COMMENTS ON MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGN FEATURES OF SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001200090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
NOFORN
Comments on Manufacturing Technology and Design
Features of Selected Soviet Military Equipment
Confidential
SR 77-100061)
April 1977
Copy
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 004836
Exempt from 9en al declassification schedub
of E.O. 11~ .xempppndn(c fepory:
Automati2dflYdeclassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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NOFORN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1977
Comments on Manufacturing Technology and Design
Features of Selected Soviet Military Equipment
Summary
The Intelligence Community recently had the
opportunity to examine several Soviet weapon systems.
In addition to detailed technical analyses of the wea-
pons by many elements of the Intelligence Community, an
analysis of the costs of producing the weapons in the US
was sponsored by the Office of Strategic Research (OSR).
An important by-product of that effort is a compilation
of comments by US weapons manufacturers and military wea-
pons experts who inspected the Soviet equipment. The
comments are summarized in this paper.
The equipment included five major ground force wea-
pons, two aircraft, and four surface-to-air missile (SAM)
systems. Most had been manufactured since 1966, but the
dates of initial production ranged from. 1958 to 1970. All
of the weapons which were examined are of types which are
still widely used by the Soviet armed forces.
Two of the ground force weapons--the BMP infantry
combat vehicle and the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun--are
25X1A
Comments and queries regarding this publication are
welcome. They may be directed to
25X1A of the i i ry- co n coma Anal-
ysis Center, Office o rategic Research, code 143, exten-
sion 7116, or gray 8319.
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NOFORN
representative of relatively complex land warfare
systems which the Soviets have designed since the
early sixties. The other ground force systems and
the two aircraft are of earlier, less complex designs.
The four SAMs which were examined showed a general con-
tinuity in design characteristics over time.
Since the weapons constitute only a small sample
of the systems which the Soviets have designed and
manufactured since the late fifties, the comments in
this paper do not necessarily apply to Soviet military
design and production practices in general. Several re-
curring themes, however, can be gleaned from the remarks:
The Soviet systems--unlike their US counter-
parts--typically were designed to perform only
one or two primary functions.
The design and manufacturing techniques of
each weapon apparently have remained basically
unchanged for the entire production period.
Standardization of components was evident
within a given system and among related systems.
Except for the BMP, the design of the weapons
showed little concern for environmental effects.
Value engineering--minimizing production cost
through hardware design--apparently was not
emphasized.
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NOFORN
The Intelligence Community recently examined several Soviet
weapon systems--two aircraft, four surface-to-air missile systems,
and five major items of ground force equipment. Most had been
manufactured since 1966, but the dates of initial production ranged
from 1958 to 1970.
25X1A
Studies of the equipment were undertaken by the Intelligence
Community to improve estimates of Soviet weapons performance. The
Office of Strategic Research (OSR), in addition, viewed the oppor-
tunity for direct examination as a means to improve its estimates 25X1A
of procurement costs for these weapons. For this purpose a separate
study of the available Soviet equipment, was
undertaken by OSR in conjunction with 25X1A
ind the
Office of Weapons Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence.
25X1A
A by-product of the cost analysis effort in
was a compilation of comments by US weapons manu ac urers anc
military weapons experts who inspected the equipment. This paper
summarizes their observations about Soviet manufacturing technology
and weapons design. Although the comments are not intelligence
assessments based on detailed analysis, they do provide important
insights into the nature of the Soviet weapon systems which were
examined.
This paper does not present detailed cost analyses of the sys-
tems examined in The cost analyses are still in
progress and have been presented in other publications.
25X1A
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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Procedure and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Hardware Examined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Assessment of Design Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Simplicity of Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Conservative Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Limited Design Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Standardization of Components and
Subsystem Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Little Attention to Cosmetics . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Lagging Design Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Lagging Production Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Methods . . . . . . . . 13
Reliability of Equipment and Ease
of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Supporting Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Simplicity of Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Conservative Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Limited Design Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Standardization of Components and
Subsystem Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Little Attention to Cosmetics . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Lagging Design Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Lagging Production Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Methods . . . . . . . . 26
Reliability of Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Ease of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table: Soviet Military Hardware Examined . . . . . . . . 8-9
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Annex: Reference Guide to Soviet Military
Hardware Examined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Aircraft Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
MIG-21M Interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fitter A Fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
32
BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . . 33
BMP Combat Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
BRDM-2 Reconnaissance Vehicle . . . . . . . . . 34
T-62 Medium Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
ZSU-23-4 Antiaircraft Gun . . . . . . . . . . . 36
SA- 2 Mod 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
SA-3 Mod 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
SA-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
SA-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
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NOFORN
Procedure and Scope
25X1A
was initiated by the Military-
Economic Ana ysis en er of the Office of Strategic
Research to have weapons specialists examine Soviet
military hardware firsthand. The specialists made cost
estimates based on US manufacturing practices and
commented on design and manufacturing philosophy and
techniques. Many elements of the US intelligence
and industrial communities assisted in the project.
Exploitation
Analysts from OSR, representatives from US weapons
manufacturing companies, and weapons specialists from
the US military were directly involved in examination
of the hardware. Cost exploitation. teams were formed to
examine and analyze each piece of hardware. The exploita-
tion was conducted at military installations, each item
being examined for one or two days. The teams prepared
cost estimates and comments on the design features as well
as the technology that the Soviets used in the manufacture
of the items. Of particular interest were. characteristics
reflecting standardization, quality control, and design
concept.
The estimates and comments then were consolidated
into intelligence handbooks for the use of, analysts in
OSR's Military-Economic Analysis Center. The information
that follows was extracted from those handbooks.
25X1A involved the exploitation of. two
aircra.t, four sur ace- o-air missile (SAM) systems, and
five major items of ground force equipment. (Photographs
and descriptive notes are provided in the Annex.) Most had
been manufactured since 1966, and all are in current use.
7
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Soviet Military Hardware Examined
Initial
production/
deployment
Aircraft Systems
Fishbed J export 1968/1968
(MIG-21M) airframe
Avionics
Spin Scan airborne Unknown/1963
intercept radar
Communications equip- Unknown
ment
Gunsight
Unknown
R-13F-300 engine
1970/1970
Fitter A (SU-7)
airframe
Land Arms
1957/1961
BTR-60PB armored per-
sonnel carrier
1966/1966
BMP infantry combat
vehicle
1967/1967
BRDM-2 amphibious re-
connaissance vehicle
1966/1966
Sagger missiles
1969/1969
T-62 medium tank
1961/1962
8
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SA-3 1960/1961
Goa missile (Mod 1) 1.960/1961
Launcher 1960/1961
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CONFIDENTIAL
The systems and components that were available for
examination are listed in the table on pages 8 and 9.
Some systems were intact, but subsystems on others
were damaged or missing.
Except for the BMP infantry combat vehicle and the
ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun, the systems in general do
not have new design features, and most lack the more
advanced features characteristic of Soviet land warfare
systems designed since the early sixties.* The sys-
tems examined, therefore, do not represent current
Soviet design technology. Rather, they reflect tech-
nology that went into the design of several currently
deployed systems--and only indirectly reveal technol-
ogy that will be incorporated in future systems.
Assessment of Design Features
The findings of the US weapons manufacturers and mili-
tary weapons experts who participated in 25X1A
_ are summarized in this section (individual comments
are compiled in the "Supporting Comments" section which
follows). The features of Soviet weapons design and
technology discussed below were identified by the par-
ticipants as being common to most of the hardware ex-
amined. Not all were found, however, in the BMP and the
ZSU-23-4--the newest of the Soviet weapons examined.
These comments should not be interpreted as reflec-
tions on the effectiveness of these weapon systems.
They pertain only to differences between US and Soviet
weapon design and manufacturing technology.
