SOVIET NAVAL TRAINING: A QUESTION OF EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001200130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Soviet Naval Training:
A Question of Effectiveness
Secret
SR 77-10062
May 1977
Copy N 2 44
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Soviet Naval Training: A Question of Effectiveness
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
Key Judgments
Major changes in the sixties created new pressures on the system by
which the Soviet Navy had traditionally trained its personnel. These
pressures included a rapid increase in the scope and pace of naval
operations, the acquisition of new, complex ships and weapon systems,
and major revisions in the Soviet draft laws to shorten the obligatory
term of service for conscripts by a year. These changes created. a
demand for a greater number of experienced personnel than ever
before.
The navy and the Soviet government responded to these pressures
by modifying their training programs, introducing a mandatory
nationwide system of preinduction training, overhauling courses of
instruction in their training schools, and emphasizing the teaching of
narrow specialties. These changes have allowed the Soviets to make
great strides toward training personnel to carry out the navy's expanded
responsibilities for operations on the high seas. As a result, the navy has
proved itself capable of responding to crises and other events that affect
Soviet interests, as well as of maintaining a routine presence in many of
the world's oceans.
At the same time, a shortage of skilled manpower and overcentral-
ization of the command process are continuing problems for the navy.
These problems appear to have limited the effectiveness of Soviet naval
responses to some crisis situations. In a. normal peacetime operating
environment, these shortcomings probably are not as evident as they
would be in wartime, when they could seriously affect the Soviet
Navy's ability to carry out its responsibilities efficiently.
The capability of the training establishment to solve these problems
in the future is questionable. There is a good chance that the Soviets
will lose some ground in attempting to meet the demand for personnel
who can operate and maintain the increasingly complex equipment
entering the naval inventory. They may attempt to make naval service
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SECRET
more attractive by increasing salaries, fringe benefits, and the like in
order to compete more successfully with the civilian sector for skilled
manpower. But such changes probably would have a minimal effect on
the navy's capability to carry out its expanding roles. Furthermore,
traditional reliance on centralized authority and discouragement of
individual initiative will continue to make it difficult for otherwise
well-trained personnel to perform to their full potential.
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Contents
Page
Preface ................................................ V
Influences on the Training Program ..................... 1
Socialist Competition .................................. 1
The Draft and Other Sources of Manpower ............. 1
The Party and the Training Process .................... 2
Challenges of the Sixties ............................... 2
Current Training Program .............................. 3
Preinduction Training .................................. 4
Service Training Institutions ............................ 4
Levels of Proficiency .................................. 6
Training in the Fleets ................................. 7
Advanced Schools ..................................... 8
Assessment of the Program ............................. 9
Skills Shortage ........................................ 11
Overcentralization ..................................... 11
The Effects on Morale ................................. 12
Prospects ............................................... 12
Illustrations
Soviet Naval Educational Institutions (description and map). 5
Officer Training in the Soviet Navy (chart) ............... 10
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Preface
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The Soviet Navy, like other Soviet military forces, believes it must
have ideologically motivated, well-trained personnel to accomplish its
assigned missions. Its training methods and goals, unlike those of
Western naval powers, have been influenced by a heavy emphasis on
political indoctrination. But training also has been affected by
problems-such as rising costs-common to all navies.
This report describes Soviet naval training practices and analyzes
some of the reasons they have developed as they have. It assesses the
capabilities of personnel trained under the Soviet system and explores
some of the pressures for change that may be facing the navy in the
future. The report deals primarily with the training of shipboard
personnel.
The evidence on which the judgments in this report are based
comes from a variety of sources. Unclassified Soviet writings constitute
a major source. A careful reading of the open literature in conjunction
with other sources-attache reports, defector reports, and reports on
exercise activity-provides some insight into the status and direction of
the Soviet naval training program.
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Soviet Naval Training: A Question of Effectiveness
Influences on the Training Program
The personnel training program of the Soviet Navy
has been shaped by three major influences-the
doctrine of socialist competition, the universal mili-
tary draft, and the desire of the Communist Party to
mold the ideological viewpoint of the Soviet people.
Socialist Competition
According to Soviet ideologues, socialist competi-
tion is possible only in a socialist society. Such
competition is viewed as totally different from the
antagonistic type of competition that the Soviets
believe is the norm in capitalist societies. In a socialist
system, competition ceases to be divisive and thus can
be used as a tool to smooth the path to the ultimate
Communist state.
Since the concept was first introduced into the
military in 1929, socialist competition has been used
to increase the levels of combat capability while
providing proper political indoctrination and control.
Socialist competition in the Soviet Navy is handled
at the individual ship level. The commanding officer
.of each unit is responsible for the conduct of the
competition, but the political officer and the primary
party and Komsomol organizations aboard each ship
are most often the sustaining forces behind it.
The Soviets use socialist competition to reinforce
training goals. At the beginning of every training
period, each sailor makes written pledges regarding
the level of expertise he will attempt to achieve. These
pledges are then used as a basis for judging his
performance.
To reinforce the importance of the competition, the
Soviets use a variety of incentives, both positive and
negative. Publicizing the names of the leaders of the
competition as well as of those lagging behind is a
common device to maintain peer pressure on the
participants. Other, more positive incentives include
laudatory letters, decorations, gifts, monetary awards,
and special shore leaves. Officers also can receive early
grade promotions for extraordinary successes and,
more commonly, preferential treatment in enrolling in
military educational institutions. Group awards, such
as pennants and banners, are a common means of
recognizing outstanding performances by individual
units.
