STRATEGIC RESEARCH MONTHLY REVIEW JULY-AUGUST 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001200040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Strategic Research
Monthly Review
Top Secret
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August 1977
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Strategic Research
Monthly Review
July-August 1977
This publication of the Office of Strategic Research contains
substantive findings and analytical judgments that are preliminary in
nature and have not been formally coordinated with other CIA and
intelligence community components.
Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcomed. They
may be directed to the person named following each item.
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least three more are under construction. The new
ships will be useful in a variety of roles, especially
in supporting Chinese interests beyond coastal
waters.
Japan's Efforts To Strengthen Its
Air and Naval Defenses 17
Events during the past year have underscored
the weaknesses of Japan's air and naval defenses
and have intensified debate regarding national de-
fense priorities and spending. Although hampered
by severe political and budgetary limitations, de-
fense planners are taking steps which will ulti-
mately improve Japan's capability to detect and
react militarily to potentially hostile air and sea
activity on its periphery.
Libyan President Grapples With Military
Manpower Shortage 20
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Conscription, the approach most recently taken
by the government to raise strength levels, is having
some effect, but substantial gains over the long
term are less likely. The draft is coincidentally
placing strains on military housing and training
facilities and, more important, on the economy.
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East Germans Expand and Modernize
Ground Force Divisions 10
East Germany is improving the combat capabili-
ties of its six ground force divisons by expanding
divisional fire support elements, introducing new
weapon systems, and relocating several major com-
bat units closer to the West German border. By
making East German divisions operationally more
compatible with their Soviet counterparts and
bringing them nearer to likely deployment areas,
these changes will facilitate the wartime integration
of the Warsaw Pact's forward-echelon formations.
Chinese Push Construction of Major
Surface Combatant 14
Since early 1975, the Chinese have deployed five
of the new Kianghu guided-missile frigates and at
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East Germans Expand and Modernize Ground
Force Divisions
East Germany is improving the combat capabilities of its six ground force
divisions by expanding divisional fire support elements, introducing new weapon
systems, and relocating several major combat units closer to the West German
border. By making East German divisions operationally more compatible with their
Soviet counterparts and bringing them nearer to likely deployment areas, these
changes will facilitate the wartime integration of the Warsaw Pact's forward-echelon
formations.
Organizational Expansion. The East Germans have largely erased the chronic
fire support deficiencies of their ground force divisions by expanding divisional
artillery and air defense units and by increasing divisional tank holdings. Now
virtually complete, these changes add over 400 men, 27 tanks, and 111 fire support
weapons to each of the four motorized rifle divisions (see table).* Slightly smaller
increases in personnel and equipment have occurred in the two tank divisions. The
most significant changes in both motorized rifle and tank divisions have been an
expansion of the divisional artillery regiment and the addition of organic artillery to
motorized rifle regiments. Antiaircraft battalions have also been expanded to full
regiments. These divisional elements are now virtually identical to their Soviet
counterparts of the mid-1970s, but they lag behind present-day Soviet units.
Modernization. The East Germans also have been slowly but systematically
modernizing their divisions. New weapon systems introduced at division level since
1970 include:
? The 122-mm D-30 howitzer, which is replacing the World War I I vintage
122-mm M-30 howitzer.
? The Czechoslovak RM-70 multiple rocket launcher.
? The ZSU-23-4 self-propelled (SP) AA gun, which is replacing older
ZSU-57-2 SP and ZU-23 towed guns in tank and motorized rifle regi-
ments.
? The M-1974 self-propelled 122-mm howitzer, which has apparently been
introduced into at least one division.
? The SA-6 mobile SAM, which is replacing the S-60 towed gun in AA
regiments.
? The BMP infantry combat vehicle, which is replacing older armored
personnel carriers.
? The FROG-7, which has replaced FROG-3/5s.
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Major Changes in Organization and Equipment
of East German Divisions
1970 1977
Personnel Personnel
Motorized Rifle Division - 10,500 (est.)* Motorized Rifle Division - 11,400 (est.)*
