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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 124
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1C10b
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December 1969
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(25 October - 21 November 1969)
I. All is Not Quiet on. Moscow's Western Front
As Moscow reiterates the creed of democratic centralism and proletarian
internationalism (i.e. control from the center, from the CPSU) with support-
ing quotes from the scriptures by Lenin, some western European Communist fac-
tions and rebellious individuals speak out in new, public forums -- in defi-
ance of democratic centralism. Splits are threatened within several parties.
Expulsions and resignations have given evidence of the serious strains trig-
gered by (but not confined to) the festering problems of Soviet policy toward
Czechoslovakia.
Italy -- "We invite the rank-and-file Communists to effect a cultural
revolution capable of even putting into question all the hitherto consoli-
dated patrimony." With this challenge to the regular leadership of the Ital-
ian Communist Party a lively new magazine, Il Manifesto, began publication in
June. "Heresy," screamed the old-line Communist periodical Rinascita. Where-
upon the PCI's Central Committee began an investigation which may well lead to
expulsion from the party for outspoken Rossana Rossanda and her Bolognese col-
leagues who publish the new monthly. By September their increasingly popular
publication carried a tough anti-Soviet article which, according to L'Es rp esso
of 12 October (attached), charged that "the political mistake committed by the
Soviet leadership group in Czechoslovakia is so serious that 'there is no
longer any possibility of counting on their self-correction; we are forced to
count on their defeat and replacement by a, new bloc of forces directed by the
working class.,..'" Could disillusion speak any more plainly?
Evidently in fear of being accused of an excess of disciplinary democrat-
ic centralism of the old-fashioned Stalinist kind -- an accusation damaging
to the assiduously cultivated image of an "open" party -- 'the PCI Central Com-
mittee has not yet expelled Rossanda and her colleagues. In the meantime Il
Manifesto continues to print the unthinkable, such as a discussion of "our
explicit request for a policy directed at overthrowing the Soviet leadership.
There are quite a few PCI leaders who agree with us and consider the Soviet
leaders a group of bandits."
On the other hand, there can be little consolation for Moscow in the
"affirmation" by Luigi Longo, General Secretary of the PCI, of the party's
fidelity to the Soviet Union. He chose the sacred anniversary of the October
revolution (7 November) for his speech which included the assertion: "The
PCT is not inspired by the regimes realized in the socialist countries but
fights for an 'Italian path' to socialism in keeping especially with the con-
ditions and possibilities of the Italian working classes and peasantry....
The party wants to create a socialist society endowed with democratic organi-
zations, neither centralist nor bureaucratic: a society which must not be-
come identified with one-party power" ... an unequivocal rejection of the
Soviet model.
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France -- While the Moscow-line French Communist Party backed away from
its original condemnation of Soviet policy on Czechoslovakia, Communist here-
tic Paul Noirot continues to discuss the Czech scene in critical terms in his
Politique Aujourd'huie Less than a year old, this unorthodox French Communist
periodical springs from the same roots as the Italian Il Manifesto. Both
freely and critically discuss international Communist policy questions with
which intellectuals have struggled more quietly for years. The editors have
also discussed such items as the Chinese Cultural Revolution with a notable
lack of polemics, which must be as disappointing to Moscow as it is to the
PCF. Editors Noirot and Guy Perrimond were expelled from the PCF for their
heresies within a few months of the magazine's appearance.
Austria -- On 29 October, the Central Committee of the Austrian Commu-
nist Party (KPOe) upheld the expulsion of its outspoken ideologist Ernst
Fischer (see our November report) after a strong attempt by liberal forces
to overturn the original Central Committee decision. Fischer, an outstanding
critic of the Soviet Czech policy -- among other things -- originated the
phrase "tank communism" (a reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia).
The final Central. Committee vote, 42-35, gave Moscow clear notice of the size
of the opposition forces. At the same time it reflected an earlier comment by
a liberal Central Committee member, Theodor Prager, on "a trend noticeable
throughout the world Communist movement toward giving the extreme conservative
elements in the Communist parties the upper hand." A further test of strength
between the orthodox and the progressive factions, which threatens a party
split, may occur during the Vienna provincial party congress late in November.
Coinciding with Fischer's expulsion was the appearance of a second issue
of Wiener Tagebuch (see the November "Communist Scene"), which is the Aus-
trian equivalent of Il Manifesto and Politique Aujourd'hui. Like its sister
periodicals, it publishes frank and revealing appraisals of the Soviet role
in the international movement. Coming as they do from long-time Communists,
they are an embarrassment to the Soviet Union and therefore to the regular
KPOe leadership, whose tenure depends on continuation of Soviet material sup-
port. (Attached, as a typical item, is "Report from Prague," sent anonymous-
ly from Czechoslovakia and published in Wiener Tagebuch.)
England -- The Czechoslovak crisis continues to agitate the British Com-
munist Party, as it met in regular Congress in mid-November. The party had
immediately denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and reit-
erated its condemnation at its current Congress -- but only after overcoming
considerable pressure from supporters of the Soviet action. Narrowly avoid-
ing a formal split, the Congress revealed the strength of the anti-Soviet op-
position in the 295 to 118 vote in favor of denouncing the invasion (see
attached New York Times account).