Simplicity of Design
The feature most frequently mentioned by project
participants was design simplicity. This attitude or
* Design features and complexity of the BMP and ZSU-23-4 and
other new Soviet land arms are discussed in detail in Increased
Complexity in Soviet Land Arms, SR IR 75-15, September 1975
(Secret/No Foreign Dissem).
10
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philosophy toward product design allows Soviet manu-
facturers to use standardized components, general pur-
pose machines and conventional assembly operations in
the production of weapons. Even the ZSU-23-4 was rela-
tively simple in actual hardware, although it is con-
sidered innovative in the integration and optimization
of components and complex in design concept. Only the
BMP incorporated new components whose features repre-
sented significant changes in weapons design.
An important design criteria therefore seemed to
be that the weapon could be produced with existing
manufacturing methods. Existing manufacturing tech-
nology is more of a constraint on weapons design in
the USSR than in the US.
Conservative Design
A dominant feature of most of the hardware ex-
amined was the conservative design, except for the
BMP combat vehicle and the ZSU-23-4 gun system. The
designers tended to use proven technology or standard
components, and there was little apparent effort to
strive for maximum system performance. For example,
the MIG-21 and SU-7 airframes as well as the SA-3
launcher were judged to be bigger and heavier than
required for their missions, and bigger and heavier
than the US counterparts. This practice minimizes
potential hardware stress problems but results in
sacrifices to performance characteristics such as
payload, range, and speed.
Limited Design Modification
The design reflected in nearly all the hardware
examined has remained basically unchanged over long
periods of time. The SA-2 and the SA-3 SAM systems
perhaps are most illustrative of this. They were
designed in the middle fifties and have been produced
in several variants since the early sixties. The few
design changes that were incorporated affected only
specific systems components and did not. reflect a gen-
eral weapon system redesign. In the US, design modi-
fications are made more often and are generally applied
to all applicable components of a weapon system.
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Standardization of Components
and Subsystem Designs
Standardization of components within a given sys-
tem and among related systems was evident. The SA-3
guidance and control van was a notable example. All
relays and oil-filled capacitors were of three basic
types; and standardized magnetics, vacuum tubes, and
diode rectifier networks were used. Pneumatic actua-
tors on the SA-2 surface-to-air missile and the AA-5
air-to-air missile appeared to be similar. Other parts
such as clamps, brackets, and connectors appeared to be
of common design and supply.
It was also evident that existing subsystem designs
were used in new versions of weapon systems. For ex-
ample, the ZSU-23-4 employs some subsystems used in
earlier ground force antiaircraft artillery systems.
High-quality or expensive manufacturing techniques
generally were used only where absolutely necessary
for system performance. By US standards finishes were
rough and tolerances were loose on many Soviet weapons
components and parts. This was especially true of
MIG-21 and SU-7 airframes and engines and the SA-2 and
SA-3 missiles.
Lagging Design Technology
Soviet design technology, for all systems except the
BMP combat vehicle, was judged to lag that of the US.
This apparently reflected a true technology gap in certain
cases, while in others it probably resulted more from a
preference for standardization and simplicity than from
an inability to incorporate more advanced' technology.
The lag was particularly evident in electronics, and
less obvious in mechanical systems. The evolutionary
nature of design changes and a reluctance to introduce
new production processes contribute to the technology lag.
Lagging Production Technology
The production techniques required to manufacture
these weapons also are outdated by US standards. For
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instance, the MIG-21 and SA-2 could have been produced
without the use of any three-dimensional machining
equipment. Also, with the exception of one or two parts,
the MIG-21 engine could have been produced using manu-
facturing technology available in the early forties.
Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Methods
The production techniques used to fabricate these
weapon systems reflects the fact that labor is cheaper
relative to capital in the Soviet Union than in the US.
Labor-intensive production techniques were used on all
weapons. Perhaps the most obvious example was the use
of the hand-stitched fabric cable on the wiring rather
than plastic or heat-shrinkable cable commonly used in
the US.
Reliability of Equipment and Ease of Maintenance
A detailed analysis of equipment reliability and
ease of maintenance requires exploitation of greater
depth than was possible in this project. A few comments
were made by US weapons manufacturers regarding the
reliability and ease of maintenance of Soviet equipment
in the field based on their analysis of design features.
Their comments are of interest and are reported on page
28, but are not sufficient for even tentative conclusions.
Supporting Comments
Quotations from the US experts who examined the
n f e rLonIH
below. References i parenthesis identif Y -\
of e
u
me
q
p
n
Simplicity of Design
"Adequate space was available for all the components of the
system, making it easily producible. No unique manufacturing
techniques were in evidence. Conventional techniques were
utilized throughout the product. Consideration for cosmetic
appeal appeared to be minimal." (SA-3 missile)
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"Machining, chem-milling, and tapering for weight reduction
are not apparent as on an F-4 or F-15. No use of titanium in
place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weight reduction."
(MIG-21 and SU-7)
"The machined components appear to be made from forgings or
castings, with machining limited to such applications as criti-
cal surface mating (none for weight reduction). Soviet design
does not require three-dimensional or sculptured machining. Alloy
steel and aluminum (no titanium) is used for forgings, and alumi-
num and magnesium are used for casting." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
"Examination of the relative complexity and quality of the
vehicle as compared to its US equivalent, the M60A1 [medium tank],
indicates to us a lesser level of complexity as well as quality.
Specifically, the vehicle lacks a range finder, and has suspen-
sion, powertrain, and fire control of simpler, less expensive
design. We have estimated that this vehicle on a per pound basis
represents a 20-percent less costly vehicle." (T-62)
"The above generalizations can be applied to the system as a
whole; however, elements of the system (i.e., pressure vessels,
actuators, etc.) reflected a well-developed specialized capabil-
ity, possibly highly capitalized.... The modular makeup of the
subject vehicle would permit the use of a large number of 'spe-
cialty manufacturers,' with only the final assembly of the sus-
tainers being accomplished at an assembly facility. The point to
be made here is that this vehicle permits more latitude along these
lines than any other the writer is aware of." (SA-2 missile)
"...commitment to simple and straightforward execution of
design to permit an equally straightforward execution in pro-
duction." (SA-2 missile)
"The [SA-7] seeker is a functional, well-designed infrared
seeker." (SA-7 missile)
"A generally unsophisticated approach to design in consid-
eration of vibration and shock environment, Although no evident
failures appeared. Although unsophisticated in approach to the
problem, the use of shock mounts on the equipment main frame at
all appeared as a surprise improvement to us. Studies by us of
earlier vintage hardware had determined that all equipment was
hard-mounted to the aircraft frame." (MIG-21 radar)
"Quality had been applied with more discretion/discernment
than any other in the writer's experience. Where precision and
care were required to assure function, they were readily apparent,
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and where not required, little effort was expended. This would
indicate a very mature and realistic approach to the application
and control of quality requirements. An element that generally
reflected a high level of quality, at least visually, were the
welds. Machined parts best demonstrated the overall philosophy.
Many were very crude by contemporary standards; however, they
too reflected precision where required." (SA-2 missile)
"The chem-milling of skins [removal of metal by etching with
an oblating chemical] shows rough surfaces, undercuts at edges,
and sharp corners, none of which would pass US inspection. The
Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins [a wing surface in which
the outer skin and load-bearing supports--ribs--are cut out of
one piece of metal] have ribs that are parallel to each other
(do not follow percent lines*), are not high and thin, and are
not tapered in thickness. Soviet riveting consists of nearly
100-percent driven-bucked rivets [a rivet that requires two
operators for installation--one to hammer the rivet and another
to hold the template that fastens it]; no blind fasteners [any
one of a number of fasterners, such as screws, that only require
one operator to install] are used. Extensive.use of alloy steel
fasteners is made rather than Monel, stainless, or titanium
fasteners. There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar
metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum." (MIG 21 and SU-7)
Conservative Design
"Machining, chem-milling, and tapering for weight reduction
are not apparent as on an F-4 or F-15. No use of titanium in
place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weight reduction."