Special competitions are organized on a short-term
basis in addition to those geared to the annual
training cycle. A ship conducting a long cruise, for
example, might organize a competition among its
watch sections. Throughout the voyage, these sections
would compete against one another to achieve the
most rapid and error-free completion of their assigned
duties. The ship's officers would keep a daily and
weekly tally of the progress of each section. Interim
results, along with praise for the leaders and criticisms
of those falling behind, would be posted in the wall
newspaper or publicized on the ship's radio. The
outstanding section each week might be rewarded
with a special pie or cake. At the end of the voyage,
the section judged the winner might receive monetary
awards, have its picture taken with the ship's flag, or
receive formal letters of commendation from the
captain.
Although quality of performance continues to be of
concern to the Soviets, competition is often oriented
toward achieving time-oriented goals. Such an ap-
proach can result in a stop-watch mentality whereby
speed counts for more than how well the job is done.
This is especially true when inexperienced officers
direct the competition. The junior officers tend to rely
too much on established, time-oriented norms to
evaluate the performance of their subordinates.
The Draft and Other Sources of Manpower
The Soviet Navy has a professional officer corps and
a small cadre of warrant officers and extended-duty
servicemen (those who voluntarily reenlist for military
service beyond the required three-year term), but it
depends on a universal draft to fill most of its
manpower requirements. Conscripts selected for naval
shipboard duty or for coastal navy combat supply
units are required by law to serve for three years, while
those selected for the naval infantry, naval aviation,
and certain other shore billets serve for two years, The
actual reenlistment rate in the Soviet Navy is not
known. Some Western analysts believe it could be as
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low as 10 percent. In that event, some 75 percent of
the manpower strength would be conscripts, drafted
between the ages of 18 and 20, The reenlistment rate,
whatever its precise value, is low, and there is a
constant influx of inexperienced personnel, which
makes heavy demands on the training program.
Because so few conscripts choose to reenlist, the
navy has had a continuous shortage of experienced
enlisted men to fill lower level leadership positions. In
an attempt to retain more veterans, the Soviets in
1972 reintroduced the rank of warrant officer,
conferring quasi-officer status and other benefits on
qualified reenlistees. The new warrant officer program
apparently has failed to attract a sufficient number of
qualified personnel, however, and the Soviets have
been forced to continue to use extended-duty service-
men.
Commissioned officers apparently make up about
15 to 20 percent of total naval manpower. Most are
graduates of one of the 11 higher naval schools
scattered throughout the Soviet Union. With few
exceptions, these graduates make the service their
career. The officer retention rate is high because
regular officers usually serve on active duty for the full
period of their eligibility. The duration of their service
is set on the basis of their age and rank (see inset).
Officers can be given early discharges only in case
of chronic illness, a general reduction in force,
inability to fulfill service obligations, conduct unbe-
coming an officer, or conviction of a crime. Thus, by
law, the option to terminate active duty lies with the
military service, not with the individual.
The Party and the Training Process
The navy's personnel training program is set up not
only to teach military skills but also to provide
political and ideological indoctrination. Political
training is a major part of the Soviet training program.
Its goals appear to be to ensure that the navy remains
a reliable tool of the state and party and, at the same
time, to imbue those who will return to civilian life
with proper Communist attitudes. To accomplish
these goals, the Soviets have set up a pervasive
political network which extends from a political
directorate subordinate to the commander in chief of
the navy down to individual cadres assigned to most
units of the fleet. Each intermediate command
echelon also has a deputy commander for political
affairs with an appropriate staff.
Military spokesmen have often professed to see a
causal relationship between the proper ideological
outlook and the ability of military forces to accom-
plish their assigned missions. (See box inset.) Such
expressions are not surprising, inasmuch as ideological
orthodoxy and political reliability are of great
importance in promotion to the senior grades.
The heavy expenditures of time and mon.,y devoted
to political indoctrination appear to be yielding mixed
results. Available evidence suggests that most enlisted
men find the mandatory weekly political lectures
boring, repetitious, and unconvincing. Although 90
percent of the officers are said to be members or
candidate members of the Communist Party or the
Komsomol, many probably join only for the purpose
of enhancing their careers. Thus, commitment to the
party is nominal in many cases.
Challenges of the Sixties
In the sixties, three major changes created new
challenges for the navy's training system: the develop-
ment of more far-flung naval operations, the acquisi-
tion of more advanced equipment, and major
US Equivalent
Rank
Maximum Age
of Eligibility
Junior Lieutenant through Captain-
Ensign through Lieutenant
40
Lieutenant
Captain 3rd Rank and Captain 2nd
Rank
Lieutenant Commander through
Commander
45
Captain 1st Rank
Captain
50
Rear Admiral through Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral
55
Admiral through Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral through Fleet Admiral
60
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Politics and the Military
The main wealth of the fleet is the people.
Devoted heart and soul to the cause of Lenin's
party, they perform their difficult and responsible
service....
Admiral F. Sizov, 1974
Communist and Komsomol members, who
make up 90 percent of all soldiers, are the
cementing basis of the army and navy....
Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. I. Yakubovskiy, 1975
remote parts of the world's oceans. The continuous
presence of Soviet naval units outside home operating
areas began in 1964, when the USSR deployed a small
force to
the Mediterranean
Seal
The
scope
of
operations
expanded between
1968
and
1970
to
include a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean
and off West Africa, and periodic operations in the
Caribbean Sea. Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic mis-
sile submarines also began nearly constant patrols off
the east and west coasts of the United States. Between
1965 and 1970, Soviet naval deployments grew an
average of 40 percent per year. Since 1970, deploy-
ments have continued to expand, but at a reduced
rate.
