Responsibility for Intelligence Analysis on Military-related Electronics within the Directorate

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100370040-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: December 6, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100370040-7
25X1 B4d
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Responsibility for Intelligence
Analysis on Military-related
Electronics within the
Directorate
1. In the 1967 survey on military intelligence
production within the Intelligence Directorate which
led to the formation of OSR, it was proposed that
two ERA branches--Electronic Equipment and Communica-
tions--be transferred along with MRA and the 25X1B4d
to the new Office. Each of the Branches
then had seven positions. objected to 25X1A9a
the proposal, saying in his memorandum of 28 March
1967:
"I do not agree that the Communications
and Electronic Equipment Branches should be
transferred from ERA. Not only is their
research integral to the work of the Economic
Research Area, but most of their effort is in
support of customers other than military
intelligence. disagrees because 25X1A9a
he believes that t ese branches should be
doing much more in support of military intel-
ligence. It may be that both military and
economic intelligence will need some capabi-
lity in this area." 25X1A9a
appropriate before raising the issue.
At our meeting with Messrs. Proctor, and
Godfrey to discuss final arrangements", 'We question
of responsibility for analysis of Soviet and Chinese
military electronics was left unresolved with the
understanding that it would be reexamined after about
six months when OSR would have completed its initial
adjustments. At the end of 1967, however, OER had
just been reorganized and additional, time seemed
0*4 1 1-- ~U, " 6-v-
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I _ . ?_' . . ,..
-ORO
2. I am not familiar with all the details of
OER reorganization but the effect appears to be that
the number of people in OER now working on military-
related electronic matters of interest to OSR has
decreased. Whether or not this is so, I believe that
our experience in running OSR for 18 months affirms
the need for research efforts in military electronics
that led to the original proposal.
3. The march of technology is making electronics
increasingly integral to analysis on the costs and
military capabilities of advanced strategic systems.
To cite the US experience: about 40 percent of the
total cost of a missile system lies in its electronic
components. Lying behind my concern that OSR have the
internal capacity to meet its basic responsibilities
for military analysis on the Soviet Union and. Communist
China are such additional factors as:
a. About 75 percent of the value of output
of the electronics industry in the USSR is for
military and space purposes. To look at it
another way, between 25 and 35 percent of the
value of all Soviet military procurement is
electronic in nature.
b. The determination of deployment timing
and operating concepts--a priority responsibi-
lity of OSR--is influenced by analysis of the
electronics of the systems involved.
c. The costing efforts of OSR on electronics
have been based largely on analysis done in ORR.
For the past few years research analysis on the
Soviet electronics industry specifically oriented
to military costing has diminished. The relation-
ships between production estimates and deployment
estimates are becoming tenuous. New work needs
to be done on prices, ruble/dollar ratios, and
costs of electronics R&D.
4. In this general area of concern, I note that
there are a number of areas of activity related to
ELINT collection across the board which the Intelligence
Directorate has little capability to evaluate. While
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25X1 130e
the field is highly technical in many of its aspects,
it is not so technical that it cannot be understood
or evaluated independently. By maintaining a more
appropriate level of analysis for finished intelli-
gence production on military electronics in their
general military context, the Directorate would have
an improved capability to evaluate collection and
processing efforts.
5. As official Soviet reporting on electronics
has been curtailed and as US/Soviet technical ex-
changes in this field have ceased to occur, other
sources of information--primarily special sources--
and other methods of analysis have become more
important. Increasingly, analysis on Soviet and
Chinese electronics will have to depend on the study
electronics facilities,
M and on a more explicit
accounting of deployed electronics. That kind of
work most closely parallels OSR analysis for other
major military systems.
6. There are three basic options: one is to
continue the present concentration of responsibilities
in OER but with greater OSR-OER interchange and
responsiveness than has been true over the last 18
months; the second is to transfer the entire respon-
sibility for analysis and production in the electronics
sphere to OSR, with OSR responsible to OER in the same
way that it is for, say, civilian aircraft production;
the third is to attempt to divide the responsibilities
and the personnel along the general military-civilian
lines that exist in the formal missions of OSR and OER.
7. From where I sit, either the second or the
third is the better option. I believe that OSR needs
to have an integral capability to accomplish the
research analysis on Soviet and Chinese military elec-
tronics that are part of the other responsibilities
of the Office. This sector of substantive analysis is
too important to the work of OSR to continue to be
handled in the present' fashion.
25X1 130e
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7. 1 would like to propose, therefore, that
the question of responsibility for research analysis
of Soviet and Chinese military electronics be re-
opened at this time to find that solution that best
accords with the over sponsibilities and per-
sonnel resources of tglflligence Directorate.,
BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research
Distribution:
Orig. and
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Addressee
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D/OER
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SR/PA
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SR/SF
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SR/TF
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SR/AD
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SR/PL
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D/OSR
D/OSR:BCClarke:lr x7111
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