THE EBBS AND FLOWS OF INDIAN COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000400140001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NOFOR N- NOCONT RACT-ORCON
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Regional and Political Analysis
The Ebbs and Flows
of Indian Communism
Secret
RP. 77-10236
September 1977
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The Ebbs and Flows of Indian Communism
Recent changes in the fortunes of India's several
Communist parties appear to stem from the imposition
of a state of emergency by former Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi in June 1975. The pro-Soviet Commu-
nist Party of India (CPI) sought to align itself with the
then-ruling Congress Party and applauded Gandhi for
taking "such a forthright and rousing stand against
fascism." The Communist Party of India - Marxist
(CPM), however, strongly condemned the measures
taken by the government in the wake of the
emergency decree and put forward its own 10-point
plan calling for support from "left and democratic
forces" to oppose the government. The Maoist-
oriented Communist Party of India - Marxist/Leninist
(CPML), whose members are known as Naxalites,
already the subject of severe repression by the
government, saw many more of its members thrown
into prison with indeterminate sentences.
As a result of the national election last March and
the state elections in mid-June, the CPI is in virtual
disarray and is torn by internal disputes over which
direction to follow. Its Soviet patrons also appear
confused. In contrast, the postemergency period has
been one of great success for the CPM. It is the
dominant force in the new West Bengal government
and captured an absolute majority in the assembly of
that strategically located and economically important
state. In addition, CPM relations with the Janata
central government have been relatively good, and a
Janata-CPM coalition has been installed in the
northeastern state of Tripura. Although it is still
unclear what course the CPML will steer, the central
Office of Regional and Political Analysis
September 1977
government and various state governments have
released a sizable number of Naxalites imprisoned
before and during the emergency. Their release may
make the violence-prone CPML a force to be
reckoned with if dissatisfaction with the central
government increases.
Background
Communism in India can trace its origins to the
1920s when a loosely knit group of upper caste, highly
educated Indians established relations with the
Comintern. Although the Communist Party of Great
Britain was instrumental in the official founding of the
CPI in 1925, its influence quickly waned and was
replaced in the 1930s by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. Association with Moscow has resulted in
direct and indirect financial support as well as
attempts by Moscow to use its economic and political
influence to temper New Delhi's often stringent
domestic anti-Communist policies.
This link with the Soviet Union, although fruitful
from Moscow's viewpoint, has not always benefited
the CPI. Under Soviet direction, the CPI supported
the British war effort during World War II while
nationalist Congress leaders opposed Indian participa-
tion from their jail cells. Subsequently the CPI was
directed to support the creation of Pakistan. Neither
action was popular among the Indian masses. Support
for the Congress Party and Gandhi during the
emergency, again under Soviet direction, helped put
the CPI in the straits it finds itself today.
The leadership of the CPI, more so than the other
Communist parties, tends to be upper caste and highly
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educated. It has tended to draw its leaders from the
intellectual and politically active segments of the
population rather than the poor, landless classes. The
rank and file is composed of low and middle caste
laborers and peasants. Over the years the CPI has
grown fairly steadily.
party members probably
numbered about 165,000. This figure, though, has
probably shrunk in light of the recent misfortunes of
the CPI.
Communism in India has a long history of
factionalism centered around both personality and
ideological disputes. The CPM was founded in 1961
when the centrist and left factions of the CPI walked
out of a CPI National Council meeting. The breach
stemmed mainly from domestic differences, many as
old as the party itself but previously_ tolerated to
maintain unity. A major cause of left dissatisfaction
derived from Soviet efforts in the 1950s to have the
CPI moderate its opposition to the government in the
interest of improving links between Moscow and New
Delhi. The Indian-Chinese border war in late 1962
exacerbated dissension within the CPI when party
leaders pledged full support for the Indian Govern-
ment and denounced the Chinese. Charges were made
at the time that pro-Soviet Party Chairman. S. A.
Dange, assisted the Nehru government in rounding up
over 1,000 left-leaning members of the CPI.
