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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 91
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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World-wide
Perspectives
KEY DATES
May 16 - 18
Stockholm Emergency Action Conference on Vietnam,
to step up condemnation of war in Viet-
nam. Announced by Gunnar Myrdal,
Chairman of Swedish Vietnam Committee.
May 22 Moscow 1943 - End of Third International
(Comintern) announced. The statement
declared the autonomy of Communist par-
ties outside the USSR (a principle once
again at issue on the eve of the World
Communist Conference).
May 23 Moscow Meeting of Preparatory Commission for
conference of world Communist parties.
June 4 - 26 Geneva Annual International Labor Conference
(ILO 50th Anniversary)
June 5 (maybe) Moscow World Communist Conference
June II - 12 Moscow 1937 - Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky and
seven other top Red Army generals ar-
rested, tried secretly and executed. In
ensuing Stalinist purge of Soviet mili-
tary, about half of all officers, in-
cluding all II Army and Navy Vice Com-
missars, disappeared (an event seemingly
being ignored by those in the Soviet
military now pushing for a revival of
Stalinism).
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May 1969
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(22 March - 18 April 1969)
1. Soviets Attain Objective in Czechoslovakia
After prolonged effort, the Soviets have finally succeeded in removing
Alexander Dubcek from his key position of Secretary General of the Czechoslo-
vak Communist Party (CzCP) by virtue of a Second Soviet Intervention. The
CzCP Central Committee met on 17 April and announced major changes in the
leadership. Slovak Party leader Gustav Husak replaced Dubcek, who, however,
remains on the new 11-man Presidium (Politburo), which itself replaces the
old 21-man Presidium and its 8-man Executive Committee ("Super-Politburo").
Josef Smrkovsky, the most consistent and outspoken of the reformist Czech
party leaders, was dropped from the Presidium. To make the demotion of
Dubcek and Srmkovsky palatable to the population and to forestall violent
mass protests, it was arranged for the Presidium to contain a sprinkling of
men of known liberal reputation, most notable among whom is Karel Polacek,
the leading Czech trade union leader, in order to counterbalance the increased
conservative coloring of the leadership. The inclusion of notorious pro-
Moscow conservatives like Lubomir Strougal, Jan Piller, and Vasil Bilak is
an ominous portent. The retention of President Svoboda and Premier Cernik
helps give an air of stability and continuity. Husak himself is generally
held to be a "realist"; he can hardly be labeled a complete conservative or
a true liberal. The central fact is that he seems to consider accommodating
the Soviets as the first and foremost task of the Czech leadership -- and
it is unquestionably this fact, along with his reputation of being neither
liberal nor conservative, that persuaded the Soviets to install him as the
new leader.
The changeover was accompanied by extensive police action in the form
of detention and questioning of hundreds of people. Whether this was a
precautionary measure or a foretaste of a more aggressive police state
should soon become clear. Also subject to doubt is the sincerity of Husak's
claim that the change in leadership means no change in policy, that the
liberal reform program will continue, and that there will be no return to
the dark pre-Dubcek days of Novotny. The Soviets engineered these govern-
mental changes and installed Husak in his key position for just the opposite
purpose, namely to hasten "normalization," the Soviet euphemism for making
Czechoslovakia conform to the colorless pattern of orthodoxy displayed in
East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria. The main question to ask is not whether
the new regime will re-impose an orthodox Communist dictatorship, but rather
how they will go about it and how long it will take. The answer to these
questions is to be found partly in the course of action that will be taken
by the groups in the Czech population who consistently supported Dubcek's
policies -- students, intellectuals, scientists, journalists, trade
unionists -- but also in how much moral support they receive from the free
world.
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2. East and West: Two Communist Congresses
It would be hard to find two more widely divergent phenomena of current
Communist activity than the Ninth Chinese Communist Party and the 15th Congress
of the Finnish Communist Party. Both took place in April: the CCP Congress
beginning on the first and the FCP Congress taking place 3-6 April. Apart
from that coincidence, virtually all they had in common was the fact that
both ignored the wishes of Big Brother CPSU, thus illustrating quite per-
suasively the ability of Communist parties to make their own decisions
independently of the CPSU if they are but determined to do so, regardless
of CPSU attempts to dictate.
The Chinese Congress
Ten years overdue and after only a brief announcement in January that
the Ninth Party Congress would convene sometime in 1969, the Congress was
suddenly pronounced assembled on 1 April at an undisclosed site in Peking.
The Chinese radio announced that Mao Tse-tung made an "important speech"
and Defense Minister Lin Piao, later officially confirmed as heir-apparent
to Mao, gave a "political report." For typically mysterious, Maoist reasons,
not even the substance, much less the text, of either report was made public.
The 1,512 delegates to the Congress then were said to have broken up into
discussion groups to study the reports in detail, paragraph by paragraph,
sentence by sentence, and also to study the new draft constitution. This
task, clearly a rubber stamp procedure, seems to have absorbed all the
energies of the delegates for the next two weeks of the Congress. Free
world "China watchers" have scrutinized the meager offerings from Chinese
news media, including the slight television coverage of the Congress, for
clues of its significance. The unconfident consensus, perhaps best expres-
sed in the attached article by correspondent Peter Grose in the New York
Times, is that a factional struggle is being silently waged between fanatic
Mao adherents who want to continue the Cultural Revolution (a purge and
purification of the Party) and more moderate leadership elements, including
the military, who seek to restore a semblance of normalcy in the administra-
tion of the country.
The course of the Congress and a communique (attached) issued during
the Congress on 14 April deserve study. Stalin was in command for roughly
25 years before the world fully realized and Communists, including his own
countrymen, acknowledged that he was a megalomaniac. The wording of the
14 April communique, as a masterpiece of vacuity in content and of
sycophancy in its flattery of Mao, apart from being an offense to human
intelligence, contends for honors with the "cult of (Stalin's) personality."
It seems reasonable to assume that many of Mao's colleagues are suffering
under the burden of his manias just as Khrushchev and his colleagues suf-
fered under Stalin's manias.
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The conduct of the Congress, incidentally, illustrates the complete
contempt in which the Chinese leadership holds its own people -- in whose
name the Congress is held. Clearly it does not feel the slightest obli-
gation to keep them informed of what the leadership thinks or has decided
about the fate of the people, for this fate is supposedly what the Congress
is determining.
The Finnish Party Congress
On the other side of the world, another important CP meeting was
taking place: the Finnish Communist Party Congress. The FCP's claim to
distinction is that it is among Europe's most powerful CF's. It holds 41
seats in a 200-member unicameral parliament, has polled some 20% or more of
the popular vote in national elections since World War II, and is the only
CP in non-Communist Europe to be participating in government (it holds three
cabinet posts in coalition with Social Democrats and Centrists). Since
Stalin's death in 1953, the party had been gradually liberalized under
pressure from younger Communists of modern outlook who have little knowledge
of, and less patience with, the irrelevant, ossified Stalinist (and even
Leninist) dogma still espoused by their older, Moscow-trained, conspiracy-
minded colleagues. The "generation conflict" of recent years unexpectedly
reached crisis proportions on the occasion of the Congress, when key
Stalinists, seeing the prospect of defeat after defeat on party statutes,
program, and membership in key party offices, walked out in a huff, planning
to meet separately on 25-26 April to discuss, among other things, whether
they should establish a separate party. One of the obsolete pieces of
Leninist baggage seemingly thrown out at the Congress was the traditional
Communist aim of establishing a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the
notion of the Communists' wielding exclusive power. This doctrine gave
way to acceptance of the ?principle of multiple parties even after establish-
ment of a "Socialist" State. It was largely due to this very heresy that
the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The Soviets seem not to have taken a public stand on these debates
within the Finnish party, evidently because they are powerless to change
the FCP stand. But in the matter of the split in the party they could
not refrain from reverting to direct interference. The main Finnish news-
paper, Helsingin Sanomat, reported that representatives of the Finnish Old
Guard and of the now dominant liberal group were summoned to the Soviet
Embassy by Arvid Pelshe, visiting CPSU Politburo member and pressed to
reconcile their differences with the admonition that whoever splits the
Finnish Communist Party is no friend of the Soviet Union. Considering
recent trends in the FCP toward independent decisions, (the dominant
leadership firmly denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia), there
is no guarantee that Soviet admonitions will have any appreciable effect.
3. Briefly Noted
a. Rumanian Foreign Minister to Moscow. Foreign Minister Corneliu
Manescu was greeted on his formal visit to Moscow, 7-9 April, with a not-
so-subtle insult in the form of a strong reiteration in Pravda of the
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Brezhnev Doctrine, among the main targets of which is Rumania. It is a
matter of intriguing speculation for foreign correspondents in Moscow why
this one-shot insult was printed. No other newspaper carried it, and there
seems to have been no follow-up. One thing is clear: the Soviets are
retaining their options concerning future action toward Rumania, and one of
these options is to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to Rumania as they applied
it to Czechoslovakia last August.
The purpose of Manescu's mission remains even now shrouded in mystery
and Communist news media offer no enlightenment. His visit was completed
with a non-committal joint announcement and an invitation to Brezhnev,
Kosygin, and Podgorny to pay a visit to Rumania. They accepted.
b. Brutal PCI-Soviet Polemics. Attached are translations of a bitter
exchange of polemics started by Giuseppe Boffa, prominent journalist-com-
mentator and former Moscow correspondent for the Italian Communist news-
paper L'Unitg, who often speaks for the leadership of the party. Boffa,
writing in L'Unit6 on 9 April took the occasion of the Sino-Soviet border
conflict to raise all the objections and apprehensions the PCI has about
CPSU policies and intentions, including the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
the role of the Soviet Union as a "guiding state" for the world's Communist
parties. Stung badly, the Soviets lost little time in replying through
Pravda on 13 April in an article by one Ivanov. Boffa's article may well
be the PCI's way of serving notice on the CPSU that they still have grave
doubts about participating in the World Communist Conference on 5 June 1969,
at which it is expected that the CPSU will try once again to reassert a
measure of control over the world's Communist parties.
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3PYRQHT.
SigAile$
Art,.
Zy PL'IiIt GROSE .
I', The New 7,,rk
WASHINGTON, A ril 4
iiescatincloiatipairii
ef, ern ip oma s . ave e-
!tected signs that Communist
!China's ninth party congress,
Inow under way, is embroiled in
,dissension and serious argu-
ment, contrary to their expecta-
tion that it would be a rubber-
stamp occasion.
, Their analysis is that basic
'Issues that have been fought
:over in the Cultural Revolution
of the last three years have
not yet been resolved.
Foremost among these are
the conflicting demands of ,ad-
ministrative stability and chair-
man Mao Tse-tung's dream of
continuing the revolutionary
zeal of his generation, along
:with the frictions and rivalries,
among the bureaucracy of the
iCommunist party, the army and
such ' revolutionary organiza-
tions as the Red Guards.
.! Finally, there is evidence that
the central question of person-.
nel ? tha? of who, under the
level of the top leadership, will,
,actually carry out Tarty and,
government functions in Peking'
? has not been decided.
Diplomatic analysts drew
these conclusions four days after
Ithe long-awaited congress be-
gun in Peking. They are based.:
these specialists hasten to point!
NEW YORK TIMES
5 April 1969
?T
cpYi!RGHPART? REMOLD111
SEEN AS MAO AIM.
Ideological Purity Believed
Key Objective in Congress
By CHARLES MOHR
:special to The Nor York Times
HONG KONG, April 4?The
CPYRGHT
91-01411N00 Me410001 -9
not on hard information emerg- .the 1,512 delegates at the cur:-
in,g from any authoritative rent con ress is the a saren
the top ea?ers are not in
doubt?the congress communi-
? .?
?
Indeed, the tight secrecy sur-
rounding the congress is con-
sidered impressive evidence
that significant issues are be-
ing threshed out. Since the
opening day, Tuesday, the Chi-
nese press and radio have
maintained a total silence
,about the proceedings. .
A Hanel rommoniquis, of the
'opening clay is still repeated
iregularly by ,Peking, four days
later. No additional details
;have been given to the Chinese
ipeople about the speech of
;Chairman Mao or the political
ireport of his heir apparent, De-
'loose Minister Lin Piao.
When the eighth party con-
gress first met, in 1956, the
major opening day speeches
were published in full two days
later. That congress recon-
vened in 1958, and then the
proceedings were not made
known until a final report at
the end.
Analysts believe that the
1958 meeting provoked consid-
erable internal controversy
over decisions leading up to
the ambitious and unsuccessful
economic program called the
"Great Leap Forward?'
Another sign that solidarity
Arhievpci :nmnrig
congress or the Chinese Com-
munist party now under way
in Peking appears to be an at-
tempt by Mao Tse-tung not
only to rebuild the party but
also to insure its future ideo-
logical purity.
, It was the party chairman's
conviction that the old party
bureaucracy was riddled with
men who opposed him person-
ally and ideologically. That is
believed to have led him to
undertake in 1966 the pro-
longed purge known as the Cul-
tural Revolution.
Tho party congress has met
without press publicity since it
opened Tuesday. It is believed
to be deliberating on a politi-
cal report given by Defen:e:
Minister Lin Piao, Mr. Mao's
hand-picke 'r
A draft
stitution that reached
Kong in January defines a pa.-
?
as observers.
Normally, Communist party
congresses attract a large num-
ber of representatives from al-
lied parties. Peking has not
reported the presence of any
foreigners, and diplomats know
that in the weeks preceding the
congress several potential dele-
gations were discouraged from
attending, at least at the early
stages.
This suggests that the lead-
ership did not want to have
outside witnesses to whatever
deliberations are taking place.
A final indication that
unanimity was lacking on key
issues was the long delay in
convening the congress. Prom-
ised since August, 1967, the
opening was repeatedly post-
poned, even, apparently, up to
the last minute. Almost all the
important provincial leaders
are reported to have been in
Peking for the congress from
the beginning of March; yet the
congress did not open until the
beginning of April.
The most pressmg question
for Western analysts is thel
identity of the officials who will
emerge with key Government
and party jobs. The narnpq
y congress ea "tlIC h:010t
leading organ of the party,"
and 1,512 delegates have ga-
thered in Peking for the meet-
ing.
To Adopt Party Charter
One of their jobs will be to
adopt the new charter, the Pe-
king radio has said. The draft
document suggests much abot:t
the tactics that Mr. Mao evi-
dently intends to follow in re-
structuring the party.}
He is believed to have been!
obsessed in recent years withl
chef that a "socialist" state;
n clangbr of a restoration oi.
italisra or of "revisionist"
as as it proceeds toward,:
e "communism."
he preamble, or "general pro-
m," of the draft constitution,
ects this view when it says
t in the stage of transition, .
socialism to communism;
re will throughout exist
ses, class contradictions and!
class struggle, there will:
t the struggle of the two
s between socialism and
talism. there will exist the
ger of a capitalist restore-
."
number of measures are
ned to forestall these dan-
.
ticle 5 of the draft says the
lc party must "obey a uni-
AVnutr4g? pallPm.:7me9
to protest and appeal any
1041al lit:USIU115 th..t may
a
is
ca
id
pu
gr.
ref
th,
fro
,,t
cla
.the
exi
roa
cal
da
tio
pla
ger
wh
RO/
ber
erences from the group of
leaders that has dominated the
Cultural Revolution for the last
three years.
Rut there are as yet no clues
to the personnel that will oc-
cupy ministerial and subminis-
terial posts directly below the
top group around chairman
Mao.
The 176 persons listed as
members of the congress pre-
sidium were initially supposed
to constitute the approximate
composition of the party's new
Central Committee. Analysts
now doubt that this will be
borne out, since about 60 per
cent of the presidium mem-
bers are local figures from the
provinces.
These specialists believe,
that the governing Central
Committee would have to in-
clude a larger representation
of full-time officials at the cen-
ter, who would operate the
party and government ap-
paratus. ?
Dispute over this question, :
over whether the administra-
tive apparatus should be
weighted . toward the military
or toward the established party
bureaucracy, may well be at
the center of the congress's
deb^tir, diplomats believe.
Nays
? "
oe in violation of Mr. asao s tnat a party member
policies. must particularly guard
"If a party member does not against careerists, plotters and
agree with the decisions or di-
two-faced persons and must
rectives of the party organiza-
prevent bad persons of this
tion, he may reserve his opin-
sort from usurping party or
This will probably encourage
ions and has the right to pass state leadership at any level."
-over his superiors and report
directly to the Central Commit-
zealots to continue to hrinp
tee and the chairman of the their complaints of "bourgeois
Central Committee," the draft, thinking" and revisionism to
1
charter said.
Mr. Mao and the group around
'Slavish Obedience' Scored
him.
The preamble also asserts1
This provision is clearly that the "party must un-.
meant to deal with what the ceasingly get rid of the old
Maoist press calls the concept and absorb the new" and an-
of "slavish obedience." The
other article says that one
Maoists say that men such as
must be a "revolutionary dc-
the."
former chief of state, Liu to gain admittance to
Shao-chi, and the party's for-
'the party.
mei-. general secretary, Teng
A reading of the press in re-
Hsih-ping, used the concept of cent years shows that nothing
unwavering obedience to spread has disturbed Mr. Mao more
t
anti-Maoist policies, such as the thanthe possibility that his old
extension of private land in
enemies would succeed in gain-
agriculture. ing political rehabilitation. An
example is former Defense
headed by Mr. Teng that al-
Minister Peng Teh-hoai, who
It was the party secretariat
lowed the Liu forces to usurp
so much day-to-day power struggled for four years to be
from Mr. Mao, and ? the draft rehabilitated after his dismis.
charter reflects suspicion of sal in 1958. In present jargon,
such bureaucracy. ) this is called "the evil wind of
, It alludes to replacement of reversing verdicts."
the old secretariat by saying To prevent it, the new draft'
that "there shall be established provides for no appeal proce-
l
the necessary competent or-1 dures at all and says that
AuktioyiyaligajiNariffiontbil.'17
stubbornly re-
ITle. "m st be
I
eminent and army? purged ? from the party and
'
. Article 3 of the draft nicn!novor anew" h...
CPYRGHT
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?
HONG KO:-;6?Th ril-
tialistie Chinese Cornr:-.?;-
nints, obsce;sed by the
monies of of their unique
theology, are foicver .-.);ftt-
ing
The China-
watcher finds that habit
both a major irritation and
a blessing. It is had for the
eyes and trying for the
memory, but the meticu-
leus ranking clearly spells
out the pecking order of
.the hierarchical society.
China - watchers were
poring Thursday over a
windfall?the list of 176
members of the Presidium
of the 5th National., Con-
gress of the /Comniunist-
Party ' of China, finally
convened after months of
anticipation and years of
delay.
Detailed examination of
the new aristocracy yields
some fascinating hypoth-
eses.: The Presidium is;
atter all, almost certain to
be the new Central Com-
mittee of the Communist
Party.
Now Aristocracy
The most obvious and
politically most significant
conclusion is that the new
aristocracy is, as the Chi-
nese put, It, "like a rad-
ish ? red outside and
white inside." After the
red skin of the 24 leading
men and women is peeled
away, several strang
phenomena support that
conclusion.
Most striking is the
preponderance of the mili-
tary; 7.1 of the 176 are
? either officers, soldiers, or
unquestionably identified
with the People's Libera-
tion Army, China's regu-
lar army.
The second -Conclusion is
:t h a t matrimony pays,
even in China, where abso-
lute equality of the 'sexes
is a cardinal tenet of faith.
'Among approximately 18
women on the Presidium,
'five are listed largely be-
,cause they are the wives
of "senior cadres." A whiff
:of bourgeois nepotism ri-
A
I
1 so
II
area ? oft. 16.
o s New Aristocracy I
Ranking of Presidium Members Clearly
Spells Out Pecking Order in Hierarchy .
BY 110BERT S. ELEGANT
start Wr.rtr
tho -prolcr.i aec 81.e dc1;bc,d+,.
xiety. offerings to the disaffected
Among those five wo- "Old Party member s,`
men, two stand with the whose ranks were scythed
tint 14 Presidium mem- by the Great Proletarian
b-rs. Chiang Ching, No. 6,* Cultural Revolution.
the %vile of Chairman Along with the dominant
1Cao Tse-tung, and Yeh military, they, by and
Clun, No. 12, is the wife of large, represent the pre-
Lep. Chairman Lin Piao. vaiiing conservative and
Power of Military compromising tendency.
Yet the full list Includes
only 42 survivors of 193
full and alternate mem-
bers of the Central Com-
mittee appointed at the
tl.e power of the military. .8th National, Congress in
Chiang Ching's favorite 19'8. Their number was
-hjsieian, the man who .also thinned by 18 natural
"N-estern piano into the deaths. .?
ritroduced the abhorred
Striking Contrast
.riditional Peking Opera,
it inds 138th. Scattered
rough the Presidium are
11 model peasants, farm-
ers, and workers, the gloss
)r the new "proletarian
rd poor peasant" comple-
ici)n claimed for the Pre-:
The political in-
luence of two "model en-
ted men" is also tenuous.
The list is also padded
,with essentially nonpoliti-
\c..1 individuals. That ano-
maly both denigrates the
P-esidium and emphasizes
Somewhat more signifi-
:ant are about five scien-
ts intimately associated
v th nuclear and rocketry
dc-velopment. Chief among
hem is Chien kisueh-shen,
o ?mer professor at the
k,Alifornia Institute of
'rc chnology.
? ,
Former Officials
The list also displays six
. o r in e r cove.;?nors, vice
-,p.vernors, mayors. ann.
vice mayors. They are
'dies of the days when
Mina was ruled by a
)r maI go vernmental Po-ta, but two opportu-
;t. -ucture. Impromptu Re- nists distinguished prima-
v lutionary Committees rily for their devotion to
lz.ve now displaced both Chiang Ching.
he provincial and local Unless an extraordinary
wgans of the Communist reversal occurs, those 14
t"). r y and the ?People's !will be the Ztantung Com-;
kiovernment. ?rnittee ?of' the Political
Those former officials Bureau of the Communist.
? The most striking con-
trast between the red out-
er skin and the white
inner skin lies in the
difference betweeii t h e
first group of 14 and the
second of 10 set above the
rank and file.
Chairman Mao and his
deputy chairman, Lin
Piao, stand at the head of
the first 14.
The remaining 12 in this
group include not only the
indestructible Premier
Chou En-lai, secretary ge-
neral of the Presidium,
but six soldiers, whose
loyalties generally tend
toward Lin Piao?as well
?as Lin's -wife, who is a
member of the People's
Liberation Army's Cultur-
al Revolutionary Group.
The four civilians on the
heights include not only
Mao's wife, Chiang Ching,
and his ghostwriter. Chen
rarty. they should, In
theory, exercise total pow- ?
er over all China.
But the next 10 names.
set above the commonalty;
make that conclusion hazi
ardous. They are, by
Maoist standards, t h e
white inner skin just be-
neath the red outer skin.
That group includes six
officers who were field
marshals untirformal mi-
litary rank was abolished
in 1965. Although at least
one, former Generalissimo
Chu Teh, is politically
negligible at 83, the other
field marshals are a sIgni,
f icant force.
i Remarkable Choice *,
Quite remarkably, LW
Po-cheng, the one-eyed
general who once fought
with Soviet troops against
a Manchurian warlord, is
first among the marshals:
Yet Liu was, among those
men, the most obdurate
and the most viciously
attacked by Red Guard
extremists. He Is, howev-
er, exceedingly powerful
in the disputed southwest.
Among the four civilians
In the second rank, Tung
Pi-nu, 83, is a political
monument like his con-
temporary, Chu Teh. The
remaining three are all
vice premiers, the techni-
cians, managers and adm1-:
nistrators of Premier'
Chou. ?
The balance Is both.
precise. and delicate. It is,
also, obviously deliberate.
, is as if Peking had
put up a big signboard.
reading: 'Communism at.
All Costs! We Will Create
Our Own Paradise No
.Matter What Becomes of
the Economy. and Civil
Order!" one acute specia-
list remarked.
:
'But. in small. print un-
derneath. 41. reads: 'Bust-,
ness as Usual?Just as,
Soon as We Can. Get Back
tO BusInesaL" he added.
roved For RCIC83C 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-0
9PYRGHipp "
rpyia""drEor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
CPYRGHT
CHINA'S RUA VOTE CHARM AKING EEIR TO fi1A01
Party Congress Approves
' New Po!icy Program ?
DiF,doses No Details
By CHARLES MOHR
ti) The New YwV rmtz
'HONG scrim- April 14?The
inth congress of the Chinese
Communist party unanimously
adopted today a new party
charter that stipulates that De-
fense Minister Lin Piao will
eventually succeed Mao Tse-
tung as China's leader.
' A communique made public
today by the official press
agency Ilsinhua said the con-
gress also unanimously adopt-
ed a political report by Mr.
ln that will' probably become
'blueprint for policy in for-
eign, economic and domestic
political fields. But it gave no
details of the report.
The communique added that
the party congress would begin
tomorrow to elect a new Can.:
tral Committee. During the Cul-
tural Revolution initiated by
Mr. Mao three years ago, about
two-thirds of the members of
the old Central Committee were
dismissed as "power-holders
taking the capitalist road."
Unusual Occasion
A congress Is described by
Chinese Communists as the
highest governing organ of
their party, and such convoca-
_ ?Ions are both rare and im-
ithiosertant. The ninth congress is
,only the second held since the
Communists won control of
China in 1049. The last con-
gress was elected in 1956 and
'last met in 105S.
TO PICK LEADERS TODAYI
ine Loiz delegates to the
present, or ninth, congress met
411 PA1116 14 days a8u vu April
TtntHtnnt Vflore had Won
no further news on their de-
liberations, but today's corn-
muniqu6 indicated that the
congress would soon adjourn.
The first two items on the
congress agenda, as announced
April I, were the adoption of
Mr. Lin's politieal report and a
new party constitution. These
tasks have been completed.
Mao Title in Doubt
Tonight's communiqud said
the congress would begin elect-
ing a new Central Committee
."starting from April 15." It was
unclear how long this process
would take.
The Central Committee will
then meet to select a new
Politburo, which, in turn, will
elect a standing committee.
This will be the supreme ruling
party body in China.
The new Central Committee
would technically be empow-
ered also to elect a new chair-
man of the committee, but most
analysts in Hong Kong assume
that Mr. Mao will be re-elected
to his post with Lin Piao the
sole vice chairman.
Some observers in Washing.
ton have speculated that Mr.
;Mao may be elevated in title
:to something approximating
...Great Leader" and Mr. Lin
named party chairman.
In either case it seems clear
that ric innt s VI, 75 year old
Full Central Committee Is
.to Be Elected, Replacing
? Purged Rulin
Mr. Mao is fit he will remain
thr. pnri,,Aunt ft.re
'munique did not revail it:
The list of persons that
leadership.
.s.lowed the ranking of major
deleg,?or 'var. the raw n thc
BUldUJI: of Its ambiguity aria one issued when the congress
lact of details; tonight's com-
muniqu?ave no real indica- On the basis of past experi-
ence,
tion of any new departures in ence, specialists on China have
policy by China.
However, it said that the speculated that the top names' congress had entrusted the among the delegates to this
sec- congress will probably be sc-
retariat of its presidium, which lected to serve on the new
is headed by Premier Chou En Politburo.
lai, with publishing "two docu-
ments after making modifica-
tions in wording." From the Session on Peking TV
context of the announcement. it ' PEKING, Tuesday, April 173
seemed that these would be the (Agencc France-Presse) ? The
texts of the new party constitu- congress delegates appeared ra-
tion- and of Mr. Lin's' political taxed and smiling yesterday
report.The when they named Lin Piao ns'
announcement that the future successor to Chairman
new constitution "clearly stipu- Ntao.
lated that Comrade Lin Piao is The delegates, who have been
the successor of Chairman meeting behind closed doors
Mao" came as no surprise. since April 2. seemed in excel.
Second Rank Expected lent humor when they appeared
on television shortly after mid-
A draft of the new constitu- night today in a program de-
tion that reached Hong Kong voted to the second plenary
in January had specified Mr. session of the congress.
Lin as Mr. Mao's closest corn- The program offered viewers
rade and political heir. Soon domestic, family-like shots of
after the Cultural Revolution Chinese leaders?Premier Chou
began in 1966, Mr. Lin dis- En-lai arranging the micro-
placed the former chief of phones for Chairman Mao,
state, Liu Shao-chi, as China's Chairman Mao drinking tea,
second-ranking Communist, wagging an admonishing finger
The draft constitution also at the audience and being en-
declared the "thoughts of thusiastically applauded by his
,Chairman Mao" to be the guid-
wife, Chiang Ching.
.ing doctrine of Chinese corn-
Viewers were able to see Lin
'munism. The test was worded
Piao giving an extemporaneous
y
'with the clear intent of at- speech, being applauded b Mr.
.tempting to perpetuate Mr. Mao, Premier Chou and the
-
Mao's militant and "left-wing" whole Congress,ancl Mr. Chou
version of communism, reading his speech and being
If the discussions of the con-
applauded by Mr. Mao, Mr. Lin
grass had resulted in any im-
and the congress.
portant realignment of personal The delegates approved the
new nartv statutes by hrandi.h.
power ' China, toai ht's cern
unt their little red books.
NEW YORK TIMES
35 April 1969 CPYRGHT
Text of the Chinese Communist Party's Communique
HONG KONG. April 14
to if the C air..tuiri..L party
(Pt 4-1 u/linvirig is die
of China and unanimously
text of a communique made
public today after a plenary adopted the Constitution of
SCNSIOtt of the ninth national the Communist party of
congress of the Communist China.
party of China in Pching, as When the great lead-
distributed in English by cr chairman Mao-Tse-tung
llsinhiia, the Chinese Corn- and his close comrade in
midst press agency: arms Vice -Chairman Lin
Pim) mounted the rostrum.
The ninth national con;
p
gress of the Communist party prolonged, thunderous cheers
,
of China, at the plena and applause resounded
plenary and
held on the afternoon of throughout the hall.
April 14, unanimously adopt- Chairman Mao. pres,led
td theApprOvedt Fe taRtgeOtY19991091172r,
by Co:1111in Lin Pao on be- %a dcumenss we.e?
.half of the Central. Commit- unanimously adopted, the
whole hall burst into pro- Chairman Mao at the onen-
longed cheers: "Long live the mg session of the congres;
Communist party of Chinal they expressed their warm
"Long live the invincible support ts it and their deter-
thought of Mao Tse-Tung. minata,n tc., act accordingly..
Long live Chairman Mao, a Party Iti..tory Reviewed
long, long life to him:"
In accordance with Chair-
Starting from April 2 after man Mao's teachings, the
the opetUng of the ninth na- delegates reviewed the his.
tonal congress of the Corn- tory of the party. In Ifi21. at
munist party of Chasa, all the time of the party's fast,
the delegates he:.: group dis- national corigres, there were
cussions. only a few groups with a few
All the delezsts. received dozen patty members, where.
darettar . mts1}4440:9A1AtOailr 0 Wifa!rtYlVY155?f correct
ohliskracitileAVitimguAlnce
studying the extremely im- line our party. has developed
portant speech made by and become the learier nf oho.
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
poy:Prful People's RepJblic of
The!
this is ti?: ?mc
by history on the grez:t
tory our party has won after
its 48 years of he.roic s:rug-
gle, and is also the cr:nclu-
sion made by history on the
complete bankruptcy of .the
"left" and right opportunism
of Chen Tu-hsiu, Wang Ming
and others, which did tre-
mendous harm to the Chinese
revolution.
Only by understanding the
history of the party is it pos-
sible to understand how
Chairman Mao has inherited,
defended and developed
Marxism-Leninism and un-
derstand the 'greatness of
Chairman Man, the greatness
of Mao Tse-tuns thought
and the correctness of Chair-
'man Mao's proletarian revo-
lutionary line,
Chairman Mao said in his
speech: "We hope that the
present congress will be a
congress of unity and a con-
gress of victory and that.
after its conclusion, still
greater victories will he won
throughout the country."
The delegates unanimously
expressed, with dation that
they are determined to re-
spond to the great call of
Chairman Mao. With full con-
fidence they declared: Our
party is unprecedentedly
united after shatterin^t' the
ea
bourgeois hdquartershead-
ed by Liu Shao-chi.
'Smoothly and in Unity'
. Under the direct leadership
of Chairman Mao, our con-
gress has been going on very
smoothly u
and in great nity
i
and it s very fine: it is
bound to be a congress of
unity, a congress of victory
and a congress of pledge for
seizing still greater victories
throughout the country.
? All the delegates conscien-
tiously discussed again and
again the political report
made by vice chairman Lin
Pao, paragraph by paragraph
? and sentence by sentence.
The delegates held that this
report hohls high the great
red banner of Marxism-
Le-'-'sm, Mao Tse-tugs
thought, expounds profound-
ly Chairman Mao's theory of
continuing the revolution
under the dictatorship of the
proletariat, sums up systema-
tically the experience of the
Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution of our country,
analyzes the situation at
home and abroad ar,d sets
forth the fighting tasks here-
after for the whole party, the
whole army and the whole'
nation.
It is a great program guid-
ing posts said that Comrade
tion and Socialist construc-
tion. The delegates who have
come from different fight-
ing posts said that Comrade
Lin Piao's report has sum-
marized all that they want to
say and that the more they
read it the happier they feel.
The more they read it the
more it warms their hearts.
The delegates have made
many good proposals for ad-
ditions to and revisions of
the report.
All the delegates conscien-
tiously discussed the revised
draft constitution of the Corn-
munnst party of China, chap-
ter by chapter and article by
article.
'A Vivid Manifestation'
The delegates held that the
revised draft was jointly
Worked out by the whole
party and the revolutionary
masses throughout the coun-
try?it is the product of the
integration of the great
leader Chairman Mao's wise
leadership with the broad
masses and it is a vivid man-
ifestation of ?the party's dem-
ocratic centralism and the
party's mass line.
The delegates pointed out
that the draft constitution of
the party has clearly reaf-
firmed Marxism - Leninism,
Mao Tse-tung's thought, as
the theoretical basis of the
party's guiding thinking and
clearly stipulated that Com-
rade Lin Pao is the succes-
sor of Chairman Mao?this is
a great Victory of the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion, a great victory of Marx-
ism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's
thought.
