THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS AND PROSPECTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
The Pakistan National Alliance
Participants and Prospects
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RP 77-10220
August 1977
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SECRET
Noforn
The Pakistan National Alliance
Participants and Prospects
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) ap-
pears to have the edge on its opponents in the
race for the national and provincial assembly
elections scheduled for 18 October. The nine-
party alliance, formed on 11 January, has so far
maintained a high degree of unity, despite the
deep differences among its members. It has
done so by concentrating on the one point on
which its members are in complete agreement-
the need to defeat former Prime Minister
Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP).
Once in power, this coalition of Islamic conserv-
atives, secular nationalists, and provincial auton-
omists will face issues which could quickly
bring basic disagreements to the surface and
threaten to split the Alliance.
The Religious Parties
C_ Pakistan is 97 percent Muslim, and religion
plays an important part in the lives of most
Pakistanis, but the religious parties have had
little success in their attempts to win public
office. Pakistani voters tend to doubt the ability
of the religious leaders to govern, and even
many of those who favor making Pakistan a
more Islamic country believe the programs of
the religious parties are too extreme.
G Success for the Islamic parties has also been
hindered by disagreements among their leaders
which have historically prevented the formation
of an Islamic front. Furthermore, all of the
major religious parties are oriented toward
Sunni Islam, which limits their appeal to the
quarter of the population that is Shiah, the
other main branch of Islam.
C Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The Congregation of
Islam, founded in 1941 by Maulana Syed Abdul
Ala Maudoodi, is probably Pakistan's best or-
ganized and most cohesive party. Maudoodi,
because of his advanced age, has relinquished
the leadership of the party to others but still
has considerable influence. Tofail Mohammed is
the current chairman, but another member,
Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, the secretary general
of the PNA, has been far more prominent in
recent months.
C The party seeks to reorganize Pakistani soci-
ety in accordance with a strict interpretation of
Islamic law and custom. It tends toward a
pan-Islamic rather than nationalistic point of
view which, in the 1940s, lay behind its failure
to support efforts to create Pakistan, something
its more nationalist opponents frequently point
out.
C Although the party is well disciplined, it has
limited popular support and has not done well
in elections. It is strongest in the Punjab and has
developed some following among non-Sindhis in
the Sind, but it is very weak in Baluchistan and
the North-West Frontier.
C Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The Society
of the Ulema (religious leaders) of Islam has its
greatest strength in the North-West Frontier
Province, where its leader, Mufti Mahmood,
who is also president of the PNA, headed a 25X1A
coalition government in 1972-73.
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C- Like the JI, the JUI seeks to transform and have supported Islam-although usually
Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Both parties more because they see it as a force for national
favor free enterprise, but the JUI is more unity than because of any deep personal belief.
sympathetic toward socialism. It is, however, C' The voters have supported men with such an
more conservative than the JI on issues such as outlook in the past and are likely to continue to
motion pictures and the role of women in do so. Policy differences among the secular
society.
C, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP). The Soci-
ety of the Ulema of Pakistan, led by Shah
Ahmed Noorani, was formed by dissidents from
the JUI in 1969. It draws on a much more
mystic interpretation of Islam than the other
two major Islamic parties. Much of its political
strength derives from the support of local Airs
(saints), the belief in whom the JI maintains is
heresy.
Although also seeking to establish an Islamic
state, the JUP is far more nationalistic than the
JI or JUL It is strongest in the Punjab, where it
elected four delegates to the National Assembly
in 1970. All later defected to Bhutto's Pakistan
People's Party, but, with Bhutto in trouble, the
party might well regain those seats.
Kaksar Tehriq. The Kaksar Movement,
headed by fladji Safaraz Khan, was founded in
1930 as a paramilitary organization dedicated
to Islamic dominance in the subcontinent.
Although some of its members and sympa-
thizers have held public office, it is not strictly
a political party and played little part in either
the last election campaign or in the agitation
and negotiations which followed. Presumably it
would have, at most, a very minor role in any
Alliance government.
