ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

National
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M1~ I Assessment
Secret
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
20 October 1977
US Share in OPEC Market Declining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
While the United States retains its number one position as the leading
supplier of OPEC member countries, its market share has suffered a small
decline in the 1970s.
Canadian Unemployment: Bleak Outlook . . . . . . . . .
Rapid growth in the labor force and the slow pace of economic recovery
practically guarantee that unemployment will remain above 7 percent
through 1980.
i
Iran: Shah Slows Frenzied Economic Pace . . . . . .
The government supports a new theme-growth the economy can absorb.
.
Sweden: Out of Economic Sync . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recession is battering confidence in what many once regarded as the
optimal economic system.
US Sales of Oil Industry Equipment to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Either through direct sales or sales incorporating US technology, the
United States has been playing a dominant role in the supply of oil
industry equipment to the People's Republic.
Statistics
ote: s a result of a reorganization, effective 11 October 1977, intelligence publications
formerly issued by the Directorate of Intelligence and by the National Intelligence
Officers are now being issued by the National Foreign Assessment Center. Publication
covers and titles have been adjusted to reflect this change. This publication was formerly
titled Economic Intelligence Weekly.
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US SHARE IN OPEC MARKET DECLINING
The US share of Big Seven exports to OPEC member countries fell more than
one percentage point between first half 1976 and first half 1977 even though the
United States retains its number one position in this market.
The decline-which has been measured in constant dollars, that is, net of
changes in export prices and exchange rates-is a continuation of trends of the
1970s. In 1970-72 the United States held 30 percent of the Big Seven share of the
OPEC market compared with 27 percent in first half 1977. Among the Big Seven
countries, West Germany and Italy have recently scored the biggest gains in exports
to OPEC states.
The US share fell in most of the OPEC countries in first half 1977; in the three
major US markets, results were mixed. The US share increased in Saudi Arabia,
remained steady in Iran, and fell in Venezuela. In Iran, however, the United States
was able to hold its own only by sharp increases in agricultural and military exports;
sales of nonmilitary manufactures fell off.
Expansion of the OPEC Market
The OPEC countries, taken together, are the most rapidly growing element of
the world market of the 1970s. OPEC imports were rising 15 percent a year in
constant dollars even before the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74. The rate of
import growth jumped to more than 40 percent annually in 1974 and 1975. By late
1975, the pace fell back to 15 percent as a result of payments problems in a few
countries and limits on ability to absorb imports in others. In five OPEC states, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Indonesia, imports in constant dollars have remained
essentially unchanged since late 1975. The first three ran into problems of absorp-
tive capacity, caused by clogged ports and inadequate internal transport. In Algeria
and Indonesia, the constraints were mainly financial. The other eight OPEC
countries, led by Nigeria, continued to increase their imports, from 20 percent to 40
percent a year.
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In 1976, imports of the 13
OPEC countries reached $65 bil-
lion, about one-half the $122 bil-
lion combined imports of the
more than 100 non-OPEC LDCs.
Imports of Iran and Saudi Arabia
each totaled more than $10 bil-
lion. Only Brazil among the non-
OPEC LDCs reached this level. At
the other extreme were Ecuador,
Gabon, and Qatar with imports of
$1 billion or less. Imports by the
remaining eight OPEC countries
ranged between $3 billion and $6
billion, making them sizable mar-
kets by LDC standards. Iran and
Saudi Arabia rank as two of the
three major markets for each of
the Big Seven countries, except
France.
Trends in Market Share
The seven leading non-
Communist developed countries-
the United States, Japan, West
Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Canada-
provided more than 70 percent of
OPEC imports in 1976. As a
group, their share remained ap-
proximately unchanged between
the early 1970s and 1976. The
Communist countries, unable to
supply the type of goods de-
manded by the newly rich OPEC
states, lost ground in this period.
Among the non-OPEC LDCs,
Brazil and South Korea registered
the most substantial gains.
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Our examination of competition in
the OPEC market focuses on the export
performances of the Big Seven countries,
for which more recent information is
available. For comparative purposes, the
OPEC market was defined as the sum of
Big Seven exports to these countries.
The United States, the United King-
dom, and France lost market shares in the
OPEC market in both value and volume
(constant dollar) terms in the period be-
tween the early 1970s and 1976. The US
share increased in Saudi Arabia and Al-
geria, held constant in Iran and Kuwait,
and dropped off sharply in most other
OPEC countries. The United Kingdom
had the worst record among the Big
OPEC: Market Shares of
Supplier Countries, 1976
Total
100.0
Big Seven
69.5
United States
19.3
Japan
14.3
West Germany
12.6
France
7.8
United Kingdom
7.8
Italy
6.5
Canada
1.2
Other Developed
14.7
Non-OPEC LDC
10.9
Intra-OPEC
1.5
Communist
3.4
Seven, with losses in nearly all markets. France also suffered widespread losses, with
the largest coming from cuts in its market share in Algeria, its major OPEC outlet.
In contrast, West Germany, Japan, and Italy have done well in the 1970s.
Germany had the strongest performance, with gains occurring in nearly every OPEC
state. Japan's share increased everywhere but in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Italy's
gains largely reflected a 7-percentage-point increase in its important Libyan market
and a good showing in the large Saudi Arabian and Nigerian markets.
Big Seven: Trends in Exports to OPEC Countries
Percent Change'
Percentage Point
Change in Market Share
Constant
Constant
Value
Dollars
Value
Dollars
United States
16
10
-2.1
-1.0
Japan
30
11
0.6
-0.7
West Germany
35
22
1.3
1.2
France
12
6
-1.3
-0.8
United Kingdom
29
16
0.2
0.2
Italy
43
26
1.2
0.9
Canada
33
34
0.1
0.3
' First half 1977 over first half 1976.
When we examine the most recent period-first half 1977 against first half
1976-West German and Japanese exports in value terms climbed 35 percent and 30
percent, compared with a 16-percent rise for the United States. As a result, the US
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Big Seven: Change in Export Volume Market Shares to OPEC Countries
United
States
Japan
West
Germany
France
United
Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Iran
-0.1
-1.9
2.7
-0.8
0.4
-0.1
-0.3
Saudi Arabia
1.7
-6.0
0.3
1.3
1.1
1.8
-0.2
Venezuela
-8.1
3.5
3.1
0.1
-0.7
0.6
1.6
Nigeria
0.6
1.6
0.1
0.8
-5.4
2.5
-0.2
Indonesia
-5.9
5.5
-0.1
-0.1
0.5
-0.9
1.1
Algeria
-1.4
3.0
6.0
-7.1
- 2.4
0.6
1.3
Iraq
-4.1
3.3
2.8
0.1
-0.8
-1.8
0.6
Libya
4.1
-3.5
-0.3
-3.0
-0.4
3.6
-0.4
UAE
-2.3
1.3
2.4
-1.5
-0.4
0.3
0.1
Kuwait
-0.7
0.6
-1.2
-3.4
1.9
1.4
1.3
Ecuador
-6.2
3.8
0.6
-0.6
5.7
-0.3
-3.0
Qatar
-0.7
3.2
-2.2
2.7
-3.3
0.3
-0.1
Gabon
-2.5
1.7
1.3
-1.3
-0.4
1.6
-0.5
OPEC
-1.0
-0.7
1.2
-0.8
0.2
0.9
0.3
market share dropped by 2 percentage points, and the German and Japanese shares
rose by about 1 percentage point.
When dollar price changes are eliminated, the decline in the US market share is
considerably less. In constant dollar terms, US exports grew 10 percent, resulting in
a market share reduction of 1 percentage point.* West German and Japanese exports
grew 22 percent and 11 percent, leading to a 1.2-percentage-point-share increase for
Germany and a 0.7-percentage-point-share decline for Japan. The combined move-
ments of currency exchange rates and domestic prices caused dollar export prices to
rise 6 percent for the United States, compared with 11 percent for West Germany
and 17 percent for Japan.
Some Aspects of Product Mix
With respect to product mix, we have been able so far to analyze the available
trade data only in broad form. The results for the United States are mixed, varying
from OPEC country to OPEC country and from product category to product
category. In some instances, a single transaction or small group of transactions can
radically change the short-term picture. The following discussion should be read
with these observations in mind.
*Constant dollar, 4e., volume, data should be used cautiously, as they depend on the accuracy of the price data,
which are subject to inherent calculation problems. For example, changes in sophistication and quality of capital
goods exports are rarely, if ever, captured by price indexes. Thus, changes in the volume market share of less
than 0.5 percent are not likely to be meaningful.
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Only in Iran is the US share of imports of Big Seven manufactures significantly
different from the US share of all imports from the Big Seven. In looking at the
composition of Iran's imports in constant dollar terms, first half of 1977 versus first
half 1976, we find that the United States lost 4.4 percentage points in manufactures,
while its overall share remained constant. This shift reflects a tripling in the volume
of US agricultural exports to Iran combined with a 20-percent fall in shipments of
manufactures.
US: Change in Share of Big Seven Exports to OPEC Countries
Percentage Point'
Iran
Total
-0.1
Manufactures
-4.4
Manufactures
-6.0
Saudi Arabia
1.7
2.4
1.1
Venezuela
-8.1
-7.8
-7.2
Nigeria
0.6
0
0.1
Indonesia
-5.9
-6.1
-6.1
Algeria
-1.4
-0.9
-0.4
Iraq
-4.1
-3.3
-3.3
Libya
4.1
4.1
4.8
UAE
-2.3
-2.1
-2.1
Kuwait
-0.7
-0.1
-0.1
Ecuador
-6.2
-5.5
-5.5
Qatar
-0.7
-0.7
-0.7
Gabon
-2.5
-2.5
-2.5
' First half 1977 over first half 1976, exports being measured in constant dollars.
s Excluding military equipment.