Switzerland -- Even the tiny Swiss party is shaken by dissent. Their
plaint? The familiar one -- the party is too subservient to Soviet positions
to suit many comrades. (See Le Monde, 9 October, attached.) A group of about
100 who have resigned or been expelled from the Swiss Labor Party (Communist)
are now considering establishing a new revolutionary organization.
2
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II. Mission to Moscow -- Czech Style
The Czechoslovak people learned on October 27th just what their top party
and government leaders were bringing back from Moscow after eight days touring
the Soviet Union and "negotiating" with Soviet leaders. The Czechoslovak of-
ficials brought back everything -- except what their economically troubled,
occupied, unhappy country needs. The Czechoslovaks learned that the Soviet
press had given the visit extraordinary coverage, that, Soviet leaders unstint-
ingly praised Party Secretary Husak and President Svoboda (Premier Cernik's
presence was simply acknowledged), and that Husak and company had returned the
compliments in full.
From the wordy Czech-Soviet communique the Czechs also learned that:
--Czechoslovakia will be increasingly dependent on the Soviet economy.
She desperately needs a hard currency loan to finance purchase of western
equipment for building up her export capability. Such loans had been made
to East Germany in 1953 and to Hungary in 1956 in similar circumstances, so
that many Czechoslovaks were optimistic. Instead, the USSR proposed a 10%
increase in their trade with Czechoslovakia -- a trade whose "unproductive
weight is already crippling the Czechoslovak economy," according to one for-
eign observer. The Czechoslovaks are to be assisted in "purchasing certain
goods which are at present in short supply in Czechoslovakia ... on foreign
markets." This vague wording, which seems to promise much, most probably
means that the Soviets will order on foreign markets whatever they want the
Czechs to have. "The Czechoslovak side has noted," Czechoslovak citizens
will be happy to learn, "that economic and scientific-technical cooperation
with the Soviet Union ... creates ... long term, stable preconditions for an
optimal development of the Czechoslovak national economy." (See Communique,
attached, pages 3, 4, 7.)
--Czechoslovakia will be subject to increasing Soviet political control.
The Czechs are supposed to believe the political purges of recent months,
culminating in demotion of the popular Alexander Dubcek, were performed for
their own good. Such Soviet-approved moves will allegedly "... strengthen
socialist social relations, improve socialist democracy, apply Marxist-Lenin-
ist principles in nationality policy...." (p.5). The Czechs also are supposed
to be convinced of the equality and mutual respect between the two countries
when they read of the "absolute unity of views ... on development of Czech-
Soviet relations" (p.2). Or, put another way, "... there will be an intensi-
fication of cooperation and friendship between units of the Czechoslovak
people's army and the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory
of Czechoslovakia." They will be assisted in developing this "unity of views"
by agreeing to "... deepen cooperation between state organs and social organ-
izations, and to develop friendly contacts among regions, towns and districts,
among collectives of Czechoslovak and Soviet enterprises, agricultural co-
operatives and institutions" (p.4).
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.--Czechoslovakia-can expect increased censorship and cultural repression.
The party has already closed down the more independent newspapers.and fired
prominent communications chiefs. Now the Czechoslovaks have learned that "An
especially important instrument of the party and of socialist power in'this
sharp class and ideological struggle is the mass media, whose duty is to fight
consistently for the' implementation of the party's line and to serve loyally
the working people and the cause of socialism. Experience shows that the in-
terests of socialism are seriously impeded by weak party direction of the mass
media" (p.9).
--Czechoslovakia will continue to 'be occupied by Soviet troops.
"...the Czechoslovak people have been clearly convinced of the importance
of safeguarding Czechoslovakia's western borders for the national existence
and state sovereignty. In this sense the treaty on the temporary stationing
of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia is of fundamental import-
ance" (p.6).
For all these blessings, Czech leaders' praises flowed like vodka. For
the Soviets, the crowning praise came from Husak: "The Czech delegation ap-
preciates the action of the five fraternal socialist countries in the critical
August days of 1968...."
Anti-Socialist Element
"...It is no accident that Husak before and after 1948
was raised on the shield of Slovak reactionaries nor that
during the anti-state demonstration in Bratislava in the
summer of 1948 the slogan was shouted: 'Long Live Husak!'
Today it is clearly proven that the activity of Clementis
and Husak was a matter of a conscious and organized crimi-
nal activity against socialism and against the unity of the
Party and Republic. It is therefore necessary to unmask
the anti-Soviet face of the Husak group, which consists of
full-fledged enemies of the Soviet people and their social-
ist order...." (Citation from the "Report of the Investi-
gation Commission of the Presidium of the Central Committee
on the Case of Sling, Smermova, Clementis, Husak and Other
Wreckers, Conspirators, and Bourgeois Nationalists.")
Concerning his being stamped as a bourgeois nationalist
and as an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet element, Dr. Husak
said repeatedly that he "had fallen into the clutches of a
fearful machine." Today he has set in motion a machine which
makes use of literally the same absurd accusations against
Communists as those under which he was condemned 18 years ago!