The Nationalists
CI-The secular nationalist parties in the Alliance
(as well as Bhutto's PPP) reflect the basic
outlook of most Pakistanis, at least the 80
percent of the population that lives in the Sind
and the Punjab. From the time Pakistan at-
tained independence 30 years ago, the nation's
rulers-whether soldiers or civilians-have placed
national interests ahead of those of the prov-
inces and pragmatism ahead of doctrine in their
economic and social policies. They have based
their foreign policies on the threat from India
nationalists are at times important to the voters,
but they are more likely to base their choice on
their assessment of the candidates' character,
p/.rsonality, and prestige.
U Pakistan Muslim Leag
ue. The Pakistan Mus-
lim League-the party responsible for the crea-
tion of Pakistan-has fallen on hard times after
dominating the country's politics for most of its
first quarter century. When it ruled, its pro-
grams were highly nationalistic, mildly socialis-
tic, and basically secular.
Its strength was based on the support of local
political leaders, many of them more interested
in the benefits of association with the ruling
party than in its ideology. Corruption and an
inability to solve Pakistan's economic problems
eroded its popular support, and defections and
divisions had reduced it to little more than a
platform for a few aging politicians at the time
of the formation of the PNA.
C The present Muslim League faction in the
PNA is led by the Pir of Pagaro and has retained
some potential as a rallying point. (Another
faction, under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan
remains outside the PNA.) There have already
been defections from Bhutto's PPP, which is
composed largely of former Muslim Leaguers,
but most have yet formally to join another
party. Although membership in the more pow-
erful Tehriq-i-Istiqlal might be more profitable
in the long run for the PPP defectors, they are
likely to find a warmer welcome and be more
comfortable in one of the factions of the much
less moralistic Muslim League.
CTehriq-i-Istiglal. The Solidarity Movement,
founded in 1970 and still dominated by former
Air Force commander Asghar Khan, is probably
the single most important party in the Alliance.
During the last election campaign, Asghar
emerged as the leading spokesman for the
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opposition. Later, during the negotiations with C, On the other hand, he has great difficulty
Prime Minister Bhutto on holding a new elec-
tion, he was able to convince his more moderate
colleagues in the Alliance to go along with his.
refusal to compromise. The Teliriq will probably
receive a significant share of the places on the
PNA slate, and many Pakistanis see Asghar as
the country's probable next prime minister.
C Asghar's devotion to principle and his incor-
ruptibility are both his greatest political asset
and his greatest liability. In a country where
most politicians are regarded -usually cor-
rectly-as motivated primarily by self-interest
and a willingness to do almost anything for a
price, Asghar stands out as a man who can be
trusted to do what he believes is right.
Air Marshal Asghar Khan
Tehriq-i-lstiglal leader
making the deals that are the life blood of
Pakistani politics, and at various times-such
when he once quit politics in disgust-=
Asghar is a strong nationalist and an advocate
of major improvements in Pakistan's defense
capabilities, He favors moderately socialistic
economic policies, although his land reform
program would go far beyond what the Bhutto
government attempted and could alienate many
local political leaders, most of whom are land-
owners.
C- Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). The Pak-
istan Democratic Party was formed by several
small parties, including the Pakistan Democratic
Movement (itself a coalition including Na-
wabzada Nasrullah Khan's splinter of the once
powerful Awami League and a small religious
party), and the Justice Party, founded and later
abandoned by Asghar Khan.
C Much of the PDP's strength was in East
Pakistan, and following the division of the
country in 1971, there were major defections
from the West Pakistani remnant because of
disagreement over Pakistani policies toward
Bangladesh.
C The PDP would win few if any seats running
on its own-in 1970, the only National As-
sembly seat it won was in East Pakistan-but
Nasrullah Klian, the party leader and vice
president of the PNA, probably has more
influence in the Alliance than his party's pop-
ular support warrants.
