TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001300060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

/?Iecopad eary
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Secret
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Trends in Soviet Military Manpower
Secret
SR 77-10103
September 1977
Copy N2 106
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Trends in Soviet Military Manpower
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1977
Key Judgments
The Soviet armed forces today, according to our estimates, total about
4.6 million men, more than double the number in the US armed forces. The
level of military manpower has been increasing since the early sixties and has
grown by a half million men since 1968.
About 3.9 million men presently serve in the USSR's Ground Forces,
Air Forces, Air Defense Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, and national
command and support structure. Soviet military Construction and Transpor-
tation Troops, which have no direct equivalent in the US armed forces,
currently include approximately 370,000 uniformed troops. An additional
340,000 men are assigned to the militarized security forces subordinate to
the Committee for State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In
addition to uniformed military personnel, an estimated 680,000 civilians
currently work for the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the militarized
security forces.
The growth in Soviet military manpower over the past 10 years has
been driven in large part by the continuing expansion and modernization of
the Ground Forces. Additions of men to the Ground Forces have accounted
for about 65 percent of the total military manpower growth between 1968
and 1977. Nonetheless, each of the major force elements in the military,
except the Strategic Rocket Forces, has expanded to some extent and the
distribution of manpower among the services has remained relatively
constant during the period.
On the basis of current manning practices and anticipated weapons
deployment programs, we expect the total number of uniformed men in the
Soviet armed forces to grow only slightly to about 4.7 million by 1985. This
change will be led by a continued expansion of the Soviet Ground Forces,
but offset somewhat by declines in the Air Defense Forces, the Strategic
Rocket Forces, and the Navy.
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The Soviet military system depends on conscription to provide about
65 to 75 percent of its total military manpower. Demographic pressures,
however, will soon require some adjustments in current manpower policies
and practices in order to maintain military forces at projected levels.
Beginning in 1978, the number of men reaching conscription eligibility each
year-a group that also provides the major portion of new labor resources-
will begin to decline. At the same time, the manpower needs of both the
armed forces and the civilian economy will continue to grow.
The resulting competition between the two sectors for labor resources
may be intensified by qualitative considerations. Future population growth
is expected to center in the Central Asian, Kazakh, and Transcaucasian
Republics. These republics are populated by ethnic minorities who at present
are ill equipped to deal with the technological complexities of the armed
forces.
We do not believe that major adjustments in current military manpower
policies would be required to maintain anticipated manning levels. Soviet
military manpower requirements probably can be met by pursuing some
combination of options, including lowering the number of conscription
deferments, retaining greater numbers of military career service personnel,
extending the term of conscripted service, and supplementing full-time
soldiers with reservists recalled to active duty for short periods. Recent
changes to the military service law, including extension of obligatory service
for conscripts with higher education, suggest that the Soviets have already
begun to face up to the problem.
While some combination of these options probably would enable the
Soviets to meet their military needs, any of them would result in the
military's commanding a greater proportion of the USSR's new labor
resources than it currently does. There will be resistance to this from
managers of the civilian economy as the competition for labor resources
increases. Certainly, pressures will exist within the Soviet hierarchy to reduce
the size of the armed forces. In deciding how to alleviate strains in the
civilian economy, however, the Soviets are unlikely to forgo what they
perceive to be an adequate defensive capability.
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Soviet Military Manpower: 1968-1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of Manpower Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Individual Force Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3
Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Air Defense Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Strategic Rocket Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
National Command and Support . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Militarized Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Conscription System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Demographic Pressures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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This report traces the growth of Soviet military manpower levels over
the past 10 years and examines variations in the allocation of manpower
among the USSR's armed services and military support elements. The
allocation of manpower within the defense establishment provides an
indicator of the size, priorities, and rate of change of the total military effort
of the USSR. Additionally, the report discusses demographic problems
which Soviet military manpower planners will face in the future.
The point of departure for this report was a joint study on the subject
completed by CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency in early 1975.' That
study was the first detailed reassessment of Soviet military manpower since
the late sixties.
During the next two years, CIA conducted an intensive research effort
to improve the 1975 estimate and to develop a time series. This effort
focused on improving our understanding of the organization of the Soviet
armed forces and deriving more accurate manning factors. These manning
factors were applied to organizational units of the armed forces and to order
of battle information.