After the split in 1964. the factions within the CPM
were united against the CPI and its Soviet "revisionist"
policies but were divided over parliamentary versus
revolutionary methods. The centrist faction controlled
the party machinerx from the beginning, however,
and participated in the 1967 national and state
elections and the midterm state elections in 1969. In
both years the CPM was successful in forming a
coalition government in West Bengal These govern-
ments were quickly dissolved by the central govern-
ment, and the state was placed under New Delhi's
direct rule because the CPM was unable to control
strikes and violence. The leaders who now control the
CPM, including Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister of West
Bengal, believe that conditions require the party to
participate in the constitutional system while
gradually developing mass support for its program and
carefully preparing for future revolutionary activity.
In the Sino-Soviet controversy, except for occasional
financial support from the Soviets, the CPM remains
essentially nonaligned. Its membership is difficult to
estimate but is probably considerably larger than a
1969 estimate of 65,000 active members. Nationwide
the CPM received over 7 million votes in the March
1977 Lok Sabha poll.
The leftists who split off from the CPI in 1964 soon
became disenchanted with the centrist leadership of
the CP1vl. As early as 1967, the left extremists set up a
Committee to Resist Revisionism within the party and
almost immediately began agitation in the Darjeeling
district of West Bengal that came to be known as the
Naxalbari revolt.* Although the centrist leaders of the
CPM had had a hand in propagandizing among the
landless peasants in Naxalbari, their assumption of
parliamentary power in West Bengal in 1967 forced
them to act to suppress the revolt.
By May of 1969, the leftists had completely split
from the CPM and formed the CPML. The CPML
received early rhetorical and financial support from
the Communist Party of China which declared it to be
the only true Communist party in India. Naxalite
members and leaders are drawn from all segments of
the population. West Bengal remains the center of
power for the CPML, but relatively cohesive groups of
extremists with tics to the CPML exist in a number of
other states, including Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.
Historically. the CPML stressed the creation of
small "Red Guard" units in the towns and villages of
rural India while other extremist elements called for
mass organizations. All Naxalites, however, have
foresworn parliamentary activity and are dedicated to
guerrilla warfare-both rural and urban-to bring
about the proletarian revolution. Except for a few
mass uprisings, the Naxalites concentrated in the late
1960s and early 1970s on such hit-and-run tactics as
the assassination of police, landlords, and other
"enemies of the people." In recent years, the CPML
has been relatively unsuccessful in the countryside,
and its strength now appears centered in the urban
areas. Here it draws its strength from middle-class
students and the educated unemployed.
Close relations between New Delhi and Moscow, in
contrast to the years of antagonism between India and
?The term "Naxalite- has come to mean any leftist who believes
in the violent overthrow of the government and- thus. includes
members of other orvanizatinn', besides the CP\I L.
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China, have influenced the government's attitude
toward domestic Communist movements. Sino-Indian
relations, for instance, do not serve as a "shield" for
the CPML, as Soviet-Indian relations do for the CPI.
Under Prime Minister Gandhi the Indian Government
took a particularly hard line against the Naxalites and
was quick to support preventive detention legislation.
Gandhi made a strenuous effort to take over popular
CPML issues such as land redistribution. As long as the
government can minimize political instability and
economic suffering, the Naxalites are unlikely to
achieve any notable successes. Furthermore, recent
evidence of Chinese desire for improved relations with
India will militate against any substantial aid to the
Naxalites.
The Emergency
For many years the CPI has followed a policy of
selective support for the Congress Party and has thus
acquired a degree of respectability. The price the
party has paid, though, has been the loss of its role as a
dynamic advocate of social and political change.
Gandhi, on the other hand, used the CPI's support in
her tactical maneuverings to maintain her "progres-
sive and socialistic" image.
Shortly before the declaration of the emergency in
June 1975, the CPI reaffirmed its intention to continue
supporting the Congress Party in some states while
opposing it in others. The emergency decree was met
with an almost immediate statement of support from
the CPI. The CPI believed that the government would
move against only the followers of J. P. Narayan and
other elements of the right such as the Jana Sangh and
that by supporting Gandhi it could both help push her
further to the left and improve Indo-Soviet relations.
Gandhi assured the CPI leadership that the party
publications would be relatively free from censorship.
The CPI was aware that the power Gandhi acquired
could be used against it and decided to maintain a low
profile. Precautions were also taken to safeguard party
leaders and maintain secret lines of communication.