Not only up-to-date combat equipment but
also highly qualified cadres, superb masters of
their craft, armed with advanced Marxist-
Leninist theory, boundlessly devoted to the party
and the Soviet people, constitute the strength and
power of our navy.
Admiral G. A. Bondarenko, 1975
Only an ideologically convinced, disciplined,
and intelligent soldier or sailor, possessing high
combat and moral qualities and strong physical
conditioning can master and employ with maxi-
mum effect the weapons entrusted to him to
achieve victory over the very strongest enemy.
Report of the All-Army
Conference of Excellent-Rated
Personnel in Combat
and Political Training, 1975
In the summary report of the CC CPSU at the
24th Party Congress, it was stressed that military
service in our country is not only a school for
military skills. It is at the same time an excellent
school for ideological and physical tempering and
for discipline and organization.
Colonel General A. Mayorov, 1975
revisions in the law on universal military service.
These all combined to subject the training system to
new pressures, none of which shows much sign of
abating.
The sixties saw the beginning of change in the scope
and pace of naval operations. From a force dedicated
primarily to the defense of Soviet maritime frontiers,
the navy began to evolve into one with increasing
responsibilities for peacetime operations in more
By the mid-1960s, a drive to provide the Soviet
Navy with better equipment was well underway. The
Soviets began replacing the relatively simple-to-
operate, easy-to-maintain units of World War II
design with more modern ones equipped with
advanced subsystems. The new units were equipped
with better and more complex electronics and
weapons, including guided missiles. In addition,
nuclear energy became an important source of power
in the submarine force.
The third major change was the 1968 draft law,
which reduced the obligatory term of service for
conscripts from four years to three for seagoing
personnel and from three years to two for shore-based
personnel. Thus, just as the introduction of more
modern naval combatants and the expansion of
operating areas were creating a demand for more
experienced personnel, the navy was faced with the
prospect of having even a smaller proportion of
veterans than before. The navy had the choice either
of passively accepting the one.-year decrease in
conscript service time, or of modifying the training
program to reduce the amount of formal training. The
other services, of course, faced similar problems.
Current Training Program
The Soviets responded to the pressures of the late
sixties by modifying their programs in schools and by
emphasizing the teaching of narrow specialities. In
addition, the government introduced a mandatory
nationwide system of preinduction training for all
services. These modifications were designed to main-
tain the combat capabilities of military personnel
while reducing the impact of new conditions.
The Soviets did deploy a group of general purpose submarines
and associated support ships to Albania in 1959, but this
deployment ended in 1961.
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preinduction Training
The mandatory preinduction training program is
conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of
Defense, but other agencies exercise direct control of
the day-to-day administration of the program. The
law on universal military service specifies that
preinduction training will be given to all full-time
male students above the eighth grade. Local educa-
tional authorities, under the general control of the
Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educa-
tion, have the responsibility for setting up these
programs, subject to the approval and supervision of
the local military commissariats. Factories and other
places of work also are required by the law to set up
preinduction training centers for draft-age youth not
in school. This training has a standard curriculum and
is designed to familiarize youths with the functions of
the armed forces, the military lifestyle, the military
oath, and service regulations. Some basic weapons
familiarization, including the live firing of small
caliber rifles, is also part of the curriculum.
Although other organizations participate, DOSAAF
(the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the
Army, Air Force, and Navy) is the focal point for
preinduction training. As of September 1974, over
315,000 primary DOSAAF organizations were in
existence, and the numbers were continuing to
expand. DOSAAF manages leisure hours clubs which
sponsor hobbies with military applications. While
these clubs are voluntary, the local military commis-
sariats select a number of young people each year at
age 17 to undergo mandatory DOSAAF-sponsored
training in specific military specialties prior to
induction.
For younger children, party organizations conduct a
summer series of voluntary military games. These
games are designed to foster an awareness of military
subjects and skills. The Young Pioneer organizations
sponsor Zarnitsa (Summer Lightning), which provides
youth with an introduction to military life and
routine. Orlenok (Eaglet), a more vigorous game for
older youth, is sponsored by the Komsomol organiza-
tion.
The success of preinduction training has been
mixed. The program gives most recruits an introduc-
tion to military discipline and routine at little direct
expense to the military. Individual enterprises rather
than the military are required to foot most of the bills
connected with the program. Reports suggest that
some graduates of the mandatory DOSAAF-sponsored
specialist training have been trained well enough to
skip further specialist training after induction and go
directly to the fleets. These cases, however, probably
are exceptions rather than the rule.
The preinduction training process and DOSAAF
have come under continuing criticism. The Soviet
press contains numerous charges of formalism in
classroom instruction, poorly qualified instructors, and
incomplete facilities and training bases. Because the
resources for this program come out of the funds of the
enterprise, individual plant supervisors probably have
little incentive to fully develop the program.
Service Training Institutions
The challenges of the sixties affected the ways in
which institutions of formal training for both officers
and conscripts carried out their responsibilities. Cur-
ricula were changed and, although officer candidates
spent the same amount of time in school as before, the
preliminary training period for conscripts was sharply
cut.
