carefully handled, the initial discussions with
Congressional leaders could contribute to the development of
sympathetic Congressional understanding of the issues, the
tactics and the objectives. This understanding will be helpful
during the talks and essential for the success of any arrange-
ments that may be reached in the discussions with the Soviets.
On the other hand, certain aspects of the SALT plans, e.g.,
the treatment of ABMs and MIRVs in some of the options, may
be so inconsistent with the strongly held views of some members
that the briefing could produce active Congressional opposition
to the plans. Public expression of adverse Congressional
attitudes could seriously weaken the U.S. position in the talks,
and special care will be required on these points in preparing
the briefings.
This paper outlines three possible plans. Both the first
and second proposals call for White House briefings; the third
calls for briefings on the Hill with individual leaders, or
groups of leaders. The complexity of the subject, the need for
statements from several agencies, and the importance of develop-
ing maximum common understanding in Congress make e it:her the
first or second plan, or some variation thereof, highly desi__r--
abl.e. The prestige and persuasiveness of a White House presen-
tatioTa, with the President presiding, cannot be duplicated in
briefings on the Hill, and only if there are the strongest over-
riding considerations should we attempt to inform Congressional
leadership of the SALT plans through a series of meetings with
individual Congressmen.
Plan I
T.. :o White House Briefings--Parallei with
NSC Deliberations and Allied Consul Lations
A. First briefinn--at the White House at approximately
same time details~ of SALT alternatives are under consideration
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i- NAC acid before final C consid era t:i-on, Pre ent schedule
calls for detailed consultation with. MC on July 8-9 and .
July 16-17, and an NSC meeting boti, e.en. July 1.8 and July 22.
July 21 would accordingly be a likely date for the fol.lo.wing:
(1) Brief introductory statement by the President,.
(2) Pare l presentation by the Director of ACDA,
Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and the Director of
CIA. The Chairman of the JCS should also make a state-
melit .
(3) Outline of presentation:
(a) Strategic Balance. Laird and Wheeler.
r
(b) Sunrliary of NSSM 2.8 of fort. Smith.
(c) Sup ra7_y of alternatives considered. Smith.
(d) Ver_ i_f i_cati.on.. Helms .
(e) Some problems anticipated and planned
responses. Rogers -and. Smith.
(4) See Annex A for list of Congressional. partici--
pants (30 members)-.
B. Second W it:e house briefin --^ft.er: al_7_ied consul-
tations completed, after, final. NSC action, after President
1, t7il,.1'"s b~:~n ,t .,+ 1 +-e fr_ s-
r
~.tul-ns and `~ befora t~Lc~~x. App2'o?~i_Tit_?.c L?rwee=k of August,
(l) Panel presentation by same officials who made
.first pre entati_on.
.(2) Outline:
(a) Summary of naj or fe~aLut:es of approach U. S.
will m akte to USSR in S'%LT. Smith,
(b) ComiimcnL:s > ,r e- L.ai.-L-d and tlelms,
i
S ]', C }RT?T
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(c) Brief forecast of possible ways talks
may develop. Rogers and Smith.
(d) Plans for Washington back up and future
Congressional liaison. Smith.
(4) Same 'Congressional participants as at first
briefing.
Advantages: Congressional leadership will be kept
informed of,our planning before final decisions are reached
and on approximately the same schedule we follow with allies.
The latter consultations will almost certainly produce leaks,
widespread comment, and probably considerable misinformation
and misunderstanding. Keeping Congressional leadership
informed will help forestall misunderstanding and criticism
on the Mill. Two-step process will give time in which to
try to develop sympathetic and common understanding by
Congressional leaders.
Disadvantages : The two-step process will require more
time of top officials, greater risks of leaks than if there
is only one briefing, and there will be period of several
weeks before talks in which critics could attack the
plans on an informed basis.
Plan II
One White House Brief_in--At Time of
Final NSC Action and Allied Consultations
A. One briefing at White Douse, after final NSC action,
after consultations with allies completed and after President
returns. Approximate date in present schedule--first week of
Augus t.