The CPI's fears were quickly realized. Early in the
emergency, Sanjay Gandhi, the Prime Minister's son
and head of the Youth Congress, made some critical
remarks about the CPI-"I don't think you'll find
richer or more corrupt people anywhere." Gandhi also
soon realized how little she needed the support of the
CPI. Subsequent CPI attacks on Sanjay brought sharp
rebukes from Gandhi and a loss of influence in the
formulation of Congress Party policies. These attacks
from the government, combined with continued
support for Gandhi by the Soviet Union and internal
dissension within the party, left the CPI in a most
untenable and isolated position as the March 1977
elections approached.
The declaration of the emergency, meanwhile, had
brought a much harsher reality to the CPM. Although
most of the top party leaders were spared, several
thousand district leaders were immediately arrested
and the party's files either confiscated or destroyed.
The CPM moved its party headquarters from Calcutta
to Madras, where it received the cooperation and
protection of the state's chief minister. Although
public agitation against the government was rejected,
the CPM established underground organizations in the
states of West Bengal, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and
Tamil Nadu-traditional Communist strongholds.
In August 1975, a CPM document accused Gandhi
of using the emergency to create a one-party
dictatorship. The CPI was branded as a lackey of both
the Soviets and the central government. By mid-1976,
however, a decline in membership and intense
factionalism within the party led the CPM to seek an
understanding with the CPI in an effort to form a
united front against the central government's policies.
The CPM's overtures were rejected by the CPI, but
only after the issue caused severe recriminations by
CPM extremists against the more moderate leadership.
At this time the CPM also increased its criticism of
both the Soviet Union and China. Thus Gandhi's tactic
of minimizing Communist influence by promoting
Communist divisiveness seemed eminently successful
when, in January 1977, she announced that national
elections would be held in March.
The emergency decree struck an even harsher blow
to the CPML. The government, having no use for the
violent tactics of the CPML, stepped up mass arrests of
party members and leaders immediately. A large
number had been jailed long before the emergency
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was proclaimed. By the end of the emergency, over
12,000 Naxalites had been imprisoned. Some placed
the number much higher. The party, already divided
and violently opposed to any form of parliamentary
rule, did what it could to harass the government.
Government forces, however, were extremely success-
ful in defending against these attacks. By the end of
the emergency and through the election period, the
Naxalites were more of a nuisance than a serious
threat to the government.
By the time the national election was held, the CPI
was in the unhappy position of being virulently
attacked by Sanjay Gandhi through his control of Lite
Indian media while at the same time being counseled
by the Soviet Union not to break with the Congress
Party in the interests of Indo-Soviet relations. In the
national election in 1971, the CPI had captured 24
seats in the Lok Sabha-the lower house of Parlia-
ment. In 1977 the (;PI was able to garner only seven
seats-four in Kerala and three in Tamil Nadu.
The CPI, like the Soviet Union, was surprised by the
massive Janata Party victory in the March elections.
After the elections the Soviets reportedly- urged the
CPI to move closer to the CPM in order to combat the
expected anti-CPI bent of the Janata Party. At the
same time, the CPl received indications that the
Soviets wanted the CPI to maintain its alliance with
Lite Congress Part %, including partnership in it
coalition government in Kerala. These conflicting
instructions and subsequent squabbling within the
party led to further (;PI defeats in the 10 north Indian
state assembly elections held in mid-June. The CPI
won only 49 seats of the more than 2,300 being
contested. Prior to this election the CPI had held over
120 seats in these bodies.
CPM was fairly successful in the March national
election considering its inability during the emergency
to put forward its program. The decisive factor in its
capture of 22 seats--17 in West Bengal-was its firm
opposition to Gandhi's emergency rule. The CPNt held
26 seats in the previous Lok Sabha. The party,s
particular success in West Bengal can be attributed to
its decision to work sith the Janata Party during the
election campaign- The CPM might have done even
better if it had held out for more seats in the electoral
State-By-State Breakdown of Votes Received
In March 1977 Lok Sabha Election
On a Percentage Basis
2.67
4.72
Assam .... ............................
1-42
2.88
Bihar ___.._.......
5.63
0.20
(:uiarat ................. _.-..-................
---
Harvana ....._........ _ ......................
0.61
0.03
Himachal Pradesh .......................
1.79
---
Jammu and Kashmir_ ...............
---
---
Karnataka.............. .......................
0.34
---
Kerala..... ...._.................................