Officer Schools. The bulk of the Soviet naval
officer corps is drawn from graduates of 11 higher
naval schools-roughly comparable to Western naval
academies-scattered throughout the USSR (see in-
set). The course of study in all but one of these schools
lasts five years. Officers with specialties common to all
the services-such as logistics and supply, medicine,
or jurisprudence-attend combined arms schools,
each of which trains officers in a particular specialty
for all branches of the armed forces.
A few officers are graduates of voluntary reserve
officer programs offered at many civilian schools.
Reserve officers are liable for two or three years of
active duty, but few apparently are called up. Those
who are usually do not serve beyond their minimum
time. Even so, the reserve officer program provides the
Soviet Navy with a pool of trained personnel which
can be drawn on if needed.
Personnel attending the higher naval schools under-
go an extensive selection process before admission.
The candidates begin by applying through their local
military commissariats. These agencies ensure that the
prospective officers are physically fit and have the
appropriate educational background. The local com-
missariats also are required to conduct extensive
political and security checks on the applicants. After
these steps, the candidates take competitive examina-
tions in mathematics, science, language, and literature
at the schools of their choice. Despite continuing talk
about the importance of ensuring that candidates
possess the proper psychological traits, the Soviets do
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Kaliningrad
Leningrad
Kiev
*MOSCOW
,Sevastopol'
USSR
Vladivostok.
Name and Location
of School
Type of Training
Commissioning Schools
Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P. S. Nakhimov, Sevastopol'
Basic line
Caspian Sea Higher Naval School imeni S. M. Kirov, Baku
Basic line-also trains for-
eign naval officers
Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze, Leningrad
Basic line
Higher Naval School of Radioelectronics imeni A. S. Popov,
Communications and sonar
Leningrad
Higher Naval Submarine School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol,
Leningrad
Kaliningrad Higher Naval School, Kaliningrad
Basic line
Kiev Higher Naval Political School, Kiev
Political
Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin,
Engineering
Leningrad
Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov,
Vladivostok
Sevastopol' Higher Naval Engineering School, Sevastopol'
Engineering
Higher Naval Engineering School imeni Dzerzhinskiy, Leningrad
Engineering
Advanced School
Naval Academy imeni A. A. Grechko, Leningrad
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not appear to conduct much psychological or aptitude
testing.
Most cadets enter the higher naval schools directly
upon graduation from civilian secondary schools, but
some are also drawn from the Nakhimov School in
Leningrad-a preparatory school run along military
lines. The Soviets have stressed the recruitment of
active-duty servicemen or those who have completed
their obligatory term of service, apparently on the
assumption they would be more mature and better
prepared for careers as naval officers than newly grad-
uated high school students. Another source of cadets is
those few personnel who transfer from civilian to
military schools. After successfully completing one
year at a civilian institute and passing a medical
examination and political and security checks, indi-
viduals can transfer to the higher naval schools
without further examination.
The increased technological complexity of naval
ships and expansion of the responsibilities and
operating areas of the Soviet Navy created the need
for some changes in the curricula of the higher naval
schools. Previously, the curricula were oriented toward
teaching specific technical skills rather than exposing
the cadets to the broad, command-oriented training
characteristic of many Western naval academies.
Most graduates of these schools received engineering
degrees in narrow specialty areas. Course work
emphasized the theoretical aspects of the specialty
being taught with little attention to practical applica-
tions. The new realities imposed on the navy,
however, made the acquisition of practical skills and a
more complete knowledge of seamanship more press-
ing.
While the curricula of Soviet naval schools remain
more technically oriented and narrowly defined than
those of their Western counterparts, the Soviet schools
now place more emphasis on increasing the cadets'
understanding of tactics and on the practical aspects
of career specialties. Some articles in the early
seventies, for example, recommended that schools
which previously had allotted only about 10 percent
of the cadets' time to practical work, increase the time
devoted to such activity to nearly 50 percent.
The schools also have made a greater effort to give
the cadets more experience at sea prior to graduation.
Rather than rely on obsolescent combatant ships as in
the past, the Soviets introduced new cadet training
ships specifically designed for this purpose. Students
also are sent to units of the fleet during the summer
for practical experience. The typical graduate of
Frunze Higher Naval School in Leningrad, for
example, is expected to spend almost 10 months on
board ship during his five-year course, of study.
Enlisted Training Detachments. Since 1968, pre-
liminary naval training for conscripts has changed
sharply in both duration and content. To minimize
the impact of the shortened draft period, the time
devoted to formal training courses was curtailed. The
amount of time now used for preliminary training of
draftees varies according to the complexity of the
specialty, but the average period appears to be about
four to six months. The first month or so of this period
is used primarily for basic military training-close
order drill, weapons familiarization, military regula-
tions, and the like-while the remainder is devoted to
specialist training.
The Soviets also altered the content of the training
course by deleting much of the theoretical underpin-
ning of individual specialties in favor of more study of
practical applications. Moreover, the trainees are
given a narrower exposure to their specialty than in
the past. A diesel engine mechanic, for example,
might learn about only one or two types of diesels
during his formal training. Thus, he would have to be
retrained if assigned to a unit equipped with an
engine other than a type that he had studied. The
training program is not designed to make experts of
the conscripts, but rather to familiarize them with a
specialty. Proficiency is not expected until after the
person arrives at his ship, where he undergoes
intensive on-the-job training.
The quality of enlisted specialist training appears to
vary from one detachment to another. Many gradu-
ates of these courses have indicated that the training
was rudimentary and did not adequately prepare
them for their duties. Most detachments apparently
still rely heavily on the lecture method. The teaching
staffs often have many graduates of the course who do
not have experience in or detailed knowledge of the
specialty they are teaching. Another common com-
plaint has been the lack of modern, sophisticated
training aids; some schools apparently have only a few
outdated pieces of equipment.