C The party takes a fairly moderate stance on
most issues-regional autonomy in the contest
of national unity, land reform which would
hurt only the large landowners, nationalization
of some-but hardly all--industries, and turning
Pakistan more toward Islam, but not to the
extent advocated by the major religious parties.
All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.
The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Confer-
ence is technically not Pakistani, but a major
party in Azad Kashmir, that part of Kashmir
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under Pakistani control but theoretically inde-
pendent. The party, headed by former Azad
Kashmir president Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan,
favors the union of all Kashmir with Pakistan
following a plebiscite throughout the state.
When it was in power, it generally followed the
policies laid down for it by Islamabad.
C The Conference was the ruling party in Azad
Kashmir in 1975, when Pakistani Prime Minister
Bhutto engineered Qayyum's removal from the
presidency. Soon afterward, in an election
which the Conference boycotted, the pro-
Bhutto Azad Kashmir People's Party gained
control of the legislature. The Conference ex-
pects to regain control of the state in an
election scheduled to be held in October.
The Provincial Autonomists
C Punjabis have generally dominated Pakistani
politics, even though no Punjabi has actually
headed a government since the late 1950s.
Although there has been some resentment of
Punjabi dominance in the Sind, the viewpoints
of the people in the two provinces are close
enough so that no major problems have arisen.
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
Province, however, have a long tradition of
resistance to control by the central govern-
ment-the Punjabis and their Sindhi allies-and
their efforts to seek greater provincial auton-
omy have been a greater or lesser problem for
all Pakistani governments.
C National Democratic Party (NDP). The Na-
tional Democratic Party was founded in 1975, a
few months after Bhutto banned the National
Awami Party (NAP) and arrested many of its
leaders including Khan Abdul Wali Khan, at
that time the most prominent of the opposition
leaders. Bhutto charged the party with plotting
the secession, with Afghan backing, of Baluch-
istan and the NWFP.
C Although Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, the
present NDP leader, was not a member of the
NAP, most other party leaders were, and Wali
Khan's wife plays a more prominent role in
party affairs than Mazari. The NAP and NDP, in
fact, are virtually identical.
SECRET 25X1A
Approved For Releas
Wali Khan
Imprisoned leader of the NAP
C The NAP historically has been three parties,
each having little in common with the others. In
the Sind and the Punjab, it was a small, almost
insignificant collection of extreme leftists, de-
spite Wali's efforts to build a national following.
C/5-111F
In the North-West Frontier, it was the party
of the Pathans and the most important party in
the province. It favored much greater provincial
autonomy, and some of its members may have
hoped eventually to unite the province with
Afghanistan. Although extreme leftis
small minority
pfomlTlent par member was a communist,
In Baluchistan, the NAP was the vehicle of
the generally conservative leaders of the major
Baluchi's tribes. Their main objective was the
protection of their traditional powers from
both the provincial government-which they
controlled until Bhutto intervened in 1973-and
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from the central government. The party was, in
fact, so thoroughly Baluch that the Pathans in
the northern part of the province formed a
splinter NAP of their own.
The Allies of the Alliance
C Two other parties have announced that they
will support the Alliance, although no formal
arrangements have been worked out and might
well be difficult.
C, All Pakistan Muslim League (QML). The
Muslim League faction headed by Khan Abdul
Qayyum Khan (not to be confused with the
leader of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference) had some strength in the Sind and
Punjab, but its major support was in those areas
of the North-West Frontier where Pakistani
nationalism was a greater force than Pathan
separatism. Qayyum has been a rival of the
provincial autonomists since his successful ef-
forts to include the Frontier Province in Pak-
istan despite the strong opposition of Wali
Khan's father and uncle.