(MIG-21 and SU-7)
"The machined components appear to be made from forgings or
castings, with machining limited to such applications as critical
surface mating (none for weight reduction). Soviet design does
not require three-dimensional or sculptured machining. Alloy
steel and aluminum (no titanium) [are] used for forgings, and
aluminum and magnesium are used for casting." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
"Weight, volume, and technological advancement seem to be
secondary to continued use of existing equipment." (MIG-21M
communications)
* A percent line is the rate at which the gap between the ribs in
an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one
edge of the wing to the other. To cut the metal from a wing and
leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophisti-
cated machinery than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs.
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"The overall appearance of the hardware indicated that the
major consideration in manufacturing was function, with little
or no consideration for cosmetic appeal. Size and weight do
not appear to be significant design criteria." (SA-3 missile)
"The Soviet design philosophy appears to be (1) a single
purpose simplicity, (2) acceptance of a heavier airframe, and
(3) shorter overall life in terms of environmental influences.
Good finishes and close tolerances are not the general rule
but are very good in the areas where they are really required.
Corrosion protection such as exterior painting and plating are
not equal to US standards." (MIG-21, SU-7)
"It was observed that the design agency had been very effec-
tive in [its] effort to achieve standardization in component
selection and application. As we mentioned above, all relays
were of three basic types and, in addition, oil-filled capaci-
tors were of three general types of a similar degree of standard-
ization among magnetics, vacuum tubes, and diode rectifier net-
works. In addition, all chassis, mechanical items, connector
blocks, sheet metal, and hold-down hardware were standardized.
Offsetting the advantages of standardization, however, we ob-
served numerous instances wherein the standardization effort
resulted in either a weight or volume penalty. This was espec-
ially true in certain of the chassis drawers where at times no
more than 30 to 40 percent of the total volume was utilized.
This was apparently the direct result of utilizing standard
sheet metal enclosures, front panels, chassis dimensions, etc."
(SA-3, command and control van)
"...it is a veritable fortress--heavy forgings and castings
with all electronics encased in castings and further shielded by
steel panels." (SA-3 launcher)
Limited Design Modification
"Extensive inspection of every solder joint was indicated
by a color-coded varnish dot on each and every connection. No
changes, re-works, or engineering improvements were indicated
by the uniformity of the assembly and the untouched inspection
marks." (MIG-21 radar)
"There were no obvious signs of post-manufactured change
incorporation. We term such changes ECPs (Engineering Change
Proposal) and tend to continually update the performance of
equipment in the field through modification of circuitry. Such
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modifications are usually obvious, since wire types are different,
components are positioned in nonconforming places, and new wires
are added outside of original wire bundles. The lack of such
changes in this hardware indicates that the equipment design
maturity is high, that upgrading of performance is done by sub-
stituting completely new suits of equipment, that changes are
accomplished by rotating equipment back to the factory of origin
for rather complete physical rework to incorporate functional
changes, or some combination of these considerations." (MIG-21
radar)
Standardization of Components and Subsystem Designs
"Weight, volume, and technological advancement seem to be
secondary to continued use of existing equipment." (MIG-21M
communications)
"It was observed that the design agency had been very effec-
tive in [its] effort. to achieve standardization in component selec-
tion and application. As we mentioned above, all relays were of
three basic types and, in addition, oil-filled capacitors were of
three general types of a similar degree of standardization among
magnetics, vacuum tubes, and diode rectifier networks. In addition,
all chassis, mechanical items, connector blocks, sheet metal, and
hold-down hardware were standardized. Offsetting the advantages
of standardization, however, we observed numerous instances where-
in the standardization effort resulted in either a weight or volume
penalty. This was especially true in certain of the chassis drawers
where at times no more than 30 to 40 percent of the total volume
was utilized. This was apparently the direct result of utilizing
standard sheet metal enclosures, front panels, chassis dimensions,
etc." (SA-3, command and control van)
"The writer had the opportunity to review parts of an air-
to-air vehicle from the same builder. In comparing the units,
it has been apparent that a sincere attempt was made to use
common hardware across a group of vehicles. The case in point
revealed actuators (pneumatic cylinders) that were at least
visually common to each vehicle. Additionally, hardware items
(clamps, brackets, connectors) appeared to be common design and
supply." (SA-2 and AA-5 missiles)
Little Attention to Cosmetics
"Adequate space was available for all the components of the
system, making it easily producible. No unique manufacturing
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techniques were in evidence. Conventional techniques were
utilized throughout the product. Consideration for cosmetic
appeal appeared to be minimal." (SA-3 missile)
"Quality had been applied with more discretion/discernment
than any other in the writer's experience. Where precision and
care were required to assure function, they were readily apparent
and where not required, little effort was expended. This would
indicate a very mature and realistic approach to the application
and control of quality requirements. An element that generally
reflected a high level of quality, at least visually, were the
welds. Machined parts best demonstrated the overall philosophy.
Many were very crude by contemporary standards; however, they too
reflected precision where required." (SA-2 missile)
"The chem-milling of skins [removal of metal by etching with
an oblating chemical] shows rough surfaces, undercuts at edges,
and sharp corners, none of which would pass US inspection. The
Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins [a wing surface in which
the outer skin and load-bearing supports--ribs--are cut out of
one piece of metal] have ribs that are parallel to each other
(do not follow percent lines*), are not high and thin, and are
not tapered in thickness. Soviet riveting consists of nearly
100-percent driven-bucked rivets [a rivet that requires two
operators for installation--one to hammer the rivet and another
to hold the template that fastens it]; no blind fasteners [any
one of a number of fasteners, such as screws, that only require
one operator to install] are used. Extensive use of alloy steel
fasteners is made rather than Monel, stainless, or titanium
fasteners. There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar
metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum." (MIG 21 and SU-7)
"The overall appearance of the hardware indicated that the
major consideration in manufacturing was function, with little
or no consideration for cosmetic appeal. Size and weight do not
appear to be a significant design criteria." (SA-3 missile)
"The Soviet design philosophy appears to be (1) a single pur-
pose simplicity, (2) acceptance of a heavier airframe, and (3)
shorter overall life in terms of environmental influences. Good
finishes and close tolerances are not the general rule but are
* A percent line is the rate at which the gap between the ribs in
an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one
edge of the wing to the other. To cut the metal from a wing and
leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophisti-
cated machinery than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs.
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very good in the areas where they are really required. Corrosion
protection such as exterior painting and plating are not equal
to US standards." (MIG-21, SU-7)
"The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of
workmanship, especially the handwork involved in assembly and
wiring. The wiring is point-to-point: That is, each wire is
routed and soldered into place individually. All solder joints
are of good quality and consistent, and wires are evenly stripped
and dressed. No loose wire strands (presume wire is stranded,
but no check was possible) were evident. Hardware was not
burred during installation." (MIG-21 radar)
"Machining operations (drill, punch, mill, etc.) are at an
absolute minimum. Welds are not dressed; little or no attempt
was made to remove burrs or flockings [residue from a coating
applied to keep stamping tools clean] from stamping operations."
(MIG-21 radar)
"The [gyro] spin and gimbal bearings appear to be of good
quality with regard to the balls and ball grooves. Outside
finishes are less than instrument bearing quality, however,
giving the impression of a low-grade bearing. The poor coast-
time characteristic of the gyro may be attributed to either
an over-oiled condition or excessive preload." (SA-7 seeker
head)
"A minimal use of anodize finish for corrosion protection;
however, no sign of corrosion." (MIG-21 radar)
Lagging Design Technology
"This equipment, with a few minor exceptions, could have
been designed by us in the 1950-1956 era and fabricated by us
in the 1952-1967 era." (MIG-21 radar)
"Cost analysis study of a Soviet MIG-21M gunsight system
reveals that the technology involved approximates that of
similar US systems designed in the 1958-1960 period. A US
manufacturer designed a gunsight in 1958 that looked very much
like the MIG-21M system. It was manufactured in the 1960s."