Military equipment deliveries play an important role in determining market
shares, especially in Iran and Saudi Arabia. In first half 1977, 10 percent of US
exports to Saudi Arabia and 21 percent of US exports to Iran were military
equipment.* The United Kingdom also delivered. large amounts of military equip-
ment to these two OPEC states. When military equipment is excluded from the
volume of manufacturers exported, the US share slips even further in Iran, and the
US gain in Saudi Arabia is diminished.
The US loss in markets for nonmilitary manufactures in Iran and Venezuela has
been taken up mainly by Japan and West Germany. In Venezuela, Japan wrested
away motor vehicles business, West Germany captured electrical machinery sales,
with both gaining at US expense in the nonelectrical machinery category. The
Japanese also did well in expanding sales of steel, for which they already held more
than half the Venezuelan import market. In Iran, roughly a quarter of the US
market share loss was due to a decline in aircraft sales. The remainder reflects US
losses in nonelectrical machinery to West Germany and in motor vehicles and
electrical equipment to Japan.
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CANADIAN UNEMPLOYMENT: BLEAK OUTLOOK
Rapid labor force growth and dragging economic recovery practically guarantee
that Canadian unemployment will remain above the 7-percent level at least through
the end of the decade. While most other developed countries have trimmed un-
employment over the last two years, Canada's jobless rate now stands at a post
World War II high of 8.3 percent, the highest rate in any major developed country.
Even though unemployment will be a major issue in the national election, which
may come next year, the Trudeau government has not made a commitment to
bringing the jobless rate down.
Dimensions of the Problem
Unemployment has mushroomed since the Trudeau government took office
nine years ago. The jobless rate, which grew from an average of only 4.2 percent in
1965-69 to roughly 6 percent in the early 1970s, will top 8 percent at yearend 1977.
In September, 8.3 percent of the labor force-886,000 persons-was unemployed.
The jobless rate varies sharply by region. Hardest hit are the lightly populated
and industrially undeveloped Atlantic provinces, where September unemployment
rates ranged from 9.3 percent on Prince Edward Island to 15.8 percent in New-
foundland. Quebec posted a 10.8-percent jobless rate in September, adding fuel to
the separatist government's complaint that Ottawa has done little to correct regional
disparities. Unemployment rates in the prairie provinces-Alberta, Saskatchewan,
and Manitoba-were below the national average in September; even here, rates are up
sharply from a year ago.
Canada's current unemployment problem stems from a combination of secular
and cyclical factors. The growth of the labor force has averaged nearly 3.5 percent
per year since the mid-1960s, the fastest growth of any major developed country.
The high rate is a result of the entry of workers born in the baby boom of the
mid-l950s, increased participation rates, and the entry of 600,000 immigrants into
the labor force.
Record numbers of young workers born in the mid-1950s are entering the job
market, creating a temporary bulge in the natural growth of the labor force. The
share of 14- to 24-year-old workers has increased from one-fifth of the labor force in
1965 to nearly one-half at the present time. Higher participation in the job market
by the working age population, particularly by women, is another factor behind the
rapid rise. In the 1970s, increased participation has added more than one-half
million workers to the labor force, accounting for roughly one-quarter of labor force
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nemployment Rate
(Percent)
6.9
6.2 6.2
5.6
1965.69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 J F M A M J J A S
Annual 1977
Average Seasonally Adjusted
J
growth. Immigrants have added another 600,000 to the labor force over the last
eight years.
The downturn in Canadian economic growth beginning in 1974 has exacer-
bated the unfavorable secular factors. Since 1974, GNP growth has averaged less
than 2.7' percent compared with the pre-energy crisis average of nearly 5 percent-a
rate that would have easily absorbed Canada's rapid labor growth. Over the last three
years, employment has increased by only 1.8 percent per year, with new entrants
into the labor force exceeding new jobs by about 60 percent.
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Canada: Changes in Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment
Labor Force
(thousand).
N
t
l
I
i
Partici-
i
T
l
Total
b
Employment
(thousand)
Unemployment
(thousand)
Unem-
ployment
ura
a
mm
-
pat
on
ota
La
or
Rate
Growth
gration
Change
Change
Force
Growth
Total
Change
Total
(percent)
1970
142
78
-15
205
8;400
87
7,919
118
480
5.7
1971
136
63
45
244
8,644
188
8,107
56
536
6.2
1972
141
59
76
276
8,920
256
8,363
20
556
6.2
1973
138
92
172
402
9,322
439
8,802
-37
519
5.6
1974
166
106
112
384
9,706
383
9,185
1
520
5.4
1975
175
81
98
354
10,060
178
9,363
176
696
6.9
1976
186
62
0
248
10,308
209
9,572
39
735
7.1
1977'
142
58
52
252
10,560
133
9,705
120
855
8.1
Total
1,226
599
540
2,365
1,873
492
' Estimated from seasonally adjusted data for January-September.
The slowdown reflects in part the effects of Ottawa's economic policies, which
are geared mainly to fighting inflation. In addition, the reduced pace of growth
stems from some deep-seated structural problems including a sharp loss in interna-
tional competitiveness, which has stifled growth in the manufacturing sector. This
loss of competitiveness has kept Canada from reaping the benefits of the US
recovery. Ottawa's oil pricing policies are also to blame for the recent slowdown. As
a net oil exporter, Canada was able to avoid most of the impact of higher energy
prices in 1974-75 by holding down domestic energy costs. By raising prices now,
Canada is experiencing the cost and growth adjustments that most countries felt two
to three years ago.
Ottawa's Reaction
The Trudeau government continues to focus its efforts on combating inflation,
while looking to the business upturn in the United States to stimulate the Canadian
economy and reduce unemployment. Ottawa has relied on a variety of compensa-
tion programs to take the edge off unemployment rather than directly attacking its
roots; evidence suggests that these compensation programs may themselves add 1.0
to 1.5 percentage points to the unemployment rate by changing the relative
attractiveness of work versus idleness.
Pressure is increasing from opposition parties and business leaders for stronger
measures to boost employment. Some businessmen propose a tax credit for firms
that increase employment. Proponents claim the plan could create up to 100,000
jobs annually at a cost of only $2,500 per job. New Democratic Party leader
Broadbent has recommended a plan that could result in as many as 300,000
additional jobs involving a $1.5 billion tax cut, $900 million in public works
spending, and $50 million in aid to small business. Some politicians are focusing on
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cutting immigration as a remedy. Because the number of immigrants entering the
labor force in recent years has exceeded the increase in unemployed, this group
makes a tempting target even though Ottawa has long viewed immigration as a
needed source of semiskilled labor.
The Outlook
Canada is not likely to bring the unemployment rate below 7 percent before
the end of the decade. Although labor force growth has slowed recently and is
expected to average slightly less than 2.5 percent per year over the next three years,
sluggish economic growth almost certainly will prevent a rapid reduction in the
ranks of the unemployed. Even if GNP grows at a 4.5- to 5-percent rate through
1980, the increase will do little more than absorb new entrants into the labor force.
Canada: Relationship of Labor Force, Productivity, and
GNP to Unemployment
Labor Force Prod
Growth G
(percent) (p
uctivity
rowth Total
ercent) (percent)
Real GNP
Growth
(percent)
Change in Unem-
ployment Rate
(percentage
points)
Unem
(p
ployment
Rate
ercent)
1972
3.2
2.9
6.1
6.1
0
6.2
1973
4.5
2.4
6.9
7.5
-0.6
5.6
1974
4.1
-0.6
3.5
3.7
-0.2
5.4
1975
3.6
-1.0
2.6
1.1
1.5
6.9
1976
1
2.5
2.5
5.0
4.9
0.1
7.1
1977
E
2.3
0.7
3.0
2.0
1.0
8.1
1978
E
2.5
2.4
4.9
5.0
-0.1
8.1
1979
2.4
2.3
4.7
5.0
-0.3
7.8
1980E
2.3
2.0
4.3
5.0
-0.7
7.1
' Estimated.
'Based on an assumed 5-percent annual growth in GNP.
Assuming a 5-percent rate of GNP growth in 1978-80, for example, we estimate that
employment would remain above 7 percent through 1980.
Employment stemming from construction of the Alcan pipeline will not
influence the job market much before 1980. Even then, many of the workers will
come from outside the country because of the skills required. Furthermore, pipeline
work will be done in the west, where unemployment is relatively low.
Continued high unemployment will put strong pressure on the government to
take remedial action. At present, Ottawa appears to be leaning toward expanding
existing jobs programs. The government would find it expensive to make substantial
cuts in the unemployment rate via these programs. Ottawa estimates that it must
spend an extra $200 million per year for each one-quarter point redu tion in the
overall unemployment rate.
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IRAN: SHAH SLOWS FRENZIED ECONOMIC PACE
With a broad reshuffle of the Cabinet last August and a fusillade of public
pronouncements, the Shah has openly abandoned his all-out development policy.
The government is calling for restrained rates of growth in support of a new
theme-growth that the economy can digest.