,C The Qayyum Muslim League's programs are
almost indentical to those of the Muslim League
headed by the Pir of Pagaro, but there is little
love lost between the two groups. Qayyum
broke with the other party in the 1960s, and his
later service as interior minister in Bhutto's
cabinet further worsened his relations with
Alliance leaders. The delegate to the National
Assembly elected by the QML in 1977, has
announced that the party has merged with the
Pir's Muslim League, but other party officials
have denied this.
Jiye Sind Mazar. It is unlikely that the
(~_Jliance either sought or wants the support of
G. M. Syed's Sindhi nationalists now united
under the name of the Long Live Sind Front. A
rabid defender of the Sind, and one whose
pronouncements raise some questions about his
sanity, Syed is likely to be more of a liability
than an asset. He might be able to win some
votes from the Sindhis who have supported
Bhutto in the last two elections, but only
through vitriolic attacks on the non-Sindhi
groups in the province who have previously
been the Alliance's most dependable supporters.
An Alliance Government
Should the Pakistan National Alliance win
the election in October, the government that
would be formed would almost certainly be
dominated by the nationalists. Although the
nationalists would control the government in
Islamabad, and presumably the provincial gov-
ernments in the Sind and the Punjab as well,
provincial autonomists would almost certainly
gain control in Baluchistan and the North-West
Frontier.
C- Even with goodwill on both sides, some
tension in relations between the latter two
provincial governments and the federal govern-
ment seems inevitable. The leaders of the NDP,
moreover, have often distrusted Asghar and the
Muslim Leaguers, and the failure of these
Alliance spokesmen to make a serious effort for
the release of Wali Khan has probably increased
this hostility. Most of the politicians jailed by
Bhutto were released either during the negotia-
tions which preceded the military coup or soon
afterward by the martial law administration,
but Wali's treason trial drags on.
C Many of the nationalists would see the NDP's
efforts for greater provincial autonomy as a
prelude to secession, and the government might
well find itself under pressure from the military
to exert stronger control over provincial affairs.
An open confrontation between the bulk of the
Alliance and the NDP would be difficult to
avoid, and if the Alliance's victory margin in
October is slim, an open break could leave
Pakistan with a minority government.
0 Other threats to Alliance unity will be more
manageable. The religious parties are certain to
press for reforms to make Pakistan into the
Islamic state they have long desired, and the
nationalists will probably be willing to make the
cosmetic changes requested. If the religious
parties demand more basic changes-such as the
abolition of the banking system (which violates
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Islamic law by paying and charging interest)-
there would be a confrontation in which at least
some of the religious leaders almost certainly
would leave the Alliance.
- Asghar Khan seems likely to dominate the
nationalists, and through them the government,
even if someone else becomes prime minister.
He may, however, have difficulty controlling his
fellow nationalists, including those in his own
party. Few of them have the strength of
character of Asghar and will find it hard to
resist the temptations of office. Eventually a
major confrontation could develop either be-
cause of an attempt to ease the too honest
Asghar from power or because of an attempt by
Asghar to cleanse the government.
C Foreign policy is unlikely to be a major cause
of disagreement in an Alliance government.
Fear of India and the need for foreign aid will
continue to determine the direction of foreign
relations. The religious parties, despite some
misgivings about dealing with atheists, will
probably not object to continued good relations
with Peking because of the importance of
Chinese political and military support. All
parties-although not necessarily for the same
reasons-will support efforts to strengthen ties
with other Islamic countries. An Alliance gov-
ernment may well be more disposed than
Bhutto's to maintaining good relations with the
US, although it will be reluctant to be seen as
bowing to foreign pressure on issues such as the
acquisition of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant
from France. Only relations with Afghanistan
could cause major disagreement within the
Alliance, but trouble with Kabul-which has
supported the provincial autonomists in the
past-is more likely to be the result than the
cause of a falling out between the nationalists
and the NDP.
C, */FA of the major Alliance leaders are noted
for their political skill. Asghar has great diffi-
culty in compromising, the religious leaders are
prone to bitter disputes with each other as well
as with other party leaders, and Wali Khan and
the other provincial autonomists have used
confrontation as a major political weapon in the
past. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, probably a more
skillful politician than anyone in the Alliance,
will do his utmost to encourage their differ-
ences.