In accordance with the pro-
visions of the new party Con-
stitution, our party will
surely be built to become still
greater, still more glo-
rious and still more correct.
Slogans Are Shouted
At the plenary session in
?April 14, the great leader
chairman Mao made an ex-
temely important and inspir-
ing speech. Comrade Lin Pao
made an important speech.
Comrades Chou En-lai, Chen
Po-ta, Kang Sheng, liguang
Yung - shcng, Wang Hung-
wen, Chen Yung-kuei, Sun
Yu-kno Weii Feng-ying and
Chi Teng-kuei also spoke.
They expressed their unan-
imous support for the ex-
tremely important speech
made by the great leader
Chairman Mao. for the politi-
cal report made by Comrade
Lin Piao and for the draft
constitution of the Commu-
nist party of China.
'? Their speeches were punc-
tuated by warm applause and
shouting of slogans through-
out the hall. After adopting
Vice Chairman Lin Piao's po-
litical report and the Constk
tution of the Communist
party of China, the congress
decided to entrust the secre-
tariat of the presidium of the
congress with the publication
of the two documents after
making modifications in
wording.
Seated in the front row of
the rostrum today were Chou
En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang
Sheng, Chiang Ching, Chang
Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan,
Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-
Sheng? Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh
Chun. Wang Tung-hsing and
Wen Yu-cheng.
Also there were: Tung Pi-
wu, Liu Po-cheng, Chu Tch,
Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Chen
Y. Li . Hsien-Nien. Hsu
Hsiang-chien, Nieh Jung-then
and Yeh Chien-ying.
Since the opening of the
ninth national congress of the
Communist party of China,
the whole nation has been in
jubilation. Hundreds of mil-
lions of revolutionary masses
of all nationalities held grand
parades and meetings to
celebrate the convening of
the congress. This is what
was never witnessed before
by the previous congresses
of the Communist party of
China.
A new high tide in the
mass movement of the live
study and application of Nlao
Te-Lung's thought and a new
high tide of grasping revolu-
tion and promoting produc-
tion and other work and pre-
paredness against war are
rising.
?
Messages From Albania
Since the opening of
the ninth national congress of
the Communist party of
China. it has received 1,977
messages and letters of greet-
ings from the Central Com.'
mittee of the Albanian Party
of Labor, many other frater-
nal Marxist- Leninist parties
and organizations. from
many friendly countries, for-
eign progressive organiza-
tions and friendly groups and
personages.
They extend warm con-
gratulations to the present
congress of our party. The
ninth national congress of
the Communist party of
China expresses heartfelt
thanks to them for their
greetings and support.
Starting from April 15, the
ninth national congress of the
Communist party of China
takes up the third item on
the agenda: to elect the Cert.
tral Committee of the party.
All the delegates will con
tinue to hold group discus-
sions, in the light of the
actual conditions of their
localities, fields of work and
their units on further im-
plementing all the fighting
tasks set forth by the con-
gress.
23 April 1969
PYRGHT innish0 ?
1211121.1111S LS A.sszime Independent Line
By DAVID BINDER
tO The Not York TImes
SIT:I_SINKT Finland. April 20
?The Finnish Communist par-
ty's leadership appears to have
fought itself free of Soviet
domination for the first time in
the 50 years of its existence un.
M. a..el h13 tcam ti,c., ,,c.. IS
of young liberal Communists, tral Committee. tending the congress, Arvid
including his deputy, Eriski Mr. Saarincn's reform major- Pelshe, indicated that his party
CPYRGHT
5,11 nIn nnuy rmnr.11 It Iv h-trtr etc! hy the* Crivint dirt not intrnci trk interforr in
secretary. Arvo Aalto. won a Communist party before, dur-1 the Finnish party's affairs and
re5ounding victory over a pow-
erful faction of Stalinists at
the party's 15th congress over
the Easter weekend.
ing and atter the Finnish party, mat Moscow prized me unity
cor.r,ress even though he has of the Finnish party above all
been critical of the Soviet in-; else. At a Soviet Embassy re-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and ception after the con^ress he
Voted downon key issues, of Moscow's attempts to re- assailed the Stalinist faction
of its chairm ParrlaVtf t
inen. leaving, Me reformers to elect movement
der the dynamlAreform policies cieFt I e t 1 ? " est 's . .
- f the
. . Stalinist omsition members
iAgOliat42tHetaffritiftliti9AAthigasfetolitirtiters."
VC Prid to r, rrrnin
to tahich a risial party. nut,
it k re;'orted, they has.e neither
financial nor political support
from the Soviet Union,
In a recent interview, Mr.
Saarinen and Mr. Aalto sug-
gested that Moscow's tolerance
for the Finnish Communist dis-
'sidence was a result of a So-
viet need not only for making
peace with as many of the
world's Communist parties as
possible but also for Maintain-
ing cooperation with Finland.
Most Finns, including Com-
munists, believe it is an axiom
of Soviet foreign policy to cul-
tivate normal relations with
Finland and to keep her out
of the tensions besetting cen-
tral Europe.
A further peculiarity of the
Finnish Communist party is
that it is the only one in
Western Europe that is repre-
sented in a national govern-
ment. Under Mr. Saarinen's
guidance, it has committed it-,
self to responsible participation
both in the five-party coalition
Government headed by Social
Democrats, and in Parliament
where it holds 41 of the 2()B
- c
to , t,c Fin
Democratic League.
Rejecting old slogans of
"dictatorship of the proletari-
at," Mr. Saarinen has cam-
paigned for "peace, democracy
and socialism.
Elected in 1966
He has consistently fought
for this approach since he was
elected chairman in January,'
1966, replacing Aimo Aaltonen,
an old-time Stalinist.
The chairman and Mr. Aalto
concede that the walkout of
the Stalinists may cost the par-
ty some voter strength in next
year's parliamentary elections,
but they are hoping that the
general trend in Finnish politi-
cal thinking is leftward and
that, as liberal Communists,
they may one day be strong
enough to form a government
coalition alone with the Social
Democrats.
The Social Democrats, under
Premier Maunio Koivisto, are
the strongest single party in
Finland, with 55 seats in Par.
'lament.
The Saarinen leadership's
new freedom ..of maneuver is,
`11111 I I Pp I
(sum 1),):.?itio1;s
power in the Politburo and the
Central Committee.
It is evident especially in the
chairman's critical stance to-
ward certain elements of Soviet
policy, for example, his move
to send a delegate to the Yugo-
slav Communist party congress
last month, even after Moscow
ordered the Soviet-bloc parties
to boycott the Yugoslays.
Ironically, the Finnish clele:
gate to Belgrade was Mrs.
Hertta Kuusinen, the grand old
lady of the party who is the
daughter of the late Otto
Kuusinen, a Bolshevik who was
prominent in both the Finnish
and Soviet parties. Mrs. Kuusi-,
nen, 65 years old, was former-
ly a Stalinist and is now a
member of the Saarinen reform
majority and of the new 12.
member Politburo.
The only other member of
the Politburo previously iden-
tified with the orthodox group
is the fornler general secretary,
Ville Pessi, and he, like Mrs.
Kuusinen, has pledged loyalty
to Mr. Saarinen and his reform
program.
Helsingin Sanomat, Helsinki
10 April 1969
CPSU SHARP WITH STALINISTS
Splitting The FCP Irresponsible
He who embarks on splitting the Finnish Communist
friend of the CPSU and .has no sense of responsibility.
member of the CPSU Politburo, extended these greetings
present leaders of the Finnish Communist Party (FCP).
procedure the present political committee, (Politburo)
one were summoned to the Soviet Embassy.
CPYRGHT
-9
?
Party is not a
Arvid Pelshe, a
to the former and
In In an exceptional
as well as the former
Taisto Sinisalo and Markus Kainulainen, who are former members of the
political committee and belong to the FCP opposition, were at the dinner.
Reportedly they listened solemnly as Pelshe read his carefully prepared
speech many pages long.
Aarne Saarinen, chairman of the FCP, Erkki Salomaa, vice-chairman,
and Arvo Aalto, Secretary General, also attended the dinner hosted by
Ambassador A.E. Kovalev on Tuesday evening, 8 April.
The tone of the speech by Pelshe, the leader of the CPSU delegation
attending the FCP congress, was said to be.that those who walked out of the
congress should return without delay to the mother party.
It is said that the feelings of the Stalinist have already calmed down
AM:319i4Y Rif ffas 694/69/62*C0941301 9%1101 wideosbcppiftiolig taken
5
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
and the foundin: of a new party is not considered very probable. Possibly
Arvid l'elshe's messa-Le had some influence on this.
The preparatory'committee of the FCP opposition camp is supposed
to meet in a fQw days. The arrangement:for the meeting have hit a snag:
"A sufficiently large hall has not been found available in Helsinki,"
our paper was told.
Arvo Aalto, the new Secretary General of the FCP, is optimistic
about the possibilities for a reconciliation: "Very likely these
problems can be resolved. The desire for reconciliation is in the wind
more than during the congress and it creates a favorable atmosphere,"
Aalto stated.
The 15th congress of the FCP was concluded on Easter with sharp
differences between the two Communist camps. The Stalinist minority
which walked out of the Culture House on Saturday held its own meeting
in Koitto.
At the conclusion of the Koitto meeting, it was reported that a
country-wide Communist meeting would be held on 26-27 April. The
intention at that meeting is to consider the founding of a new Communist
Party.
The regular congress placed Communists supporting the party line into
FCP leadership positions; not even one Stalinist visibly participating
in the opposition activity was elected to the FCPis leadership bodies.
KAN'SAN UTISET, Helsinki
11 April 1969
CPU CONCERNED ABOUT THREAT TO SPLIT FCP
^
,"The necessity to achieve unity in the FCP was strongly emphasized in
the discussions which were held with the representatives of the CPSU
already in Moscow and later during the congress. Similarly it was made clear
that the difficulties arising from a party split would not concern internal
policies only, but the situation would also lead to foreiEn policy problem,"
stated Aarne Saarinen, chairman of the FCP, on Thursday L.10 April/ when he
presented an evaluation of the events of the congress to the SOL executive
committee. "The CPSU delegation presented the view at the congress and in
discussions during the congress that the minority group should return from
the Koitto hall to the congress," said Saarinen.
Chairman Saarinen stated that, "Arvid Pelshe, the leader of the CPSU
delegation, dealt with the situation on Tuesday at the dinner at the Soviet
Embassy, which was attended by the former and present members of FCP political
comittee. At that time, Pelshe repeated in his speech that the line of the
FCP has been correct and this also holds true for the party's new program in
principle, the immediate objectives, and the decisions for collaboration in the
government. Similarly he stated in speech that there were no obvious reasons
for splitting the party. Administrative measures do not resolve differences
since they would continue despite everything."
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
2aarinen stated in his report that under no circumstances would it
be possible to continue in the same way as before. Disciplinary actions
are the extreme means' when everything else has been tried. Saarinen
mentioned that the ndw Central Committee would meet after the Finnish
People's Democratic League (SYZL) council meeting. The League council
would meet 19-20 April.
HELSINGIN SAMMAT, Helsinki
10 April 1969
CPYRGHT
Mzip jyr51 kkana stalinisteille:
Sip :n jLcanainen.
edesvastuu.tont
Sc, joka ryhtyy hajottamaan Skpaa, ei ole Nkp:n ystiivU cikii tunnc vastuu-
ta. Niirnii terveiset csitti Neuvostoliiton kommunistisen puolueen (Nkp) polit-
byron jasen Arvid PcIshe Suomen kommunistisen puoluccn (Slip) entisil-
lc ja nykyisillc johtajille. Neuvostoliiton suurlahetystoon oh i poikkeuksellises-
ti kutsuttu Skp:n nykyiscn poliittisen, toimikunnan lisiiksi royos cntinen.
Enti,scn poliittisen totmi. scurannecn Nkp:n valtuus-
kunnan jasenina oli.vat pal. kunnan johtajan Pelshen pu-
valilisp6ydiissa myr.s Skp:n }leen savyn sanotti;in oliccn
opposition lolvtorYhmiKin se, ctta cdustajakokou;ksesta
kuuluvat Taisito Sinisa to poisqunciden on viipymattii
jaMarkusKainuleincn. palattava emapuoluceseen.
licid5p kerrottiitt istunecn;
Stalinistileirin ?tuntcidea
totisi;na Pelshon lulcicsia '.
. J.Ce rrataan jo viilentyncco
huolel;lisesti ralmistettua.;
odushajakokoutcsen jalkcen.
useita liuskoja pit kaii puthot.
; Kiihkeimpi kannanottola
taan.` kadutaan ja uuden puolucca
:a pubcenickttaia Aar. perustamista pkIct fii n,.va rsio
TE Sac' ri.n en, varapu. epatodennakoisena. Tamil
; hccnjohtaia Erkki S a lo.1 !knee Arvid Pc1;shen tcrvei-
paa
rna-a ja s;ihtcer; . Arvo , rAil.la ()mut v-aikutusta.
A 41.1 t o olivat mYiis? Pisa
Skp:n oppositiolcirin ko-
stturtahettiliis A. E. Kovale.
kousta vcolimistcicv.an rtoim.s.
vitt iiistai-il;tana latioarnalla
pli
kunnan on mai?ra koktu
oonn vall,lisella. .
ipiivina. Kokou.ksen jar.
_
Skp rn ? edipst ejakokou?sts :
tuuritalosta lauantatina pots.
jestcky joutu,nut vastatuu.
ken: 9104.;.ngi9ca e; ole ;ay. tunut stalinistineh vahcm.
misto omaa kokoustuan
tynyt suurta' va.
paata kerrotan {ch. Ke4.1?5,5.3.
dellernme. Koiton kokouksen pt.
tccksi ihuoitettiin, cttii 26.?
Kornmunistipuolucen utrsi
27. huhtikuuta pidetaan ko.
piiasihtceri Arvo Awito on
optimstincn sovntion ko maata kasktava komm.up
ii
nisticn kokous. on tar.
do!lisuuksista: "On hyvin
todcnnkiista, koitus hark ita widen ko.
i nama on.
goimai sclvitetaan. Sovn. munistiscn puolucen porvs.
t i
nonhalua on 1.1massa enern. "rnIsql*
man kun clu k Vans in a ;nen c d ustn j alto.
isstalakokotlk. 0.1k9 michitti Skp :n johto.
'sen aiacena ja se luo tui.' parkat puolucon linjaa kan.
s?an sanol. mattancilla kommunistcilla;
Skp :a 15. clustajakokous ynakyviisli opposi.
,paatty.1 paasiaisensi mo:ern. .-ClOt.oimintaan osallistutvut
pi jyrk. ci issyg Skp
joh roe! i mi 141?
ki i?n e Xut1.11.
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
CPYRGHT
LQ3 L.1-J,IL7DC.ysG --SSE\jP8n
n el: re4=
174.7* rl a [7\ 1111 ?2
LI 2E3
VtirnitUmyys saaaa
aikaan yhteniiisyys Suoinen
lionmunistisessa puolueessa
korostui voimakkaasti niis-
s:i kcskusteluissa, joita
NNP:n edustajien kans-
sa jo Moskovassa ja
hernmin edustajakokouksen
aikana. Sarnoin todettiin,
ettii puolueen hajotuksesta
koituvat vaikeudet eiviit
jiiisi vain sislipoliittisilisi,
vaan tilanne jobtaisi niy?s
ulicopoliittisiin ongelrniin,
mainitsi SKP:n puheenjoh-
taja. Aarne Saarinen esitt5-
essilLin torstaina arvion
cdustajakokoustapahturnis-
ta SKDL:n tyiivaliokunnal-
le. Kokouksessa ja sen aika-
na kiiydvissii keskusteluis-
sa NKP:n ? valtuuskunta
csitti kantanaan, etta,
hemmist5uhmiin tulisi pa-
lata Koiton salista mukaan
edustajakokoukseen, sanoi
Saarinen.
Puh e njohtaja Saarinen totest,
ettii NKP:n valtuuskunnan johtft-
ja Arvid Pelshc koskettell than-
netta myos puheessann tlistalna
Neuvostolliton Uik ?ses suurift-
hetystbssil jiirjestetyillit pitiviillLsil-
la, joule osallistuivat SKP:n po-
llItttsen toimlkunnan nykylset ja
entLsct jiisenet. Tindln Peishe tolft-
tl puheesAatm. ettii SKP:n johdon
Haja on ollut oikea ja
krv,,kee myos puolueen uutta pert-
nateohjelruaa. lahlftjan tavolteoh-
jelmaft ja piititokstiL hallitusyhtels-
tyostii. Samotn hiLn linalsL pu-.
heessaan. ettel ole nithtftvir4L
syl-
t puolueen hajottruntseen. Erimlo-
lisyyksia cIvt ratkalse liallinnol-
ilset toimet, Itecla ne jatkuL5ivat
ftaikesta huolimatta.
Saarinen totest selostukzessitan,
etta, LiihanastLseen taparin el Vol.
da jatkaa missliAn tapauksesz.a.
Kurinpidolliset toimet ovat
keinoja, kun Jo katklci muut
on kitytetty. Saftrinen inalnits1 et-
tft uusl keskuskomitca kokoontuu
SKDL:n hatoneuvoston kokouk-
sen jiilkeen. Llittoneuvoston kokous
pldetalin 10-20. huhtikuuto.
?
?
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8
CPYRGHTw
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Soviet Assails Views of Italian Communist Party
.fteeeeinax.acirtetriae.
MOSCOW, April 131?Pravda,
Lew, in its retenE ?circler eravda licensed Mr. Soffa Of
clashes with Communist China, having demanded a new defini-
the communist party new 4aa e{ Eke term -sprefeta,a.
per,. today sharply criticized
the views of the Italian Corn-
munist. party on one of the
principal issues that divide the
world Communist movement.
The criticism came in the
form of a reply to an article
printed last Wednesday In
L'Unita. the Italian party daily.
iThe article had ouestioned the
AoViet contentien,? that,M?It
L'UNITA, Rome
9 April 1969
CPYRGHT
.1G
1.11011
.5
T1111
Czechoslovakia last August,
was representing the interests
of the world Communist move-
ment.
The article in L'Unita was
written by Giuseppe Boffa.
who usually presents the views
of his party's leaders, particu-
larly on relations between
Italy's Communists and Com-
munist countries.
-
internatidnalism." Soviet use of
the term to mean that it is the
duty of the world's Communist
parties to follow the Soviet
lead in international relations.
aloecow defended the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia on the
ground that communism had
been endangered In Prague.
Similarly. Moscow holds that
in its military clashes with
China on its eastern border. it
. .
"China Weighs Heavily, One Feels It"
by Guiseppe Boffa
defends not only its own terri-
tory but also the cause of oro-'
Ichaiwo 4a4crriatiena/13n
Observers believe that Mos-
cow's decision to publicize its
differences with leaders of the
lItalian party?the largest out-
side the CommunfSt camp?ine
dicates the depth of their dif-
ferences as the June 5 confer-
ence, of all Communist parties
draws near.
Until now. Moscow has made
no public comment On the di'
vergendes. .
Moscow, April --Throughout these recent weeks Soviet public opinion has been ,
anxiously eyeing tne country's eastern zrontiers where trio long border with China lies. ?
It is a genuine concern. Any observer comes to realize it within a few hours. A
few signs of nervousness in the streets--and I have seen more such signs that at any. '
time in the past--suffice to reveal this concern at the beginning of March when. for
the first time, it was learned that blood had been shed. Whereas no one among the ft:,
better informed circles believes that graver dangers are imminent, among the "man ea
in the street" there are those who fear the worst. bn
i!ea
But let us clarify some points. Peking's claims over vast areas of Soviet territory
are absolutely unjustified. There is little that is socialist in any territorial Jczei
claim. This is particularly true when the territories in question are not inhabited ca,
by people of the claimant nation. And this is the case in the territories of the ? nail
Soviet Far East, weare there are in effect no Chinese and practically have never beenLI,
any. The arguments of the unequal treaties, according to which those borders were ,.);.r
fixed, is not convincing. On this basis one cottld, in fact, demand the revision of
almost all frontiers in the world. Anyway, the Chinese themselves became aware that a..
these treaties were unequal only in 1963 when they came into open conflict with the
Soviets. Nor is there any validity in that other argument (which, in truth, even the ?/
Chinese themselves do not seem to use), according to which Chinese territory is too
small for such a large population as that of the CPR. Quite apart from resembling , te
other such dangerous theories, the fact is that there are in China enormous underpopui.
lated areas where man's creative energy could be well applied. True, these areas ;14
are not all hospitable. But the same applies to the entire Asiatic area of the Soviet
Union where the Soviets have invested colossal efforts and worked extremely hard to , -
transform those lands in the past 50 years.
Despite these points in their favor, the Soviets have noticed with some embarrassment ,
how during this very spring their position vis-a-vis the Chinese has become weaker,
and particularly so from the viewpoint of the sympathy which international. progressive )
opinion could have aroused for the Soviets. Why? Primarily because of the shock e;
caused by the fact, in itself very grave, that such a conflict should have occurred
between two large socialist countries which have both effected great revolutions of ,
a socialist nature. But there are also more detailed reasons.
4 ,
What has struck this time has been the Soviet difficulty in finding a socialist ,and
positive reply to the Chinese claims. Let me explain. In 1963 Khrushchev was also
faced with similar claims. Although some of his most serious errors were committed
in the field of relations with China. Khruahchev knew then how to give a constructive'
answ,rikl4PrPaYoghfctrReleasectOWNiaa:04k.milan -01f9U01306K15t01
day all frontiers would disappear, that this was the communists' objective; u e r
also added that this could not be achieved by starting with an arbitrary shifting of,
existing frontiers, because this would open the way for a worldwide process which
could culminate only in a general war. On this basis he then proceeded to propose
negotiations which were at that time blocked by the prejudiced manner in which, the
Chinese asked that the existing treaties should be declared invalid--at least
preliminarily and in principle.
ToLL, time, however even before reac.hing the stage of a constructive offer to
negotiate, boviet propaganda has eontlned itself to getting excited about the theme,
of the "inviolable nature" of the "fatherland's sacred borders." This is certainly
not the way to make an impression on leftwing opinion in the world, which is justly
concerned about the very hypothesis of a possible Sino-Soviet conflict. To this
have been added some absolutely deplorable voices such as that of the Soviet
Journalist who, addressing himself to the political forces of the West, went So far
as to suggest in the Paris LE MONDE that the USSR is not defending only its own
borders in the Far East. Irresponsible voice? Could be. However, it also indicate*
a certain climate and a certain mentality which is not that or one individual alon0f
Let it be said that the support given to the Soviet positions in the ideologival
and political dispute with China by a large section of progressive world opinion,
and by the communist movement in particular, has never been, nor could it have ever,
been support for the USSR as such and against China as such. And in my opinion,
the reason it could not have been so has been explained excellently in a recent
article by Comrade Carrillo, Spanish Communist Party secretary, who explained that
:the "unconditional defense of the USSR" was valid for the communist movement only
when the Soviets were isolated and encircled by hostile countries. "Today," he
added, "there are 13 socialist countries. When one of them--and it does not mattor
:which one it is--finds itself in conflict with the imperialist camp, there are no
:problems and there can be no doubt as to the choice that must be made. But when
;there is a conflict, of whatever nature, between socialist countries, the question
As no longer as clear and as simple. The old conditioned reflexes of the time )(bon
:the Soviet Union was the only socialist country are no longer enough."
What,, then, was the nature of the support given by so many parties (including the
'Spanish and Italian ones, among others) to the Soviet communists in their polemic
with Peking? It was support primarily for a definite political line. To be quite
'clear about it, we could say briefly that it was support for the political line of
the 20th CPSU Congress. IV would be just as well, however, to recall some of the
,main points of that political line, points which were defended in the Peking polemic.
They included, and still do, peaceful coexistence, understood not as a simple
rejection of atomic war but as a struggle for a new system of international relations
d system particularly based on the peaceful resolving of controversies, noninterferen
and respect for the sovereignty of others. They also included a confirmation of the
'need for socialist democracy and its continuous development; seen in this light, it
included a criticism of Stalinism, its methods, and its consequences.
They included d new concept of relations between parties, a concept which was to do
away with any residual idea of a leading center and would thus make room for the
autonomy of every party in choosing its own path to socialism and its own model of
.ocialism. That is what we Italian communists have been struggling for, and still
are, in the international communist movement, and it seems to us that this is the
path that must be followed, also in order to avoid the degeneration of disputes
between socialist countries.
And precisely because these were the stakes, our polemic with the Chinese was also
accompanied, as things developed, by criticism of what seemed to go against such a
direction in the Soviet Union itself, a direction which was opened by the 20th CPSU
Congress and for whose development we have always wished. But the real crisis of thL
direction happened in August 1969 an a result of the intervention in Czechoslovakia.
It suffices to read again what was written in'Mosoow and in other countries to justiry
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CPYRGI-11-
-9 t .
:el
2
CPYRGI-IT
tA04.FV;140-0iit4E4RIPIPOJW lAiP4RAP4WitgatANARPAili1WWW1;1114)91t1AV
-
events have shown) to see that what was at stake were exactly those three points '
. .
the policy set forth by the 20th congress; that same_solieit-in-whose.4name.t.he
"Polemin..with-Chinese-pbsit16firvins conducted, that is, with positions which were
explicitly in contradiction to that policy. The entire Soviet position with regarctz',"
to China could only emerge seriously weakened.
These questions are not openly discussed in the USSR, either in the press or at '
party meetings. -Nevertheless, they are talked about, although in more restricted
circles. myself have talked about such questions in Moscow. Ido not know--;
becausejt is rather difficult to measure--to what extent there is an awareness:0
the dilemmas which are,fdoing Soviet Policy so dramatically. ;What Ijlave been able
to ascertain is the bewildered feeling, at various levels, that, grave dilemmas do'H
exist I think that the knowledge ofthe,faotthat,..facing the conflictsbetween
isooialist'stateshickhave all the characteristics-af,COnflicts'betiften:statesfit
would serve'Puhlic.-0Pinion of the left-in:the-world nothing t0 simply take a poSiti*
for one side and against the other,,thatthisfaet could'ile1R.bringtheseAilemme-..te
flulturityt4a'.frir.betterto make-an.effort:to,diacover::thecausesi,s0-,ad.to:'
penetrate the contradictions, both theoretical and political1 uhiah are concealed
behind * 'c`
L'UNITA , Rome
9 April 1969
SI registra ore, rispetto alla crisl de11963, untevidente?difficolta a trovare una risposta positive, socialista, elle
grPui rivendicazionl duet e questa difficolta si riflette anche su scale internazionele - Fatto 6, come ha dello'
Sirmago Carrillo, the cc I vecchi rlflessi condizionati del tempo in cui l'URSS era l'unico paese soclalista non
bastano pi b Yht e che lappeggia aflajolemica ideate con to posizioni di Pechino ?tate innanzitutto,'nel
.:movimento comunista, appoggio alla lima politica elaborate dal XX Congresso
Dal nostro inviato
MOSCA sprite.
"5-In tulle questa ultimo settimane l'opinione pubblica sovietica, dalla pitt amorfa alla pi6 artieolata,.ha guar-
dato con ansiosa preoccupazione alio frontiere orientali (lel paese, l?ove ?I lungo confine con la Cina. E'
unit preoccupazione sincera. Qualsiasi osservatore pub rendersene. conic in poche ore, Bastano alcuni episodi
di nervosismo per le strade e zte ho visti pill di quanti ne abbia visti in passata -- a rivelarlo. Per la prima
volta, agli inizi di tnarzo, si 6 appresoshe ii sangue era stato versato. Se nei circoli pia informati non si crede
all'imminenza di pericoli pitt gray!, fra uomo della strada ? cle invece chi teme ii peggio. A questo punto
vanno precisate alcurte osservazioni. Le rivendicazioni Pechino avanza su vaste porzioni di territorio so-
vietico sono assolutamente ingiuste. Qualsiasi rivcndicazione territoriale ha ben poco di socialista. In partico-
larc. questo ?era quando richiedere la revisione di per una popolazione tanto ,negli ultimi cinquant anni
si rivendicano territori the quasi tufte le frontiere del grand*. A parte le sorniglian. ;harm? investito energie co-'
non sono abitati da gente del- mond?. Gil stessi eines!, del ze the cio avrebbe con al- lassali e durlssimo lavoro
In propria nazione. E' quest? resto. si ?sono accorti the Ire pericolose teorie, vi sono per trasformarle.
fl case dello term dell'Estre- quei trattati erano ineguali in mita in Cina cnorrol re- E'bbene, nonostante quest!
mo orlentc sovietleo, dove solo domil 1963, quando sone giant poco popolate. 'cut pud punti a lora favore, 1 sovle-
effdtivamente non vi ? sono entrati in aperto conflitto con benissimo applicarst l'ener- tic! hanno avvertito, ningarl
rino31 c, in pratlea, non vi i sovietici. ? girt creatrioe delruomo. So- confusarnente/ che proprio
Lona nu! stat-I. L'argomento MI pun Indere l'argomento no terra non scmpre ospita- In_questa prirnavera, In lore
bi.
del trat
rwrebberotAt.hgowitt glisr Roka2?srehri 389/09102e: vevikyw.. F3 on 4Q044391A0 OW04 1 0 '1 aliaSonti del
ftltir la' Vine asia Ica cinesi era ?ebolita. Era in-
non sembrano usare) se-
non 4 convincente. Ale atm- condo out II territorio eine. dell'llRS.5, costituita da ter- debolita aoprattutto per la
ao?SUOde at potscbbo _ 1.
Au IA ..&oviyu re i 1
pr.,pr.o I 5uvI,LlcI uspui,144 dos stet luny
_
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
' VAS H IN GTON POST matocyliatougur t.;olotxa.j
18 A pl4P1419:79ied For Release (119991B9102e:ALA-atinglegy
-Retention
Of Reforms -.
Is Pledged.
/-
??? i pie.'
By Kenneth Ames
specist to The Washington Post '
PlyiGUE, April 17?A1-:
exander Dubcek, Czecnos1o.1
vakia's national political
hero since January, 1968,
today was forced to resign'#
as First Secretary of the:
,Communist Party.
Dubcok, 47, was removed.
.from thb key Party post "at'
this own request" in the course.
,of a plenum meeting of the
Party 'Central Committee in'
:Prague today. Elected in his,
:place was another Slovak, Dr.
' Gustav Hausak, 56, until now
.leader of the Slovakian Party.
Dubeek was forced into a ,
tlosition where he virtually'
had to resign after growing '
pressure from the Soviets and
the conservative wing of the
Party since the anti-Soviet
demonstrations of March 28.
The announcement of
changes was made tonight in a
television appearance -by Pres-
ident Ludvik Svoboda and Dr.
,Husak at the end, of the firisi'
day's meeting of the 190-mem-
ber Central Committee.
President Svoboda told a
television audience: "We have
been through many crises and'
experienced many difficulties.,
Provocative actions in recent
weeks have hindered our ef-
forts of many months and
damaged the efforls of the
Party, particularly in our rela-
tions with the Soviet Union."'
Svoboda added: "The Cen-
tral ;Committee is seeking
ways out of the complicated
situation. Comrade Dubcek
;has asked to be relieved of his
post. The name of Dubcek will
rethain in our history. During
the period of his work he has
"Our present situation re-
quires," President Svoboda
continued, "an energetic First
Secretary and Dr. Gustav
Husak has been chosen. I
know that Husak is an honest
worker and ask for the trust
of the people."
[AP reported the white-
haired, bespectacled Husak
told the television audience:
"I beg ?yru to keep calm and
support he new leadership.
We are 'rot going to give up
anything of the great ideas
which in the past year have
come int( our public life."
[But, i.e added, "it will be
necessary to determine how,
When an I in what order we
can imp' ement those ideas."
He also warned that "some
people magine liberty is
something without limits, but
rules must be ob-
served."]
The election of Husak
to the Op Party slot repre-
sents a concession to pres-
sures whth have been increas-
ing from the Soviets and from
the orthodox,. left-wing- Ale-
ments of the Party.
It is significant that only a
few bouts earlier a statement
was isst ed which virtually
whitewa4ted 10 of these con-
servative members who had
been under suspicion of col-
laborating with the Russians.
Husak, until now leader of
the Slov ik Party in Bratisa-
lava, ha: recently earned the
reputatio for being a Slovak
national' ;t and chauvinist.
The newest joke in Prague to-
night is .hat Husak will now
change from being 'a ' Slovak
nationalist io being a' czechp;.
slovak nationalist. '
It is generally' conceded
among ' Czeehoslovaks that
Dubcek was showing definite'
signs of falling down on the
job. He has from the begin-
ning bdet an extremely popu-
lar man but has never been
mistaken- for a strong or wily1
politician.
As some Czechs say, "He Is
too' nice i guy for that. In fact 1
he is just too nice period." '
Husak has shown definite" I
indications of knowing how to '
handle r egotiations with ther
Russians,
tral Committee met. Roads
surrounding the Hradeany
Castle above Prague were cor-
doned off and traffic diverted.
Police patrqlled the. sur-
youndings and army trucks
were kept in reserve to be
used as road blocks against
possible demonstrations. But a
mere handful. of 40 oir.'50 per-
sons stood outside the palace
gates as members of the Com-
mittee drove in. ,
Earlier ; it was announced,
that ' security forces had'
rounded up. several thousand
people in the country, the first
action of this kind to be an-
nounced in many years, and
had arrested persons sus-
pected of being "anti-social
and criminal" elements. .
On television, Husak, a
quiet, able speaker talking off
the cuff, explained: "We be-
lieve it essential to request
you not to .cause a panic. For
almost a year we have been
trying to get out of .a difficult
situation and to produce the;
atmosphere for a calm life." .
He added that one of the
Central Committee resolutions
was the election of a new
Party Chairman and First Sec-
retary.
