COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION TO ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01383A000100030001-2
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE
An Analysis of the Communist
Position on the Palestine Question
25X1A2g
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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE
CONTENTS
PART ONE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT
SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION
SECTION THREE: REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
PART TWO: EXAMPLES OF COMMUNIST BLOC STATEMENTS
SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT
SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION
PART THREE: COMPARATIVE RECORD OF ROLL CALL VOTES ON
THE PALESTINE QUESTION
SECTION ONE: FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, 28 April - 15 May 1947
SECTION TWO: SECOND (REGULAR )'SESSION, 16 September -
29 November 1947
SECTION THREE: SECOND SPECIAL SESSION, 16 April -
14 May 1948
SECTION FOUR: THIRD (REGULAR) SESSION (PART I),
21 September - 12 December 1948
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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT
SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION
SECTION THREE: REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
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SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE; GOVERNMENT
BACKGROUND
On 2 April 1947 Sir Alexander Cadogan, head of the United Kingdom
delegation to the United Nations, sent a letter (document A/286) to
Dr. Victor Chi Tsai Hoo, Assistant Secretary-General of the United
Nations, in which he requested, on behalf of His Majesty's Government,
that the question of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the next regular
session of the General Assembly. The letter also asked that the Secretary-
General summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General
Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special com-
mittee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future
government of Palestine.
On 22 and 23 April 1947, the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia sent almost identical letters to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations* each requesting inclusion of an additional
item in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly
namely, "The termination of the Mandate over :Palestine and the declara-
tion of its independence. "
Following the approval of the majority of United Nations members
.to hold a special session for discussion of the proposal by the United,
Kingdom, the first special session in the history of the United Nations
met in New York 28 April to 15 May 1947. The Palestine question was thus
officially brought before the United Nations for deliberation on 28 April
1947.
* Documents A/287, A/288, A/289, A/290, and A/291 respectively.
I. THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
28 April - 15 May 1947
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
On 1 May 1947, the General Assembly approved the United Kingdom's
request to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the next regular
session of the General Assembly and to call a special session to constitute
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and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at
the regular session, of the question of the future government of Palestine.
On the same day, however, the Assembly rejected a proposal by the
Arab States to include the following item in the agenda of the First
Special Session: "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and
the declaration of its independence. "
On 5 May 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution sub-
mitted jointly by Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Argentina, Yugoslavia, and
Uruguay. This resolution directed the First Committee to permit the
Jewish Agency for Palestine to state its views on the Palestine question.
A chronology of important events in the First Special Session of
the General Assembly leading to the adoption of the joint resolution follows:
A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE
1. The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and
Declaration of its Independence
On Tuesday, 29 April 1947, during the 28th meeting,
Mahmoud Hassan Pasha, head of the Egyptian delegation and the only
Arab member of the Committee, proposed that the Committee begin con-
sidering the Arab States' request to include the following additional item
in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly: "The
termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its
independence."
On Wednesday, 30 April 1947, during the 31st meeting,
the General Committee, after considerable deliberation, rejected the
Arab States' request by vote of 8-1, with 5 abstentions.
a. The Arab Position
Although the Egyptian delegate was the only Arab mem-
ber on the Committee, the other Arab States in the UN were allowed to
participate in the deliberation. All of them, without exception, fought
hard for inclusion of their sponsored item. (pp.. 13-16; 19-25; 27-28;
29-37; 54; 68; 70; 80)
Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume II, General Committee, Verbatim Records of Meetings,
29 April - 7 Ma 1947
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b. The Communist Position
The Communist bloc, represented on the Committee
by the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, did not launch a direct
attack on inclusion of the Arab proposal for termination of the' Mandate
and declaration of Palestine independence. Instead, they shrewdly
attacked from the flank, by professing that no decision on the subject
should be taken prior to hearing the Jewish point of view.
In expressing the Polish delegation's opinion on the
proposed inclusion of the item Mr. Winiewicz (pronounced Viniyayvitch)
stated:
"However, the Polish delegation experiences great
difficulty in reaching a decision on the inclusion of the
suggested item, as formulated in our agenda, at the
present state of this Assembly's deliberations. The
difficulty arises out of the fact that the Egyptian pro-
posal, and others, suggest in a most decisive form
the termination of the Palestine mandate, even before
we have heard the opinion of the most interested party,
the Jewish people, for which the mandate in Palestine
provided special rights.
"We cannot, therefore, vote for the inclusion
of this. additional item at this special session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations. We shall
abstain from voting, urging at the same time that
this committee should take up as soon as possible
the admission of a Jewish representative body for
consultation with this Assembly." (pp. 16-17;
29 April 1947)
'Mr. Gromyko (USSR) on the other hand, attempted to
embarrass the Arab States' representatives without showing his hand
when he asserted:
"The representatives of the Arab States have said
that they do not insist on a vote on their proposal at
this meeting. Thus, it seems to me that we have no
reason at present to vote on this proposal for it is as
if this proposal did not, as it were, exist at the present
meeting.
"I think this is the only explanation which corre-
sponds to the situation which has arisen. If this is
so, I would ask the representatives of the Arab dele-
gations and the representative of Egypt in particular,
to give a definite reply. I consider that the proposal
cannot be put to a vote at the present moment and that
it does not, as it were, exist at this stage.
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"Of course, I reserve the right to define my posi-
tion in regard to the vote when this proposal is dis-
cussed again, if it is discussed again and in the place
where it is discussed." (pp. 79 -80; 30 April 1947)
c. The Communist Voting Record
The item was voted on by show of hands, and therefore
no record is available to indicate how each Communist member voted.
However, statements by each Communist member lead to the con-
clusion that the Communist bloc did not vote for the item but that,
on the contrary, the only vote cast in its favor was by the representative
from Egypt.
d. The Outcome
The rejection of the Arab-sponsored item was followed
on 30 April 1947 by adoption of the following compromise proposal, sub-
mitted by Mr. Aranha (Brazil), which received eleven votes in favor,
with three abstentions:
"The General Committee,
"Having considered the item of the supplementary
list entitled 'The termination of the Mandate over
Palestine and the declaration of its independence' sub-
mitted by the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria,
"Reports that it decided not to recommend that
item be placed upon the agenda of the General Assembly
as a separate item; but
"Recognizes that the terms of reference for the
special committee on Palestine will not exclude the
possibility of this or any other solution which may be
found appropriate." (p. 71)
2. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly
On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 32nd meeting, Mr.
Winiewicz, head of the Polish delegation, proposed that the General
Committee recommend adoption of the following draft resolution (docu-
ment A/BUR/79/Rev. 1):
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"The General Assembly
"Resolved to give careful consideration to the
point of view of the Jewish people on the Palestine
question,
"Decides to invite the representative of the
Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the
General Assembly for consultation. "
Later, during the same meeting, Mr? Winiewicz accepted
a Czechoslovakian amendment (document A/BUR/80) rewording the
second paragraph of the Polish resolution as follows:
"Decides to invite the representatives of the
Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the
plenary meeting of the General Assembly for the pur-
pose of expressing their views on this question."
a. The Arab Position
The Arab States, represented on the Committee by
Mahmoud Hassan Pasha, (Egypt) objected to having Jewish organizations
appear before the plenary meetings of the United. Nations or before any
of its main committees, on the premise that, according to the United
Nations Charter, only representatives of States are allowed to appear
before the United Nations General Assembly. However, they did not
object to such organizations appearing before sub-committees. (pp. 114-116)
b. The Communist Position
The Communist bloc, represented by Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, and the USSR, argued that the Jewish Agency for Palestine was
an internationally recognized body, that its opinion should be heard before
the General Assembly since the Jewish population of Palestine should be
given consideration.
The following excerpts from a statement made by Com-
munist delegates expose their views on the subject:
Mr. Winiewicz (Poland)
"May I here mention that the Jewish population of
Palestine has been connected with the Palestine problem
since the mandate was established. As early as 1908
the Zionist Organization in Palestine embraced upon
the work of practical colonization of that country and of
its development. The Palestine Office was founded in
Jaffa at that time and was the forerunner of the present
Jewish Agency in Palestine. For this reason we think
the Jewish population of Palestine also should be heard."
(p. 89; 2 May 1947)
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"We have to hear not only the representatives
of the Arab countries who present the Arab point
of view, but we must also hear' the Jewish point of
view." (pp. 89-90; 2 May 1947)
"May I repeat, we of the Polish delegation
cannot imagine how this General Assembly could
pass sound judgement on this problem without hear-
ing the views of the representative Jewish body when
preparing the terms of reference for the committee
proposed by the United Kingdom and now being dis-
cussed by the General Assembly. " (p. 90; 2 May
1947)
Mr. Gromyko (USSR):
"When I speak of inviting the representatives
of the Jewish organizations, I have in mind primarily
an invitation to these representatives to attend the
General Assembly, that is, the plenary meetings.
The Soviet delegation does not accept the point of
view that the representatives of the Jewish organiza-
tions can be permitted to be present, let us say, at
the First Committee but at. the same time cannot be
permitted to attend the General Assembly's plenary
meetings where they would be given an opportunity
of expressing their views on this question. Such
half-hearted decision would be especially unjust from
the point of view of the Jewish population in Palestine,
which is vitally concerned in this matter. " (p. 110;
2 May 1947)
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 33rd meeting, and
after considerable debate, the Polish resolution as amended by Czecho-
slovakia (document A/BUR/80) was voted on and rejected by vote of
eight to three, with.three abstentions. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the
USSR, the only Communist members on the Committee, cast the three
votes favoring adoption of the resolution.
d. The Outcome
Rejection of the Polish resolution as amended (docu-
ment A/BUR/80) was followed by adoption of the US resolution (docu-
ment A/BUR/81) as amended by the United Kingdom.
3. Referring Jewish Requests to First Committee
On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 33rd meeting, while deliber-
ating the Polish draft resolution calling for the invitation of the representative
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of the Jewish Agency to appear before the General Assembly for consulta-
tion, Mr. Warren Austin, head of the US delegation, proposed, through
a draft resolution (document A/BUR/81), that the Polish draft resolution
as amended (document A/BUR/80) be reworded as follows:
"The General Committee,
"Having considered the communications referred
to it by the President of the General Assembly from
the Jewish Agency and other organizations requesting
that they be permitted to express their views on the
Palestine question,
"Recommends to the General Assembly that it
refer these communications to the.First Committee
for its decision. "
During the same meeting the United Kingdom representa-
tive, Sir Alexander Cadogan proposed, and Mr. Austin agreed, that
the second paragraph of the US draft resolution be reworded as follows:
"Recommends to the General Assembly that
it refer these communications, as well as.any communi-
cations of similar character which may be submitted
to the special session, to the First Committee for its
decision. " (p. 105)
a. The Arab Position
The Arab states approved and supported the US pro-
posed resolution because they believed that the US recommendation was
in conformity with the charter. (p. 116)
b. The Communist Position
Throughout the deliberations, the Communist delegates
maintained that it was necessary to invite the Jewish Agency for Palestine
to testify before the General Assembly, that not to do so would be unjust.
Their stand is best revealed by the following excerpts from two state-
ments made by Mr. Gromyko (USSR) and Dr. Fiderkiewicz /pronounced:
Feederkayvitch/ of Poland:
Mr. Gromyko:
"We heard the statement of the representative of
the United States of America, Senato:r Austin. He sub-
mitted a resolution to us which not only makes no pro-
vision for inviting the Jewish organizations to the
General Assembly's plenary meetings but does not
provide for inviting representatives of the Jewish
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organizations at all. The resolution merely states
that statements and documents received from
Jewish and other organizations should be transmitted
to the appropriate Committee of the General Assembly.
The transmission of documents to the appropriate
Committee is practically a technical. operation. Apart
from this, delegations have received at least the
main statements of organizations which have made
requests. Therefore, the solution offered by the
resolution does not get us much further; it does not
constitute the slightest progress in any way. "
(pp. 110-111; 2 May 1947)
"I understand the difficulties which the repre-
sentative of the United States is experiencing with
regard to our resolution. Nevertheless, the Polish
delegation does not see much possibility of solving
the problem before us and arriving at a decision on
the resolution, after due consideration by the Com-
mittee, without a Jewish voice being heard before
the Assembly.
"Sending the matter to the First Committee
for consideration would serve.only to prolong the
situation for the present, and no one knows for how
long. That is why the Polish delegation regrets
that it cannot accept the proposal of the United
States representative." (p. 118; 2 May 1947)
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Friday, 2 May 1947, during the 33rd meeting,
the General Committee, by show of hands, voted to adopt the US
proposal as amended 11-0, with three abstentions. Although the
vote was not recorded, the negative Communist attitude toward
the US proposal would indicate that they did not support it.
d. The Outcome
Following the adoption of the U'S resolution as amended,
the General Committee submitted a report to the General Assembly,
(document A/299) containing the following resolution:
"The General Committee,
"Having considered the communications referred
to it by the President of the General Assembly from
the Jewish Agency and other organizations requesting
that they be permitted to express their views on the
Palestine problem,
"Recommends to the General Assembly that it
refer these communications, as well as any communi-
cations of a similar character which may be submitted
to this special session, to the First Committee for its
decisions. " (p. 126; 2 May 1947)
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B. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS
1. The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the
Declaration of its Independence.
On, Thursday, 1 May 1947, during the 71st Plenary meet-
ing., the Arab States' item, "The termination of the Mandate over
Palestine and the declaration of its independence", which they had
wanted included in the agenda of the First Special Session of the General
Assembly, was reintroduced by the President of the Assembly, Mr.
Aranha (Brazil) for further discussion and final decision.
a. The Arab Position
The position of the Arab States' representatives on
the inclusion of their proposed item was similar to that adopted by
them in the General Committee,
b. The Communist Position
Throughout the deliberations, the Communist bloc
did not show its hand, and not one of its representatives voiced an
opinion on this item. The Communist bloc remained silent on this
issue despite previous assertions by Messrs. Winiewicz and Gromyko
in the General Committee meetings. The former had stated that his
delegation could not vote for inclusion of this item in the agenda of this
special session; the latter had warned that he reserved the right to
define his position in regard "to the vote when this proposal is discussed
again, if it is discussed again and in the place where it is discussed."
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Thursday, 1 May 1947, during the 71st meeting,
the item sponsored by the Arab States was rejected 24--15 with 10
abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia
voted'fo'r the item, Czechoslovakia and Poland abstained.
Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record,
28 April - 15 May 1947
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d. The Outcome
As result of the negative vote, the Assembly adopted
the following agenda and referred it to the First Committee for further
deliberation:
"Item 1. Constituting and instructing a special
committee to prepare for consideration of the question
of Palestine at the second regular session." (p. 60;
1 May 1947)
.-
2. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly
On Saturday, 3 May 1947, during the 73rd Plenary meet-
ing, Dr. Fiderkiewicz (Poland) delivered a lengthy statement in which
he defended the Polish delegation's negative attitude on the report of
the General Committee (document A/299). He also resubmitted the
Polish resolution, as amended by Czechoslovakia, (document A/BUR/80)
inviting representatives of the Jewish Agency to appear before the General
Assembly after declaring:
"The Polish delegation regrets that it must oppose
the report of the General Committee; it asks this Assembly
to reverse the decision of the General Committee by voting
in favor of the Polish resolution." (p. 71)
On Monday, 5 May 1947, during the 75th meeting,
Mr. Gonzalez Fernandez (Colombia) presented the following joint resolu-
tion for adoption, (document A/305) submitted by Chile, Uruguay, Byelo-
russian SSR, Yugoslavia, and Argentina:
"The General Assembly resolves,
"1. That the First Committee grant a hearing to
the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before
the Committee;
"2. To send to that same Committee for its decision
those other communications of a similar character from
the Palestinian population which have been received by
this special session of the General Assembly or may
later be submitted to it." (p. 100)
a. The Arab Position
The Arab attitude toward this question remained unchanged.
The only Arab delegate who expressed-his delegation's opinion on the
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issue was Mr. Zeineddine, (Syria) who reiterated the views expressed
previously in the General Committee, to the effect that, according to
the Charter, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, since it did not represent
"a State, was not entitled to testify before the General Assembly.
b. The Communist Position
Undismayed by defeat in the General Committee, the
Communist delegates, Messrs. Fiderkiewicz (Poland), Gromyko (USSR)
and Kosanovic (Yugoslavia) consumed much of the Assembly's time in
arguing that the Jewish Agency for Palestine should be invited to testify
before the General Assembly on the Palestine question. Highlights of
their statements on this issue follow.
Dr. Fiderkiewicz:
the arguments in favor of barring the Jewish
Agency from the plenary meeting which promise eventual
support for its being heard by one of the committees,
are not convincing to our delegation. I cannot understand
what type of procedure can be adopted by the committee
to which the Agency's request is referred. As I stated
yesterday, we do not find anywhere in the rules of pro-
cedures, nor especially in the Charter, any rule to
prohibit the hearing of the Jewish Agency or any other
representatives before any organs of the General
Assembly. The lack of such a prohibition would be
quite sufficient to justify the adoption of the resolution
proposed by the Polish delegation, as amended by the
Czechoslovak delegation. " (p. 70; 3 May 1947)
Mr. Gromyko:
"Concerning the resolution which is under dis-
cussion at the present meeting of the General Assembly,
and which was adopted yesterday by the General Com-
mittee, I must state that in the view of the Soviet
delegation this resolution is unsatisfactory. It is
unsatisfactory, in the first place, because it does
not provide for an opportunity for representatives of
Jewish organizations to express their views at the
plenary meeting of the General Assembly.
"In the second place, it is entirely unsatisfactory
for the further reason that, in speaking of the First
Committee as a possible place where representatives
of Jewish organizations can or might express their
views on the Palestine problem, the resolution com-
pletely omits to say that the representatives of
these organizations should be invited. The resolu-
tion merely says that communications and documents
received from Jewish organizations should be referred
to the First Committee, which would take the neces-
sary decisions. In other words, the resolution con-
tains the General Assembly's recommendation to
refer documents from Jewish organizations to the
First Committee." (p. 82; 3 May 1947)
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And again,
"The Soviet delegation, as in the General Com-
mittee, will support the proposal, which we dis-
cussed yesterday, at the meeting of the General Com-
mittee, to admit representatives of Jewish organiza-
tions to the General Assembly, to the Plenary meeting,
in order that they may be given an opportunity to set
forth their views on this question, which has become,
and is continuing to become, more and more acute."