[Wiener;Tagebuch, No. 3/4, September-October 1969.1
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L'ESPRESSO, Rome
12 October 1969,
Gli eretici del "i a> I esto" e la
commissione di cerimura del Pc:
r OMA. 11 comunicato era breve, laconico, non
occupava pill ti tre centimetri di spazio sulla pri.
ma pagina deli"'Units" di sabato scorso, e soprat-
to centrale del partito per lunedi 13 ottobre. 11 pun-
o centrale sara svolto dal compagno Fernando Di
iulio: lotte delle masse lavoratrici, situazione eco-
omica e prospettive politiche ?. Normalissima am
anistrazione, dunque. Eppure, per i lettori pit'
sperti, per i pit attenti esegeti dei testi ufficiali di
is delle Botteghe Oscure, quel comunicato era a
hiave: it fatto che la re-'
azione del compagno
i Giulio vi venisse an-
unciata come "punto
ariamente indicare che
on sarebbe stata l'unico ar
omen to all'ordine del gior-
o; a it fatto che vi sareb-
ero stati altri argomenti in-
ominati, faceva automatica-
ente sospettare che uno di
uesti dovesse riguardare "Ii
Manifesto".
E' insomma da sabato 4
ttobre scorso che Rossana
ossanda, Lucto Magri, Aldo
atoli, Luigi Pintor, e tutti
11 altri firmatari delle "ere-
ie" ideologiche e politiche
istematicamente ospitate
y al mensile della nuova sini-
tra del PCI, possono con-
are le ore che li separano
al giorno del Gludizio. La
potesi che sia 11 comitato
entrale di lunedi prossimo
d affrontare e risolvere ii
roblema della loro attivita
ditoriale a un'ipotesi del
utto realistica. Troppi chia-
i segni Sono ormai nell'aria:
'ovedi 2 ottobre, 'sotto la
1 residenza del segretario
ella federazione di Bologna,
alletti, s'b riunita a Roma
la quinta commission del
comitato centrale ("proble-
mi dell'organizzazione della
vita del partito"); giovedl 9
ottobre a in programma la
seconda (nonche ultima) se-
duta della stessa commissio-
ne; e tutt'e due non hanno
altro scopo se non la raccol-
ta di materiale istruttorio
sul caso "Manifesto", desti-
nato appunto al comitato
centrale per permettergli di
forlnulare una sentenza. Ma
quale sara questa sentenza?
E' veramente difficile ri?
spondere. Tutta la storia,
breve eppure rumorosa, di
questo mensile a stata pre-
ceduta e accompagnata dal-
l'incertezza sul suo avvenire
e quello del suoi autori. Al-
i'inizio dell'estate, quando "II
Manifesto" c ancora in fase
di preparazione, non c'e dl-
rigente comunista che non
ne sconsigli decisamente la
uscita. Per qualcuno, legato:
ai1'idea d'un partito autorita.
rio a monolitico, la soli ipo-'
tesi d'un giornale non uflicia?
le r scandalosa; per qualcun
.
altro t% soprattutto it me
mento che b sbagliato: e
m,rsrn sin sail binno interno,
ca di Bufalini, si afferma so-,
lennemente 1'esistenza dun
a problema di compatibility
di scelta tra it proseguire la
iniziativa del "Manifesto" e.
i principii su cul si reggono
la vita del partito e la milizia
comunista ?, A questo punto
11 destino dei promotorl del-
la rivista sembra ormai se-
gnato: it problema viene of-.
fidato alla quinta commissio-
ne del comitato centrale; la
relazione Natta esce dal ri-
stretto ambito dei dirigenti
e viene pubblicata sul set-
timanale del partito.
T 1JTTAVIA, proprio nello
stesso momento, inizia una
fase che si pub chiamare in-
terlocutoria.' Se lo sbocco
verso una soluzion discipli-
nare appare inevitabile a an-
che evidente che vi si vuole
arrivare lentaxnente, quasi in
punta di pied'!, con la consa-
pevolezza del costi politici
d'un provvedimento d'espul-
sione (sia verso 1'interno, per
quello che riguarda le possi-
bili reazioni di molti militan-
ts, soprattutto di base, che
non considerano affatto in-
fondate alcune delle tesi cri-
tiche esposte su11e pagine
della rivista; sia verso l'e-
sterno, per quel che riguarda
it grado di credibility del
PCI nel momento in cut si
parla d'una futuxa unity or.
ganica di tutte le sinistre),
e con ]a segreta speranza
d'un ravvedimento in extre-
mis the permetta di mette-
re una pietra sull'intero ca-
so. St tratta duna speranza
molto fragile. La tendenz
ad accelerare la soluzion
del problerna in senso radi
tale (impersonata dalla d
stra Amendola-Pajetta, oltr
che dalla vecchia guardia sty
liniana) prevale sulla tenden?
za a rinviare (impersonata
dal gruppo Berlinguer-In.
grao) nello stesso momento
in cui alla fine di settembre
x ppare ne11e edicole ii quar-
to numero del "Manifesto",
dove l'aumento delle pagine
(e del prezzo) coincide con
I'aumento de11a produzione
eretica.