Despite the uncertainties stemming from limited information and
definitional ambiguities, we believe that our estimates of aggregate military
personnel levels accurately portray the growth pattern of the past 10 years
and that this estimate for the middle 1970s is within 15 percent of the actual
figure. This assessment, however, is based on subjective judgment rather than
on a rigorous statistical analysis of uncertainty. Estimates of manning levels
for some units, especially front-line combat units, are thought to be
relatively more accurate, while others, such as those for many support
elements, are less so. We generally have less confidence in the accuracy of
our estimates of civilians working for the Ministry of Defense, because these
are based on less data and analysis than our estimates for military personnel.
A brief discussion of the method used by the CIA to derive its
manpower estimates can be found in the Annex, beginning on page 13.
' The results of the study were published as Reassessment: Soviet Armed Forces Personnel Strengths,
Part II November 1975, SECRET.
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Major Categories of
Military Manpower Subordinate to the Ministry of Defense
Main Political
Directorate
HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPORT FOR:
Ground Forces
Air Defense
Forces
Military
Districts and Air Defense
Groups of Districts
Forces
Ministry of Defense
Staffs, Directorates, and Agencies
(and subordinate elements such as
construction and transportation troops)
Strategic
Rocket Forces
Air Armies Fleets and
Flotillas
Strategic
Rocket Forces
Armies
Subordinate Subordinate Subordinate Subordinate Subordinate
Elements Elements Elements Elements Elements
NOTE: Although the militarized security forces are discussed in this report, they
do not appear here because they, aare subordinate either to the Committee for
State Security or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not the Ministry of Defense.
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Trends in Soviet Military Manpower
Soviet Military Manpower: 1968-1977
Organization
The Soviet military manpower structure in-
cludes seven major functional groups-five
armed services, the national command and
support organizations, and the militarized secu-
rity forces2 (see figure 1). Each of these
functional groups includes uniformed personnel
and civilians.
The five services are the Ground Forces, Air
Defense Forces, Air Forces, Navy, and the
Strategic Rocket Forces. Each has its own
command authority with combat and direct
support elements subordinate to it. The national
command and support category includes person-
nel filling command and staff positions in the
Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Main
Political Administration, and troops assigned
central support functions. These functions in-
clude the construction of military facilities and
the transportation of military men and materiel.
The militarized security forces consist of the
Border Guards and the Signal Troops of the
Committee for State Security (KGB) and the
Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD).
Overview of Manpower Trends
Published Soviet data indicate that at the end
of World War II, the armed forces of the USSR
totaled just over 11 million men. Rapid demobi-
2Personnel assigned to the militarized security forces are not
administratively subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. They
are included in this report because the Soviets include them in
their legal definition of the armed forces of the USSR. Men in
these elements receive a form of basic military training similar
to that of the regular armed forces, are equipped with light
military weapons, and perform military functions during war-
time. In addition, service in these elements fulfills the Soviet
military service obligation as defined by the 1967 Law on
Universal Military Service.
lization brought the total down to less than 6
million in 1950. The size of the armed forces
increased sharply during the early fifties as a
result of the Korean conflict but declined
steadily thereafter to slightly more than 3
million men in mid-1960.
The last major cutback began in 1960 when
Premier Khrushchev announced plans to reduce
the number of armed forces personnel by 1.2
million between January 1960 and the end of
1961. This cutback resulted from Khrushchev's
desire to change the composition and structure
of the armed forces. He wanted to deemphasize
traditional manpower-intensive military forces
in favor of smaller forces equipped with ad-
vanced weapons systems.
In June 1961, Khrushchev indicated publicly
that the demobilization had been halted tempo-
rarily. Some Soviet writers have suggested that
the planned reductions were later resumed and
eventually completed. Information from other
sources tends to confirm that demobilization
did occur during the period, but it is not firm
enough to verify that reductions of the magni-
tudes described by the Soviets were made.
After 1961 the size of the armed forces began
to grow in response to several events:
? Following the ouster of Premier Khrush-
chev and what many observers interpreted as
Soviet backdowns in both the Berlin and
Cuban crises, the Soviets began to revitalize
their general purpose military forces.
? Increased tensions with China throughout
the middle sixties created larger demands for
troops along the Sino-Soviet border.
? An earlier Soviet belief that any major
confrontation with NATO would quickly
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escalate to the level of nuclear exchange
began to give way to the view that a
conventional war of some duration was possi-
ble.