Tank Division - 8,500 (est.)* Tank Division - 9,100 (est.)*
Motorized Rifle Regiment** Motorized Rifle Regiment**
31 T-54/55 tanks 40 T-54/55 tanks
6 120-mm mortars 18 120-mm mortars
6 BRDM Saggers 6 122-mm howitzers
9 B R DM Saggers
AA Battalion AA Regiment
24 57-mm cannons
or
20 SA-6 TELs (est.)
Multiple Rocket Launcher Battery Multiple Rocket Launcher Battalion
6 122-mm launchers 18 122-mm launchers
Antitank Battery (MRDs only) Antitank Battalion (MRDs only)
6 100-mm antitank guns 18 100-mm antitank guns
Artillery Regiment Artillery Regiment
36 122-mm howitzers 36 122-mm howitzers
18 130-mm guns or
152-mm howitzers
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The East Germans have not implemented their divisional expansion and mod-
ernization programs at a uniform pace. Divisional AA regiments, which were ex-
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These procurement delays, which reflect both East Germany's priorities and its
dependence on its Pact allies for most military equipment, have imposed low or
heterogeneous equipment inventories that almost certainly cause training, supply,
and movement problems. Two-battery structures, adopted to accommodate tem-
porary shortages when divisional multiple rocket launcher and antitank battalions
were formed in the mid-1970s, probably no longer exist. To maintain current
equipment levels, however, each division deploys at least three of the four models of
infantry transporters (BMP, BTR-152, BTR-60, and BTR-50) widely in use with the
ground forces and as many as four models and three different calibers of artillery
(122-mm D-30, 122-mm M-30, 152-mm D-20, and 130-mm M-46). Most divisions
also apparently field both the Soviet BM-21 and Czechoslovak RM-70 rocket
launcher.
Although East German divisions have been appreciably improved since 1970,
they have continued to lag behind Soviet divisions. There are, however, indications
that further changes similar to those observed recently in Soviet divisions may soon
occur in East German divisions.
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Impact. Although not equipped according to current Soviet standards, the East
Germans today are far better suited than in 1970 to assume first-echelon roles in
initial Pact operations against NATO. The modernization of East German fire
support units reflects renewed Soviet emphasis on massive conventional firepower in
divisions and should enhance East Germany's operational utility to the Pact.
Chinese Push Construction of Major Surface Combatant
The Chinese have embarked upon a program to beef up their force of major
surface combatants. Since early 1975 they have deployed five units of a new class of
guided-missile frigate-the Kianghu-and at least three more are under construction.
The Kianghu effort is already as large as any major surface combatant program
undertaken by the Chinese, and additional Kianghus evidently will be built. The new
ships will be useful in a variety of roles, especially in supporting Chinese interests
beyond coastal waters.
Earlier Programs. The Chinese have constructed four classes of large surface
combatants over the years, but three of these programs were limited or encountered
technological problems. The initial effort occurred in the mid-1960s when the
Chinese built five Kiangnan-class frigates. The Kiangnan is a derivative of the Soviet
Riga, but incorporates changes The Chinese
tried again in the late 1960s when they began work on the Luta-class. destroyers. Like
the Kiangnan, the Luta bears some resemblance to a Soviet ship-the Kotlin-but
incorporates significant Chinese modifications. Seven Lutas were begun, and three
became operational within a relatively short time. Work on the other four Lutas was
protracted, however,
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In the early 1970s, the Chinese foundered in their first effort to build a frigate
of entirely native design-the Kiangtung-because they had not completed develop-
ment of its principal armament, a surface-to-air missile system. Although two
Kian tun s have finished sea trials
Impetus. The Paracel Islands clash in January 1974 evidently provided the
latest impetus for expanding the force of major surface combatants, which then
numbered only 17 units. The engagement apparently caused the Chinese to reassess
their naval warfighting capabilities, particularly their ability to project naval power
beyond coastal waters. Their initial response was to strengthen the South Sea Fleet
by increasing its force of surface combatants
Kianghu Design and Armaments. The rapidity of Kianghu construction prob-
ably can be attributed to the use of on-the-shelf technology and the ship's rather
simple design and armaments. The Kianghu has a hull similar to that of the
Kiangtung and probably utilizes the same propulsion system. In addition, the
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Role. The size and armaments of the Kianghus will enable them to perform
many different missions, including antiship and ASW.
Significance. The Chinese apparently attach great importance to the Kianghu
program, given the rapidity of construction and deployment. This priority may
account in part for a substantial drop in the number of submarines and missile boats
produced last year, despite some apparent gaps in those forces. These programs may
have been cut back to make scarce resources available for more Kianghus. The
doubling of units under construction last year suggests that the Chinese plan to build
a substantial number of these ships and may employ other shipyards as well. r
The Kianghu adds an important operational capability to the Chinese Navy.
Deployed in sufficient numbers, the Kianghus will enable the Chinese to project
power well beyond their immediate coast and increase their capability to defend
territorial claims in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands. The Kianghus
could also be used to protect China's interests in offshore resource exploration and
exploitation. Many of these areas are beyond the range of China's missile boat force,
and distant operations would require ships with sufficient firepower to contest
challenges from other claimants. In addition, the Kianghus have an all-weather
capability and can remain on station longer than any of the units employed in the
Paracels clash.