' At the. ;same time, in re-
sponse to Soviet pressure, the
Party presidium has been re-
duced from 21 to 11 members,
With the exclusion of the lead-
ing reformist Josef Smrkovsky
and aumber of other liber-
als.l Apart from Smrkovsky,
the er inal quartet of reform-
ers remains intact. Oldrich
Cernik head of the Czechoslo-
yak gqvernment, Svoboda and
Dubcqk stay as members of
the smaller party presidium.
[A report carried by the Bul-
garian news agency BTA,
which could not be confirmed,
said the new presidium's mem-
bers would be: Husak, Cernik,
Dubcek, Svoboda, union leader
Karel Polacek, National Front
chairman Evzen Erban, Slovak
Premier Stefan Sadovsky, con-
servative Czech Party Bureau
head Lubomir Strougal, con-
servative leader Vasil Bilak,
former Interior Minister Jan
Pillnr Anti Parlors'. Avaamhly
ounced changes
made this a turning point in
the recent political history of
Czechoslovakia. It was the mo-
ment which many Czechs have
been awaiting since the Au-
gust invasion, to see if the two
leading figures of the 1968
progressive policy would be!
quietly dropped or shoved into
the sidelines.
The immediate Party prob-
lem is now to make the new
set-up palatable to the trade,
unionst the intellectuals and
the students?all of whom
have recently been united in a
front against erosion of, re-
formist policy.
Husak told the nation to-
night in his first television ap-
pearance as party leader, "Our
main task is to lead the coun-
try out of the crisis situation
and return to a normal life,
solving our problems with the
Soviet Union."
[Reuters reported that
Prague was tense but out-
wardly calm tonight after the
announcement. City police,
reinforced. by blue-uniformed
provincial police and troops,
appeared on the streets in in-
creasing numbers.]
A communique issued after
the Central Committee meet-
ing stated that Dubcek would
be moving into "a high state
function." It was assumed by
officials that this meant chair-
manship of the Federal As-
sembly.
; Referring to the appoint-
ment of Husak to succeed
Dubcek, the communique said,
"We are convinced that in his
new function he will do all
possible to avoid repeating the
practices and injustices of the
50's."
In a separate appeal to
workers, the Party committee
asked for maintenance of law
and order 'and referred to
"opposition elements which
abused freedom."
There has been "serious
danger from rightist forces
which would bring us into a
power conflict. The develop-
ments of the past weeks have
made the situation unbear-
able," it said in a clear refer:
once to the rift which had
developed in the Party leader.
snip on we boviet occupation.
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CPYRGHT
T LIES
18 April 1969
'IDUBCEK IS GUSTED
AS PRNIIE YIELDS'
TO THE RUSSIANS'
To Remain in Party's Ruling,
dropped from the ruling par-
ti body.1
Svoboda Announces Shift
President Ludvik Svobodk rai-
n( unced the decision of the
Central Committee on tele-
vision tonight and appealc..d to
tt e public to remain calm. He
& id that the 47-year-o1d Mr.
Dubcek had "asked to be te-
ll !ved of his post" and urged
the public to give their support
to Mr. Husak, whom General
Presidium ? Husak Gets '` ,Svoboda described as `honest,
Cf !experienced find farsighted.", _
First Secretary's Post '
"The name of Comrade Dub-
cek," the 73-year-old President
?
SUCCESSOR URGES CALD:( "Id' "will be premanently
litked In all our minds with th
ceded Antonin Novotny, the
Stalinist leader who had ruled
or 11 years. '
The Central Committee, still
osssion, also voted to estab-
ish a new ruling Presidium,'
)ut :he names of its members
werc not disclosed immediately.
Mr. Husak, appearing on tele-
visien after President Svoboda,
said the new leadership was
into ided to end disunity in the
Preddium.
M. Husak was the second
Slovak to assume leadership Of
this binational country since
the Communists seized powei
In Czechoslovakia in 1948. Me.
Dubcek, too, was First Secre-
tary of the Slovak party. from
1961 to January, 1968, before
bee( ming the leader of all of
Cze:hoslovakia.
ni post-January policy of the
? Communist party of Czecho-
?
He Premises to Work foe, rdovakia." ?
Liberalization as Soon as This is this policy of liberal
... reform initiated in January,
Present Crisis Ends 1968 when Mr. Dubcek suc-
By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to Thir New York Ilmet
PRAGUE, April 17?Alexan4
der Dubcek, who led Czech?,
sloyakia's efforts for liberaliza-
tion under communism, fell
from power tonight.
The Communist party's Cen-
tral Committee, yielding to
Soviet pressure, named Gustay.
Husak, the 56-year-old leader
of the Slovak party, to succeed'
Mr. Dubcek as First Secretary,
of the national Czechoslovak,
party.
Mr. Husak, who was arrested
in 1951 in a Stalinist purge and
spent nine years in prison, said
that Mr. Dubcek would remain
in a "high responsible position.'!:
Mr. Dubcek pledged himself to:
work for liberalization once
-
the country emerged from thq P .esident Svoboda and Mr.
crisis set In motion by the' Husak took note of the possi-
Soviet-led invasion last August.; biaglaibinesst the deppuabrlituc ;.e por mstrs.
' [The Bulgarian press agen-s: Du t cek, who had become a
cy said Mr. Dubcek would 4. popular Coinmunist leader. Des'
remain a member of the par- t pite Mr. Dubcek's efforts to
ty's new ruling 11-member bad with the demands from
Presidium and Josef Smrkov-! Ma cow after the August In-
vas;. on, he remained at the top
sky, deputy chairman 'of. the' of he popularity polls.
.National Assembly, would be t4i13 was a cad-
dened country as the two lead-
ers went on television to an-
nounce what citizens had be-
gun to fear would happen, first
after the invasion and then aft-
er the anti-Soviet riots that
erupted following a Czechoslo-
vak ice-hockey victory over the
Russians last month.
"Keep calm," Mr. Husak said.
"Preserve peace. Support this
course. We expect the Wide
participation of the masses, of
every citizen in creating our
policy, in its realization and
its control.
"We are not giving up on
any fundamental principles of
our post-January policy. But we,
have to know what to do andl
when."
It remained to be seen
whether strikes and demonstra-!
bons would be called by stu-
dents, intellectual groups and,
reform-minded traded unions.1
Tonight in Wenceslas Square, a
small crowd of about 100 had
gathered at the statute at St.
Wenceslas, the informal memo-
rial to those who died during
the invasion. Police cars were
patrolling the square.
In appealing for support,
President Svoboda noted that
the current crisis had resulted
from extremists "who caused
great damage to our country
in the anti-Soviet rioting last
month.
Declaring that "we have had
only a few hopeful and pleasant
days," he urged the "majority
of honorable journalists, rep-
resentatives of culture and sci-
ence, the intelligensia and trade
unions and youth" to "have
nothing in common" with what
he -Allr.d the extremlst forces.
The bespectacled Mr. Husalt
put the appeal with more blunt-
ness.
"Some people think that free-
dom has no limits, no restric-
tions," he declared, and I
'would say that they would
want some elements of anarchy
in it. But in every orderly statel
there must be some rules of
play. Laws must be kept. So-
cial, party and civil disciplinel
observed. And ther must be!
stress on honest work."
Once the country is out of
the crisis, he said, the party
will move to carry out such
liberal demands as another
party congress and elections to:
the National Assembly.
WWI U1e .en.menta. Mr-I
Husak was apparently trying!
to strengthen' his position wit1.
the reform-minded groups,
which have been supporting
Mr. Dubcck in his efforts to
transform Czechoslovakia in-
to a liberal Communist state.
Though considered a friend.
of the liberals at the height of
the reform movement, Mr. Him-
ak is now generally regarded
as more likely than Mr. Dubcek
to compromise with Moscow
an dcontinue with the restraints,
imposed under Soviet pressure
after last month's violence.
? Liberals first turned cool to
Mr...11usalt, shortly ?after the in-
vasion because he joined with
conservatives in declaring il-
legal the esults of the 14th
party congress held secretly
during the invasion to chose a
liberal-minded Presidium.
An articulate, 'lifelong Com-
munist, Mr. Husak has risen to
power rapidly. He became one
of four deputy Premiers under
Premier Oldrich Cernik during
last year's liberalization and,
after the August invasion, took
over as Slovak party leder Vol
the Vasil Bilak, who had been
out of favor for his support of
Moscow.
Until after the invasion, Mr.
Husak was not even a member
of the National Central Commit-
tee that elected him today as
First Secretary. In recent
months, he was regarded gen-
erally as one of the ' three of-
ficials who controlled levers of
power. The two others ac Pre-
mier Cernik and Lubomir Strou-1
gal, a leader of the party for
the Czech? Republic of Czecho-
slovakia.
New Presidium Listed .
SOFIA, April 17 (AP)?The.
Bulgarian press agency said the,
new 11 -member Presidium of;
the Czechoslovak party was,
made up of Gustav Husak,
Oldrick Cernik, Alexander
Dubcek, Exzen Erban, Stefan
Sadovski, Ludvik Svoboda,;
Lubbmir Strougal, Karel Pola-
cek, Vasit Bilak, Jan Piller and;
Peter Colotka.
Mr. Polacek, liberal trade?
union leader, and Mr. Colotka,
liberal chairman of the Na-'
tional Assembly, are new full,
members of the Presidium.
Among those dropped from
the old 21-member Presidium
were Josef Smikovsky, deputy
chairman of the National Al'
semblv.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
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CPYRGHT
AppromadicaorReteitse 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00050011006T-PGHT
18 April 1969
Czech ackd.4i ' n ai
kip
To Efforts of Grechko
By Anatole Shub
WitchIngton Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, April 18 (Fri-
day)?With tne ceposiduir ef
Alexander Dubcek in
:Czechoslovakia the mar-
shals of the Soviet army
have manifested the great-
est political power they
have ever enjoyed in Corn%
munist Russia.
Marshal Andrei, Grechko,
Union today is composed of cheslav Molotov and other
Brezhnev, Grechko and Yak- foes. Zhukov was removed
matters."
The Soviet army has been
on almost continuous ma-
neuvers in Eastern Europe,
for nearly a year, while the
Soviet military budget. has
increased some 25 per cent
the 66-year-old Defense Min- made the situation unbear-
ister. brought about in able," it said in a clear refer.,
Prague what the Soviet ence to the rift which had
Communist Party Politburo developed in the Party leader..
Secretariat and a host of ship on the Soviet occupation.
Party and government en- since 1967. Russia according
voys high and low were luta- to London's Institute of
hie to do at conferences in Strategic Studies, has pulled
Dresden Moscow Karlovy. even even with the U.S. in the
Vary Cierna Bratislava missile race, and new Soviet
'Prague Kiev and elsewhere rocket tests have been an-
over the past year. , nounced for the Pacific next
Grechko's ultimatum to month.
Czechoslovak President Meanwhile, the Party Cen-
Ludvik Svoboda last week tral Committee?theoreti-
forced the rehabilitation of cally the country's leading
discredited Czechoslovak So- force?has been meeting
viet agents the ouster of less and less frequently,
Dubcek and liberal hero with virtually none of its de-
Josef Smrkovsky and the bates ever made public.
admission that last spring's Since the invasion of Czech
Czechoslovak renaissance oslovakia, the Central Com
was a "counter-revolution.? mittee has met only once?
Grechko thus completed the briefly, late last October, Os.
political job that a half mil- tensibly to hear a report on
lion Warsaw Pact soldiers, agriculture. (Preceding the
commanded by his deputy meeting, there had been
Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky 'widespread rumors of resig-?
began with the invasion last
August 20. nations in the Politburo.)
Grechko came to Czecho- Another Central Commit'
slovakia unaccompanied by tee meeting may take place,
any leader or official of So., :next week, to ratify the
viet Communist Party. He "Prague triumph," but there
moved on to East Berlin to has been on confirmation so
deal as an equal with Corn- far. Nor has a date yet been
rnunist Party chiefs of occu- set for the 24th Party con-
pied East Germany and Po- gress?
land Walter Ulbricht and Ironically, the Soviet mar-
Wladyslaw Gomulka. shal's Prague triumph today
, Even before this week's came on the 75th birthday
decisive "second round'' in of Nikita Khrushchev, the
Prague, one of the highest man who first called in the
leaders of the Yugoslav army to act as the final
Communist Party was tell- arbiter of inter-Party con-
ing visitors: "Do not overes- flict. In 1957, the support of
timate the influence of such .
Marshal Georgi Zhukov and
politicians as Andrei Kiri- other army leaders enabled
lanko, Pyotr Shelest or even Khrushchev to overthrow a
Alexei Kosygin. The politi. 7-to-4 Politburo majority and
cal summit in the Soviet oust Georgi Malenkov, Vya-
IivL!y dLtewuLd,,u the'
army's support cost Khrus-
hchev dearly later on.
In 1960, the military in-
fluence committed Khru-
shchev to a doctrine of sup-
port for "wars of liberation"
which helped doom pros-
pects for the Paris Big Four
summit conference even be-
fore the ill-fated 13-2 inci-
dent. A glowering Marshal
Rodion Malinovsky, the new
Defense Minister, accom-
panied Khrushchev to Paris
to be sure that the agile pre-
mier did not strike a bar-
gain with President Eisen-
hower, whom Khrushchev
publicly had proclaimed to
be "a man of peace."
In 1962 the military un-
doubtedly helped plunge
Khrushchev into his great-
est gamble?the installation
of offensive missiles in
Cuba. Khrushchev was corn-
Welled to use extraordinary
means of personal diplo-
macy to end the crisis by
compromise with President
Kennedy.
' The new regime moved
swiftly to supply arms aid to
North Vietnam?on which
Khrushchev had turned his
back?and to accelerate the
arms race with the Vnited
States-.
The army entered last
year's Czechoslovak CriSiS
early. A group of leading
Soviet marshals toured the,
country in May, and soon
after large Red Army units
entered for "maneuvers,"
which did not end until the
apparent political compro-
mise reached in Clerna last
July 31. The army returned
in force, however, three
weeks later.
In 1964, the marshals re-
mained neutral, at the very
least, as Khrushchev was
swiftly overthrown. He was
replaced by. Brezhnev, ,who
had never joined his pred-
ecessor's unsuccessful cam-
paign, to reduce the armed
forces, curb the "metal eat-
ore" tif the soviet Defense
Ministry. or thin our. r
Red Army occupation estab-
lishment in East Germany
and Eastern Env*.
The new regime moved
swiftly to supply arms aid
to North Vietnam?on which
Khrushchev had turned his
back?and to accelerate the
arms race with the United
States. The role of the army
and its intelligence services
In bringing on the June,
1967, ; Mideast war remains
to be clarified.
; In a key test of strength
two years ago, the marshals
prevented the selection of
Dmitri Ustinov to become a
"Sciviet McNamara" and
chose Grechko as Defense
Minister after Malinovsky's
deatillsi
Horically-minded Com-
munists here- recalled how
the late Joseph Stalin had
defeated Leon Trotsky in
the 1920s by stressing the
danger of "Bonapartism,"
Trotsky, although a pro-
fessional revolutionary and
intellectual, had organized
and led the Red Army to
victory in the Russian civil
war. Stalin and his allies
had stressed Aire parallel
with the French Revolution,
when a conservative Direc-
tory, or collective leader-
ship, proved incapable of
'ruling and gave way to the
victorious general of em-
pire, Napoleon Bonaparte,
who reconciled the remain-
pig rhetoric of the revolu-
tion with the restoration of
large elements of the old
autocratic regime.
Mars bad analyzed these
develients in great de-
tail, nif until the last de-
cade it, was a primary arti-
cle of t'faith that the army
be kept under firm Party
control. Some non-Soviet
Communists, however, com-
pare the present Soviet lead;
ership to the old French
?
Directory.
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3
CPYRGHT .
fr:nti poteva APiPrOyeti_F
progrecsi!;ta internaziona-
Perche? Innanzitutto, ry.,r
h.scossa the qu? a ha ;WU-
tC dal fatto, di tic-: gra-
y che un simile con-
I] Lb potes:ie prir;i fra due
g'andi pac.fj, i tall Immo
rran!ii
oni di earats.tre sociHi.
Mn vi sono anche raeioni
ri? &costa nziate.
Ci, che ha colpito questa
%olta 6 stata In difficolth da
t arte sovietica di trovare
t na risposta positiva,
alle rivendicazioni cine-
I. spiego. Net 1963 lo
tesso Kruseiov Si trovb.di
I ronte ad analoghe richie-
,te. Egli, che pure oveva
commeSso I suoi sbagli pii
,eri net rapporti con la
seppe allora indicarc una
-isposta costruttiva, capacc
ii trovare pii larghi consen-
si. In sostanza egli disse
:he tuttc le frontiere un.
giorno avrebbero dovuto spa-
vire net mondo, che questo
era l'obiettivo cut puntavano
comunisti, ma che questo
traguardo non poteva essere
raggiunto conninciando a spo-
stare arbitrariamente i con.
tint esistenti, perche do
avrebbc aperto tin process?
mondiale che poteva culmi-
nare solo in una guerra ge-
neralizzata. Su questa base
propose gih allora trattativc,
che furono poi bloccate dal-
la pregiudiziale con cut i ci-
nest chiedevano di invaliclare.
? preliminarmente e &men?
in linen di principio ? i trat-
- tati csistenti.
Questa volta, 'prima che si
arrivasse all'offerta costrut-
tiva di ncgoziati. In propa-
ganda sovietica si 6 limitata
ad esaltare II tema del a ea-
ratter? inviolabile z dei sa-
erl confini della patria *. Si.
mill accent' non sono certo
tali da toccare nal mondo
un'opii,ione pubblica di sini-
stra, che e giustamente co-
sternata dalla sola ipotesi di
Un nossibile conflitto cino-so-
greteassai1990/09/021,1, glAnglaP7460-1194A000
qualche voce assolutamenle
dep:orevole. come quella di
un giornalista sovielico, II
quale 6 arrivato a suggcrire
a Parigi sul Monde, rivolgen-
dosi afle forze politiche del-
l'Occidente, che MISS di-
f ende Estremp Oriente
non solo le sue frontiere.
Voce irresponsabile ? Pub
darsi. Purtroppo essa 6 an-
che indicativa di un certo
clima e di una mentalita
che non 6 quella di un solo
individuo.
Va detto che l'appoggio
(into alle posizioni sovietiche
net contrast? ideologic? c po-
litico con la Cina da una
gran parte clell'opinione pro-
gressista nel mondo ? c, in
particolare. del movimento
comunista I? non 6 mai sta-
to, ne poteva essere, un ap-
neggio all'URSS in quanto
tale contro In Cina. Perche
non potesse esserlo 6 stato
spiegato, a mio parere in
modo eccellentc, in un suo
recente scritto dal compagno
segretario del Par-
tit? comunista spagnolo, ii
quale spiegava come la di-
fesa incondizionata dell'U-
nione Sovictica valesse per
ii movimento comunista so-
lo quando I sovietici erano
isolati e accerchiati da pae-
si ostili. c Oggi ? egli ag-
giungeva ? ci sono tredici
Stati socialisti. Quartdo uno
di essi ? qualunque esso sia
? si trova in conflitto col
cam pa imperialista. non ci
sano problemi e to scelta
non presenta dubbi. Ma
quando il con flitto, di qual-
siasi indole, sorge fra gli
stessi Stati socialisti, la co-
so non ?ia cosi semplice
e chiarci. I vecchi riflessi
condizionati del tempo in cut
l'URSS era l'unico paese so-
cialista non bastano pin.
Che cosa 6 stato dunque
l'appoggio che tanti partiti
? quello spagnolo come quel-
no dato at comunisti sovieti-
ei nella polemica con Pechi-
no? Ebbene, e stato Innen-
zitutto l'appoggio ad una de-
terminate linea politica. Per
intenderci. potremmo dire
brevemente che ?tato l'ap-
poggio alla politica del XX
congresso. Ma sara bene ri-
cordare sommariamente qua-
ii crano i capisaldi di que-
sta politica che venivano di-
fesi nella discussione con
Pcchino. Essi erano c sono
in coesistenza pacilica, into-
non come semplice rillu-
to della guerra atomica, ma
come lotta per un nuovo Si.
sterna di rapporti internazio-
nali, fondati principalmente
sulla soluzione pacifica delle
controversic, sulla non Inge-
renza e sul rispetto della so-
vranita altrui. Essi erano
inoltre affermazione della
necessita cli una democrazia
socialista. di un suo continuo
sviluppo e, in questa luce,
la critica ale stalinismo, ai
suoi metodi e elle sue con-
seguenze. Infine, essl erano
una nuova concezione del
rapport( fra I parliti, che
sopprimesse ogni residua
idea di un centre dirigente,
e facesse quindi posto alla
autonomia di ogni partito
nella suite della propria
via al socialism? e del pro-
prio modcllo di socialism?.
Per questo ci siamo battu-
ti e ci battiamo, net movi-
mento internazionalc, noi co-
munisti Reliant: tale ci sem-
bra. tra l'altro, essere la via
per evitare che anche I con-
trasti Ira paesi socialisti pos-
sano degenerare.
Proprio perche tale era la
posta in gioco, la nostra pa-
lemica con i cincsi si 6 ac-
compagnata via via anche
con la critica di cie che nel-
l'URSS ci sembrava e ci
sembra andare contro quella
direzione. aperta dal XX con-
gress?, di cui abbiamo sem-
pre auspicato l'approfondi-
CPYRGHT
no st
9 04109 ivail sia-
quest! sAribdietro
not 1 abbiamo detto. Ma la
vera .risi di questo indiriz-
zo 6 state determinate nel-
l'agos.o scorso dall'interven-
to in Cecoslovacchia. Basta
rilegmre cio che si sent-
to a \Iosca e in altri paesi
per tatistificare quella tragi-
ca d cisione (lc cui conse-
guenzk, come gli avvenimen-
ti pi recenti hanno dimo-
stratc sono ben lungi dal-
l'esse?.si attenuate) per ve-
dere come fossero messi in
gioco proprio quei tre capi-
saldi della politica del XX
congnesso, la stessa in no-
me cilia quale si era condot-
ta la polemica con le posi-
zieni incsi, elle ad essa erano
espliaitamente contrarie. Tut-
ta to posizione sovictica an-
che wi confronti della Ci-
na n n poteva non risultarne
seriaAente indebolita.
Di questi tem' nell'URSS
oggi non si discute aperta-
ment ne mina stampa ne
nelle riunioni di partito. Ep-
pure Sc ne parla. magari in
circo PlO ristretti. Io stes-
so n ho discuss? a Moses.
Non lo ? perche 6 ben dif-
kik misurarlo ? fin dove
Vi si consapevolezza dei di-
lemrr che si pongono dram-
matimmente alla politica so-
victim. Quell? the io ho po-
tuto 2ostatare 6 la confusa
senstatione. a diversi
dell'asistenza di dilemmi gra.
vi. knit loro maturazione
cred( possa contribuire la
costal azione che per l'opinio-
ne ratbblica di sinistra net
monou a nulla servirebbe ?
di fr'inte a conflitti fra Sta-
ti che del conflitti
Ira tall hanno tutte le ca.
nate istiche -- premiere sem-
plice lento posiziono per una
parte contro l'altra. Meglio
sforzhasi di scoprirne le cau-
se per venire a capo delle
contrkddizioni, teoriche e
dietro di esse
si clam
Giuseppe Boffa
Pravda
13 April 1969
"Darkening a Clear Day"
by
I. Ivanov
CPYRGHT
As usual the world press devotes extensive commentaries to bloody
provocations by Maoists on the Ussuri River. These commentaries are of
course different. The imperialist press is engaged in searching for
something in favor of their masters. And why not "the old red flag is
completely turn," exclaimed with malice a certain Karl Grobe in West
GermanAVINAtir t, . . : s I=
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.41 '
H says: i."we should think about the perspectives that this,Sovietmidwv
m'Chinese'4apute-opensLfor the West. America's interests drian4it1i5" '""
And, Life calls ox theAUStoinake a "unilateral first, step" in establishing '
hHcopperatiOn with Mao. 'it is clear from this magazine article that 'the- "1
Illogic of class war is being revealed.
nwrI I I(
On the other hand, the press of the progressive forces, led by the
icommunist press, is indignant about-the-treacherous activities of the Peking
leaders. Those in Peking only butter the bread of. the enemies by resorting
to armed provocations against a socialist state.
The presb of socialist Countries, 'the press of communist parties in
Pcapitalist countrieb, and-the press of young states that consider the Soviet
('Ilnionianciother sObialist countries their loyal friends angrily condemn the
"gression OfvMaotb group., This is easy-to understand., ,Here it is also
"YIJOSsible o,See thellogid ofclass struggle.
II ? Itlid,much!morediffictlt, however,ito understand some journalists who
seek to place themselves above the melee and to argue in general whether it
is worthwhile supporting, the party that was attacked. There are not many
of these, and they could, be ignored if among them were not included a
contributor to the Italian communist paper, Comrade Giuseppe Boffa, who
published an article on 9 April, under a strange, ostensibly neutral heading,
,"The' Chinese are Exerting Pressure, and It is Being Felt."
Comrade Boffa admits that Peking's territorial pretensions are absolutely
unjustified. Indeed, he also admits that any sort of territorial claim has
little to do with socialism. Comrade Boffa immediately forgets this,
however, and turns all his ardor against the CPSU. Yes, you understood
perfectly. Comrade Boffa considers the present moment most suitable to
darken the serene sky. You see, to begin with, immediately after the
perfidious attack by the Maoists on our border guards, Soviet propaganda
limited itself only to exalting the theme of the inviolability of the sacroSanc
frontiers of the motherland.
Such statements, writes Comrade Boffa with the tone of a mentor,
certainly cannot receive the approval of leftwing world public opinion.
Did you hear that? What do you expect, dear sir, that we should renounce
the defense of our brothers? And do you believe that in that case, left-
wing world opinion, in whose name you claim to speak with astonishing
courage, would have understood us? We wish to be sincere. You know very
well that progressive world opinion actually esteems and supports our
people precisely because, while defending just positions in international
relations, they also know how to defend their own borders Smd to deliver a
crushing blow to any aggressor.
In the second place, Comrade Boffa is indignant that a Soviet journalist
in an article released by NOVOSTI and printed in the Parisian paper Le Monde
Observed that the Soviet Union is not defending: merely Soviet borders in
the Far East.' "What is this?" He exclaims, "An irresponsible statement?"
Actually, it is Comrade Boffa's statement that is irresponsible. He should
not forget that the Soviet people defended not only their own freedom and
independence, but also the freedom and independence of other peoples in the
battles against fascism during World War II. And also today, the Soviet
Egasvavrc1e44grtilopfpciuthehcaugae of thetfreedam of till; peolitilar
It
0
CPYRGHT
borderN?)Pr9MegcrugrIPtIgPS9PIQ2arc atiVerr9-411e1 q4egiugt?cal two 1 -9
peace-loving peoples.
And there is another important observation: Every communist keeps
in his heart the idea of proletarian internationalism. Its importance is
well understood by the 'working men of all countries, and in particular by
Comrade Boffa's fellow countrymen, who remember the Soviet people's role in
the destruction of the fascist regime in their country as well.
The Soviets also remember the fraternal aid that the Italian workers
rendered to our country during the tempestuous half century following the
October Revolution. Now Comrade Boffa is trying to argue that the time may
have come to reexamine the question of proletarian internationalism. Referring
to the observation made by Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party Cartillo
' that today the old beliefs dating back to the time when the Soviet Union was
the only socialist country are no longer sufficient, he purses his lips and
concludes that at present support for the Soviet Union should be determined
within the framework of a given political direction. What direction is meant?
He claims that he is a supporter of the decisions of the 20th CPSU
Congress--as though there were communists who question these decisions--
Comrade Boffa cites the following: peaceful coexistence, confirmation of the
necessi.ty for socialist democracy, and finally a new concept of the relations
between parties based on the renunciation of the idea of the existence of a
directing center. And is that all? Yes, that is all. It is precisely in
that, he states, that the way is to be found that will make it possible to
avoid the intensification of differences between the socialist countries.
And Comrade Boffa adds: precisely because this was at stake, our
argument with the Chinese gradually reduced itself to a criticism of those
same phenomena in the Soviet Union--which it seemed to us and still seems to
us--that are contrary to that trend. And here, he immediately refers to
the intervention in Czechoslovakia. So it came to that As we say)
Comrade Boffa began praying for health, but finished praying for the dead.
He began with an expression of sympathy for the Soviet people, but finished
by blaming them for the "interference".
Comrade Boffa, it is a dangerous thing to forget the principles of
proletarian internationalism, which imperatively oblige all revolutionaries
to close ranks, compactly and firmly, every time that danger emerges. This
occurred in Czechoslovakia, where the rightwing and the counterrevolutionary
forces formed a bloc with external imperialist reaction. The fraternal aid
of the socialist and allied countries was rushed there to defend socialist
gains. It also occurred in the region of Damanskiy. Island on the Ussuri
River, where the Chinese soldiers, operating on Mho's directives, opened
fire on their Soviet brothers.
We could explain all this to Comrade Boffa privately, so to speak,
without using the pages of Pravda for this purpose. The fact is, however,
that he printed his confusea mnoughts in the Italian Communist Party paper
L'Unita. Everyone who has the Marxist-Leninist unity of our movement at
heart will understand that it was impossible to leave such a public statement
without a published reply.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
6
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
PRAVDA CPYRGHT
13 April 1969
PER/114KA
LLLIULW
rtri [IT)
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4.
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25X1 C1 Ob
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
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AmA9ialAcirtatablevia99/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00050011000M 1969
THE FORGOTTEN WAR IN LAOS
While military action in Vietnam and political maneuvering in Paris
dominate the headlines, a war goes on in neighboring Laos, a war that per-
sists in spite of the Geneva Accords and great nation guarantees of inde-
pendence and neutrality. For most of the free world Laos has been a
matter of almost subliminal concern -- crowded out by Vietnam, the Middle
East, the events in Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet clashes. And in the
meantime the Communist Pathet Lao, led and bolstered by North Vietnamese
troops, has gained control of at least half the territority of Laos. The
Communist forces do not yet control half the population, although the long,
wearing struggle has rendered the Laotian people and economy anemic, its
youth cynical and many of its leaders corrupt.
From 1964 through 1967, the military situation in the field at least
looked hopeful and Government forces were able to maintain the military
initiative and provide protection against the Communists for most non-
Communist elements of the population. But in 1968 the number of North
Vietnamese regulars (Peoples' Army of Vietnam - PANN) in Laos reached
40,000 and the Communist forces were able to inflict a series of shattering
military setbacks on the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) forces. Govern-
mental defeats on the battlefield not only wiped out many of the earlier
territorial gains, but also badly eroded the confidence of the political
and military establishment. The start of the Paris negotiations to end
the war in Vietnam gave many Laotians a psychological breather in May 1968,
but they felt so badly deceived when their hopes for a speedy end to the
war were dashed that the general loss in fighting spirit intensified on the
home front and battlefield alike.
Despite the military edge they are believed to enjoy, the Communist
forces have let pass many recent opportunities to seize governmental gar-
risons and important towns by frontal attack. They seem instead to be
trying to force the RLG to evacuate towns and garrisons of strategic or
psychological importance without a pitched battle, the ultimate objective
being to enable the Pathet Lao to quietly win more territorial control and
therefore more leverage for political bargaining with Premier Souvanna
Phouma. (Phouma's neutralists hold eight of the RLG's sixteen cabinet
posts under the 1962 Geneva Accords and, although he could not allow the
Pathet Lao much more power and hope to survive, he'could probably add
two to their present four Cabinet posts on condition that the North
Vietnamese forces withdraw from Laos.)
Of course, a political settlement with its native Communists would by
no means solve Laos' security problems because the ambitions of other near-
by Communist powers must also be considered. China has been looking
hungrily at Laos for a long time. The Soviet Union also has a lively
interest in Laos. Under the terms of the Geneva Accords the Soviet Union
and Great Britain are Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Convention on Laos and
Moscow tries to appear to be the responsible mediator. It is suspected,
however, that the Soviets are more interested in increasing their influence
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
over the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) which is the political organization of the
Pathet Lao, than in establishing any serious dialogue between the NLHS and
the RLG aimed at a political settlement. Certainly the recent affair of
Soviet Ambassador to Laos, Viktor Minin, hints at this possibility. In
February, Minin, with Souvanna Phouma's agreement, traveled to the NLHS
stronghold in Sam Neua to talk with NLHS Chairman, Prince Souphanouvong.
His alleged purpose was to persuade Souphanouvong to begin talks with his
half-brother, Souvanna Phouma. Rather than preparing the ground for an
RLG-NLHS dialogue, Minin's trip was almost immediately followed by a major
Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese offensive, which is still going on. A real
dialogue has yet to begin.
Increasing its influence over the Pathet Lao is probably not Moscow's
only reason for moving into Laos, although it may be the most compelling.
Moscow probably believes that the Pathet Lao has a brighter political
future in the long run than the politicians and generals who lead the present
government in Vientiane. However, Moscow also has another objective: to
pre-empt Chinese influence in Laos. And, of course, a Pathet Lao govern-
ment in Laos would give the USSR a foothold in the center of Southeast Asia.
China's view of Laos appears to be the one she traditionally casts on
any small neighbor: potential food for the tiger. In September 1968 Peking,
without permission from the RLG, resumed road building in northern Laos after
a lapse of five years. By late January 1969 the Chinese had completed a
motorable road between the Chinese-Laotian border town of Batene and Muong
Sai, a Laotian town 70 kilometers from the border. It took two more months
to push the next section of the road through difficult terrain to a point
10 kilometers northeast of Muong Sai. That branch of the Chinese-built
road will lead into North Vietnam near Dienbienphu; the other branch will
go south and west and could be extended south to the Mekong River and into
Thailand.
Estimates of the number of Chinese involved in this venture range from
two to ten regular Chinese army (PLA) battalions, equipped with mobile anti-
aircraft batteries, who are assigned to defend from 2,000 to 5,000 Chinese
coolies and engineers working on the roads. There are also reports of PLA
fighting units in northwest Laos with estimates on their numbers also
widely varied. Support for the Chinese forces in Laos comes from Yunnan
Province, from which hundreds of Chinese trucks pass into Laos monthly
carrying food and construction materials and, presumably, military equip-
ment for the PLA units in the area.