Levels of Proficiency
The number of different specialties (similar to
Western military occupational specialties) has prolif-
erated as technological innovations and new weapon
systems have been brought into service. One Soviet
writer has estimated that the number of unique
specialties grew from about 60 during World War II
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to more than 1,000 in 1974. While these figures
include specialty categories for all branches of the
Soviet military, the same relative increase appears to
hold true for the navy.
The Soviet Navy has designated four levels of
specialist proficiency for both officers and enlisted
men. In ascending order of capability, they are:
specialist third, second, and first class, and master
specialist. These ratings are reportedly independent of
the individual's rank. On graduation from higher
naval schools or enlisted training detachments, most
officers and enlisted men apparently receive the
lowest proficiency rating, although outstanding stu-
dents apparently receive higher ratings. Within a few
months after arrival at their units, the neophyte
specialists are required to pass tests which authorize
them to stand watches independently. The Soviets
may use these tests to confirm the ratings of the
personnel.
More advanced ratings are earned by passing
further proficiency tests. Each testing period appar-
ently extends over several days and consists of written,
oral, and practical phases. Brigade-level staff person-
nel administer the tests for advancement to second- or
first-class specialist levels. Advancement to master
specialist requires an appearance before an examina-
tion board at fleet level. The amount of time it takes
to fulfill requirements for the more advanced ratings
depends on the specialty and on individual capabili-
ties, but it appears that the Soviets expect attainment
of a second-class rating by about the end of the first
year of service and a first-class rating during the third
year. Although a few have done it in less time, it
generally takes about six to eight years to gain a rating
of master specialist.
Persons who have earned specialist ratings are
required to reconfirm them periodically. One source
indicated that naval officers were required to defend
their specialist rating every six months. The testing
schedules apparently are adhered to rigidly, especially
for the higher ratings, and failure to take or to pass the
tests can result in a loss of rating. Another source
indicated that a warrant officer lost his master
specialist rating because he had been on leave during
the time the tests were given.
Incentives used to encourage personnel to attain
more advanced ratings vary. Although moral suasion
and peer pressure are brought to bear, added pay
probably is the best incentive. Third-class ratings do
not bring extra pay, but the more advanced ratings
do. A conscript, for example, can almost double his
basic pay by earning a specialist first-class rating.
Besides extra pay, the higher ratings attained by career
personnel probably bring better opportunities for
promotion and preferred assignments.
Training in the Fleets
Separate training institutions and detachments
teach incoming personnel the basics of narrow
military specialties, but a working knowledge of those
specialties most often is gained only after the men
arrive at their first permanent duty station. Several
types of training are used at the fleet level to foster
proficiency in the requisite military skills, including
continuation of classroom training, on-the-job train-
ing, individual study programs, and experience
derived from exercises and extended cruises.
The training program is geared toward the rapid
assimilation of the semiannual influx of new personnel
into the fleets. The yearly program apparently is,
divided into two subcycles, each of about six months'
duration. Each subcycle includes periods of training
at fleet facilities ashore and on ships in port. Exercises
at sea, beginning with the simple and progressing to
the more complex, round out each cycle. Often the
cycle culminates with fleet-wide or interfleet exercises.
Distant cruises, while described by the Soviets as the
most valuable part of the training process, do not
occur as regularly.
Training Ashore. Although the Soviets believe that
training at sea is the best way to develop experienced
sailors, they feel such training can be effective only
after sound preparation in fleet and unit training
facilities ashore. The Soviets have begun to make
greater use of such facilities in the past few years,
believing that they provide reallistic training at
relatively low cost. The use of training facilities ashore
conserves fuel and results in less wear and tear on
shipboard equipment and in less disruption of training
schedules because of bad weather (a major consider-
ation for the Soviets). Despite this increased emphasis,
however, there appears to be little centralized control
over the development of unit training rooms and
facilities. Each naval brigade-typically composed of
8 to 12 ships-apparently is responsible for setting up
its own training facilities and for providing its own
training aids.
Only a few centrally located fleet training facilities
have been established. These facilities generally
conduct specialized programs, such as damage control
training. These centralized facilities are open to all,
but some apparently do not have permanent staffs of
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instructors. Consequently, unit officers are required to
serve as instructors when their men use the facilities.
On-the-Job Training. On-the-job training consti-
tutes the major portion of the Soviet personnel
training program for both officers and enlisted men,
and, with the expanded scope and frequency of at-sea
operations, opportunities for such training have
increased. The Soviets use such training to fill in the
many gaps in knowledge which remain after the
completion of formal training ashore. When a unit is
in port, regular specialty training sessions are to be
included in its weekly training schedules. Although
such training is under the control of departmental
officers, the warrant officers and more experienced
enlisted personnel often must conduct the day-to-day
training of the newcomers who are assigned as
understudies. Traditionally, those personnel about to
be released from active duty are required to train a
replacement before they leave the service.
Two methods are used to conduct on-the-job
training-mass training classes and individual study
programs. Individual study programs apparently are
being used with increasing frequency, especially in
training specialists. Because each program can be
tailored to the trainee's own level of skill and
achievement, mastery of a particular specialty can be
more efficiently and effectively achieved. Moreover,
this method does not disrupt the operating routine of
the ship. Although more effective in these respects,
individual study programs put an increased burden on
the departmental officers who must run them, because
the officers involved must prepare and monitor several
plans.