10.38
20.32
Rtadhva t'radesh........................ .
0.52
---
tstaharashtra. ..................................
0.67
3,56
.Manipur ........................................
11.50
--
Mughalaya .....................................
Nagaland .__ ..................................
NA
NA
Orissa . _._......_ ................._..__.....
3.15
1.98
Punjab
1.65
4.94
Rajasthan ....................
0.48
0.38
Sikkim ..... ..._....._ ........................
---
-
--Tamil Nadu ..... ........................... .
4.60
1.56
Tripura ................................. _.......
2.24
34.09
Uttar Pradesh -....___.-....... ..........
1.10
0.10
West tie nga l ............ _ ......... ........
6.49
26.15
agreement, but its true strength was not known until
the state assembly elections were held in mid-June.
The state assembly elections were a more decisive
victory for the CPM and further vindicated its
opposition to emergency rule. Although the CPM
could not reach an electoral alliance with the Janata
Party, relations with the new government in New
Delhi remained cordial. The CPM rejected an alliance
with the CPI even though this would have meant
support from the Soviet Union. The CPM nationwide
won over 200 seats. Of these, 178 were in West
Bengal, which gave the CPM absolute control over the
"fate government. The CPM also controls the govern-
merit in the northeastern state of Tripura in coalition
with the Janata Party.
The Naxalites did not contest any seats in the -March
election in an organized manner-most would have
had to do so from prison cells. Some members
contested seats on their own in the state elections in
June, and two won seats in the West Bengal assembly.
This limited participation in parliamentary elections
presumably does not reflect any change of heart by
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the majority of Naxalites who still favor the violent
overthrow of existing governments.
The CPI is still seriously divided over whether its
support of the 1975 emergency decree was correct or
whether it should have disassociated itself from the
Gandhi government. Although the Soviet Union is at
least partially responsible for CPI factionalism, knowl-
edgeable sources report that the Soviets are now trying
to keep out of CPI infighting. CPI Chairman S. A.
Dange is the leading supporter of the view that the
CPI's actions between 1975 and 1977 were correct,
and Soviet Ambassador Maltsev has convinced General
Secretary Rao that the CPI should not abandon
Gandhi as a result of the CPI and Congress Party
defeats.
The faction that wishes to admit the CPI's past
mistakes, however, believes that the party should
become more independent of Moscow and follow the
lead of the more liberal Communist parties of Western
Europe. There are others in the party who believe that
the CPI should get on with the business at hand and
avoid recriminations.
The Soviet Union officially has friendly relations
with the Government of India but has indicated to the
CPI that it will try to discredit the Janata government
by publicizing the CPI's anti-Janata criticisms. The
CPI has increased the pace of its campaign to protest
the mistreatment of untouchables and the high rate of
unemployment, and to demand the reinstatement of
bonus payments for workers that were prohibited
during the emergency. The Soviets have also suggested
that the CPI protest more vigorously against the US
position on nuclear proliferation and the US presence
in the Indian Ocean. CPI members of the Lok Sabha
have also unsuccessfully sought assurances from the
government that US Peace Corps volunteers will not
be allowed back in the country.
Unless there is a very sharp economic downturn
and/or serious social unrest, the CPI tactics are likely
to be unsuccessful. The government has already taken
over one CPI issue by indicating that it will reinstate
the bonus payments. Under Soviet direction, pro-CPM
elements of the CPI have indicated support for a
vaguely conceived plan to create a third force in
Indian politics b combining the CPML, the CPM, the
CPI, and progressive sections of the Congress and
Janata Parties. Such an event can only occur with the
full support of the CPM. The stand taken by the CPI
during the emergency, the election defeats and
subsequent defections from the party, and recent
Soviet overtures to the CPM have all combined to
make the CPI a minor force in Indian politics and
likely to remain one for the foreseeable future.
The CPM's successes on the state level, notably West
Bengal, have lent credibility to claims of its leaders to
national leadership of the Indian Communist move-
ment. In West Bengal the Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu,
in his public statements and actions, has thus far
revealed a conciliatory attitude toward the central
government and his opponents in West Bengal. Party
leaders have reassured industrial and commercial
interests in the state that they have nothing to fear
from the new government and that Basu personally
will see to it that labor unrest is minimized. Basu has
also made several trips to New Delhi to promote good
relations with the Janata government and extract more
aid for his economically troubled state.