(MIG-21 gunsight)
Although the design is crude in some respects (note the
external push rods to actuate the roll control, and the wire
holding the booster fins in the folded position), it is quite
functional in all respects." (SA-3 missile)
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"...rugged, heavy, high-quality material and workmanship."
(ZSU-23-4 guns, turret, and electronics)
"The examiners were particularly impressed by the BMP com-
bat vehicle. It shows a degree of sophistication of armored
vehicles which the Soviets were not expected to possess. The
transmission and transfer case arrangement on the vehicle are
excellent. Seals to assure pressurization are superior to those
in the US, and it is equipped with automated CBR devices and a
73mm cannon loader that operates with an indexing ammunition
basket which is unique and eliminates the need for a second
gunner." (BMP)
"System capabilities concept was quite ambitious for the
early 1960s. The technology represented is 15-20 years old
relative to present state of the art." (ZSU-23-4 guns, turret,
and electronics)
"The Soviet MIG-21M gunsight system was assembled with ex-
cellent workmanship, particularly in the electronics area. There
was, for example, very careful tying of wire bundles, indicating
that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high.
The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than
would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment.
Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self-
aligning and show advanced design techniques, considering the
time of their manufacture." (MIG-21 gunsight)
"The equipment and technology are estimated to be approx-
imately equivalent to our 1955-1960 vintage equipment." (MIG-21
communications)
"An analysis of the hardware available for observation
showed the manufacturing technology to be comparable to that
experienced [for US] missiles produced in the early 1950s.
These missiles were an air/hydraulic system with vacuum tube
type of electronics." (SA-3 missile)
"The technology used is not equivalent to the 1970 American
technology. They have used mostly vacuum tube circuits with
very little or no solid state circuitry. There were no observ-
able printed circuit boards but rather mostly hard wire boards
with discrete components. This system is probably equivalent
to a late 1950 or early 1960 American system." (ZSU-23-3 radar)
"It is a vacuum tube type radar employing no solid state
technology. Wiring is all by hand; no formed cables were in-
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dicated. The entire unit is labor intensive, that is, hand
labor was used to an excess in lieu of mechanical, automation,
machine, or cost effective aid[s] in completing any operation.
Cables are obviously assembled by hand--no crimping of wire
connectors--and laced extensively (in fact it looks more like
a good sewing stitch on the cable cover rather than a lacing
job). Cable relief points are manually tied within the wire
bundles, and each wire end is individually tied to prevent
fraying. No use of teflon or heat-shrinkable plastic to protect
these wire ends was observed. All of the above indicate a high
use of manual labor rather than machines or other labor-saving
devices." (MIG-21 radar)
"A large, flat rib-stiffened casting (appears die cast) on
the antenna, of very thin section, is pushing, and may be beyond,
our state of the art. From appearances, it is not acid dipped
for thinning. It would be worthwhile studying this in more
depth with respect to alloy type and method of fabrication."
(MIG-21 radar)
"The general design period relative to US hardware would
appear to be vintage 1942 through 1946. This equipment has a
marked similarity to US World War II equipment in the selec-
tion and application of components. The command and control
van is all vacuum tube, carbon resistor, with all chassis wir-
ing cabled and laced. The only major departure from equipment
of this approximate time frame (1942-1946) was the limited use
of single-sided printed circuit boards. Such boards were rel-
atively simple in circuit layout and density and were rigidly
mounted and hard-wired to the internal chassis cable." (SA-3
command and control van and radar)
"Examination of the relative complexity and quality of the
vehicle as compared to its US equivalent, the M60A1 [medium
tank], indicates to us a lesser level of complexity as well as
quality. Specifically, the vehicle lacks a range finder, and
has suspension, powertrain, and fire control of simpler, less
expensive design. We have estimated that this vehicle on a per
pound basis represents a 20 percent less costly vehicle." (T-62)
"A generally unsophisticated approach to design in consid-
eration of vibration and shock environment, although no evident:
failures appeared. Although unsophisticated in approach to the
problem, the use of shock mounts on the equipment main frame at
all appeared as a surprise improvement to us. Studies by us of
earlier vintage hardware had determined that all equipment was
hard-mounted to the aircraft frame." (MIG-21 radar)
C8, NFIpENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Lagging Production Technology
"The chem-milling of skins [removal of metal by etching with
an oblating chemical] shows rough surfaces, undercuts at edges,
and sharp corners, none of which would pass US inspection. The
Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins [a wing surface in which
the outer skin and load-bearing supports--ribs--are cut out of
one piece of metal] have ribs that are parallel to each other
(do not follow percent lines*), are not high and thin, and are
not tapered in thickness. Soviet riveting consists of nearly
100-percent driven-bucked rivets [a rivet that requires two
operators for installation--one to hammer the rivet and another
to hold the template that fastens it]; no blind fasteners [any
one of a number of fasteners, such as screws, that only require
one operator to install] are used. Extensive use of alloy steel
fasteners is made rather than Monet, stainless, or titanium
fasteners. There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar
metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum." (MIG 21 and SU-7)
"The machined components appear to be made from forgings or
castings, with machining limited to such applications as critical
surface mating (none for weight reduction). Soviet design does
not require three-dimensional or sculptured machining. Alloy
steel and aluminum (no titanium) [are] used for forgings, and
aluminum and magnesium are used for casting." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
"Machining, chem-milling, and tapering for weight reduction
are not apparent as on an F-4 or F-15. No use of titanium in
place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weight reduction."
(MIG-21 and SU-7)
"The Soviet MIG-21M gunsight system was assembled with ex-
cellent workmanship, particularly in the electronics area. There
was, for example, very careful tying of wire bundles, indicating
that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high.
The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than
would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment.
Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self-
aligning and show advanced design techniques, considering the
time of their manufacture." (MIG-21 gunsight)
* A percent line is the rate at which the gap between the ribs in
an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one
edge of the wing to the other. To cut the metal from a wing and
leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophistica-
ted machinery than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs.
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"...rugged, heavy, high-quality material and workmanship."
(ZSU-23-4 guns, turret, and electronics)
"Cost analysis study of a Soviet MIG-21M gunsight system
reveals that the technology involved approximates that of similar
US systems designed in the 1958-1960 period. A US manufacturer
designed a gunsight in 1958 that looked very much like the MIG-21M
system. It was manufactured in the 1960s." (MIG-21 gunsight)
"This equipment, with a few minor exceptions, could have
been designed by us in the 1950-1956 era and fabricated by us
in the 1952-1967 era." (MIG-21 radar)
"The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of
workmanship, especially the handwork involved in assembly and
wiring. The wiring is point-to-point: that is, each wire is
routed and soldered into place individually. All solder joints
are of good quality and consistent, and wires are evenly stripped
and dressed. No loose wire strands (presume wire is stranded,
but no check was possible) were evident. Hardware was not bur-
red during installation." (MIG-21 radar)
"Materials used appeared consistent with [those of the US]
as did methods of fabrication and use of sheet metal tooling.
There was a lack of newer style plastics, such as ABS (nylon),
but other older types such as Micarta were in evidence."