Going for Broke
When oil revenues jumped from $4 billion in 1973 to $21 billion in 1974, the
Iranian Government quickly jacked up growth and spending targets of the 1973-78
plan. The revised plan called for total investments of $123 billion over five years,
including $70 billion in development projects. The main priority was placed on
heavy industry-steel, copper, aluminum, petrochemicals-and related infrastructure.
The Shah's theme was to industrialize before oil revenues level off, expected to
happen in the mid-1980s.
The boom in government spending quickly overheated the economy. Imports
doubled between 1974 and 1975, causing port turnaround times to increase to
between 120 and 200 days and severely overtaxing storage facilities and the inland
distribution network. These constraints-compounded by shortages of skilled labor-
disrupted project timetables and escalated the cost of labor, materials, and housing.
The Shah responded by postponing certain projects and stretching out others by two
to three years. Even so, budget allocations continued to increase sharply, reaching
$37 billion for the Iranian year ending in March 1976.
The effects of the spending spree gave a strong boost to growth in 1976, when
real GNP rose 14 percent. At the same time, rising wages and housing costs helped
fuel the 17-percent inflation rate. Port bottlenecks also contributed to the price
spiral by preventing the growth in imports needed to satisfy demand. Rather than
restraining demand, the government concentrated its efforts on rolling back prices
on hundreds of items and pressed the antiprofiteering campaign begun in mid 1975.
These steps had more impact on discouraging private investment than on inflation;
an estimated $2 billion in private capital fled the country in the 16 months after the
measures were adopted.
Slowdown in 1977
Imbalances generated by the development drive have contributed to a sharp
slowdown in economic growth. Real growth in non-oil industries this year is
expected to average 10 percent--less than half the 1976 increase-while the rise in
GNP will slip to 6 percent or less. This lower rate largely reflects the mild slump in
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oil production through
mid-1977; the OPEC price
split had helped to reduce
demand for Iranian crude.
For the year as a whole,
we expect oil output-ac-
counting for 36 percent of
GNP-to remain at about
last year's level of 5.9 mil-
lion b/d.
A variety of factors is
holding down the non-oil
sector. Manufacturing out-
put has been curtailed by
frequent electric power
blackouts, which affected
more than 1,000 plants
last summer. Even though
port congestion has been
largely alleviated-the
turnaround time is now 25
days or less at most ports-
the inadequate inland
transport system remains a
barrier to the expeditious
movement of goods. Fin-
ally, the domestic pool of
skilled labor has been de-
pleted; at least 100,000
foreign workers have been
brought in during the past
three years, but needs have
increased much faster.
Iran: GNP
12.3 9.1 2.6 13.8 5.1
Percent Increase Projected
-Iran: Gross Domestic Product,?
by Sector (at Current Market Prices)
These problems have
maintained the pressure on
domestic prices; this year the rise in the cost of living may even exceed the
17-percent increase of 1976. Government efforts to contain consumer price inflation
through price rollbacks and controls on profits have continued to undermine
business confidence and to cut sharply into private investment. Indeed, the cumula-
tive outflow of private capital since mid-1975 may have reached $6 billion. Capital
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
flows at this rate would eat up a large part of the 1977 current account surplus,
which we estimate at $5 billion to $6 billion.
The buildup of these problems has moved the
Shah to reexamine his spending priorities. The re-
assessment, apparently begun in early 1977, has al-
ready affected the budget for the year ending in
March 1978. The $50 billion budget represented only
a 12-percent increase in nominal spending compared
with allocations for the year ending in March 1977.
Most of the budget rise is slated for infrastructure and
projects already under way. No new projects were
included in the budget for this year.
Iran: Foreign Exchange
Reserves'
1973
1.2
1974
8.4
1975
8.9
1976
8.8
1977
11.62
' At yearend.
2 At the end of August.
Iran's new Prime Minister, Jamshid Amuzegar, has trumpeted the shift in
policy, stressing that slower growth is necessary to eliminate past mistakes. By the
conclusion of the five-year plan in March 1978, Iran will have spent practically all of
the funds allocated, while meeting only three-fourths of the physical targets. Current
operating expenditures will have exceeded the planned level by about 25 percent;
development spending will be some 15 percent short of the target. Defense spending
reached $10.4 billion last year, driving the five-year total $2 billion above the
planned level.
Progress on road and rail construction is lagging well behind schedule, while
completion dates for copper, aluminum, and steel plants have been pushed back at
least several years. Plans to construct 10 million to 11 million tons of steelmaking
capacity by the early 1980s have no chance of meeting target dates. The plan to
create a copper industry has been poorly managed; the mining operation is well
along, but construction on the associated rail facilities and the refinery has not even
begun.
The Longer View
The Shah announced last week that the traditional five-year format for eco-
nomic development plans has been abandoned and that yearly plans will be prepared
instead. It is not yet clear whether a formal document setting out long-term
economic objectives will be published, but any future plans must heed the Shah's
call for spending that can be absorbed. An annual growth target of less than 10
percent, perhaps 7 to 8 percent, is likely. This presumably will entail the scaling
down or elimination of many projects now on the books but not yet under way. At
12 SECRET 20 October 1977
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the same time, spending for education will receive high priority. Nonetheless, the
number of primary and secondary school graduates entering the work force will not
have a substantial impact on skilled labor shortages until at least the late 1980s.
The Shah shows no inclination to extend his new gradualism to military
spending. Moreover, the ambitious, multibillion dollar nuclear power program will
generally retain its high priority. We doubt, however, that the current plan to build
20 nuclear powerplants by the 1990s will be achieved.
For the longer run, the Shah is still determined to establish a broadly based
industrial sector to protect Iran's position when the oil runs out. Development
projects now in train will provide increasing capacity in steel, copper, petrochemi-
cals, machinery, and the like. The flow of industrial products will first supply
domestic needs and then be used to supplement and ultimately to replace oil
exports. Iran, however, almost certainly will face weak world demand for its
industrial products. Further trimming of its development plans and greater use of its
petrodollars for investment in North America and Europe make more economic
Recession finally has hit Sweden, battering confidence in what many once
regarded as the optimal economic system-a blend of capitalist efficiency and
socialist compassion.
Industrial production, profits, and investment are all falling, while inflation,
unemployment, and foreign debt continue to rise. Recovery will be difficult because
political commitments to full employment will impede retirement of outmoded
industrial capacity. Prime Minister Falldin's nonsocialist coalition, whose first year
in office was marred by a seven-month struggle over wage negotiations, may be
unable to carry out a promised series of wide-ranging structural reforms.
Recession Finally Comes
In 1975 when other developed countries were painfully adjusting to the OPEC
price hikes, Sweden avoided recession by implementing generous countercyclical
programs to buttress demand. The government paid full wages to laid-off workers,
subsidized retraining programs for redundant employees, and hired young people
just out of school. It also offered incentives for investment in inventories by firms
that pledged to maintain employment.
20 October 1977 SECRET 13
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Belatedly, Stockholm has recognized that this effort to ward off recession has
reduced international competitiveness. With the government guaranteeing employ-
ment, labor had no reason to moderate its wage demands. Despite stagnant industrial
production, unions pushed through pay increases of 40 percent in 1975-76. Industry
accepted narrower profit margins but could not hold the price line against such cost
pressures. Swedish industrial export prices climbed 16 to 20 percent more than
average world export prices. As a result, Sweden did not share in the revival of world
trade. Instead, exporters witnessed a 17-percent decline in their share of OECD trade
volume. Swedish labor costs are now the highest in the world; hourly compensation
in manufacturing exceeds compensation in the United States and West Germany by
20 and 25 percent, respectively.
Estimated Hourly Compensation of -
Production Workers in Manufacturing
United
States
West
Germany
United
Kingdom
~~ ~~R~~ x9976
Wage increases negotiated this spring are calculated to add 10 to 11 percent to
industry's wage bill. Firms will find it difficult to absorb the increases since profits
this year are expected to average only one-fifth the 1974 level. Under the influence
of the wage settlement, consumer price inflation-currently at 12 percent and
rising-will remain high.
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Domestic demand has been insufficient to offset the decline in exports.
Industrial output is languishing below 1973 levels and continues to slide. This year,
real GDP, which rose 0.6 percent even in the depths of the 1975 worldwide
recession, will suffer its first postwar decline. With exports down and import
demand propelled by rising wages, the current account deficit has swelled. Last
year's shortfall of $2.4 billion was a record, and a $3 billion gap is in prospect for
1977.
Direct government intervention in the labor market has kept the unemploy-
ment rate low by international standards, around 2 percent. Another 4 percent of
the labor force is in training programs and special public works activities. On top of
this Stockholm is conducting expensive rescue operations to prevent troubled
companies from shedding workers. Still, as firms trim work forces through attrition,
industrial employment is edging down; 40,000 to 50,000 jobs will be lost this year.
The young, who always suffer when hiring is slow, constitute nearly half of the
unemployed.
,,,-Sweden: Real Gross Domestic Product'
111.3 112.0 113.7
103.4 17.0 F--1 F7
113.4 114.7 115.3
111.3 ,-, 111.5 112.1
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The Policy Response
Faced with sagging exports and dwindling foreign exchange reserves, Stock-
holm announced a stabilization package in late August. The measures represent an
inadequate attempt to bolster industrial investment and demand:
? The krona was devalued 10 percent and removed from the joint Euro-
pean float. It will now be pegged against a basket of 15 currencies-an
arrangement designed to unbind. it from the rising West German mark.
? A temporary price freeze was imposed to be followed by price surveil-
lance. This move was intended to minimize the inflationary impact of the
devaluation.