Unit Exercises. The highest level of shipboard
training is the integrated exercising of an entire crew.
Such training is used to reinforce military skills, to
practice intraship and intership coordination, and to
test the overall combat capabilities of the forces.
Exercise plans apparently are designed to take each
ship through a sequence of activities, starting with
simple, single-ship exercises and continuing through
more complex, multiship evolutions. This progression
is intended to bring the ships and their crews up to
satisfactory levels of combat capability as quickly as
possible.
The conduct of some of these exercises has been
criticized in the Soviet press, especially the lack of
initiative displayed by many shipboard officers in
preparing and carrying out progressively more diffi-
cult activities. This reportedly has reduced the
training value of such exercises. Another common
criticism is the reported use of unrealistic scenarios.
Our observation of some Soviet naval exercises-
especially smaller ones-tends to substantiate these
press criticisms. Many of the smaller exercises are
stereotyped and rudimentary. They appear to he
short, pro forma affairs with little, if any, unrestricted
activity. Such training does little to encourage
command leadership or to increase crew capabilities
beyond the most basic levels.
Major exercises at the fleet or interfleet level, on the
other hand, have shown a trend toward more complex
and realistic scenarios, possibly because of increased
attention from higher authorities in the navy, the
Ministry of Defense, and the political leadership.
Besides providing an opportunity to practice on a
large scale the skills learned through the training year,
the larger exercises often are used to test the
integration of new weapon and sensor systems into the
naval inventory. Such exercises normally are preceded
by an intensive period of smaller preparatory exercises.
Next to fleet exercises, long-range cruises provide
the most realistic training, and Soviet military writers
have described long sea voyages as the most valuable
part of the naval training process, largely because such
voyages subject crews to psychological stresses not
possible to simulate in other types of training.
Nevertheless, units deployed far from home waters,
especially surface ships, in many cases spend most of
their time at anchor. They do participate in routine
exercises, but apparently not with the same regularity
as when they are in home waters, and exercises they
do carry out are rudimentary in nature.
Advanced Schools
Although the Soviet naval training program is
intended mainly to develop expertise in both the
single-term and career personnel through on-the-job
training, some advanced, formal training is available
to selected personnel-mostly careerists-in both the
enlisted and officer ranks. The advanced training is
carried out at both military and civilian institutions.
Career Enlisted Training. Advanced training for
career enlisted personnel is intended mainly to provide
a deeper appreciation of a given specialty, but it also
provides leadership skills which better equip the
trainees for their intended positions in the lower
management ranks. Special centers have been estab-
lished for advanced training of warrant officers in
each of the fleet areas, and there is evidence which
suggests similar schools exist for career petty officers.
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The duration of the courses at these centers appears to
vary according to the qualifications of the individuals
attending. Other evidence suggests that the course of
study at the warrant officers' schools is two years long
but that some especially qualified personnel graduate
in less time. Warrant officers and extended-duty
servicemen also are allowed to enroll in courses offered
at civilian technical and higher educational institu-
tions, either as correspondents or as full-time students,
an option that is specifically denied to men serving
their initial term of service.
Advanced Officer Training. Members of the
officer corps also are expected to polish their
substantive and leadership skills through on-the-job
training. Although officers have several opportunities
to further their formal education during the course of
their careers (see chart page 10), the selection process
for advanced schooling is competitive, and not all
officers are eligible or selected to receive it.
During their first assignments in the fleets (which
can last up to about six years), officers are expected to
become masters of their areas of specialization. While
junior officers concentrate on narrow specialist fields
during the early years of their careers, their potential
for future line-command positions is being evaluated
by their commanding officers. (Officers with engineer-
ing or engineer-technical degrees, however, are gener-
ally excluded from consideration for such positions.)
At the end of the evaluation and selection process, the
junior officer corps is divided into two groups-those
who will remain specialists throughout their careers,
and those who will be trained as line commanders.
Each of these categories has its own career develop-
ment program.
Specialists. Formal educational opportunities, both
at the junior and senior officer levels, are offered to
officers who intend to remain specialists throughout
their careers. Both the higher naval schools and the
joint-services commissioning schools, for example,
offer postgraduate resident and correspondence
courses. These courses are of eight months' to three
years' duration. Most Soviet officers probably serve
five to six years in the fleets before beginning such
postgraduate work. Officers of more senior rank can
be admitted either to the Naval Academy or to
various joint-services academies either as resident or
correspondence students. Academy courses, which last
from two to three years, prepare the officers for higher
staff positions and probably provide them with a
broadening experience within their area of specialty.
In most cases, these courses probably serve as a
prerequisite
positions.
for promotion to the higher ranks and
Line Officers. Officers selected for development as
line commanders follow a similar but generally
separate career development program. For example,
future commanders apparently are enrolled in a
precommand course after four to ten years' service.
Such courses reportedly last about a year and are
intended to prepare the officers for their first
command. Those who are expected to be tapped for
even higher positions attend the Naval Academy
imeni A. A. Grechko in Leningrad.
This school, the highest training institution in the
navy, is open to officers of middle grade from all arms
of the navy. The courses at the academy vary from
two to four years and are intended to prepare officers
for senior command and staff positions. The ultimate
level of officer training is provided by the Higher
Military Academy of the General Staff in Moscow.
This two-year school prepares officers from all services
for key positions in the Ministry of Defense and for
command and staff positions in major commands.