(MIG-21 radar)
"Electrical components appear to be quite similar to American
manufactured components. Powdered iron or ferrite cup-cores like
we use were in the ADF [automatic direction finder]." (MIG-21
electronics)
"The use of double insulated hook-up wire, with a plastic
inner jacket (presumably for electrical protection) and fabric
outer sheath (presumably for mechanical protection), ... would
indicate a lack of plastic insulation capability either in terms
of formulation or production capacity, since the technique used
required more assembly time." (MIG-21 radar)
"Radar equipment, aside from antenna, employs subminiature
vacuum tube discrete component point-to-point wiring technology--
no semiconductors of pwbs." (ZSU-23-4 guns, turret, and elec-
tronics)
"Components, for the most part, had the appearance of being
direct copies from ... major [US] suppliers. An interesting
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observation was that many components were date stamped, with
the latest observed date being 1967. Two items of component
interest, in comparison to [US] hardware, are the lack of carbon
resistors (the substitutes appear to be of ceramic composition),
and, conversely, the lack of ceramic disc capacitors (most are
tubular)." (MIG-21 radar)
"Adequate space was available for all the components of the
system, making it easily producible. No unique manufacturing
techniques were in evidence. Conventional techniques were
utilized throughout the product. Consideration for cosmetic
appeal appeared to be minimal." (SA-3 missile)
"...the minimal amount of special tooling and equipment
required to produce. Assuming the next vehicle produced in
this facility/facilities follows the same philosophy, it would
be reasonable to project a very low cost and speedy re-
implementation." (SA-2 missile)
"No unique or unknown manufacturing techniques were in
evidence. Conventional machining and fabrication techniques
appear to be utilized throughout the product." (SA-3 missile)
"Skills appeared to be commensurate with the requirement.
Critical components, such as gyros, showed greater refinement
in manufacturing techniques and skills than was evident for
circuit board assemblies, machined surfaces, and exterior
finishes." (SA-3 missile)
"The vehicle represents a Soviet commitment to engineering
and tooling for production not normally to be expected. It
also reflects a degree of craftmanship never before seen in
Soviet produced equipment--a craftmanship which is not
absolutely necessary, incidentally; e.g., surfaces finished
which would not have to be put through the finishing produc-
tion step." (BMP)
"The manufacturing techniques employed were approximately
equivalent to those utilized in the US in the late 1950-early
1960 time frame. These techniques are adequate for this
design but could not be utilized for today's sophisticated
missile systems, due to cost, size, and weight." (SA-3 missile)
"The hardware available for observation did not appear to
show any excessively difficult manufacturing requirements.
The manufacturing technology employed appeared to be in line
with the state of the art of the 1950s." (SA-3 missile)
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"The packaging design of the SA-7 hardware requires the
use of hand wiring techniques to a significant degree. It has
been estimated that fully 95 percent of all component and/or
circuit connections have been made by hand. With respect to
printed circuitry, very little use has been made of this tech-
nology within the electronics boards, while this approach is
implemented to only a slightly greater extent within the modules
used within the control electronics. The overall electronic
packaging is reminiscent of techniques utilized in early Mod 24
Redeye and Sidewinder (AIM-9B) hardware." (SA-7 missile)
"Manufacturing quality is good and the internal design is
equivalent to US technology of the early 1960s." (SA-3 missile)
"Protection plating, coating, or painting is at an abso-
lute minimum. Most individual chassis are raw aluminum. in
areas where the equipment is painted (black), no preparation
of the surface before painting is made. In a few areas, com-
ponents were coated, but no general attempt was made to en-
vironmentally protect this equipment." (MIG-21 radar)
"The production methods/techniques employed require the
sequential performance of several small increments (opera-
tions), each one generally requiring the use of a specific
piece of universal equipment and frequently only hand or power
tools. The associated skill levels required have been the
semi-skilled grades; however, a high level of dexterity along
with a general commitment to performance by the labor elements
would be required to assure uniform product quality. There
was virtually no evidence of the use of automated or high-rate
production equipment in features where their use would be
visually detectable; conversely, there was much evidence of
manually controlled fabrication and assembly." (SA-2 missile)
"The construction of this seeker implies the existence of
a facility which has a high-quality, accurate tooling specif-
ically set up for this design. The basic cleanliness of the
interior of the seeker head further implies a controlled area
for assembly and testing where the standards for contamination
are very high." (SA-7 seeker head)
"It was noted that electrical wire bundling was largely
done manually, and that no micro-miniaturization was evident.
Also, hydraulic piping and fittings used flared connectors,
with little evidence of welded connections. It is concluded
that in both these areas the Soviets are using techniques a
decade or so old by US standards." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
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"This equipment is simple, made to minimum standards in
a plant with minimum sophistication and a large labor force."
(MIG-21 radar)
"In conclusion, it is obvious that many more man-hours of
labor are being expended on fabrication and assembly compared
to US practices. There is little evidence that the Soviets
are using automated fabrication techniques or advanced assembly
methods." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
"The processes used to produce the chassis were old, estab-
lished methods, and duplication would require no new or un-
usual equipment." (ZSU-23-4 chassis)
Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Methods
"Inspection was evidently detailed. Each electrical con-
nection point, including some that were not wired, bore an
inspection dye mark. In addition to an obvious visual in-
spection, this may also have included a chassis ring-out
[check of circuits for continuity] of completed wiring. Each
piece of hardware (nut, screw, etc.) also bore a dye mark that
probably doubled as an antivibration operation such as our
Glyptal applications of an earlier era." [Glyptal is a red
liquid chemical that was applied to connectors. Upon contact
with air it hardens and forms a seal that prevents the con-
nections from vibrating apart.] (MIG-21 radar)
"The Soviet MIG-21M gunsight system was assembled with ex-
cellent workmanship, particularly in the electronics area. There
was, for example, very careful tying of wire bundles, indicating
that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high.
The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than
would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment.
Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self-
aligning and show advanced design techniques, considering the
time of their manufacture." (MIG-21 gunsight)
"It is a vacuum tube type radar employing no solid state
technology. Wiring is all by hand; no formed cables were in-
dicated. The entire unit is labor intensive, that is, hand
labor was used to an excess in lieu of mechanical, automation,
machine, or cost effective aid[s] in completing any operation.
Cables are obviously assembled by hand--no crimping of wire
connectors--and laced extensively (in fact it looks more like
a good sewing stitch on the cable cover rather than a lacing
job). Cable relief points are manually tied within the wire
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bundles, and each wire end is individually tied to prevent
fraying. No use of teflon or heat-shrinkable plastic to pro-
tect these wire ends was observed. All of the above indicate
a high use of manual labor rather than machines or other labor-
saving devices." (MIG-21 radar)
"Extensive inspection of every solder joint was indicated
by a color-coded varnish dot on each and every connection. No
changes, re-works, or engineering improvements were indicated
by the uniformity of the assembly and the untouched inspection
marks." (MIG-21 radar)
"The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of
workmanship, especially the hand work involved in assembly and
wiring. The wiring is point-to-point: that is, each wire is
routed and soldered into place individually. All solder joints
are of good quality and consistent, and wires are evenly strip-
ped and dressed. No loose wire strands (presume wire is stran-
ded, but no check was possible) were evident. Hardware was not
burred during installation." (MIG-21 radar)
"This equipment is simple, made to minimum standards in a
plant with minimum sophistication and a large labor force."
(MIG-21 radar)
"It was noted that electrical wire bundling was largely
done manually, and that no micro-miniaturization was evident.