We estimate that by 1968, Soviet uniformed
military manpower stood at just over 4.1 million
men.' Over 3.1 million of these were assigned to
the five armed services; some 660,000, including
about 370,000 Construction and Transportation
Troops. were categorized as national command
and support personnel; and about 330,000 were
militarized security forces of the KGB and
MVD.
Today we estimate that the USSR has about
4.6 million men in the military. The five armed
services account for 3.6 million; national com-
Growth Pattern of
Military Manpower, 1968-1977
FIGURE 2 1
mand and support elements, including Construe- 1 3.5
tion and Transportation Troops, make up an
additional 710,000; and militarized security
forces about 340,000 (see figure 2).
The growth of military manpower over the
past 10 years has resulted primarily from con-
tinuing expansion and modernization of the
Ground Forces. Additions to the Ground Forces
25
have accounted for about 65 percent of the
total military manpower growth during the
period, reflecting the long-standing Soviet com-
mitment to maintain a strong army. Because 20
each of the major force elements in the military;
except for the Strategic Rocket Forces, also
expanded to some extent between 1968 and
1977, the allocation of men among the services 1.5
has not changed significantly. This situation
contrasts with that in the early 1960s, when the
Strategic Rocket Forces expanded rapidly at the
expense of conventional forces. 1.0
In addition to uniformed military personnel,
the Ministry of Defense and the militarized
security forces employ a large number of civil-
ians. We estimate that some 680,000 civilians 0.5
currently are employed in support positions
among all seven of the major functional groups,
up from 610,000 in 1968.
3Figures represent midyear totals.
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Disposition of Military Manpower, 1968-1977*
In Thousands
Ground Forces
1,430
1,430
1,470
1,550
1,590
1,670
1,700
1,720
1,720
1,760
Air Defense Forces
550
570
560
560
560
560
560
560
580
590
Air Forces
460
460
470
480
480
490
490
500
520
530
Navy
360
360
370
380
380
380
380
380
380
390
Strategic Rocket Forces
370
380
390
400
400
390
390
380
380
330
National Command and
Support
290
300
310
310
310
310
310
320
330
340
Subtotal
3,450
3,490
3,560
3,670
3,720
3,800
3,840
3,880
3,920
3,940
Construction and
Transportation Troops
370
370
370
370
370
370
370
370
370
370
Subtotal
3,820
3,860
3,930
4,040
4,010
4,170
4,210
4,250
4,300
4,310
Militarized Security
Forces
330
330
330
330
330
330
330
340
340
340
Total
4,150
4,190
4,270
4,370
4,430
4,500
4,540
4,580
4,640
4,640
Individual Force Elements4
Ground Forces
The main combat element of the Soviet
Ground Forces is the division, of which there
are three types -motorized rifle, tank, and air-
borne. These divisions are controlled by corps,
army, and military district headquarters and by
an extensive command and support organiza-
tion. In 1977, the Ground Forces included 171
line divisions, 22 mobilization divisions', 33
corps and army headquarters, and miscellaneous
command and support elements.
Over the past 10 years the ground forces have
grown by nearly 25 percent--from just under
1.43 million men to over 1.76 million (see figure
4Manpower estimates discussed in individual force elements
include only uniformed military personnel.
5A mobilization division consists of a planning staff or com-
mand element and administrative and maintenance support per-
sonnel-numbering about 200 people-who may be colocated
with an active division. A mobilization division may also have a
stock of equipment parked in typical divisional arrangements.
3). This growth reflects a continuing desire to
modernize and expand the capabilities of the
Ground Forces, as well as an ad hoc response to
international events.
Plans to modernize the Ground Forces prob-
ably were formulated in the early 1960s. In-
creasing tensions along the border with China,
however, delayed implementation of these
plans. Instead, the Soviets began to establish
new combat divisions and to move existing
divisions to the border areas. Most of this
buildup was completed by the end of 1969. The
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 prompted
the Soviets to flesh out some of their cadre
strength divisions, further increasing Ground
Forces manpower totals.
Expansion and modernization of the Ground
Forces probably began in 1966 and continued
thereafter, despite disruptions from situations
like the Sino-Soviet border dispute. There were
numerous changes during the next seven years;
the estimated table of organization for motor-
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Ground Forces
Military Manpower, 1968-1977
grew as training regiments were added at the
army level and the logistics structure was ex-
panded.