(p. 82; 3 May 1947)
Mr. Kosanovic (Yugoslavia):
"The Yugoslav delegation believes that the
General Committee missed an opportunity in dealing
with a problem which was not necessarily complicated,
and which had no political implication.
"That was the question of hearing before the
General Assembly those who, in every sense of the
word, are directly concerned with the solution of
the Palestinian problem, and without whose parti-
cipation the terms of reference for an investigating
commission could not be made explicit.
"Listening very carefully to all the speeches in
the General Committee, I was under the impression
that there was no difference in the expression of under-
standing among us for those who were the first victims
of nazi crime; but the rejection of the proposal of the
Polish delegation, amended by the Czechoslovak dele-
gation, to give an opportunity to the representatives of
the Jewish Agency for Palestine to expose their views
before the General Assembly, was a great disappoint-
ment. Not only was the proposal rejected, but we have
before us a resolution proposed by the majority of the
General' Committee which tries to solve a problem of
principle with meaningless technical expedience.
"The Yugoslav delegation feels that the safety
of this world parliament would not be threatened if
we decided to hear a representative of the Jewish
organization in the General Assembly. Such a hear-
ing would have a symbolic meaning in the sense
that we, the free, peace-loving peoples of the
world, after the victory over nazi ideologies, would
be identifying ourselves in understanding, in sup-
port, and in appreciation, with those: who were the
first victims of the brutal nazi-fascist ideology of
race supremacy and discrimination, with the first
victims of gas chambers and concentration camps. "
(pp. 87-8; 5 May 1947)
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Monday, 5 May, during the 75th Plenary meeting,
the Polish resolution, as amended by Czechoslovakia, (document A/BUR/80)
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was rejected 39-8, with 7 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia voted for the resolution.
Following this rejection the Assembly voted on and
adopted the Joint resolution (document A/305) 44-7, with 3 abstentions.
d. The Outcome
The adoption of the Joint resolution was an obvious
victory for the Jewish organizations which had applied for permission
to be heard by the Assembly. It was a victory also for the Communist
delegates, who strove unremittingly to have the Assembly grant a hearing
to these Jewish organizations.
SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted the Ad Hoc Committee report (document A/516) embodying a
draft resolution F181 (II)/ recommending partition of Palestine into
two separate States - one Arab, one Jewish.
On 11 December 1948,the General Assembly adopted the Committee
1 draft resolution (document A/776 as amended). This resolution called
for establishment of a Conciliation Commission, and resolved that (1)
the Jerusalem area be placed under United Nationst control, (2) refugees
wishing to return to their homes be permitted to do so, and (3) compen-
sation for lost or damaged property be made by the authorities concerned.
A chronology of important events leading to the 11 December resolu-
tion follows, together with examples showing the part played by the
Soviet Union and its satellites in the creation of the State of Israel.
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I. THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 16 September -
29 November 1947
A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
1. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice
On Monday, 24 November 1947, the first draft resolution
contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Palestine Question" (document A/AC -14/ 32 and Add. 1) was voted
on and rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee. This resolution recommended
that the International Court of Justice be requested to give an advisory
opinion on vital legal questions involving the rights and fate of the
indigenous population of Palestine, and also on certain treaties and
covenants affecting these people.
a. The Arab Position
Believing that the International Court of Justice is
the only legal body qualified to give an opinion on vital legal questions
involving the fate of the whole population of a country, the Arab States'
delegates fought for adoption of the "First Draft Resolution". (pp. 173-175;
185-186; 194-195)
b. The Communist Position
The Soviet bloc delegates, knowing that adoption of
the resolution would end their well-planned scheme for partitioning
Palestine, insisted that the UN Assembly was qualified to render its
opinion on the Palestine controversy, and opposed the Arab States' desire
to have the legal aspects of the matter referred to world's highest tribunal-
the international Court of Justice (p. 184). The Communists refused to
support the resolution even after it had been stripped of its most pertinent
part, as will be noted below.
Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc
Committee on the Palestinian Question, Summate Records of Meetings,
25 September - 25 November. 1947
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c. The Communist Voting Record
(1) Paragraph 1 of this resolution's operative part,
up to and inclusive of sub-paragraph (g) was rejected by a majority of
eight votes, five of which were cast by Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR.
(2) Paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (h) of the resolution,
which is the last section of the operative part, was rejected by' only one
vote, with Byelorussian SSR, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR
voting against it, and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia abstaining.
d. The Outcome
Rejection of the operative part of the resolution auto-
matically killed the resolution and the hope of the Arabs for a favorable
decision by the International Court of Justice and for avoidance of further
unfavorable decisions in the future.
2. The Palestine Question, Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons
On Monday, 24 November 1947, the second draft resolution
contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestinian Question" (document A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) received a tie
vote and therefore was not adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee. This
resolution contained important recommendations affecting Jewish refugees
and displaced persons in Europe, and their rehabilitation, and also affecting
the fate of Palestine and its people. It contained three paragraphs recom-
mending that (1) countries of origin be requested to take back Jewish
refugees and displaced persons belonging to them,. (2) Jewish refugees
and displaced persons who could not be repatriated should be absorbed into
the territories of Members of the United Nations in proportion to their
area, economic resources, per capita income and population, and (3) a
special Committee of the General Assembly should be set up to recommend
a plan for resettlement of Jewish refugees and displaced persons in their
respective territories.
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This second draft resolution was not adopted because
the Soviet Union and its satellites voted against each recommendation and
against the whole resolution, as modified by subsequent amendments.
a. The Arab Position
The Arab delegates fought desperately to have this
resolution adopted, since by it resettlement of Jewish displaced persons
and refugees in countries other than Palestine would be facilitated and
the danger of their threatening influx on Palestine would thus be stemmed.
(pp.75; 87-9; 92-4; 100-101; 195)
b. The Communist Position
The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, did not think that
increased Jewish emigration to Palestine would be harmful. and that
Palestine could absorb large numbers of Jewish. refugees and displaced
persons. (pp. 42-3; 70)
c. The Communist Voting Record
(1) The first recommendation of this resolution was
adopted by roll call vote of 17-14,with 23 abstentions. The Ukrainian SSR
and the USSR voted against, and Byelorussian SSR; Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia abstained.
(2) The second recommendation was adopted by a roll
call vote of 18-16, with 21 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against; Yugoslavia abstained.
(3) The third recommendation. was not adopted, having
been voted down 18-15, with 22 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Poland,
Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
abstained.
(4) The first paragraph of the preamble to the second
draft resolution was adopted by show-of-hands vote, 20-10. (No record
on show-of-hands voting is available to ascertain how the Soviet bloc voted.)
(5) The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted
by show-of-hands vote of 17-15.
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(6) The third paragraph of the preamble was rejected
by show-of-hands vote, 18-15.
(7)
The fourth paragraph was :rejected by show-of-hands
vote, 17-15.
(8)
The fifth paragraph was adopted by show-of-hands
vote, 18 -15.
(9)
The sixth paragraph was rejected by roll call vote,
26-11, with 18 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against, and Yugoslavia abstained.
c. The Outcome
The second draft resolution, as amended by rejections,
received a tie vote, 16-16, with 23 abstentions, and was therefore not
'adopted. Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted against,
and Czechsolovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia (having been assured of the
rejection of the resolution) abstained.
3. Establishment of a Unitary State
On Monday, 24 November 1947, the third draft resolution,
contained in "Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question" (document A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) was rejected by
the Ad Hoc Committee. The chief recommendation of this resolution
was formation of a provisional representative government in Palestine
and establishment'therein of a unitary, sovereign state which would have
a democratic constitution, with an elected legislature and an executive
responsible to it.
a. The Arab Position
The Arab States delegates pinned their hopes on this
/resolution. If adopted, it would fulfill their dreams and crown with success
their efforts to save Palestine undivided. They gave it their whole support.
(pp. 10-11; 25; 31; 48; 90; 95)
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b. The Communist Position
From the outset, the Soviet bloc insisted on the Jewst
right to Palestine. Delegates expressed the opinion that, under prevailing
conditions, it would be impossible to get Arabs and Jews to live peaceably
together in a single unitary state. (pp. 41; 69; 184)
c. The Communist Voting Record
The third draft resolution was voted down 29-12, with
14 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian
SSR, and the USSR voted against, and Yugoslavia abstained.
d. The Outcome
With 12 votes for, and 29 against, and with the Communist
bloc having voted against the first two draft resolutions, they clinched the
matter by voting against the third draft resolution. It was on this resolu-
tion that the Arab States counted in order to stern the tide of Zionism
already beating against the shores of Palestine. The rejection left the
door wide open for voting on the only remaining alternative- -the plan of
partition.
4. The Partition Plan
On Tuesday, 25 November 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee
climaxed and ended its deliberations on the Palestine question by adopting
the draft resolution and partition plan contained in "Report of Sub-Committee
1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question" (document A/AC
14/34 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1 as amended). This resolution recommended
the adoption and implementation of the "Plan of :Partition with Economic
Union" as defined in the remainder of the report, and as amended.
a. The Arab Position
Throughout the deliberations the Arab States' delegates
had fought! desperately against adoption of this resolution. They warned
that its adoption would- create an endless problem in Palestine and the
Arab World; and to all the world they declared that creation of a Jewish
State would create a wave of anti-Semitism which would harm Jewish
populations everywhere. (pp. 75; 81-2; 102; 104; 107; 18; 194-5)
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b. The Communist Position.
The Communists, on the other hand, argued that the
Jews were entitled to part of Palestine, that Partition was the only
possible solution to Arab-Jewish strife, and that Palestine was large
enough to absorb large numbers of the Jewish refugees. Their stand
on partition was a logical sequence of statements defending the right
of Jews to Palestine and consistent with their voting record in favor
of partition and against any other solution.
c. The Communist Voting Record
The partition resolution was adopted by roll call vote,
25-13, with 17 abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR voted for, and Yugoslavia abstained.
d. The Outcome
Adoption by the Ad Hoc Committee of the partition
resolution paved the way for its adoption at the plenary meeting of
the General Assembly, 29 November 1947.
B. SOVIET RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS
1. The Partition Plan
On Saturday, 29 November 1947, at the 128th Plenary
meeting, the General Assembly adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee (document A/516). In this report the Ad Hoc Committee recom-
mended to the General Assembly adoption of its draft resolution / 18.1(II)/
on the future government of Palestine, which embodied a plan of partition
with economic union.
a. The Arab Position
The Arabs stood pat on their previous assertions, empha-
sizing that. they would not recognize the resolution if adopted, and would
not be responsible for any consequent developments.
Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary
Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 16 September -
29 November, Volume II, 110th - 128th Meetings, 13 November
29 November 1947.
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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE
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SUMMARY
At the request of the delegate from the United Kingdom, the
Palestine question was brought before the United Nations for official
consideration during the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
which convened 28 April 1947.
From that date until 11 December 1948, the General Assembly,
after lengthy deliberation, passed several far-reaching resolutions
affecting Palestine, its people, and its future. Chief among these
resolutions was the Plan of Partition, passed by the Assembly
29 November 1947.
Deliberations in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and
in the various committees revolved around three basic alternative pro-
posals:
1. To create an independent unitary state in Palestine.
2. To partition Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish
and one Arab.
3. To create a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, pending a
final settlement mutually determined by and acceptable to
both Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine.
During the deliberations, the initiative was taken and held by Com-
munist delegates from the USSR andPoland who assumed the task of
influencing the Assembly to adopt resolutions the Communist bloc
sponsored.
On major issues the Communist position was directly opposite
to that of the Arab States. Whereas the Arab States wanted the Assembly
to pass a resolution for creation of an independent unitary state in
Palestine, the Communists championed passage of the Partition Plan;
and whereas the Arab States favored studying the trusteeship proposal
submitted by the United States during the Second Special Session, the
Communists raised vehement objections, allegedly because the proposal
would nullify the Partition Plan.
The records of the United Nations reveal beyond any doubt that
the Communist delegates were responsible for (1) passage of the
Partition Plan, (2) defeat of the various Arab States' proposals on the
Palestine question, (3) defeat of the US proposal to create a temporary
trusteeship, (4) survival of the Partition Plan during the Second Special
Session, and (5) present conditions in Palestine and consequent insta-
bility throughout the Arab East.
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b. The Communist Position
Unchanged.
c. The Communist Voting Record
The partition resolution was adopted 33-13, with 10
abstentions. Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR,
and the USSR voted for; Yugoslavia abstained.
d. The Outcome
Triumph for the Soviet bloc; shattered hopes for the
Arabs; confusion rampant in Palestine. A second Special Session for
further consideration of the future government of Palestine was therefore
obligatory.
II. THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
16 April - 14 May 1948
BACKGROUND
As a result of the refusal of the Arab States to recognize the
29 November 1947 Partition Plan, and the subsequent deterioration of
the situation in Palestine, the US Government representative on the
Security Council, at the 275th meeting of the Council, on 30 March 1948,
submitted a draft resolution (S/705) requesting the Secretary-General
"to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further
the question of the future government of Palestine." This resolution was
adopted by nine votes, Ukrainian SSR and the USSR abstaining. Although
the Communist delegates on the Security Council abstained, the statement
made by the Soviet representative, Mr. Gromyko, following the submission
of the US draft resolution, showed that the Communists had opposed the
resolution and reconsideration of the Partition Plan of 29 November 1947.
Mr. Gromyko stated that the General Assemblyrs decision in favor of
partition of Palestine was equitable, and that the: USSR delegation saw
no reason for convening a special session of the General Assembly.
Thus, in accordance with the Security Council decision of 30 March,
the General Assembly opened its second special session, 16 April 1948.
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A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE
No votes were taken by roll call throughout the 117th-141st meet-
ings; therefore no record is available to show how the Communist bloc
representatives voted. However, in statements made by these representa-
tives concerning the alternative plans of partition and trusteeship, their
hostility toward the Arabs, their utter disregard for the rights and fate
of the indigenous population, and their obvious pro-Jewish sympathies
were all plainly indicated.
1. The Trusteeship Proposal
On Tuesday, 20 April 1948, during the 118th meeting of
the First Committee, Mr. Warren Austin (US), reviewed the course of
events since passage of the partition resolution in the General Assembly
and stressed the necessity of a workable solution for the Palestine question.
He then circulated, for consideration by the First Committee, a working
paper (document A/C 1/277) embodying a draft trusteeship plan for
Palestine. In presenting this working paper, Mr. Austin stated that the
trusteeship proposed by the US delegation was "an emergency measure to
ensure public order and the maintenance of public services, " and that the
"trusteeship would be entirely without prejudice to the rights, claims. or
positions of the parties or to the character of the eventual settlement. " (p. 97)
The plan, as defined in the United. States' working paper,
(document A/C 1/277) proposed establishment of a trusteeship leading
to self-government under UN administration, and guaranteed the territorial
integrity of Palestine until such time as it would reach the self-governing
stage.
------------------------------------------
Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume II, Main Committees, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April -
14 May 1948
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The Arab Position
The Arab representatives felt that the US working
nerited consideration, and that trusteeship was much better than parti?-
don. Their position was well defined by Syria's elder state sm-7.
(houri, who on Wednesday, 21 April. 1948, at the beginning ci the
,_;e`ting, endorsed consideration of the trusteeship working paper by
-hat "the new proposal put forward by the United. States in the form of
=iorking paper (document A/C 1/277) required study", and that "they
.ie UN delegates) should be grateful to the United States for prepar
working paper to facilitate this task. " (pp. 25-6)
b. The Communist Position
On Tuesday, 20 April 1948., at the beginning of the 119th
meeting, Mr. Gromyko (USSR), as senior Communist representative and
spokesman for his group, launched a severe attack against the US working
paper and any attempts to nullify the partition. He opened his attack by
asserting that he (Gromyko) "shared the anxiety felt by some representatives
by reason of the fact that the partition had not been parried out, that the
Palestinian question was being brought before the General Assembly for
the third time and that one Government (the US) was putting forth proposals
which had the effect of nullifying the General Assembly's decision, and
further, promoted neither the interests of the people of Palestine nor the
maintenance of international peace." Mr. Gromyko ended his long-winded'
speech by stating:
"The USSR delegation would therefore vote against
the new United States proposal for the establishment of
trusteeship in Palestine. "
"The USSR delegation considered that the decision
on the partition of Palestine was a just decision and that
the United Nations should take effective measures to
ensure its implementation. " (pp. 17 and 20)
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c. The Outcome
On Wednesday, 21 April. 1948, Mr. Jessup, (US) in
stressing the urgency of the problem before the First Committee and the
need for haste in finding a solution, stated that "the draft trusteeship
agreement, (document A/C 1/277) submitted by his delegation, contained
a number of technical questions which ought properly to be considered
by the Fourth Committee. " He added that "the United States delegation
had circulated a draft resolution (document A/C 1/278) proposing that
the draft trusteeship agreement be referred to the Fourth Committee
for study and report to the General Assembly." (pp. 26-7)
Following Mr. Jessup's statement, Messrs. Katz-Suchy
(Poland), Tarasenko (Ukrainian SSR), Gromyko (USSR), Kaminsky
(Byelorussian SSR), Vilfan (Yugoslavia), Houdek (Czechoslovakia), and
Panyushkin (USSR), respectively, assailed the trusteeship proposal and
Mr. Jessup's suggestion that it be considered by the Fourth Committee.
In their individual and repeated statements throughout the deliberations,
they made it clear to all concerned that they (the Communist representa-
tives) would not accept any proposal at any time which would modify the
Partition Plan of 29 November 1947.