Also, hydraulic piping and fittings used flared connectors,
with little evidence of welded connections. It is concluded
that in both these areas the Soviets are using techniques a
decade or so old by US standards." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
"In conclusion, it is obvious that many more man-hours of
labor are being expended on fabrication and assembly compared
to US practices. There is little evidence that the Soviets
are using automated fabrication techniques or advanced assem-
bly methods." (MIG-21 and SU-7)
"The printed circuit assembly appeared to be hand soldered,
with the body of the components held up off of the board during
assembly." (MIG-21 communications)
"A lack of large plastic sleeving was apparent. The sub--
stitutes for this lack were hand-stitched protective covers
on main cables, and the use of hand whipping [a tight binding
that prevents cable unraveling] with string on cable and wire
ends." (MIG-21 radar)
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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"The equipment is assembly labor intensive as opposed to
utilizing technological advancement to reduce labor." (MIG-21
communications)
"The packaging design of the SA-7 hardware requires the
use of hand wiring techniques to a significant degree. It has
been estimated that fully 95 percent of all component and/or
circuit connections have been made by hand. With respect to
printed circuitry, very little use has been made of this tech-
nology within the electronics boards, while this approach is
implemented to only a slightly greater extent within the
modules used within the control electronics. The overall
electronic packaging is reminiscent of techniques utilized in
early Mod 24 Redeye and Sidewinder (AIM-9B) hardware." (SA-7
missile)
"Judging from the number of hand-soldered connections in
the seeker head alone, a great deal of time and well-thought-
out planning is required to assemble the hardware and avoid
errors. (SA-7 seeker head)
Reliability of Equipment
"The team was impressed by the total number of control re-
lays in the van electronics. By actual count, 489 relays are
utilized, including snap-cover telephone type, hermetically
sealed, and miniature. From the standpoint of reliability
this would appear to be a potentially troublesome area." (SA-3
command and control van, radar)
"The team was equally amazed at the total number of adjust-
ment potentiometers [these allow for screwdriver adjustment to
vary the electrical current in a circuit] within the system.
By actual count, 776 potentiometers are used throughout, and
this again should have an additional effect upon system reli-
ability." (SA-3 command and control van, radar)
"The forced-air rack cooling system would appear to be in-
adequate on several counts, namely, volume of air handled vs
rack dissipation within the van enclosure. Even in the some-
what mild ... environment, the rack temperature appeared to be
very high after a short period of operation." (SA-3 command
and control van)
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"The seeker apparently has low sensitivity in terms of state
of the art in CW [continuous-wave] seekers. This may be deliber-
ate in design strategy.... It is simpler and less expensive to
produce target seekers with lower sensitivities, which in turn
will not undergo as much receiver degradation when committed to
field conditions. Thus, missiles are in a higher state of
readiness and will require less field maintenance and read-
justment." (SA-6 seeker)
"The mechanical characteristics of the resistors in use,
however, are certainly less than desirable from a stress stand-
point. When soldered in place, these devices can be fairly
easily broken with only slight excessive handling of the hard-
ware." (SA-7 missile)
Ease of Maintenance
"A corollary observation concerns field maintenance. Al-
though estimates of field reliability are beyond the scope of
our observations other than to note that this specific suit
of hardware bore no signs of field repairs, the difficulty of
field troubleshooting and repair is inherently obvious. As
previously mentioned, the tightly packed, layered construction
renders the replacement of parts (other than many of the tubes)
difficult. Also, there are no service loops in the harness
wiring [or] in the component leads. In terms of troubleshooting
and fault isolation, it would appear that relatively highly
skilled technicians are required. Presumably, there is some
kind of special field test equipment to provide assistance in
isolating faults to the black box level, and possibly some
additional equipment to troubleshoot each black box at an
intermediate or depot level. There are some test points on
the front panels of the black boxes. But designed-in help* to
the field users practically stops there. Wires are not indi-
vidually marked [or] even basically color coded to indicate
that they carry power, signals, etc. Chassis are minimally
marked to indicate the specific component in the circuit that
is mounted at that position. Although the pins are individually
numbered on each terminal board, the boards themselves are not
individually identified, and the individual terminals on large
* This includes any equipment aid to the field maintenance tech-
nician such as built-in terminals provided exclusively for check-
ing circuit continuity, color-coded wiring for easy tracing, and
identification marks on terminals. Later US equipment has com-
puter program tapes which, when run through a piece of equipment,
will isolate trouble spots.
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components are not identified. All of this means that highly
experienced electronics technicians, working from a combination
of schematics, wire tabs, and pictures or drawings, and using
basic laboratory test equipment, are probably needed to service
the hardware." (MIG-21 radar)
"The packaging concept used does render field changes diffi-
cult, at best. The hardware is densely packaged, built in layers,
and all hard wired. There are no replaceable plug-in units that
could be easily replaced in the field by improved versions, except
at the complete black box level." (MIG-21 radar)
"These features indicate that the first equipment maintenance
level is module replacement." (MIG-21 communications)
"The maintenance of the vehicle can be readily accomplished
assuming the availability of a cadre of trained (not highly
skilled) technicians. Most elements of the vehicle are easily
replaced, adjusted, and in some cases, field repaired." (SA-2
missile)
"Each unit front panel provided numerous test points available
to the technician. It would appear that all adjustment and trouble-
shooting was performed by means of the numerous blown-fuse indica-
tors and the several hundred test points as provided. The equip-
ment does not feature a self-check capability or anything that would
assist in rapid isolation and identification of faulty circuitry."
(SA-3 command and control van)
"The graduation level electronic packaging design does not
lend itself either physically or economically to any series re-
work, as any efforts to carry out repair work might well create
more problems than they could solve." (SA-7 control package)
"Should an error or component failure occur, the gyro or
seeker head is probably discarded because the design does not
lend itself to rework or repair." (SA-7 seeker head)
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Reference Guide to Soviet Military
Hardware Examined
.25X1A
The systems examined were
manufactured in either the late sixties or ear y
seventies. Except for the BMP infantry combat vehicle
and the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft gun, however, their basic
designs date back to the fifties and early sixties.
Despite their apparent lack of sophistication, signi_j=i-
cant numbers of the systems are still used by Soviet.
and Soviet-supported military forces.
Aircraft Systems
MIG-21M Interceptor. The MIG--21M--an export version
of the Soviet Fishbed J--is primarily an all-weather,,
medium-to-high-altitude interceptor with a secondary
role of ground support. It is capable of Mach 2.0
flight. The MIG-21M is similar to the Fishbed J except
that it is equipped with the older Spin Scan airborne
intercept (AI) radar. The Fishbed J is equipped with
the new Jay Bird AI radar, which gives it a better
low-altitude intercept capability than the export
version.
The MIG-21M represents a further development of the
Fishbed series aircraft initially designed in 1952 by
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001 /04/09d --PP7, B00457A001200090001-1
Lhe Mikoyan Design Bureau. The principal changes are
an improved engine and weapons system. The aircraft is
equipped with the R13-300 engine, which has a maximum
engine thrust estimated at 64,500 newtons (14,500 pounds).
This engine is a direct derivation of the R11F-300 after-
burning turbojet engine used on some earlier Fishbed
models. The most significant weapons changes made in
the MIG-21M were the internal installation of a 23mm
twin-barrel cannon and the addition of two more wing
stations, which enables the aircraft to carry four,
instead of two, air-to-air missiles.
There is some evidence that a later version of the
Eishbed series--the Fishbed L export--has replaced the
MIG-21M on the production line and is currently being
fielded. However, the MIG-21M remains the mainstay
of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air forces as well as
the air forces of Egypt and Syria.
r"fitter A Fighter. The SU-7 Fitter A is the first
of three variants of a medium-weight, sweptwing, super-
sonic fighter designed in the early fifties by the
Sukhoy Design Bureau. Its primary mission is ground
support and interdiction, but it also has limited capa-
bility as a clear-weather interceptor.
Series production of the Fitter A began in about
1957 and the fighter is estimated to have become
operational in 1961. When fielded, it was equipped
with an AL-7F turbojet engine. Its armament consisted
Approved For Release 2001/04/09 :BMA-1R@RT9800457A001200090001-1
 Approved For Release 2001 /04/06? RAD T JB00457A001200090001-1
of one gun in each wing and a maximum payload of 2,000
kilograms (4,400 pounds). Fitter B and C aircraft--
later variants of the Fitter produced in the late sixties
and early seventies--have variable-geometry wings and
were modified with an uprated engine, avionics, and in-
creased payload. The Fitter A is being replaced by
Fitter C and Flogger aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation,
but there are still some 400 with Soviet units and about
100 with other Warsaw Pact air forces.
Land Arms
BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). The BTR-
60PB is an amphibious, eight-wheel-drive APC. It can
carry 10 troops and is powered by twin gas-fueled engines.