Peking's possible reasons for being in Laos include her search for more
territory, but there are others, as well: she may be seeking to create
both a buffer zone and a sphere of influence in the region in anticipation
of a settlement in Vietnam; she may be striving to prevent further growth
of North Vietnam's influence with the Pathet Lao which the great number of
PAVN regulars deployed in Laos gives to Hanoi; Peking may be establishing
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
a road link to old route 46 which runs southwest of Muong Sai and has long
been used by Thai Communist terrorists to move into and out of Thailand.
The new road system could also be intended to facilitate shipment of Chinese
supplies to the Thai Communists, to the Chinese and North Vietnamese laborers
keeping the Ho Chi Minh Trail operating, and to PAVN and Viet Cong units
fighting in South Vietnam.
The prolonged fighting has propelled the nation into a vicious cycle,
for as long as the war continues the RLG is compelled to keep up a large
military establishment which now consumes 50% of the national budget. The
growth of this military establishment and the readiness of some to profit
by built-in opportunities for special privileges, law evasion and cor-
ruption have discouraged the Laotian people and made cynics of many among
the younger element in politics. The swelling Swiss bank accounts of the
elderly, non-military upper classes, who make up the Laotian ruling elite,
have further alienated a vital group -- the men in their thirties who are
at the beginning of their political careers.
The small nation of Laos lives in very real peril. The most immediate
menace comes from North Vietnam, already on the scene with 40,000 troops.
But Communist China's thrust over the border with roads, laborers and her
own troops shows she is as firmly committed as Hanoi to territorial expansion
and subversion. And the Soviet Union stands in the wings. Any Asian knows
that events in the Southeast Asian area will be largely determined by what
happens in Vietnam, and Laos' future is no exception. Failure to reach
peace in Vietnam will lead to additional fighting in Laos, and a peace in
Vietnam without reference to Laos will surely mean more trouble for Laos,
whose Communistoccupied areas will not readily submit to the discipline
of any central government except one controlled by the Pathet Lao.
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3
cpyiknriored FOrAMGeicla2Di PL9499/02 :
1 March 1969
Laos Prince Says
Red Activity Up
VIENTIANE, Laos, March 1
CPYRGHT
r 1 ?
3-
(A 111?P rinee Snnvanna
CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001crRGHT
Phouma said today that Com-
munist military activities have
increased in Laos since the
'United States halted its bomb-
ing of North Vietnam last,
Nov. 1.
The Laotian premier in a
speech marking National War
Victims' Day, said Pathet Lao
terrorists supported by "many
opposing untric
stepped up their sabotage
raids in Vientiane and the
provinces in an effort to de-
stroy the neutralist govern-
ment..
JAPAN TIMES
2 March 1969
?
Changung War, in Laos
New Communist Attempt to Stir Up Disorder'
.ur rig t ,e Nist Ullee ytmts
the Communist, 'Pathet Lao
'forces in the kingdom of Laos
1Jhave refrained, from spear-
heading any major attack.!
tNow, however, they have.
'started unleashing daring at-
tacks in the neighborhood of
Vientiane, the
headquarters of
Premier Sou-
yanna Phou-
ma's ? 'Govern-
ment. And for
the 'first time ti
's ince 1962,
when the big
powers tactly
divided this
Southeast- .Asi-
an kingdom into an eastern
half for the Communists and
Western half for the Royal.
Lao and neutralist forces, the.
Royal Lao capital of Lump
Prabang is seriously threaten-
ed.
It was just a year ago that
in a battle .at Nam Bac, locat-
ed to the north of the royal'
s'eapital, the Government force
lost 2,500 troops?about four,
per cent of its 70,000 men. The
Government has not recover-
ed from the heavy defeat
since.
The Communists are appar-
ently preparing for a straight-;
forward assault in northern
Laos against the Govern-
ment base of Nakhang, which.
Is not far from the Pathet
Lao area of Xieng Xhouang.
Their main objective, pre.
Sumably, is to widen their
territorial control in an ap-
parent effort to reinforce the
leverage of 'the Pathet 'Lao
for a possible political bar-
gain with Souvanna Phouma
in the future. They want to
hold as much ground as pos,
sible in this country when
the Paris talks reach a
climactic point.
Pathet Lao Objective
i? In 1962, the coa.tion_Gor-
erliexpfel?erch.Cor Release
nat ritippi^ns 'natured
CPYRGHT
By CHU SATT0 fn access) to thc baidc't
Souvania Phouma's neutral- regions of Thailand.
Through territory controlled
by the Pathet 'Lao, a major
road is being constructed at
high speed with bulldozers;
graders, trucks and other
modern equipment. From
the Chinese town of Mengla
in the province of Yunnan, it
crosses the Laotian border at
Ban Botene, and runs into
Laos to a distance of about
30' miles. It is now roughly.
three miles from the strategic;
Laotian town of Muong Sal,.
which guards 'the approaches
to the valley of Nambang
leading south diyectly to the
Thai border.
From this town, the Chi-
riese Communists can build a
road link eastward to the
present Route 19, which leads
to the important North Viet'
namese, base at Dienbienphu:
They can also head south tO
Ban Houei Sai, on the bank
Of the Mekong across from
Thailand.
ists holding eight Cabinet
seats, and the rightist and
leftist factions with four
seats respectively,
? The Pathet Lao, led by.
Prince Seuphanouvong, quit.
"the coa Mon in the year that;
followeal. Ever since then,:
the Communists have claim-.
ed tha , Soui,anna Phouma'
now ha; become a mere pup.:
pet of tie Amerigan imperial- ?
ists. T ley assert- that the
only al.thentic group in the
center i; the so-called "Patriot-
ic neutralists" they control.,
Implicit in ? this claim is the
suggestmn that the. Commu-
nists nay come forth with
the con ention that they now
deserve half the Government'
seats.
? North Vietnamese troops,
at present, surround both
Saravan and Attopeu. They
:could capture the two
strategiC towns tomorrow::
They are attacking the near.'
by road junction of Thateng;
Which guards the approaches
to the p ateau of Bolevens, in
an appa -ent? attempt to force
the Gov n?nment in Vientiane
to evact-ate these towns.
Contre 1 of these two towns
would n iturally serve to sub-
stantiate the Pathet Lao
claim that the situation in
their c )untry has utterly
Changed. They could openly
demand more than the four
seats they were originally ac.
Corded in the 16-member
coalition created In Geneva.'
At prent there are some
40,000 North Vietnamese
troops ir Laos, most of them
based n Jar the South Viet+
nam frootier. ? They consti+
Lute the )ackbone of the Com*
munist forces in this country
; Road to Thai Border
It mar be significant for
the futui e of Soutl,ifseiiiatstdo_
escal 79-01
now pushing southward : ?
through the territory of Lam'
1
This may signify a Chinese
Communist attempt to stir;
up confusion and disorder in:
this region to prompt the,
United States, who is wary.
of another Vietnam war in,
?Asia, to withdraw its military!
forces.
Or they may be seeking td
create ?a buffer zone and a
sphere of Influence there,
anticipating that an eventual,
settlement in Vietnam could
lead to some new kind of
political formula for Laos, het;
Immediate neighbor.
At all events, a Settlethene
in Laos depends on a settle
ment in Vietnam. Until that
is achieved, this troubled
land is likely to be tormented
by continuing skirmishes and
obscure maneuvers.
New Cause of Trouble
The _ n_eegaiki Qufw.
letrAragOeVd the war efforts of
the North Vietnamese. Ther
App
CPYRGHT
remedforoRelease 4-9991091MMIPgrer9290M4A?
tration in Laos.
Every Pathet Lao company
or battalion has ,advisers
from North Vietnam. Pathet
Lao soldiers only serve as
reinforcement. Or they are
to be um' as occupation
forces to keep towns and vit.
lages under their control.
This sometimes provokes a
'dispute between the Pathet
Lao and the North Viet-
namese troops; The North
Vietnamese side blames the
the other hand, protest that
they have to go around the
Lao towns and villages to
look for food to feed the
North Vietnamese fighting in
their country.
This, in fact, was the cause
of the bitter armed conflict
which took place between
the two .on Dec. 11 last year
at an area about 13 kilome-
ters south of Muong Phong
Sa Thone in the province of
. Sam Neua.
JAPAN TIMES
8 March 1969
Over the Horizon
Stirrings in Laos
Pallet Lao, the 'leftist Lao-
tian forces entrenched in the
eastern half of the country,
have been stepping up their
military and political activi-
ties as the world uneasily
watches the slow progress of
the Paris talks.
Their recent
behavior
would seem 'to
show that they k .
are planning' !T?
to settle the
Muffled civil
war in Laos
by the same
tactics aspf,
those employ ,
ed by North
Vietnam and the National
Liberation Front in South
Vietnam.
On Sept. 21 last year, just
10 days before the United
States announced the com-
plete suspension of the bomb-
ing of North Vietnam, Radio,
Pathet Lao declared that if,
the U.S. halted the bombing
of the "liberated areas" in
Laos, conditions favorable for
distussing the Laotian issue
would be created.
About three weeks after the
complete suspension of the
American bombing of North
Yietnam, Radio Hanoi report-
By SHINROKU NOZAKI
oo5@efiirobi1T9
CPYRGHT
ei the new Pathet Lao pont'.
pi tenet to the effect that
Fathet Lao aims at setting up
a "democratic, national coati-
t on Government" in colla-
boration with "patriotic, na-
t onal forces" in Laos.
Pathet Lao's call for the
s ispension of bombing is
identical with Hanoi's appeal
while their slogan for a *na-
t onal coalition Government
is an exact replica .of the ap-
real made by the NLF in
South Vietnam.
After the American bomb.
Ing halt against the north,
owever, U.S. air attacks on
tie "liberated areas" of Laos
were reportedly tripled in in-
t.nsity, presumably because
of the increased need to
disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail
hilowing the bombing halt
against North Vietnam.
Last January, Prince Soup-
lanouvong, who is the leader
t) the Pathet Lao, again called
f )r. the suspension of U.S.
bombing of Laos' "liberated
areas" as a condition for
peace and threatened to in.
tmsify Pathet Lao military
activities "until peace mated.
aizes."
The U.S., however, cannot
le expected to halt the
bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail that runs through the
"liberated area" in view of
the uneasy situation in South
Vietnam.
Thus, the Pathet Lao forces,
With the support of 40,000
North Vietnamese troops, are
stepping up guerrilla attacks
against the Royal Laotian
region under, Premier Souvan-
na Phouma. Their tactics re-
semble those of North Viet-
nam and the NLF in South
Vietnam, whose Vietnam War
strategy consists of "breaking
the military balance" and
"winning the political war."
In another significant de-
velopment, Y u e Tai-hong,
Communist China's first high-
ranking diplomat to return to
an overseas post following 4
long diplomatic hiatus, resum-
ed his assignment early last
month as counselor in the
Communist Chinese Embassy
in Vientiane. Meanwhile, the
Soviet ambassador to the Lao-
tian capital, Viktor Minine,
visited Hanoi early in Febru-
ary and then proceeded to the
Pathet Lao headquarters in
Sam Neua. He carried with
him Premier Phouma's letter
to his half brother Prince
Souphanouvong, who in
known as the Red Prince. ,
CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1969
Laos Killings
VIENTIANE?Five French
civilians were allied by 12
Communist Pathet Lao sol-
diers at a Franch-supported
agricultural school 22 mile*
north of here.
Three French technicians
CPYRGHT
were bound and shot at the
school where they worked,
tipsnitp the nleas of local
Laotiano that they were
French, not American. Two
other visiting Frenchmen
heard the shots and rushed
over, also to be gunned
down.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RbP79-01194A000500110001-9
Loa ANGELES TIMES
Approved kiwiRellAgse 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
CPYRGHT
Pekin te s' p
Pressure on Laos
,
F-' '?? -
: Apparent Goal : ii southernmost Yunnan province.
One road leads to Thong Saly to
r-S Control the east. A second road goes south to
een as
C; Muong Sai in Laos and there turns,
! .
-of Border Areas. cf the way to connecting with:
East where it has progressed a third
, North 'Vietnam's famed border townf
. .
?
k ( f Dien Bien Phu. This is the site of
, BY JACK FOISIE Mo Chi Minh's. climactic victory overi
' Tirriee Staff Writer : the French in 1954 and now is a way!
: . BANGKOK?Peking appears to be, flop on Route 19 to Hanoi.
A ' third road. from Mengla leadS
stepping tip its efforts to establish !
buffer areas of influence .or control' ro;uthwesbte to Nam Tha in Laos and
l
pushed" west .1,9 . th
Bum e,
ieolav
In the border provinces of Laos and bord m.
1.3urina adjoining mainland China's. The New Mina News Se rVi e el
southern border. . ' Peking's propaganda agency, has
lao'a St ed .1 bout these Lao r o a 4
' . The same effort also is beiniinade.
i
1. is
them free hid to n the extreme northern , areas !of
Thailand.. Thailand does not have a! La?8-? "' .
. Thoere is a certain legitimacy to
common i border with. China but 4
this !constru :tion for. shortly .after
nbrthern ,provinces are easily, acces-
s through shor t the Geneva accords' of 1962, which
ible to infiltrators
stretches of Laos or Burma. ? i ought to min to Laos
g ' peaCe ? ;
! ' ) aeutralist Pi emier Souvanna Thou.
' One Chinese aim seems io be to arta. gave his approval to Chinese
reach, more easily into areas of Lssistance. - . .. .
possible subversion. , - The zeal with which the road
.! In Laos the province of Phong, auilclers go forward-using ? a
Saly protruding protruding into China's Yun-. Pure of trucl s, bulldozer? and coolie
tan province is conceded by officials liabor to cu -t through jungle and
in the Laotian capital of Vientiane to aiountains, plus the selection .p0
,be entirely dominated by Chinese., routes?indi !ates the Chinese ahnld
. , The only unpredictabld force in to react} more easily areas "
that densely jungled., mountainous: of possible subversion.
province is a 1.enegade Laotian band. k
- American aerial surveil4
of perhaps 1,000 men commanded by
a .Col. Khammouane, which _operates
much like the war lord armies of
pre-Communist China..
Orders. Taken rikora Chinese
But even Khammouane, who for.!
rnerly was loyal to Vientiane, .now
grudgingly takes orders from the.
Chinese consul in the town of Phong
Saly, according to intelligence sour-.
, . .
Ces.
? There: has been extensive :road. Vembei to March or April
construction .by the Chinese in the, i:d 1970 to complete that
three Laotian provinces of Plion,,,,,,
.oad. .
Saly, northern Luang Prabang and._
Helm 'Chong bordering Thailand ?' Rece ltly Soviet Ambas-.
since 1963. ?? . , iador 7 i c t or Minin in
':
i Using* up to 10,000 Chinese coolies,- Vientiane .visited Prince
who are directed by Communist'
Chinese engineers and protected by; ouplic nouvong, the Red
Chinese guards; wnetwork of roads ruler to the Communist*
hag been built.- All stern from the,,.ield portion of Laos. One
imivictieus town of Mengla, ap-, a his alissions,accordi
tsowiadifelniReiletussi4r999/09/0 : CIA-RDP791:11 1
CPYRGHT
p. speculation, was to lear
more about Chinese
r
, volvement in Laos with
the Americans hope
Moscow effort in mind t
'subvert it.
The increase of Pathe
Lao attacks in areas ad
jacent to the Thai borde
Indicates an effort t
protect and enlarge infil
tration routes into Th
Land Nan province abut
ting Laos. The province i
Mountainous and inhabi
ed by aborigine tribe
t,srhich have always bee
scorned by the lowlan
!Thais.
t. Communist agent?
I
trained either in China b
lNorth Vietnam are seek
1.1g to exploit this histori
discrimination by Thais
against the upland Meo
Yao and lesser tribes. ,
v
kt Insurgency Peril
.,,
! Westerners who live
this remote area, mainl
anthropologists, missiona
ries and American agents
consider the nor ther
That insurgency mor el
'dangerous now than thd
more - publicized struggld
in the barren flat country'
fronting the middle belt a
& northeast Thailand
Laos.
American counterinsur-
gency efforts have been:
,r easona bly successful
'among the Thai farmers.'
Seeking to eliminate the
low-level but apparently
firm foothold'the Commu.
nists have gained in The
rnountain tribe country,
pal officials spmt
94A000500110001-9
lance has kept track of this
activityy an d informed
sources can say exactly
how f.Er along the all*
weathe 7 road has reached
from TTuong Sai toward
Dien B.en Phu. They esti-
mate it will take only one
inore d 7 season (next No.?
. 3
,
I '
,
moApprovErdifbeReleasefp,011010 P79-0/1-149k1310t801711141111 -9
" e ? so
Van,* Pao a Laotian Mea continues etween -
nese- backed insurgents
and loyal Shang and Bur-
mese troops.
The same situation is
present in Assam in India,
where the defiant Nagas
opposing any settlement
with New Delhi continue
to resist with Chinese
support Indian army pad-
fication efforts.
In all of the four border
countries the unanswered
question is whether , the,
Chinese. motive is only te!
create a ',buffer against
hostile neighbors or is a
creeping offensive for poli.
tical or military gain.
areas.rcier
leader and staunch anti-
Communist; to a parley.
Thrt hope Was that he
could regain the loyalty of
the Meos in Thailand for
the Bangkok government.
Yang Pao, it is con-
firmed in Vientiane, was
flown to Thai Third Army
advanced headquarters at
the village of Chiang
Kiang in an American
plane. tut little resulted
from the conference, pos-
sibly because the Fhai
gOvernment does not look
favorably on a yang Pao
private army in Thailand.
In Burma and India
Less is known about
Chinese activities across
the borders into Burma
and India. But lack of
detailed information avai-
lable bere does not dam-
pen the belief of qualified
specialists that the Burma
and Indian hill country
adjoining China is also a
target of Chinese insur-
gen cy efforts.
The Shan tribes in north-
ern Burma have made an
accommodation of sorts
with the Rangoon govern-
ment.* But the guerrilla
ASSOCIATED ettr.Sb
I" CPYRGHT 8 April 1969'
:.'"` -L? 65 Hanoi Battalions
ReportedA t. ? t Laos
c tve Li .
Hi Ili, I .1-IL-. ti 1,
t hitIii? tI VIENTIANE, April 8 (AP)?
'11,, ii);,?it
ill, I,
I ? I
1,1 I). It ti??01,
'Hu' I' '"WASIYIliGTOISTAR
ilChamehanh Pracian,
mation, director general of
Iiaos, said today at least 65
, North Jiepamese battalions
,arp ioperating in Laos. ,
14 l'Atpri 1 1969
d? 41. I 1??1 4 ht ,?
it I
11,,11V
CPYF,R6HT 1,1 H 1 1
tY:DONALD RIRK
,Wa ce4re,pondent of The Star
VliNTIANE,Laos--=, Officials
here ,are counting on tne bovieE
Union' to help stem the gradual
Comniimist advance across the
mountains and jungles of Laos.
Leaders of the royal govern:
ment' as well as Western diplo-
mats' believe Russia eventually
may try to persuade the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese lead-
ers to abandon the military
phase of their struggle. The rea-
soning is that Russia wants the
war to end before Communist
China begins to include the coun-
try within its sphere of influ-
ence.
One hopeful sign of Soviet in-
terest in settling the war, an
integral phase of North Viet-
nam's struggle for domination
over all the former French Indo-
chinese states, was the journey,
this winter of the Soviet ambas-
sador to the Pathet Lao "capi-
tal" in Sam Neua, the northeast-
ern Laotian province largely
controlled by North Vietnamese
troops. Approved F
T.To teld a tGv5f ere rice
_
that some of these, 25 battal-
ions are reported around Sam-
, neua and 'Thong Saly in north,
,
,.....-. T,_..._W II ll
,scattered in areas near Luang
,Prabang, Savannak het In
sa,uthern Laos, and Pakse and
,Champassak.
CPYRGHT
ooks to ussia to
from Vientiane . to Hanoi and
' then traveled by road from Ha-
yei la Neua, carried a mes-
sage from Laotian Premier Sou-,
vanna Ph mma to his younger
half-broth u r, Prince Souphanou-
vong, the leader of the Pathet
Lao.
The ambassador returned to
Vientiane, again by way of Ha-
noi, with a reply from Souphan-
ouvong iodicating he was not
ready to think of rapproche-
ment, at east as long as Ameri-
can wan r lanes were bombing
parts of U e country.
Despite the inconclusive re-
sults of ane trip, analysts here
believe i , showed the Russian
interest ii exerting direct influ-
ence civet the Communists war
for Laos. The Communists rely
to some extent on Soviet arms,
but they are shipped from Hanoi
and not consigned directly for
Laos by Moscow.
Laotiar officials, notably Sou-
vanna, oelieve the Russians
would work even more actively
1 ?.1. ? ??
One view is that the question
of Laos might finally enter the
peace talks in Paris at the stage
at which the participants had
reached some solution, however.
temp or ar y, for a Vietnam
cease-fire.
Before the talks reach this
stage, however, the Communists
appear determined to solidify
their hold over vast stretches of
the Laotian jungle.
During the current "dry-season
offensive," they have knocked
out small government installa-
tions from the northern to the
southern provinces, have built
new roads and ambushed vehi-
cles on old roads leading to im-
portant towns in the Mekong
River lowlands. The Commu-
nists, spearheaded by an esti-
mated 40,000 regular north Viet-
namese troops, seem bent on de-
veloping a bargaining position
on Laos that would enable the
Pathet Lao to gain de facto con-
trol of the government through
'a
? ? . ? ?
? ? ? .1
4
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
It
the major towns along the river,
they could rule the entire coui-
try. And North Vietnam, as a
result of its military and poli
cal control over the Pathet Lao,
could turn Laos into a satellke
kingdom under a figurehead
king.
Some analysts believe ne
Russians might favor the to
objectives. At the same time,
Russian policy at the moment
calls for full recognition of Scu-
vanna, whom the Russians origi-
nally supported as neutral st
leader when the accords on Laos
were signed in Geneva neatly
seven years ago. Souvan
steadfastly insists on holding to
the letter of the accords, whizh
called for the departure of ill
foreign troops. Despite his pie-
sent relia-^,ce on U.S. military
aid, he has often indicated he
might revert to a pro-Soviet m u-
tralist position if the North Vi et-
namese withdrew.
Such a dinouement to the
struggle, while probably acce )t-
Id
I ?
f.: ft I S I;
?
CPYRGHT
Approved For Releaso 1-9e9mei02 CIA-RD 79 01194A000500110001-9
nevitably arouse the ire of Com--
munist China, which for years,
has accused the Soviet "revi-
sionists" of collaborating' with
the American "imperialists."
ECONOMIST
15 March 1969
Laos
Peace has its dangers
CPYRGHT
FROM A CORRESPONDENT LATELY IN LAOS
" What we want is an independent life,
blessed equally by both America and Red
China. We must build together a peace-
ful, independent, democratic, united,
neutral and prosperous Laos." So runs the.
manifesto just published by a group of
right-wing politicians in Vientiane. 1
Their leader, Mr Chao Sopsaisana, vice-
chairman of the national assembly, has
no friend in the past of the neutral-
it posed on Laos by the 1962 Geneva
agreement, and certainly no supporter of I
moves to find a fresh basis for co-opera-
tion with the communist Pathet Lao. But
the Vietnam peace talks raise the possib-
ility of a new attempt to reunify Laos. If ;
it happens these conservatives do not wish
to be caught with their trousers down. ;
"We have no political organisation to ;
match the communists," Chao Sopsaisana
told this correspondent in Vientiane. " We
may well have to face a general election ;
in Laos before 197i, We must now set up
3. political movement of all Buddhists andi
ion-communists." Ile is trying, with syni-1
lathy from the Americans, and support
.rorn certain politicians and generals.
These are mostly relatively young men,1
n their forties, professing opposition to!
'injustice, corruption and inefficiency;
rkomitie royal government headed by
Prince Souvanna Phounia. But there isi
little sign that they have captured the,
dealism of the still younger men, gener-!
31Iy disgusted with their elders?including
most of those involved in Laotian politics
;ince the early 196os?and with a good !
leal to be disgusted about. Power politics
lave propelled the Laotians abruptly into i
the twentieth century, and mountains of::
American money. Economic aid in 1967-'!
:38 amounted to $63 million (for a popula-
tion of some 1.5 million under royal
government control). A fair part has gone
to line the pockets and Swiss bank
accounts of the numerous potentates who
employees of the Soviet news agency
Novosti in Vientiane can be seen distribu-
ting in the streets anti-Chinese literature
in French. One of the booklets, entitled
" DuplicitC," describes Chinese policies
as " irresponsible and insane."
The Chinese are now building a road,
:through northern Laos, to link Yunnan
with Dien Bien Phu, just across North
Vietnam's western border. They are
!pernianently represented in Pathet Lao.
territory by a consulate. Yet the Pathet!
!Lao has given its full approval to the,
!invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians,
evidently can still pull strings.
: The royal government claims the Pathet
'Lao threat would quickly evaporate if
'North Vietnamese units withdrew from
Laos. It reckons they total 18,000 combat
troops and over 21,000 men in support
.units. They have been responsible for
the communist military successes of the.
last four years. Recently North Viet-
namese reinforcements are reported to
have come in from South Vietnam. Com-
munist troops have also recently been.
:supplied with 140 mm rockets and other
new weaponry. Meanwhile the royal army,
.now some 75,000 men strong, has
reorganised with American assistance and
advisers. Abler officers have been
given responsible command. American'
air force support has increased greatly?
since the attpckx on North Vietnam were
halted.
Events in Laos are bound to be influ-
enced by what happens to Vietnam. A'
failure to reach peace there will probably'
lead to more fighting in Laos. But peace,
:in Vietnam may not mean peace in Laos:
:Even if the Ho Chi Minh trails lose their:
:significance, the large areas bordering on,:
China and North Vietnam now occupied:
by the communists will not easily return
to the control of any central government,.'
except a Pathet Lao one.
make up the Latian rei ing class.
No Laotian politician, right-wing or
Pathet Lao, could survive if he did not
pay at least lip service to the need for
national reunification. But neither of the
warring parties is prepared to work for
union except on its own terms. The royal
'government unrealistically asks Prince
Souphanouvong and three of his left-wing
! colleagues simply to endorse the old tri-
partite formula, return to Vientiane and.
:take up their vacant cabinet seats,
as if nothing had happened in the six
!years since the left-wing ministers fled
from a right-wing coup. (The Pathet Lao,
:in fact, now &:introls at least half the
:territory, although somewhat less than
half the povulation.) And except for
Souvanna Phouma himself it is hard to
name anyone in the non-communist ruling
group who can be considered a neutralist.
Some of the neutralists have joined the
Pathet La.o, as a separate group, and may?
now demand representation in a coalition!
government.
The Russians could do much to help
Prince Souvanna Phounia (for whom
they have a great liking) out of his predic-
ament, if they wanted! to. But there is no
real evidence to suggest that they do. Far
from wishing to mediate they seem to.
be principally anxious to rebuild their
,bridges to the Pathet Lao. This would
explain the unexpected recent visit of
the Soviet ambassador in vientiane to
Prince Souphanouvong's headquarters .in
Sam Neua, in northern Laos.
They evidently do not wish to create,
the impression of being in collusion with!
the Americans over a possible settlement.:
And they believe that the Pathet Lao has
a brighter future as a political movement
than the conservative politicians and
generals in Vientiane, whose fortunes may
depend on how long the Americans
choose to support them. Not that they .
want Chinese-sponsored disorder. Russian
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CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
employees of the Soviet news agency
Novosti in Vientiane can be seen distribu-
ting in the streets anti-Chinese literature
in French. One of the booklets, entitled
" Duplieite," describes Chinese policies
as " irresponsible and insane."
The Chinese are now building a road,
through .northern Laos, to link Yunnan
with Dien Bien Phu, just across North
Vietnam's western border. They are
permanently represented in Pathet Lao
territory by a consulate. Yet the Pathet
Lao has given its full approval to the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians
evidently can still pull strings.
The.royal Povernment claims rhe Pathet
Lao threat would quickly evaporate if
North Vietnamese units withdrew from
Laos. It reckons they total 18,000 combat
troops and over 21,000 men in support
units. They have been responsible for
the communist military successes of the
last four years. Recently North Viet-
namese reinforcements are reported to
have come in from South Vietnam. Com-
munist troops have also recently been
supplied with 140 mm rockets and other
new weaponry. Meanwhile the royal army,
now some 75,000 men strong, has been
reorganised with American assistance and
advisers. Abler officers have been
given responsible command. American
air force support has increased greatly
since the attacks on North Vietnam were
halted.
Events in Laos are bound to be influ-
enced by what happens to Vietnam. A
failure to reach peace there will probably
lead to more fighting in Laos. But peace
in Vietnam may not mean peace in Laos.
Even if the Ho Chi Minh trails lose their
significance' the large areas bordering on
China and North Vietnam now occupied
by the communists will not easily, return
to the control of any central government,
except a .Pathet Lao one.
NEW YORK TIMES
9 April 1969
Foreign Affairs: How the War Must End
By C. L. SULZBERGER
SAIGON?There can be no
valid setucmcmof he VIeLoani
war that does not specifically
include Laos and Cambodia.
? Otherwise Southeast Asia
would face, the following para-
? doxical situation: Communist
? troops could withdraw from
South Vietnam but continue do
facto occupation of eastern
, Laos and eastern Cambodia.
^ They now control the entire
strip running from the Laotian
border of China to the Cam-
bodian Parrot's Beak that points
right at Saigon.
Therefore no basis for evac-
t. uating foreign forces from
South Vietnam can be devised
that does not also include
evacuation of foreign forces
from Laos and Cambodia. If
there is to be a return to the
formula of the 1954 Geneva
agreement governing Vietnam
and Cambodia, there must also
be a return to the 1962 Geneva
agreement neutralizing Laos.
Threats to ,Salgon
Any other settlement would
be meaningless. It might pro-
vide for restoring peace to
South Vietnam, but the Saigon
regime would be permanently
? threatened not only by the
access routes from North Viet-
, , nam that lead along the Ho Chi
Minh trail through Laos and
the Sihanouk trail through
cambocua; it woula aiso be
threatened by sizable North
Vietnamese forces actually in
Prince ihan ouk's army. b I ha-
nouk himself admitted last
month: "There are Vietnamese
CPYRGHT
?
oak
cause- but ne is angling for ;
Washington's help.
Progislont Nixon auiotiv melts
?
This problem is so acute that
the Paris Vietnam negotiations
must ultimately be expanded to
take in diplomatic representa-
tives from Laos and Cambodia.
The Laotian situation is in-
creasingly bad. Hanoi, which
has been violating the 1962
agreement with mounting ef-
frontery, is now pushing its
most serious drive into Laos
since 1962-63. If it advances
any further it will destroy the
heartland of the Meo tribes.
crumbling their especially dedi-
cated resistance.
At the same time, the Ninth
Vietcong Division (80 per cent
North Vietnamese) is stationed
in the Cambodian Parrot's
Beak. Some strategists guess it.
will eventually be committed
with two other divisions sent
through Cambodia in the pres-
ent offensive against Saigon.
- Others speculate it will attack
the provincial capital of Tay-
ninh. It is worth considering,
however,- that Hanoi prefers to
leave the Ninth just where it is.
This menaces the Cambodian
Government and prevents it
from reaching accommodation
with the United States and its
allies.
The Ninth Division alone is
strong enough to overwhelm
6
deeply worried. There are Viet-
cong and Vietminh [meaning
North Vietnamese] infiltrating.
If you look at a map near
Mondolkiri is Sen Mororom, is
0 Raing. After 0 Raing is
Mount Nam Lean and there
are plenty of Vietcong and Viet-
minh there. If you go up to
Ratanakiri you will see Laban
Siek. Farther north is Bo
Khanh. Let us stop there?a
few meters from Bo Khanh. It
is full of Vietcong and Viet-
minh."
Sihanouk's Dilemma
These are Sihanouk's first de-
tailed admissions of the Com-
munist military advance into
Cambodia, which is now their
outright sanctuary against Sai-
gon and U.S. troops. The Com-
munist military presence is
even more extensive than the
Prince acknowledges and Siha-
nouk doesn't know how to get
them out.
Sihanouk still proclaims Cam-
bodia has "only four enemies?
Thailand, Laos, Vietnam [South]
and the United States." But he
hints he is prepared for accom-
modation with all of them if
they will only recognize Cam-
bodia's existing frontiers. He
insists he will "always support"
the Vietcong "in their just
a diplomatic solution to this
impasse. Both Bangkok and
Saigon have recently indicated
willingness to recognize pres-
ent Cambodian frontiers, thus,,
abandoning their own previous
claims. , One suspects U.S. i
prompting. Furthermore, Nixon
sent Sihanouk a personal letter '
and encouraged Robert McNa-
mara and David Rockefeller to -
contact him.
But Sihanouk complains that ;
Nixon has not yet granted "un-
conditional recognition of my
frontiers" and adds: "Whether;
I swing toward the right or Walk
depends on me alone." He does,
of course, have the alternative
of temporarily resigning?which
he has done before?and letting
General Lon Nol, the pro-West-
em Acting Premier, take respon-
sibility for a difficult transition,
What is also taking place in
Laos?where there is heavier
North Vietnamese military oc-
cupation?is vitally important'
to South Vietnam. There can be
no final settlement here until
there is settlement as well in
Its westerly neighbors South-
east Asia cannot approach sta-
bility until Laos and Cambodia,'
are brought into the Paris talks.
War shouldn't be escalated but
peace must be. , 4
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31 January 1969 CPYRGHT
From Fred Ermry, lately in Vientiane
OSTENTATIOUS RULE
1111101111MInt does seem that precious
little has been done by Prince Souvanna
Houma in the way of political galvani-
zation during the past seven years. In
the face of many frustrations the inclina-
tion is not to rock the boat.