Thus, as result of the adamant position maintained by
the:.Communist representatives concerning the US working paper (document
A/C 1/277) the trusteeship question was killed without a vote, by the
introduction of watered-down amendments and by passage on 4 May of
the Cuban Amendment (document A/C 1/290) to the draft resolution of
Guatemala as amended. This amended resolution called for the appoint-
ment of a sub-committee composed of the officers of Committee 1 together
with representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Guatemala,
France, India, the USSR, and the US to formulate and report to the
Committee a proposal for a provisional regime for Palestine, taking into
account: (a) whether it is likely that such proposal will commend itself
to the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, (b) whether it is possible
to implement this proposal and make it workable, and (c) the approximate
cost of such proposal.
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4
4
B. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS
NOTE: The trusteeship plan was not deliberated in the plenary meetings,
since the vote on it was blocked in the First Committee.
III. THE THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 21 September -
12 December 1948
RECAPITULATION
Three main proposals were deliberated during the third session of
the General Assembly. These were: (1) the USSR draft resolution request-
ing that all troops of Arab States be withdrawn from Palestine, (2) the
Syrian draft resolution recommending that a special committee be set up
to prepare proposals for establishment of a unitary state in Palestine on
a canton or federal basis, and (3) the new Syrian draft resolution requesting
the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on certain
legal points affecting the fate of Palestine and its people. None of these
resolutions, however, were passed by the Committee. As a result of
their rejection, the First Committee submitted its report (document A/776)
on the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine. This
report of the First Committee contained a resolution calling for establishment
of a Conciliation Commission for Palestine with certain definite functions,
and responsibility for specific decisions concerning the Holy Places and
refugees. This report was debated in the plenary meetings of the General
Assembly and was adopted on 11 December 1948 by a majority of 35-15,
with 8 abstentions.
Although representatives of both the Arab and Communist blocs
voted against the draft resolution, as amended, (document A/776), UN
records, shown below in chronological sequence, reveal that both sides
held diametrically opposite views on this and other resolutions deliberated
in the preceding First Committee and Plenary meetings.
Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records
of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948
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A. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE
1. Palestine and Removal of Arab Troops
On Thursday, 25 November 1948, during the 212th meet-
ing, Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR) submitted a resolution (document A/C 1/401)
recommending "the immediate removal from the territories of the Jewish
and Arab States in Palestine, the creation of which was provided for by
General Assembly resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947, of all foreign
troops and foreign military personnel."
Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I,
First Committee, Summary Records of the Meetings, 21 September -
8 December 1948
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b. The Arab Position
The Arab States' delegates claimed that Arab troops
were in Palestine at the invitation of the Arabs living there, to defend
the land and people from invasion. They further stated that the real
foreign troops were those fighting on the side of the Jews, who were
neither natives nor legal residents of Palestine. They opposed the Com-
munist resolution, believing that the subject could best be resolved in
the Security Council.
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Saturday, 4 December, after hearing the Communist
charges and the Arab rebuttal, the Committee rejected the resolution by
a vote of 33-7, with 8 abstentions. Seven of the eight votes for the resolu-
tion were cast respectively by Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Yugoslavia.
d. The Outcome
The rejection of the USSR resolution (document A/C 1/401)
was followed by a vote on the Syrian resolution (document A/C 1/402) calling
for the creation of a unitary State in Palestine.
2. Palestine and the Creation of a Modified Unitary State
On Friday, 26 November 1948, during the 214th meeting,
Mr. Faris El-Khouri (Syria) submitted a draft resolution (document A/C
1/402) embodying the following:
"The General Assembly,
"Decides to constitute a Commission composed of
five member states with functions:
"To study on the spot and to prepare proposals for
the establishment of a single state of the whole of
Palestine on a cantonization or'federal basis in which
all sections of population in Palestine will participate
in rights and duties as loyal citizens of a democratic
state with wide autonomous privileges in cantons or
areas to be assigned to each of them."
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in. submitting draft resolution A/C 1/402, Mr. El-Khoury
(Syria) expressed the Arab view:
. . the proposals under discussion were far
from winning the support of the Arabs in Palestine
as in the Middle East. Consequently, those proposals
could not ensure peace and security in the Middle
East. The partition policy of the Assembly had initi-
ated the disasters there and there was no hope of
changing the situation if the same policy were con-
tinued. In the present circumstances the Arabs
could not accept the recommendations before the
Assembly.
"Even if the Assembly were to adopt a resolu-
tion along the lines proposed, the question of its
implementation arose. Such a decision would have
to be forced upon the-Arabs and the Assembly was
not competent to make cnnnulsory recommenclations."
"This proposal would assure that all minority
rights would be confirmed. The division into cantons
enjoying a large measure of autonomy would provide
for local administration by the people in accordance
with their own interests. "
"The Syrian proposal would ensure the seeiirity
of the Holy Places by placing them under the adminis-
tration of those who would respect them. Moslem,
Christian and Jew could be sure of access to them
under a cantonal or federal regime, Under this
plan, too, the Arab refugees would have the neces-
sary assurances if they were to return to their
homes.. Thus the Palestine problem could he solved
without any difficulties or dangers, either in the
present or in the future. " (pp. 781-2; 26 November
1-948)
b. The Communist Position
The Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) was
a great concession by the Arabs in their attempt to solve the Palestine
question. But the Communist delegates knew that its adoption would
quash their plans, upsetting their calculated scheme to create an ever-
smoldering inferno in Palestine which would render the whole Arab East
a prey to Communism. The Communist delegates therefore opposed the
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resolution, stating that its adoption would nullify the Partition Plan.
Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR) led the attack on the Syrian draft resolution,
declaring:
"As to the Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/402) it
would put the Assembly right back in the position in
which it had been before the adoption of the November
resolution. It was well known that the Assembly,
during its first special session had considered at
length the proposal for a unitary State and had rejected
it as impracticable, There was no reason to re-examine
the proposal, and the Committee could not possibly
entertain such a suggestion in view of the fact that
the Jewish State had come into being in conformity
with the Partition Plan, and could not be liquidated. "
(p. 820; 30 November 1948)
The other Communist delegates to a man agreed with
Tsarapkin's stated views and one by one asserted that the Syrian draft
resolution was not acceptable.
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Saturday, 4 December 1948, the Syrian draft resolu-
tion (document A/C 1/402) was rejected by vote of.26-14, with 8 absten-
tions. The Communist bloc - Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia - voted solidly against the resolution,
as was expected.
d. The Outcome
Rejection of the Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402)
by the First Committee led to a vote on the same :resolution,as amended by
el Salvador, (document A/C 1/405) recommending that the International
Court of Justice review and give an opinion on certain legal questions
pertaining to the status quo in Palestine.
3. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice
On Wednesday, 1 December 1948, Mr. Faris E1-Khouri
(Syria) submitted a draft resolution (document A/C 1/405) requesting the
International Court of Justice, under Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter
IV of its Statute, to give legal opinion (1) on the power of the Assembly,
under the Charter, to partition Palestine in order to create within its
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borders a sovereign Jewish State against the wishes of the majority of
the Palestine population, and (2) on the international status of Palestine
upon the termination of the Mandate on 15 May 1948. The resolution
further stipulated that the Secretary-General would supply the Court
with documents pertinent to this matter, and that the parties concerned,
Arabs and Jews, might submit to the Court, through the Secretary-General,
the representations they deemed necessary in order to clarify the question.
a. The Arab Position
This resolution followed a lengthy statement by
Mr. Eban (Provisional Government of Israel) to the effect that the State
of Israel claimed full rights over the entire territory assigned to it under
the resolution of 29 November, and that the territories seized by Israeli
forces, in addition to those claimed by the Partition Plan, were "a fit
matter for negotiations, in which the various claims of the State of
Israel should receive due consideration." (p. 832; 1 December 1948)
In submitting this resolution, Mr. El-Khouri (Syria)
declared:
"The Arabs would never yield to any proposal to
lay down the boundaries of a separate Jewish State.
The General Assembly had no power to delimit the
frontiers of any country whatsoever without the consent
of the inhabitants. Therefore, it could not do so with-
out exceeding its powers.
"The Syrian delegation had submitted a proposal
noting that the General Assembly was not 'competent
under the Charter to divide States'. If any of the
delegations had doubts on the question, the General
Assembly should seek an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice as suggested in the
new Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/405)." (p. 833;
1 December 1948)
The Arab delegates had been hopeful that the First Com-
mittee would pass the Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/402) direct-
ing the preparation of proposals for establishment of a unitary State in
Palestine. But that resolution met with solid opposition from the Com-
munist bloc, causing the Arab delegates to submit draft resolution A/C 1/405,
in case their first draft resolution was not adopted. They felt that this
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resolution would very likely be adopted, inasmuch as during an earlier
session of the General Assembly, twenty delegations had voted in favor
of consulting the International Court of Justice, and six members of the
Security Council had subsequently voted the same way.
b. The Communist Position
None of the Communist delegations, apparently, thought
it necessary to repeat their already stated, negative views concerning
the new Syrian draft resolution (document A/C 1/405). Instead, they
concentrated on defending the USSR draft resolution (document A/C 1/401)
calling for removal of all foreign (i.e. Arab) troops from Palestine.
c. The Communist Voting Record
Having disposed of all other outstanding resolutions,
the First Committee, on Saturday, 4 December 1.948, by tie vote of 21-21,
with 4 abstentions, rejected the Syrian draft resolution as amended by
El Salvador. . The Communist bloc voted solidly against this resolution.
d. The Outcome
Following its rejection "Mr. El-Khouri (Syria) stated
that he reserved the right to re-submit his resolution concerning consulta-
tion of the International Court to the General Assembly and have it voted
upon again." (p. 933; 4 December 1948) With the rejection of the USSR
draft resolution (document A/C 1/401), and the two Syrian draft resolutions
(documents A/C 1/402 and A/C 1/405 as amended) the First Committee
ended its deliberations on the Palestine question and forwarded its report
to the General Assembly (document A/776) for consideration.
B. COMMUNIST RECORD IN THE PLENARY MEETINGS
1. The Conciliation Commission
On Saturday, 11 December 1948, during the 184th meeting,
Mr. Sarper (Turkey) Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Com-
mittee on the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I,
Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings,
21 September - 12 December 1948
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and the accompanying resolution.
The resolution included in this report (1) called for estab-
lishment of a Conciliation Commission having certain definite functions;
(2) resolved that the Holy Places in the Jerusalem area and elsewhere
in Palestine be accorded adequate protection; (3) resolved that the Jeru-
salem area "should be placed under effective United Nations' control";
(4) resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes be permitted
to do so, and that compensation should be paid (a.) for the property of
those choosing not to return, and (b) for "the loss or damage to property
which under principles of international law or in equity, should be made
good by the Governments or authorities responsible. "
S _ meetinc's A T,h ri talc. rrn i-ne i,
,eatedly emphasized that they opposed any resolution or action which
knight support implementation of the Partition Pit tl,r.i
vote would suffice,
b. The Communist Position
The Communist bloc representatives opposed the adoption
of the resolution not because they shared the Arabs' views but because they
believed that it modified the Partition Plan, and, :presumably, because the
Assembly rejected the Polish proposal (document A/804). Adoption of
this proposal would have increased the membership of the Conciliation
Commission from three to five, and would have enabled the Communists
to plant two of their agent-representatives on the Commission.
Messrs. Zebrowski (Poland) Houdek, (Czechoslovakia), and.
Vyshinsky (USSR) consumed almost the entire time allotted for deliberation
of this resolution in asserting their belief that only by adhering to the pro-
visions of the Partiton Plan of 29 November would an equitable solution
for the Palestine question be possible. However, Mr. Vyshinsky, in
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attacking the report of the First Committee revealed the true cause for
his opposition when he stated:
"The resolution before the Assembly provided for
a conciliation commission composed of three member
states. In the First Committee the USSR delegation
had stated that it was not opposed in principle to such
a commission. But the commission should consist of
more than three members; five might be a better num-
ber, 'because less pressure could be brought to bear
on a commission composed of a larger number of
members; a membership of five would be more likely
to achieve greater objectivity. It would be an advan-
tage if the principle of geographical distribution were
applied in the selection of members. That was
another argument in favor of a membership of five
rather than three. The USSR delegation was not,
therefore, in favor of such a small number. A
larger membership would be more desirable in order
that the commission might really be a conciliation
commission and be enabled to extend its conciliatory
efforts to all aspects of the matter, including the
General Assembly's resolution (i. e. the partition
resolution).
"The commission should consist of representa-
tives of states which were not prejudiced against
that resolution (i. e. the partition resolution). To
appoint representatives of states which were hostile
to it from the outset would complicate the situation
and indefinitely postpone as final settlement from the
point of view of everyone, and particularly that of
the Arabs and Jews." (p. 987; 11 December 1948)
c. The Communist Voting Record
On Saturday, 11 December 1948, during the 186th Plenary
meeting, the General Assembly adopted Committee 1 draft resolution
(A/776 as amended) by vote of 35--15, with 8 abstentions. Both Communist
and Arab Statest blocs voted against the resolution, but, as stated before,
for different reasons, but not because of mutual support.
d. The Outcome
Adoption of this resolution, which the Communists thought
compromised the partition resolution, gave the UN authority to establish
the Conciliation Commission. It also gave to the Arab States and to the
Arabs of Palestine a favorable decision on the basis of which they could
demand(1) compensation for Arab property seized by the Jews, (2) that
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refugees wishing to return to their homes in the new Jewish state be per-
mitted to do so, and (3) that Holy places under Jewish control, such as
those in Nazareth, be accorded adequate protection.
SECTION THREE: REVIEW AND CONCLUSION
I. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
This chapter is devoted to reviewing the most important actions
taken in the United Nations General Assembly, and to analyzing the
position adopted by the Communists on the Palestine question from
28 April 1947 to 11 December 1948.
A. SUMMARY REVIEW OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
From 28 April 1947 to 11 December 1948 the General Assembly
of the United Nations deliberated the Palestine question and the recommenda-
tions and proposals pertaining to it. Several far-reaching resolutions
were passed, affecting Palestine, its people, and. its future. Much the
most important of these resolutions was the one passed on 29 November
1947, recommending that Palestine be partitioned into two sovereign states.
The following is a tabulation of the most important items and
proposals concerning the Palestine question on which action has been taken
by the .General Assembly. The tabulation also shows the positions adopted
by the Communist and Arab blocs:
1. Inclusion of the following additional item in the agenda of
the First Special Session of the General Assembly: "The termina-
tion of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its inde -
pendence."
voted for it in both the General (';nmm*ttee and in t1i,-
.'lenary meetings of the First Special Session-
b. The Communist bloc declared opposition to the inclu-
sion in the General Committee, but abstained from
voting. In the Plenary meetings of the First Special
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Session the Communist bloc failed to voice its
opinion, but, when voting, some of its members
voted for the inclusion and some abstained.
2. Invitation to the representative of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine to testify before the Assembly on the question of
Palestine.
a. The Arab bloc was against this Communist-sponsored
proposal. Accordingly, it opposed and voted against
it in the General Committee and in the Plenary meet-
ing of the First Special Session.
b. The Communist bloc, supported the invitation in the
General Committee and the Plenary meetings of the
First Special Session, voting for it in both the General
Committee and in the Plenary meetings.
3. Reference of the Palestine question to the International Court
of Justice for an opinion on vital legal questions affecting Palestine
and its people.
a. The Arab bloc sponsored this proposal and voted for
it in the Ad Hoc Committee in the Second Session; in
the First Committee, a" in the Third Session.
b. The Communist bloc opposed the proposal, and accord-
ingly voted against it in the Ad Hoc Committee during
the Second Session, and in the First Committee during
the Third Session.
4. Restriction of immigration of Jewish refugees and displaced
persons to Palestine and proportionate resettlement of the majority
of these groups throughout the world.
a. The Arab bloc approved the proposal, voting for it
in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second Session.
b. The Communist bloc was against the resolution as a
whole, and, accordingly, withheld support when most
of its members, principally the USSR;, voted against it,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia abstained.
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5. Establishment of a unitary or federated State in Palestine.
a. The Arab bloc favored this proposal, and voted for it
in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second Session,
and in the First Committee during the Third Session.
b. The Communist bloc opposed this proposal and accordingly
voted against it in the Ad Hoc Committee during the Second
Session and in the First Committee during the Third Session.
6. Partitioning of Palestine
a. The Arab bloc opposed this resolution, voting against
it in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the Plenary meeting,
during the Second Session.
b. The Communist bloc favored partition and, with the
exception of Yugoslavia which abstained, voted for
it in the Ad Hoc Committee. and in the Plenary meeting
during the Second Session.
7, Establishment of a temporary trusteeship over Palestine.
a. ; The Arab bloc was not opposed to studying the proposal.
No vote was taken on the subject, however.
b. The Communist bloc was opposed to the proposal even
to studying it. However, no vote was taken.
8. Removal of Arab troops from Palestine.
a. The Arab bloc was opposed to this Communist-sponsored
proposal, and, accordingly, voted against it in the First
Committee during 'the Third Session.
b. The Communist bloc, sponsor of and driving force behind
the proposal, voted for it in the First Committee, during
the Third Session.
9. Establishment of a Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
a. The Arab bloc opposed creation of a Conciliation Com-
mission, on the ground that it partly facilitated imple-
mentation of the Partition Plan. Accordingly, they
voted against the proposal in the Plenary meeting during
the Third Session.
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b. The Communist bloc also opposed creation of a Concilia-
tion Commission. Its opposition was based on the
belief that a commission would modify the Partition
Plan, and, apparently, because membership on the
commission was not increased to the number desired
by the Communist bloc. Accordingly the Communist
bloc voted against creation of the Conciliation Commission.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC ON
PALESTINE
Communist representatives in the General Assembly plainly
manifested their adherence to their adopted principle that the end justifies
the means. Throughout the most important part of the deliberations on
Palestine, Communist representatives maintained a consistent, well-
contrived policy aimed at certain definite objectives, and took deliberate
steps, ingeniously and carefully calculated, toward achieving these objectives.