Assessment of the Program
The Soviet Navy has made much progress in
training personnel to carry out its expanding responsi-
bilities. Since the sixties, the navy has evolved from a
force oriented toward the defense of the Soviet coastal
areas to one structured for operations on the high seas.
The Soviet Navy has proved itself capable of
responding to crises and other events that affect Soviet
state interests and has for some time now been
maintaining a routine presence in many of the world's
oceans.
At the same time, the navy has experienced
continuing problems, such as shortages of skilled
manpower and overcentralizatior- of the command
process. These chronic problems in turn have tended
to foster an erosion of morale and may be degrading
the ability of Soviet naval forces to operate as
effectively and efficiently as they otherwise might.
Some of the problems result from the rapid expansion
of naval technology and of Soviet naval responsibil-
ities and capabilities. Others result from compromises
made in the training program to enable the navy to
continue to perform its missions in the face of new or
continuing constraints. Most problems appear to be
essentially those of any peacetime force and probably
would disappear in combat, when appeals to patri-
otism would be more meaningful. A few, however,
may go deeper than that and might influence the
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Officer Training In the Soviet Navy
Higher Naval
School
(Officers evaluated for
command potential)
(2-6 Years)
Joint-Services
Commissioning
School
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ability of the navy to perform its missions in both
peace and war.
Empirical data about the effect of the personnel
training program on Soviet naval efficiency are sparse
and can lead to conflicting conclusions. The mainte-
nance of a permanent naval presence in many of the
world's oceans suggests that the Soviets are able at
least to perform routine operations with minimal
difficulty. Soviet naval forces also appear capable, for
the most part, of accomplishing their training goals
during exercises, whether in home waters or on the
high seas. In Soviet at-sea exercises, however, the
activities of all participants frequently are carefully
controlled, so the navy's ability to react in a
nonexercise situation to an enemy whose actions
cannot be predicted is more difficult to assess.
Soviet naval responses to international crises appear
to have met with mixed success. During US mining of
the waters off North Vietnam and in the several Arab-
Israeli wars, the Soviets were able quickly to muster a
reaction force to demonstrate Soviet concern. At the
same time, these naval forces often provided little
more than a symbolic presence, once they were on the
scene. But the relative inactivity of many of these task
groups almost certainly derived from Soviet foreign
policy considerations rather than from an inherent
inability of the forces to carry out their most likely
missions.
In other cases, such as instances in which Soviet
units have had to respond to shipboard casualties, the
record has not been as good. The activities of the
afflicted as well as of the assisting units during these
incidents-the loss of an N-class submarine in 1970,
the near-loss of an H-11-class submarine in 1972, and
the loss of a Kashin-class destroyer in 1974-suggest
continuing deficiencies in the Soviet ability to cope
with emergencies at sea. Although units responded
quickly in each case, actual rescue attempts and other
activities at the scene did not appear to be well
coordinated and were often characterized by poor
seamanship. The rescue attempts appeared to have
been hindered by such things as excessive interference
by remote headquarters, ineffective coordination and
control by on-scene commanders, and insufficient
training of shipboard personnel. Poor ship design may
also have hindered rescue operations.
These episodes highlight two of the most prominent
problems affecting Soviet naval operations, problems
which the training program has had little success in
overcoming: the shortage of skilled manpower, and
the tendency to overcentralize decisionmaking.
Skills Shortage
The chronic shortage of skilled manpower, especial-
ly in the enlisted ranks, is a long-recognized problem;
numerous commentators, including Admiral Gorsh-
kov, have stressed the need to improve the skill levels
of naval personnel. The problem stems largely from
the continuing inability of the navy to provide
sufficient incentives to retain a significant proportion
of its experienced specialists.
The problem has been exacerbated by navy training
methods. The current training system, which relies
heavily upon on-the-job training after only a mini-
mum of formal classroom training, often produces
personnel who have only a superficial understanding
of their specialty. This type of training tends to
develop personnel who, although they eventually may
gain a working knowledge of their own particular
responsibilities, often have little appreciation of the
capabilities and limitations of an overall weapon
system or ship. While this is more often true in the
case of conscripts than of career personnel, it could
have a pronounced effect on a unit's overall perform-
ance, because conscripts make up such a large
percentage of total manpower.
In part to minimize the impact of this problem,
naval personnel are assigned to relatively long tours of
duty in the same position. Conscripts, for example,
normally remain on the same assignment for the
duration of their enlistments. Extended-duty service-
men and warrant officers generally transfer only upon
reenlistment. Officers, too, spend comparatively long
periods aboard one unit-tours of five years or more
are not uncommon. In addition, the Soviets have
mounted a campaign to encourage their enlisted
personnel to gain proficiency in a second, related
specialty during the last year of service.
The Soviet personnel training program attempts to
inculcate political orthodoxy, rigid discipline, and
operational conformity. One result is a tendency
toward overcentralization of the command process
and excessive dependence on higher authority. The
tendency to view situations through the eyes of one's
commander becomes a state of mind which carries
over from the training process into the operation of
individual naval units. The maintenance of strong
central control over all naval activities in the fleets is
buttressed by the sometimes heavy hand of staff
officers and the political apparatus, which intrudes
into the day-to-day life of individual units. Such
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control appears to be a shortcoming because it stifles
the development of good leadership qualities and can
result in a lack of initiative by commanders facing
unforeseen situations.