a Quale senso avrebbe I'in-
gresso del PLC nell'arva di
sistematicamente ospitate
dal mensile della nuova sini.
stra del PCI, possono con-
tare le ore che 11 separano
dal glorno del Giudizio. L L-
ipotesi che sia it comitato
centrale di lunedi prossimo
ad afrontare e risolvere F
problema della loro attivit
editoriale L un'ipotesi dcl
tutto realistica. Troppi chia-
ri segni sono ormal nell'aria:
giovedl 2 ottobre, sotto ia,
presidenza del segretario
della federazione di Bologna,
Galletti, se riunita a Roma
la quinta commissione del
comitato centrale ("proble.
ml dell'organizzazione della
vita del partito"); giovedl 9
ottabre a in programma la
seconda (nonches ultima) se-
duta della stessa commissio-
ne; e tutt'e due non hanno
altro scopo se non la raccol-
ta di materiale istruttorio
sul caso "Manifesto", desti-
nato appunto al comitato
centrale per permettergli di
formulare una sentenza. Ma
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quale sara quests sentenza?
E' veramente dif tcile ri-
spondere. Tutta la storia,
breve eppure rumorosa, di
questo mensile i stata pre-
ceduta e accompagnata dal-
l'incertezza sul suo avventre
.e quello des suol autori. Al-
1'inizio dcll'estat?, quendo 11
Manifesto" & ancora in fase
di preparazione, non c'8 di-
rigente comunista the non
ne sconsigli decisamente la
uscita. Per qualcuno, legato
all'idea dun partito autorita.
rio e monolitico, la sola ipo-
tesi dun giornale non ufilcia-
le b scandalosa; per qualcun
altro a soprattutto it ma
mento the a sbagliato: e
questo sia sul piano Interno,
idopo the l'ampio dibattito
svoltosl al 12. congresso del
i PCI. a Bologna ha fatto in-
jtravedere le premesse per
una nuova collocazione del
'partito nella vita politica ita-
liana; ? sia sul piano interna-
zionale, dove la polemica tra
it PCI e 11 gruppo dirigente
sovietico si va facendo ogni,
giorno pit( aperta.
A sono argomentazioni
V11 senza seguito per quel
drappello di esponenti co.
munisti (tra cui Aldo Na-
toli, Luigi Pintor, Massimo
Caprara, I ucio Magri) the
appunto at congresso dl
Bologna si sono sentiti
abbandonati da Ingrao c
hanno flnit.o per unit:si nlla
Rossanda di cut condivideva-
no I'atteggiamento critico net
confrontl della nuova Itnea
centrists dt'1 partito. Firma
to do Rossanit R.ossanda o
Luclo Magri come dlrttlorl,
it print() nunmro del "144ntti?
festo" esce dunque verso in.
fine dt giugno; so no tirnno
55 mils copie; se ne vendono'
40 mils. Not, scrivono in so-
stanza Magri e I suoi colla?
boratori, ppensiamo the ci cla
bleogno Warta nuova, a invi?
tiamo la base comunista a
una rivoluzione culturale
capace di mettere in discus-
sione anche it patrimonio fin
qui consolidato ?.
II primo a reagire a Paolo
Bufalini su "Rinascita", con
un violento articolo in cut
le test del "Manifesto" ven-
gono bollate di eresia e i lo?
ro propugnatori accusati di
"volonta frazionistica"; cioe
imputati dun delitto the net
codice del partito comunista
italiano prevede come pena
1'espulsione. Qualche setti-
mana dopo, verso la fine di
lugiio, c'e un duristimo In-
tervento di Alessandro Natta
in cui, riprer_dendo e svflup-
par.do 1'fnterpretazior.e
TUTTAVIA, proprio nello
,stesso momento, inizia una
fase the si pub chiamare in-
terlocutoria: Se lo sbocco
verso una soluzione discipli-
nare appare inevitabile is an
the evidente the vi si vuole
arrivare lentamente, quasi in
Punta di piedi, con la consa.
pevolezza del costi politici
d'un provvedimento d'espul-
stone (sia verso I'interno, per
quello the riguarda le possi-
bill reazioni di molts militan
L'ESPRESSO, Rome
1.2 October 1969
ti, soprattutto di base, the
non considerano afatto in-
fondate alcune Belle test cri-
tiche esposte sulle pagine
delta - rivista; sia verso l'e-
sterno, per quel the riguarda
it grado di eredibilith del
PCI nel momento in cut si
parla d'una future units or-
ganica di tutte le sinistre),
e con la segreta Speranza
d'un ravvedimento in extre-
mis the permetta di mette-
re una pietra sull'intero ca.
so. Si tratta d'una Speranza
molto fragile. La tendenza
ad accelerare Is, soluzione
del problema In senso radi-
cale (impersonata dalla de-
stra Amendola-Pajetta, oltre
the dalla vecchia guardia sta-
liniana) prevale sulla tenden.
za a rinviare . (impersonata
dal gruppo Berlinguer-In-
grao) nello stesso momento
in cui alla fine di settembre
appare nelle edicole 11 quar.
to numero del "Manifesto",
dove l'aumento delle pagine
(e del prezzo) coincide con
l'aumento delta produzione
eretica.
a Quale senso avrebbe I'in.
gresso del PCI nell'area di
governo )), si chiede ad esem-
plo Aldo Natoli In ono scrit-
to the prende spunto dai due
famosi articoli di Giorgio
Amendola sull"'Units", a se
non quello della degradazio-
ne e della seonfitta storica?n.