? The employer payroll tax was reduced from 4 percent to 2 percent in
order to relieve cost pressure.
On the negative side, the freezing and surveillance of prices will threaten profit
margins, erode business confidence, and discourage investment. The reduction in
payroll taxes will only serve to offset increases in employer welfare contributions
already in the works.
While the government had intended to postpone its stabilization program till
mid-fall, a sharp rundown in foreign exchange during July-August forced Stock-
holm's hand. Still, the devaluation will only partly offset international labor cost
differentials that have emerged in the last three years. To fully restore profitability,
a much larger adjustment would be required.
Tension Ahead
Relations with labor could be the government's number one problem in the
months ahead. The bond that existed between labor and the government under
nearly 45 years of Social Democratic rule was broken with the election of Falldin's
center-right coalition last fall. The unions already are demanding compensation for
any increase in the cost of living brought on by the devaluation. Having little
influence over the unions and facing tough economic decisions, the government will
have to carefully conserve its small stock of political capital.
Stockholm promised to follow up the August stabilization package with meas-
ures to restructure investment, curb public spending, and foster a shift from
consumption to exports. Such a program would involve substantial transfers of labor
and probably would entail a jump in frictional unemployment. Yet to keep workers
in place, Falldin's government has taken over all but one of the major shipyards and
is negotiating a merger of private and state-owned steel firms. Generous subsidies are
being lavished on the textile, clothing, and glass industries. If competitiveness is to
be restored, Stockholm must encourage, rather than impede, diversion of redundant
resources from these declining sectors to potential growth areas.
More generally, the Swedes will have to become accustomed, whether they like
it or not, to the common frustrations of contemporary Western industrial nations.
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Sweden, unscarred by World War II, had been enjoying the benefits of a homogene-
ous population, a worldwide reputation in engineering products, one of the world's
highest living standards, and a balance in its international accounts. Now, Sweden
must face up to the long-term problems of high-cost oil, the inroads of vigorous and
powerful rivals in international markets for high-technology products, high youth
unemployment, and rising tensions among a population accustomed to, and softened
by, the guaranteed good life of a welfare state.
US SALES OF OIL INDUSTRY EQUIPMENT
TO CHINA
Since 1972, the United States has sold Peking nearly $90 million worth of oil
industry equipment.* Direct sales by US firms have amounted to $70 million. In
addition, US-licensed or US-manufactured equipment has been sold to the People's
Republic of China through foreign firms or subsidiaries of US firms. Since 1972,
Chinese imports of oil industry equipment have totaled $283 million; the other
suppliers were firms in Canada, France, Italy, West Germany, Denmark, Singapore,
and Japan.
China: Imports of Oil Industry Technology-Related Equipment
Total Amount Percent of
Million US $ Total Imports
Total 1972-77 ............ 282.9 69.9 25
1972 ...................... 9.3 0 0
1973 ...................... 31.2 2.4 8
1974 ...................... 103.4 ' 13.8 13
1975 ...................... 38.21 37.3 98
1976 ...................... 17.11 12.1 71
19778 .................... 83.7' 4.3 5
' Of the import totals for 1974 and 1977, 58 and 78 percent consisted of the value of
offshore platforms. The share of the United Staes for 1974 and 1977 would have been
33 and 24 percent without the platforms.
2 The 1975 and 1976 imports were depressed by a general retrenchment undertaken
by Peking to overcome a $1.2 billion balance-of-payments deficit in 1974. A
contributing cause was the ideological criticism that the "gang of four" directed
against all programs to import plants and technology. The pickup during 1977 reflects
the policy of the new leadership to revive imports supporting industrial development.
8 Projected.
*For purposes of this article, oil industry equipment excludes pipe, casing, kellys, and routine equipment such as
diesel engines and land rigs.
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US firms compete for Chinese business at a disadvantage. Because of the
unresolved political issues between Peking and Washington, the Chinese turn to
non-US suppliers whenever possible. When US technology is sold to China indirectly
through deals by non-US firms, the monetary return to US companies is relatively
small. Moreover, in sales to China of equipment in which technological gain is not an
issue US firms have been almost completely shut out.
China: Imports of Oil Industry Technology-Related Equipment
By Type, 1972-77 '
Total .................................................. 282.9 2
Drilling/well completion ........ 30.5
Downhole ................................ 35.2
Meters ...................................... 0.2
Offshore .................................... 184.91
Onshore exploration ................ 17.1
Pipeline .................................... 6.4
Pumps and compressors .......... 7.2
Refining (excluding petro-
chemicals) ............................ 1.4
Amount
Percent
of Total
69.9
25
13.3
44
35.2
100
0.2
100
6.3
3
10.3
60
3.8
59
0.8
11
0
0
' The total is a conservative rackup of imports of oil equipment with technological significance for China.
The actual total was certainly higher because:
a. There were too many sellers and sales for our reporting sources to catch all imports. However, after
comparing our listing with those of trade journals and of the National Council for US-China Trade,
we are confident that our list is more comprehensive than any other available.
b. Every effort was made to eliminate double counting arising from reports of the same sale by
different sources. Where ambiguities could not be fully resolved, the figure represents the minimum
number of sales possible.
2 Excludes the following sales for which values are not available and cannot be deduced from available
information: eight fracturing trucks from the US in March 1977, a 600-ton drill ship from Japan in June
1975, a vibroseis seismic system from the United States in January 1975, and three Twin Otter aircraft with
US geophysical equipment from Canada in June 1977.
5 Including $138 million for platforms.
The United States has played a dominant role in all sizable oil technology sales
to China, even those by foreign firms. Of the major non-US sales, the three offshore
rigs from Singapore and Japan were built to a US design for the Gulf of Mexico and
are equipped mostly with US machinery; the Norwegian rig reportedly will be
equipped with US machinery; the offshore support vessels and helicopters were
equipment types that did not require the latest in technology. In those cases where
US firms have not been directly involved, the Chinese with rare exceptions have not
garnered the best in oil technology. The US firms that lead the world in oil
technology normally sell their latest equipment directly.
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Currently, the main block to expanded sales by US firms to China is Peking's
shortage of foreign exchange. The oil industry is still given high priority in state
plans, but agriculture, steel, and petrochemicals, among other sectors, also need
expensive support from abroad.
China: Major Imports of Oil Industry Technology-Related Equipment
Ex
porting
Cost
(Million
Type of Equipment
C
ountry
US $)
Year Imported
Total
218.0
Marine navigation sys-
Franc
e
7.5
1973
tems and seismic
vessel
Blowout preventers
US
2.5
1973
Offshore rig support
Denm
ark
and
30.2
1973 and 1974
ships
Three offshore rigs
Jap
Singa
an
pore
and
85.0
1974 and 1977
(same design)
Pipelayer systems
Jap
Japan
an
1.0
1974
US
3.8
1975
Onshore seismic explo-
US
5.5
1974
ration systems
Franc
e
5.0
1974
Well-logging system
US
23.0
1975
Acidizing and fractur-
US
6.0
1975
ing system
Marine seismic explo-
US
6.0
1976
ration system
Drill-rig moving
US
2.5
1977
equipment (land)
Offshore rig
Norw
ay
40.0
1977
eking's hope back in 1973-74 that exports of crude oil
would earn abundant foreign exchange to pay for plants and equipment for every
sector has not been realized. Oil exports to the Free World in 1977 will earn about
$650 million out of total export earnings of approximately $6 billion. Peking still
bans both product sharing as a means to pay for foreign oil equipment and direct
foreign participation in the oil industry.
25X1
25X1
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 Secret
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Ap rov d For 'e'I 4,61,2003100/05 : CIA RDP79'B00457A000200080001-3
 Nation
prM@ f ror Release 2003/08/05: CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
Assessment
Center
Economic Indicators
Weekly Review
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gifts Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
Note: As a result of a reorganization, effective 11 October 1977,
intelligence publications formerly issued by the Directorate of
Intelligence are now being issued by the National Foreign Assessment
Center. Publication titles have been adjusted to reflect this change.
This publication was formerly titled Economic Indicators.
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
1. The Economic Indicators Weekly Review provides up-to-date information
on changes in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non-
Communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic Indicators
Weekly Review is updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that the
results are made available to the reader weeks-or sometimes months-before receipt
of official statistical publications. US data are provided by US government agencies.
2. Source notes for the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are revised every
few months. The most recent date of publication of source notes is 20 October 1977.
Comments and queries regarding the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are
welcomed.
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 INDUST 8/Mi ,M PMEM4M goaa
United States
110
Japan
West Germany
130
120
121
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1972 Approvved?For Releas 'Hb` /08/05: C1J41R6P79Rg0457Ab 1@0080001-3 1977
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
United Kingdom
-110
111''
100'
Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL
Change GROWTH RATE SINCE Change GROWTH RATE SINCE
from from
LATEST Previous 1 Year 3 Months LATEST Previous 1. Year 3 Months
MONTH Month 1970 Earlier Earlierl MONTH Month 1970 Earlier Earlierl
United States ;. s a, United Kingdom Ijl _._
Japan Italy 1^ 77 t: 7
West Germany ? Canada N 0.3 i ..v
France , 1,j7 77 3.2 3 n a.: a r)
1-Average for latest 3 monAppr8 )7d ot or' eied'se?2O fl58/05,q_CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 ~Ap roved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
UNEMPLOYMENT PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE
West Germany
-1965-74 AVERAGE
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
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United Kingdom
6
Italy (quarterly)
A labor force survey based on new definitions of economic activity sharply raised the official estimate of Italian unemployment in first quarter 1977. Data for earlier periods thus em not comparable.