The proclamation of the Lao Patriotic
Front's political programme moved ,hitn
,to respond with a political statement on
New Year's Eve in which he implored
his countrymen "not to remain passive
and take the easy way". Most observers
estimate. however, that " government "
as an entity beneficial to the people still
means little more than it did seven years
ago. ,
The Americans, meanwhile, have not
'waited for peace to attempt efforts at
economic development. While it is, true
that U.S.A.I.D. props up the country
with aid (excluding military) at some
$58m. last year, moves have been made
to, 'stimulate rice production. Some
optimistic assessments reckon that self-
sufficiency could be hopod for next year,
with even some rice exports in 1971. An
American-backed purchasing agency is
trying to make the short cut from sub-
sistence to a market economy without
the intercession of money lenders, and
may succeed. Timber exploitation has
been stepped up considerably, and in the
towns there has been transformation
since the "village days" of ,only 10
years ago. Cars taxis and motor cycles
?nearly all Japanese?fill the streets.
The question is. how much of this
advance do the people associate with
government and how much with the
Americans. An honest answer is: The
Americans "?and therein lies a great
problem.
There have been radical changes in
administering American aid since the
1950s, younger Laotians are? asserting
themselves in economic planning; and
there is a sense of mission. But there
is far to go?and nowhere farther, in
the eyes of the young .men, than .in
correcting the flagrant luxury and otten-
tation of the lives of the ruling families
and cliques. It is generals, government
ministers and high officials who have
built all the stylish villas for renting to
the many foreigners.
It may well be true the future of Laos
will depend more on external than in-
ternal decisions. But a healthier internal
situation would obviously help to decide
that future in more positive terms. It
seems clear that the Americans, in return
for their own withdrawal from Vietnam,
will insist on North Vietnamese with-
drawal from the Ho Chi Minh trails
complex. But it seems doubtful that the.
!North Vietnamese will leave northern
Laos, where people have so long been
directed towards Hanoi rather than
, Vientiane. ? ?
In this sense all 'depends on the
lUnited States, Russia, 'and of course
China. Can they improve on the present
miserable reality?that a buffer .istate
is only a cover for hostile partition.?
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7
May 1969
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Compiled from Newspapers and Periodicals
On Laotian Protests at Hanoi Aggression
Continuing military activity of the North Vietnamese in Laos
has caused the Laotian Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, to
protest to the co-chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference, Britain and
the Soviet Union. The Protest, published in Laos on 19 March 1969,
has been circulated by Britain to other countries which took part in
the Conference - Cambodia, Nortil Vietnam, France, Laos, China, South
Vietnam, the United States, Burma, Canada, India, Poland and Thailand.
Britain has also suggested to the Soviets that the International Con-
trol Commission (ICC) for Laos (India, Poland and Canada) be asked to
report on the situation.
Although the Geneva Agreement provided for the withdrawal of for-
eign troops from Laos and guaranteed her neutrality, the Laotians have
frequently protested at the North Vietnamese military presence. Be-
cause of the refusal of the Communist Pathet Lao to allow the ICC to
investigate areas under their control, the strength and composition of
the guerrillas could not be assessed, but Prince Souvanna Phouma gave
an estimate on 24 October 1968, that there were now some 40,000 to
50,000 North Vietnamese troops in his country, either fighting with
the Pathet Lao or protecting the Ho Chi Minh trail (the route through
Laotian territory by which the North Vietnamese have been infiltrating
men and supplies into South Vietnam).
All foreign troops were supposed to leave Laos after the 1962
Agreement, and although there were then some thousands of North Viet-
namesein the country, only 40 North Vietnamese civilian technicians de-
parted from Laos via the checkpoints set up by the ICC.
Both Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have since denied that any North
Vietnamese men or materiel are in Laos, but in September 1964. three
North Vietnamese soldiers were captured. At Souvanna Phouma's request
the ICC inspected documents found on the prisoners, considered their
statements and confirmed their nationality and military status.
In March 1965 nine more prisoners were captured at Dong Hene in
Southern Laos. The evidence they provided formed the basis of a ma-
jority report published by the ICC on 22 August 1966, which amounted
to a major indictment of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos. (Po-
land refused to be associated with this.)
In an article published by the Far Eastern Economic Review on
21 November 1968, Guy Hannoteaux, who had been captured and held for
a month by the Pathet Lao, confirmed the existence of a "sizeable num-
ber" of North Vietnamese in Pathet Lao-held territory. He spoke to
one who said he was North Vietnamese "like the others you have seen
in this camp;" he had come to Laos only ten days previously. Accord-
ing to Hannoteaux, it was generally the North Vietnamese who directed
Pathet Lao operations. '
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On 4 December, Sergeant Cao Van Mai, of the Second Battalion,
505th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army, told a press conference
in Vientiane that he had been fighting in Laos since 1965 and had
taken part in five attacks before being taken prisoner.
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3 February 1969
All
World Affairs
bout a
t S the world at large Teets al:
lernately relieved and dise
iressed at the course of the Viet,
; am talks in Penile the anguish of
Xttle Laos deepens, as do its
Wounds. Either because of over-,
pncentratIon of attention on Viet-
am or became of its meeming
demographic negligibility Laos ine
eferi writhes In /teeny unnoticed
\nd uaappreciated. A knife cuts
at its henrt, yet L809 cannot cry,
The world seeMa, to have little
cline for it.
Some 40,000. North Vietnamese
solefers are on Its soil. Two new
S iv isions were reported arrived in
the leet fortnight. Hanoi, ot
course, questions not only the
figure but the fact itself of the'
presence of its soldiers In Laox.t,
That the North Vietnamese armed
forces have been In Laos was;
however confirmed by the Inters'.
national Control Commission spinal
years- ago though their numbeii
then could not be as large. The:
;CC 'consists of the representativesif
of Canada and Poland with India?
as its Chairman. It was sot up in:
1954 as pnrt of the soscalled acel
Cords arrived at the iirst Geneva!
Conference on the problems of,
the former States of Indo-China. 3
The ICC has not always been,
able and active enough to .dis-
charge its responsibility at least.
in Laos. Indeed it does not halm
the requisite capacity. This Is
probably the reason why Prince
Souvanna Phourna,? the country's,
universally acclaimed neutralise,
Prime IViinister, has been seeking;
expension of its role and pers.!
eonnel. But the smnliness of its,
size and number or the men at?
its disposnl is not the only wealve
ness of the ICC. Every time, the
,Governmept of Laos has mule a!
.complaint ineolving the Northj
elletnamese, its Polish member has;
Opposed action. . According to,
,Warsaw no decision of the ICC Le
;binding unless it is unanimous. I
; What seems to be the crassese
example of this strcinge legalisne
'came when Prince Soul/1111nel
Phouma requested the ICC to see
cheekposts at access points
into Laos from North Vietrunne
Poland frustrated the implemen-'
tntion of this request. Obviouslye
this explains how the North Vices
homes? mannged to be In Laos
such missive strength.
t? That in spite of its internee
quarrels, the Communist world as
a whole hag been acting In cone
ert in relation to Laos became
evident on nnother occasion. Ap-
prehending that the little country
Might be engulfed in, "Tonkinese
!expansionism'," in )119 own phrase;
Werence Souyanne Phourea fiat
Seepreeteldied the 'Burians for nen-,
tary assistance. Moscow refused
to comply with his request, with
ehe result that he had to turn to
the Americans. The Americans
initially agreed only to provide
him facilities for reconnaissance
information, though later they be.
gan bombing North Vietnamese
reinforcement and supply convoys
along the Ho Chl-Minh Trail in
Laos used by Hanoi to keep up.
its war effort in South Vietnam.
It may also be of some Interest
to note that Communist China has
been using its army men to build
a road to connect Yunnan with
Muong Sal, in that part of Laos
Which is now under the controe
of the Pathet Lao.
Involuntary Role
What is the extent of - North
Vietnamese-assisted insurgency in
Laos that is harrying the other-
wise idyllic kingdom that res
'sernbles Nepal in several ways?.
If we are to believe Soth
Phetrasi, the leader of the Lao
Patriotic Front,. a counterpart oe
:the National Liberation Front in
South Vietnam, three-fifths of the
territory and half of the populae
ton of Laos are controlled by the
Pathet Laos Even Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma concedes that onesi
third of the territory a Laos Is
!under Pathet Lao control and ones;
third in contest between his Govsi
.ernment and the Communist guee
'rains. How long the Governe
'ment a Laos can on its own be s,
match for the challenge It laces
es an open question. '
It has been assumed not only by
the Americans, who find their
basic emotions at war with their
Involuntary role of the biggest
, 'world power, but also by Prince
Souvanna Phourna himself that
'once the war in Vietnam comes to,
an end L809 will regain its peace.'
neutrality and independence. The
Prince told a Western journaliat
some time ago that Hanoi would.
not then find it necessary to main-
tin its presence in Lao& This is
Indeed Si chicken-and-egg story..
;s It was in 1982 that the. Geneve
Conlerence, after prolonged
!wrangling, was supposed to have
settled "once for all' the question
of Laos. A Government of "natios
nal unity" was established, It com-
prised the nationalists, Prince
Souvanna Phoumes neutralists
end the Pattie Lao. But not long
after, the Pathet Lao representa-
tives walked out of it In touching
faith that the word given is the
word honoured, Prince Souvanna
Phourna still keeps ..the vacated
chairs unoccupied. In the Cabinet
He has also reiterated more than
once his hope that the Pathet Lao
would agree to talk with him- ors
whatever the points of dispute hes"
tween them. et this has been an:
B
invitation without zesponse. Are.
the Communists in Laos, or more
pertinently their mentors abroad4
being -merely obsent-minded- Or ckt
they lve-wIder arnbitIonse we
trfay find the answer to this ques.e,
tion in military geography as it,
obtains In Laos today.
' I
Mere Coincidence
?
Pathet Lao forces are in occu-
pation of Laotian territory not
only along the borders a South'
;Vietnam but also in all the north-
em and north-western regions.
that bring them to the borders of
Burma and Thailand. And they
came into that posse5sico1 quite
some time before the "war-mong.s
erinp," U.S. President Johnsoei
'escalated" the war in Vietnam,
wnseperhaps necessary for the
North Vietnamese and the Pathet
Lao to occupy the territory that
constitutes the Ho Chi-minls trait,
Their friends in South Vietnren
had to be supported and eustaine ?
ed. But why wns it necessnry
them to occupy T,aotien tertitoryi
up So the borders a these tw(e
countries? To vary somewhat the
same question, is it merely a .coe
incidence that the Laotian terse.
tory under the control of the Paei
Viet Lao is contiguous with those
areas of Burma and Thailand
where insurgency is growing on
an ineseasing scale? ?
In an ostensible bid for an alibi,
Mr Soth-Phetrasi has accused the
Laotian Government of being he
"tow with the Americans." He
calls upon Prince Souvanna Phos
=la and other members of hisi
Government "to return to reason."
But one fact seems to show that
either Prince Souvanna Phouina'S
Government is utterly inefficient
or not as much sold to the .Aineti
ricane as Seth would have us be
Wye. While his friends are carry-ii
ing on a vicious war against View-,
tiane, Seth maintains an office id
the Laotian capital. The office ill
guarded by 120 Pathet Lao name4
men. Soth has been noticeably
busy in keeping contacts not cinlyi
with the foreign embassies in the
Laotian Capital but also with dif-
ferent departments in Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma's Government. An
"imperialist stooge" has seldom
before been known to allow such
facilities to a known enemy. -
Prince Sotivanna Phourna Inny
or may not .be the best practi-
tioner a neutralism?he wrts at
one time believed to derive inspi-
ration from Jawaharlal Nehru--
but one cannot In reason ignors
the lesson of his troubles anc,
:eravails. His country's future Is ir
jeopardy mainly because he one,
most of his countrymen refuse tc"
be sucked Into .the Corm-minis
bloc of one variety or another. r
is indeed distressing that his coun.
ery's war should be forgotten
!when. it is unforgettable, at lezs.
for this pnrt of the world. .Noise
about one part of the ? wonl
should not be allowed to mea
silence about another.
e? ,?
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CPYRGHT
BURMA
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110#11/
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25X1 C1 Ob
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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p9tuo, y.,e(1,!_?!4,e11! jsFril?9,9/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
May 1969
ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN CUBA
After an initial period of growth and expansion, the Cuban economy has
stagnated, in spite of the approximately $350 million in subsidies and
credits which Cuba receives annually from the Soviet Union. Since 1957,
the record pre-revolutionary year, the Cuban Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
has risen by an average of only 1.5 per cent per year -- one of the poorest
records in the region. Since the population has steadily grown, this means
that per capita consumption has declined 15 to 20 per cent in the past decade.
Change in Economic Objectives
During its ten years in power, the Castro regime has changed its
economic policies and objectives. Soon after taking over the government,
Castro announced broad and ambitious plans to achieve rapid agrarian reform
and agricultural diversification, rapid industrialization, nationalization
of the economy, redistribution of income, improved living conditions and
other benefits for the lower classes. After trying, without success, to
attain so many objectives simultaneously for the first two to three years,
the regime ordered a change in priorities.
In 1963, after several disastrous sugar harvests and other economic
failures, the government gave highest priority to increasing sugar pro-
duction, while its earlier goals for industrialization and an increase in
popular welfare were postponed until after 1970, the year the regime
expected to meet its goal of a ten-million-ton sugar harvest. Emphasis has
also been given to cattle raising, with the aim of developing livestock
products for export purposes. The year 1963 marked the low point in the
transition of the Cuban economy to a socialist structure. Since then,
Cuba's GNP has grown at an average annual rate of less than two per cent,
or about the same as the growth in population.
Problems of the Economy
The major reason for the general lack of economic progress in Cuba has
been gross mismanagement of the economy. Most of those who now belong to
the managerial class are poorly educated and inexperienced, while the system
itself gives little authority to lower echelon managers and excessive
authority to higher level officials. The administrative structure has been
frequently reorganized and personnel has been freely shifted about, with
consequent duplication and conflict in authority. There has been a
perpetual shortage of labor in the agricultural sector, while at the same
time a labor surplus has existed in other sectors. The U.S. trade embargo
has forced Cuba to import capital goods to replace U.S.-built equipment and
so has limited Cuba's ability to import other goods. And even this limited
ability must be sustained by large infusions of economic aid from Communist
countries, most of it from the Soviet Union. In spite of government efforts
to increase the value of exports, there has been a decline. This is the
result of a lower volume of sugar exports as well as a drop in non-sugar
exports because of production problems, increased domestic demand and the
loss of U.S. markets.
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Sugar Production
Current prospects indicate that the 1969 sugar crop will not be much
larger than -- if as large as -- the 5.2 million tons of 1968, and Castro
himself has admitted the crop has "gone badly." During a recent tour of
Camaguey Province, a major sugar-producing area, Castro declared the delays
in harvesting this year's crop could cost Cuba ten million dollars in
foreign exchange, the same amount he hoped to earn by sugar rationing which
was started the first of this year. Far from reaching the nine-million-ton-
goal originally planned for 1969, this year's harvest should yield 51-- million
tons, according to Castro's own estimates at the beginning of the year. Even
that figure now appears unlikely since no production statistics have so far
been published, although in the past the harvesting of one or two million tons
early in the season has been widely publicized. Furthermore, it is said that
preparations to meet the 1970 target of 10 million tons are interfering with
the current harvest, with rumors that sugar from the current crop may even be
concealed in order to appear to increase the yield next year.
According to the official Communist Party newspaper Granma, Cubans must
work harder to bring in the 1969 harvest and to cope with other economic
tasks. A fresh drive in harvesting and planting was begun on 30 March and
is to last until 1 May. This custom was started in 1966, when Castro
proposed the Easter holidays be replaced by a week of intensive work in
honor of his victory at Playa Giron. In 1967 Playa Giron week as it is now
called was extended to two weeks, and in 1968 it was extended to a month.
Now Castro has suggested there be no public holidays at all between October
1969 and July 1970 in order to meet economic goals. Such a drive, however,
is in addition to the now regular mass mobilizations of thousands of citizens
who are required to spend at least a month between February and May in the
harvesting of sugarcane. All other activity -- governmental, business and
educational -- suffers as a result, as it must either cease or slow down
during this period.
Dependence on the Soviet Union
In early February the 1969 Soviet-Cuban trade protocol was signed,
including the grant of long-term credit to finance the Cuban trade deficit,
presumably not only to cover the deficit for this year, but also whatever
may be necessary to cover the unfinanced protion of past trade deficits.
Thus Cuba may well need more Soviet aid than last year when it totaled
$328 million. (The 1968 trade deficit was larger than planned because Cuba
shipped considerably less than the 2.7 million tons of sugar required by
last year's protocol. Thus her deficit is estimated to be close to $400
million, or an increase of $150 million over the 1967 deficit.)
Although Soviet exports to Cuba are not expected to increase in the cur-
rent year, the USSR is expected to continue to supply considerable machinery
and equipment, including that needed for Soviet-aided projects, raw materials,
foodstuffs and almost all of Cuba's petroleum. Even if Soviet petroleum
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2
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deliveries to Cuba were to increase over the 1968 total of 5.3 million tons,
there is no indication that it would allow the lifting of fuel rationing,
which Cuba has had for over a year.
The 1969 trade protocol was signed within the framework of a six-year
agreement reached in 1964. There is no indication the Cubans have obtained
any firm Soviet commitment for the years after that basic agreement expires
in 1970. Obviously Castro's need for an assured subsidy will continue to
be as great as ever, especially since economic planning includes further
mechanization and diversification of Cuban agriculture and general expansion
requiring huge capital investments.
Dismal Outlook for Average Cuban
In general, the average consumer is faring poorly under the Cuban
revolution. Per capita consumption of goods and services has declined about
15 per cent since 1957. Except for landless farm workers and urban service
workers, who now receive higher wages and increased health and education
benefits, consumption levels for most other groups have declined, and high
income groups have lost nearly everything. Acute shortages of almost all
types of consumer goods have developed, and the people now must queue up
daily for many essentials. Prices in the controlled retail market are
forty per cent above 1957, and prices in the widespread black market are
five times higher than legal prices. Because the supply of goods and
services is expected to grow only slightly faster than the population,
there will apparently be little improvement in living conditions for the
average Cuban in the foreseeable future. Added to this is the fact that
the average citizen can no longer find temporary escape in such simple
pleasures as playing the lottery or visiting his neighborhood cantina,
since the regime considers such past-times out of line with economic austerity
and its concept of the "new Communist man." All told, there is little in
this bleak situation to appeal to would-be instigators or followers of the
revolution elsewhere in Latin America. And, indeed, the widespread admiration
which the Cuban revolution once inspired in Latin America is now almost
entirely dissipated. The cause is not hard to find: the Cuban revolution
has simply failed to live up to its promise.
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May 1969
ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN CUBA
After an initial period of growth and expansion, the Cuban economy has
stagnated, in spite of the approximately $350 million in subsidies and
credits which Cuba receives annually from the Soviet Union. Since 1957,
the record pre-revolutionary year, the Cuban Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
has risen by an average of only 1.5 per cent per year -- one of the poorest
records in the region. Since the population has steadily grown, this means
that per capita consumption has declined 15 to 20 per cent in the past decade.
Change in Economic Objectives
During its ten years in power, the Castro regime has changed its
economic policies and objectives. Soon after taking over the government,
Castro announced broad and ambitious plans to achieve rapid agrarian reform
and agricultural diversification, rapid industrialization, nationalization
of the economy, redistribution of income, improved living conditions and
other benefits for the lower classes. After trying, without success, to
attain so many objectives simultaneously for the first two to three years,
the regime ordered a change in priorities.
In 1963, after several disastrous sugar harvests and other economic
failures, the government gave highest priority to increasing sugar pro-
duction, while its earlier goals for industrialization and an increase in
popular welfare were postponed until after 1970, the year the regime
expected to meet its goal of a ten-million-ton sugar harvest. Emphasis has
also been given to cattle raising, with the aim of developing livestock
products for export purposes. The year 1963 marked the low point in the
transition of the Cuban economy to a socialist structure. Since then,
Cuba's GNP has grown at an average annual rate of less than two per cent,
or about the same as the growth in population.
Problems of the Economy
The major reason for the general lack of economic progress in Cuba has
been gross mismanagement of the economy. Most of those who now belong to
the managerial class are poorly educated and inexperienced, while the system
itself gives little authority to lower echelon managers and excessive
authority to higher level officials. The administrative structure has been
frequently reorganized and personnel has been freely shifted about, with
consequent duplication and conflict in authority. There has been a
perpetual shortage of labor in the agricultural sector, while at the same
time a labor surplus has existed in other sectors. The U.S. trade embargo
has forced Cuba to import capital goods to replace U.S.-built equipment and
so has limited Cuba's ability to import other goods. And even this limited
ability must be sustained by large infusions of economic aid from Communist
countries, most of it from the Soviet Union. In spite of government efforts
to increase the value of exports, there has been a decline. This is the
result of a lower volume of sugar exports as well as a drop in non-sugar
exports because of production problems, increased domestic demand and the
loss of U.S. markets.
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Sugar Production
Current prospects indicate that the 1969 sugar crop will not be much
larger than -- if as large as -- the 5.2 million tons of 1968, and Castro
himself has admitted the crop has "gone badly." During a recent tour of
Camaguey Province, a major sugar-producing area, Castro declared the delays
in harvesting this year's crop could cost Cuba ten million dollars in
foreign exchange, the same amount he hoped to earn by sugar rationing which
was started the first of this year. Far from reaching the ninet-million-ton-
goal originally planned for 1969, this year's harvest should yield 5? million
tons, according to Castro's own estimates at the beginning of the year. Even
that figure now appears unlikely since no production statistics have so far
been published, although in the past the harvesting of one or two million tons
early in the season has been widely publicized. Furthermore, it is said that
preparations to meet the 1970 target of 10 million tons are interfering with
the current harvest, with rumors that sugar from the current crop may even be
concealed in order to appear to increase the yield next year.
According to the official Communist Party newspaper Gramma, Cubans must
work harder to bring in the 1969 harvest and to cope with other economic
tasks. A fresh drive in harvesting and planting was begun on 30 March and
is to last until 1 May. This custom was started in 1966, when Castro
proposed the Easter holidays be replaced by a week of intensive work in
honor of his victory at Playa Giron. In 1967 Playa Giron week as it is now
called was extended to two weeks, and in 1968 it was extended to a month.
Now Castro has suggested there be no public holidays at all between October
1969 and July 1970 in order to meet economic goals. Such a drive, however,
is in addition to the now regular mass mobilizations of thousands of citizens
who are required to spend at least a month between February and May in the
harvesting of sugarcane. All other activity -- governmental, business and
educational -- suffers as a result, as it must either cease or slow down
during this period.
Dependence on the Soviet Union
In early February the 1969 Soviet-Cuban trade protocol was signed,
including the grant of long-term credit to finance the Cuban trade deficit,
presumably not only to cover the deficit for this year, but also whatever
may be necessary to cover the unfinanced protion of past trade deficits.
Thus Cuba may well need more Soviet aid than last year when it totaled
$328 million. (The 1968 trade deficit was larger than planned because Cuba
shipped considerably less than the 2.7 million tons of sugar required by
last year's protocol. Thus her deficit is estimated to be close to $400
million, or an increase of $150 million over the 1967 deficit.)
Although Soviet exports to Cuba are not expected to increase in the cur-
rent year, the USSR is expected to continue to supply considerable machinery
and equipment, including that needed for Soviet-aided projects, raw materials,
foodstuffs and almost all of Cuba's petroleum. Even if Soviet petroleum
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2
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deliveries to Cuba were to increase over the 1968 total of 5.3 million tons,
there is no indication that it would allow the lifting of fuel rationing,
which Cuba has had for over a year.
The 1969 trade protocol was signed within the framework of a six-year
agreement reached in 1964. There is no indication the Cubans have obtained
any firm Soviet commitment for the years after that basic agreement expires
in 1970. Obviously Castro's need for an assured subsidy will continue to
be as great as ever, especially since economic planning includes further
mechanization and diversification of Cuban agriculture and general expansion
requiring huge capital investments.
Dismal Outlook for Average Cuban
In general, the average consumer is faring poorly under the Cuban
revolution. Per capita consumption of goods and services has declined about
15 per cent since 1957. Except for landless farm workers and urban service
workers, who now receive higher wages and increased health and education
benefits, consumption levels for most other groups have declined, and high
income groups have lost nearly everything. Acute shortages of almost all
types of consumer goods have developed, and the people now must queue up
daily for many essentials. Prices in the controlled retail market are
forty per cent above 1957, and prices in the widespread black market are
five times higher than legal prices. Because the supply of goods and
services is expected to grow only slightly faster than the population,
there will apparently be little improvement in living conditions for the
average Cuban in the foreseeable future. Added to this is the fact that
the average citizen can no longer find temporary escape in such simple
pleasures as playing the lottery or visiting his neighborhood cantina,
since the regime considers such past-times out of line with economic austerity
and its concept of the "new Communist man." All told, there is little in
this bleak situation to appeal to would-be instigators or followers of the
revolution elsewhere in Latin America. And, indeed, the widespread admiration
which the Cuban revolution once inspired in Latin America is now almost
entirely dissipated. The cause is not hard to find: the Cuban revolution
has simply failed to live up to its promise.
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? Solo para uso de fondo.
ESTANCAMIENTO ECONOMIC? EN CUBA
Tras un periodo inicial de crecimiento y expansiOn,
la economia,cubana se ha paralizado a pesar de los sub-
sidi9s y creditos que con'valor aprwsimado qe 350 millones
de dolares recibe cada aflo de la Union Sovietica. Desde
1957, alio extraordinario de la era pz.revolucionaria, el
Producto Nacional Bruto de Cuba (PNB) ha promediado un
agmento de uno y meg() por ciento anual, una,de las cifras
mas bajas de la region. Dado que la poblacion ha aumentado
regularmente, el porcentaje significa que el consum9 per
capita ha decrecido en un veinte por ciento en los ultaMos
diez anos.
Cambios en los objetivos econOmicos.
. El regimp de Castro ha modificado su politica y
objetivos economicos durante los diez afios que ha permanecido
en el poder. A raiz de asumir el control del gobierno,
Castro dio a conocer programas vast9s y ambiciosos encami-,
nados a lograr la reforma agraria rapl.da, la diversificacion
de la agricgltura, la industrializacion del pe,..fs, la na-
cionalizacion de la economfa, la redistribucion de los
ingresos, la mejora de las condiciones de vida y otas
medidas beneficiosas para las clases pobres., Despues de
intentar infructuosamente de alcanzar simultaneaments tan
varialas metas en los,primeros dos o tres anos, el regimen
ordeno una modificacion de las prioridades.
En 1963, tras algunas zafras azucareras clesastrosas
y,otros fracasos economicos, el gol3ierno otorgo la prioridad
mas alta al aument9 de la produccion azucarera, abandonando
la industr4lizacion y el mejoramiento del bienestar del pueblo
hasta despues de 1970, alio en que el gobierno espera alcanzar
la meta que se fijo: la zafra azucvera de diez millones de
toneladas. Asimismo, se ha pues,to enfasis en la ?lila de
ganado con vista a la exportacion.
El alio de 1963 marc6 el punto ms bajo en la transiciOn
de la economfa cubana hacia una estructura socialista. Desde
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entonces el PNB de Cuba ha Fomediado un aumento de menos
del dos por ciento'anual,,mas o menos igual a la tasa de
crecimiento de la poblacion.
Problemas de la economra.
La causa principal de la falta de progreso,econcimico
general de Cuba ha sido la malfsima administracion de la
economla. La mayorla de los dlirigentes son personas
inexpertas y de poca preparacion, y por otra parte, el
sistema le otorga poca autoridad a los funcionarios de
segunda categoria mientras que le concede excesivo poder
a los dirigentes principales.
La estructura administrativa ha sufrido numerosas
reorganizaciones, transfiriendose al,personal de un lugar
a otro con la consiguiente duplicacion y conflict? de
autoridad. Ha habido una constante escasez de mano de
obra en el sector agrIcola, mientras que en otros sectores
se ha registrado exceso de empleados. El embargo de los
Estados Unidos ha forzado a Cuba a importar bienes capitales
para r;emplazar los equipos de manufactura norteamericana,
limitandose asf la capacidad para importar otros bienes.
Y aun esta capacidad limitada necesita ser sostenida por las
grandes dosis de ayuda exterior iue Cubs recibe de los parses
comunistas, mayormente de la Union Sovietica.
A pesar de los esfuerzos del gobierno por aumentar las
exportaci9nes estas han disminufdo,a consecuencia de la
disminucion en los embarques de azoa11 y de otros productos
por los probleTas en la produccion,e1 aumento de la demanda
interna y la perdida de los mercados norteamericanos.
La producciOn azucarera.
Las pvspectivas actuales indican que la zafra de
1969 no sera mayor que las 5,200,000 toneladas logradas en
1968... sI es que se llega a.esta cifra. El propio Castro
ha admitido que .1a zafra no marcha bien."
Durante un recorrido reciente por la provincia d9
Camaguey, que es una de las regiones de mayor produccion
de azucar, Castro declaro que las demoras en el acopio
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de 1a cafia este aTio le podrfan costar a Cuba cliez millones
de dolares en divisas: la misma 9antidad que el esp9raba
obtener del racionamiento del-azucar que se implant? a
principios de alio.
Lejos de alcanzar la meta de nueve millones de,tone-
ladas planeada para 1969, la zafra d9 este alio debera
llegar a 5,500,000 de toneladas, segun el estimado del
propio Castro a principios de alio. Pero esta cifra ya
luce ser ina1canzab19: no se han publicado hasta ahora
datos de la produccion, a diferencia,del pasado en que se
le daba gran publicidad a la obtencion de uno o dos millones
de toneladas al principio de la zafra.
AdemSs, se at Irma que los preparatins para lograr
las diez millones de toneladas en 1970 estan interfiriendo
con la zafra actual y se rumora que hasta se estS escon-
diendo el amicar de la vesente zafra con el objeto de dar
la apariencia el afio proximo de que se ha aumentado la
producciOn.
Segtin Granma, Organ() oficial del Partido Comunista,
los cubanos deben trabajar mSs arduamente para acabar la
zafra de 1963y hacer fronte a otras tareas econOmicas.
El 30 de marzo se inici6 una nueva campafia de cosecha y
cultivo. que durarS hasta el primero de mayo. Esta costumbre
comenzo en 1966, afio en que Castro propuso que las vaca-
ciones de Semana Santa fuesen sustituldas por una semana
de trabajo intensivo para conmemorar la victoria de Playa
Giron.
En 167 la Jornada de GirOn, como se la llama ahora,
se extendio a dos semanas y en 1968 a UI) mes. Ahora Castro
ha sugerido que no haya dfas festivos publicos en lo
alpoluto desde octubre de 1969 a aulio de 1970 con el pro-
posit? de alcanzar las metas economicas. Sin embargo esa
campafia es adicional a las mobilizaciones, ya regularizadas,
de miles de ciudadanos a los que se les exige que laboren
per lo menos un mes en el corte de cafia. Como resultado
toda otra activ;dad, ya sea gubernamental, comercial o
educacional, practicamente cesa o disminuye durante ese
period?.
Dependencia en la UniOn.Sovietica.
A principios de febrero se firm6 el protocolo comercial
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cuano-sovie.tico para 1969, incluyendose la concesiOn de
creditos a largo plazo para financiar el 4eficit comercial
de Cuba (este compr9de posiblenpnte no solo el del ail.?
er,i curse, sine tambien la porcion no financiada de am5iguos
deficits)., Per tanto, es posible que Cuba necesite mas
ayuda sovietica que los 328 millones de dolares recibidos
el aria pasado.
(El deficit comercial de 1968 results may,or de lo
que se ha,.b/a planeado debido a que Cuba embarco mucho
menos azucar que las 2,700,000 toi)eladas estipuladas en
el protocolo. Se,estima que el deficit asciencle a unos
400 millones de dolares; o sea, 150 millones mas que
en 1967.)
No es de esperar que la exportaciones sovieticas a
Cuba aumeten durante 1969, aunque sf se cree que la URSS
continuara proporcionando maquinaria y equipos en grandes
cantldades para los proyectos establecidos con ayuda
sovietica, as1 como,materias primas, productos alimedticios
y casi todo el petroleo que consume Cuba.
Aun Si las entregas de petrOleo sovietico a Cuba
sobrepasaran el total de 5,300,000 toneladas de 1968, no
hay indicios que serialen el cese del rac;onamiento de
combustible implantado en Cuba hace ya mas de un
El protocolo comercial de 1969 se firms dentro del
marco del convenio per seis arios de 1964. No se cree que
los cubanos hvan obtenido promesas en firme per parte de
la Union Sovietica para los afios siguientes a 1970, fecha
en que vence ese convenio bS.sico. Es obvio que la nece-
sidad de Castro de contar eon un subsidio seguro continuard
siendo tan gpande somo siempre, principalmente porque el
planeamiento economic? incluye la progresiva mecanizaciOn
y diversificaciOn de la agricultura cubana, y la expansion
general requiere grandes inversiones de capital.
Perspectivas 11.1iubres para la mayor/a de los cubanos.
En general, al consumidor cubano le va mal bajo la re-
volucion. El consumo per capita de bienes y servicios ha
disminufdo a?lrededor de un quince por ciento desde' 1957.
Con excepcion de los trabajadores. agricolas que no posefan
tienoas y los empleados cle servicios urbanos, quienes
reciben ahora salarios mas altos y mayores beneficios en
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cuanto a salud y educaciOn, los niveles de consume de la
mayorfa de los otros grupos ha disminuldo, y aquellos que
gozaban de altos ingresos lo han perdido casi todo.
Se han producido escaseces agudas de casi todos los
bienes de consumo y en la actualidad los cubanos se ven
obligados a hac9r colas diarias para adquirir muchos de
los productos basicos. Los p.recios en el mercado controlado
son un cuarenta por ciento mas altos que en 1957, y en la
balsa negra que es bastante extensa, son cinco veces por
arriba de los precios legales. Puesto (pie se espera gue
1. oferta de bienes y,servicios crezca solo un poco mas
rapid? que la poblacion, se hace aparente gue las condi-
clones de vida del cubano medio no mejoraran en el futuro
cercano.