E. mentre poche- pagine pri-
ma in un editoriale intitola-
to "Praga a sola" si pub leg.
;gere the 1errore politico
commesso dai gruppi dirt-
genti sovietici in Cecoslovac-
chia a cost grave the it non
e plat possibile puntare su
una Toro autocorrezione: si
e costretti a puntare sulla la
ro sconfitta e la loro sosti-
tuzione da pnrte di tin nun-
vo blocco di forzo dire{.to
dttllit etlasae+ eipeiraia.,. o, pi)
the pagine pill nvanti c't' 'sin
lungo saggio critico (di L'u-
cto Magri e Filippo Mnono)
su11'orgnnizznzione conninl?
sta to cui sl ridiscutonn it
('1)n('t'tto stess) dl 111t1-tlt(1,
I erittnil dl i;rvlton(~, 1 rnirylor
It colt It, rtuts$e, In sek'r.ttlnr
des dirigenti. In scelt.n driln
linea, e cost via.
((E' questo the ha dato
soprattutto fastidio alle Bot-
teghe Oscure a, dice oggi Lu-
cio Magri; ((it discorso sul
partito (o almeno ii modo
come l'abbiamo posto) e, su-
bite dopo, la nostra richiesta
esplicita d'una politica the.
tenda a rovesciare it gruppo
dirigente sovietico. Certo non
sono pochi anche tra i lea-
der del PCI quelli the Sono
d'accordo con not e conside-
rano I dirigenti sovietici ur
gruppo di banditi. Ma 1'af?
fermarlo ad alta voce gli
crea del gravissimi imbaraz-
zi diplomatici; senza contare
the 1'idea the si pub essere
antisovietici da sinistra, e
non da posizioni socialdemo-
cratiche, a ancora lortana
dzl. poser essere comp.-esa p.
CARLO GREGORETTI
Let's Talk About the Funeral Pyre
The comtliunique was brief, laconic and hardly occupied.
more than 3 centimeters of space on last Seturdayts issue
of 1 'Uni La. But, above all, it contained nothing
special: "The Directorate," it read, "has decided to con-
voke the party CC on Monday, 13 October. The main subject
will be discussed by Comrade Fernando Di Giulio: the work-'
Ing masses' struggle, economic situation, and political
outlook." Yet, for the more experienced readers, for the
more attentive exegetes of official documents issued from
Central Committee headquarters, this communique was like a
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lcey. The fact that Comrade Di Giulio's report was announced
as the "central theme" necessarily showed.that it would not
be the only subject on the agenda of the day. And the fact
that there were other, unannounced subjects immediately
made one suspect that 11 Manifesto -was - to 'be one of these subjects.
At any rate, since the Saturday of. ti. October Rossana
Rossanda, 'Luoio Magri, Aldo Natoli,, -Luigi Pintor, and all
the other signatories to the ideological and political here-
sies found in the monthly of the PCI's new left have been
counting the hours that separate them from judgement day.
The hypothesis that it will be next Monday's CC meeting to
tackle and solve the problem of their editorial activity
is most realistic, Attesting to this are extraordinarily
clear signs: Thursday, 2 October, a meeting of the CC4s
censorship commission, chaired by the secretary of the
Bologna-Federation, Galletti, was held in Rome (to discuss
"Problems of. the Organizational Life, of the Party) . That*s-
day,, 9 (DOtober, the second (as well as the last) session
of this commission is scheduled, And both sessions have
no other purpose than to collect material pertinent to 21
Manifesto case and prepare It for the CC, no that it can
1 sentence. What will this sentence be?
This is s difficult question to answer. The entire
history, short but noisy, of this monthly was preceded by
and accompanied with uncertainty relative to its future and
that of its authors, At the beginning of summer, when T1
Manifesto was still in the preparatory phase, there was not
a comnnxn st leader who did not decisively counsel against
its publication. For those tied to the idea of an authori-
tarian and monolithic party, the very hypothesis of a non-
official newspaper is scandalous. For others, only the
timing of its publication is wrong -- from both the domestic
and the international points of view. In the former case
the broad debate at the 12th PCI' Congress trade some members
glimpse the premises for a new disposition of party forces
in Italian political 11Th, while in the latter case the
polemics between the PCT and the Soviet leadership are be--
coming ever-increasingly open.
This is the evidence in the appealless case against
that group of communists (including Aldo Natoli, Luigi
Pintos, Massimo Caprara, Lucio Magri) who felt themselves
abandoned by Ingrao at the Bologna Congress and wound up
joining Rossanda, with whom they shared a critical atti-
tude toward the party's centrist line. Signed by Rossana
Rossanda and Lucio Magri in their capacities as directors,
the first issue-of 11 Manifesto came out toward the end of
June; tj.O,000 of the ` ,b pu7Tished copies were sold. We
think, Magri and his collaborators wrote in substance, that
new ventilation is required in the party: P"we invite the .