(1) Introduction.by President.
(2) Panel presentation as in Plan I.
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.(3)
Outline:
(a)
Strategic Balance. Laird and Wheeler.
(b)
Brief summary NSSM 28 effort and alter-
natives considered. Smith.
(c)
Summary of approach U.S. will make to
USSR. in SALT. Smith.
(d)
Verification. Helms.
(e)
Problems we foresee and to which we are
alert. Rogers and Smith.
(4) Same Congressional participants as in Plan I.
Advantages: Short time for leaks and development of
unsympathetic attitudes and comments before talks start.
Less time required of top officials.
Disadvant_.ags: Almost certain resentment by many members
at presenting Congress with a firm, final position without
affording any opportunity to comment and only after full con-
sultation with allies. Public expression of this resentment
and divergent Congressional views could weaken position of
U.S. negotiators at outset of talks.
Plan III;
Briefings for _Individual Leaders
at the Capitol
A. Briefings for a selected list (see Annex B) of
Congressional leaders in their offices on the Hill. (As
possible, arrangements would be made. to brief these leaders
in small groups.) The White House briefing list (Plans I
and II) has been reduced to a more manageable size for a
series of private briefings (17 members).
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action on July 23.. This is a poor third among the plans.
to have a panel of 'b.ricf ers , to be headed by the A.CDA
Director, accompanied by top officials of State, DOD and
CIA, or their deputies. The substance of the briefing
would be approximately the same as in Plan II, and since
only one round of briefings would be possible, meetings
would be scheduled to start immediately after final- NSC
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B. The complexity of the problem and the involvement
of the basic interests of various agencies make it necessary
will start planning arrangernent:s for follow-on liaison.
soon as the plan for the first briefings is approved, ACDA
with assistance from the CIA, will be necessary in pro-
viding information to Congress as the talks progress. As
Fol.loF,w-on Liaison
Continued cooperation among ACDA, .State, and Defense,
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1. Annex A.
2. Annex B.
ACDA/GC:WWHancock:MChristopher:amc
. 7/7/69 - x 6866
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ANNEX A
PARTICIPANTS IN WHITE HOUSE CLASSIFIED
BRIEFINGS OF MEi?IBERS OF CONGRESS ON SALT
.Executive Branch
The President.
The Vice President (as President of the Senate).
Secretaries Rogers and Laird, ACDA Director Smith, General
Wheeler,. CIA Director Helms.
Mr. Farley, Mr. Nitze, Ambassador Thompson, Dr. Brown, and
Maj. General Allison.
Selected Congressional liaison representatives.
Congressional Leaders
Leadership: Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Kennedy, Scott.
Speaker McCormack, Albert, Ford.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Fulbright, Aiken.
Disarmament Subcommittee: Gore, Case.
House Foreign Affairs Committee: Morgan, Adair.
Senate Armed Services: Stennis, Smith.
House Armed Services: Rivers, Arends.
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Holifield, Pastore, Hosmer,
(Aiken, ranking Senate Republican, noted above).
Others: Senators Russell and Milt Young (Appropriations
Committee and particularly interested in security matters);
Congressmen Zablocki and Thomson (National Security Sub-
committee of HFAC).
Senators Jackson ,Symington, Brooke, Percy and Cooper, and
ongrc.ssLLia-n John B . iii id ~.i ' i'.Liu
interested.
TOTAL: 3 0
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ANNEX B
PRIVATE SALT BRIEFINGS
FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
Leadership: Senators Mansfield, Dirksen; Speaker McCormack,
Ford.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Fulbright, Aiken.
Disarmament Subcommittee: Gore,. Case.
House Foreign Affairs Committee: Morgan,Adair.
Senate Armed Services: Stennis, Smith.
House Armed Services: Rivers, Arends.
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Holifield, Pastore,
Hosmer, (Aiken, ranking Senate Republican, noted above).
TOTAL: 17 Members
n r - tmiro H lni r r u'/
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