1. Declared Communist Objectives Before and During the
Deliberations
The declared objectives of the Communists on Palestine,
before and after the question was brought before the United Nations, varied
scarcely at all. Before the question was considered by the United Nations,
Communist mouthpieces in Moscow and throughout the Arab World loudly
proclaimed that they had no personal ambitions in. Palestine whatsoever,
that their sole objective in that area was to bring about the realization of
the national aspirations of the people of Palestine through termination of
the Mandate over Palestine and declaration of its independence. During
the deliberations, Communist representatives in the General Assembly
reiterated their comrades r past views on Palestine with scarcely perceptible
modification. Instead of using the words "people", and "population" they
used "peoples" and "populations". This seemingly slight modification,
apparently harmless on the surface, was in itself a very significant one,
since 'it signaled a departure from the often declared Communist Ago
objective to a new and radical one. The change from the singular to the
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plural revealed that the Communists no longer maintained their stated
objective, and that their newly adopted twin objectives (the creation of
two independent States in Palestine) allegedly stemmed from their recent
discovery that two separate peoples inhabit Palestine, and that consequently
these two peoples form two separate nations, each of which is entitled to
separate independence.
2. or Steps by the Communists to Achieve their Objectives
The first step by the Communists toward achieving their
objectives in Palestine was to install themselves as arbiters of the
Palestine question. This they achieved by placing on the record state-
ments to the effect that the Communists had always stood for the ful-
fillment of national aspirations of all peoples, and that only in this light
would they discuss the Palestine question.
The second step was to prevent inclusion of the Arab-
sponsored item ("the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the
declaration of its independence") in the agenda of the First Special Session
of the General Assembly, without giving the impression that the Communists
were opposed to the substance of the item, since such an impression would
harm reputation, arrogated to themselves, as champions of independence
for all nations and peoples. In this they succeeded magnificiently. In
their arguments before the General Committee, they made it clear to all
concerned that they were opposed only to the inclusion of the Arab proposed
item in the agenda of the First Special Session, and that exception had not
been taken to substance of the item. In the Plenary meetings when the
substance of the item was under discussion, they refrained from expressing
their opinion on the issue, choosing to split their vote by having some support
the already doomed item, and some abstain. This they did after having
declared a few days earlier in the General Committee that they were
experiencing great difficulty in reaching a decision, and that, therefore,
they could not vote for inclusion of this additional item at that special
session of the General Assembly.
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The third step was to create confusion in the General
Assembly and thus prevent it from taking decisions which might obstruct
or hinder the achievement of Communist objectives. This day did vehemently
opposing adoption of any solution concerning Palestine prior to hearing the
views of the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the
Palestinian question. From the start they kept on hammering out their
point until a favorable decision was given them.
The fourth step was (1) to define for Assembly members
the national aspirations of the people of Palestine! and how such aspirations
might be fulfilled, and (2) to convince the majority of the members that the
Communist point of view on Palestine was unchallengeable. This they
achieved by haranguing the Assembly members with trick arguments,
such as freedom from British imperialism was the main aspiration of
the peoples of Palestine, that such an aspiration might be fulfilled by
abolishing the Mandate and granting national independence to the Arab and
Jewish peoples, that these peoples constitute two separate nationalities
each of which was entitled to its own state.
The fifth step was to beat down and suppress, by slander
or intimidation, any opposition to the Communist 'plans and point of view.
This they achieved by continuously reminding the Assembly of the persection
the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis, of the present plight of Jewish
refugees and displaced persons in Europe, and by stamping the Western
powers, as imperialists, with selfish, even fiendish ambitions for Palestine
and the Middle East.
The sixth step was so to contrive that the General Assembly
would adopt the Communist plan for Palestine or a solution similar to it.
This they achieved almost automatically, since after the successful execution
of the first five steps, all opposition to the Communist plan became weak
and non-effective.
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3. Survey of Communist Behavior in the General Assembly
An exhaustive examination of the official records of the
United Nations General Assembly, covering the period 28 April 1947 to
11 December 1948 - the period during which the most important decisions
on Palestine were taken - revealed that representatives of the Communist
bloc:
a. displayed unified total prejudice in favor of the Jewish
minority in Palestine, and of the Jewish position on
on the Palestine question,
b. paid only lip service in support of the aspirations of
the Arab majority, as defined. by the legal representa-
tives of this majority;
c. sponsored, and/or supported by votes every measure
favored by the Jews and their representatives;
d. opposed, and/or sabotaged every measure sponsored
and/or favored by the Arab majority or Arab representa-
tives in the United Nations;
e. opposed and sabotaged every compromise solution
proposed for the Palestine question, after the
Partition Plan had been hastily adopted on 29 November
1947.
II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
The findings and conclusion reached as result of the study of the
Palestine question are based on the records of the General Assembly, on
the Palestine question and other supporting evidence. They were arrived
at only after thorough examination of the United Nations records on Palestine,
of every recorded statement made by Communist representatives in the
General Assembly, and of all the votes cast by these representatives on
major proposals and draft resolutions.
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A. FINDINGS
The Communist representatives in the General Assembly, beyond
any doubt or question, exercised great influence in shaping the United
Nations decisions on Palestine during the deliberation of the Palestine
question.
The magnitude of the role played by Communist representatives
in the United Nations, and the effect of this role on the deliberations and
their outcome, can best be outlined by the question and answer method as
given below:
(1) Were the Communist representatives in the General Assembly
instrumental in shaping the United Nations policy on Palestine, and in passage
of the resolutions on Palestine?
The answer is Yes! Communist representatives in the General
Assembly were instrumental in shaping the United Nations policy on
Palestine, and in passage of the most important resolutions on
Palestine. The United Nations records of the historic deliberations
substantiate this answer.
(2) Would it have been possible to adopt the Partition Plan with-
out Communist initiative, support, and agitation?
The answer is No! Had the Communists only refrained from
taking the initiative in proposing the partitioning of Palestine, or
had they refrained from giving it their all-out support, and agitating
for its adoption, the Partition Plan would most likely never have been
debated at length and, in any case, would not have been adopted. The
Communists were the first to introduce discussion on the possibility
of partitioning Palestine in the Assembly, and were' the first to declare
that no solution other than partition should be worked out for Palestine.
Moreover, among the major and most interested Powers, they were
the only ones who (1) insisted that no decision on the Palestine question
should be taken prior to hearing the views of the Jews, who, according
to the Communists, were the most interested party, and (2) who fought
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relentlessly, throughout the deliberations, for partition of Palestine.
Furthermore, the Partition Plan would not have reached the Plenary
meetings of the General Assembly had the Communist bloc voted
in the Ad Hoc Committee on 24 November 1947 either in favor of
the report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine question, (which recommended that certain legal questions
pertaining to Palestine be referred to the International Court of
Justice for an advisory opinion) or against the draft resolution and
partition plan contained in the report of Sub-Committee 1 to the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question.
(3) Would it have been possible to grant Palestine independence
as a unitary State, had the Communists favored such a course of action
by the United Nations?
The answer is Yes! It would have been possible to grant
Palestine its independence as a unitary State, had the Communists
favored such a course of action. Moreover, such a course of action
would have been the natural outcome of the deliberations, had the
Communists but refrained from attacking such a course, from
championing partition, and from insisting that the United Nations,
in subsequent decisions, adhere strictly to the letter and spirit of
the 29 November 1947 partition plan. The :record shows that the
Arabs, who constituted the major portion of the population in
Palestine, wanted an independent unitary State, and were willing
to grant the Jewish minority its original demand for an autonomous
status. Moreover, the record indicates clearly that, during the
initial stage of the deliberations,, the majority of the UN representa-
tives in the General Assembly were inclined to hear the Arab view
on the subject, but were not prone to hear the Jewish argument.
This was manifested in the General Committee on 2 May 1947
when by vote of 8 -3, with three abstentions;, it rejected the Polish-
Czechoslovakian draft resolution inviting the representative of the
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Jewish Agency for Palestine to testify on the Palestine question,
and in the Plenary meeting of 5 May 1947, when the General
Assembly rejected the reintroduced Polish.-Czechoslovakian draft
resolution by vote of 39-8, with seven abstentions.
(4) Would it have been possible to place Palestine under a
temporary United Nations trusteeship, pending a final settlement to be
arrived at amicably between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, had the
Communists not vehemently opposed such an action, and any other action
that might alter or modify the 29 November 1947 resolution recommending
the partitioning of Palestine?
The answer again, is Yes! It would have been very possible
to place Palestine under a temporary United Nations trusteeship,
and thus avoid the partitioning, had the Communists in the General
Assembly been willing to compromise and to give this proposal a
chance during the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
which was convened in order to reexamine United Nations decisions
in the light of subsequent developments in Palestine, and to recom-
mend new measures aimed at restoring order in that war-torn
country. The records show that during this special session, senti-
ment toward the trusteeship proposal was favorable, even though
no direct action on it was taken. The records also show that
Communist bloc representatives, during the same session, by long-
winded speeches and repeated savage attacks on the trusteeship pro-
posal, managed to kill the proposal by blocking a vote.
(5) Did the Communist representatives in the General Assembly
consider the will of the majority in Palestine and the feelings of their Arab
and Moslem brethren throughout the world?
The answer is Yes l The Communists did consider the feelings
of those hundreds of millions of people, and reacted as only Communists
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can. With one exception, (Yugoslavia) they voted for a partition
plan to be carried out against the will of the majority in Palestine,
and saw to it that the United Nations did nothing to rectify the harm
it had done, by sabotaging the trusteeship proposal. As further
proof of the Communist attitude toward the will and aspirations of
the people, excerpts from a 21 February 1953 Reuters despatch
from Belgrade are given below:
"Disclosure that there were strong differences be-
tween Yugoslavia and Russia even before the Tito-Stalin
split in 1948 has been made by Dr. Ales Bebler, Yugo-
slav Deputy Foreign Minister and former permanent
delegate to the United Nations.
CPYRGHT
"According to Dr. Bebler's disclosures published
here, the first diplomatic differences arose over Trieste
in 1946, then over Palestine in 1947, and finally over the
Danube Conference in 1948. "
Also,
"The following year /1947/ came the trouble over
Palestine in which Yugoslavia, before the UN General
Assembly, advocated a Jewish Arab federation while
the Russians favored a purely Jewish state.
"Describing a conference of Iron Curtain dele-
gates at this time, Dr. Bebler recalls: 'When I
disagreed . . . with something proposed by the
Soviet delegate (Andrei Y. Vishinsky), one of his
secretaries . . , began to make signs to me with
his hands, tried to convey to me in every possible
way that he was trying to remind me of something
I was forgetting.'
"Later the secretary told Dr. Bebler he only
wanted to warn him not to oppose Mr. Vishinsky.
'He could not even imagine that anyone could dis-
agree with the chief,' Dr. Bebler adds.
"When Dr. Bebler later criticized the Soviet
Proposal on Palestine on the ground that it would
alienate the Arab-Moslem bloc he was told by
Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, Chief of the Ukrainian dele -
gation, that 'two Soviet divisions are a greater
revolutionary force than the whole of the Moslem
world,' Dr. Bebler recalls. Mr.- Manuilsky
added: 'The present is a time when only force
can decide'. "
B. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the position taken by representatives of the Communist
bloc in the United Nations, and of the circumstances under which the General
Assembly adopted its decisions on Palestine, reveals unquestionably, that
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the Communist bloc in the United Nations, led by the USSR, was responsible
for (1) passage of the Partition Plan, (2) defeat of the various proposals
by the Arab States and other proposed resolutions for Palestine, (3) defeat
of the US proposal to create a temporary trusteeship in Palestine, (4) the
consequent survival of the Partition Plan, and (5) the present situation
in Palestine,. and the state of insecurity now prevailing throughout the
Arab East.
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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE
EXAMPLES OF COMMUNIST BLOC STATEMENTS
SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT
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SECTION ONE: PALESTINE AND ITS FUTURE GOVERNMENT
I. THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
28 April - 15 May 1947
A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
GENERAL COMMITTEE
1. The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the
Declaration of its Independence
Mr. Jozef Winiewicz (Poland):
"The Polish delegation experiences great difficulty in
reaching a decision on the inclusion of the suggested item,
as formulated,, in our agenda, at the present stage of this
Assembly's deliberation. The difficulty arises out of the
fact that the Egyptian proposal, and others, suggest in a
most decisive form the termination of the Palestine man-
date, even before we have heard the opinion of the most
interested party, the Jewish people, for which the man-
date in Palestine provided special rights.
"We cannot, therefore, vote for the inclusion of
this additional item at this special session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations. We shall abstain from
voting, urging at the same time that this Committee should
take up as soon as possible the admission of a Jewish
representative body for consultation with this Assembly."
(pp. 16-17; 29 April 1947)
2. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly
Mr. Winiewicz (Poland):
"We have heard here in this General Committee, and
before the plenary session, speeches by the representatives
of countries, which are interested in this problem, the Arab
States. However, in our opinion, at the present stage of
international discussion you cannot divide the problem of
Palestine from the problem of the Jewish population. The
issue brought before this Assembly is the right of the Arab
countries to establish an independent Arab State. It has been
brought before us because of the many difficulties that have
arisen in settling the problem of the Jewish population of
that country.
"May I here mention that the Jewish population of
Palestine has been connected with the Palestine problem
since the mandate was established. As early as 1908
the Zionist Organization in Palestine embarked upon the
work of.practical colonization of that country and of its
development. The Palestine Office was founded in Jaffa
at that time and was the forerunner of the present Jewish
Agency in Palestine. For this reason we think the Jewish
population of Palestine also should be heard here.
Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume II, General Committee, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 29 April -
7 Max 1947
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"I owe you one explanation as to why this problem
is a major concern of the Polish delegation. That can
easily be explained by the fact that nearly fifty per, cent
of the Jewish population of Palestine speaks the Polish
language and has always shown keen interest in the fate
of the Polish people. We cannot forget them in their
distress." (p. 89; 2 May 1947)
"May I repeat, we of the Polish delegation cannot
imagine how this General Assembly could pass sound
judgement on this problem without hearing the views of
the representative Jewish body when preparing the terms
of reference for the committee' proposed by the United
Kingdom and now being discussed by the General Assembly."
(p. 90; 2 May 1947)
Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko (USSR):
"The Soviet delegation considers that the question
of inviting representatives of one or more Jewish organi-
zations deserves to be considered by the General Com-
mittee and the General Assembly. Up to the present,
many representatives, in discussing procedural questions,
have touched upon questions of substance concerning the
Palestine question and, to a certain extent, the question
of Palestine's future. We have also heard statements by
representatives of the Arab States, who, even in this
initial stage of consideration of the Palestine question,
submitted their views more or less fully. But neither
in the General Committee nor in the plenary meetings of
the General Assembly have we yet heard the voice of the
representatives of one or more of the Jewish organizations.
It well is known, however, that the question of Palestine is
largely a question of arrangements which are to be made
for the Jews, and that the Palestine question cannot fail
to be of interest and even of concern to the Jewish popu-
lation of Palestine.
"The Soviet delegation, therefore, is of the opinion
that it would be unjust to deprive the appropriate Jewish
organizations of the right to express through their repre-
sentatives, their views and their attitude to the Palestine
question. This would be equally incomprehensible both
to the Jews, including the Jews of Palestine, and to many
others, non-Jews. " (p. 109; 2 May 19417)
"When I speak of inviting the representatives of the
Jewish organizations, I have in mind primarily an invita-
tion to these representatives to attend the General Assembly,
that is, the plenary meetings. The Soviet delegation does
not accept the point of view that the representative of the
Jewish Agency can be permitted to be present, let us say,
at the First Committee but at the same time cannot be per-
mitted to attend the General Assembly's plenary meetings
where they would be given an opportunity of expressing
their views on this question. Such a half-hearted decision
would be especially unjust from the point of view of the
Jewish population in Palestine, which is vitally concerned
in this matter.
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"We heard the statements of the representative of
the United States of America, Senator Austin. He sub-
mitted a resolution to us which not only makes no pro-
vision for inviting the Jewish organizations to the
General Assembly's plenary meetings but does not pro-
vide for inviting representatives of the Jewish organi-
zations at all. The resolution merely states that
statements and documents received from Jewish and
other organizations should be transmitted to the appro-
priate Committee of the General Assembly. The trans-
mission of documents to the appropriate Committee is
practically a technical operation. Apart from this,
delegations have received at least the main statements
of organizations which have made requests. Therefore,
the solution offered by the resolution does not get us
much further; it does not constitute the slightest pro-
gress in any way.
"So far as the particular organizations which have
applied to the General Assembly are concerned, the
course of the discussion on this question has shown that
the Jewish Agency would seem to be a :representative
organization which can speak in the name of the Jewish
population of Palestine.
"If this is so, of course a positive decision can
and should be made on the statement of this Agency.
If there are any other Jewish organizations whose .
communications merit attention, the Soviet delegation
is ready to take part in the consideration of communica-
tions from such other organizations." (pp. 110-111;
2 May 1947)
Dr. Alfred Fiderkiewicz (Poland):
"I understand the difficulties which the representa-
tive of the United States is experiencing with regard to
our resolution. Nevertheless, the Polish delegation
does not see much possibility of solving the problem
before us and arriving at a decision on the resolution,
after due consideration by the Committee, without a
Jewish voice being heard before the Assembly.
"Sending the matter to the First Committee for
consideration would serve only to prolong the situation
for the present, and no one knows for how long. That
is why the Polish delegation regrets that it cannot
accept the proposal of the United States representative.
It will ask for a vote on the resolution previously sub-
mitted. " (p. 118; 2 May 1947)
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B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS
1. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine to Appear before the General Assembly
Dr. Alfred Fiderkiewicz (Poland):
"The Jews deserve the highest consideration. Let
us remember that there is no dispute between the Jews
and the Arabs. The problem is to solve the Palestine
issues for the Arabs and the Jews. We want to make
peace in that country. We want to have freedom. The
mandate should end.