Italian data are not seasonally adjusted.
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
THOUSANDS OF PERSONS UNEMPLOYED
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted. Unemployment rates for France are estimated. The rates shown for Japan, Italy and Canada are
roughly comparable to US rates. For 1975-77, the rates for France and the United Kingdom should be increased by 5 percent and
15 percent respectively, and those for West Germany decreased by 20 percent to be roughly comparable with US rates.
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A-5
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DOMESTIC PRICES1 INDEX: 1970=100
United States
APR JUL OCT
1972
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A-6
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
United Kingdom
Semilogarithmic Scale
Percent
AVERAGE ANNUAL
Percent
AVERAGE ANNUAL
Change
f
GROWTH RATE SINCE
Change
f
GROWTH RATE SINCE
LATEST
rom
Previous
1970
1 Year
3 Months
LATEST
rom
Previous
1970
1 Year
3 Months
MONTH
Month
Earlier
Earlier
MONTH
Month
Earlier
Earlier
United States
SEP 77
0.5
8.5
7.1
6.7
United Kingdom
AUG 77
0.9
14.8
20.0
13.4
AUG 77
0.4
6.6
6.6
6.1
AUG 77
0.5
13.9
16.5
6.8
Japan
AUG 77
0.2
7.6
0.8
-2.3
Italy
JUL 77
0.3
15.7
14.7
5.0
JUL 77
-0.3
10.5
7.7
0.7
AUG 77
0.7
13.2
20.1
9.9
West Germany
JUL 77
-0.1
5.3
2.1
0
Canada
JUN 77
-0.2
10.0
9.6
2.2
JUL 77
0.9
5.7
4.5
3.9
JUL 77
0.9
7.5
8.4
10.3
France
MAR 77
0.9
8.4
8.2
7.6
AUG 77
0.5
9.0
9.9
9.1
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 Approved or Release 2 T68/O
(Wff 5XL 1
Percent Change
Latest from Previous 1 Year Previous
Quarter Quarter 1970 Earlier Quarter
Percen
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
t Change
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Percent Change
Latest from
Quarter Q
Previous 1 Year Previous
uarter 1970 Earlier Quarter
Latest
Month
from Previous
Month
1970
1 Year
Earlier
3 Months
Earlier'
United States
United States
Aug 77
1.6
3.3
4.7
-3.7
Japan
May 77
-3.8
9.9
2.3
9.5
Japan
77 II
West Ge
rmany
Jul 77
0.8
2.5
5.3
5.9
West Germany
77 11
France
Jun 77
7.7
-0.3
1.0
-8.1
France
76 IV
United Kingdom
77 1
United Kingdom
Aug 77
0.2
1.1
-1.6
9.5
Italy
Apr 77
-0.4
2.8
1.0
-3.1
Italy
76 IV
Canada I
Jun 77 1
-0.7 1
4.1 I
- 3.7
- 8.7
Canada
76 IV
' Seasonally adjusted.
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
' Seasonally adjusted.
77 II
77 II
75 IV
77 I
76 IV
76 IV
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Canada
Eurodollars
Commerical paper
Call money
Interbank loans (3 months)
Call money
Sterling interbank loans (3 months)
Finance paper
Three-month deposits
Seasonally adjusted.
Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
Percent Change
Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
Period Period 1970 Earlier Earlier'
Jul 77
Jun 77
77 II
77 I
Jun 77
May 77
Jun 77
Hourly earnings (seasonally adjusted) for the United States, Japan, and Canada; hourly wage
rates for others. West German and French data refer to the beginning of the quarter.
' Average for latest 3 months compared with that for previous 3 months.
1 Year 3 Months 1 Month
Latest Date Earlier Earlier Earlier
Oct 12
Oct 14
Oct 12
Oct 14
Oct 12
Oct 12
Oct 12
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A-8
 EXPORT P $ S oved For Release 2003/08/05: CI
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US $
National Currency
Average
Average
Annua
l Growth Rate Since
Annual
Growth Rate Since
Percent Change
P
ercent Chang
e
Latest
from Previous
I Year
3 Months
Latest
from Previous
_
1 Year 3 Months
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Earlier
Month
Month
1970
Earlier Earlier
United States
Jul 77
-0.6
9.6
4.7
- 1.7
United States
Jul 77
-0.6
9.6
4.7 - 1.7
Japan
Jun 77
2.0
10.8
14.9
10.1
Japan
Jun 77
0.4
6.5
4.7 - 1.0
West Germany
Jun 77
-0.5
11.3
11.6
5.4
West Germany
Jun 77
-0.5
4.5
2.0 -0.9
France
May 77
0.9
11.3
7.4
3.7
France
May 77
0.6
9.5
13.1 1.4
United Kingdom
Aug 77
2.9
11.0
13.9
15.7
United Kingdom
Aug 77
1.9
16.1
16.7 10.1
Italy
Mar 77
0.5
11.3
16.9
16.7
Italy
Mar 77
- 1.1
16.8
22.9 17.1
Canada
May 77
0.3
9.7
-0.8
-0.8
Canada
May 77
0.1
9.7
6.1 7.4
IMPORT PRICES
National Currency
OFFICIAL RESERVES
Average
Annual
Growth Rate Since
Billion US E
P
ercent Change
Latest
Month
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
1 Year 3 Months
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Earlier
End of
Billion US $
Jun 1970
Earlier Earlier
United States
Jul 77
0.6
13.4
7.9
7.6
United States
Aug 77
19.1
14.5
18.6 19.2
Japan
Jun 77
-0.8
10.9
0.3
-14.8
Japan
Aug 77
17.8
4.1
16.3 17.3
West Germany
Jun 77
-0.1
4.4
1.7
3.0
West Germany
Jun 77
35.1
8.8
33.3 34.7
France
May 77
-0.4
10.6
15.4
2.6
France
Jul 77
9.9
4.4
9.4 10.0
United Kingdom
Aug 77
-1.0
19.3
13.9
1.7
United Kingdom
Sep 77
17.2
2.8
5.2 11.6
Italy
Mar 77
- 1.9
21.2
24.6
25.8
Italy
Jul 77
10.5
4.7
6.2 6.8
Canada
May 77
0.5
8.6
11.9
18.2
Canada
Jun 77
5.1
4.3
6.0 5.1
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE'
BASIC BALANCE'
Current and L
ong-Term-C
apital T
ransactions
Cumulati
ve (Million
US $)
Latest
Cumulat
ive (Million US S)
Period Million US $ 1977
1976
Change
Latest
United States'
77 II
-4,605 -8,763
1,070
-9
833
Period Million US $
1977
1976 Change
Japan
Aug 77
660 5,321
1,255
,
4,066
United States
No longer published 2
West Germany
Aug 77
-726
684
177
506
Japan
Aug 77
260
3,781
1,472 2,309
France
77 II
-
West Germany
Aug 77
- 1,048
-3,403
883 - 4,287
438 -2
,101
2,052
-50
United Kingdom
77 I
-773 -773
-502
-271
France
77 I
- 1,354
- 1,354
-2,015 660
Ital
77 1
-
United Kingdom
76 IV
-277
N.A.
-4,171 N.A.
y
929 -929
1,413
484
Canada
77 1
-1,530 -1
,530 -
1,911
381
Italy
76 III
779
N.A.
1,096 N.A.
Canada
77 I
-550
- 550
882 -1,432
Converted to US doll
ars at the curr
ent market rates of exch
ange.
Converted to US dollars at the current market rates of exchange.
' Seasonally adjusted.
2 As recommended by
the Advisory Com
mittee on the
Presentation
of Balance of Payments
Statistics, the Department of Commerce
no longer publishes a ba
sic balance.
EXCHANGE RATES
TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE
RATES'
Spot Rate
As of 14 Oct 77
Percent Change from
ge
Percent Chan
from
US $
1 Year
3 Months
1 Year
3 Months
Per Unit
19 Mar 73
Earlier
Earlier
7 Oct 77
19 Mar 73
Earlier
Earlier
7 Oct 77
Japan (yen)
0.0040
3.94
14.08
4.85
2.17
United States
5.39
1.18
0.12
-0.34
West Germany
0,4398
24.22
7.36
0.37
0.71
Japan
9.88
16.38
5.06
2.04
(Deutsche mark)
West Germany
27.44
5.66
0.08
0.18
France (franc)
0.2061
-6.50
2.22
0.10
0.32
France
-7.70
-0.57
-0.49
-0.28
United Kingdom
1.7675
-28.18
6.19
2.79
0.50
United Kingdom
-28.81
5.97
3.28
0.06
(pound sterling)
Italy
-39.18
-7.56
-0.15
-0.44
Italy (lira)
0.0011
-35.82
-4.54
0.26
0.09
Canada
-7.05
- 12.18
-3.85
-1.06
Canada (dollar)
0.9113
-8.66 - 11.29
-3.49
-0.86
Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized countries to
reflect the competitive
impact of exchang
e rate varia
tions among
the major currencies.
An:) rove TT
-o-r
-
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79BOO457AO00200080001-3
Exports to (f.o.b.)
Imports from (c.i.f.)
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD
OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
UNITED STATES 3
82
218
100
490
49
415
9
636
15
1
282
24,395
1974 .............