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Japan's Efforts To Strengthen Its Air and
Naval Defenses
Events during the past year have underscored the weaknesses of Japan's air and
naval defenses and have intensified debate regarding national defense priorities and
spending. Although hampered by severe political and budgetary limitations, defense
planners are taking steps which will ultimately improve Japan's defensive air and sea
capabilities.
jintensified debate regarding national defense priorities and spending. Neverthe-
because of political constraints and the technical complexity of the systems
involved, little progress has been made in improving air defenses. Such improvement
will require the upgrading of aircraft, missiles, and radar systems-an expensive
effort which will take a minimum of five years.
New Aircraft and Missiles. In late 1976 the Defense Agency recommended
adopting the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 fighter-interceptor as the mainstay of Japan's
next generation of fighter aircraft. But although the budget for the Air Self-Defense
Force increased about 12 percent this year, the National Defense Council decided to
postpone purchasing the F-15 for one year and ordered the manufacture of a dozen
additional F-4Js as a stopgap.
The Japanese have submitted a tentative proposal to the US Government for
permission to coproduce 123 F-15s, and recently a Japanese delegation visited the
US to investigate coproduction arrangements. As yet, however, no funds have been
allocated for this purpose.
Tokyo must make a decision on the F-15 program in 1978 if it is to have its
order included in the first production run of these aircraft. Even if purchase plans
are approved next year, F-15s will not enter Japan's operational inventory before
1982.
Japan is also seeking to improve its land-based air defenses. The surface-to-air
missile forces are armed with US-made Hawk missiles and a Japanese version of the
Nike-Hercules missile called the Nike-J. The 1977 defense budget provides initial
funds for the gradual replacement of the existing Hawk missiles with an improved
version until 1983.
The first domestically designed surface-to-air missile system, the SR-SAM, has
reached the final stages of development and will be delivered to ground force units
later this year for testing. A highly mobile system comparable to the French-built
Roland, the SR-SAM is designed to supplement Japan's antiaircraft artillery and
Hawk missiles. The SR-SAM will probably not be available in large numbers until
1981.
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Improved Radar Systems. This spring a team of military experts made a
month-long tour of US military bases and industrial facilities that manufacture air
defense equipment. Although no commitments were made, the Japanese demon-
strated a strong interest in the Grumman E-2C and Boeing E-3A airborne early
warning systems.
Naval Defense Needs. Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force is also likely to be
expanded and modernized as a result of recent economic developments. Since the
first of the year, Japan has extended its territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles,
established a 200-mile fishing zone, initialed an interim fisheries agreement with the
USSR, and approved an agreement with South Korea for joint offshore oil explora-
tion and development. These actions will force the Japanese to pay increased
attention to defending their maritime interests and monitoring foreign shipping, and
will place increased demands on their naval and coastal patrol forces.
Coastal Patrol Expansion. Japan has already moved to strengthen its coastal
patrol capabilities. The Japanese are augmenting their Maritime Safety Agency, an
11,000-man Coast Guard-type force that polices their territorial waters. This agency
will rely heavily upon air surveillance, making use of long-range, fixed-wing aircraft
and helicopters. A three-year development plan beginning in 1977 calls for the
acquisition of two helicopter-carrying patrol ships, five YS-1 1 patrol aircraft, and 12
Bell-212 utility helicopters. Even with the additional equipment, however, the
Maritime Safety Agency will have difficulty meeting the demands placed upon it,
and by law Japan's regular naval forces can aid the maritime agency only under
special circumstances and on the order of the Prime Minister.
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This year's naval budget provides for an increase of about US $140 million, or
some 14 percent, over that of the previous year. The budget includes two frigates, a
2,200-ton submarine, one minelayer, two minesweepers, and three support ships.
Funds for a new missile-armed destroyer, however, were withheld.
Maritime Self-Defense Force planners are giving high priority to improving
submarine training programs, and they hope to acquire the ship-launched version of
the US-made Harpoon missile for use on a new class of frigate to be built by a
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Japanese corporation. In addition, the navy is reported to be interested in obtaining
missile-armed hydrofoil patrol craft from a US manufacturer.
The navy would also like to replace its P-2J fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft
with the advanced Lockheed P-3C. The Lockheed scandal set back acquisition of the
first of a potential fleet of 60 to 70 of these aircraft last year, and a combination of
political and budgetary limitations prevented a decision on procurement again this
year. It will cost more than $2 billion to replace the P-2Js, which will begin to reach
the end of their service life by 1981.