For amphibious operation, the vehicle uses a hydrojet
propulsion system similar to that found on previous
Soviet. APCs.
The BTR.-60PB has two machine guns in a small turret
and is equipped with overhead armor. It entered pro-
duction in 1966 and is based on the BTR-60P, an earlier
version that lacked the turret and. overhead armor. An
intermediate version, the BTR-60PK, had overhead armor
but no turret.
Currently both the BTR-60PB and the newer BMP are
replacing older APCs in Soviet units. The Soviets
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/096Id9B00457A001200090001-1
probably will continue to produce the BTR-60PB and field
it throughout their forces in conjunction with the BMP.
BMP Combat Vehicle. The BMP tracked infantry
combat vehicle entered service in 1967. Unlike most
25X1A systems examined the BMP in-
corporates many a vance esign ea ure . The vehicle
is similar to the earlier wheeled BTR-60 and tracked
BTR-50 APCs in its ability to carry troops but is not
limited to this role. It is armed with a 73mm smooth-
bore gun and the Sagger antitank guided missile; older
versions of this vehicle were armed only with heavy
machine guns. In addition, the gun system on the BMP,
unlike those of older Soviet armored vehicles, is fed
by an automatic loader.
Other features of the BMP include a central venti-
lation system that provides protection for passengers
and crew in a CBR environment; provision for venting
the fumes from small arms that can be fired from inside
the vehicle when it is closed; and improved armor, engine,
and track. Only the BMP's amphibious propulsion system
is less sophisticated than that of older vehicles. The
vehicle moves by spinning its tracks, while some older
vehicles have a hydrojet propulsion system.
BRDM-2 Reconnaissance Vehicle. The BRDM-2--an
armored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle first fielded
in 1966--is based on a BRDM vehicle produced in the early
sixties. The BRDM-2 was initially armed with two ma-
chine guns mounted in a small turret, but in 1969 was
modified to carry six Sagger antitank guided missiles
Approved For Release 2001 /04/090 IA( PV00457A001200090001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/04/OS:OU*ftDRDfl 9.B00457A001200090001-1
mounted on a retractable pylon. Like earlier versions
of the BRDM-2, these modified vehicles have four-wheel
drive, weigh about 6,800 kilograms (15,000 pounds) and
have a top speed of around 95 kph (60 mph). They also
have four auxiliary wheels for added mobility in poor
terrain. The BRDM-2 has also been modified to serve
as a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) for the SA-9
surface-to-air missile.
T-62 Medium Tank. The T-62 medium tank, first
fielded with Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions
in 1962, is a 36,000-kilogram (40-ton) vehicle armed
with a 115mm smoothbore gun. The tank's gun is the only
major improvement over the T-62's predecessor, the T-55,
which was first produced in 1959. The T-62 uses the
same engine, transmission, track and suspension system
as the T-55.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/08a' kAdIDPV9B00457A001200090001-1
The Soviets began fielding a new medium tank with
their ground force units in the early seventies. This
tank--the T-72--incorporates significant improvements
over the T-62, and has been replacing older T-54 and
T-55 tanks in Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions.
Nevertheless, it appears that the T-62 will remain in
the active inventory for some time.
ZSU-23-4 Antiaircraft Gun. The ZSU-23-4 is a tracked
tactical antiaircraft system for defense of combat units
against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. The weapon
was first produced in 1965. The most significant advan-
tage of this gun system over older weapons is the ad-
dition of an acquisition and tracking radar and a
computerized fire control system. The fire control
system has an analog computer that automatically aims
the four 23mm gun barrels and an indicator that enables
the system to distinguish between a moving target and
background clutter.
Four ZSU-23-4s are in use in each Soviet tank and
motorized rifle regiment. These weapons, together with
the SA-9 SAM system, are replacing the older ZSU-57-2
self-propelled air defense guns in tank regiments and
the towed light antiaircraft guns in motorized rifle
units.
Approved For Release 2001/04/0k? R-B00457A001200090001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/04/6%)NUTAENTYF7-9B00457A001200090001-1
Surface to Air Missiles
SA-2 Mod 1. The SA-2 is a command-guided SAM system
designed to provide defense against aircraft flying at
medium and high altitudes. The original version of this
weapon entered the Soviet inventory in 1958. A modified
version--the SA-2 Mod 1--was fielded in 1959 with an
improved fire control radar, the Fan Song B. Since 1959,
modifications have been made to improve the SA-2's low-
altitude intercept and electronic counter-countermeasures
capabilities. Although the SA-2 system is old and is
gradually being phased out and replaced by newer systems,
it is still widely used by Soviet strategic and tactical
air defense forces.
SA-3 Mod 1. The SA-3 is a command-guided, trans-
portable SAM system designed to provide point and
barrier defense against aircraft flying at low altitudes.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/09 ^'rCtA1R 8B00457A001200090001-1
SA-7 mis~~ile in launch tube with firing mechanism
and battery attached
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIV?ti6b157A001200090001-1
The system is primarily used to defend fixed tar-
gets. It was initially given to Soviet units in
1961. Modifications to the SA-3 have improved the
low-altitude intercept and refire* capabilities of
the system.
SA-6. The SA-6 is a mobile, short-range SAM system
intended to provide Soviet field forces with defense
against high-performance aircraft at low and medium
altitudes. A prototype of this weapon was first seen
in the 1967 Moscow parade, but it was not fielded until
1970. The system consists of three missiles on a TEL
and associated acquisition and fire control radars
mounted on separate tracked vehicles.
SA-7. The SA-7 is a man-portable, shoulder-launched,
infrared guided SAM system developed for tactical defense
against subsonic fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft
flying at low altitudes. The original version of this
weapon entered the Soviet inventory in 1967. It is
similar to the US Redeye. A later version--the SA-7
Mod 1--was first observed with Soviet forces in 1972.
This version has improved range and altitude capabilities.
*The Soviets are currently replacing the two-rail SA-3 launcher
at some sites with a newer four-rail launcher. This doubles the
number of ready missiles for firing from 8 to 16.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIA-RDP79B00457AO01200090001-1
Confidential
Confidential
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 CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION STATINTL
Dissem: 28 April 1977
SERIES NUMBER
SR 77-10006D
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
15
DATE OF DOCUMENT
April 1977
NUMBER OF COPIES
100
NUMBER IN RC
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1-66
External dissem (see attached sheet)
28 Apr 77
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67
Ch PPG - - ---- ------
2 7 Apr 77
--
68
--- STATINTL--- -- -
3- may
69
A enc. Archives ~3
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70-85
Filed in PPG/R&D --- --------- - -------
STATINTL
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May
STATINTL
62 _S
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---
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 Approved For Releas5iQgti pfi R -~B #7AflOt/ZOQEOQE1
Copy No. Recipient
v 'Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, Calif. 93940
'Naval War College
Newport, R. I. 02840
d-)Cis77
Rm. 813, Key Bldg.
MIRADCOM
Hawk Program Manager
Redstone Arsenal
Huntsville, Ala. 35809
MIRADCOM
Roland Program Manager
Redstone Arsenal
Huntsville, Ala. 35809
% MIRADCOM
/ Patriot Program Manger.
Redstone Arsenal
Huntsville, Ala. 35809
jThomas Nock
FTD/ETWD
Wright Patterson AFB
Ohio 45433
Mr . Autio
FTD/PDX5-5
Wright Patterson AFB
Ohio 45433
STATINTL
IUS Army/FSTC
' Chief Field Support Division
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. 21005
CMDR, DARCOM
Attn: Monroe Hill
5001 Eisenhower Ave.,
Alex., Va. 22333
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
LTG Jack C. Fuson
Rm. 3E560 Pentagon
32 Director of Logistic Plans, Operations and Systems
BG H. cKK5. Tompkins
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? Eeciyaient
33-37 Commanding General
US Army Air Defense School
Attn: ATSA-CI)-SA (Maj. Paek)
Ft. Bliss, Texas 79916
e 44-66
612
STATINTL
4r b3' &5-
US Army Tank-Automotive Command
TRADCOM, Attn: Herman Nadler
Warren, Mich. 48089
Defense Documentation Center
Alexandria, Va.