"These are our reasons for desiring a full and
speedy discussion and an approach to the problem
from all angles in order to enable us to arrive at a
just solution. The Polish delegation regrets that it
must oppose the report of the General Committee;
it asks this Assembly to reverse the decision of the
General Committee /to refer to'the First Committee
for decision, all communications received from the
Jewish Agency and other organizations requesting
that they be permitted to express their views on the
Palestine question/ by voting in favor of the Polish
resolution" /which embodied a decision to invite
representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine
to appear before the plenary meeting of the General
Assembly to express their views on the Palestine
question. /
"I do not think there is any need for further
argument. On behalf of the welfare of Palestine
and its people, the Polish delegation asks the General
Assembly to vote in favor of its resolution as amended
by the Czechoslovak delegation. " (p. 71; 3 May 1947)
Mr. Andrei Gromyko (USSR):
"At yesterday's meeting of the General Committee,
I had an opportunity of expressing the Soviet delegation's
point of view on this matter. I also,pointed out that the
proposal to invite the representatives of the Jewish
organizations to attend the General Assembly deserved
attention. What, in fact, is the present position?
"The General Committee considered the agenda
for the General Assembly's present session, it con-
sidered the question of inviting the Jewish organizations
to the General Assembly. During the discussion of
these two questions, a number of delegations touched
upon the general problems of Palestine from various
important angles. This was especially so in the case
of the delegations of the Arab States. I am not
Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record,
28 April - 15 May 1947-
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reproaching any delegation at all, and least of all those
of the Arab States.
"The Palestine problem has become acute. It
concerns the Arab States, and has become the concern
not only of the Arab States; as you are aware, it has
become the concern of the United Nations as a whole.
It is not surprising, therefore, that, even during the
consideration of the agenda, certain delegations touched
upon some important aspects of the Palestine problem.
"I repeat, I am not about to reproach any delega-
tion; I merely state a fact. Up to the present, however,
we have not heard the voice of those organizations which
speak for a considerable part of the Jewish population
of Palestine. Not a single representative of any Jewish
organization speaking on behalf of the Jewish population
of Palestine has yet spoken before the General Committee
or the General Assembly. Can such a situation, even in
the present initial stage, be considered normal in the
discussion of the Palestine problem?
"The Soviet delegation maintains that such a situa-
tion cannot be considered normal. We cannot overlook --
still less can we ignore -- the fact that if the Palestine
problem has arrested the attention of the United Nations,
it primarily concerns and, furthermore, alarms the
Jewish population of Palestine.
"For this reason, in the interests of an objective
and-thorough consideration of the Palestine problem,
even in this first stage, it would be perfectly just to in-
vite representatives of the Jewish organization to give
expression to the point of view of the Jewish population
of Palestine. It would be unjust to deprive the Jewish
organizations, or organization, of the :rights to express
their views on this matter. " (p. 78; 3 May 1947)
"Consequently, it is not a question of the United
Nations Charter or of its infringement. In the demand
to give the Jewish organizations an opportunity to speak
at the General Assembly, there is no infringement. As
I see it, the talk about infringement of the Charter is out
of place. It is not'a question of prestige which may be
influenced by statements of the representatives of Jewish
organizations at the General Assembly; it is not a matter
of past practice. But the fact is that, if this question is
to be approached justly and objectively, the representatives
of the Jewish organizations to the, General Assembly should
be admitted and given an opportunity of setting forth their
views at the plenary session. (p. 80; 3 May 1947)
"If the General Assembly does not agree to give
the Jewish organizations an opportunity to speak at the
Assembly -- I-mean the plenary meetings of the Assembly --
in order to set forth the views of the Jewish organizations,
the latter, and naturally, in particular, the whole Jewish
population, and many others, may interpret and understand
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this to mean that the United Nations does not wish to
give due consideration to a considerable part of the
Palestine population. It would not be in the interests
of the General Assembly of the United Nations as a
whole if such an impression, or even such a conviction,
were to be created among the Jewish population, and
among others besides the Jewish population. (p. 81;
3 May 1947)
"Concerning the resolution which is under dis-
cussion at the present meeting of the General Assembly,
and which was adopted yesterday by the General Com-
mittee, I must state that in the view of the Soviet dele-
gation this resolution is unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory,
in the first place, because it does not provide for an oppor-
tunity for representatives of Jewish organizations to ex-
press their views at the plenary meeting of the General
Assembly.
"In the second place, it is entirely unsatisfactory
for the further reason that, in speaking of the First Com-
mittee as a possible place where representatives of Jewish
organizations can or might express their views on the
Palestine problem, the resolution completely omits to
say that the 'representatives of these organizations should
be invited. The resolution merely says that communica-
tions and documents received from Jewish organizations
should be referred to the First Committee, which would
take the necessary decisions. In other words, the resolu-
tion contains the General Assembly's recommendation
to refer documents from Jewish organizations to the
First Committee. I do not think I am :mistaken if I say
that such an operation as the reference of documents re-
ceived from the Jewish organizations, or organization,
to the First Committee is almost a technical operation
and does not advance us a single step towards.a definite
decision regarding an invitation to representatives of
these organizations, with a view to giving them an oppor-
tunity to express their opinion on the matter under dis-
cussion.
"In the event of the adoption of this resolution by
the General Assembly, the First Committee is not even
obliged to invite representatives of Jewish organization.
On the basis of this decision, the First Committee will
be obliged to do no more than receive communications
from Jewish organizations. It is clear that the Soviet
delegation, being concerned with a just solution of the
Palestine problem, could not support such a very general,
indefinite and entirely unsatisfactory resolution as that
adopted by the First Committee.
"The Soviet delegation, as in the General Committee,
will support the proposal, which we discussed yesterday
at the meeting of the General. Committee, to admit repre-
sentatives of Jewish organizations to the General Assembly,
to the plenary meeting, in order that they may be given an
opportunity to set forth their views on this question, which
has become, and is continuing to become, more and more
acute. (p. 82; 3 May 1947)
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Mr. Sava Kosanovic (Yugoslavia):
"The Yugoslav delegation believes that the General
Committee missed an opportunity in dealing with a prob-
lem which was not necessarily complicated, and which
had no political implications.
"That was the question of hearing before the General
Assembly those who, in every sense of the word, are
directly concerned with the solution of the Palestinian
problem, and without whose participation the terms of
reference for an investigating commission could not be
made explicit.
"Listening very carefully to all the speeches in
the General Committee, I was under the impression that
there was no difference in the expression of understanding
among us for those who were the first: victims of nazi
crime; but the rejection of the proposal of the Polish dele-
gation, amended by the Czechoslovak delegation, to give
an opportunity to the representatives of the Jewish Agency
for Palestine to expose their views before the General
Assembly, was a great disappointment, Not only was
that proposal rejected, but we have before us a resolution
proposed by the majority of the General Committee which
tries to solve a problem of principle with meaningless
technical expedience.
"The Yugoslav delegation feels that the safety of
this world parliament would not be threatened if we
decided to hear a representative of the Jewish organiza-
tion in the General Assembly. Such a hearing would have
a symbolic meaning. It would be symbolic in the sense
that we, the free, peace-loving peoples of the world, after
the victory over nazi ideologies, would be identifying
ourselves in understanding, in support, and in appreciation,
with those who were the first victims of the brutal nazi-
fascist ideology of race supremacy and discrimination,
with the first victims of gas chambers and concentration
camps.
"We have before us a principle much more important
than the problem of procedure. That is why, the Yugoslav
delegation is whole-heartedly in accord with the Polish
resolution, as amended by the Czechoslovak representa-
tive. " (p. 87 -88; 5 May 1947)
2, Future Government of Palestine
Mr. Gromyko (USSR):
"Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the
establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal
rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as
one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy
methods for the solution of this complicated problem.
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Such a solution of the problem of Palestine's future
might be a sound foundation for the peaceful co-existence
and co-operation of the Arab. and Jewish populations of
Palestine, in the interests of both of these peoples and
to the advantage of the entire Palestine population and
of the peace and security of the Near East.
"If this plan proved impossible: to implement in
view of the deterioration in the relations between the
Jews and the Arabs -- and it will be very important to
know the special committee's opinion on this question --
then it would be necessary to consider the second plan
which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine,
and which provides for the partition of Palestine into
two independent autonomous states, one Jewish and
one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine
problem would be justifiable only if relations between
the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed
proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to recon-
cile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the
Arabs and the Jews." (p. .134; 14 May 1947)
SECTION TWO: THE PLAN OF PARTITION
I. THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 16 September -
29 November 1947
A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE AD HOC
COMMITTEE
1. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice
(Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question)
Mr. Semen K. Tsarapkin (USSR):
"It was surprising and deplorable that those powers /i. e.
the Assembly's powers in regard to the solution of the
Palestine problem/ should have been. called in question.
Neither the United Kingdom when it had made its request
to the United Nations, nor the representatives who had
attended the special session of the Assembly, nor the mem-
bers of the Special Committee had had any doubts on that
score. Such doubts as were being expressed in the Ad Hoc
Committee were completely unjustified, because Article
10 of the Charter gave the General Assembly the right
and the duty to discuss the Palestinian question. It was
in complete accordance with the provisions of Article 10
that the special session had been called, the Special Com-
mittee established and the Palestinian question considered
by the General Assembly. Any recommendations which the
Assembly made would have sound juridicial foundations.
"The doubts expressed by certain States /namely,
the Arab States and the UK7 were based not on legal but
on political grounds. In particular, the Mandatory Power
was attempting to avoid its responsibilities in the matter
Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc
Comm ittee on the Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings,
25 September - 25 November 1947
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of Palestine and any co-operation in solving the problem,
despite the moral and political obligations of a Mandatory
Power conscious of its responsibilities.
(p. 184; 24 November 1947)
2. Palestine, Jewish Refugees, and Displaced Persons
Mr. Jozef Winiewicz (Poland):
"The successive commissions of investigation had
felt that there were not only Jewish interests but also
Jewish rights. Anti-Semitism and the immigration
restrictions imposed by certain States which could have
accepted Jewish refugees had led the Jews to look towards
Palestine, which the Mandate had promised them as an
immigration area, but the most rigorous restrictions had
been imposed at the very time when the pressure of the
refugees was greatest. The case of the Exodus 1947 was
both touching and shocking; those who had placed their
trust in the international documents concerning the Jewish
National Home were now in camps guarded by Germans,
many of whom had doubtless taken part in the massacre
of Jews.
"The Polish delegation therefore unamimously sup-
ported recommendation VI made in Chapter V of the re-
port of the Special Committee, namely? that the General
Assembly should undertake immediately the initiation and
execution of an international arrangement whereby the
problem of the distressed European Jews would be dealt
with as a matter of extreme urgency. The Polish dele-
gation considered, however, that the problem could and
ought to be solved primarily by Jewish immigration into
Palestine. The immediate admission of 250, 000 refugees
who were awaiting their turn would not have any decisive
effect upon the numerical relationship between Jews and
Arabs. The United Nations should solemnly repeat the
promise made in the Covenant of the. League and open
the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigrants immediately,
while at the same time giving favorable: consideration to
the suggestion for opening up greater possibilities of
immigration for Jewish refugees into other countries. "
(p. 42; 8 October 1947)
3. The Palestine Question and the Establishment of a
Unitary State
Mr. Semen Tsarapkin (USSR):
"With regard to the two plans, the deletion of
the USSR was in favor of the plan /of partition/ drawn
up by Sub-Committee 1 on the basis of the majority plan
contained in Chapter VI of the report of the Special Com-
mittee, for that plan gave both the Arab and the Jewish
people an opportunity to organize their national life as
they desired. It was based on the principles of the
equality of peoples and the right of self--determination,
principles on which the USSR had based its domestic
policy and on which it was in duty bound. to base its
international policy.
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"It was in the light of those principles that the
USSR delegation found the plan of Sub-Committee 2
To establish a unitary state in Palestine/ unacceptable,
for that plan paid no regard to democratic principles
and did not afford the two peoples the opportunity to
develop and collaborate in harmony. "
(p. 184; 24 November 1947)
Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR):
"The Jewish people were therefore striving to
create a State of their own and it would be unjust to
deny them that right. The problem was urgent and could
not be avoided by plunging back into the darkness of the
ages.
"Every people -- and that included the Jewish
people -- had full right to demand that their fate should
not depend on the mercy or the good will of a particular
State. The members of the United Nations could help,
the Jewish people by acting in accordance with the
principles of the Charter, which called for guaranteeing
to every people of their right to independence and self-
determination.
"The problem could be solved by clearing away
the historical and juridicial superstructure and adopting
a broad political outlook. "
(pp. 69-70; 13 October 1947)
"The USSR delegation accepted the unanimous
recommendations in Chapter V of the report, the most
important of which were recommendations I and II.
The minority plan had its merits and advantages, since
it was based on the idea of creating a single Arab-Jewish
State in Palestine. However, relations between Arabs
and Jews had reached such a state of tension that it had
become impossible to reconcile their points of view on
the solution of the problem; the minority plan therefore
appeared impractical. In the circumstances, therefore,
the Partition Plan proposed by the majority offered more
hope of realization. "
(p. 70; 13 October 1947)
B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS
1. Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the
Declaration of Palestine Independence
Dr. Oscar Lange (Poland):
"The Arab people of Palestine, as well as the Jewish
people of Palestine, want national independence. They
Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary
Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 16 September -
27 November 1947
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want a discontinuation of the Mandate and of the present
situation, and the establishment of their national State.
"My delegation and my Government believed for
a time, and hoped, that those national aspirations might
find their expression in one Palestinian State in which
both Arabs and Jews would be equal partners, free to
develop their national life. The situation, however, is
such that this aim cannot be achieved, at least not at the
present stage. We therefore have to establish two States,
an Arab State and a Jewish State, to provide for the
national aspirations of the two communities which live
in Palestine. There is no other way out, and anyone
anxious to do justice to the national aspirations of both
Jews and Arabs must support this proposal."
(p. 1334; 26 November 1947)
"I should therefore like to direct. to my Arab
colleagues the request that, in the very interest of
their own Arab brethren in Palestine, they should not
block a solution -- the only solution that will give
political independence to the Arab people of Palestine
within the next year. "
(p. 1335; 26 November 1947)
2. The Palestine Question and the Establishment of a Unitary
Mr. Gromyko (USSR):
"The delegation of the USSR thought, it would have
been advisable to take a decision on the Ad Hoc Committee's
recommendation /for partition/ yesterday. Unfortunately
at yesterday's meeting it was decided on the proposal of
the French delegation, to postpone the vote for twenty-
four hours. The delegation of the USSR saw no sense in
this French proposal and we doubt whether the French
delegation itself sees any sense in the proposal, to judge
by the statements the French representative made yester-
day after the meeting of the General Assembly.
"Nothing has changed since yesterday's meeting.
This was clear even yesterday: nothing could change in
twenty-four hours, if only because this question has
been debated and discussed for twenty-.five years and
has been discussed by the United Nations for at least
six months. How could one expect a solution of the
question in twenty-four hours? That is why we are now
in the same situation as we were twenty-four hours ago.
"The statements made here by the representatives
of Lebanon and Syria have not introduced any new factor
which could in any way change the situation; there is
nothing new in their statements which would affect the
position. They mentioned the establishment of a federal
state. We referred to this as one of the possibilities at
the outset of the debate on this question. The Arab
representatives did not wish to discuss the matter. That
is their business. They are free to behave as they deem
necessary in the discussion of the question.
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"To reopen the debate on this question as proposed,
for instance, by the representative of Iran, would mean,
however, going back at least six.months. After the
question was submitted to the General Assembly, all
kinds of alternatives were studied and,, after compre-
hensive and careful consideration of all the possible
alternatives and proposals, the majority of the members
of the Ad Hoc Committee came to the conclusion that
Palestine would have to be divided into two sovereign,
independent, democratic states -- an Arab State and a
Jewish State. This decision by the Committee is the
result of a thorough, careful and profound study of this
question.
"The delegation of the USSR considers that it
would be wrong now to set the General Assembly back
six months and to begin all over again. I say nothing of
the fact that to adopt such a proposal would mean wrecking
the settlement of the Palestine problem."
(p. 1422; 29 November 1947)
M. Gromyko (USSR):
"After the work of this /Special/ Committee had
been completed, we were gratified to find that its recom-
mendation, or to be more exact, the recommendation of
the majority of the Committee, coincided with one of
the, two solutions advanced by the USSR delegation at the
special session. I have in mind the solution of partitioning
Palestine into two independent democratic States -- an
Arab and a Jewish one.
"The USSR delegation, therefore, could not but
support this alternative which was recommended by the
Special Committee. We now know that not only did the
Special Committee which studied the problem of the
future of Palestine accept the alternative of partition,
but this proposal gained the support of an overwhelming
majority of the other delegations represented in the
General Assembly. The overwhelming majority of Mem-
ber States of the United Nations reached the same con-
clusion as had been reached by the USSR Government
after a comprehensive study of the question how the
problem of the future of Palestine should be resolved."
(pp. 1358-9; 26 November 1947)
"The opponents of the partition of Palestine into
two separate, independent, democratic States usually
point to the fact that this decision would, as they allege,
be directed against the Arabs, against the Arab popula-
tion in Palestine and against the Arab States in general.
This point of view is, for reasons that will be readily
understood, particularly emphasized by the delegations
of the Arab countries. But the USSR delegation cannot
concur in this view. Neither the proposal to partition
Palestine into two separate, independent States, nor
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the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee that was created
at the session and which approved the proposal which
is now under discussion, is directed against the Arabs.
This decision is not directed against either of the two
national groups that inhabit Palestine. On the contrary,
the USSR delegation holds that this decision corresponds
to the fundamental national interests of both peoples,
that is to say, to the interests of the Arabs as well as
of the Jews.
"The representatives of the Arab States claim
that the partition of Palestine would be an historic in-
justice. But this view of the case is unacceptable, if
only because, after all, the Jewish people has been
closely linked with Palestine for a`considerable period
of history."
(pp. 1359-60; 26 November 1947)
"In connexion with the proposal to partition.