Basu reportedly believes that the CPI is trying to
disrupt the CPM government by encouraging work
slowdowns and industrial sabotage. Nevertheless, the
Soviet Union has recently played a major role in trying
to reconcile the CPI and the CPM. In May, E. M. S.
Namboodiripad, recently appointed general secretary
of the CPM, made a short unpublicized trip to the
Soviet Union to discuss CPM-Soviet relations and also
CPM-CPI relations. The Soviets warned Namboodiri-
pad that good relations were necessary to protect the
left from rightist attacks. Soviet aid was promised if
the CPM would adopt a more conciliatory position
toward the CPI. Soviet-supported elements in the CPI
are continuing their efforts to neutralize anti-CPM
sentiment. CPI Party Chairman Dange has been ill
lately, and his death could hasten a reconciliation.
A late August visit of two East German officials was
also arranged by the Soviets as part of the effort to
create a CPI-CPM coordination committee. This
committee will look into ways to ease disputes
between the two parties. Basu is likely to go along with
this reconciliation if for no other reason than to
indicate his good will towards the Soviets. CPI
renunciation of its Congress Party links will probably
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be needed before the CPM takes the reconciliation
efforts seriously.
Basu indicated that the Soviets have
not yet ah rl an impact on CPM policy. The CPM,
however, has gone out of its way to declare its loyalty
to the principle of proletarian internationalism and its
desire to have good relations with all Communist
parties. It is unlikely that the CPM will turn away all
Soviet advances. and party leaders can be expected to
accept financial aid when it suits their purposes.
The future looks bright for the CPM. Its control of
two state governments enables it to have an
influence-however slight-on national policy. The
success or failure of its programs will be carefully
watched in other parts of India. Its success over the
longer term may depend on forces largely outside of
its control, including economic conditions, relations
with the central government, the attitude of the Soviet
Union, Naxalite intentions, and industrial unrest. At
this point the most serious challenge to the success of
the party may be its internal dissensions, especially the
continuing conflict in West Bengal between Basu and
the State Secretary, Promade das Gupta.
The Naxalites are the great unknown of Indian
Communism. The emergency saw the imprisonment
of a substantial portion of the CPML's membership
and largely deprived the organization of an effective
underground movement. Many thousands of Naxalites
have been released since the relaxation of the
emergency, and the CPML will probably spend the
coming year in reorganizing and planning. The
Naxalities are likely to eschew any coalition with the
CPM or the CPI, and several Naxalite groups have
already attacked the "revolutionary" credentials of the
CPM. Prior to the release of the Naxalites some state
governments required their signing a written oath
abjuring violence. Violence, fed by discontent with the
economic policies of the Janata government, will,
however, be the keynote of the Naxalite program.
Naxalite success can only come at the hands of Janata
failure to maintain a minimum level of economic
growth.
The Indian Communist movement has not been
immune to the many changes brought about in Indian
politics by the defeat of the Congress Party. The CPI,
by remaining in alliance with the Congress Party,
scaled its defeat at the polls. The CPM, on the other
hand, by working with the Janata Party for a
restoration of parliamentary democracy saw its for-
tunes rise. This turnabout has forced the various
parties to reassess their positions and has prompted the
Soviet Union, the major foreign influence on Indian
Communism, to rethink its support for the CPI and
work for a reconciliation of the two parties. The forces
within the CPI that support a reconciliation with the
CPM also believe that the CPI should become more
independent of Soviet influence. In the wake of its
electoral victories, the CPM has maintained its
nonaligned status. Thus, direct Soviet influence on
Indian Communism may actually diminish should a
reconciliation occur. Such a reconciliation would
marginally strengthen the Indian Communist move-
ment, but India's Communists-limited in numbers, at
odds with the nation's tradition of nonviolence, and
with a long history of internal dissension-are likely to
remain minor actors on the stage of Indian politics,
subject to the ebbs and flows of forces beyond their
control.
This working paper has not been coordinated, and
the views expressed are those of the author alone.