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R 6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE: CLERK'S
INITIALS
9 Approved For Re ase 200
90 C d t rQab 97,4 Yf}eIMA90"1sp ce --
t9 1 1. The following service is requested (check one).
0 Show to whom and date delivered...--..---.- 150
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered..----..--..- 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO: ~,~, , ~(\~YY1Ct
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
R~GsISTEPD. p0. I CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of addresses or agent)
I have receiv a article described above.
SIGNATURE Addressee ^ Authorized agent
0 SENDER: Complete it:ms 1. 2. and i.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse. '
1. The following service is requested (check one).
Show to whom and date delivered.--....----- 150
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered........--.-- 650
RESTRICTEI) DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2.
ARTICLE ADDR
SSED TO:
~
-
E
sf
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE ^ Addressee [Authorized agent
'
DATE OF DELIVERY
ETMARK
.;
5. ADDRESS (Com lets only if requests
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CL 'S
S
I
IN
TIAL
 Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIA-RDP79B00457AO01200090001-1
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS,r ?
Print loner name, address, and ZIP Code in"
? Complete items 1. 2. and 3 on the
RETURN
TO
CENTRAL N(f FENCE AGENCY
4
960 2
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVI -III
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS'
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.
? Complete Items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
? Moisten summed ends and attach to front,of article
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of. artlett.-y
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested"yOio.-
Cant to number.
RETURN
TO
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE
USE TO AVOID PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE. $300
CENTRAL !TELL
endm)
1*li~ 433 M11 fC 771 i..+
nerve, address, and ZIP C. in the s p 4diear.
? Carole a items t 9 end a -~..._ ___-_
ace
-.
...m,.?. vmrwrse hss of.aAfte.
Enaorae article "Return R nested" adia-
? cent to number.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print yam mom, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.
? CewPlete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
Moisen dammed Oak and attach to front of article
ff Npce permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
cent to number.
F 1 ('.Y 01
20
{City, State, and ZIP Code)
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE
USE TO AVOID PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE, $300
App F,p45Release 2001/04/09: CIA DP79B00457A001200090001-1
 proved oii rq~ 0
~E
" -
"
SENDER: Complete item 1, 2, and 3.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
17 Show to whom and date delivered............ 150
(~ Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered ............. 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO:
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGI$'I t NQ-). CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of addresses or agent)
I have received the article descri bed bove.
ent
ed a
i
th
g
or
z
SIGNATURE ^ Addresc Au
4. D OELIV Y
, ~ ~7)}I/1RK
if
l
requ
y
5. A (C plate
{
~k
I
?ys
1y~~
'
-6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE: I LS
ii GOP: IgN-0-203-458
.Qp SENDER: Add yete items "RETURN rv
our address in the
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one) - 150
Ca Show to whom and date delivered --------- -
0 Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.- 350
^ RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered.---- -------- 650
D DELIVERY.
o RESTRICTE
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2, TICLE ADDRESSED TO: '
___ ~~.,wme~T1AN?
REG?IbT D .ND, GtKitr,~v ..
space on
RETURN TO
Add your address in the
reverse.
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
Show to whom and date delivered............ 150
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered------------- 65.0
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 854t
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO: (~lS2JdG
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
.. b a ,.J -4: 4'
(Always obtain signature of addressee or eglIlLiV
I have received the article describeabove. t*1 `D
-J b
SIGNA ddressee uthoriz d(-agetj
4.
D OF DELIVERY T~r
5. A RESS (Comp only if request*) - 1
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
~
r 1 I
Ga 3
GOP: t97b--0"203-456
Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIA-RDP79B00457AO01200090001-1
0 SENDER: Complete items 1, 2, and 3.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
0 Show to whom and date delivered ----------- . 150
o Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
0 RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered ------------- 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2.~ARTICLE ADDRESSED
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTICN:
REGISTERED NO. :RTIFIED NO.
('Alwfy5 o In signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article describe~t above.
SIGNATURE ^ Adder"!] Authorized agent
 Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIA-RDP79B00457AO01200090001-1
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Cade in the spurn below.
? M n gummed ~aNs saad3atan the e-- . -
tach to front at article
it specs permits. O hmrise affix td back of artieta.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
cent to number.
-~>G(D?' ity, State, and ZIP Code)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.
? Modern gummed a dsaand a3 ttach to front article
if z permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
wnt to number.
RETURN
TO
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE
USE TO AVOID PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE, $300
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
print you M no, address, and ZIP Code in the space ter.
? Complete Items 1, 2, ad 3 on the reverse.
? Moirtaa gum d end. and attach to front of article
if splice permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" ed$?
cent to number.
RETURN
TO
FOR PIUM
USE TTOO AYWD PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE, $300
TAI. I TEL CE AGENCY
( o O. F) 205i
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.
? Complete items I, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse artide "Return Receipt Requested" adia-
cent to number.
)-,c7
(Ctty, State, and ZIP Code)
PENALTYFOR PRIVATE
USE TO AVOID PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE, $300
RETURN
TO
2001/04/09 : CIAFRDP79B00457A001200090001-
 SENDER: Admplote ite
Add Your ad 0h,rlq~rt`fh '!tnr pn'Ie2(~
T~Rl~`~7
1. Th . following service is requested (check one).
Show to whom and date delivered............ 150
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered_____________ 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show. to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADD ESSED TO?
KcAk ADi t J&s. )
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S T P 5 p FF~~T AFB Air f'NS ! R
3, ARTICLE DESCRIPTION: - ". f -
-1tEGISTERED NO CERTIFIED NO INSURED NO
- (Always obtain signature of addressee or agent)
- I have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE ^ Addressee _ Authorized agent
4
4.
DATE OF DELIVERY
POSTMARK
SRESS omp lete only if requested)
(c
.
ADDR
S/
s7
T4-
-c~. 4 T ice' ~P l /i
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CLERK'S
INITIALS
SENDER: Complete items 1. 2. and 3.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one) .
0 Show to whom and date delivered............. 15,t
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered------------- 651
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
E ADDRESSED TO: rti??Cr 161
2. ARTIC
L
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
ERf0 NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Alwa obtain signature of addressee or agent)
1 have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE ^ Addressee Authorized agent
4. DATE OF DELIVERY
POSTMARK
5. ADDRESS (Complete only if requested)
- rf /y 741 7(, #-4- tiY
6. UItIABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CLERK'S
INITIALS
aompeterrms ._,a d .00050001-1
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
Show to whom and date delivered............ 150
^ Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whotr. and date delivered ------------- 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO:
V ,)0
4E
RI
-
-
CR
IPPTIION:
3. ARTICLE DES
REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE ^ Addressee ^Authorized agent
4
.
DATE OF DELWERY
POSTMARK
5. ADDRESS (Complet.s only if requested)
k ' t
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CLERKS
INITIALS
05
0 SENDER: Gumplcte items 1, 2, and i.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
[] Show to whom and date delivered..--.-.-..-. 131!
[] Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 3,5j'-
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered_____________ 650'
L] RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 85E
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED "(11:
ill
.^
f
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGISTEREP NO,, CERTIFIED NO.
? i.. 3. 1
INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of addressee or
I have received the article described abo
v
SIGNATURE
e. i-I Addressee 1"Authorized agent
DATE OF DELIVERY
5. ADDRESS (Co plate 'Ill requested)
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CLERK'S
INITIALS
Z} GOP: 1976-0-203-458-
Approved For Release 2001/09 : Th- GOP; 1976-0-2.03 _