98,507
45,866
15,630
6,723
3,406
26,8
,
,
,
,
,
1975 .............
107,592
46,926
16,191
10,765
3,699
30,011
4
96,140
677
120
46,715
626
56
8,170
9
058
17,083
017
25
1,156
445
1
23,016
531
28
1976 ..... . .......
114,997
51,298
17,612
12,567
3,936
29,58
,
,
,
,
,
,
1st Qtr
27,360
12,184
4,088
2,751
1,144
7,193
27,319
12,884
2,226
5,570
327
6,312
2d Qtr
29,695
13,383
4,496
3,113
1,088
7,615
28,367
14,332
2,242
5,582
372
5,839
3d Qtr
27,437
11,944
4,073
3,106
850
7,464
32,452
14,285
2,228
6,952
389
8,598
4th Qtr ........
30,505
13,787
4,955
3,597
854
7,312
32,539
15,125
2,362
6,913
357
7,782
1977
1st Qtr ........
29,454
13,752
4,716
3,136
951
6,899
34,990
15,124
2,566
8,324
366
8,610
2d Qtr ........
JAPAN
31,673
14,282
4,707
3,389
816
8,479
37,907
17,059
2,578
8,673
411
9,186
1974 .............
55,610
18,591
6,862
5,450
4,367
20,340
62,074
18,755
6,219
19,970
3,684
13,446
1975 .............
55,812
16,468
6,091
8,423
5,283
19,547
57,853
16,917
6,083
19,404
3,382
12,067
1976 .............
67,364
22,406
8,588
9,278
5,049
22,043
64,895
14
832
17,534
4
083
7,777
696
1
21,877
213
5
2,926
671
14,781
169
3
1st Qtr ........
14,429
4,848
1,827
1,872
1,289
4,593
,
,
,
,
,
2d Qtr
16,431
5,402
2,092
2,271
1,348
5,318
15,903
4,347
1,948
5,400
667
3,541
3d Qtr
17,542
5,897
2,272
2,476
1,135
5,762
16,818
4,497
2,137
5,406
747
4,031
4th Qtr ........
18,962
6,259
2,397
2,659
1,277
6,370
17,342
4,607
1,996
5,858
841
4,040
977
1
1st Qtr ........
17,911
5,848
2,449
2,459
1,409
5,746
17,452
4,717
1,845
6,246
801
3,843
Apr & May .....
13,017
4,404
1,611
1,823
875
4,304
11,988
3,195
1,380
3,925
575
2,913
WEST GERMANY
69
659
878
23
504
25
9
211
153
5
913
5
1974 .............
89,365
30,820
36,431
4,066
9,473
8,575
,
,
,
,
,
,
1975 .............
90,181
28,331
36,406
6,776
10,629
8,039
74,986
27,085
27,761
8,239
5,526
6,375
1976 .............
101,980
33,443
41,811
8,245
10,310
8,171
88,211
31,281
32,632
9,720
6,718
7,860
1st Qtr
23,467
7,918
9,519
1,710
2,430
1,890
20,147
7,130
7,577
2,189
1,502
1,749
2d Qtr
24,570
8,215
10,110
1,838
2,421
1,986
21,571
7,704
8,133
2,223
1,625
1,886
3d Qtr
25,147
8,003
10,272
2,235
2,510
2,127
21,791
7,565
7,894
2,575
1,699
891
2,058
167
2
4th Qtr ........
28,796
9,307
11,910
2,462
2,949
2,168
24,701
8,883
9,028
2,732
1,
,
1977
1st Qtr ........
27,804
9,281
11,609
2,307
2,156
2,451
24,084
8,465
8,828
2,578
1,270
2,943
Apr
9,230
3,058
3,849
799
694
830
7,991
2,892
2,949
756
428
966
FRANCE
1974 .............
45,914
19,361
14,854
3,017
2,265
6,417
52,874
22,062
13,620
10,117
1,714
5,361
1975 .............
52,189
19,960
15,454
4,909
3,477
8,389
54,238
23,039
14,350
9,665
2,065
5,119
1976 .............
55,680
22,438
16,081
5,067
3,558
8,536
64,256
27,750
16,894
11,336
2,384
5,892
392
1
1st Qtr ........
13,639
5,524
3,921
1,240
917
2,037
15,529
6,567
4,157
2,818
595
,
2d Qtr ........
14,769
5,911
4,395
1,221
1,059
2,183
16,187
7,149
4,324
2,610
593
1,511
3d Qtr ........
12,409
4,922
3,446
1,280
729
2,032
14,841
6,431
3,733
2,723
577
1,377
4th Qtr ........
14,863
6,081
4,319
1,326
853
2,284
17,699
7,603
4,680
3,185
619
1,612
1977
1st Qtr ........
15,323
6,250
4,540
1,392
847
2,294
17,885
5
788
7,494
499
2
4,840
1
543
3,056
879
600
194
1,895
673
Apr ...........
UNITED KINGDOM
5,232
2,193
1,569
460
288
722
,
107
54
,
18
158
,
968
17
695
8
870
1
7
416
1974 .............
38,615
11,704
15,544
2,554
1,458
7,355
,
,
,
,
,
,
1975 .............
43,751
12,399
16,310
4,535
1,768
8,739
53,260
18,387
18,370
6,912
1,726
7,865
1976 .............
46,312
14,016
17,492
5,133
1,619
8,052
56,029
19,653
18,732
7,292
2,143
8,209
2
006
1st Qtr ........
11,637
3,415
4,362
1,238
433
2,189
13,641
4,704
4,597
1,824
510
,
2d Qtr ........
11,553
3,532
4,307
1,259
420
2,035
14,052
5,041
4,547
1,738
579
2,147
3d Qtr ........
11,058
3,430
4,100
1,262
386
1,880
13,787
4,744
4,547
1,893
528
2,075
4th Qtr ........
12,064
3,639
4,723
1,374
380
1,948
14,549
5,164
5,041
1,837
526
1,981
1977
1st Qtr ........
13,150
4,008
5,145
1,521
413
2,063
15,575
5,786
5,068
1,783
514
2,424
2d Qtr ........
14,375
4,195
5,700
1,687
530
2,263
16,623
6,009
5,718
1,702
602
2,592
Approved For Release 2003/08/?&9 CIA-RDP79BOO457AO00200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79BOO457AO00200080001-3
Developed Countries: Direction of Trade
(Continued)
Exports to (f.o.b.)
Imports from (c.i.f.)
World
Big
Seven
Other Com-
OECD OPEC' munist
Other
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD
OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
ITALY
1974 .............
30,252
13,894
7,135
2,238
2,701
4,284
40,682
17,949
6,394
9,384
2,513
4,442
1975 .............
34,825
15,626
7,519
3,718
3,228
4,734
37,928
17,284
6,189
7,854
2,431
4,170
1976 .............
35,364
16,698
8,276
4,027
2,592
3,771
41,789
18,585
7,755
7,831
3,000
4,618
1st Qtr ........
7,398
3,513
1,713
756
597
819
9,092
4,063
1,708
1,689
608
1,024
2d Qtr ........
8,705
4,157
2,040
951
623
934
10,716
4,786
1,918
2,092
744
1,176
3d Qtr ........
9,398
4,505
2,191
1,057
657
988
10,335
4,497
1,860
2,035
792
1,151
4th Qtr ........
9,863
4,523
2,332
1,263
715
1,030
11,646
5,239
2,269
2,015
856
1,267
1977
1st Qtr ........
9,668
4,520
2,264
1,236
655
993
11,299
4,964
2,130
2,166
720
1,319
Apr & May .....
7,480
3,435
1,719
981
540
805
8,523
3,829
1,561
1,605
523
1,005
CANADA'
3
343
1
979
1974
.............
32,390
26,827
1,970
626
851
2,116
32,408
25,965
1,508
2,61
,
1975
.............
31,778
25,885
1,753
827
1,255
2,058
34,050
27,181
1,579
3,126
311
1,853
1976
.............
37,746
31,415
2,048
930
1,270
2,083
37,922
30,383
1,661
3,171
363
2,344
1st
Qtr ........
8,539
7,197
424
167
334
417
9,159
7,331
367
843
85
533
2d
Qtr ........
10,015
8,441
496
183
345
550
10,290
8,175
421
954
95
645
3d
Qtr ........
9,216
7,486
568
271
354
537
8,834
6,965
433
716
91
629
4th
Qtr ........
9,976
8,291
560
309
237
579
9,639
7,912
440
658
92
537
1977
1st
Qtr ........
9,672
8,201
524
248
231
468
9,640
7,850
391
742
87
570
2d
Qtr ........
10,740
9,055
540
278
292
575
10,841
9,007
430
677
96
631
' Data are unadjusted. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
2 Including Gabon.
3Import data are f.a.s.
' Import data are f.o.b.
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : 61) -RDP79BOO457AOOO2OOO8OOO1-3
 FOREIGN IfgXbEr Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
A BILLION US $, f.o.b., seasonally adjusted
West Germany
10.0
8.0
APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
Approved For Release 2003/08/05~_1 9IA-RDP791300457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
United Kingdom
LATEST
MONTH
MILLION
US $ 1977
1976
CHANGE
LATEST
MONTH
MILLION
US $ 1977
1976
CHANGE
12,232
97,251
77,646
25.2%
United Kingdom
AUG 77
4,579
39,260
33,044
18.8%
-2,670
-17,583
-2,263
-15,320
Balance
245
-3,196
-4,236
1,041
=%3=;
42
541
22
2
4 ( ; / ' -
%u ., t h
e ( t(r
. -. 4
Japan
AUG 77
5,466
40,645
.
