COMBINED WATCH REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 30, 2009
Sequence Number: 
9
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 24, 1965
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1.pdf139.86 KB
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Conclusions COMBINED WATCH REPORT of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD 24 February `960 25X1 We have detected no Soviet Bloc military activity indicating preparathons for offensive military action in the immediate future a ainst the United States. 4s overseas forces or its Allies . We have no evidence to indicate that there has been an southward deov- ment of Chinese round combat units. the peoples of US allies. Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1 There are continuing indications that North Vietnam is moving men and Bloc International Developments ropaganda moves reflect continuing efforts to corgi - tic and l di p oma p Soviet cate relations between the US and its allies and to foster the notion that the US .eod=3r p is facing increasing opposition both at home and abroad to its policies on Vietnam. Soviet public media are attempting to depict mounting opposition from "an ever g-ow +,qy number" of people in the US to Vietnam policies and claim that the same s t',-re amo,eg Critical Areas i , Communist China, We have no evidence to indicate that there ITas bee- ar?7 southward de Io ment of Chinese round combat units. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1 Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1 24 February 1966 completed to within a few miles of the Cambodian border. 25X1 orth Vietnam into the Panhandle and thus relieve the present North Vietnamese de- pendence on the roads in the Mu Gia Pass area for truck movements. In the extre=me southern Panhandle, a new road begun since 1 October from the Chavane area has been 2. North Vietnam: North Vietnamese plans to continue a large-scale movement of troops and supplies into South Vietnam are indicated by the intensive and widespread effort to improve and expand the logistic routes through the Laos Panhandle, It has be- come apparent that an intensified construction program involving thousands of workers has been under way on these routes for some time. In addition to the construction of numerous bypasses and alternate roads adjacent to the existing main supply routes, work has begun on a new road between Route 911 and North Vietnam, about midway between Mu Gl~, and the demilitarized zone, which may be intended to provide a new route from N In two recent articles in the party daily, North Vietnam has taken an :x- tremely tough line on a political settlement of the war. The language of the statements is confident and bellicose, in contrast to reports of supply difficulties sinking morale among the Communist forces in South Vietnam. 25X1 rrucKs per day, or about double that of last year. 25X1 3. South Vietnam: The identification of another North Vietnamese reg.ment, 25X1 the "Quyet 'ram" regiment, four months after its reported arrival in South Vietnam, again demonstrates that North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam are normally identified only after engagement in combat and that their infiltration into the south cannot be firmed on a current basis. We continue to believe, namese regiments arrived in late October or early November. 125X1 rg evel of infiltration has been continuing since the last firmly identified Nort1 Wet- L that a 25X1 There is also growing evidence that at least some infiltrated North VieHamese regiments are comprised not only of infantry battalions but also include organic repimental support companies (AA, mortar, transport, etc), and that the regiments are subordinate to "field front" or task force tactical headquarters, which in some cases also include Viet 25X1 Cnnri itoi+c Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1 , Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1 25X1 24 February 1966 Within recent weeks, I c 25X1 general southward movement of major commands and North Vietnamese regiments in Military Region V. The 325th Division "Front" Headquarters and elements of at feast two of its regiments have moved from Pleiku into Darlac Province, and a similar south- ward movement has been evident in the coastal provinces. The reported southward move of the North Vietnamese 6th Regiment from Quang Tin to Quang Ngai Prov-nce would leave no identified North Vietnamese units in the four northern provinces. These moves are suggestive of a coordinated strategy and plan of operations in the coastal and highlands areas. 25X1 a plan to step up the strength of the Com- 25X1 munist party element of the Viet Cong political apparatus in Saigon as well as plans to form stronger military forces in the capital area by mid-1966 to exploit the situation in the city if another coup should disorganize government forces there. Pending such an opportunity, the political task reportedly will be to exploit existing economic and social problems in the cities. An article in the January issue of the Communist party theoretical journal for South Vietnam clearly set forth party orders to blunt government effor*s at pacification in rural areas and to organize and coordinate anti-regime activities in the 4. Laos: Strong Communist forces, believed to be mostly North Vietnamese troops, on 18 February overran the important government base and air strip at Na Khang in Sam Neua Province. Government reinforcements are being moved into Muong Hiem, a few miles to the northwest, which will probably be the next target of the Communist (attacks. If the Communist forces are able to secure Route 6, they will have an alternate supply route from North Vietnam into the Plaine des Jarres area. 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/01/30: CIA-RDP79B00864A000100010009-1