A esto se arlade el hecho que al ciudadano medio ya
no se le permite buscar refugio en 131aceres tan simples
como la loterfa o la visita al "cafe" del barrio dado que
el r6gimen considera que estos pasatiempos no estSn en
lfnea con la austeridad econOmica ni eon el concepto del
ftnuevo hombre comunista."
Dicho todo esto, hay poco en esta situaciOn sombrfa
que pueda svvir de all,.ciente a los posibles seguidores de
la revollicion en la America Latina., En realidad,, la
admiracion que er) el pasado desperto la revolucion cubana
en toda Latinoamerica se ha di*pado casi por,completo.
No es diffcil descubrir por que: la revolucion cubana
simplemente ha fracasado en cumplir sus promesas.
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FOREIGN AGRICULTURE
6 January_ 1969
Cuban AgLizaz0trare?Ten
!ears Under Castro CPYRGHT
Although Cuban farms have changed
drastically over the past decade
sugar remains the No. 1 crop?
and the mainstay of the economy.
By WILBUR F. BUCK
Foreign Regional A nalysis Division
Economic Research Service'
This January 1, Fidel Castro's Government observed its
10th anniversary?a suitable vantage point from which to
review the major events in Cuba's agricultural development
under the present regime.
Although the decade has been a period of significant
change in the political, social, and economic structure of
Cuba, the change has not necessarily meant progress. Tan-
gible benefits to the populace?such as free schools, free
medical services, and minimal reths?have been offset by such
negative factors as increased food costs and severe rationing
of food, clothing, gasoline, and other daily requisites.
Undcr Castro, Cuba's gross national product has risen from
$2.7 billion in 1958 to nearly $3.0 billion in 1967. But per
capita income has declined nearly 14 percent, to $368.; popu-
lation is now 8 million compared with 6.5 million in 1958.
The Cuban economy continues to be weak, requiring massive
aid from the Soviet Union (reportedly some $360 million,
annually) plus additional assistance in the form of credits
from Free World countries to stave off collapse.
Cuba continues, almost fanatically, to focus its agriculture ?
on sugar?a commodity that faces already-glutted world mar-
kets and low prices. The tourist business, once an important
source of revenue, has disappeared. Migration of professional
and other skilled citizens continues, and Cuba remains iso-
lated from nearly all its Hemisphere neighbors.
Cuba has a preferential sugar-price agreement with the
Soviet Union (incidentally the world's largest producer of
sugar), but most payment is taken in the form of barter,
leaving considerable doubt with respect to actual price.
Castro's 10 years in office have produced a trade balance over-
whelmingly in favor of the Soviet Union, which has had
the effect of mortgaging the Cuban sugar crops for years to
come.
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1
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Land confiscation a flrst step
Re1ease4999109102rt elscORDP791.1011494A90050
months of fighting, revolutionary forces led by Fidel Castro
succeeded in toppling the Batista Government. On January 1,
1959, Castro gained control of the government, and the
people of Cuba?after long civil strife?welcomed the pros-
pects of change.
The change they encountered exceeded their expectations.
Premier Castro, promptly revealing his Communist sym-
?pathics, lost no time in calling for sweeping agricultural and
political reforms. His government set out "to eradicate the
effects of a colonial and imperialist heritage and to build a
new life."
The blueprint for Castro's agricultural programs appeared
in the first Agrarian Reform law passed May 17, 1959. This
legislation established the National Agrarian Reform Institute
(IN RA), an agency to carry out government directives relat-
ing to agriculture. The agency promised land for the landless,
arranged for expropriation of the large estates (with pro-
visions for indemnification), prohibited sharecropping, and
endeavored to diversify agriculture to increase the island's
food production and thereby conserve scarce foreign ex-
change.
-
Under INRA supervision, all lands in excess of 402 hec-
tares (about 1,000 acres) were promptly confiscated; in some
instances 2-caballeria units (about 66 acres) were redistrib-
uted to former tenants. Few of the estate owners received
indemnification. The estates were not subsequently dissolved
as planned; rather the government began to operate the seized
lands as Soviet-type state farms with hired workers.
Confiscation of agricultural properties proved a severe blow
to United States interests. U.S. holdings were said to equal
about 35 percent of the entire sugar industry (some 39 of the
157 sugar mills and their estates were U.S. owned), and U.S.
interest was also heavy in rice production and cattle ranches.
The few remaining large landholders were eliminated by
the second Agrarian Reform law passed. October 3, 1963,
which nationalized all farmlands in excess of 67 hectares (167
acres). These properties were added to the established state
farms. The remaining 200,000 small farmers were bracketed
into the government-directed National Association of Small
Farmers (ANAP). By mid-I960, the 1NRA had taken title
to 60 percent of all Cuba's privately owned cropland. By
1966, the number of small farmers reportedly had dwindled
to 120,000.
Loss of a U.S. good neighbor
In the meantime, diplomatic and trade relations with the
United States, Cuba's major trading partner, continued to
deteriorate. In 1958, Cuba was shipping two-thirds of all its
agricultural exports to the United States and purchasing a
similar share of its agricultural needs from U.S. firms. Value
of Cuban imports of U.S. farm products came to $145 million
in 1958; wheat and flour, rice, pulses, meat, and lard were
the principal import commodities. Cuba ranked seventh
among U.S. foreign markets.
Early in 1960, Castro's Government negotiated trade agree-
ments with many of the Communist countries and systemati-
cally began shifting its traditional trade with the United States
in atiother direction. In less than a year, 70 percent of all
Cuban agricultural exports were being routed to Communist
country destinations.
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balance (700,000 tons) of Cuba's lu.rative 1960 sugar quota Y GHT
and suspended further sugar purcha..e.s. Steadily worsening
U.S.-Cuban relations reached a clima7 when refineries owned
by the United States and Britain re ised to process Soviet
crude oil and their properties were seed by the Cuban Gov-
ernment.
In February 1962 the United Stg es imposed a trade em-
bargo on Cuba and severed diploi atic relations. Thus, 60
years of mutually beneficial trade I Aween the two countries
went down the drain.
The changing economic plan
The early years of central plannin,
were characterized by intensive eff&.
food production and to expand tit+
for development during the years
signed to increase the gross nationa
cent a year, followed. In 1963, this r
its impracticality became evident.
The policy then reverted to emph sis on sugar production,
frequently at the expense of rice an other food crops; com-
mercial development was limited to it dustries either connected
with agriculture or to other enterr ises requiring relatively
small investments. This policy rema'ls in force today.
Agricultural development has incuded such programs as
land reclamation, irrigation, pasture improvement, and de-
velopment of the cattle industry. Botween 1955 and 1965,
cropland was increased by 22 percent and much of the waste-
land was returned to pasture. Acquisition of a number of bull-
dozers and other farm machinery in recent years reportedly
has accelerated the rate of land improvement.
A sugar dependency
Cuba and sugar are synonymous; the island has always been
highly dependent on this crop.
In 1958 the sugar industry employed half a million workers
and accounted for four-fifths of the value of all Cuban ex-
ports. At estimated 60 percent of the cropland was in sugar-
cane. Or a world basis, Cuba produced 15 percent of all the
sugar manufactured and accounted for one-third of all sugar
moving in foreign trade. Production was reasonably good that
year?about 5.6 million metric tons compared with the 4.9-
million-ton average for the preceding 5 years; it was valued
at nearly $400 million. The United States had an agreement
to purchase approximately 60 percent of the 1958 crop at
preferential prices.
In 1958 and other pre-Castro years, Cuba's sugar-producing
capacity was probably much greater than production because
growers were then'deliberately trying to hold output to market
requirements. Emphasis seemed more on factory efficiency in
extraction than on efficiency in cane production.
In 1959, production of sugar in Cuba reached 6 million
metric tons. It continued at approximately the same level (5.9
million tons) the following year. In 1961?the best sugar-
producing year of the Castro administration-6.8 million tons
were produced. In 1962, however, sugar output declined
sharply to 4.8 million tons, as redirection of production re-
sources and a general falling-off in efficiency of both equip-
ment and management began to have their influence. The low
point of sugar production in the Castro period came in 1963
Approved For Rekvdbell919911991000OSAIIRIDPIA934143119411v984600
of sugar.
for the Cuban economy
ts to increase domestic
industrial base. A plan
962-65, specifically de-
product at least 10 per-
an was abandoned when
110001-9
Approved Fo
Rttlegdieg 19 9 9/097023r4eFOR*511?19111 ? ,
A I
t s
.0056k1(6N-I
to million tons of sugar is ihe target program d o
This was to be achieved by stages according to the following
timetable of annual production:
Million metric tons Million metric tons
1965 6.0 1968 8.0
1966 6.5 1969 9.0
1967 7.5 1970 10.0
Since the establishment of these goals, sugar production has
reached the target only in 1965. In 1966, output was short
by as much as 30 percent. In 1968, the goal will likely be
underachieved by more than 35 percent. Prospects for the
oncoming 1969 harvest have already been dimmed by an ex-
tended period of drought.
Attainment of the 10-minion-metric-ton sugar goal by 1970
may be remotely possible but only under fortuitous climatic
conditions and at great cost to the Cuban people and their
economy. This would entail the mobilization of a vast army
of cane-cutters and other workers to man the expanded acre-
age in cane, converting of transportation and other facilities
to the sugar industry, plus intensive application of fertilizer,
farm machinery, and other resources to the crop.
Undoubtedly much 1969 cane will be "left over," and in all
probability subsequent crops will suffer as a result of over-
cutting. In past efforts to reach sugar goals, few production
resources have been spared; high priorities have been set for
labor and machinery, and large allocations of funds have been
made for the purchase of fertilizer and the modernization and
-expansion of milling facilities.
Cuba's present exports of coffee are being accomplished by
squeezing an undcrsupplied domestic market?a sharp con,
drast with the situation in 1958 when, from a relative surplus
20 percent of its crop was sold abroal. Coffee production for
1968 is estimated at 30,000 tons, ap somewhat from the
previous year but still 25 perccr short of the 1957-59
average.
The 1968 rice harvest is less if In the 1967 tonnage and
just slightly over half the output pre-Castro days. Produc-
tion of' tobacco, an important ea ter of foreign exchange, h
only about two-thirds the prerc lution volume. There hat
been some improvement recent' in the production of live.
stock and meat, but the totals st'J remain substantially Woe
the 1957-59 averages.
Diets deteriorate
When the Castro regime came t.? power in 1959 the Cuban,
were one of the best-fed peoples i Latin America. Excessive ?
and indiscriminate livestock slaugh? * in 1959 and early 1960\
however, caused a sharp drop in r ?at supplies. A decline in
the output of food crops, especial') ice, during Castro't carl
years in office was precipitated t , rapid nationalization o
farm properties and the shift in di ; :tion of trade.
The past decade has witnessed ; deterioration in the avers
age Cuban's diet, particularly in i quality, as grain protcia
has replaced much of the animal r ? ttein.
Food production in 1968 is esti ated to have been about
10 percent less than the 1957-59 av age. But food production
per capita has declined some 25 t 4 30 percent from that of
a decade earlier, necessitating heav imports of food product:,
such as wheat and wheat dour from Canada on Soviet
account.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : qIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
Apgattnest FlexRelease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
17 April 1969 CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT Cuba Striving to, Boost
Size of Vital Sugar Crop
By Fenton Wheeler
HAVANA (AP)?Fidel Cas-
tro named it ''the year of deci-
sive endeavor." Everybody
agrees 1969 will be a year of
unprecedented hard work, sac-
rifice and probably less con-
sumer comfort for Cuba's'
eight million people.
There is little doubt the gov-
ernment is making its most se-
rious effort so far to
strengthen the economy. The
goal: A record 10 million tons
of sugar production next year.
Present indications are that
the government will have to
hustle to make it.
Premier Castro already says
:this year's harvest? billed as
a rehearsal for next year?is
not going Well. It may make
five million tons.
Cuba needs a big sugar har-
vest to meet credit obligations
on both sides of the Iron Cure
lain. Trade experts say it is
possible that Castro can get by
financially in 1970 with less
than 10 million tons?say
eight million tons?if sugar
prices stay up.
But the Cuban leader him:
'self has tied political consider-
ations to the 1970 harvest by
pledging the honor of his
Communist government on
reaching the goal. He says the
Cuban revolution can be
Judged once and for all on
whether the country makes it.
; The result has been to make
the 10 million tons a national
motto. Huge posters dot the
countryside proclaiming "thee
1
.10 million are coming." A big
neon sign flashes the same
'news in red, white and blue on
litivana's main street.
I Along with sloganeering has
,come more work. Some exam-
ples:,
?
? More than 110,000 volun-
teers, mostly young people,
are working in hot, Texas-like
Camaguey province. Many will
stay up to three years.
? Workers in westernmost
Pinar del Rio province have
pledged to work 12 hours
daily. Some dn Las Villas
province have given up vaca-
tions this year. Most factory
workers have agreed to work
one hour extra daily without
pay to make up the production
loss of fellow workers toiling
In agriculture.
? High school students who
normally spend 45 days in ag-
ricultural work are doing 90
this year. Some are staying for
120 days.
Castro has indicated the tra-
ditional Christmas and New
Year's holidays will be post-
poned 'until July, 1970, when
the harvest is finished. This
year will be 18 months long,'
he says.
Meanwhile, the country's.
food a n d clothing shortages
continue. Thousands of man-
hours are still being lost in
queues and in a breakdown of
services as employes leave
their jobs to work in agricul-
ture.Castro has blamed bad ort
ganization for this year's daw-
dling harvest. He also has
noted that many state work
centers are run by administra-;
tors who have no more than a.
sixth-grade education.
Nature, too, is a persistent
problem for one-crop Cuba.
After the 1967 drought bat'
tered sugar production, Castro
'rushed ahead plans on dam
building and irrigation. Now
'too much rain has slowed
planting for next year aid
,though the really rainy season
'doesn't begin until mid-May.
After that tomes the htuTil
taw aeasont
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
5
GRANMA, Havana, Cuba (Official CP Newspaper)
RGHT
22 marApplisied For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00050-011W0Y1.9
,
giogt
CPYRGHT
Era
SICOO love..nos.e3 dfick._qpi.:'j
SANTIAGO DE CUBA.?:
Desde el prim,ero ae aoril
hgsta el 14 de junio, einco
mU jovenes orientales se mo-
vilizaran hacia plantaciones
,catieras del norte de Oriente
para rendir homenaje a los
aniversarios de natalicio de
ldos grandes heroes: Antonio
-Macee v Ernesto Che Gue-
vara, nacidos ambos un dia
14 de junio.
El movimiento que desple-
fgaran los jovenes orientales
'neva este nombre: "Opera-
cion 14 de junio" y se des-'
larrollare, fundamentalmente,"
en la zona de Manati, Puerto
.Padre, atendiendo los resul;
,
tados y experiencias acopia-1
dos en la "Operacion 13 de',
AVIarZO"?
t El anuncio del desarrollo,
de este movimiento se dio a'
,Cpnacer en nna.yetm,16n gig;
'presidlo Ren?nillo, seguni
do secretario del Partido en!
'.Oriente, celebrada en Pitut-I
fes de Mayari.
En ella se dijo,, ademAs:
wee se promoveran 7,100
jOvenes y 1,200 muchachas
a la Columns Juvenil del
Centenario, asi como que se
tomaran medidas pare la or-:,
ganizacion de la "Columna
Cien Alms de Lucia", inte-;
grada, por javenes de 13 a4
16 anos, para marcher a ln
zafra del caf?
A nombre del' Bur& Eje-,
cutivo Provincial del Partii
;do, Ren?nillo felicito a la
UJC y" a todos los javenes1
,que en Oriente han respon4
dido a los llamados del Par;
tido; los exhort6 ademas
mantener ese espiritu.y en
tusiasmo ante las nueiras
tareas.
' Ilms4 Commit, Abut
Approved For Release 1999/09/Oa : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
Is'
AttiFi%Reditgaigfit9tYlAbf!T,TARRIliP79-01194A00050011 COOTliG HT
21t rCh 1969
. tro
-?pprwm-,,,7-,Pr.--4-vr=1-4.1irm;,-1-4. ? 773rSTEMTIMIIM.Pmq-vt
,047410 a el; AP Oki* r4V*4 41241 P`,?111#140'
.40400?h4 4A4 14v4glittlit WS tail (7)
4,...., -. , 4.,......
01 PING CUATRO, Camagiley,,
Phipl p intarrmaii
zarzo zu.?unas noras des-
fties de haber recorrido, las
rees cafieras ? , del central'.
.Amancio Rodriguez", lugares3
en que departi6 respective-
Monte con, ,trabajadores de'
fine .brigada. de caminos del,
DAP y con jOvenes, machete..
ros de la StibagrupaciOn 1 del;
Ejerclto de`Oriente, el primer'
,ministro, comandante Fide I:
Castro, sostuvp Una
,tante' reuni6n, on, .facto-,
res regionales envueltos. en ,la
,presente zafra.
El punt e Alnico% del .encuen-
!Aro, que tuvo lugar en ? este'
;puesto de mando de 'la agri-
+Culture. ,fue el analisis y.
i'adopciOn de medidas ante una,
tsituaciOn de zafra retrasada
utmenaza,cle las lluvias
verales en la regi6n de 'Amen-,
+cio-Santa Cruz.. -
De acuerdo a lo examined?,
la region resulta ser el punto
'm?critic() de la provincia en'
materia de zafra, con un
Mesti-
ado de cane por cortar
moler superior a 80 millones
de arrobas. Este total debera,
ser asimilado por los tres cen-
trales de la regi6n ?"Amen-.
do Rodriguez", "Haiti" yi
"Candido Gonzalez"? aSi
mo por el central Colombia",,'
que tambien molera gaits de;
,esta zone.
. En un contact? previo a la,
reunien, Fidel discutio
porme-
por1zadaiente los casos de,
aquellas colonies con -mayor:
volumen de cafra en tierras
bajas 5/. m?compleja
ciOn en cuanto a caminos ca.(
fieros, a los efectos de viabi-,
Ilzar las operaciones de. zafra
en dichos lugares antes de la
llegada de las lluvias. De este,
modo fueron analizadas situa
clones como la imperante en la,
Zona "Santa Amelia'', "Junco",
9 "La Lucha", en la cual 7,
millones de arrobas de cafia,
r
corren peligro de no pode ser
convertidas en, azucar, en casofk
de quo se iniciaran las lluvia
Amancio-Santa Cruz enfren
l -,
a la doble caracterfstica
,un ?regimen de Iluvias tempraa,
'ruts y vastaa Areas cafieras. en,
lerrenos muy bajos.
Sucesivamente fueron exa-?
por el estado de los cantings,
cafieros, la localizaciOn respee-
tiva de los centros de recep-
CiOn, ail como los equipos cid
tiro, y solicito de los dirigen-'
tes locales informaciOn sobrti
ello.
"Aqui no hay un dfa que es-
perar; no estamos en condi,
clones de esperar ni 24 ho.
tar. coment6 el Primer Mi..
nistrO a varios de los presen:
tes, para esbozar a continua-
den un plan de construcciOn
de eaminos catferos de emer.4
gencia, mediante el apoyo dei
cuatro brigades de caminos del'
DAP. Subray,rd? Fidel que el
mencionado' personal deberat
ejeeutar los caminos cafierotr,
para la,Zafra de 1970, despuesi
tie haber soluciorrado la con-,1
tingencia presente; es' decir4
luego de priorizar y construirj
o reconstruir los caminos mast
afectados actualmente. ,
"Ahors, hay que prestarles.!
atencidn alas caminos ---orien-4
to Fidel? 'y 'al' mismo tiempo I
4
.ver 'donde va haciendo faita,
alguna cosa, arreglar aim po-I
.ner un tubo,. para acometerlol
cuando sea posible"
El Primer Ministro .restnni6
tlit estrategia alli trazada como;
un conjunto de medidas ten-i
fdientes a apresurar los traba-'i
?jos en las zonas bajas y con-1
jurar as( los posibles efectos,
i,de las Iluvias en el prOxirno!
mes de abril. Igualniente,
+Fidel fue informado por el:
tomandante Rogelio Acevedo,.
delegado del I3ur6 Politico, de:
'algunas llmitaciones tecnicaat
de los ingenios de la regiOn4
que serail atenuadas mecliante,
la vinculaciOn., respective de,
algunas Areas cafieras hacia,;
los centrales' de mayor capaci-4
dad en le regiOrva los efectosi,
de un aprovechamiento pleno.
de las capacidades instaladas,'
factor que tambien agiliiara
la zafra.
flo' TRES REGIONES CoN
, LA ZAFRA "APRETADA"
! A este respect?. el ? Colom,-,
, . I
bia" absorbera parte de las:
Areas de "Amancio Rodri-;
guez";'quien a su vez recibirai
calla desvinculada de los cen-
m os
' inados cases analogos en las rales "Haiti" y "Candido'
,
?
,
:zones cafieras de los aentrales Gonzalez",
4Amancio Rodriguez"
(35 mil.; ., A continuaciOn," el Coined
llones de arrobas pendientes); ,
dente en Jefe se, dirigi6 a los'
'
pgiSplibta rafteasskktiog crisitlb
. : a:
g,
,(24..raillones de arro s)._ Jeamee Gonne
osta "spretnea.? ist rite, T.,
s o n: Amancio, ,Panama y la.
gone de Punta Alegre". '
"Amancici es la peor
405 Fidel? debido a las Iluvias,
,tempranas y las ticrras bajas.;
Los drenajes no son suficien..'
les edit; el alio pasado se hi
cieron varios canales pero no,
son todavfa suficientes, y se
,esta mal de caminos, con una!
cantided grande de' cafia.
Cane que queda aqui significa
.10 millones en divisas pare
,nosotros". ?
F "El prop6sito oe esta reunidn
r?settal6? debe ser enfrentar
,estas condiciones diffciles y,
tomer las medidas necesarias
para lograr cortar esa calla.
,Me parece que si en esta re-.
'gift se resuelve el proble-
ma, sera Inas facil resolverlo
,en otras regiones. Si aqui se
terrains la zafra; no,nos podra
i'quedar .ninguna otra region en
'la provincia s,in terminar la
,zafra".
M?adelante, Fidel previno
clue si toda la cane no era
cortada, podia afectarse Is
!economia del pars, ya que.la
,presente zafra se habfa \risk),
triermada basicamente por el!
vasto plan de siembra, y en'
,consecuencia, 200 6 300 6 400,,:
miI toneladas de azOcar cobra.:
ban en 1969 una importancia
relevante".
"ibSEMBRADA' TODA LA CARA. ,
DEL PAIS A FINES DE MAYO
P79-( 4I
"Todo el plan de siemb..a.
que se ha estado haciendo
`desde abril del', alio pasado
i?subray6 el Primer Ministro--,
hace un total de mas de 40'
roil caballerfas. netes... Y aqui
hay que afiadir las caballerfas
que hubo que sembrar dos ye-
ces, por perdidas ocasionadai
en unos casos por sequfas y
+en otros por lluvias exceskt
,vas".
"Eso dignifice un empleo de
isemilla ?prosigui6? suficien.
to como para producir un mit
.116n de toneladas de azuCarf':
, Anunch5 seguidamente qua
entre el 20 y 30 de mayo se
baba sembrado la Ultima cafisk
en todo el pals pare la rani
Ale 1970,, v que de las Ultimo
30 mul. caballerfas a setbrar.
7,500 se atenderan con hier-?
bicida, de las? cuales 4,000 co-.
yesponderan a Carnagliey.
? Luego de referirse'a las yen-
do experimentalmente el. alto
pasado .en este regional Amaik
4., -Santa C1)4? I idyl I rue o. may &reales ue ae estan 6r jo
r 1.1 el
ma
zas, prob emas a veces e gb- a una e las regio es, 6 9
mas acumuladores, en fin, esta la cafia sembrada en bi-
les dificultades qua gares bajos, cuantas arrobas
se presentan en toda lucha du- hay, que camino liege hasta
ra e intense como este". alit, corno estA el camino, to-
dos esos detallitos, Hay qua
"Incluso nuestros equipos ? tener una informaci6n del pro.
ariadi6 Fidel? no son siempre blema global y de todos los
los equipos ideates, a veces es- factores concretos que hay que
tan muy lejos de serlo, pero tomar en cuenta pare enfren-
con ellos se estan haciendo mL tar y resolver un problema".
les de kilOmetros de buenos En relaci6n a? la zafra de
caminos y carreteras". 1970, el Primer Ministro anun.
Ref iri6 su visite a la brigada ci6 que "para el ano que vie.
tie caminos que construye el ne vamos a concentrar en la
provincia de Camaguey todos
tramo comprendido entre
los cuadros necesarios del ejer.
21" y Amancio Rodriguez, don- los
y vamos a contar con la
de algunos trabajadores expre-
ayuda de la Facultad de Tec-
saban su preocupaci6n por al-
gunos problemas de equipos, y nologia de la Universidad. Se-
ra un Estado Mayor, bajo la
apunt6:
direccien del comandante Ace-
"CuandO ofa eso recordaba vedo, como delegado del Buret
cuando nosotros estabamos en Politico, con toda la capacidad
la Sierra, estabamos sonando organisativa del Ejercito".
siempre con ametralladoras,
song:lamas tener un automati- En Amancio ?agree? se
co. Ahora, cuando agarrabamos .debe comenzar ya esa organi.,
zaciOn y unit en un solo cuer-:
un fusil de isos de cerrojo,
en ocasiones agarrabamos un po los cuatro centrales, con la
ha. tarea de llevar la zafra haste,
fusil con defectos, y no
bfa ningiln metal pare reparar. el final. Hay que prepararse
por at llueve en abril, trabajar
lo y haste con un pedazo de
madera habfa que repararlo? como si fuera a llover en abril
Nuestros propios zapatos te. ,y despues en mayo; hacer los
arreglos por detente de los he.
nfamos que coserlos elem.
'chos; prever lo que va a su-
bre de cerca. Aparecfg un fu-
sil "Springfield" y le faltaba ? ceder. Tomer esas medidas, de.
Ia mitad del can6n. Si dispara- tette por detalle, como en una
ba tambien servfa, aparecfan guerra: can eso estariamos ade
'fres bales y eran tres bales. Jantando el trabajo del an?
Nunca nos pareci6, 'jamas!. .prOximo",
qile no podfamos /lacer una
el enorrrAicC
en el plan d .1, rn (lo e
ro cif tReltasfal 9109/ c?,.
poRqprii et1 94
101,
gran parte dc est uel 1.0 co-
rresponde a c quo
pars play? ,Jr 1111)Cr .L,Lm-
bmlo on total de alreciedor
de 12,000 caba!lerias de calla.
"Estamos al borde ya dr
Culminar ese esfuerzo ?pun-,
y esa situaciOn se
ha enfrentado cuando todavfa
In quimica y la maquina no
han sustituldo al hombre, y
en especial aqui. donde ni si-
quiera teniamos los hombres".
Recalc6 el Primer Ministro
la merma ocasionada en la
presente zafra por la utiliza-
ciOn de calla para semilla Y
dijo que Is de 1969. sin ser
la de los diez tiene
una gran trascendencia, Ya
que el pais ha hecho cc mpro-
misos comerciales con vistas
al desarrollo nacional, "y esos
compromisos tambien hay que
pagarlos con la zafra de
/969".
Se refirie asimismo a In se-
riedad de la RevoluciOn Cu-
bana en sus operaciones co-
rnerciales y agreg6 que toda
la maciignaria empleada en las
grandes obras fue adquiri,:a
,cuando el .azticar estaba' a 1.3.
Ei pais ha lOgrado consolidar
credho en condicioneL, en
que el azticar terda el precio
Inas ? bajo de los Oltimos 30.
"afros. Pod tos decir co sa-
4.isfi-^lOn c. Cuba
es un pais que paga con pun-
tual idad religiosa".
Subray6 que por primera
vez en su historia, Cuba ha
firmed? un convenio azucare-
ro internacional sin tener que
restringlr la producci6n nacio-
nal, aparte de que el precio
ha subido easi en tres
Anunci6 Fidel que "hemos
pensado en adquirie para des.'
pu?de Id zafra del 70, hier-
bkida Dare la mayor parte de
cafies a cultivar". ,
!1, NUNCA. NOS PARECIO,
OUE NO
PODIAMOS HAGER
" UNA TAREA
Despues de referirse a otros
planes econemicos airnultineos
que se desarrollan en todo el
pais, expres6:
"Pero queda mucho pot ha-
ter. En Camagtley quedan
unas 20,000 caballerfas de
buldoceo. En caminos estamos
prActicamente incomunicados;
hay 104 brigades en todo el
pals y no se ven. En CamagUey
hay 19 y calculamos que nece-
Oita 40 brigades".
"Creo que este batalla aqui
en Is region de Amancio se
puede ganar porque lo funda-
mental esti, que es la gente:
los 6,000 soldados y los 3,000
,columnistes, edemas de los
obreros agrkolas. Aqui esta
la fuerza. Per o no es auf
ciente la volurttad y la ener-
gia par a cottar y transpor-
.tar la coda. Hay que arreglar
rapidarnente los caminos con
as briedas quellegan dere.
tarea". A continuacidn, Fidel inst6
.a los alli reunidos a transmitir
? HUH? CUE LUCHAR num* 'a todos los compafieros que
CON LO p0C0 OUE laboran en tareas de zafra en
TENIAMOS Y TODO LO
c GIME TENEMOS HOY ES . esa region, las razones que de-
, EL REauLTADO terminan la necesidad de ter-
, . DE TODO AQUELLO 'miner la presente zafra: ?
' "Con' lo que tenfamos, trati. , "Nosotros tenemos los me-,
bamos de arreglarlo y resolver. dios y tenemos los hombres.
Y claro, se agarraba una ame- ,Faltan algunos medios que es-
una bazuka y on mortero. S tralladora, un din se agarr6 tan en camino. Ahora de uste- des depende cdmo programan.I
i
hubieramos empezado con to. este batalla. Tienen los horn-
do eso, con tanques, con to- bres, la voluntad de luchar de
do 10 q u e tenemos idiom, .esos hombres. Es duro, pero en'
4cuantos dfas hubiera durado este pals los revolucionarios,
todo aquello? Chico minutos
duraba todo aqua?. Pero en ban vencido dificultades supe.
"
fin, hubo que luchar dues" con riores.
lo poco que tenfamos y todo
lo que tenemos hoy es el resul.
tado de todo aquello".
,
"Hoy hemos avanzado bas-
tante, tenemos maquinas bue-
nas y maquinas males, pero to.
davfa hay cosas que no apro-
vechamos bien, falta mucho
por hacer, hay muchos detain-
tos que traban las cosas, a ve-
ces no se logra toda la coope-
radon".
"Tenemos mucho mas de lo
que hemos tenido nunca, inclu-
so mAs compafieros experimen.
tados que nunca, pero todavfa
nos falta mucho. Tenemos que
hacer un gran esfuerzo de or-
ganizacion, de analisis. Hay clue
tener todas las respuestas; den-
"Por esta misma zona pan-
tanosa pas6 la Columna de Ca-
milo y pas6 la Columna del
Che. Por duras que sean las
condiciones de cualesquiera de
ustedes en este momento, to.
dna esas incomodidades no se
pueden comparar a aquellos
40 6 50 dias que ellos pasaron
enterrados por estos panta-
nos... Y podemos remontarnos
mas etas, hasta las luchas por
la independencia, cuando los
orientales atravesaron esta zo-
ne".
? Finalmente, el Comandante
en Jefe expresd:
"Y vamos a poner a pruett
ba en este punto critic? la vo-
luntad y is decisiOn. En este
CPYRGHT
caso ustedes son el grupo r
feart110104134n este ado,
en una zafra importantfsima.
en una provincia importante y
en el punto m?diffcil de esa
provincia, van a representar la
Revolucidn y van a represen;
tar esa voluntad, el sentido
del honor y del deber revolug
cionarios".
"Y no sera sell? ganar In ba=
talla, sino ganarla lo mas inte,
ligentemente posible, lo antes
posible, lo mejor posible. Uste-'
des deberan !lever este mensa-
je, esta apelaciOn de la Re-;
volucidn, y la seguridad de la
Revolucion en que esos miles
de hombres van a cumplir est:
ta tarea".
,
!Penn Pin; A.111(1111*
'
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8
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may 19o9
THIRD WORLD IMPATIENCE WITH SINO-SOVIET MEDDLING
Among the large numbers of African, Asian, and Latin American
students returning from the Soviet Union, East Europe, Communist China,
Cuba, or North Korea, those who have been subverted and trained as
"professional revolutionaries" are in the minority; the politically
naive and "duped" make up a larger group. Once the students are home,
the distinction is of little import since the naive, both foreign and
native-educated, can be easily led by the professionals into stirring
discontent among other students. Too often,. the disciplined, disrup-
tive minority succeeds in capturing the leadership of entire student
unions and associations.
The professional revolutionaries do not .operate alone, without
outside guidance. Activities are carefully monitored and directed
either by Bloc representatives in the country (or in neighboring coun-
tries), or by Communist-front organizations, such as the International
Union of Students or the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Since
guidance is given clandestinely and is unknown to persons not directly
involved, its existence can be all too readily denied. Occasionally,
when student dissidence threatens to run out of control, the revolu-
tionaries are put down, the participants exposed, and the clandestine
curtain parted to provide a true insight into the dangers of such sub-
version.
Two recent cases in Ethiopia and Kenya in which the curtain parted,
as outlined below, should be especially.meaningful to countries of the
Third World since the Communist effort is directed principally against
them.
Ethiopian Restraint
As illustrated by the following chronology of events, the Imperial
Ethiopian Government (IEG) has consistently been sympathetic to the
students' point of view in internal university matters but became in-
creasingly concerned about the way extremists, with Communist backing,
exploited the situation for purely political ends:
March-April 1968 - Outbreak of student disturbances, the most
widespread since the attemped coup of 1960. A police search of the
National Union of Ethi,opian. Uhivergity.Stu4ents (NUEUS) headquarters revealed
large quantities of propaganda pamphlets prepared by the Communist-
(Soviet-) controlled International Union of Students (IUS) and numer-
ous propaganda and instruction films, some made in Czechoslovakia.