Comments are welcome and should be addressed to
25X1A Chief, South Asia Division, ORPA,
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27 September 1977
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for Near East and South Asia., Bur. of Intelligence & Researc
1 - Chief, South Asia Div. , Office of Research and Analysis
for Near East and South Asia, Bur. of Intelligence & Researc
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400140001-4
 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
5?p0l l4: -CYI F P~~~W8557J&04QMY)-4job 425-1293-7
Dissemination LAi rfoVevl e T
(continued)
No. of Copies
31
Recipient
Defense Intelligence Agency, RDS-3C, A Bldg. , AHS
2 - Office of'the Assist. Sec. of Defense, ISA
1 - Dep. Assist. Sec. , Near Eastern African and
South Asian Affairs, ISA
1 - Dep. Assist. Sec. , Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, ISA
1 - Office of the Director, DIA
3 - DIO for Worldwide Political /Military Affairs, DIA
1 - Dep. Dir. for Estimates, DIA
1 - Free World Div. (DE-4), Estimates, DIA
1 - Deputy Dir. for Intelligence (NMIC) (DIN), DIA
1 - Eastern Branch, Intelligence (NMIC), DIA
1 - Western Branch, Intelligence (NMIC), DIA
1 - Dep. Dir. for Intelligence (Research Center) (DIR), DIA
2 Special Actions .and Control Branch, Eastern. Div...,,
Intelligence (Research Center) (DIR-2A), DIA
2 - China Branch, Eastern .Div. , Intelligence (Research Center)
(DIR-2B), DIA
1 - Western Div. , Intelligence (Research Center) (DIR-3), DIA
1 - J-5, JCS
1 - Far East/South Asia Div. , J-5, JCS
1 - Security Asst. Plans Div. , J-5, JCS
1 - ACSI/Army
1 - U. S. Army Medical Intelligence & Information Agency
1 - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Attn: John Chomeau
1 - Office of Naval Operations
Attn: CNO Executive Panel Staff Rep.
1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
1 - U. S. Air Force Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence (AF/IN)
1 - U. S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI/IVOA)
1 - National Military Intelligence Center, ATTN: Data Base
1 - Commanding Officer, Fleet Intell. Center, Europe and
Atlantic, Norfolk, Va. 23511, Attn: 232-A
Approved For Release 2001/08/'i4 -CIA-RDP79B00457A000400140001-4
 Dissemination LA "~+f CFJR l c 1 / i 7-~ ~ ~ 1p~~4 '4job 425-1293-7-,
(continued)
No. of Copies Recipient
Strategic Warning Staff, Room I C925, Pentagon
Attn: STATINTL
National Military Command Center, CIA Representative,
Rm. 2D901, Pentagon
National Security Agency, Attn: -
Rm. 2E024, Ft. Meade, Maryland
1 - Director
Department of the Treasury, Office of Intelligence Support,
Dolores A. O'Dell, Rm. 4326, 15th St. & Pa. Ave., N. W.
Attn: Mr. J. Foster Collins
Special Assist. to the Sec. (Nat. Sec. )
Mr. David N. Laux, Department of Commerce,
Rm. 3520, Main Commerce Bldg.
USIA, Ms. Rosalee Johnson, IOR/L, Rm. 532, 1750 Pa. Ave., N. W.
1 - Director
1 - Security Affairs, Advisor, IOP/P
1 - Defense Affairs Advisor, IOP/P
Energy Research and Development Administration, Division of
International Security Affairs, Suite 5221, Room 30,
20 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Department of Agriculture, Director, Management Services
Division, FAS, Rm. 6066, South Agriculture Bldg.
Attn: Mr. Thomas Hughes, Administrator, Foreign
Commodity Analysis, FAS
ACDA, Chief, Intelligence Staff, Plans and Analysis Bureau,
Room 6510A, New State Bldg.
Approved For Release 2001/08E14:-CIA-RDP79B00457A000400140001-4
. ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Dissemination 1Br~~~d~~11eIo2i01~1/1747-Cb
(continued)
1 DDI Plans and Programs, Rm. 2F28, Hq.
No. of Copies Recipient
ICS Registry, Rm. BW09, Community Hq. Bldg.,
1 - PAID
1 - OPEI
2 OPS/CEN, Rm. 7F33, Hq.
7 CPS, Rm. 7G 15, Hq.
1 - Director
1 - SALT
1 - CSO
1 -
3 - Issues Officers
CRG, Rm. 7G 15, Hq.