35,772
.
13.6%
Italy
AUG 77
3,489
29,071
25,696
13.1%
Balance
1,055
11,344
6,769
4,575
Balance
533
146
-2,391
2,537
West Germany
AUG 77
7,808
62,796
53,654
17.0%
Canada
JUN 77
3,311
20,020
18,940
5.7%
Balance
2,041
13,369
11,201
2,189
Balance
14
691
-166
857.
France
AUG 77
5,888
44,174
39,000
13.3%
Balance
-378
-2,210
-1,548
-662
Approved For Release 2003/08/0R_1clA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
FOREIGN TRADE PRICES IN US $1
United States
INDEX: JAN 1975 =100
Japan
West Germany
110
108
105
04
! I% edFo eRe 'ge92003/08/05 1~%T RDP79B004&-A-600200080001-3
1Export and import are
A-14
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
France
United Kingdom
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
Approved M7l elease 2003#1 7c : CIA-RDP+ c457A000200M301-3
A-15
 3
Approve Fl,PUEZTtb 2J.1Q3(O ffbPWT5UFRfflp,2.Q0080001??
MONEY SUPPLY'
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION'
Average
Average
An
nual Growth
Rate "inc.
Annual
Growth Rate inc. S
Percent Change
-
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier'
Brazil
May 77
1.5
36.3
41.7
Brazil
76 II
0.1
11.0
10.7
0.4
Egypt
Apr 77
1.2
18.6
23.0
India
Feb 77
3.5
5.5
6.8
18.8
India
Apr 77
0.9
12.2
19.7
South Korea
Jun 77
8.3
22.8
14.7
22.8
Iran
Jun 77
-4.5
28.8
26.5
Mexico
May 77
1.9
5.9
2.4
27.1
South Korea
Jul 77
1.9
31.6
39.6
Nigeria
76 IV
0.2
11.3
9.0
0.7
Mexico
Jun 76
-0.3
17.0
16.6
Taiwan
Jul 77
-2.0
14.2
8.9
12.7
Nigeria
Feb 77
5.9
35.9
54.8
Taiwan
May 77
0.6
24.1
21
0
' Seasonally adj
usted.
.
' Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.
Thailand
May 77
1.5
13.5
13.0
' Seasonally adjusted.
' Average for latest
3 months comp
ared with average for previous 3 months.
CONSUME
R PRICES
WHOLESALE PRICES
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Average
Percent Cha
nge
Annual Growth Rate Since
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Percent Change
-
-
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Brazil
May 77
3.5
26.9
44.4
India
Apr 77
0.3
8.1
8.3
Brazil
Aug 77
0.9
27.2
37.0
Iran
Jun 77
1.6
12.5
29.9
India
May 77
2.0
9.5
10.2
South Korea
Aug 77
1.3
14.6
9.7
Iran
Jun 77
0.1
10.9
21.6
South Korea
Aug 77
0.7
16.3
9.2
Mexico
Jul 77
1.1
14.7
32.9
Mexico
Jul 77
0.7
16.4
48.2
Nigera
Mar 77
3.4
14.9
13.6
Taiwan
Jul 77
0.4
10.6
7.2
Taiwan
Jul 77
0
9.1
4.1
Thailand
Jul 77
0.4
8.6
9.4
Thailand
Jul 77
1.0
10.1
7.1
EXPORT PRICES
OFFICIAL RESERVES
US $
Million US $
Lates
t Month
Average
1 Year
3 Months
Ann
ual Growth Rate Since
End of
Million US $ Jun 1970
Earlier
Earlier
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Brazil
Feb 77
5,873 1,013
3,667
5,139
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier
Egypt
Apr 77
405 155
375
389
Brazil
Mar 77
4.5
16.5
35.4
-34.4
India
Jun 77
4,559 1,006
2,449
3,747
India
Nov 76
-2.1
9.4
10.5
-4.0
Iran
Jul 77
11,592 208
8,426
10,548
Iran
Jun 77
0
36.0
18.9
0
South Korea
Jul 77
3,656 602
2,128
3,247
South Korea
77 I
1.7
8.8
11.9
6.9
Mexico
Mar 76
1,501 695
1,479
1,533
Nigeria
May 76
-0.1
33.2
8.2
6.6
Nigeria
Jun 77
4,663 148
5,885
4,931
Taiwan
May 77
0.4
12.3
9.4
14.7
Taiwan
Jun 77
1,411 531
1,394
1,349
Thailand
Dec 76
2.0
13.3
13.1
77.7
Thailand
Jul 77
2,017 978
1,929
2,006
Approved For Release 2003/08/06-?tIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
Jun 77 Exports
190.5
37.3
6,199
4,410
40.6%
Jun 77 Imports
47.0
-0.4
5,963
5,938
0.4%
Jun 77 Balance
236
- 1,528
1,764
76 IV Exports
-9.0
-33.3
NA
NA
NA
76 IV Imports
76 IV Balance
177.6
15.7
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Apr 77 Exports
109.3
13.0
1,890
1,670
13.2%
Apr 77 Imports
-56.3
5.6
1,456
1,434
1.5%
Apr 77 Balance
434
236
198
Iran
Jun 77 Exports
-4.4
4.2
11,984
10,968
9.3%
May 77 Imports
143.6
6.8
5,268
5,050
4.3%
May 77 Balance
4,845
3,926
919
South Korea
Jun 77 Exports
107.4
23.8
4,518
3,414
32.3%
Jun 77 Imports
158.0
31.7
4,692
3,625
29.4%
Jun 77 Balance
-174
-211
37
Mexico
Jun 77 Exports
17.1
25.3
2,162
1,661
30.2%
Jun 77 Imports
73.5
-21.5
2,340
2,971
-21.2%
Jun 77 Balance
-178
- 1,310
1,132
Nigeria
May 77 Exports
17.1
24.5
1,965
1,570
25.2%
Dec 76 Imports
Dec 76 Balance
73.5
8.4
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Taiwan
Jul 77 Exports
207.0
22.1
5,078
4,458
13.9%
Jul 77 Imports
92.6
16.8
4,441
3,924
13.2%
Jul 77 Balance
637
534
103
Thailand
Apr 77 Exports
34.3
22.9
1,221
963
26.8%
Mar 77 Imports
30.1
22.7
940
766
22.7%
Mar 77 Balance
- 22
- 39
17
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA- jtDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Am3roved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
AGRICULTURAL PRIE MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE
7 5 $ PER BUSHEL
12 OCT 2.49
5 OCT 2.56
SEP 77 2.46
OCT 76 2.76
500
SOYBEANS
$ PER BUSHEL
1.12 0CTI I
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 0
1-12 OCT
110
World Raw New York No. 11
;:1,500
12 OCT
7.20
5 OCT
7.50
`
SEP 77
7.31
50 'll
A
OCT 76
8.07
.1,000
25
500
12 OCT 1.82
5 OCT 1.83
SEP 77 1.84
OCT 76 2.51
1-12 OCTI I
2,000
350
1-12 OCT II
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 0 50
1.12 OCTII
TEA
London Auction
COFFEE
Milds Washed
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 :11 IA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
37.5 $ PER HUNDRED WEIGHT
No. 2 Medium Grain, 4% Brokens,
f.o.b. mills, Houston, Tex.
3 OCT 14.75
CL AVV a.VV
AUG 77 14.94
OCT 76 14.00
1-3OCTII
19 AUG 213.50
12 AUG 225.00
AUG 77 222.22
OCT 76 132.54
25 1973
12 OCT 0.1889
5 OCT 0.1912
SEP 77 0.1917
OCT 76 0.2068
u,000 1-12 OCT1'lI
1976 1977 0 1973 1974 1975 -ya 1976 1977
100 1-4 OCT 11
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
400
240
N
NOTE: The food index is compiled by the Economist for 16 food commodities
which enter international trade. Commodities are weighted by
3-year moving averages of imports into industrialized countries.
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
A-19
SOYBEAN MEAL
$ PER METRIC TON $ PER TON
800
12 OCT 132.00
5 OCT 130.00
SEP 77 143.50
OCT 76 171.48
1-12 OCTI I 100
SOYBEAN OIL
$ PER METRIC TON $ PER POUND
7,000 0.5
I Percent Bulk, f.o.b. Decatur
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS PRICES MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE
COPPER WIRE BAR
q PER POUND
40'- 1973
q PER POUND
LEAD
$ PER METRIC TON 45 C PER POUND
X3,000
LME
US
12 OCT
56.1
60.6
12 OCT
28.0
31.0
5 OCT
55.2
60.6
5 OCT
27.1
ii 31.0
SEP 77
54.3
60.6
SEP 77
26.3
31.0
OCT 76
58.5
73.0
2,500
35
OCT 76
21.0
25.8
1-12 OCT1
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
75 175
25 125
1.11OCTII
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
2,000
550
1,500
1973 1974
US
4 OCT 52.0
11 OCT 52.0 125 225
SEP 77 59.6
OCT 76 64.8
1-12 OCT
1- 12 OCT
1975
I
1976 1977
5 OCT
167.0
152.1
28 SEP
167.0
153.4
SEP 77
167.0
150.6
OCT 76
180.0
158.2
Approved For Release 2003/08/(A5 oCIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
ALUMINUM
Major US Producer
d per pound
53.00
51.00
48.00
41.00
US STEEL
Composite
$ per long ton
359.36
339.27
327.00
303.85
IRON ORE
Non-Bessemer Old Range
$ per long ton
21.43
21.43
20.51
18.75
CHROME ORE
Russian, Metallurgical Grade
$ per metric ton
150.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
CHROME ORE
S. Africa, Chemical Grade
$ per long ton
58.50
58.50
42.00
44.50
FERROCHROME
US Producer, 66-70 Percent
d per pound
41.00
43.00
44.00
53.50
NICKEL
Composite US Producer
$ per pound
2.16
2.35
2.41
2.20
MANGANESE ORE
48 Percent Mn
$ per long ton
72.24
72.00
72.00
67.20
TUNGSTEN ORE
65 Percent W03
$ per short ton
8,727.19
10,628.47
7,640.84
5,101.29
MERCURY
NY
$ per 76 pound flask
143.00
166.15
132.45
132.00
SILVER
LME Cash
j! per troy ounce
464.77
479.23
421.55
433.80
GOLD
154.66
149.17
116.12
142.76
RUBBER
60 C PER POUND
10 1973 1974
12 OCT
NR
44.8
SR
NA
1,200
5 OCT
44
2
NA
.