Air Defense Forces
Air Defense Forces (PVO) are composed of
surface-to-air missile (SAM) units, antiballistic
missile (ABM) and antisat4lite units, interceptor
aircraft regiments, radio-technical troops, and
several other command and support elements.
Their primary task, of course, is to defend the
homeland against air and missile attack. The
Soviets' emphasis on these tasks is reflected in
the large commitment of military manpower to
air defense. The PVO is the second largest
branch of service.
Over the past 10 years, active-duty PVO
manpower has grown by over 40,000 to about
590,000 (see figure 4). These men operate and
maintain some 1,240 SAM sites, 2,600 inter-
ceptor aircraft, and over 1,100 early warning
and ground-controlled intercept (EW/GCI) sites.
The numbers of SAM sites and their associ-
ated manpower rose through the late sixties and
early seventies as the deployment of new SAM
systems more than offset reductions in the
number of deployed SA-2 sites. Since 1971,
however, the overall numbers of SAM sites and
men have remained relatively stable, as SA-2 site
deactivations have compensated for the con-
tinuing deployment of the more modem SA-3
and SA-5 missile systems.
Interceptor aircraft inventories assigned to
the PVO declined through the early seventies as
the Soviets retired large numbers of obsolescent
aircraft and replaced them with fewer but more
capable ones. Since 1974, the number of inter-
ceptors subordinate to the PVO has remained
relatively constant, although the composition of
the force has continued to change. Manpower
associated with these systems also declined
through the early seventies but has gradually
begun to increase. The growth in manpower,
despite a fairly stable number of aircraft, re-
sulted from the replacement of older aircraft
with new interceptors with more complex sub-
increased by over 2,000 men,
while that for tank divisions rose by about
1,500. These changes, some of which are con-
tinuing, reflected in part an increase in the
number of tanks, armored personnel carriers,
and artillery pieces at the regimental level.
Ground Forces support personnel strengths also
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Air Defense
Military Manpower, 1968-1977
deployment of operational ABM units, which
began in 1966, added a new category of
manpower to the PVO.
systems which require greater numbers of
people to ensure adequate maintenance.
Since 1968 the number of men assigned to
PVO EW/GCI sites has increased by more than
30 percent. This growth reflects an effort to
ensure more effective command and control of
the operating forces. Additionally, the initial
Air Forces
The Soviet Air Forces are composed of
central command and support elements and
three major aviation elements-Frontal Aviation,
Military Transport Aviation, and Long Range
Aviation. Each of these elements has its own
command and support apparatus.
The manpower strength of the Air Forces has
grown from about 460,000 in 1968 to about
530,000 in 1977. The increases result primarily
from a buildup of tactical aviation units and
from an increase in the airlift capabilities of
Military Transport Aviation (see figure 5).
Frontal Aviation. Frontal Aviation provides
tactical air support to the Ground Forces. To
accomplish this, military manpower in Frontal
Aviation-which
has about 4,500
aircraft, an
increase
of 35
percent over the
1968 inven-
tory-has
increased from about
180,000 to
about 240,000. The growth in the number of
men and the introduction of a new generation
of more capable aircraft have enabled the force
to shift from an almost exclusively defensive
orientation to a more balanced mix of offensive
and defensive capabilities.
Military Transport Aviation. The aircraft as-
signed to Military Transport Aviation provide
the logistic air support required by the rest of
the armed forces. Personnel assigned to this
element have increased from about 70,000 in
1968 to about 110,000 today.
The major part of this growth accompanied a
twofold increase in the number of general
purpose helicopters assigned to Transport Avia-
tion. The remaining increases reflect the steady
procurement of additional medium- and long-
range transport aircraft by this air force ele-
ment.
Long Range Aviation. The medium- and
long-range bombers of Soviet Long Range Avia-
tion are tasked with carrying out air strikes
against enemy targets in Europe, Asia, and
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North America. The number of personnel as-
signed to it declined steadily through the 1960s
as land- and sea-based strategic missile forces
assumed an increasing portion of the USSR.'s
strategic deterrence mission.
Over the past decade, the number of men
assigned to Long Range Aviation has declined
Air Forces
Military Manpower, 1968-1977
slightly to just over 60,000 in 1977. This de-
crease parallels reductions in the number of air-
craft, particularly medium-range bombers, in the
force.