Insistence on strong central control has, on occa-
sion, had debilitating effects on naval operations. A
well-documented example of this problem was the
near-loss of an H-II ballistic missile submarine at sea
in February 1972. The Soviets deployed a large task
group to aid the stricken vessel, but timorous on-scene
commanders failed to provide the leadership and
imagination necessary to generate an effective rescue
effort. Naval headquarters in Moscow, apparently not
trusting the judgment of on-scene commanders,
assumed overall control of the effort. Those on the
scene, apparently afraid to make innovative decisions,
followed Moscow's lead, even when its suggestions
clearly would not work.
The Soviets have paid lip service in the open press
to the need to develop the imagination and initiative
of commanding officers, but the observed activities of
the operating forces do not reflect a significant
relaxation of central control such as would be required
to allow development of greater initiative. Stereotyped
exercise routines which allow little or no unrestricted,
operations are still the rule. Such activities do little to
raise skill levels or to imbue naval commanders with
boldness and independent judgment.
Under peacetime conditions, the shortcomings in
leadership training and the lack of initiative are not
readily apparent and probably have little impact on
day-to-day operations. Under crisis, combat, or
emergency conditions, however, the efficient conduct
of operations could be jeopardized.
The Effects on Morale
that morale and
discipline are declining in the Soviet Navy,2 in part,
perhaps, as a result of inflexibilities in both the
political and military chains of command. A recent
mutiny aboard a Krivak-class destroyer in the Baltic
Fleet points to this possibility. Although the mutiny
itself probably was an isolated incident, the pressures
which led to it may well be common throughout the
navy.
The ship in question was the subject of an
unusually scathing article in the Soviet press some 11
months prior to the mutiny. That the Soviets were
For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see CIA
Intelligence Memorandum SR 77-10038, Morale and Discipline
Problems in the Soviet Armed Forces.
aware of problems on board the ship and still were
unable to prevent the situation from deteriorating to
the point of mutiny tends to suggest a certain amount
of inflexibility on the part of the hierarchy in dealing
with morale and disciplinary problems. Nonetheless,
the net result of the mutiny almost certainly will be to
put more stress on orthodoxy and centralized com-
mand responsibility, further reducing the likelihood of
developing greater initiative and independent deci-
sionmaking in lower command echelons.
The continuing acquisition of technically more
advanced ships, weapon systems, and sensors will
increase the demand for well-qualified naval special-
ists. The new units are likely to spend more time in
areas distant from the Soviet Union, thus increasing
the need for well-trained personnel capable of
operating and maintaining their equipment without
benefit of nearby shipyard experts. This prospect
undoubtedly will influence how Soviet naval person-
nel are trained, both during formal training periods
ashore and after arrival in the fleets.
Shallow practical training which characterizes
present-day programs will have to be expanded to
include the theoretical underpinnings of the special-
ties, even though this will result in shorter periods of
productive time from the graduates.
Although more advanced formal schooling is likely,
training in the fleets probably will continue to receive
the most attention. Improvements in fleet-level
training probably will include increased use of more
advanced simulators ashore and more realistic training
at sea, especially in the case of small-scale exercises in
home waters.
The Soviets are also likely to place greater emphasis
on efforts to retain skilled personnel. In the process,
however, they could create as many problems as they
solve. In developing a more professional, career-
oriented service, for example, they might cut back the
universal draft. The Soviets, however, view the draft
not only as a means of providing manpower for the
military but also as a way to provide political
indoctrination to a broad segment of the population.
Another way to meet the increased demand for
more experienced personnel would be to lengthen the
term of service that conscripts are required to serve.
There have been periodic hints that some in the naval
hierarchy favor this option. Thus far, there have been
only minor alterations in the conscription law. More
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substantial changes might not be feasible because of
the competing demands of the civilian economy for
skilled workers. The competition for skilled manpower
may well increase in the future if, as some demogra-
phic studies suggest, the Soviets experience acute
manpower shortages in the eighties. Moreover, a move
to increase the length of service would limit the
usefulness of military service as an instrument of
political indoctrination, assuming the overall size of
the armed services remained about the same.
A potentially less disruptive step would be for the
navy to increase its efforts to retain skilled personnel
by making military service more attractive through
larger salaries, better housing, and more fringe
benefits. The reintroduction of the rank of warrant
officer in 1972-while not a great success-may be a
precursor of additional steps in this direction. Such
programs would be expensive in terms of both time
and money, but they might avoid some of the pitfalls
of other possible solutions.
The use of military training as a tool for political
indoctrination is not likely to diminish, and this in
turn will limit the extent to which flexibility can be
injected into the training process.
Regardless of what changes may take place, the
principal features of the current Soviet training system
are likely to remain. The navy's ability to assimilate
and use effectively the more complex equipment that
will continue to enter its inventory is not likely to
improve, and may even deteriorate. Time constraints
will continue to limit severely the opportunities for
broader based formal training and more realistic
exercise activities in the fleets. Likewise, failure to
retain a greater percentage of experienced personnel
would continue to stultify growth in shipboard
expertise. The products of these negative influences
further propagate themselves by eroding morale and
discipline.
Although the emphasis periodically peaks and ebbs,
Soviet naval officers almost certainly will continue to
be taught to rely on centralized command procedures
for controlling their forces at sea. This continued
reliance on centralized authority and the consequent
discouragement of low-level command initiative will
offset some of the benefits of improved training
programs and make it difficult for otherwise well-
trained commanding officers of the future to exercise
their full leadership potential.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
The author of this paper is
ffice of Strategic Researcti. om-
na s are welcome and should be directed
to" I
25X1A
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