Comments on DIA Article, A Review of the Soviet Helicopter Carrier, of 8 April 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100260003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Comments on DIA Article, A Review of
the Soviet Helicopter Carrier, of
8 April 1968
1. The article on which you have requested OSR
views is lengthy and detailed. I believe that our
comments, to be fully useful to you, must be presented
in some detail also.
2. The article was produced by DIA's Scientific
and Technical Intelligence Directorate and presents a
factual review of the development of the Soviet
helicopter carrier. The chronological account of the
ship's construction progress is accurate and the pre-
sentation of basic characteristics, radar, armament,
propuls' and helicopters agree generally with
community itions -- except for factors listed in
Paragraph 4. states that, based on ship's charac-
teristics, a si mission cannot be defined but that
its capabilities ate that it will fulfill a major
requirement of the t naval forces. The conclusion
is that the primary ro of the ship could be either
ASW or a command ship in an intervention force, with
the latter being favored.
3. OSR continues to believe that the ship was
built for one specific role and that, even though it
could perform different tasks, it is not a multi-purpose
ship. Study of Soviet naval strategy, US naval assault
helicopter operations and recent developments during
the Moskva's sea trials have strengthened our view that
the helicopter carrier is intended primarily for employ-
ment in an ASW role.
TCS No. 879/68
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4, Characteristics
Although there is general agreement on the
characteristics of the ship there are several factors
worthy of discussion. Intelligence acquired within
the past few weeks is pertinent to at least two of
these items:
a. Waterline Beam
The DIA article estimates that the water-
i ne beam is 100 feet and, based upon this beam,
that the ship has a displacement of 23,000 tons.
Later, more accurate measurements indicate that
the figures should be 87 feet and 19,000 tons.
While DIA makes a comparison with other ships to
indicate ample capacity for amphibious assualt,
we believe that the comparison is misleading
because of the differences in construction, arma-
ment and equipment. A preliminary analysis of the
weight distribution of the 23,000 tons suggested
several thousand tons of possible excess carrying
capacity that could be allocated for assault forces;
the later figures do not permit such an assessment.
b. S i Doors
The .cle says that "the possibility of
25X1D3a stern doors ca be eliminated''. Analysis of
the construc-
tion period indica that the ship has a closed
stern. The hangar and elevators occupy the
deep bay just below light deck. Incorporation
of a well deck and stern doors is incompatible
with this configuration.
5. Helicopters
a. Model to be Deployed
DIA states that, although the Harp/Hormone
military helicopters are most likely to be deployed
aboard Moskva, the Hound and Hip types cannot be
+.. excluded. The analysis disregards as a valid indi-
ator, the size of the elevators which limit their
0, 1
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use to the Harp/Hormone helicopter. Also dis-
regarded was a Harp/Hormone helicopter seen aboard
the Moskva in October 1967. Twenty-three Harp/
hormone type helicopters and 10-12 crates were
f
at Kacha airfield, site o
a known ASW helicopter base in the Crimea;
yew days a er the os va appeare at ancior a
few miles off Kacha. In view of a
statement that helicopters intended for ep oymen
aboard the carrier were located at Kacha, the evi-
dence of an intention to employ Harp/Hormone types
is considered conclusive.
b. ASW Configured
During the past year, deployment of the
Hormone aboard Soviet ships has been underway.
To date the helicopter has been seen on four space
support ships and two submarine tenders. In all
cases the helicopters had a radome as well as
other suspect electronic devices. Recently a
Hormone helicopter similarly configured was shown
on Soviet TV participating in an ASW exercise and
dropping what appeared to be small depth charges.
For these reasons we believe Hormone helicopters
deployed aboard Soviet ships are fitted for an ASW
role.
6. The Carrier Force
DIA believes that, if ASW is to be the primary
role, the construction of only two units indicates
either that the Soviets intend to restrict this capabi-
lity to a single limited ocean area or that they desire
to evaluate the performance of the weapon system prior
to expending additional resources for more units. We
agree with the latter point, i.e., that the Soviets
would wish to evaluate the performance of the Moskva
and the Leningrad before constructing additional units.