Navy
The Soviet Navy has a wide range of responsi-
bilities and requires different types of forces to
accomplish them. These forces include surface
ships and submarines, naval aviation, naval
infantry, coastal defense units, and their associ-
ated specific command and support elements,
including fleet and flotilla staffs and rear serv-
ices organizations. in addition, the Navy has a
command and support structure consisting of
personnel assigned to positions in the national
Naval Military Manpower, 1968-1977
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naval command apparatus and to subordinate
support functions.
Over the past 10 years, the number of
uniformed personnel assigned to the Navy has
grown from approximately 360,000 to almost
390,000 men (see figure 6). This relatively small
increase, however, does not reflect the rapid
growth of naval capabilities and responsibilities
through the period. Since the middle sixties, the
Navy has been transformed from a force ori-
ented toward defense of Soviet coastal waters to
one capable of carrying out a variety of missions
in more distant seas.
Strategic Rocket Forces
The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) are com-
posed of operational units (equipped with me-
dium-range, intermediate-range, and interconti-
nental-range ballistic missiles) and miscellaneous
command and support elements. Created as a
separate branch of service in the late 1950s, the
SRF grew rapidly through the 1960s and peaked
at about 400,000 men in 1972, declining since
then to a current level of just over 330,000 (see
figure 7).
The rapid growth in estimated SRF man-
power was caused by two separate develop-
ments. In the early sixties a rapid buildup in the
numbers of MRBMs and IRBMs caused a cor-
responding buildup in force manpower. In the
middle sixties the Soviets began a rapid deploy-
ment of ICBM systems; this continued the
growth pattern and more than offset a slight
decline in the numbers of MRBM and IRBM
units after 1965.
The main factor in the manpower reduction
since 1972 has been the dismantling of some of
the older launch facilities-especially the man-
power-intensive version of the SS-7 ICBM sys-
tem that was launched from soft sites-to com-
ply with the terms of the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Agreement.
National Command and Support
Personnel grouped in the national command
and support category are those assigned to the
offices and staffs of the Ministry of Defense, the
Main Political Directorate, and the General Staff
Strategic Rocket Forces
Military Manpower, 1968-1977
as well as Construction and Transportation
Troops. Construction and Transportation
Troops, which have no direct equivalent in the
US armed forces, account for just over half of
the men in this category. In the aggregate, the
number of uniformed men assigned to national
command and support elements grew from
about 660,000 to 710,000 between 1968 and
1977 (see figure 8).
Four elements account for about 85 percent
of this increase. The number of Ministry of
Defense Signal Troops rose markedly, reflecting
Soviet efforts to strengthen the command and
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National Command and Support control network. Another area of growth was in
Military Manpower, 1968-1977
the number of Soviet military advisers stationed
abroad-an indication of the USSR's in-
FIGURE 8 creasingly active military assistance program.
The military political schools subordinate to the
8001 1 Main Political Directorate also expanded
through the late sixties as the Soviets sought to
improve the training of officers whose task it
was to ensure political conformity within the
armed forces. Somewhat smaller gains were re-
corded in the number of personnel assigned to
sensitive operations complexes subordinate to
the 12th Chief Directorate, as the Soviets con-
tinued to construct such facilities through 1974.
Militarized Security Forces
Militarized security forces include the KGB
Border Guards and the MVD Internal Troops.
The Border Guards are responsible for patrolling
the USSR's 65,000 kilometers of land and water
borders. The MVD Internal Troops are respon-
sible for maintaining public order and for
guarding government installations and correc-
tional facilities.
About 340,000 men are assigned to these
forces. The nature of their responsibilities is
relatively static, and we estimate that these
security forces have not changed in size signifi-
cantly during the past 10 years.
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Civilians
The Ministry of Defense and the militarized
security forces employ a large number of civil-
ians, who work in all branches of the armed
forces and in national-level support positions
(see table). Over the past 10 years, the number
of civilians working for the Ministry of Defense
has grown from 590,000 to about 660,000 men,
while the number employed by the militarized
security forces has remained relatively constant
at about 20,000.
Our estimates of civilians working for the
armed forces generally are based on less infor-
mation than those of uniformed military person-
nel. Several types of institutions subordinate to
the Ministry of Defense-special research insti-
tutes and military farms, for example-report-
8
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Civilian Employees of the Ministry of Defense
and Militarized Security Forces, 1977
Ground Forces
260,000
Air Defense Forces
30,000
Air Forces
100,000
Navy
110,000
Strategic Rocket Forces
40,000
National Command and Support
100,000
Subtotal
640,000
Construction and Transportation Troops
20,000
Subtotal
660,000
Militarized Security Forces
20,000
Total
680,000
edly employ civilians, but these institutions have
not been included because we are unable to
estimate the number of their employees. The
inclusion of these categories could significantly
increase our estimate of civilian employment in
the Ministry of Defense.