East European embassies (especially Soviet and Czechoslovak) which had
had contact with the students were thought to have trained them in
demonstration techniques. A former NUEUS leader had spent July and
August 1967 in the Soviet Union. IEG action in April 1968 was:lim-
ited to imprisoning and later releasing student agitators, to banning
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the university's two student unions (NUEUS and another), and to pro-
hibiting publication of an extremist student monthly, Struggle.
November 1968 - A boycott of classes at the University of Addis
Ababa, which began on 14 November, ended two days later when student
leaders met with the Prime Minister and received his assurances that
a student Union could again be established at the university and a
newspaper published, provided it respected the libel laws. At a
17 November student meeting, leaders who had met with the Prime Minister
were accused by extremist students of being too soft because they had
agreed to a referendum on the new union. Those same extremists captured
the leadership of the student movement and threatened continued boycotts
until three days later when the Government abandoned its request for a
referendum. A pamphlet distributed early in November and credited to
a radical extremist student cell, "The Crocodiles," made it clear that
the new student leadership was aiming at political action against the
government. It called on peasants, the urban proletariat, soldiers and
"revolutionary students" to unite in opposition to feudalists, bourgeoisie,
"top-brass" military leaders and "perfidious imperialism." The IEG was
described as a "treacherous, senile and cynical feudal regime." It
was the pamphlet's Marxist terminology which pinpointed "The Crocodiles"
as its authors and suggested that the extremist students belong to or
were influenced by this Marxist-Maoist cell, known to exist in the
university at the time of the April disturbances and known as the pub-
lishers of Struggle.
February-March 1969 - A resurgence of dissidence throughout pro-
vincial secondary schools and among students at Haile Selassie Uni-
versity culminated in a school shutdown on 4 March. During this
period, Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Ethiopia were harshly critical
of the IEG, degrading to Haile Selassie, and usually prefaced by the re-
mark that the broadcaster's information "came directly from our Addis
Ababa correspondents." One broadcaster, on 7 or. 8 March, prefaced a
strident vituperation of the Emperor by identifying himself as Vladimir
Sharayev, a cultural attach; at the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa and
at that time on vacation in the Soviet Union. Such flagrancy could
only have been iterpreted by the IEG as sanctioned by the Government
of the USSR;. In addition, Radio Moscow propaganda was repeated in
student-circulated, mimeographed flyers mass distributed throughout
Addis Ababa.
13 March 1969 - An editorial in the morning Ethiopia Herald,
probably inspired by the government (copy of text attached), WTned
against the subversive activities of certain foreign agents (meaning
Soviet-) and noted that there is a point beyond which patience ceases
to be a virtue.
14 March 1969 - A front-page news feature in the Ethiopia Herald
(reprint attached) announced the expulsion of six Soviet Bloc officials,
to be effected within 24 hours, on charges of fomenting subversion
among students.
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Who Was Expelled?
Names of the ousted Communist officials are given in the attached
Ethiopia Herald news story. The three Czechoslovak officials were
fairly recent arrivals unknown, minor functionaries in the Addis
Ababa commercial mission. Perhaps their. expulsion, can be explained
as a backlash of IEG anger stirred up by Soviet, blatancy; or as the
IEG's belated reaction to Czechoslovak -involvement in the 1968 dis-
turbances; or even as an indirect IEG slap at the trouble-making, So-
viet--controlled IUS, which is headquartered in Prague. The Soviet
dfficials, at least two of them, are better known: Victor Matveyev,
TASS correspondent; Mikhail Novikoy, Novosti correspondent; and
Vladimir Sharayev, cultural attache and director of the Soviet Per-
manent Exhibition in Addis Ababa.
. Bombay's Current of 12 April 1969 discusses the "Soviet Agents
Chucked Out" of Ethiopia and recalls the early 1950's when Victor
Matveyev headed TASS in New Delhi, where.. he. was active in agitating
students and trade union subversion (excerpts from text attached).
Vladimir Sharayev was associated with Radio Moscow long before
his now-famous broadcast of early March and has long been known in
Ethiopia. A feature article published in the 25-26 February 1967
edition of Rome's independent daily, Il Giornale d'Italia, describes
Sharayev aa:being,Un the'mid-1960's, the broadcaster from Radio Mos-
cow of all the Amharic-language scripts which openly attacked IEG pol-
icies. Sharayev acquired his fluency In the Amharic language in the
'early 1960's as an exchange student at the University in Addis Ababa.
Kenya Not in the Mood
In Kenya, student agitators have been abette-d.by both Peking and
Moscow and have been helped by the Soviet-controlled International
Union of Students (IUS):
January-February 1969 - An article in the 6 February 1969 Hin-
dustan Times (copy attached) described the closing in early 1969 of
the University College in Nairobi and noted that in. Kenya the gov-
ernment was in no mood to "tolerate trouble from students -- or any-
one else." A Radio Peking broadcast to Africa, which claimed 34
deaths and police disobedience caused by the university closure, was
scored by the Kenya press:
"The broadcast shows how far removed from reality
the authorities in China have become..... They can no
longer even lie intelligently.... There is no doubt the
Chinese technique of the big.lie has gained some dupes
in Africa who are eager to parrot the tired slogans which
Peking and its supporters feed. (East Africa
Standard, 3 February 1969)
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The Communist Bloc role in training young men and -students in subver-
sion came to light with the appearance at Nairobi court hearings,
7-11 February, of eight defendants charged with circulating banned
Communist Chinese publications, most of which advocated violent revo-
lution. One defendant was a Moscow University postgraduate research
student, one admitted to having attended a "school of professional
revolution" in North Korea, one was just a student in Nairbbi, and
five were students in the mid-1960's at the Wuhan Military Training
College in Peking.
March 1969 - A 14 March Kenya Gazette article-announced that a
considerable number of scholarships. would be awarded Kenyan students
by the Soviet Union under terms of a new cultural agreement which is
presently under discussion. Kenyan officials had in the-paSt expressd
public concern about the qualifications of the many IUS-sponsored
scholarship students returning from the USSR and East Europe and the
prospect now of facing "considerable numbers" of graduates of the
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University could not have been very reas-
suring. Someone may have recalled an East African Standard article
of 10 May 1965 which discussed Kenyan students in Bulgaria under IUS
auspices and stated that the students were studying "nothing but Com-
munist ideology and guerrilla warfare." They were reported to have
attended a "Party Students' School" and to have taken part in a Com-
munist revolutionary course.
April 1969 - A banner headline in 13 April 1969 Nairobi
NatiOn read "Russian Envoy Ordered Out": the Nairobi-based Pravda
correspondent, Mikhail Domogatskikh, and a secretary at the Soviet
embassy, Victor ElisSeev (Yeliseyev), were declared personae non
gratae by the Government of Kenya. "Russian diplomatic sources,"
the article said, "had clamped a news blackout on the situation ...
and there was no comment from Home Office sources." The story con-
tinued that in February 1968 Kenya had expelled a Soviet Novosti
correspondent (Venyamin D. Zakharov) and the Soviet representative
of Sovexportfilm (Eduard B. Agadzhanov). At that time, Mr. Daniel
Arap Moi, Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs, said: "Meth-
ods adopted by'llostile intelligence services to subvert and under-
mine governments and to carry their ideological battles into coun-
tries which have repeatedly expressed their intention to remain un-
aligned are too well known to require repetition." In a brief follow-
up story on 14 April, the Nation iterated "the Russian Embassy re-
frained from commenting and the Kenya Government has made no comment
... Vice President Moi said of the-Sunday Nation front page story,
'You have got it all there. What more do you want'"
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ETHIOPIA HERALD, Addis Ababa
13 March 1969
Editorial
Time for Action
ItThere is a point beyond which patience ceases to be a virtue.
The subversive activities of certain foreign agents are now pushing
Ethiopia to this point.
"The problem of subversion and interference in the affairs of
other states by major powers is an old but continuing cause for con-
cern, not only among the now developing nations of the third world,
but even among some highly industrialized but nevertheless subjugated
satellite nations. Nor is Ethiopia a stranger to such intervention.
The annals of our history bear witness to many instances of foreign
intervention, interference and invasion. The whole long and lamenta-
ble era of colonialism is replete with examples of intervention under
the guise of the so-called civilizing mission of imperialist powers.
The Fascist invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was one example of such in-
tervention which the world-- to its subsequent sorrow -- chose to
,ignore. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was. the latest but
apparently not the last example of such foreign intervention.
"Sometimes foreign interference takes a more subtle form than
the naked aggression of 1935 and that of 1968. Interference in na-
tional sovereignty may take the form of efforts to divide a country
against itself, efforts to divide generation against generation, re-
gion against region. The undermining of developing nations may even
take the more insidious form of posing as a protector. When the need
in developing countries is for economic advancement, some major powers
prefer to sow the seeds of discord and conflict by offering aid only
in the form of arms.
"Ethiopia has experienced and survived if not all at least most
of the forms of direct and indirect interference and subversion. On
her part, Ethiopia, as a founding member of the United Nations and the
seat of the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity, has
stood fast against all instances of interference by outside powers
against the sovereignty of any nation. Nor will Ethiopia view inter-
ference against herself any more lightly than she would against a sis-
ter state.
For sometime outside agents have been trying to dupe students and
some other groups of Ethippians not only into betrayal of their own ,
best interests but even into violence against the very fabric of their
nation. Those who would try to tear Ethiopia apart should be warned:
the cloth of our unity is durable and tough.
, "Ethiopia did not become aware only yeaterdqy or.today of the sub-
versive activities being fomented here by foreign agents. The various
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acts of subversion attempted through bribery and corruption that
have perpetrated have been known since their inception.' Diplomatic
hints have been dropped to the countries responsible. The soft hints
seem to have fallen on deaf ears. The hand of friendship which Ethiopia
continued to hold out to these countries seems to have been misinter-
preted. If the open hand of brotherhood is misunderstood, perhaps it
is time to show the closed fist.
"Many diatribes against Ethiopia, broadcast recently by a foreign
radio have lately been circulated in the streets of Addis Ababa under
the name of Ethiopian students. Subversion should at least be more
subtle; duplicity, less obvious. Were the circumstances not so tragi-
cally sad, such an act might be viewed as an absurd and amateurish
betrayal of itself. In this sophisticated age, even the intended vie-
time of subversion might expect it to be carried out with more skill.
"Ethiopia, as a cornerstone of the non-aligned world, has made
the principle of non-interference in the integrity and soveriegnty
? of nations the foundation of its own foreign policy. We believe equal- ,
ly in national unity. We expect our sister nations to do the same. A
country which has no% bent to the Fascist sword will not bend to sub-
version from any source. Ethiopia's determination to defend herself
against foreign aggressors has inscribed itself in the pages of history.
A new page in this long and honorable history must now be written. The
time for concern is passed. The time for action is here. Those respon-
sible for subversive interference and cowardly attacks against Ethiopia
will now have:to pay the price. It has been said that those who do not
know history are forced to repeat it. Those who ignore Ethiopia's long
and heroic history ot self-defense now have to be taught the lesson at
first hand."
2
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ETHIOPIAN HERALD
14 March 1969
"Duping Students"
it piaiia
Czee
ree
etivit
ici
versive
CPYRGHT
S ree
ussian
ADDIS ABABA, Thursday, (ENA) ? Two Russians and three Czeeha will he
expelled from Ethiopia within 24 hours elf
ective This evening for activi ties in Ethiopia
of Foreign
."deteritnental to the mationel interest of the
Affairs announced this evening...
A third Russian will be prohibited
from entering Ethiopia, a Apokeontan
of the Foreign Ministry announced.
The three Russians and three Cze.
,elts were declared persona non-gni:a
for their activities which were deteri.
mental to the national interest of
Ethiopia in general and for their acti-
vities in the recent A tudent agitation
in particular. The two Russians who
will be expelled within 24 hours are
Mikhail Novikov, the A.P.N. (Moscow)
correspombitt in Ethiopia, 114r. Victor
1,11atweev, the Ta ss correspondent. The
third Russian. Mr. Vladniir Charaev.
of the Soviet Permanent Exhibition
here, who is presently outside of Eth.
he prohibited .from enter.
ing Ethiopia.'
The three Czechs who will be ex.
pelled within 24 hours are Mr. Jos&
Barton, an attache in the Czechoslovak
Embassy and Mr. Vincent Stefanck
and Mr. I..adislav Poslusny, both of the?
commercial section of the Czechoslo.
vak Embassy.
country,"
the Ministry
; The university and secondary sell?.
ols in Addis Ababa were closed March
? .three by governinent order. The ele,
sure announcement said the action was
taken "to avert possible damage to pro-
perly and even human lives in the
wake of recent fittellent agitation."
Government sources. said at the
ine a few student agitators were duped
by foreign elements to di@rupt nation-,
al unity.
A. spokesman for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs .saiti last night the ex-
"polsion was necessary for "the norma.
lization of student life in Ethiopia."
Security esaurces revealed that
they had. "full proof" of. the subversive
activities of the expelled Soviet atul
Cacich agents. They said a "compart;
mentalized" system had been set am-
ong studenti. Various "cells" of stud-
ents were said to have been given se-
parate tasks to perform,_ some of whom
were apparently innocent or .cven pat.
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CPYRGHT
riotic hi themselves, but which ioge-
ther in a pattern pre-conceived by the
foreign agents but unknown to the full
group of students. amounted to a
rse of activity which was a calculated
betrayal of the peopl,? of Ethiopia..
One official said the government is
now proceeding to "Lreak the back"
of the cell system set- up by Soviet
agents. ?
Another official said Radio?Nloscow
had made obvious the Soviet complicia
Ty in subversive activities here. "Their
recent hroadcasts against Ethiopia we-
re virtually an admission Of guilt," he
said.
Security officiali,. however, had al?
ready uncovered some of the details of
the clandettine operations undertaken
ben. by ?Soviet and Czech agents. In-
vestigatione arc continuing into the.
. subversive cell structure set up among
a innall minority of 'Ethiopian stud.
ents" by the foreign agents, official sou.
Fee* paid. .
? .
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CURRENT, Bombay
12 APRIL 1969
"Soviet Agents Chucked Out"
(Excerpts)
"In New Delhi there is nothing but love between the Indians and
Soviets but in Addis Ababa, the capital 'of Ethiopia, it is different.
Ethiopian intelligence is smarter than ours for recently, following
serious student unrest, the Ethiopian government chucked out two Rus-
sians and three Czechs as being the brains behind this student agita-
tion.
"Now the interesting thing is that among those expelled was Com-
rade Victor Matveyev former TASS correspondent in New Delhi who was
regarded as an old friend of India. Matveyev was head of the TASS.
bureau in the capital city in the early 1950's.
"Also expelled was Mikhail Novikov, representative of the 'unof-:
ficial' Novosti news agency. 'Unofficial' only because the Russians
continue to claim that this news agency has nothing to do with the
Soviet government.
"These strong and firm measures taken by the Ethiopian government
are in striking contrast to the attitude of laissez-faire shown by
India in exactly the same kind of student agitation. For years So-
viet personnel have been active in subverting-Indian University tu-.
dents but with Mrs. Indira Gandhi as the head of our government, so
anxious not to displease her guru, Mr. Kosygin, no action is being
taken here. Mrs. Gandhi is known to have passed the word down the
line that under no circumstances should Soviet 'feelings' ever be
hurt.
a.
-.?
"In the case of Victor Matveyev, who was known as the TASS Cor-
respondent in India and who is now expelled from Ethiopia, the Ethio-
pians bluntly said that he is no journalist. They dub him as a propa-
ganda activist for the KGB which he also was during his Indian tour
of duty. Matveyev was not Only an activist among students but he also
did a great deal of damage in the trade union field. He was, of course
an accredited correspondent to the Government of India. The Indian
government gives facilities to Soviet agents to do their work in our
country.
"While Matveyev was regarded as a journalist in New Delhi and was
treated as a pen-pal by local journalists, he Was even then working
with Soviet intelligence personnel. In the Soviet set up -- KGB and
others -- it is often the number two who control the number one and so
it was with Matveyev who had an 'assistant' Comrade Protyannikov. Yet
it was Protyannikov who was the control man and the main liaison with
the headquarters of the KGB in Moscow.
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"Under Matveyev's regime the TABS office in New Delhi was greatly
expanded. Propaganda work particularly at the time of the Telengana
riots erupted and soon Matveyev had to push aside his student 'side
line' to others to perform. The bigger subversive activity, namely
Telengana riots, needed his attention first and foremost.
"After Matveyev's departure a number of Soviet intelligence men
have been in charge of Indian student 'cells.' At least two of these
did not come to the attention of the Indian authorities chiefly because
the Indian authorities are not suspicious of Soviet activity in this
country. There was for instance, Comrade Ramiz Ibrahimov, a Central
Asian, who specialized in infiltration of what is known as the Muslim
wing of the student movement. When Ibrahimov was whisked away, his
successor in.the job was Alexandr Dmitrievich Terekhin, a very effi-
cient operator in India, who established many close contacts but al-
ways managed to keep his nose clean. Ibrahimov and Terekhin were the
kingpins of the KGB personnel attached to the student wing in India
during the middle 1960's."
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Student Unres? t .in. E:Africa
ne coitege, no says, wiu b
din ea with his radical leftist' Thls sparked off the students. 'opened only on certain contlitiOn
Iiirefustatt Times Correscimident
? i'lle lealalae ..d alodc.ol
-I- Is being Increasingly felt in
universities and coileges of East
Africa,
In common with the students of
France, Britain, India and Japan,
the movement here is leftist or-
iented and becoming Increasingly
militant although shorn of actual
vtolenco. The confrontation with
the authorities is generally con-
fined to demonstrations and
strikes.
, Last year about 1.400 students'
of University College, Dar es
. Salmon. confronted President
Nyerere when he directed that
they, should serve a spell in the
Tanzania National Youth Service
. to work pn various social projects
in the field. The students defied
the order and boycotted lectures
'President Nyerere retaliated by
closing .down the institution and
, sacking them all.
Twiny a similar phemomenon is
; being witnessed at. the University
College in Nairobi. The Kenya
Government has closed clowii the
' college and packed off home its
1,800 inmates. Including over 200
of Indian and ' Pakistani origin.
The confrontation in Nairobi
arose from the refusal of the
authorities to allow the Qpposition
7Kenya Peoples Union leader, 1Vir
, OgInga Odinga, to address the
students.
There, is no doubt' that Mr
, student body. In the post his talks' they staged a demonstration at
? have been applauded not only by -1 the college campus and resolved,
the Nairobi students but also in ' not to attend lectures. The autho-
'? Dar es Salaam and at the Make- rities rushed into campus with,
rcre College in Uganda. However armed police units, closed down.
Jollowing tougher measures the college and forcibly evicted.
against the KPU in Kenya, the the .students from the halls of re-!
Government on two occasions this, aidence.
year. refused to let him address' While the rumpus was going
them on the role of elections In . on in Nairobi, students of Kam-
' a democratic society." pala's hlakerere College came out
? A - In open support of their Nairobi lunicipal Elections - colleagues by staging a demons-
tration there, followed by a 24-
hour college strike. A copy of the
East African Standard. v..hic'h had
denounced the action of the Nai-
robi students, was ceremoniously
set ablaze. The Tfakerere chaps
1
Mr "Double 0" would have of
course, in his talk scathingly re-
ferred to last year's municipal
elections In Kenya when almost
all KPU candidates were disquali-
fied for various alleged irregula-
rities. His talk would also have .
to Nairobi to see President Ken-
focussed attention on the forth- '?
coming General Elections next yells but were stopped from .en-
year and received publicity. 'its In tering Kenya.
the past. in the local and overseas Academic
Freedom ,
pre is.
Whatever the reasons. the The Nairobi students accuse the
Nairobi students were deprived of Kenya Government of interfering'
listening to Mr Odinga. On the 'with academic freedom guaran-
first occasion the authorities stat- teed in the college constitution.
ed that a proper procedure had They claim that the debarring of
not been followed by the student, Odinga from the college care-
when inviting him to the college pus is only incidental to this basic
Campus. On the second occasion, isstle?
however, it was clear that the col- Fighting out a verbal battle
lege principal, West Indian Dr with them is the Minister of Edu-
`Arthur Porter, had been directed. cation, Julius Mono, who asserti
by the Government not to let Mr, that the students must obey the
Odinga address them at all. . . Government "without question."
that -no politic an will be allowed
to address them without prior
Government approval. The Minis-
ter is being fully backed by Pro-,
sident Kenyatta.
The college staff, which in-
cludes a fair number of foreign
professors and lecturers, Is main-
taining a coutlous attitude to the
whole affair. While expressing
,support for academie freerimiLH
and, as Dr Porter puts it, ??%,
"free circulation of ideas" at
campus, it has urged the students
to play it pool and enter into
"negotiations" with the Govern.
merit.
confrontation has now be-
come a trial of strength between
the students and the Kenya
authorities. Although In many '
Overseas countries students have
sometimes come out victorious IN
such contests, students In Africa
are generally tame and lack stay-,
ing power compared to their col-
leagues in the West or In Asia. In ,
Dar es Salem lest year, students
backed down after staging a si-
milar confrontation and returned
sheepishly with tails between'
'their legs following President,
Nyerere'e tough attitude. It Is
likely that this will be repented,
, anyone else.
:n wheT,,tvhze Government
..,.,
trouble from :the studentir?or
is in no mood to tolerate any.
2
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May 1969
SOVIET SCIENTISTS: DISAFFECTION AND DISAPPOINTMENT
Contradictions between the USSR's self-proclaimed image and Soviet
reality are nowhere so glaring as in the broad realm of science. Marx
repeatedly referred to the scientific soundness of his analyses of con-
ditions and of his forecasts of the historically inevitable victory of
communism. Stalin in 1927 predicted, that in the communist society of
the USSR, "Science and art will enjoy conditions conducive to their
highest development." Khrushchev in 1957 boasted of achievements of
the USSR which "mark a new epoch in the development of science and
technology" and acclaimed the "greatest feats of workers of Soviet
science and technology" ih solving complicated problems. In January
1966 Soviet Academy of Sciences member Peter Kapitsa spoke of "the
great advantages offered by our socialist system in the organization
of our science and industry." In February 1969 the World Marxist
Review called science and technology "one of the principal ?and deter;.-
minative fields in the contest between the two opposed social systems"
and asserted that socialism offers "the greatest scope for scientific
worth." Finally, in Moscow News of 29 March 1969, Soviet Academy of
Sciences member Janis Peive asserted that the Soviet state "displays
great concern for developing science, which is making an important con-
tribution to the acceleration of engineering progress, to the solution
of major probelms of the conomy, and to the further raising of cultural
standards in our country."
How does this picture of a science-oriented society square with
the actual achievements of Soviet science and the situation of Soviet
scientists? Several recent documents and. commentaries shed consider-
able light on this subject. It can be clearly concluded that Soviet
science, except in military support work, has fallen far short of the
Kremlin's expectations. Moreover, Soviet scientists, who as a class
have long been favored by the regime, have demonstrated that they are
deeply disaffected by the Soviet system and some recent Kremlin poli-
cies.
Major Conclusions Concerning Soviet Science
An exhaustive study entitled "Soviet Science Policies" was completed
in June 1968 by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Richly documented and offering cogent discussions in
its 738 pages, it has only recently been distributed, in limited numbers
to reviewers in Great Britain and the United States. In the reviews,three
of which are attached, several of the OECD compendium's findings are high-
lighted:
a. Soviet science has scored tangible achievements in
military research and development and, as alcompanion effort,
in space exploration,
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b. In other selected scientific pursuits, such as re-
search in mathematics, theoretical physics, earth sciences,
and physiology, the Soviets have done well; but it is noted
that these are pursuits in which pre-Revolutionary Russian
scientists also did well.
c. In technology, besides aerospace, the USSR has done
reasonably well in electric power equipment, machine tools,
steelmaking equipment, and some aspects of medicine.
d. As for the balance, according to one reviewer, "There
remain huge deserts in Soviet science, both in academic work
and in industry."
e. Soviet achievement in almost every science-based in-
dustry lags far behind that of Western Europe and even farther
behind that of the United States. The need to call on Italian
and other Western European help in the present effort to devel-
op' the automobile industry is a case in point.
f. The Soviet bureaucracy has been able to marshal scien-
tists for selected military-related projects, but the clumsy un-
responsiveness of the bureaucracy has severely impaired scien-
tific and technical development in other fields.
g. Soviet science and technology has yielded only meager
returns on the huge outlays -- three per cent of gross national
product -- invested in science. An important reason for this
is that research is given an unduly large emphasis at the ex-
pense of developmental and experimental work related to industry.
h. Soviet scientists are estimated to be only one half as
productive as American scientists. (This is admitted by Soviet
scientists; one reviewer believes the comparison is even more
unfavorable to the Soviets.)
i. The critical failing in Soviet science is the incentive
to innovate. Soviet scientists have been judged mainly on the
volume of their reserach as measured in money terms, and not on
the quality and number of projects which yield genuine benefits
to the society.
j. The most evident shortcoming of Soviet science is in the
technology of the USSR's consumer goods industries (automobiles,
refrigerators, TV's, sewing machines, etc.). Soviet consumer goods
are so shoddy that cash-heavy and goods-poor Soveit citizens de-
posit increasing percentages of their income in savings banks.
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Past Soviet Efforts to Improve Scientific Work
It would be inaccurate to say that the Soviets fail to recognize
the plain fact that they have obtained poor overall results from their
vast array of scientific institutes and industrial research establishments. To refute that notion it is enough to note (as does the OECD
study) that the Soviets have reorganized their scientific and technical
establishment time and again over the years. These reorganizations,
however, were superficial and even frequently repeated systems resembled
solutions which had been tried and found wanting in the past:
A departure from this dependency on reorganization was started in
January 1966, when a speech by the prominent physicist Peter Kapitsa
was published in the Communist youth newspaper. Kapitsa noted Premier
Kosygim's statements in September 1965 about the declining growth of
labor productivity and linked that decline to the unsatisfactory ap-
plication of the achievements of Soviet science and technology. As-
serting that the Soviets had not been closing the scientific gap be-
tween them and the Americans, he made a series of recommendations, the
most important of which was that some means be found to offer monetary
incentives for useful innovations. Kapitsa was quite candid in attrib-
uting his suggestion to American experience and, possibly for this reason,
little was done about it for almost three years. (See the attached trans-
lation of Kapitsa's speech.)
New Proposals to Improve Scientific Work
In October 1968 the Soviet Government issued a decree entitled "Meas-
ures to Raise the Efficacy of the Work of Scientific Organizations and to
Accelerate the Utilization of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the
National Economy." (See attached article from Pravda.) The published re-
port of the decree is largely a rehash of familiar, nagging problems, but
it contains a remarkable new feature: a: proposed system of material in-
centives to be introduced gradually, starting 1 January 1969. Under this
system, both the institutes and their employees will be rewarded in prb-
portion to the profits that their innovations earn for industry. Insti-
tutes;andJscientiSts are to be rated every three years by committees com-
posed of scientists, Party representatives, and trade union officials.
Those who fail to measure up will be demoted or dismissed. Scientific
and professional competence will no longer be the criterion of success;
rather, it will be the practical economic results of the work performed.
How this profit and incentive system will work out is an open queu-
tion. One obstacle is the deeply entrenched system under which Soviet
scientists have been working for decades; demoting veterans for failure
to meet new criteria is not easy, especially for their contemporary super-
visors in the institutes. Getting industry to accept new and better
methods has always been difficult, for the simple reason that factory
managers customarily avoid the kinds of work slowdowns and loss of pro-
duction which result from experiments with, or the introduction of new
equipment. It would jeopardize their profits. Moreover, the profit
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system for science will depend largely on the profit system introduced
since 1965 in Soviet industry, which has fared poorly during the past
several years, largely because bureaucrats have resisted changes and
Party ideologists have been suspicious of reforms which would lead in
the direction of a market economy. These shortcomings won't encourage
the scientists to hope that their system will work any better.
Soviet Scientists Are Increasingly Disaffected
Signs that Soviet scientists are disaffected are apparent not only
from the above-noted deficiencies in scientific achievement and the re-
gime's moves to redirect scientists' work and make it more profitable.
There are also signs that many prominent Soviet scientists are question-
ing the basic Soviet system, and that many young scientists are, at the
least, politically apathetic.
The best-known figure among disaffected Soviet scientists is Andrei
Sakharov, the physicist who in 1954, when still in his early thirties,
was made the youngest full member in the history of the USSR's Academy
of Sciences as a reward for making a major contribution to the USSR's
hydrogen bomb. In 1968 Sakharov, in an essay circulated widely amongst
leading Soviet scientists, set forth his theses of convergence of commu-
nist and capitalist systems in the interest of serving mankind, and of
the essential need of intellectual freedom in human society. Sakharov's
essay scathingly condemns the Stalinist survivals'inthe Soviet society,
and proposes measures which would radically changethe political philoso-
phy and structure of the USSR.
Other leading Soviet scientists have since 1966 joined with prominent
intellectuals in protesting against moves taken or contemplated by the
Soviet regime. The attached article by Victor Zorza entitled "Scientists'
Rebellion Upsets the Kremlin" describes some of these protests by scientists,
as well as steps being taken by the regime to discredit the scientists and
thus minimize the effect of their protests. Also described are Soviet
press articles indicating that residents of the "science town" of Obninsk
have held "misguided" political seminars and have invited "dubious people
who preached incorrect views" to speak to them.
Causing further concern to the regime is the indication that young
Soviet scientists are either apathetic to political affairs or are taking
unorthodox views of wrestling with national problems. The Soviet press
particularly attacks young scientists who "lack the political experience
to get to the bottom of even simple questions" and are unable to draw
the line between "correct" criticism and "criticism which seeks to under-
mine the foundations of our society." The press maintains they wrongly
dispute the party's right to restrict their personal and political freedom.
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The Soviet regime shows little evidence that it can solve the sub-
stantial problems posed by the long-tolerated shortcomings in science
and technology and at the same time contain the stirrings of disaffection
among prominent and young scientists. Offering more money for more re-
sults will undoubtedly help some. However, the Soviet regime would be
very naive to believe that scientists, who have undergone many years of
rigorous training, will confine their thoughts to strictly scientific
matters and agree not to encroach upon the party's monopoly over politi-
cal questions.
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5 February 1969
client:1s s' rebellion "Upsets
R the reran
The COMMUNIST WORLD:
by VICTO zonzA
THE. Kremlin's thought-
' police is moving in slowly,.
circumspeetly, on the Soviet
. scientific community whose
:rebellion Is threatening to
undermine? the party's totali-
tarian rule. Professor Andrei
Sakharov, whose call . for a
multi-party system in Russia is
circulating ever more widely
'through underground chart,
nets inside the country, is still
.at liberty. ?
To arrest this nian?who made
a signal contribution to the
Soviet nuclear programme?for
demanding freedom of thought
. for scientists and the public
alike would be to provoke a
powerful wave of public protest.
The scientists took a prominent
, part in the recent protests
against the arrests of "freedom
; writers." They would fight that
; much harder against the arrest
, of one of their own. ?
. The Sakharov manifesto, with
:its closely argued pica for the
'convergence"of the Commu-
nist and capitalist systems,
:clearly shook the party establish-
ment. There was no public con-
demnation, nor even any direct
mention, of the Sakharov docu-
ment in the Soviet press, but the
problem which lie created for the
party's control of the scientific
community is being tackled with
i
increasing vigour n the party
journals.
The latest contribution to the
debate appears in "Kommunist,"
the party's chief ideological maga-
zine, in an article signed by N.
Sviridov?whose position as
deputy head of the party propa-
ganda department is tactfully
glossed over. He complains that
some scientists, whom he does not
name, get hold of." casual " poll-
lical information "and on this
shaky foundation they sometimes
build far-reaching conclusions."
At the same time, without
actually threatening them with
th) sack for political noncon-
formity, he mentions that ' a
check on the qualifications of
scientists in Leningrad has led
to 100 dismissals.. This appears
to be the first such check since
the announcement recently of
the new system under which all
scientists would have to undergo
fitg riet(aUftagg IfuRrigb
of retaining their posts.
The examination panel con-
sists not only of the scientists'
own peers, but also of party and
trade union officials. It is thus
clear that political as well as
professional criteria enters into
the decision. Indeed. 'the
" attestation" procedure now
extended to scientists is a long-
standing Soviet prsctice, which
Is specifically defined in a Soviet
law encyclopaedia as being con-
Cerned, among other things, with
the " political qualifications" of
the people being "attested."
Clearly, the Kremlin cannot
afford anything like a real purge
of free-thinkers among the
scientists, because this would
pull the rug from under its own
feet. All the evidence suggests
that too large and too influential
a part of the scientific com-
munity shares, to a greater or
lesser extent, many of Sak-
harov's ideas. The thought-police
nntst, therefore, proceed circum-
spectly, using both stick and
carrot.
Material conditions for scien-
tists, who already comprise the
most privileged section of the
community, have recently been
further improved as part of a
general reorganisation of the
administration of science. Steps*
have been taken to cut out the
dead wood, about which there
have been many complaints from
younger scientists, whose career
prospects were frustrated by old
men hanging on to lucrative
posts. The " reattestation" pro-
gramme is partly directed to this
end.
? In science, however, the intel-
lectual._ rebellion is maturing
among both the old and the
young, as distinct from most
other walks of Soviet life, where
the young are the rebels. Sak-
harov himself was joined by such
old pillars of Soviet science as
Kapitsa and Tamm in a widely
distributed protest to the
Politburo at the time of the last
party congress against the pro-
posed rehabilitation of 'Stalin.
At the same time, young,
scientists" are criticised, as in
the recent "Kommunist " article,
for taking an "abstract and ?
classless" view of such ideas as
" democracy, freedom of the
person, and humanism." This is
?to say that they dispute the
party's right to impose restric-
tions on personal and political
they ewiv pccial meeting
and issue a thumping resolution
which publicly condemns the
'shortcomings and demands imme-
diate improvements. It would
seem that in the present matter
they have behaved with much
greater discretion. A meeting has.
certainly been held and the,
appropriate minority resolution
passed?but it was all done in
secret, in order not to stir up,
the scientific hornets' nest.