The author of this paper is
South Asia Division, Office of egiona an
Political Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be directed to
-telephone [phone].
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RP 77-10220
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
SECRET/NOFORN
DISTRIBUTION TO RC STATINTL
55
DATE OF DOCUMENT
August 1977
NUMBER OF COPIES
220
NUMBER IN RC
DATE
COPY
NO. (S)
RECIPIENT
SENT
RETURNED
1
DCI STATINTL
1 Sept. 77
2
A/DDCI
" if of
3
SA/DDCI
it if
5
pipf SA/DDCI 1025 C OF
" 11
4
DDI STATINTL
6
D/ORPA
" " II
7,8
DD/ORPA
9-23
ORPA/ECS
ORPA SOA
25
Analyst to Annotate & return
If If If
26-30
ORPA/SOA
if it
1 II it
36
Ch/PPG
if If if
37
SA/PPG
if it If
2 Se t. 7
38
Ch/PDB/PPG
If it If
40
TPB/PPG
it
41
PPG/R&D for Carter Ly.
"
42
CIA REP SAC
'I
43
II II II
44
II II II
45
46
TATINTL
1I II II
47
II II II
48
II II tI
11 11 tl
50-60
filed in PPG R&D
I'
-
50
OTR STATINTL
. O t'>
144-16
3 filed in PPG STATINTL
(:
-c ce A/ / C' c Y-
-
AD j--2 7
FORM 2353
2.65
 A roi / r Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A0004 SoA
The Pakistan National Alliance--XXIMMMI.
Participants and Prospects
ORPA EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION LIST
FOR MEMORANDUMS, STUDIES, ETC.
get) '7- log a-a
l- vJ.
International Situation Room
Asst to the Vice President for Nat'l. Security Aff (Clift)
Asst to President for Nat Sec Affairs (Brzezinski)
Dep Asst to President for Nat Sec Affairs (Aaron)
Plans and Programs
European Affairs (Hyland, Hunter, Binnendijk)
Global Issues (Tuchman, Kimmitt)
,,-North-South Relations/Latin American Affairs
(Hansen, Pastor, Brownell) (1_110R"70,10
Middle East Affairs (Quandt, Sick)
'~ Far Eastern/China Affairs (Oksenberg)
Far. Eastern/Japan Affairs (Armacost)
Dir for Policy Analysis (Utgoff, Hadley, Molander, Jayne,
Marcum, Beck)
Sec of State (Vance)
Deputy Secy of State (Christopher)
Dir, Policy Planning Staff (Lake)
Dep Dir, Policy Planning Staff (Bartholomew)
Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Habib)
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (Cooper)
Asst Secy, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Hoibrooke)
Asst Secy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Todman)
Asst Secy, Bureau of European Affairs (Hartman)
Asst Secy, Bureau of Near East & S Asian Affairs (Atherton)
Asst Secy, Bureau of African Affairs (Schaufele)
Asst Secy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (Katz)
Asst Secy, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Maynes)
Asst Secy, Bureau of Oceans and Int'l Environmental and
Scientific Affairs (Mink)
US Permanent Rep to OAS (McGee)
Dir, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb)
Ambassador at Large (Bunker)
US Ambassador to UN (Young)
Director, Bureau of Intelligence
Dir, INR/Sov Union and E Europe
Dir, INR/E Asia and Pacific
Dir, INR/ W Europe
and Research (Saunders)
(Cook)
DirApproveu Rel se 00~/d 1'44 CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
Dir, INR/American Republics (Summ)
Dir, INR/Africa (Thorne)
Dir, INR/External Research
Dir, INR/Pol-Mil Affairs & Theatre Forces
Dir, INR/Strategic Affairs