The Conscription System
One of the prominent features of the Soviet
military manpower procurement system is its
dependence on conscription. We estimate that
conscripts provide about 65 to 75 percent of
total uniformed military manpower.
Conscription is governed by the 1967 Law on
Universal Military Service. Under its terms, most
conscripts serve for two years. Those assigned to
shipboard billets of the Navy or seagoing ele-
ments of the Border Guards serve three years.
Recently, the Soviets changed the section of the
draft law pertaining to conscripts with higher
(college-equivalent) education. These men now
are obligated to serve for 18 months (two years
for naval service) instead of one year as stipu-
lated in the 1967 law. Induction of conscripts
takes place twice a year-in the spring and fall.'
'Under the previous Soviet draft law, promulgated in 1939,
conscripts had to serve for three or four years depending on the
branch of service to which they were assigned. Additionally, the
old law required that induction occur only once a year.
The use of conscription to supply most of
their military manpower has advantages and
disadvantages for the Soviets. Conscription pro-
vides large numbers of able-bodied young men
to the armed forces at low monetary cost. It
also provides a large pool of experienced mili-
tary reservists who are available for mobilization
in times of crisis. Moreover, the Soviets believe
this almost universal conscription is a good
vehicle for the political indoctrination of a large
number of its citizens.
On the other hand, the reliance on short-term
draftees to supply the bulk of defense man-
power contributes to the armed forces' peren-
nial shortage of skilled personnel.' This prob-
lem, which is discussed periodically in Soviet
writings, could impair the ability of the armed
forces. The effects of these shortages may
become worse as the Soviets continue to mod-
ernize their armed forces by introducing more
complex weapons systems.
Demographic Pressures
The armed forces compete with civilian in-
dustry for young men entering the labor force.
Demographic pressures may increase the inten-
sity of this competition in the 1980s. While the
manpower needs of both the armed forces and
civilian. industry are expected to grow, the
supply of new labor resources is expected to
fall.
The Soviets have faced this situation before.
During the late fifties and early sixties, Soviet
planners dealt with a labor shortage resulting
from the low World War II birthrates by a series
of institutional adjustments. These included en-
couraging housewives to return to work, elimi-
nating one grade in the public school system,
and permitting pensioners to work without loss
of annuity.
The Soviets' treatment of labor problems in
the early 1960s removed so much slack from the
'Shortages also result from the inability of the Soviets to retain
significant numbers of trained personnel in the armed forces.
They have had little success in persuading soldiers and sailors to
reenlist. Soviet military service is harsh and demanding, and few
enlisted personnel are inclined to make military life a career.
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labor pool that the only significant remaining
source of new labor was young people just
entering the work force. It is this source of labor
that will decline in the years ahead.
Competition between civilian and military
uses of manpower is not new to the Soviets. The
consequences of manpower losses and the low
birthrate in World War II were first felt during
the late fifties. The annual supply of 19-year-old
males (the draft age at that time) dropped by
about 60 percent-from 2.4 million in 1955 to
less than 1 million in 1961. The impact of this
decline was softened, however, by concurrent
reductions in the size of the armed forces.
Moreover, during that time the draft law re-
quired most conscripts to serve three years. This
meant that shortages of personnel in one year
could be eased by spreading them over two
others.
By the middle 1960s, the yearly conscript
pools, or cohorts8, rose to over 2 million for the
first time in 10 years. The cohort size has
continued to rise slowly to its current level of
nearly
2.6
million. This steady
rise in the
number
of
18-year-olds gave the
Soviets the
flexibility to modify their draft law in 1967 and
has allowed them to interpret more liberally the
provisions in that law permitting deferments
from conscripted service for continuation of
education, family hardship, or medical unsuit-
ability. We estimate that over the past 10 years,
the Soviets have drafted between 65 and 75
percent of each cohort in order to maintain the
armed forces at these manning levels.
In the coming decade the numbers of 18-year-
olds available each year will fall to 1967 levels.
The cohort size is expected to drop from a high
of over 2.6 million in 1978 to about 2 million in
19859, and to remain near that level through
the remainder of the 1980s (see figure 9).