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rank-and-file communists to effect a cultural revolution
capable of even putting into question all the hitherto con-
solidated patrimony."
The first to react was Paolo Bufalini. In a violent
article in Rinascita (Rebirth), he labeled the monthlyts
theses as heres es and accused their proponents of "splitist
activity"; i.e., they were accused of an offence whose penal-
ty in the P0116 criminal code entails expulsion from the
party. Several weeks later, toward the end of July, Ales-
sandro Natta delivered a hard-line report in which he, em-
phasizing and developing Bufalinits critical enterpretation,
solemnly affirmed the existence of a "compatibility problem
between the initiative made by I Manifesto and the prinoi-
plea governing party life and the, me ere p." At this
point it seemed that the fate of the monthlyts promoters
had finally been sealed. The case was turned over to the
CC's censorship commission. Nattats report, which had
been delivered to a limited group -- the leadership -- was
then published in the party's weekly.
Nevertheless, at the same time a new phase was initiate8,,
a phase that can be called interlocutory, While a disciplin-
ary solution seems inevitable, it also seems evident that
the leadership wants to effect this solution slowly, almost
at a snail's pace, for it is fully aware of the political
costs of expulsion (both on the intraparty level, where there
could be reactions by many activists, primarily rank-and-
file members who in fact do not consider unsubstantiated
some theses presented on the monthly's pages; and on the
interparty level, where the PCI could create a credibility
gap precisely when there is talk about an organic unity of
all leftist forces). The leadership is also preceding slow-
ly because it harbors the secret hope of having the heretics
repent in extremis, thereby enabling the whole case to be
closed. This is a very fragile hope. The trend to accelerate
the solution of the problem in a radical sense (sought by the
Amendola and Pajetta right wing, as well as the old Stalin-
ist guard) is prevailing over the trend to postpone a solution
(sought by the Berlinguer and Ingrao group) at the time (at
the end of September of the appearance of the fourth issue
of I1 Manifesto at t e newstannds, where the increase in the
ium e'6rr o pages (and the price) coincides with.the? increase
in the output of heresies.
"Would the PCIts participation in government have any
other significance than that of degradation and historical
defeat.?" So wrote, for example, Aldo Natali in aii article
that takes its point of departure from 2 famous Amendola
articles in 1'Unita. An editorial entitled "Prague'Is Alone"
in the same issue states that the political mistake comnited
by the Soviet leadership group in Czechoslovakia is so serious.
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that "there is no longer any possibility of counting on their
self-correction: we are forced to count on their defeat and
replacement by a new bloc of forces directed by the working
class...." Subsequently, there is a critical article (by
Lucio Magri and Filippo Maone) on communist organization.
Discussed here are the very, conception of the party, leader-
ship' ariboria, tieo with the maases, the aeloction of leaders
and the party line, etc.
"This is what, above''ali, has bothered Central Committee
headquarters," Luigi Magri says today. "This is,the discussion
on the party (or at least the way we discussed it) and,
immediately after, our explicit request for a policy dir-,
ected at overthrowing the Soviet leadership group. There
is no denying that there.are quite a few PCI leaders who
agree with us and consider the Soviet leaders a group of
bandits. But to affirm this out loud would create the.
most serious diplomatic embarrassments. Moreover, the
acceptance of the idea of criticizing the Soviets from
leftist and not sooial-demooratio,positions is still
remote,
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 ~aga. e sofa
Il PCI e it governo
artito e chase
I ? movimenti di lotto.
[1 satellite della Luna
Dopo un anno di occupazione militare la situa
zione cecoslovacca non lascia piu margin a com
promessi. e impone nuove scelte al movimento
operaio occidentale.
Una nola di Aldp Natoli sulla proposta di par
tecipazione comunista all'area governativa, e. un'
articolo di Valentino Parlato sulle prospettive'
economiche.
Corrispondenza dall'Italsider.
Conversazione con J. P. Sartre sul rapporto tra
spontaneity a coscienza, con una introduzione di
Rpssana Rossanda.
Uno scritto di Luigi Pintor sul ? partito nuovo
Materiali per una discusione sull'organizzazione`
comunista.
Articoli di Pino Ferraris sully Iotta alla Fiat es
di Claudio Lombardi sui techici e i contratti.
Marcello Cini riprende it dibattito sulla gara spay;
ziale, frutto dell'uso capitalistico della scienza
e specchio di una civilt& deforme.
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IL MANIFESTO, Rome
i} September 1969
CPYRGHT
Un an no dopo
PR
La Cecoslovacchia non suscita piu vera emozione.
Qualche grosso titolo nei quotidiani e le sonanti di-
chiarazioni del leaders non bastano a nascondere l'ac-
cettazione dello stato di fatto. Ognurno tira 1'acqua al
suo mulino, cercando di trarre it maggior vantaggio
o it minor danno possibile da quanto succede a Praga,
senza sentirsi obbligato a pensare o ad agire.