140
SEP 77
44.5
NA
OCT 76
42.2
33.8
1-12 0CT I I
1975 1976 1977
LUMBER INDEX6
1-7 OCTII
1977
1Approximates world market price frequently used by major
world producers and traders, although only small quantities of
these metals are actually traded on the LME.
2Producers' price, covers most primary metals sold in the US.
3As of 1 Dec 75, US tin price quoted is "Tin NY lb composite."
4Quoted on New York market.
5S-type styrene, US export price.
6This index is compiled by using the average of 13 types of lumber whose
prices are regarded as "bell wethers" of US lumber construction costs.
NOTE: The industrial materials index is compiled by the Economist for 19 raw
materials which enter international trade. Commodities are weighted by
3-year moving averages of imports into industrialized countries.
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 :2CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
SOURCE NOTES
FOR
ECONOMIC INDICATORS WEEKLY REVIEW
20 October 1977
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Seasonally adjusted; Index: 1970=100
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
UNEMPLOYMENT
Seasonally adjusted
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
Survey of Current Business. Industrial Production: Federal Reserve Board index of quantity output;
seasonally adjusted; total index; 1967=100.
Economic Statistics Monthly. Industry-Production: Indexes relating to mining and manufacturing;
indexes of industrial production; all industries; seasonally adjusted; 1970=100.
Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank-Reihe 4: Saisonbereinigte
Wirtschaftszahlen (subsequently referred to as `Bundesbank-Series 4"). Industriele Produktion-
Gesamtuebersicht: gesamte Industrie, ohne Bauindustrie; monatlich; seasonally adjusted; 1970=100.
[Excluding the construction industry.]
Bulletin mensuel de statistique. Industrie-Indice de la production industrielle. Indice general, BTP
exclus.; seasonally adjusted; 1970=100.
Monthly Digest of Statistics. Production, Output, and Costs: Index of industrial production; total
manufacturing industries; seasonally adjusted; 1970=100.
Bolletino mensile di statistics. Industrie: Numeri indici della produzione industriale; Indici per rami,
classi e sottoclassi di industria; indici generale; 1970=100.
Canadian Statistical Review. Domestic Product, by industry: Real domestic product, by industry of
origin, monthly volume indexes; special industry groupings; index of industrial production; seasonally
adjusted; 1971=100.
Survey of Current Business. Labor Force, Employment, and Earnings; Labor force; unemployed; and
rates (unemployed as a percent of total); all civilian workers; both series seasonally adjusted.
Japanese Economic Indicators. Labor and Wages: Labor force; wholly unemployed and rate of wholly
unemployed; both series seasonally adjusted.
Bundesbank-Series 4. Beschaeftigung and Arbeitsmarkt: Arbeitslose; gesamt; monatlich; and
Arbeitslosenquote; monatlich; both series seasonally adjusted.
Bulletin mensuel de statistique. Emploi de la main d'oeuvre: Demandes d'emploi en fin de mois;
seasonally adjusted.
Seasonal adjustment (Census Method II, X-11
Variant)
Adjustment of number unemployed by esti-
mate of unemployed not covered by published
series; estimation of labor force from popula-
tion projections and participation rates; calcu-
lation of unemployment rate. Monthly esti-
mates derived from yearly data provided by
the US Embassy, Paris.
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
United Kingdom Monthly Digest of Statistics. Labour: Unemployment; United Kingdom; unemployed excluding school-
leavers and adult students; total and percentage rate; both series seasonally adjusted.
Italy Bolletino mensile di statistica. Unemployment: Popolazione secondo it sesso, 1'eta e l'atteggiamento nei Seasonal adjustment of labor force data
confronti del lavoro; persone in cerca di occupazione. Labor Force: Popolazione secondo it sesso, l'eta e (X-11)
l'atteggiamento nei confronti del lavoro; persone appartenenti alle forze di lavoro. Both series not
seasonally adjusted.
Canada Canadian Statistical Review. Labour: Labour force characteristics of the population 14 years of age and
over (thousand persons); unemployed; and unemployment rate. Both series seasonally adjusted.
DOMESTIC PRICES: (a) Wholesale
Not seasonally adjusted; Index: 1970=100
United States Survey of Current Business. Industrial Commodity Prices: Wholesale prices (US Department of Labor); Conversion to 1970=100
industrial commodities; not seasonally adjusted; 1967=100.
Japan Economic Statistics Monthly. Prices and Household Economy: Wholesale price indexes; all
commodities; not seasonally adjusted; 1970=100.
West Germany Statistischer Wochendienst. Monatszahlen-Preise: Index der Erzeugerpreise industrieller Produktion;
Industrieerzeugnisse ohne elektr. Strom, Gas and Wasser; 1970=100. [Index of industrial producer
prices excluding electricity, water, and gas.]
France Bulletin mensuel de statistique. Indices des prix de gros: Produits industriels (ensemble); indice taxes Conversion of all series to 1970=100; calcula-
comprises; 1962=100. And Indices des prix des machines-outils francaises; 1973=100. And Indices tion of weighed average.
mensuels des prix a la consommation: Produits manufactures; 1970=100.
United Kingdom Monthly Digest of Statistics. Wages and Prices; Index numbers of wholesales prices; price indexes of the
output of broad sectors of industry; home sales; all manufactured products; 1970=100.
Italy Bolletino mensile di statistica. Prezzi: Prezzi all'ingrosso; numeri indici dei prezzi al'ingrosso; indici per Conversion to 1970=100
settore e brande; prodotti non agricoli; 1976=100.
Canada Canadian Statistical Review. Prices; General wholesale price indexes; special groupings; nonfarm Conversion to 1970=100
products; not seasonally adjusted; 1935-39=100.
DOMESTIC PRICES: (b) Consumer
Not seasonally adjusted; Index: 1970=100
United States Survey of Current Business. Commodity Prices (all items): Consumer prices (US Department of Labor); Conversion to 1970=100
all items; not seasonally adjusted; 1967=100.
Japan Economic Statistics Monthly. Prices and Household Economy: Consumer price indexes; national Conversion to 1970=100
indexes; general; not seasonally adjusted; 1975=100.
West Germany Statistischer Wochendienst. Monatszahlen-Preise: Preisindex fuer die Lebenshaltung; alle privaten
Haushalte; 1970=100. [The cost of living index for all households.]
France Bulletin mensuel de statistique. Indices des prix a la consommation: Serie France entiere; ensemble;
1970=100.
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
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DOMESTIC PRICES: (a) Wholesale
Brazil Conjuntura economics. National Economic Indexes: Wholesale prices (new classification); products for
domestic use; base period; first semester 1969=100.
India Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices-by Groups and Important
Commodities: All commodities; average of weeks ended Saturdays; 1970-71=100.
Iran IMF International Financial Statistics. Wholesale Prices, 1969-70=100.
South Korea Monthly Statistics of Korea. Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices: All commodities; 1975=100.
Mexico Indicadores economicos. Indice de precios al mayoreo en la Ciudad de Mexico: 210 articulos; indice
general; base, 1954=100.
Taiwan Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China. Indices of Wholesale Prices in Taiwan district: General
index; base period, 1971=100.
Thailand Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin. Wholesale Price Index for Thailand: All items, 1968=100.
DOMESTIC PRICES: (b) Consumer
Brazil Conjuntura economics. Regional Economic Indexes: Cidade do Rio de Janeiro; cost of living (consumer
prices); total; base period, 1965-67=100.
India Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. Consumer Price Index Numbers for Industrial Workers: All-India;
1960=100.
Iran IMF International Financial Statistics. Consumer prices, 1970=100.
South Korea Monthly Statistics of Korea. Index Numbers of Consumer Prices for All Cities; all items, 1975=100.
Mexico Indicadores economicos. Indice de precios al consumidor en la Cuidad de Mexico: Indice general; base,
1968=100.
Nigeria Monthly report. Composite Consumer Price Indices: Consumer price index; base-average, 1960= 100.
Taiwan Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China. Indices of Urban Consumer Prices in Taiwan District:
General index; base period, 1971=100.
Thailand Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin. Consumer Price Index for Urban Areas; Whole Kingdom; all items;
October 1964-September 1965=100.
*Except as noted, the cited sources are official government and central bank publications of the respective countries.
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000200080001-3
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