The evidence of the party's
secret moves is to be found in
articles' which began to appear
shortly after the Sakharov mani-
festo had emerged from the
underground. Many of them use
:precisely the same phrases and
the same evidence of ideological
backsliding among scientists,
thus indicating that they are all
based on the same original docu-
ment?that is, on the secret
party resolution about the
.scientific rebellion.
Brezhnev's warning to the
'Soviet intelligentsia in general.
? issued in the early stages of the
Czechoslovak reformation, has
now, been made to apply to the
scientists in particular. The
scientists are told that "the
enemies of communism are
clutching at any evidence of
political immaturity among its
individual representatives, whom
they are attempting to use in.
their hostile activity against our
country." They should, as " Kom.
munist" instructs them, stand
firm "against the attempts of the
ideological saboteurs to introduce
Ideas and views that are alien to?
socialism into our midst."
But what happens if " alien "
ideas are somehow conceived by
thoroughly . patriotic scientists,-
who base their case for political
and social modernisation of the
system on grounds of national
interest? The party's answer is
to ridicule the scientists as
politically immature.
Many young scientists, com-
plains the newspaper "Soviet
Culture," .take a " snobbish "
attitude to the public activities
In which the party asks them to
participate. Instead, it would
seem, they demand the demo-
cratic right to take part in the
discussion and shaping of policy,
ialmost as if this was not the
exclusive province of the party.
With heavy irony, the paper
comments that "they are only'
Interested in 'major' problems
freedom?just as Sakharoir did.
e 199 wint) j, 19Q
particular section of SOCitY; which they are ready to discuss
'Ind to 'solve' without thinkinr
1
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w'nether the so problems are
within their grasp."
yoqn7 :,-;e',t..-111t-; in particular
"lack t!it; holit,eal experience to
get to the bottom of even simple
questions." They are unable to
distinguish between criticism
that is " correct "?and tIlercfore?
perinissible?" and criticism
which seeks to tincli,.rinine the
foundations of our society."
Club lectures
Soviet scientists are privileged
not only materially but also
ideologically, for the party has
bad to give them with one hand
the right to independent think-
lag which it is trying to take
away from them with the other.
If they are to produce tho
.scientific wonders that (ho party
keeps pressing them for, they
must be free to play with scienti-
fic ideas?and they use this
freedom to play with political
Ideas which are barred to other
sections of the community.
In the " science town ". of
Obninsk, which is being ustd by
the party press as the example
of what is wrong with Soviet
scientists, the local club " readily.
granted its platform to dubious
people who preached incorrect
views?' This could hardly hap.
pen in other " cultural" clubs,
which are usually firmly conttol?
led by party supervisors, but it
can and does happen repeatedly
in the Soviet scientific communi-
ties which control their own club.
lectures.
Political seminars, according
to an article in "Party Life,'
lacked "a clear political direc-
tion?' 'Topics for discussion were
chosen " thoughtlessly." In Soviet
double-talk this means the very
opposite of what it says?that is,
the "political direction" was all
too clear, and the choice of
topics only too thoughtful. The
party's thought-police can do.
little about it unless it demands
the dismissal and?arrest of many
,scientists. Even the Kremlin
cannot afford to fall in with
such demands. Sakharov is still
free?and so are 770,000 others
who are officially classified , as
.7" scientiftg workers.".
NEW STATESMAN
28 March 1969
How Bad is Soviet Science?
NIGEL CALDER
C PYRG HT
II Aineticans land salely tlw moon this
summer, they will do at least some seivice
to truth. by laying the ghost of .Spurnik I.
Since October 1957, when the West Viii4
mute unnecessarily surprised by the lirst of
the 'firsts in space. the myth ot Soviet scien-
tific and technological escellence has been
hard to dispel. ?I he Tt''..tlii.!CIICe ill ptihlie
support for education, research and engin-
eering. following the sputnik. helped the LIS
and Furope much more than krushellev
IlitVi2 intended. I here ssas wedi
he deceived: tor those urging the cause or
science in the West the Russian bogey came
in very handy. ( \lowadays, for Europeans,.
it's an American hog,ey.) .1 he tact is that
the numerically?equal scientilie armies of the
I IS and the L titilt are ainaiingly ii,viti ill'
perlorintinee. I et's NCI,Nre the Americans al
eight out of III. East month I'd have given
the Russians four out of. 10; :titer reading a
new analysis, shortly to Ile published. I'm not
inclined to Ile even that generons.
l.et me add. right iovay, that you cannot
have large numbers of' talented people at
svork in laboratories, as the Russians have,
and produce nivilling. however much you
misma nage them; In a few fields, the Soviet'
it oril is good; on the teseatelt siih., mathe?
mattes and theoretical physics, tii ii, ,CitIkt'S
MIAk v ire areas in which the
Russians traditionally do well; on the techno-
logical sitte, in aerospace, power generation.
machine ttAisjobwki
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they have nothing to he ashamed of. The
troiible is that there remain huge desertsui
Soviet science, both in academic work and
in industry.
In chemistry and biology, in agriculture.
in .ilmost every science -based industry except
those mentioned. Soviet achievement lags
far behind Western Europe's. never mind that
of America. The USSR failed to produce
even a good automobile without Italian help.
For a nation officially committed to automa-
tion and computerisation, the Soviet cont?.
putter IL,elinohigy runs pathetically behIml the
times, as shown by the 11ral-4' fiasco. To say
:ill this is not needlessly tteattack a country
that has had a bitter struggle to modernise
itself. Leading Soviet commentators have
been very self-critical. In any case. Soviet
science is an object lesson to bureaucratic
planners in all countries. especially because
the regime is allegedly founded on science
and rationality, and science is doctrinally a
productive force. I he (allure is politically
ciithai!..1V?111;!, Int 1.1.1prili1)% Lill ?
imalk
simcc 11w11, the Wank Iii iiipssiIt.
the supersonic aircraft -- these are proof of
a concentration of skill in iiipecial areas
which rive the USSR sopi.rposser status in
the strategic sense. I hey .in have been
achieved only by mtary craslaprog.ramme
plot-climes that cut through the red tape. On
the 'Ilia hand. ilic military secrecy sur-
2
CPYRGHT
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sending tip C?periments in spacecraft. J
never saw the vehicles, or even the box that
:carried the experiment. Outside these an&
jthe few other special areas which have tied
!up a disproportionate fraction of the money
:and best n p isver, it is hard to find very j
!much that is strikingly original, or appliedj
J with exceptional vigour ? and originality is
the essence of science, as application is of
technology. Whether Whether you're interested in
j pulsars or psychology, in chemical plant or
j'IjV sets. the, Russian lag is. unmistakable.'
; Attempts from time to time to promotej
joriginality of thought have led tosrotesquc,
publicity for cranks in the Soviet press.
- Yet there are many very bright and force-
ful Russian scientists. Of the various reasons
1411y the system is rotten, the most obvious
I is Lysenko, who not only succeeded in
arrest ing agricultural progresS for a genera-
ilion. but also created ilt1 litmosplicre of
terror lhiut tlevislatetl biology." he physicists
were in a stronger position to shrug off Wm-
, logical attacks on quantum theory and the
Ii ke. vet die intellectual freedom so nixes-
jsai y for creative ideas, in science as in any-
thing else, is still badly Compromised. On -
jtop of that is a ',disastrouS institutional
;system which segregates the leading research
'institutes both from the universities on the
,one hand and the factories on the other.
So much has long been clear to Western.
visitors. and admitted by internal critics like
kapitla and Lisichkin..islow I have before
CIA-RDPZ9701494A000.500(14000*.ey in
,h I 'N.s/?, prepared by Western experts for.
the OLCD's Directorate for - Scienthic
Affairs. In its cool and statistical way, drawH
ing oh Soviet documents, it amounts to rt
formidable indictment -of the bureaucrats,'
academicians and party bunglers.
Altlioneli its tone is more kindly than
tonic, ii persuades me that, If anything, I
j have tended to he too charitable allow the,
glories of Soviet science. 'I he report shows'
'how ineptitude has permeated the system,
front the local criterion that a laboratory has
fulfilled its plan if it spends its budget (and
done better if it's overspent!) to the failure
at the national level effectively to disburse
the allotted funds for research and develop-
ment. 'the chapter on science and industry,
by R. W. Davies and his colleagues at Bir-
mingham University, is particularly reveal-
ing, not least in its account of official efforts
. to circumvent a pricing system that has made.
innovation unattractive to managers.
The communist regime is failing at the
yery point where ideologically it should
have been strongest. where in the popular
imagination it offers its greatest challenge
.to die West, and where its greatest chance,
for building true communism once lay. 'I he
Czech academicians who inspired the.
Dubeek reforms understood what was going
:wrong. The reactionary forces in Moscow
new being in the ascendancy again, we can-
not expect more than occasional twitches
from the smothered genius of Russian
scientists.
WASHINGTON POST
3 April 1969
CPYRGHT ?
Russia Found
Still Lagging
4i100 Industrially
By Eric Wentworth
WashIngton Post Staff Writer
CPYRGHT
, icor a naiocentury, the :no-
s'irit Union has looked to sci-
ence to take the country to
-the forefront of the modern
industrialized world.
For all their solid achieve-
ments on the space and mili-
tary frontiers, the Russians
,today still suffer a chronic
technology gap in countless
other, important sectors of
their vast and cumbersome
.economy. Indeed, by one defi-
nition, the Soviet Union still
falls short of being an indus-
trialized nation.
In an exhaustive new trea-
tise dissecting Soviet science
policies and programs,. the
Paris-based Organization for
shins are turning to Western
approaches in some cases in
hopes of improving their sys-
tem.
When the Soviet leaders once
decide to assign top priority to
.some technological program,.
the 500 n-to-be-p u b I Is lied
j()ECD report concludes, they
can marshal their resources
errpririv r. y inel icnnlly
poses definite limits on the ef-
ficiency of Soviet research
and development."
In terms of sheer man-
power, the Soviet education
system has been turning out
masses of scientists, engineers
and technicians. As of 1965,
for example, an estimated
one-third of the 4.891,000 citi-
zens with higher-level school-
achieve icsu is on a tr w
anything the United States ac-
complished.
But such crash efforts are
limited, and the Russians lag
well behind their American ri-
vals in the crucial computer
and chemical industries and in
almost all consumer products.
Rigid, centralized planning,
and unwieldy hareaucracy,
limited research support, fail-
ures to follow up research
with development and fre-
quent resistance to innovation
on the factories have all con-
tributed to this Soviet gap.
"The centralized planning
system in its present form," a
clans. By another estimate, be-
tween 1,655,000 and 2,291,000
persons?accurate data are
elusive?were ,engaged in re,
search and development work
In I966.
j However, the OECD study!
jfinds "reasons for believing,
Alva with the possible excel--
tion of the high priority sec-
tors a lower level of equip-
ment and other facilities per
scientist means that, the 'pro-
ductivity' per man of It and D
is lewer in the U.S.S.R. than
in the United States."
A knottier factor in the Rus-
sian technological lag/appears
Economic Cooperation and summary of the 738-page. to be frequent failure to de-
DeveA
151Y-folielisFir kdiease IOV0971512'.. Cfrt4DPi9-01194ttatiaaibigiftar,nat:
3
5C111 y- use,
CPYRGHT
'SO OT-0
Sov,et ztecoi to
the 01::C1) (,iett i,avo claimed
dey(lopment st,:atling in theie
country i.:: than ti,u per
cent of the total It and f)
budget a',:;ainst. G3.5 pet- cent in
the United State3. :t`,"Itile ques-
tioning these tpfic figures,:
the (IEC.1:) exports don't quar-:
rel. with the 'basic contention.'
They repot t running across
numerous . complaints about
skimping on provision of test-
ing facilities, production of
prototypes and construction of
pilot plants. in addition, they
relate, "The Soviet press fre-
quently publishes accounts of
the failure to introduce new
products 6:35and processes,
once developed, into large-
scale production, and of the
slow rate at which new prod-
ucts and processes, even when:
they are fully introduced into
production, replace existing,
products and processes,.
Bureaucratic harriers within:
:the Soviet governmental hier-
archy and between the aca-
demic and industrial worlds(
are one cause of the lag but I
more basic still is the stub-
born resistance to change'
built into the present Soviet :
system.
Thanks to traditional in-
dustrial planning that sets ar-
I I
bitrary output argct o
tories and their parent minis-
tries with limited budgets
available to attain them, har-
ried factory managers and of-
ficials have been prone to re-
ject any innovations that
might cause current produc-
tion to break stride or divert
available funds from existing.
needs.
Aware of their system's fail-
ings, the Russians in the past
few year's have been undertak-
ing some remedial steps with
what the OECD analysts view
so Ear as mixed results. They
, are experimenting, for exam-
pie, with ."factory centers,"
I"research complexes" and
"r e se arch corporations"?
patterned to some extent on
United States structures and
designed to bring laboratories
and assembly lines into com-
mon harness. ?
Borrowing further on West-
ern approaches, the Soviet
leaders have moved toward fi-
nancing research work
through contracts and have ac-
cepted the idea of fostering?
competition among research
groups.
?
Beyond that, they are begin-
ning the use of bonuses to in-
spire scientists, designers and
factory workers engaged in re-
.111
ward faster, more effective
work?with the size of the re-
ward related to the economic
return from what they pro-
duce.
The OECD experts consider
this last a healthy step but not
a panacea. "It seems certain,"
their summary observes ''that
successful innovations in the
West cannot entirely be ex-
plained in terms of the higher
'profit margins obtainable
from innovation."
At the same time, they add,
"Soviet efforts in the next few
years to measure and reward
the economic return on re-
search and development are
nevertheless likely to be rele-
vant and interesting to West-
ern countries."
The 22-nation OECD's ana-
lysts recognize that despite
its shortcomings, the Soviet
Union has made immense
strides toward becoming a
modern society over the past
40 years. But by one OECD
definition they conclude that
Russia, with more than 30 pet
cent of its labor force still or
.the farm and reportedly pro
clueing More than 20 per cen
of its national income, canno
yet be classified as an Indus,
trialized nation.
THE ECONOMIST
8 February 1969
Tha Teciindosical Gap? in Russia
Looking at thc Russians achieve- ,
merits in space, one finds it hard
to believe that one of ,their obses- ?
sions at home is with the techno-
logical gap between themselves
and the United States, and the
way to ?close it. The Russians
are, after all, training a quite
staggering number of scientists'
and engineers ; half the students
coining out of the universities
have qualified as either thc one
or the other, making the num-
ber of young, technically qualified
graduates coming out each year
substantially higher than it is in
the United States.
And the pool of technically quali-
fied manpower is substantial, even
for a country the Size of the
Soviet Union ; it could be well
over gi mu, of whom nearly
700,000 are university graduates
or the equivalent. The American
pool of qualified man-power is
not all that different, although
the ratio of university-trained
scientists and engineers is much
higher?about i mu gradu-
ates ApprovednFolg,Release
sets of figures excluding the social
CPYRGHT
sciences. It is not lack of trained
.men that explains the gap, nor
is it lack of money. The sums
spent on science have been
increasing 'annually and very
rapidly, trebling in a decade and
running at 3% of gross
, national product, roughly the
same ratio as in America; what-
ever else they lack, those Soviet
scientists arc not short of money.
Then what are they short of ?
The Organisation for Economic
Co-oneration and Development
has been making its own, if not
exactly clandestine, then not
exactly official assessment for thc
last two or three years, and thc
resulting report*, nearly 750 pages
long, is now being given a
restricted circulation. Because of
the notorious unreliability of
official Soviet figures, and the still
more notorious difficulty of match-
ing them to any comparable
P V rn? _he US' R.
9disZ `ititlieRDP79-011940,0An,
aintiOtti-Wri=
western data, the specialists who
compiled the report have been
careful to explain their sources
and methodology at every step,
and the rash attempt to make
some comparison with thc Ameri-
can research is ours, not theirs:
But
we thought it useful to show,
, however notionally, that the
Russians have tried the brute force
approach of throwing in masses
of men and money on a scale
approaching thc American?but
failed to get the results they
Were looking for. They arc now
groping for some more subtle key
to technological innovation and
this is having a profound effect
on thc whole of their economic
thinking.
-Why they lag
For what thc Russians appear
, to have found is that innova-
tion requires first of all an
attitude of mind that is not
fostered by a normal Marxist
economy. If a factory managers
wage nontises if( teed
APPPOIMd feCtirblViase
is going to object to any orm
re-tooling that is going to inter-,
fere With production. lie is also,
going to run into difficulty in pric-
ing the new product so that it
pays for its re-tooling and still
remains competitive enough to
CPYRGHT
, sell. And even when a plant
:manager is prepared to innovate,1
he 'runs the risk of being landed
,with a half-baked scheme badly
worked out and only partially
'tested. The Russian scientific
'establishment, it seems, prefers
,to spend its time on research
'rather than development work.
1Few of the big research institutes
,have adequate facilities for pilot
,plant design. The lack of these has
.hit the chemical industry partieu-'
'lady hard and probably goes a
,long way to explain why so much,
?chernical and synthetic fibre
,technology has been imported
from the west. But there have
been complaints about electronics,
:engineering, atomic energy, com-
puter controlled machine tools
:and iron and steel as well. And
:these are nearly all fields- where
a big technological fall-out front
'the, Soviet space :effort might have
happened?hut has not.
:The Russians thernelves estimate
that the productivity of their
researchers i only ,about half the
;Americans' and that innovations
take two or three 'tithes as long .
to put 'into'''effeet." One likely
reason is, lack of dev'eldpin'ent
another is the of
supporting ,Siaff.' iSeniOr q.Ciehtits
constdr shoold'''haV
between irwii and three ''j'imior
seKnt . , , .
ria a three to me iabiii-a;?
toryt assistants to help iftethwhen
; they, are funtlithenthl'
rcsearelt, and double that n'dmber
,
when- they, are on. rleve ppment.,
It is reasoimbly email that thyi
get nothing or the sort In Pfiietice.
Cvideore Of some universities
rintlicateS 'thu scielui isis are 'doing.
well if two of' them share the
services of three laboratory
aSSiStanti:''I lucy also
as 'UniverSiiy, profeisorsso often
hi 'cOniinnitist countries: that
.0, ?-,
:senior staff are eXpected to spend
S., Much Of their tune teaChifig'
.that . little Margin reinaiiiii for
research,' and
.ofresiMreh',' they are
equipped to teach.
If when i It r Soviet machine,
and the me:mites% or the iotal
reinailics has :taken all thehl4itter
they unquestionablY.'ileseiVe, the
suspicion rcnmins that the.
scientists themselves may be short.
on intellectual curiosity: Soviet
industrial research tends to be
organised on lines rather like
ths British_ _ govemmerstainchistrv
raPAriaxiVIQCsigeAPaSe 1
rod Is
1999O
PTSM)1"n
/W how atchy their 1 n-
194AdeD,&16
e.
is iZrta.
from the. things that industry
really wanted to know. The same
tendencies are at work in the
Soviet Union with a few out-
standing exceptions like the two
major iron and steel research
institutes that have established a
two-way flow of information with
the factories which has made this
one of the most advanced of
Russian industries.
The Russian press, like. the
British,. has been irritated by the
number of times ideas that
originated in Russia have been
exploited commercially by other
countries, notably the United
States; instances of work on cer-
tain electronic components seem
to rankle the most. And to pot
beside this is a number of spec-
tacular failures; OECD cites
computers (the infamous Ural 4_
.series) and car design. This, in
the report, is contrasted with
Soviet successes in what are
classed as priority industries like
space' defence.' research and
? atomic energy. But except for
space, ? is this strictly 'true ?
No one questions the quality of
Soviet military equipment, includ-
ing aircraft, but thc performance
. of Soviet civil aircraft is open to
challenge, and so is the country's
record in atomic energy. Early
Soviet planners made such basic
'mistakes as drawing up energy
policies that tied the country to
coal rather than oil, and transport
, policies that ivcre based on steam
locomotives rather than diesels.
But Russia ,was also the first
country to have a working nuclear
ixiwer station?a small one,
admittedly but pre-dating Calder
hall by several years. llowever,
this never materialised into a
nuclear power programme. Simi-
larly very few Soviet civil aircraft
have ever gone into quantity pro-
duction.
Russian remedies
These examples arc important
because the OECD seems to think
that the reason that scientists in!
these industries got more idoor
than their colleagues in other
research institutes is because they
knew what they were attempting
to do. They had a clear goal
that allowed them to co-ordinate
the efforts of researchers and
industries scattered the breadth
of the Soviet Union and had
government backing from the top
to by-pass the normal labyrinthine
scientific planning machine to get
their hands on key materials and
equipment of good quality, to get
the Soviet supersonic prototype
:airliner now tlying; the evidence
is that it suffers from all the short-
comings that have given super-
;sonic airliners in the west such
:a chequered record. Yet aircraft
is a shining example of a Russian
?industry where development work
and the construction of prototypes
is given its due importance, and
where the designer and his sup-
porting engineers outrank the
factory manager, which they do
not do elsewhere.
Among the remedies the Russians
have sought to prevent the dissi-
pation of their scientific effort,
are reforms aimed at cutting
down the power of the scientific
establishment, as represented by
the Academy of Sciences, and the
giving of more autonomy to the
individual research centres includ-
ing the famous Novosibirsk
laboratories in Siberia. Around'
this a "centre of excellence
is building up on American lines,
and attracting advanced industries
to set up locally to cater for
its advanced needs. The result
of these reforms should in the
long term be to reduce the status
somewhat of the pure scientist
and increase that of the engineer
--Russian intellectuals are as big
culture-snobs as any in the west
and engineers have (like teachers)
had to put up with a good deal
of patronising. But this merely
alters the climate slightly, of itself
it will not close the technological
gap.
So efforts arc being made to
devise a Soviet-type formula for
measuring the possible costi.,
effectiveness of innovation ; for
giving factory managers a choice
of innovations to adopt .in theiri
own plant?say, to choose which
of several possible designs of
machine tool they think worth .
putting into development ; and
combining this with sonic. incen.
live to adopt innovation on the
factory floor, together with a,
price system that will not penalise
the manager who does so. If
this sounds as if the Russians
arc moving, at industry level,
towards a more western approach,
to cost accounting, this is precisely ,
what the OECD specialists who
have studied the research ,and
development end of Russian ?
industy think they arc doing. llow?
far this can be carried without ,
a wholesale revision of the indus-
trial cost structure, and of
economic policy generally, the
next few . years may show.
Sufficient for the moment that
building work done quickly and the Russians arc increasingly cow
999109N.,!!itTSILIOAVV94Atogittiggvf zr maj
only
t Is, of the
trated life. Maybe they did, but ?obsolete design of many of their
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500110001-9
textile looms; and of the fact
that many factories are continuing
to churn o,t obsolete designs
because it is less bother than to
adopt the new tows that have been
de% eloped and cinild be sUpplicd
were there a demand for them.
And that the necessary demand
can only be created by supplying
some kind of western-style incen-
tive for it. Moscow is also begin-
ning to realise that incentives in
a Marxist economy are less easy
to provide than one might think.
The first attempt at offering
factory managers " innovation
bonuses " ended with a fair pro-
portion of the budget for bonuses
underspeot.
The degree of success that the
Rt..-sians have in getting round
these difficulties has more bearing
oil sve:crit science than one might
think. ";lre Russians' problem
from the G.itsct i..as been how to
combine plarwing with initiative.
The west's is iw:reasingly how to
combine initiative with planning.
As more and more " big science
gets government financed, sz, the
west runs into MOM a::(1 1710::
Soviet-typc muddles, and all the
short-comings highlighter! in
the OECD report, the curr-
some planning structure, the poo;
standards of outlying and distant
'laboratories, the low status of
science teachers, the reluctance
of managers to adopt me ideas,
the difficulty in getting new pro-
jects started, combined with the
even greater difficulty of getting
them finished within a. reasonable
time. Already it is being argued
quite strongly in thc west that
innovation now comes not from.
big but small companies that have
overheads low enough to allow
;them to improvise and experiment
on a scale no big corporation can.
-If their innovation is successful,
they get taken over by big coin-
Tanks who then look after the
problems of quantity production
and marketing that no small en-
terprise can handle. But if tax, and
financial and institutional factors
make it increasingly difficult for
small companies to live?as is
becoming the ease in Britain and
western Europe but not yet in
thc United States?this source of
ideas is cut off from big industry
and you get Sovict-typc problems,
with, , presumably", Swirl-type
results.
THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS
13 November 1968
Resolution to Spur Scientific
Research and Development
CPYRGHT
In the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers: ON MEASURES TO RAISE THE EFFICACY OF
THE WORK OF SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS AND TO AC-
CELERATE THE UTILIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECH-
NICAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.
(Pravda and lzvestia, Oct. 23, p. I. Complete text:) The
C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Min-
isters have examined the question of measures to raise the
efficacy of the work of scientific organizations and to accel-
erate the utilization of scientific and technical achievements
In the national economy. The resolution adopted on this ques-
tion notes that in a short historical period Soviet science and
technology have attained a high degree of development and
exert a decisive influence on the pace of the country's techni-
cal progress. Soviet science is first in the world in several
major fields; this makes it possible to resolve important
tasks in developing the economy and strengthening the coun-
try's defense capacity.
The 23rd C.P.S.U. Congress defined the chief trends of
technical progress that are connected with the growth of pro-
duction forces, the strengthening of the Soviet state and a
steady increase in the people's material and cultural stan-
dards of living. To resolve these tasks, it is essential to im-
prove the work of scientific organizations substantially and to
eliminate the obstacles retarding utilization of scientific and
technical achievements in the national economy.
A common shortcoming in the work of scientific-research,
design, drafting and technological organizations and scientific
subdivisions of higher schools is that their work is not fo-
cused to the proper extent on solving the most important sci-
entific-technical problems, especially questions related to
accelerating the growth rate of labor productivity in industry,
agriculture, construction, transport and other branches of the
national economy. The time it takes to apply scientific
achievements is still considerable; the Chief explanation for
this lies in the insufficient responsibility exercised by scien-
tific institutions for the level of performance of scientific and
technical projects, and by enterprises for the timely_pgrA-,,,
tion of items Apriscoletwor Release 199 viu
6
Clear-cut specialization of scientific, design and drafting
organizations has not been provided, and scientific-technical
competition among them is poorly developed. There is a
large gap between the time scientific research and design and
technological elaborations are done and the time they are put
into practice. To a considerable degree the reason for this
lies in the inadequate role played by design subdivisions and
laboratories at enterprises and in the slow development of
capacities for the production of technological equipment and
tools.
The existing system of economic incentives for scientific
research and for assimilation in production of the results of
this research does not promote a rise in the efficacy of the
scientific organizations' work. The scientific base at enter-
prises is being developed inadequately, and the technical
equipment of many scientific-research institutions and higher
schools is lagging. Adequate measures have not been taken to
make rational use of scientific cadres and to increase their
responsibility for the technical-economic level of research.
The C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers, on the basis of the tasks of the country's further
economic development, have proposed to the U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers' State Committee for Science and Technology, the
U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. State Con-
struction Administration, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences,
the ministries and departments and the Union-republic Coun-
cils of Ministers that in drafting long-term, five-year and
annual national-economic plans, broader use be made of the
latest achievements of domestic and foreign science and tech-
nology and advanced experience and urgent measures be taken
to raise substantially the efficacy of the work of scientific in-
stitutions, to improve the organization of scientific research
and the management of scientific and technical development
and to increase the responsibility of heads of enterprises, sci-
entific organizations and higher schools for the creation of new
technology and applying it in the national economy.
It has been deemed necessary that long-term scientific-
rendairctitgaaiWift d ore)
DONICLInttircrmrin
the development of the national economy. The eliihnrsttInn
CPYRGHT
tt:ersse' S'cmt OMMIXIMICIPMEPTZss:rRc.
State Planning Committee, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
and the U.S.S.R. State Construction Administration, together
with interested ministries and departments and Union-republic
Councils of Ministers.
On the basis of the scientific-technical forecasts, ministries
and departments and Union-republic Councils of Ministers
have been instructed to organize long-term elaboration of .
:drafts for enterprises and production branches, as well as
models of machinery and equipment for the future. The inten-
tion of all this is to provide the necessary scientific and
technical backlog for the transition to qualitatively new
"technological processes making it possible to raise labor pro-
ductivity severalfold over the present level. By the time'
enterprises now being designed go into operation, they should
substantially surpass existing enterprises in our country and
abroad in terms of technical-economic indices and technical
, level of output.
The basic form of state planning of science and technology is
? the five-year plan, which is drafted in accordance with the
tasks of the country's economic development and the basic
trends in science and technology over the long run. Proposals
on the basic trends in scientific and technical development, as
well as a list of major scientific-technical problems, are
drawn up by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Commit-
tee for Science and Technology jointly with the U.S.S.R. Acad-
emy of Sciences, with the participation of ministries and de-
partments, Union-republic Councils of Ministers and scientif-
ic-technical societies. These proposals define the level of
technical development for various branches of the national
!economy that is to be attained by the end of the plan period, as
well as the most important scientific research and projects
? necessary to create a scientific-technical backlog.
The chief components of the plan to solve the basic scientif-
ic-technical problems should be:
4 ?creation and use of highly productive machinery and equip-
ment for industrial production, construction, agriculture,
transport and the communal economy, as well as both effective
means of mechanizing and automating of production processes
and new, More economical materials;
?creation and use of highly effective technological produc-
tion processes to ensure integrated utilization of raw and other
,materials, improvement in the quality of output, reduction in
'outlays of labor and material expenses, increased productivity
and improved working conditions;
? ?further improvement in the methods of organizing and
managing production and in scientific organization of labor;
and the creation and use of automated control and data pro-
cessing systems in enterprises, associations, ministries and
'departments and of automated systems for the control of tech-
nological processes?these systems are to be based on the ap-
plication of mathematical methods, computers and control
machinery;
?solution of problems in the area of construction, architec-
ture, agriculture and public health.
! In order to improve scientific and technical leadership, when
necessary pilot organizations will be appointed to deal with
fundamental scientific-technical problems, and scientific di-
rectors or chief designers will be appointed from among lead-
ing scientists and specialists; their assistants will also be ap-
pointed and will be responsible for solving particular parts
of the problem.
In addition to the five-year plan for scientific-research
projects ?acomponent part of the State Five-Year Plan for
the u.S.S.R. National Economy?coordi-
nated plans are being drawn up to solve basic scientific-tech?
nical problems, as well as annual plans for applying new
machinery and technology in the national economy. It has
also been deemed necessary to have branch and republic five.
. year and annual plans for research work and for utilization ol
scientific and technical achievements in production, as well -
as analogous plans for every scientific institution and enter-
prise.
The coordinated plans to solve fundamental scientific-tecl
nical startin
problems must embrace a wijole comple,WM . ?-?
gAteivedaRancRetaarnecaa
of researct r esults In the national economy, and must coor-
filtaRDRe76313014 9494100060041)000103uPs?
U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic
Councils of Ministers have been instructed to provide the
projects stipulated in the coordinated plans with the neces-
sary cash and material-technical resources on a top-priority .
basis. Control over fulfillment of these plans has been en-
'trusted to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee
for Science and Technology.
U.S.S.R. ministries and departments and Union-republic
Councils of Ministers have been permitted to have in their
possession an undistributed reserve of up to 2% of budget
appropriations, within the limits of the total expenditures on ?
research projects. These funds are to be used to strengthen
the most important areas of scientific-technical research.
The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for Sci-
ence and Technology has been granted the right to redistrib-
ute, in consultation with the ministries and departments, ex- -
penditures on research work, including the salary fund.
The research institutions of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sci-
ences, of the Union-republic Academies of Sciences, of branch
academies and of several ministries and committees have
been permitted to undertake projects with clients on a con-
tract basis over and above the volume of expenditures on sci?
entific research established by the national-economic plan.
The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' State Committee for
Science and Technology, the U.S.S.R.. State Planning Commit-
tee, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance and the U.S.S.R. Acad-
emy of Sciences have been charged with elaborating a system
of planning, statistical and accounting indices for scientific
and technical development that will make it possible to evalu-
ate the actual economic effectiveness derived from applying
the results of scientific-technical projects and to determine
the correctness of technical policy in the branches of the
national economy.
The resolution charts steps to develop wide-scale competi-
tion in the scientific-technical area and to prevent a monopoly
in solving the most important scientific and technical prob-
lems. Toward this end it has been recommended that when
necessary the ministries and departments, Union-republic
,Councils of Ministers, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and -
'branch Academies of Sciences assign the conduct of explora-
tory research, as well as design, drafting and technological
'projects, to several organizations that are following different
'paths. This will make it possible to choose the best scientific,
technical and economic solutions at the early stages of re-
search and technological-drafting projects. In performing
particularly important tasks, research projects should be
carried to the stage of making experimental models for pur-
poses of comparing them and selecting the best ones for use
in production.
It is recommended that branch research, design and draft-
ing organizations and enterprises participate widely in the
most important scientific work done in general-science in-
stitutes and higher educational institutions, with the intentioll.
of ensuring continuity in scientific-technical projects, all the
way to their utilization in production. It is essential to deter-
mine beforehand the enterprises and construction sites that
will apply the results of the most important research, experi-
mental-design and technological projects. This will enable .
enterprises and construction organizations (with joint rights
of co-authorship) to join with the scientifie-institutions at the
proper time in working out the technical documentation with
scientific institutions and to prepare production for the use of
new marhinerv.
The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' Slate Committee for &I
enee mid Technology, with the participation of U.S. minis-
tries and departments, should draw up and ratify., in consulta-
tion with the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, a model stat-
ute on the procedure for testing samples of new types of
equipment.
The executives of ministries and departments have been in-
structed to increase the responsibility of enterprises, re-
search and drafting-and-design organizations for; fulfilling the
established plans to produce new types of output And elaborate
technological processes. The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers'
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and Technology, the .U.ELS.R. State Planning Committee and thp
7
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