The USSR's manpower problem is even more
serious when qualitative considerations are
in this context, a cohort is defined as the total number of
Soviet males who reach draft age in a given year.
Numbers of Soviet Males Reaching
Draft Age Yearly, 1968-1990
taken into account. The only areas expected to
show significant population growth in the future
are the Central Asian, Kazakh, and Transcauca-
sian Republics-areas where industrialization
and urbanization have been relatively slow and
where Russian is not the native language. Incor-
poration of these peoples into the mainstream
of modern society-and the armed forces-in a
politically acceptable manner is a problem that
Soviet planners are being forced to confront.
Prospects
Estimates of Soviet military manpower re-
quirements through the middle 1980s reflect
our belief that existing programs will continue
and that new and more complex conventional
and strategic weapon systems will be deployed.
Estimates of the manpower required to operate
these weapon systems are derived using existing
manning factors for currently deployed units
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Alternatives for Meeting
Future Military Manpower Needs, 1976-1990
Term of conscripted service =2 years
70-75% of forces are conscripts
5 80% of 18-year-old males are conscripted
75% of 18-year-old males are conscripted
65% of 18-year-old males are conscripted
0
V I I I I
Varying Length of
Conscripted Service
PP-
65% of 18-year-old males are conscripted
Career force =25-30% of total
Term of conscripted service=2.5 years
Term of conscripted service=2.0 years
1=40% of total
2=35% of total
3==30% of total
4==25% of total
5=20% of total
MAXIMUM:
80% of 18-year-old males are conscripted
Term of conscripted service=2.5 years
Career force= 40% of total
MINIMUM:
1 65% of 10-year-old males are conscripted
Term of conscripted service=2.0 years
Career force= 20% of total
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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and predicted manning estimates for future
weapons.
On this basis, we expect the number of men
assigned to the armed forces to continue to
grow only slightly by 1985 to a level of roughly
4.7 million men, a net increase of less than
100,000.
Manpower requirements for some of the
individual force elements are expected to con-
tinue to increase in the future. Specifically:
e The Ground and Air Forces are expected to
continue to grow through the next 10 years
as additional units are added.
? The number of men assigned to the Air
Defense Forces is expected to grow through
the remainder of the 1970s as new aircraft are
added. Air Defense manpower should decline
thereafter, however, as less manpower-inten-
sive SAM systems replace older ones.
The growth in the preceding areas will more
than offset the following projected declines in
individual force manpower requirements:
? The SRF is expected to continue to lose
manpower through the early 1980s. If newer
missile systems-particularly mobile types--
enter the force in larger numbers, SRF man-
power will again grow.
? Naval manpower is expected to decline
through the 1970s and to remain relatively
stable from 1980 to 1985. The number of
men in shipboard billets is expected to
decline throughout the period as older units
are replaced by fewer, more capable ships.
Between 1980 and 1985, an expected in-
crease in the number of men assigned to naval
aviation and the naval infantry should offset
this decline.
Maintenance of these projected military force
levels will require adjustments in Soviet man-
power practices because of the declining supply
of young men. From the military point of view,
expected shortfalls of conscripts through 1985
and even beyond are not so great, however, that
these adjustments would have to be major. The
Soviets could tighten up on deferments, retain
greater numbers of career service personnel (al-
though attempts in the past to do this have not
been satisfactory), extend the term of con-
scripted service by six months, and supplement
the number of full-time soldiers by recalling
reservists to active duty for short periods (see
figure 10).
Recent changes in the 1967 Universal Military
Service Law appear to be aimed at strengthening
the armed forces. These changes include the
extension of required service for conscripts with
college-level education and the premilitary train-
ing of youth during, rather than after, working
hours. Both of these moves tend to rob the
civilian manpower pool in order to help meet
military requirements.
Although the Soviets could meet their mili-
tary manpower needs by using some combina-
tion of the options mentioned above, any of
these choices would require the military to
command a greater proportion of the USSR's
new labor resources. This will surely be chal-
lenged by the managers of the civilian economy
as the competition for scarce labor resources
grows. Certainly, pressures will exist within the
Soviet hierarchy to reduce the size of the
military. While the Soviets are unlikely to forgo
what they perceive to be an adequate defense
capability, they will face increasingly difficult
choices in their attempts to alleviate strains in
the civilian economy.
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