Vale per tutte le forze politiche, compresa la sini
stra. Da anni esse condividono 1'ipotesi di una gra-'
dual.e ma effettiva evoluzione in senso < democrati-
co >> della society sovietica e degli altri socialismi
europel, sotto la pressione dello sviluppo produttivo
e per, opera dei gruppi dirigenti. Nessuno si attende
grandi rotture, in un senso o nell'altro. E' una con-
vinzione che risale al 1956. La denuncia dello stali-
nismo, fu interpretata dai comunisti come la prova
migliore che it sistema socialista era in grado di'
riformarsi da se, dai socialdemocratici come l'inizio
di un riavvicinamento fra i due sistemi, del comune
orizzonte < del socialismo e della liberty >>. I succes-
si dell'URSS negli anni immediatamente seguenti al.
XX Congresso sostennero le immutate certezze del
primi e spinsero i secondi a preferire la prospettiva
dell'accordo a quella del >.
Da allora molta acqua a passata sotto i ponti: le diffi-
colty erescenti del movimento antimperialista, la rot-
tura tra Cina e Unione Sovietica, la crisi del riformi-
smo in Occidente, le difficolty economiche e i riflussi
autoritari nel campo socialista europeo. Si comincib
a - pensare che it processo di sviluppo di queste so'
iety sarebbe stato meno rapido e lineare di. quanto
el 1956 si era sperato. Togliatti, che meno di ogni
ltro -si era abbandonato all'euforia del XX Congresso,
it primo a riconoscere la possibility di ' arretra-
enti e lacerazioni, ma sempre nel quadro di una,
nea di tendenza positiva. La formula della fu dedotta da questa convinzione.
Alla quale iI < nuovo corso ? cecoslovacco portb, nel
1968, un innegabile conforto. E vero che. esso costi
iva una nuova drammatica denuncia del passato,
rmai a dodici anni dal XX Congresso e dun ue ettava
11J9 SOLA
un'ombra di clubbio sui progressi nel frattempo com-
piuti. Ed e vero che esso esprimeva forze contraddi-
torie, spinte centrifughe e dunque poteva comportare
it pericolo di un cedimento all'Occidente. Ma si trat-
tava, ancora una volta, di un rinnovamento promosso
del comunisti, diretto dal loco gruppo dirigente. Pa-
reva quindi testimoniare, the in quel partito e in
quel paese, nonostante gli errori, esisteva una ricchezza
di uomini e idee tale da garantire una continua corre-
zione del processo di rinnovamento. E infatti, nel giro
di pochi mesi, la partecipazione operaia e popolare
stava sostituendo all'egemonia tecnocratica, e terzafor-
zista degli esordi del una ispirazione
diversa e ben piu ricca.
L'intervento militate dell'agosto 1968 fu un brusco
risveglio. Non solo per la gravity dell'errore di cui it
gruppo dirigente sovietico si rivelava capace, non solo
per la conferma del vincoli che 1'equilibrio fra le grandi
potenze impone Salle forze progressive, non solo per-
che tradiva it peso ancora determinante degli schemi
passati; ma sopratutto perche' era prova di una debolez-
za interna cost grave del paesi del Patto di Varsavia,
da spingere i gruppi dirigenti a pagare qualsiasi prezzo
pur di tagliar corto con 1'esperimento cecoslovacco. Si
spero, in quei giorni, che affiorasse al vertici dell'URSS
una discussione, una divisione die permettesse di in,
travedere un ricambio. Questo se,fino non venne.
Restavano la fierezza, la misura, it carattere < socia
lista >> dells resistenza di Praga: vi si pot6 vedere anco
ra, nei primi mesi dopo l'occupazione, 1'espressione di
una potenzialita politica, di una. maturity sociale chc
it partito o una parte di esso avrebbe ancora potuto.
a un certo punto, raceogliere; 1'esistenza insomnia di
una Linea, per it momento perdente ma che, allentata
la pressione sovietica, avrebbe potuto prendere la ri-
vincita. Quando i comunisti italiani condannarono 1'in-
tervento sovietico senza aprire un fronte di discussione
radicale con gli orientamenti dell'attuale gruppo diri-
gente dell'URSS e del paesi del Patto di Varsavia, pun-
tavano ancora, con qualche ragione, su questa carta
residua.
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CPYRGHT
Fine del tt nuovo torso
E 1969 obbliga ormai ad una riconsiderazione. Cib the
colpisce negli avvenimenti cecoslovacchi dopo aprile e
la definitiva liquidazione delle forze the avevano dato
vita al ? a nuovo torso *. Se continua una ressstenza
nelle masse, essa appare, perb, priva di una espressione
o prospettiva politica. Deludendo it calcolo dei reali-
sti, Gustav Husak si a rivelato la pib irrealistica delle
soluzioni: dietro di lui non c'e the it vuoto, egli non.
rappresenta the la copertura d'una ripresa delle forze
burocratiche. I leaders del nuovo corso restano, nella
migliore delle ipotesi, dei simboli; non piu esponenti
di una forza o di una linea. La resistenza di base, di-
sperata quanto tenace, obbliga ai tempi lunghi, alla
espressione negativa, come passivity e sabotaggio, pub
funir col perdere ii suo carattere socialista. Che si pub
ragionevolmente attendere dal domani, se non the sia
piu grave dell'oggi?