The carriers initially may be deployed to the
an can Sea, because of the current high level of
naval in that area and favorable conditions
for conduc114viroperations against US submarines. However,
4ee
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we believe, that if successful, the helicopter carriers
will not be restricted to the Mediterranean but will be
directed against the Polaris submarine force elsewhere.
7. Soviet Requirements
The DIA article speaks of an "obvious" Soviet
"need for an intervention force". However, at the time
the Moskva was designed, 1961-62, Soviet writings con-
cerning their naval requirements indicated primary
concern with the growing US strategic threat and ASW was
emerging as a critical requirement. Since then, as part
of the effort to improve their ASW capabilities, the
Soviets have expanded a number of programs. They are
developing new attack submarines, patrol aircraft, heli-
copters and surface ships. Efforts are underway toward
production of variable depth sonar, submarine mounted
sonar, hydroacoustic detection systems and antisubmarine
weapons. Kashin class frigates have been redesignated
as ASW ships and the new Kresta class cruisers are
equipped to carry two helicopters in a hangar. Large
surface combatants, all of which are equipped with heli-
copter landing pads, are well suited to operate with
the Moskva in an ASW task force.
8. Vertical Assault
a. Fleet Support
The Mediterranean Squadron is the only de-
ployed surface force which has operated in distant
waters on a continuing basis. As presently con-
F ,ured, even with the Moskva included, this force
t land an assault force against a defended
shore.'' Soviets would require a logistic
supply fo d additional landing ships. If, by
the term "in ntion," DIA means a capability to
land troops without opposition, the Moskva could be
used but then so could a variety of other ships
including standard cargo ships.
b. Operating Limitations
US experience in operatin helicopter
carriers in a vertical assault has revealed
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a number of problem areas if the Moskva is to be
used as a key part of an intervention force.
These relate to the fundamental problem of the
race against time which must dominate such
operations in order to ensure survival of the
assault troops. The US initial effort was a con-
version of an existing aircraft carrier. This ship
had five landing spots and a somewhat tortuous
system for movement of supplies. Limitations caused
by the movement of materiel and the handling of
helicopters caused unacceptable delays in the build-
up and supply of forces in a drop zone. Under
optimum conditions 9 hours were required to land a
complete marine battalion landing team.
The US then developed the LPH's which had
eight landing spots and specially designed cargo
handling facilities. Even so the flight deck
(about 600 feet) restricted capabilities and the
US has now evolved a concept using converted Essex
class carriers and LPH's together.
The flight deck of the Moskva (285 feet)
not only restricts helicopter operations due to
turbulance across the flight deck created by the
arge superstructure forward but assault operations
r would be restricted to two landing positions
beck the need for helicopter refueling and
mainten e cycles. This small area, combined with
difficul es in maintaining logistic flow stemming
from location of its two small elevators would
limit troop movement to a force of company size,
about 200 men.
The concept of dual role, i.e., the ability to
carry out an ASW mission and a vertical assault mission
interchangeably, probably is not workable. The use of
helicopters and ships in the two roles require differ-
ences in equipment configuration and training which are
incompatible.
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All intelligence received to date which bears
directly on the role intended by the Soviets for these
ships appears ASW related.
a. ~. possible, large sonar dome was observed
in June 1967 at the Nikolayev shipyard alongside
the Leningrad while it was being outfitted, sug-
gesting that the carriers are sonar equipped.
c. On 23 October 1967, Moskva was at sea in
an ASW associated exercise involving a submarine,
several surface ships and four Black Sea Fleet
aircraft.
11.. Minesweeping
The US is beginning to use helicopters in a
minesweeping role but this use is limited to very
shallow water which would be inconsistent with Moskva's
ocean-going capability. The suggestion of a minesweep-
ing role for the Moskva class appears almost frivolous.
They are heavily built and armed surface combatants of
cruiser size. A preliminary assessment of their cost
suggests that it is probably in the upper portion of
themiiti4 4e..:between 100 and 200 million dollars each.
We agree that the Moskva can be used as a
command ship. Such use is predicated on size rather
than the military capabilities of the ship. Cruisers
of the Sverdlov, Kynda, anxses have been
used in such a manner as"ave s ne tenders of the
Ugra and Don classes.
BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research
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