Palestine, the representatives of some Arab States
referred to the USSR and attempted to cast aspersions
on the foreign polite of its Government. In particular,
/ Camille Chamoun_/ the representative of Lebanon
twice exercised his ingenuity on the subject. I have
already pointed out that the proposal to divide Palestine
into two separate independent States, and the position
which the USSR has taken in this matter, are not directed
against the Arabs, and that, in our profound conviction,
such a solution of this question is in keeping with the
basic national interests not only of the Jews but also of
the Arabs. "
(p. 1360; 26 November 1947)
"The delegation of the USSR maintains that the
decision to partition Palestine is in keeping with the
high principles and aims of the United Nations.. It is
in keeping with the principle of the national self-
determination of peoples. "
(pp. 1360-61; 26 November 1947)
"The solution of the Palestine problem based on a
partition of Palestine into two separate states will be of
profound historical significance, because this decision
will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people,
hundreds of thousands of whom, as you know, are still
without a country, without homes, having found temporary
shelter only in special camps in some western European
countries. I shall not speak of the conditions in which
these people are living; these conditions are well known.
Quite a lot has been said on this subject by representatives
who share the USSR delegation's point of view in this
matter, and which support the plan for partitioning
Palestine into two States. "
(p. 1361; 26 November 1947)
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"The USSR delegation, unlike some other delega-
tions /i. e. the US and the U01, has from the outset
taken a clear-cut definite and unequivocal stand in this
matter. It is consistently maintaining this stand. It
has no intention of manoeuvering and manipulating
votes as unfortunately is done at the ,Assembly, especially
in connection with the consideration of the Palestinian
question. "
(p. 1363; 26 November 1947)
"Certain manoeuvers which are., going on in the
General Assembly are understandable, but they cannot
be justified. They can confuse and complicate the issue,
but they cannot settle the problem of Palestine's future.
Once having undertaken this task, the. United Nations
should settle the problem of Palestine's future. That is
precisely why the delegation of the USSR considers that
the General Assembly, should, without further delay,
take a decision on the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation
and proceed to vote on it. For its own part, the delegation
of the USSR supports this proposal in the General Assembly,
just as it supported it in the Committee.
(pp. 1422-23; 29 November 1947)
II. THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
16 April - .14 May 1948
A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
FIRST COMMITTEE
1. The Trusteeship Proposal
Mr. Gromyko (USSR):
"Since the close of the previous session of the
Assembly, public opinion, even in the United States,
had found that the position taken by that country on the
Palestine question had really been directed against the
General Assembly resolution. Official denials by the
United States deceived no one; it was clear that the
United States was preparing to deal a mortal blow to
the partition decision and to present a new plan for
Palestine. It was claimed that the new plan was better,
although in reality the contrary was true. The argu-
ment had been put forward that the Partition Plan could
not be implemented by peaceful means, but that agru-.
ment could be sustained only if the Security Council
had adopted practical measures for its implementation,
and such was not the case. "
(pp. 17-18; 20 April 1948)
- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Volume II, Main Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April -
14 May 1948
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"The trusteeship plan proposed by the United
States was likely to lead to an intensification of the
struggle in Palestine; it would create it threat to
peace and would increase anxiety in the Near East.
Moreover, trusteeship in Palestine was not compatible
with the present cultural and political level of either
Jews or Arabs. Such a plan was inconsistent with the
right to self-determination of the peoples of Palestine
and would place that country in a state of virtual
colonial slavery, with all the deplorable consequences
of such a state."
(p. 19; 20 April 1948)
"The Arab States and the Arab Higher Committee
had adopted a curious attitude in that, although they dis -
liked trusteeship, they were prepared to explore the
United States proposals. They had, however, said
nothing regarding the substance of the proposals because
it was clear that if they favoured trusteeship they would
be favouring postponement of independence for Palestine.
Thus it would be embarrassing for the .Arab representatives
to give direct support to the United States proposals. On
the other hand, they want to wreck the partition decision
and had adopted tactics to confuse the discussion. No
doubt they would follow the same line in the sub-committee."
(pp. 135-6; 28 April 1948)
"The Arabs had indicated their equivocal position
and it was unlikely that they would make it any clearer
in the sub-committee. The lack of clarity was part of
their tactics. The Jewish Agency had rejected the idea
of trusteeship and was unlikely to reverse itself in the
sub-committee. "
(p. 136; 28 April 1948)
Dr. Joza Vilfan (Yugoslavia):
"Yugoslavia was particularly opposed to the prin-
ciple of trusteeship because, having fought so hard to
achieve its own freedom, it sympathized with the aspira-
tions for freedom of all colonial peoples."
(p. 34; 22 April 1948)
Mr. Vasili A. Tarasenko (Ukrainian SSR):
"Moreover, the proposal for a trusteeship system
did not remove the necessity of applying armed force.
Neither the Arabs nor the Jews wished to be deprived
of their sovereignty and at least one of the parties (the
Jews) had stated in the Security Council that it was
opposed to the trusteeship system. Yet it appeared
that the United States was prepared to provide armed
contingents to implement the trusteeship, but not to
carry out partition. "
(p. 39; 22 April 1948)
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Mr.. Leonid I. Kaminsky (Byelorussian SSR):
"The aim of the trusteeship was to keep Palestine
in a state scarcely distinguishable from bondage and to
place it under the control of American monopolies.
Trusteeship was contrary to the right of the peoples
to self-determination; it would intensify the struggle
in Palestine and increase anxiety in the Near East."
(p. 98; 26 April 1948)
Mr. Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland):
"Establishment of a truce commission (document
S/727) could be understood, but not justified, as an
attempt to create some sort of trusteeship supervised
by States opposed to partition. Such manoeuvers would
not settle the problem but would only confuse it."
(p. 103; 27 April 1948)
"The United States representative's explanations
would not modify the Polish delegationrs attitude on that
point, since a trusteeship agreement could not come under
discussion before the General Assembly had decided to
set aside the solution of partition. "
(p.. 121; 27 April 1948)
Mr. A. I. Galagan (Ukrainian SSR):
"In fact, trusteeship could neither facilitate a solu-
tion nor improve the lot of the Palestine people whose
progress would be retarded by depriving them of their
freedom.
"On the whole, no organ could examine a new
decision in the Palestine question as long as the-General
Assembly's decision has not been annulled by a two-
thirds majority.
"The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic would vote against a proposal to examine the
United States document. "
(pp. 126 -7.; 27 April 1948)
Mr. Gromyko (USSR):
"Discussions among the permanent members of the
Security Council had revealed that the United States not
only did not wish to consider how the General Assembly
decision might be implemented but wished to revise
that decision. From the very beginning, the representa-
tive of the United States had been proposing consultation
with the Jews and the Arabs as though no decision had
ever been taken on Palestine. He had then tried to prove
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that it was impossible to implement partition by peaceful
means but he had never mentioned that the Security.
Council had not exhausted the means available to it to
implement the General Assembly decision.
(p. 18; 20 April 1948)
"The USSR delegation considered that the decision
on the partition of Palestine was a just decision and that
the United Nations should take effective measures to ensure
its implementation. "
(p. 20; 20 April 1948)
"The delegation of the USSR believed that the
Assembly could put an end to the bloody conflict in
Palestine only by assuring the implementation of parti-
tion. Even the opponents of partition must recognize
that it was in fact taking place, as was shown by the
statement of Senor Azcarate and data submitted by the
Jewish Agency, not to mention the numerous reports in
the Press. A Jewish State was in existence, in spite of
attempts by certain countries to impede the implementa-
tion of partition. "
(p. 222; 4 May 1948)
Mr. Tarasenko (Ukrainian SSR):
"The'decision of the General Assembly of 29 November
fully satisified the interests and national aspirations of both
Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It also met the requirements
of the Charter. Nobody could accuse the United Nations
of having taken its decision with undue haste. All were
well aware of the extensive work that had been done by the
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question which resulted
in the adoption by more than two-thirds of the Assembly of
the plan of partition with economic union. The Assembly
had decided that the solution was the most equitable one
and rejected all alternative solutions. The world would
have been entitled to expect that the Assembly decision
would have been implemented immediately particularly
since the situation in Palestine was rapidly deteriorating.
Unfortunately, that was not the case. The United Kingdom
pursued from the very beginning a policy designed to wreck
the Assembly's decision."
(p. 37; 22 April 1948)
"The United States insisted upon convoking a special
session of the Assembly to revoke the partition and to
begin a search for an alternative solution. It attempted
to justify the modification of its position on the grounds
that the Partition Plan could not be implemented by peace-
ful means. However the Security Council had not taken
any measures to implement the Assembly's resolution
and it could not be proved that the Partition Plan would
require force."
(pp. 38- -9; 22 April 1948)
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4
"The delegation of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic
had supported the Partition Plan when it was adopted be-
cause it believed that the plan provided the most equitable
and just solution of the Palestinian question. A refusal
to implement that plan would constitute a serious and
irreparable blow to the United Nations. "
(p. 40; 22 April 1948)
Mr. Houdek (Czechoslovakia):
"The delegation of Czechoslovakia believed that
the solution of partition was the best and most neces-
sarily anti-Arab in character, nor was it irreconcilable
with the national and political aspirations of neighbouring
Arab countries."
(p. 53; 22 April 1948)
Mr. Panyushkin (USSR):
". . . the Assembly resolution of 29 November
constituted a just and correct decision and met the
deep-rooted national interest of the Arab and Jewish
peoples of Palestine. The decision had not been taken
hastily, as some representatives believed. The Assembly
had carefully studied the political, economic and other
factors before taking its decision."
(p. 71; 23 April 1948)
Mr. Kaminsky (Byelorussian SSR ):
"The delegation of Byelorussia had upheld and
still supported the partition scheme. It considered that
it was essential for the United Nations to carry out the
resolution of the General Assembly immediately."
(p. 98; 26 April 1948)
Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland):
"A heavy responsibility had been laid upon every
member to help the people of Palestine in resolving a
conflict which might be a major threat to international
peace. The question should be examined in terms of
two peoples of Palestine and not in the light of any military
or economic considerations. The time was late and action
was called for but first they should hear the views of all
Governments. "
(p. 101; 27 April 1948)
a
"The convocation of the present special session was
a cause for anxiety, for it was apparent that it had been
called to revise the previous decision. It should be made
clear, however, that the resolution of 29 November 1947
was still in force. Until the Assembly, by the necessary
majority, adopted another resolution, the decision in
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favour of partition remained binding. This situation
could not be changed either by the Security Council or
by any State, however powerful."
(p. 102; 27 April 1948)
"The Jewish interests in Palestine were no mere
claims but were based on rights, recognized internationally
in the Covenant of the League. Jewish demands for state-
hood were based on international law and could only be
confirmed by the Assembly. Moreover, there were hun-
dreds of thousands of Jews seeking to start a new life in
the refuge they looked upon as their fatherland. Yet, the
Jews were still being kept in German concentration camps. "
(p. 105; 27 April 1948)
"With regard to the Arab objections, no one expected
that the Arabs would help enforce partition. They were
free to refuse their support, but under the Charter they
were obliged to refrain from the use of force to prevent
implementation. Any infringement of this obligation
should be branded as aggression. The principle respon-
sibility for postponing the implementation of the resolution
fell upon those who had weakened the United Nations by
trying to change it into an instrument of their own policy. "
(p. 105; 27 April 1948)
"The Polish delegation considered the resolution of
29 November 1947 to be still valid. The Assembly should
deal with the situation created by the refusal of the majority
of the Security Council to fulfil the Assembly's request re-
garding implementation. Postponement would lead only to
new suffering and increased strife. For the sake of the
future dignity of the United Nations, they should act now
in the spirit of the Charter and in accordance with the will
of the peoples of Palestine. The Assembly had put the
Jews and Arabs of Palestine on the road to national inde-
pendence and could not now force them away from it."
(p. 107; 27 April 1948)
B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Mr. Katz-Suchy (Poland):
". . . after four weeks of discussion, during which
numerous delegations had tried to show that implementation
Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records
of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948
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of resolution 181(11) on the partition of Palestine was
impossible, practical and concrete measures were
being taken to implement the resolution. The Polish
delegation considered that the creation of a Jewish
State in the part of Palestine designated for that purpose,
was in conformity with the resolution of 29 November. "
(p. 39; 14 May 1948)
Mr. Gromyko (USSR):
"The USSR delegation was firmly convinced that
in view of the situation in Palestine at the present time
there was no reason to appoint a mediator. A feature
of that situation was the existence of one of the two States
provided for in the General Assembly's resolution: the
Jewish State.
"In those circumstances, to impose upon Palestine
a provisional regime of a transitional nature would be
unjustifiable, to say the least. Even if the draft resolu-
tion was accepted, that would in no way affect the parti-
tion decision, which remained valid.
"Fearing that the opponents of the partition decision
might take advantage of the provisions of the resolution
to complicate the existing situation, the USSR delegation
would vote against the resolution (document A/552) before
the Assembly. "
(p. 38; 14 May 1948)
III. THE THIRD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 21 September -
12 December 1948
A. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE FIRST
COMMITTEE
1. Palestine and Removal of Arab Troops
Mr. K. V. Kieselev (Byelorussian SSR):
"When the United Kingdom realized that it could not
nullify the decision of 29 November, it had attempted to
destroy the Jewish State by using armies of the Arab
States. When that too failed, the United Kingdom had
recourse to a Mediator, in a further attempt to get rid
of the Jewish State, the existence of which it regarded
as a threat.
"The chief responsibility for the hostilities in
Palestine lay with the United Kingdom and with the United
States. Long before the end of the Mandate, the Mandatory
Power had authorized the entry into Palestine of an Arab
Legion which was reinforced by Nazi officers formerly
interned in camps in Egypt. After the termination of the
Mandate, moreover, British officials had 'voluntarily'
offered their services to that same King Abdullah who
was to be the chief beneficiary of the Mediator's plan,
which had in fact been rejected by the Arabs as well as
by the Jews. " (pp. 741 -2; 24 November 1948)
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Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part.I,
First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September --
8 December 1948
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"In order to thwart those designs, as injurious to
the Arabs as they are to the Jews, the United Nations
must ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Palestine; and it was incumbent on the Security Council
to take steps to prevent the renewal of military action
and to restore peace in Palestine. "
(p. 743; 24 November 1948)
". . . so long as foreign troops remained in the
territory of Palestine peace could not prevail in that
part of the world. The matter the First Committee was
called upon to settle was the putting into effect of the
General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947.
Part of that resolution had already been carried out by
the establishment of the State of Israel. within the terri-
torial limits established by the General Assembly. On
the other hand, the Arab State had not yet been estab-
lished; the territory alloted to it was occupied by regular
troops of Transjordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and else-
where. "
(p. 795; 29 November 1948)
Also:
"The Byelorussian delegation would support the
USSR proposal on the withdrawal of armed troops, be-
cause it was, of vital importance. "
(p. 795; 29 November 1948)
Mr. Tsarapkin (USSR):
". . . the presence of those troops, particularly
at this moment when the United Nations was attempting
to bring about peace, was a hindrance to peaceful adjust-
ment of the situation and it was essential that they should
be withdrawn. Their presence on the 'territories of the
Arab and Jewish States created by the Assembly's resolu-
tion 181(11) of 29 November was illegal. and unjustified and
maintained a tense situation which might lead to further
military action. "
(p. 755; 25 November 1948)
"Everyone knew that there were in Palestine foreign
troops and military personnel which had invaded the
country. The presence of those troops had caused the
war, the present disorders and the sufferings of the
population; moreover it was an obstacle to the re-
establishment of peace, the very object of the General
Assembly.
"The USSR delegation had therefore submitted a
proposal (A/C 1/401) for the withdrawal of foreign troops
and military personnel. At the very time when the United
Nations was doing its utmost to achieve a peaceful settle-
ment of the problem, the presence of those foreign troops
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was particularly inadmissible and might at any moment
bring about the resumption of hostilities. The General
Assembly should therefore take a decision leading to the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine, and ask
the Security Council to take all necessary measures to
prevent the resumption of military operations.
"What the USSR delegation had in. view was of
course the withdrawal of the troops of certain foreign
Governments, and there could be no ambiguity or mis-
understanding possible on that point. Moreover, no
decision would be practicable if the problem of foreign
troops was not first settled, for their presence in
Palestine was likely to prevent the application of that
decision. If the problem of Palestine was really to be
solved and peace and security re-established in the.
Middle East, the first problem to be settled was that
of withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine."
(pp. 791-2; 29 November 1948)
the withdrawal of foreign troops was a neces-
sary condition for the establishment of peace and for any
settlement of the Palestine question in accordance with
the November resolution. The presence of Arab forces
in Palestine was a direct violation of the appeal which
the Assembly had issued in connection with the November
resolution, calling upon all States and individuals to re-
frain from any acts likely to complicate the situation in
Palestine or to hinder the implementation of the recom-
mendation of the General Assembly. From the beginning,
the Mandatory Power had attempted to prevent the imple-
mentation of partition and the establishment of two inde-
pendent States. It was significant that the departure of
United Kingdom troops had been immediately followed
by the invasion of Palestine by Arab forces. The syn-
chronization of those two events showed that the military
intervention by the Arab States was part of the United
Kingdom plan to prevent the Assembly from carrying
out partition. That it had been successful only in prevent-
ing the creation of an Arab State in Palestine was due
solely to the quick action of the Jewish people in defend-
ing the area assigned to them."
(p. 799; 29 November 1948)
"The Committee could not but be aware that the
presence of foreign troops in Palestine was an insur-
mountable obstacle in the way of any peaceful settle-
ment which must be removed if the Assembly was to
make any progress. "
(p. 800; 29 November 1948)
Mr. Lange (Poland):
". . . on 29 November 1947 the Assembly had
established the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States
in Palestine. Since then, the Jews had established their
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Mr. Kiselev (Byelorussian SSR):
. . . the problem before the United Nations was
to implement the General Assembly resolution of
29 November 1947 for the partition of :Palestine and
the establishment of two independent States."
(p. 741; 24 November 1948)
"As regards the United States, since the decision
on the partition of Palestine, its Governmenthad been
subjected to strong pressure from military circles and
United States oil companies. The United States had then
refused to help in the establishment: of the new Jewish
State, and on the contrary, attempted to wreck the
Partition Plan. Indeed, the United States had taken
the initiative in calling a second special session and.
had proposed placing Palestine under a Trusteeship
System, while declaring herself the champion of both
Jewish and Arab interests. When the proposal for
placing Palestine under trusteeship was rejected, the
United States and the United Kingdom had proposed the
appointment of a Mediator. It was then that, on various
pretexts, the British and Americans poured into Palestine,
while the United States tried to come to an agreement with
the United Kingdom, at the expense of the Jews.