1 - Director
1 - PDB
1 -
23 PPG/R&D, Attn: ^
for ORPA dissem
3 - USSR
2 -EE
3 - WE
2 - II
3 - EA/P
3 -LA
1 - ME
1 - AF
1 - M&F
3 -SRP
1 - Admin
T$98040M4J"f4-4rob 425-1293-7"
Rm. 7G 15, Hq.
1 D/OCR, Rm. 2E60, Hq.
1 OCR/ISG, Rm. 1H19, Hq.
1 OCR/CLD/DSB, Rm. 1H1129, Hq.
2 OSR, Rm. 3F50, Hq.
Approved For Release 2001/08/94-: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400140001-4
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Dissemination LApprf d PRel ape2O 110811747:-IIA2IRDF(*BWOS If 4
(continued)
No. of Copies Recipient
2 OGCR, Rm. 1232, Ames Bldg.
1 - GO
1 OGCR / CD/ V, Rm. GH08, Hq.
NPIC, Rm. 1S315,
1 - IEG
1 - Library
2 OIA, Rm. 15518,
4 OSI, Rm. 6F24, Hq.
2 OWI, Rm. I D0401, Hq.
2 OPS / CEN, Rm. 7F33, Hq. for DDS& T / DO
1 DDS& T/ OTS, Rm. 212, South Bldg.
6 Rm. 1005, Key Bldg.
OD&E, Rm. 1B19,
1 - FO/EXPDIV
1 - FO/COMDET
22 DDO, Rm. GB38, Hq.
1 DCD, Rm. 811, Key Bldg,
OTR, Rm. 936, CoC
1 - II
1 -
1 DDI/ CS, 7G15, Hq.
FLASC, Rm. 1H5120, Hq.
OER, Rm. 4F21, Hq.
I14Q M).4Tob 425-1293-
77
STATINTL
- 5 -
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400140001-4
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATSPEC
 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2001/08/,4 : C01qq RRD 7g g ~q57q~o~0 ppp1-g
Dissemination List for ORPA Report, RP ?1 Z36 S/NSF N(~c-~Rt8N) Job 425-1293-
(continued) 77
No. of Copies Recipient
20 PPG/R&D, Rm. 7G07, Hq.
Finished Intelligence Project, Rm. 154, P&P Bldg.
Agency Archives
Agency Records Center
Total: 280 copies
1
- Camera original to Agency Archives
1
- Diaso copy to Agency Archives
1
- Silver Duplicate to OCR/CLD/DSB,
Rm. 1H1124, Hq.
1
- Diaso copy to OGCR, Rm. 1232, Ames Bldg.
1
- Diaso copy to PPG/R&D, Rm. 7G07, Hq.
ApproAvf)cf r-eel s ,?001/08114 ; If RPL79IO~45aA&0g400140001-4
 PLEASE NOTE: THIS REPORT CANNOT
J
R !
'BE-aENAi T
Analyst:
pP79RMd570Mn ~f An ni.A
CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION STATINTL
DISSEM: 29 Sep 77 NO ELITE
SERIES NUMBER
RP 77-1023k
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
SECRET/NOF-NOC-OR CON
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
35
DATE OF DOCUMENT
September 1977
NUMBER OF COPIES
280
NUMBER IN RC
Q S-_
COPY
DATE
NO.(S)
RECIPIENT
SENT
RETURNED
1-50
Rec'd from P&PD
28 Sep 77
1
DCI
28 Sep 77
2
DDCI
"
3
DDI
if
4
SA/DDCI
STATINTL
5
D/ORPA
6,7
DD/ORPA
"
8-22
ORPA/ECS
23
ORPA/SOA
STATINTL
24-30
ORPA/SOA
"
31-35
NIO Reg.
36
Ch/PPG
37
SA PPG
29 Sep 77
38
Ch/PDB/PPG
if
39
Ch/TPB/PPG
If
40
TPB/PPG
It
STATINTL
41,42
Filed in PPG/R&D
if
43
PPG/R&D for Carter Ly
"
44-47
Destroyed
"
48
Analyst to annotate & return
"
80 ``n
49
Filed in PPG/R&D
50
Double cover w/#49
~t ^ J J-43
3 M- -~
a , .
4
0 1'~ ~-e._.
72zN
72
1 av, .
STATINTL
C TC 7