If political factors continue to delay the purchase of the P-3C, pressures for the
domestic design and production of an antisubmarine aircraft are likely to grow. This
alternative would be costly and could postpone availability or replacement planes
until the late 1980s.
Outlook. The air force and the navy will require additional strengthening if
Japan's defense needs are to be met in the coming decade. Yet progress is likely to
be slow. Proposals for additional naval ships and antisubmarine aircraft must
compete with equally expensive requests for acquisition of advanced fighter-
interceptors and an airborne early warning system. An attempt to purchase these
weapons and systems too quickly would drive Japan's defense spending above the
politically acceptable threshold of 1 percent of gross national product.
This year's total defense budget represents an increase of nearly 12 percent
over last year's, but that increase will be eroded by inflation. Until a stronger
consensus regarding defense programs evolves, the pace of Japan's efforts to improve
the defensive a abilities of its navy and air force will continue to be slow and
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Libyan President Grapples With Military
Manpower Stortage
The quantity and quality of manpower are now the major obstacles to Presi-
dent Qadhafi's ambitious plans to expand Libya's armed forces over the next few
years. Although oil revenues allow him to continue massive purchases of weaponry,
the military has too few men to operate the arms already on hand. The army, for
example, has 1,900 medium tanks, yet only some 350 are assigned to combat units.
Because Qadhafi intends to maintain an ample weapons reserve for such contin-
gencies as providing arms aid to other Arab countries in any future war with Israel,
this surplus is partly by design. But it is also symptomatic of the government's
inability to resolve the longstanding problem of manpower for the military.
Unsuccessful Earlier Efforts. Qadhafi has tried various approaches to raising
strength levels. Recruitment drives, the preferred method for several years, failed to
attract enough young men even after standards for age and physical condition were
relaxed. Military salaries were raised, but the still higher pay and more favorable
working conditions in the civilian sector continued to make careers outside the
armed forces more attractive for technically qualified Libyans. When compulsory
military training was initiated in mid-1974, primarily for the purpose of developing a
reserve system, Qadhafi anticipated-incorrectly-that a number of trainees would be
motivated to enlist in the armed forces.
Conscription. The realization that nothing short of conscription would flesh
out the military force structure finally impelled Qadhafi to call for a draft law in
January 1976. He apparently had long favored it, saying publicly a few years earlier:
"There should be conscription. We have...the most modern planes, but these have no
pilots... nobody volunteers for the navy." In announcing the draft, Qadhafi made it
clear that the shortages of manpower in the armed forces would be overcome
"regardless of all circumstances," and that no group would be exempt from con-
scription.
The conscription law has created problems for the military.
preinduction physicals had proven burdensome
because o relatively large ca ups, and that some men had to wait up to two months
to be examined. Housing and instructing the draftees are straining already limited
resources. The armed forces are unable to keep up with the schooling requirements
for the compulsory military training program, and the draft has sharply increased
the demands placed on training facilities. At a time when the military should be
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upgrading instruction programs to ensure effective employment of advanced
weapons systems, it is probably able to do little more than keep the quality of
training from declining.
Impact on the Economy. Qadhafi will have to reckon with the effect on the
economy of commandeering large numbers of men. A high illiteracy rate, the limited
participation of women, and a low median age hold the labor force to about
one-fourth the total population. This figure is too small to meet the demands of the
economy, forcing Libya to import workers. About one-third of its 900,000-man
labor force is made up of foreigners, who are heavily represented at professional,
technical, and managerial levels. Any move to raise the requirement for educated
and skilled conscripts, who are the ones of most interest to the military, will have to
be accompanied by an increase in foreign workers.
Manpower almost certainly will remain an intractable problem. The govern-
ment can ill afford to take steps that would endanger the economy, particularly the
all-important oil industry. To continue the draft until the reported objective of
having at least 100,000 men in uniform by 1980 is reached probably would have
that effect.
Qadhafi's confrontations with Egyptian President Sadat complicate the matter.
More than 20,000 of the Egyptians working in Libya have left since tensions
increased between Cairo and Tripoli late this spring. Qadhafi has threatened to expel
some of the Egyptians; a mass exodus of the remaining 230,000 would seriously
hamper the progress of conscription, as Libyans otherwise available for armed
service would have to replace them. This would strike a serious blow to the
economy. Finally, dramatically increasing the size of foreign advisory contingents to
compensate for personnel shortages is likely to be no more than a half measure, and
Libya will still have far more weapons than men to use them.
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