"But even the United States and the United Kingdom
had had to take into account the existence of a Jewish
State which had proved its right to exist, and which had
been recognized, de jure or de facto, by 18 States. Like
other States before it, Israel was borne of an armed
struggle for liberty and independence. "
(p. 742; 24 November 1948),
"The General Assembly should reject the draft
resolution of the United Kingdom (A/C 1/394) which was
contrary to the decision of 29 November 1947. The Bye-
lorussian delegation was opposed to the transfer of cer-
tain parts of Palestine, and in particular the Negeb to
Transjordan. Adoption of that proposal would mean
placing four-fifths of Palestine indirectly under the con-
trol of the United Kingdom."
(p. 743; 24 November 1948)
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B. EXCERPTS FROM COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN THE
PLENARY MEETINGS
Mr. Zebrowski (P?oland):
". . . just over a year ago the General Assembly,
at its 128th Plenary meeting, had adopted by a very large
majority a resolution concerning Palestine which pro-
vided for the establishment of two, independent States,
an international regime for Jerusalem. and the economic
union binding the two States together. That resolution,
if fully implemented and respected by all the Members
of the United Nations would have brought in the family
of nations two new States and would have advanced the
cause of peace and progress in the Middle East.
"The implementation of that resolution, however,
was obstructed by the manoeuvers and. machinations
of certain Powers, led by the United Kingdom and. the
United States of America. "
(pp. 957-8; 11December 1948)
"Twice in the course of the past year, the United
Kingdom and the United States had tried to use the General
Assembly as an instrument for reversing previous de-
cisions. In spite of their abject failure at the second
special session during the previous spring, when the
United Kingdom and the United States :had tried to replace
independence by Trusteeship, the same two Powers were
again trying at the current session to undo what had al-
ready been implemented. Those attempts were obviously
no contribution to peace in the Middle East; they would
merely fan the flames of war."
(pp. 958--9; 11 December 1948)
"By voting against the draft resolution (proposed
by the First Committee /document A/7767), the Polish
delegation affirmed its support of the resolution of
29 November 1947., as containing the basic principles
of the solution of the Palestine problem. That resolu-
tion was legally in force and its terms would be binding
upon whatever conciliation commission was formed.
They provided a foundation upon which the State of
Israel and the Arab States could base their direct
negotiations for the establishment of a permanent settle-
ment. "
(p. 964; 11 December 1948)
Official'Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I,
Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings,
21 September - 12 December 1948
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Mr. Houdek (Czechoslovakia):
"All who had taken part in the General Assembly's
dealing with the Palestine question would recall that the
Czechoslovak delegation had always advocated the estab-
lishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, and `at the same
time had manifested its full understanding of the national
aspirations of the Arabs. For those reasons, it had sup-
ported the appointment of the United Nations Special Com-
mission on Palestine in May 1947 and had taken an active
part in its work. In accordance with its basic attitude, it
had voted, on 29 November 1947, for the resolution of the
General Assembly which had proclaimed the idea of par-
tition. It had foreseen some difficulties as regards its
implementation, but had voted in favour of the resolution
because it had seemed to offer the best possible solution
of the problem under the conditions then prevailing in
Palestine. It provided for a Jewish home in Palestine
which, as a result of the horrible sufferings of the Jews
in the war of extermination planned and carried on
against them by the Nazi regime and the associated
puppet Governments, had to take the form of a sovereign
and independent State. At the same time, although many
appeared to have forgotten that fact, the resolution had
envisaged the establishment of an Arab State in Palestine,
thus meeting. the national and political aspirations of the
Arab populations of that country. "
(p. 965; 11 December 1948)
Mr. Vyshinsky (USSR):
it. . . at the first stage of the discussion on the
Palestine question, the United Kingdom. Government had
taken up an attitude which could only be called one of
resistence to the resolution adopted by the General Assem-
bly on 29 November 1947. That attitude had been taken
up because it had been claimed that the decision could
not be implemented, since it had not been accepted by
one part of the Assembly. The United :Kingdom Govern-
ment had maintained that attitude until the second special
session of the Assembly, which had taken place in April
and May of the current year, that is to say until the time
when the Assembly, under pressure from the United
States and the United Kingdom, had adopted, on 14 May
1948, resolution 186 (S-2) appointing a United Nations
Mediator on Palestine. "
(p. 981; 11 December 1948)
"The United Kingdom delegation had hastened, to sub-
mit its own resolution at the beginning of the discussion on
the Palestine question, with the evident. intention of making
that resolution a basis for the Committee's handling of the
question. It had been based almost entirely on the report
of the Mediator and, fundamentally, aimed at considerably
amending the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November
1947. That resolution had, for example, provided for certain
boundary lines; the United Kingdom resolution aimed at
revising them and taking from Israel the Negeb territory
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which comprised approximately two-thirds of the State
of Israel. Such wishes had been expressed by repre-
sentatives of the British military authorities."
(p. 985; 11 December 1948)
"The attitude of thg USSR delegation toward the
Palestine question had been extremely consistent. It
favoured the freedom of peoples, and peaceful and friendly
relations among nations. The USSR delegation's position
was fully in accord with the aims and purposes of the
United Nations as set out in the Charter. That was pre-
cisely the reason why it still thought that the true solution
of the Palestine problem could be achieved only on the
basis of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November
1947, which provided for equal rights and independent
existence for both peoples in Palestine. "
(p. 990; 11 December 1948)
2. The Conciliation Commission
Mr. Vyshinsky (USSR):
"The resolution before the Assembly provided for
a conciliation commission composed of three Member
States. In the First Committee the USSR delegation
had stated that it was not opposed in principle to such
a commission. But the commission should consist of
more than three members; five might be a better number,
because less pressure could be brought to bear on a
commission composed of a larger number of members;
a membership of five would be more likely to achieve
greater objectivity, It would be an advantage if the prin-
ciple of geographical distribution were applied in the
selection of members. That was another argument in
favour of a membership of five rather than of three.
The USSR delegation was not therefore, in favour of
such a small number. A larger membership would be
more desirable in order that the commission might really
be a conciliation commission and be enabled to extend its
.conciliatory efforts to all aspects of the matter, including
the General Assembly's resolution.
"The commission should consist of representatives
of States which were not prejudiced against that resolution..
To appoint representatives of States which were hostile
to it from the outset would complicate the situation and
indefinitely postpone a final settlement from the point of
view of everyone, and particularly that of the Arabs and
the Jews. "
(p. 987; 11 December 1948)
30
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COMMUNIST BLOC OPPOSITION
TO
ARAB ASPIRATIONS IN PALESTINE
COMPARATIVE RECORD OF ROLL CALL VOTES ON THE PALESTINE
QUESTION
SECTION ONE: FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, 28 April - 15 May 1947
SECTION TWO: SECOND (REGULAR) SESSION, 16 September -
29 November 1947
SECTION THREE: SECOND SPECIAL SESSION, 16 April -
14 May 1948
SECTION FOUR: THIRD (REGULAR) SESSION (PART I),
21 September - 12 December 1948
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I. THE GENERAL COMMITTEE *
A. INVITATION TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH
AGENCY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
1. Proposal of the Polish delegation as amended by the repre-
sentative of Czechoslovakia (document A/BUR /80):
"The General Assembly,
"Resolved to give careful consideration to the
point of view of the Jewish people on the Palestine
question,
"Decides to invite the representative of the
Jewish Agency for Palestine to appear before the
plenary meeting of the General Assembly for the
purpose of stating their views on this question."
Voting Record: (p. 126; 2 May 1947)
For: 3 Against: 8
Czechoslovakia Canada
Poland China
USSR France
Sweden
UK
US
Egypt
India
II. THE FIRST COMMITTEE **
A. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE.
1. Draft resolution recommended in sub-Committee 6 re-
port (document A/C 1/171) on the terms of reference.
a. -Motion of the French representative to delete
paragraph 5 and its alternative drafts from the resolution:
(i) Paragraph 5, draft a.
"The Special Committee shall bear
in mind the principle that: independence
for the population of Palestine should be
the purpose of any plan for the future of
that country."
' Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume II, General Committee, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 29 April -
7 May 1947.
** Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume III, Main Committees, Verbatim Records of Meetings, 28 April -
13 May 1947.
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SECTION ONE: THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION, 28 April - 15 May 1947
I. The General Committee
A. Invitation to the Representative of the Jewish Agency to Appear
before the General Assembl .
II. The First Committee
A. Terms of Reference for the Special Committee.
B. Composition of the Special Committee.
III. The Plenary Meetings of.the General Assembly
A. The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the
Declaration of its Independence.
B. Invitation to the Jewish Agency to Appear before the General
Assembly.
C. Creation of a Special Committee to Prepare a Report on the
Question of Palestine.
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(ii) Paragraph 5, draft b?
"The Special Committee shall be
guided by the principle that independence
for the people of Palestine should be the
purpose of any plan for the future of that
country. "
(iii) Paragraph 5, draft c.
"The Special Committee shall be
guided by the principle that independence
for the people of Palestine should be the
purpose of any plan for the future of that
country."
(iv) Paragraph 5, draft d.
"The Special Committee shall be
guided by the principle that independence
of Palestine should be the purpose of any
plan for the future of that country."
Voting Record: (pp. 299-300; 12 May 1947)
For: 29
Against: 14 Abstentions: 10
France Afghanistan Byelorussian SSR
UK Egypt Czechoslovakia
US Iraq Poland
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia India
Syria Iran
Turkey
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
. Motion of the Australian representative to delete
paragraph 6, drafts a and b, from resolution.
(i) Paragraph 6, draft a:
"The Special Committee shall give
most careful consideration to the interests
of all the inhabitants of Palestine and also
to the religious interests in Palestine of
Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. "
Voting Record: (p. 309; 13 May 1947)
For: 19 Against: 25
Abstentions: 7
Byelorussian SSR France Afghanistan
Czechoslovakia UK Egypt
Ukrainian SSR US India
Yugoslavia
Iraq
Lebanon
Iran Poland
USSR
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(ii) Paragraph 6, draft b:
"The Special Committee shall give
most careful consideration to the religious
interests in Palestine, of Islam, Judaism
and Christianity. "
Voting Record:
(p. 309;
13 May 1947)
For: 27
Against: 9
Abstentions: 16
France
India
Afghanistan
UK
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
US
Lebanon
Syria
Byelorussian SSR
Egypt
Turkey
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
Yugo slavia
c. USSR-India amendment to paragraph 7
(i) Original text of paragraph 7:
"The Special Committee shall pre-
pare a report to the General Assembly
and shall submit such proposals as it may
consider appropriate for the solution of
the problem of Palestine. "
(ii) USSR -India amendment adding the following
to paragraph 7:
"Including a proposal on the question
of establishing, without delay, the independent
democratic State of Palestine."
Voting Record: (pp. 312-13; 13 May 1947)
For: 15 Against: 26 Abstentions: 12
Afghanistan France
Egypt UK
India US
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
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d. Paragraph 7 (as amended by Polish delegate):
"The Special Committee shall prepare a
report to the next session of the General Assembly
as it may consider appropriate for the solution
of the problem of Palestine, including a proposal
on the question of establishing, by the United
Nations, the independent democratic State of
Palestine. "
Voting Record (p. 314;
13 May 1947)
For: 10
Against: 25
Abstentions: 18
Byelorussian SSR
France
Afghanistan
Czechoslovakia
UK
Egypt
Poland
US
Iraq
Ukrainian SSR
Lebanon
Yugoslavia
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
USSR
B. COMPOSITION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
1. First USSR draft resolution (document A/C 1/ 177) con-
cerning the composition of the Special Committee:
"The General Assembly resolves that the special
committee should consist of those Member States which
are on the Security Council. "
Voting Record: (p?.
344;
13 May 1947)
For: 6
Against: 26
Abstentions:
21
Byelorussian SSR
UK
Afghanistan
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
US
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
France
2. Alternate USSR draft resolution document (A/C 1 / 177)
concerning the composition of the Special Committee:
"The General Committee resolves,
"That the composition of the special committee
should be based on the same principle as the Security
Council, namely, the committee should include States
permanent members of the Security Council, one
State representing western Europe, one State repre-
senting eastern Europe, two States representing Latin
America, one Arab State, and one State representing
the Far East and Africa."
4
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Voting Record: (pp. 344-45;
13 May 1947)
For: 6
Against:
26
Abstentions:
21
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
US
UK
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
3. Polish resolution (document A/C 1/176) concerning the
composition of the Special Committee:
"The General Assembly resolves,
"That the special committee should be composed
of eleven members, as follows: the five permanent
members of the Security Council, two countries of
Latin America, one of the Arab States, one country
of Africa, one country of Asia, one country of eastern
Europe. "
Voting Record: (p. 345;
13 May 1947)
For: 7
Against: 26
Abstentions:
20
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
UK
US
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
4. Australian
resolution (document A/C 1/178) concerning
composition of the Special Committee:
"The General Assembly resolves,
"That the special committee shall consist of eleven
members, not including the permanent members of the
Security Council. "
Voting Record: (pp. 345-46; 13 May 1947)
US
Against: 11
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
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III. THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. THE TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE OVER PALESTINE
AND THE DECLARATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE.
1. Inclusion on the supplementary list (a/294) of the General
Committee report (a/298), the Item entitled: "The Termination of the
Mandate over Palestine and the Declaration of its Independence, " sub-
mitted by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in documents
A/287, A/288, A/289, A/290, and A/291 respectively.
Voting Record: (pp. 59-60; 1 May 1947)
For: 15
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
India
Against: 24 Abstentions: 10
France Czechoslovakia
UK Poland
US
Byelorussian SSR
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
B. INVITATION TO THE JEWISH AGENCY TO APPEAR BEFORE
THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
1. Polish resolution as amended by Czechoslovakia (A/BUR/80):
"The General Assembly,
"Resolved to give careful consideration to the point
of view of the Jewish people on the Palestine question,
"Decides to invite the representatives of the Jewish
Agency for Palestine to appear before the Plenary meetings
of the General Assembly for the purpose of stating their
views on this question. "
Votin Record:
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
5 May 1947)
(p. 114;
Against: 39
Afghanistan
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey _
France
UK
US
Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records
of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948.
6
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2. Joint resolution (A/305) submitted by Byelorussian SSR,
Chile, Argentina, Yugoslavia, and Uruguay:
"The General Assembly resolves,
1. That the First Committee grant a hearing to
the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before
the Committee;
2. To send to that same committee for its
decision those other communications of a similar
character from the.Palestinian population which
have been received by this special session of the
General Assembly or may later be submitted to it."
Voting Record: (pp. 114--15; 15 May 1947)
For: 44 Against: 7
Abstentions: 3
Byelorussian SSR
Afghanistan
India
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
Iran
Poland
Iraq
Ukrainian SSR
Lebanon
USSR
Saudi Arabia
Yugoslavia
Syria
Turkey
France
UK
US
C. CREATION OF A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO PREPARE A
REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
1. Committee 1 Resolution (A/307) concerning the creation
of a "Special Committee to prepare for the consideration at the next regu-
lar session of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine."
a. Paragraph 1:
"The General Assembly resolves that:
1. A special Committee be created for
the above-mentioned purpose, consisting of the
representatives of Australia, Canada, Czecho-
slovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands,
Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. "
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Voting Record: (pp. 174-5; 15 May 1947)
For: 40 Against: 0 Abstentions: 13
France
UK
Us
India
Iran
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
b. Preamble and Paragraphs 2 to 9:
"Whereas the General Assembly of the
United Nations has been called into special ses -
sion for the purpose of constituting and instruct-
ing a Special Committee to prepare for considera-
tion at the next regular session of the Assembly
a report on the question of Palestine,
"The General Assembly resolves that:
2. The Special Committee: shall have the
widest powers to ascertain and record facts
and to investigate all questions and issues
relevant to the problem of Palestine;
3. The Special Committee shall deter-
mine its own procedure;
4. The Special Committee shall conduct
investigations in Palestine and, wherever it
.may deem useful, receive and examine written
or oral testimony, whichever it may consider
appropriate in each case, from the mandatory
Power, from representatives of the Population
of Palestine, from Governments and from such
organizations and individuals as it may deem
necessary;
5. The Special Committee shall give
most consideration to the religious interests
in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity;
6. The Special Committee shall prepare
a report to the General Assembly and shall sub-
mit such proposals as it may consider appropriate
for the solution of the problem of Palestine;
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7. The Special Committee's report shall
be communicated to the Secretary-General not
later than 1 September 1947, in order that it
may be circulated to the Members of the United
Nations in time for consideration by the second
regular session of the General Assembly;
The General-Assembly,
8. Requests the Secretary-General to
enter into suitable arrangements with the proper
authorities of any State in whose territory the
Special Committee may wish to sit or to travel,
to provide necessary facilities, and to assign
appropriate staff to the committee;
9. Authorizes the Secretary-General to
reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of
a representative and an alternate representative
from each Government represented on the Special
Committee on such basis and such form as he
may determine most appropriate in the circum-
stances. "
Voting Record: (p. 176; 15 May 1947)
For: 45
France
UK
US
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
India
Iran
Voting Record: (pp.
For: 45
France
UK
US
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
India
Iran
Against: 7 Abstentions: 1
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
176-7; 15 May 1947)
Against: 7 Abstentions: 1
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
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SECTION TWO: THE SECOND (REGULAR) SESSION, 16 September -
29 November 1947
A. Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question.
B. Report of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestine Question.
II. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly
A. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question.
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I. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
A. REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 2 TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE-
ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION.