Dir, INR/Economic Res & Analysis
Administrator, Agency for Int'l Development (Gilligan)
Dep Administrator, Agency for Int'l Development
ACDA Intelligence Staff (Morrison)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:
Secretary of Defense (Brown)
Deputy Secy of Defense (Duncan)
Special Asst to Secy of Defense (Kester)
Asst Secy of Defense, ISA (Slocombe)
Dep:Asst Secy of Defense, ISA
Dep Asst Sec for EAP Affairs, ISA
Reg Dir, EAP Affairs, ISA
Dept Asst Sec for Eur and NATO Affairs, ISA (Glitman)
Reg Dir for EUR and NATO Affairs, ISA
~.+ Dep Asst Sec for Near Eastern African &'S Asian Affairs, ISA
(L--I, e 7% .Tanlra)
Reg Dir for Near Eastern, &_ SAsian Affairs, ISA- __ (Thomas):
Reg Dir for African Affairs, ISA ,'(Reed)
Dir, Inter-American Region, ISA
Dep Dir, Inter-American Region, ISA (Cavazos)
Deg Asst Secy for Int'l Affairs, ISA
Dir;.~Int'ltEc?nomic Affairs, ISA
Dep Asst Secy for-Policy Plans & NSC Affairs, ISA
(Attn: Stivers)
Dir, Plicy Plans & NSC Affairs, ISA
Dir, Law of the Sea Task Force, ISA
Asst Sec of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, DIA (W lsQrt)
Director, Net Assessments
Vice Dir for Plans, Operations and Support, DIA
Vice Dir for Production, DIA
Sr. Intelligence Adviser, DIA STATINTL
Policy Planning Staff OSD/DIA
DIOs
Eur & Soviet Political/Mil Affairs
LA and Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East/South Asia STATINTL
East Asia/Pacific
Dep Dir for Current Intel, DIA
,~. Current Intel Production Div,-DIA
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
Dep Dir for Estimates, DIA
Asst Dep Dir, Sov/EE Div
Asst Dep Dir, China/Far East Div
Asst Dep Dir, Free World Div
Dep Dir for Intelligence Research
Sov/Warsaw Pact Div
,..,.-Eastern Dix
Western Div
DIA/RDS 3B3 (Lib) (No Codeword)
Asst Chief of Staff, Intell, USA
Chief, Naval Operations
Dir, Naval Intell.
Asst Chief of Staff, Intell, USAF
Asst to Secy, Intl Affairs, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown)
Dir, Joint Staff
Vice Dir, Joint Staff
Dir, J 5 Plans fi. Policy
Vice Dir, J 5 Plans $ Policy
Office of NSC Affairs
Dep Dir for Political & Military Aff
Asst Dir for Political E Military Aff
Eur Div
Far East & S Asia Div.
Western Hemisphere Div
ME/Africa Div (Capt. Jack E. McQuea
Strategic Warning Staff
NSA :
Director (Allen)
V /TREASURY:
Off of Special Asst for Nat'l Sec Aff
COMMERCE:
Office of Int'l Trade Policy
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
Board of Governors
Director of Intelligence
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
Director (Reinhardt)
Office of Asst Director - Press & Pub (Smith)
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
STATSPEC
/SA/ODDCI'
ICS/PAID
NIO (5) _-"
DDO (3)
DCD
DDS&T
OSO
ORD
= (2)
DDI (2)V?
DDI/Plans & Programs
ORPA (36')
ORPA/E S (15)
ORPA/ (5)
OSR
OCR SG
OCR/CLD/DSB
NPIC/IEG
NPIC/Library
CPS (')-1-+; 1-,SA '--J 90'
STATINTL CRG (3)
DDI/CS
OPSCEN
Fin. Intell. Project
Archives
Carter Library "-="'
OER (3)
W~~~OTR
RFI E
PPG (4)
Supplemental Dist.
STATINTL
 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8
Form No.
Use PM"stua kdiGian,
1 56 160
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A000400100001-8