1. First Draft Resolution contained in "Report of Sub-Committee
2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question." (A/AC 14/32 and
Add. 1) entitled: "Draft Resolution Referring Certain Legal Questions to
the International Court of Justice. "
a. Paragraph 1 of the operative part, up to and inclusive
of sub-paragraph (g) relative to requesting the International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on:
"(a) Whether the indigenous population of Palestine
has not an inherent right: to Palestine and to
determine its future constitution and government;
"(b) Whether the pledges and assurances given by
Great Britain to the Arabs during the First
World War (including the Anglo-French
Declaration of 1918) concerning the independence
and future of the Arab countries at the end of
the war did not include Palestine;
"(c) Whether the Balfour Declaration, which was
made without the knowledge or consent of the
indigenous population of Palestine, was valid
and binding on the people of Palestine, or con-
sistent with the earlier and subsequent pledges
and assurances given to the Arabs;
"(d) Whether the provisions of the Mandate for
Palestine regarding the establishment of a
Jewish National Home in Palestine are in con-
formity or consistent with the objectives and
provisions of the Covenant of the League of
Nations (in particular Article 22), or are com-
patible with the provisions of the Mandate relat-
ing to the development of self-government and
the preservation of the rights and position of the
Arabs of Palestine;
"(e) Whether the legal basis for the Mandate for
Palestine has not disappeared with the dissolu-
tion of the League of Nations and whether it is
not the duty of the Mandatory Power to hand over
power and administration to a government of
Palestine representing the rightful people of
Palestine;
Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly: Ad Hoc
Committee on the Palestine Question, Summary Records of Meetings,
25 September - 25 November 1947 and Annex.
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"1(f)
11(g)
Whether a plan to partition Palestine without
the consent of the majority of its people is
consistent with the objectives of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, and with the pro-
visions of the Mandate for Palestine;
Whether the United Nations is competent to
recommend either of the two plans and recom-
mendations of the majority or minority of the
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine,
or any other solution involving partition of the
territory of Palestine, or a permanent trustee-
ship over any city or part of Palestine, without
the consent of the majority of the people of
Palestine;"
Voting Record:
(p. 203;
24 November 1947)
Against: 25
Abstentions:
11
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
France
US
India
UK
Yugoslavia
b. Paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (h): Whether the
United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to
enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning
the constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular,
any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted
without consent of the inhabitants of Palestine.
Voting ecord: (p. 203; 24 November 1947)
For: 20 Against: 21 Abstentions: 13
Afghanistan Byelorussian SSR Czechoslovakia
Egypt Poland Yugoslavia
India Ukrainian SSR
Iran USSR
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
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2. Second Draft Resolution contained in "Report of Sub-
Committee' 2 to Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question, " (A/AC
14/32 and Add. 1) entitled: "Draft Resolution on Jewish Refugees and
Displaced Persons.
"
a. First recommendation:
"That countries or origin should be requested to
take back Jewish refugees and displaced persons
belonging to them, and to render them all possible
assistance to resettle in life;"
Voting Record:
(p. 204;
24 November 1947)
For: 17
Against: .14
Abstentions: 23
Afghanistan
Ukrainian SSR
Byelorussian SSR
Egypt
USSR
Czechoslovakia
India
Yugoslavia
Iran
Iraq
France
Lebanon
UK
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Syria
Yemen
b. Second recommendation:
"That those Jewish refugees and displaced persons
who can not be repatriated should be absorbed in
the territories of Members of the United Nations
in proportion to their area, economic resources,
per capita income, population and other relevant
factors;"
Voting Record: (p. 204; 24 November 1947)
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
Against: 16 Abstentions: 21
Byelorussian SSR France
Czechoslovakia UK
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Turkey
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"That a special committee of the General Assembly
should be set up to recommend for acceptance of
the United Nations a scheme of questions of Jewish
refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in
their respective territories, and that the special
committee should, as far as possible, work in con-
sultation with the International Refugee Organization
or its Preparatory Commission;"
Voting Record: (p. 204; 24 November 1947)
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
Against:. 18 Abstentions: 22
Byelorussian SSR Czechoslovakia
Poland Yugoslavia
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
d. Sixth paragraph of preamble only;
Turkey
"Considering that Palestine, despite its very small
area and limited resources, has absorbed a dis-
proportionately large number of Jewish immigrants
and can not take any more without serious injury to
the economy of the country and the rights and position
of the indigenous population, "
Voting Record: (p. 205; 24 November 1947)
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Against: 26 Abstentions: 18
Byelorussian SSR Yugoslavia
Czechoslovakia
Poland UK
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
France
US
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e. Second Draft Resolution, as modified by previous
amendments:
Voting Record:
(pp. 205-6;
24 November 1947)
For: 16
Against: 16
Abstentions: 23
Afghanistan
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
Ukrainian SSR
Poland
4
India
Iran
USSR
Yugoslavia
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
France
US
(Resolution was not adopted)
3. Third Draft Resolution, contained in "Report of Sub-
Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question, "
(A/AC 14/32 and Add. 1) entitled; "Draft Resolution on the Constitution
and Future Government of Palestine." The resolution recommends, chiefly,
(1) the setting up of a provisional representative government in Palestine
which would assume the powers and functions of the present administration
in Palestine, and which would enact an electoral law for establishing a
constituent assembly, and hold elections for the constituent assembly;
(2) the withdrawal of the troops of the Mandatory Power as soon as the
provisional government is installed and within a one-year period thereof;
and strict adherence, to certain defined principles, chief of which are:
(a) Palestine shall be a unitary, sovereign state, having a democratic
constitution with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to
the legislature; (b) the constitution shall guarantee the rights of religious
bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educa-
tional establishments administered by public authority, educational insti-
tutions of their own, subject to normal government supervision and
inspection; (c) the constitution shall ensure adequate representation in
the legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion
to their numerical strength; and (d) the guarantee contained in the
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constitution concerning the rights and safeguards of minorities shall
not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the
minority concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives
in the legislature.
Voting Record:
(p. 206;
24 November 1947)
For: 12
Against: 29
Abstentions:
14
Afghanistan
Byelorussian SSR
India
Egypt
Czechoslovakia
Iran
Poland
UK
Iraq
Ukrainian SSR
Saudi Arabia
USSR
Yugoslavia
Turkey
Yemen
US
Syria
France
4. Draft resolution and partition plan contained in "Report
of Sub-Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question"
(A/AC 14/34 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1) as amended. The resolution recom-
mends the adoption and implementation, "with regard to the future govern-
ment of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union" as
defined in the remainder of the report and as amended.
Voting Record: (pp. 222-23;
25 November 1947)
For: 25
Against: 13
Abstentions:
17
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
US
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
France
UK
Yugoslavia
II. THE PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (A/516) on the Palestine question.
In this report, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the
General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution "181(11)" on the future
government of Palestine embodying a plan of partition with economic union.
' Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary
Meeti gs of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 16 September -
29 November 1947, Volume II, 110th - 218th Meetings, 13 November -
29 November 1947
15
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SECTION THREE: THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION, 16 April -14 May 1948
I. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly
A. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10 on the Temporary Administration
of Jerusalem.
.B. Draft resolution contained in Report of Committee 1.
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Voting Record: (pp. 1424-5; 29 November 1947)
For: 33 Against: 13 Abstentions: 10
Byelorussian SSR Afghanistan UK
Czechoslovakia Egypt
Poland India Yugoslavia
Ukrainian SSR Iran
USSR Iraq
Lebanon
France Pakistan
Us Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
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i. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly *
1. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10 on "Temporary Administra-
tion of Jerusalem" (contained in document A/C 1/298) specifying the type
of temporary government to be set up for Jerusalem.
a. Mexican Amendment (document A/C 1/302) to
paragraph 5 of preamble:
"Whereas the maintenance of order and security
in Jerusalem is an urgent question which concerns the
United Nations as a whole, "
Voting Record:
(pp. 33-4; 14 May 1948)
For: 15
Against: 11
Abstentions: 28
France
US
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Yemen
India
UK
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Mexican Amendment (document A/C 1/302) to
paragraph 6 of preamble to read as follows:
"Whereas Chapter XII of the Charter authorizes
and empowers the United Nations to exercise temporary
administrative authority, "
Voting Record:
(p. 34;
14 May 1948)
For: 14
Against: 11
France
Afghanistan
Iran
US
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Syria
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
India
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Official Records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly,
Volume I, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records
of Meetings, 16 April - 14 May 1948, and Annex to Volumes I and II.
17
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1 to read as follows:
c. US Amendment (A/C 1/304) to article 4, paragraph
"The Government of Jerusalem shall consist
of a United Nations Commissioner and such officers
as may be appointed by him or by the Trusteeship
Council. . . "
Voting Record: (pp. 34-5; 14 May 1948)
For: 17
Against: 11
Abstentions: 26
India
UK
France Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
d. US Amendment (A/C 1/304) to article 10, paragraph
2 to replace the words: "shall be paid from a special United Nations
operational budget, " by the words:
United Nations budget. "
"shall be paid from the regular
Voting Record:
(p. 35;
14 May 1948)
For: 19
Against: 12
Abstentions: 23
US
Afghanistan
India
France
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Yugoslavia
UK
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
e. US Amendment (A/C 1/304) proposing the addition
of the following words at the end of article 10, paragraph 2:
it. . . provided that, if United Nations funds are con-
templated, the Secretary-General shall be guided by
the procedures which were established by the second
session of the General Assembly for defraying unfore-
seen and extraordinary expenses. "
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Voting Record:
(pp. 35-6;
14 May 1948)
For: 17
Against: 12
Abstentions: 25
France
Afghanistan
India
US
Egypt
Iran
I
UK
raq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Poland
Yugoslavia
f. Resolution of Sub-Committee 10 (document A/C 1/298)
as amended:
Voting Record:
(p. 36;
14 May 1948)
Against: 15
Abstentions: 19
France
Afghanistan
India
US
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
UK
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Yugoslavia
Note: Failing to receive required two-thirds majority, resolution was rejected.
2. Draft resolution recommended in report of Committee 1 (con-
tained in document A/552). The resolution (1) affirms the General Assem-
bly's support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in
Palestine, (2) calls upon all Governments, organizations and persons
to co-operate in making effective such a truce, and (3) empowers a United
Nations Mediator in Palestine, to be chosen by a committee of the General
Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, to
exercise certain definite function.
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Voting Record: (pp. 44--5;
14 May 1948)
Against: 7
Abstentions:
16
France
UK
Us
India
Iran
Pakistan
Turkey
Afghanistan
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
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1. THE FIRST COMMITTEE
A. PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR
1. Australian Amendment (A/C 1/408) to revised UK resolu-
tion on Palestine (A/C 1/394/Rev. 2).
a. Amendment to paragraph 1:
"Being of opinion that the Assembly's resolution
of 29 November 1947 is the basic starting point
of settlement by the Assembly of the Palestine
question;"
Voting Record: (pp. 859-60; 1 December 1948)
For: 12 Against: 24 Abstentions: 12
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Afghanistan France
Egypt US
India
Iraq
Iran
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
b. Amendment to paragraph 2:
"Being further of opinion that the final settlement
in Palestine as regards boundaries should be in
conformity with the principles of the recommendation
contained in the Assembly's resolution of 29 November
1947 but should also take into account subsequent
proposals, including those in the Mediator's report;"
Voting Record: (p. 860; 1 December 1948)
For: 4 Against: 25 Abstentions: 20
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
France
US
',Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I,
First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September -
8 December 1948, and Annex to Part I.
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c. Amendment to paragraph 3:
"Noting the establishment since 15 May 1948 of
civil and military authority under the Provisional
Government of Israel, over substantially the area
which, under the resolution of 29 November 1947
was recognized as delimiting the Jewish State in
Palestine envisaged in that resolution;"
Voting :Record: (p. 860; 1 December 1948)
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Against: 25 Abstentions: 13
Afghanistan France
Egypt US
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
d. Amendment to paragraph 4:
"Noting that the establishment of the Provisional
Government of Israel and the exercise by it of
autonomous defense and administrative functions
is in conformity with the spirit and intention of
the resolution of 29 November 1947, and that
this Government has been described by the Media-
tor as a 'living, solidly entrenched and vigorous
reality', "
Voting Record: (pp. 860-1;
1 December 1948)
Against: 24
Abstentions:
13
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
Yugoslavia
USSR
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
.Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
France
US
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SECTION FOUR: THE THIRD (REGULAR) SESSION (PART I),
21 September - 12 December 1948
I. The First Committee
A. Progress Report.of the United Nations Mediator.
B. Withdrawal of Arab Troops.
C. Creation of a Unitary State in Palestine.
D. The Palestine Question and the International Court of Justice.
II. The Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly
A. The Conciliation Commission, Holy Places, and Refugees.
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2. UK second revised draft resolution (A/C 1/394/Rev. 2
paragraph 5:
The General Assembly,
"Endorses the recommendation, contained in paragraph
4(c) of the Mediator's conclusions concerning the disposition
of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries
of the Jewish State or the City of Jerusalem, and instructs
the Conciliation Commission, in full consultation with the
inhabitants of Arab Palestine, to assist the Governments
of the Arab States concerned to arrange for the disposition
of this territory in accordance with the aforesaid recommendation;"
Voting Record: (p.. 890; 3 December 1948)
For: 18 Against: 26 Abstentions: 12
UK Afghanistan
us Egypt
France India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
3. United Kingdom draft resolution (document A/C 1/394/Rev. 2)
as amended:
Voting Record:. (pp. 923-4; 4 December 1948)
For: 25 Against: 21 Abstentirns: 9
France Afghanistan
UK Egypt
US India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
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B. WITHDRAWAL OF ARAB TROOPS
1. USSR draft resolution (A/C 1/401):
"The General Assembly,
"Considering that the presence of foreign troops in
Palestine prevents the establishment of peaceful relations
between the Arab and Jewish population in Palestine, as
well as the normal development of the State of Israel and
the creation of an Arab State in Palestine,
"Recommends the immediate removal from the
territories of the Jewish and Arab States in Palestine,
the creation of which was provided for by General
Assembly resolution 181(11) of 29 November 1947, of all
foreign troops and foreign military personnel; and
"Requests the Security Council to adopt appropriate
measures for debarring a renewal of military activity in
Palestine. "
Voting Record: (p. 930; 4 December 1948)
For: 7 Against: 33 Abstentions: 8
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
India
Iran
UK
US
France
C. CREATION OF A UNITARY STATE IN PALESTINE
1. Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/402):
'The General Assembly,
"Noting that resolution 181(II) of the General Assembly
of 29 November 1947 was not accepted by the Arabs of
Palestine and the neighboring Arab States and gave birth
to the disastrous situation in the Holy Land,
"Noting that the recommendations proposed by the
Mediator in his part one of the progress report are based
on partitioning Palestine between Arabs and Jews, proposal
which has been flatly rejected by the Arabs and proved
detrimental to the interests of both Arabs and ,Yews,
"Noting that the General Assembly is not empowered
by the Charter to make imperative and compulsory recom-
mendations for splitting countries,
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"Noting that the. Jewish community now found in
Palestine is composed essentially of foreign immi-
grants and refugees who have no legitimate rights to
appropriate a part of the country and establish their
sovereignty on it against the wishes of the lawful
majority of the people of Palestine,
"Decides to constitute a Commission composed
of five Member States with functions:
"To study on the spot and to prepare proposals for
the establishment of a single State of the whole of
Palestine on a cantonization or federal basis in which
all sections of population in Palestine: will participate
in rights and duties as loyal citizens of a democratic
State with wide autonomous privileges in cantons or
areas to be assigned to each of them."
Voting Record:
For: 14
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Syria
Yemen
(pp. 930-1; 4 December 1948)
Against: 26 Abstentions: 8
France
UK
US
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
D. THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE
1. Syrian draft resolution (A/C 1/405) as amended by el Salvador,
embodying a decision to refer certain legal aspects of the Palestine question
to the International Court of Justice.
Voting Record:
(pp. 932-3;
4 December 1948)
Against: 21
Abstentions: 4
Afghanistan
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
US
France
UK
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II. THE PLENARY. MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION,. HOLY PLACES, AND
REFUGEES
1. Polish proposal (A/804) to delete from paragraph 2 of
Committee 1 Report draft resolution (document A./776) the words "3'1
and substitute "5" to increase the membership of the Conciliation Com-
mission. (The resolution contained in document A/776 calls for the
establishment of a Conciliation Commission consisting of three State
members of the United Nations which will assume the functions given to
the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.
Voting Record: (p. 993; 11 December 1948)
For: 6 Against: 47 Abstentions: 5
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
UK
US
France
2. Joint proposal (A/800/Rev. 1), presented by Australia,.
Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, and New Zealand to delete
paragraph 2(c) from resolution of First Committee (document A/776).
Paragraph 2(c) reads as follows:
"To promote good relations between the State of Israel,
the Arabs of Palestine, and the neighboring Arab States;"
Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I,
Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings,
21 September - 12 December 1948, and Annex to Part I.
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4
Voting Record: (pp. 993-4; 11 December 1948)
For: 46 Against: 8
Afghanistan Byelorussian SSR
Egypt Czechoslovakia
Iran Poland
Iraq Ukrainian SSR
Lebanon USSR
Pakistan Yugoslavia
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Yemen
France
UK
3. El Salvador's amendment (A/801) to Committee 1 resolu-
tion (A/776). Amendment calls for extention of UN's supervision of Holy
Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine (proposed and defined
in paragraphs 7 and the second paragraph following paragraph 8 of draft
resolution of Committee 1) to include Nazareth.
Voting Record:
For: 17
Lebanon
(p. 995; 11 December 1948)
Against: 11
Afghanistan
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
Abstentions: 29
Turkey
France
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
Yugoslavia
UK
US
4. Committee 1 draft resolution (A/776), as amended. (Com-
is
mittee 1 draft resolution (1) calls for the establishment of a Conciliation
Commission having certain definite functions; (2) resolves that the Holy
Places in Jerusalem area and in Palestine be accorded adequate protection;
(3) resolves that the Jerusalem area "should be placed under effective
United Nations control;" (4) resolves that refugees wishing to return to
their homes be permitted to do so, and that compensation should be paid
for the property of those choosing not to return" and for loss or damage
to property which under principles of international law or in equity, should
be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. "
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I
41
Voting Record: (pp. 995-6; 11 December 1948)
For: 35 Against: 15
Turkey
France
UK
Us
Abstentions: 8
Afghanistan India
Egypt Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Syria
Yemen
Byelorussian SSR
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Ukrainian SSR
USSR
Yugoslavia
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