Non si tratta di passare da un acritico ottimismo ad
un pessimismo catastrofico. Ma le forze the si vogliono;
rivoluzionarie in Occidente. sono costrette a fare i conti
con la realty, a determinarsi di fronte a quel the avvie-
ne nei paesi socialisti europei, a indicate quale via
d'uscita sembra loro auspicabile. I gruppi capitalists;
e imperialisti hanno dal canto loro compiuto la pro-
pria'scelta: non tirare la corda, tentar di inserirsi con
prudenza nella crisi,in atto, puntare sulla secessione
romena piu the sulla resistenza cecoslovacca, senza
perdere di vista it punto fondamentale, cioe l'accordo
con 1'attuale gruppo dirigente sovietico. Non si pre-
figgono piu di rovesciare i regimi socialisti, ma di con-
dizionarli e spingerli a condividere una politics di sta-
bilizzazione mondiale.
Ma le forze di sinistra? I comunisti? Nessuno meglio
di noi, the per cinquant'anni abbiamo visto, giusta-
mente, nell'URSS la garanzia della rivoluzione mon-
diale, pub valutare la gravity del vuoto derivante da
una crisi crescente del campo socialists europeo. E
proprio nella misura in cui rifiutiamo lo schema sem-
plicistico, the vede compiuta in URSS una restaura=
zione capitalistica, siamo tenuti a chiarire su quali
.
ipotesi puntiamo, a quali forze. ci riferiamo nei ' mo-
mento in cui diviene evidente the gli attuali equilibri
politici e sociali non sono in grado di garantire a quei
paesi una evoluzione positiva. .
Due alternative
Un punto sembra assodato: l'inconsistenza dell'alter-
nativa tecnocratica, con la sua propaggine dell'oppo L:
zione intellettuale. Sono, queste, furze troppo debo s,
troppo legate ai propri privilegi, troppo subalterne al a
ideologia capitalista per dirigere un blotto di for e
progressive.. Cercano, a talvolta trovano, l'adesione d -
la massy sul terreno d'una spinta ai consurni, me so
destinate a rompere con essa sull'organizzazione d I
lavoro e della democrazia. E a questo punto, a ria
nodare un compromesso con la burocrazia, a sua vol a
instabile, in una spirale the vede 1'elemento auto -
tario intrecciarsi sempre psi strettamente all'ideolog
produttivistica. Non i3 una logics analoga, d'altrond
the in occidente ha portato al f allimento delle ill -
sioni riformiste?
Una opposta alternativa si era abbozzata proprio ne -
I'esperienza cecoslovacca: quella fondata sugli oper i
e Pala progressiva, radicale degli intelletuali. Di q ti
era venuto quell'esplodere di una . partecipazione e
una maturity delle masse, una loro naturale ostilita
privilegio, una inattesa capacity di rielaborazione ide
le e di autorganizzazione. Se mai al < nuovo corso
fosse stato dato di procedere, sarebbe riaffiorata
suo interno una dialettica avanzata di classe; quell
esplosione di democrazia, di bisogno di potere, di ri
flessione , su se stessi e sui propri fini non sareb
stata riconducibile net quadro angusto di un sociali
smo tecnocratico. Essa esigeva un tipo diverso di svi
luppo, in cui partecipazione e uguaglianza fossero I
molla del progresso tecnico-produttivo. Questo en
l'elemento comune the al di ly di evidenti difformit'
derivate dalla totalmente diversa condizione storica
poteva unite la primavera di Praga con i principi dell
rivoluzione culturale in Cina: due modi di resistenza,
due forme di contestazione - certo parziali, ma straor-
dinariamente ricche - rivolte contro la stabilizzazione
degli equilibri mondiali, contro i privilegi sociali e po-
litici, fondate sulla mobilitazione e l'iniziativa di massa.
Ma non bisogna fare le cose piu semplici di quanto
non siano; scambiare una potenziality con una realty.
L'alternativa di cui parliamo, nelle society -socialiste
europee a tutt'altro the a portata? di mano. Non solo
perch soffocata, ma perche le sue radici oggettive
sono ancora deboli, debole l'impalcatura teorica di
cui pub disporre, assente . un punto di riferimento
internazionale. La classe operaia di questi paesi espri-
me, ad esempio, una collocazione ancora contradditto-
ria: pressata da bisogni elementari e consapevole delta
possibility di soddisfarli, essa resta profondamente
sensibile alle. suggestion di un migliore' tenore di vita;
ni intende, giustamente, rinunciare alle conquiste strap-
pate sul. terreno della piena occupazione e della orga-
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nizzazione del lavoro. Sul piano politico, diffida della
fraseologia* rivoluzionaria, dall'egualitarismo demagogi-
c che troppe volte sono serviti a coprire it privilegio
e it sopruso. Pcnsare che da essa possa nascere quasi
spontaneamente, e in condizioni di clandestinita effet
`tiva, un nuovo discorso rivoluzionaria, come a avve-
nuto nella rivoluzione culturale cinese, a pan assurdo,
Minca un < penskero cli Mao >> non solo perche manta
chi dall'alto promuova un tanto radicale processo di
rottura, ma perche mancano le condizioni di una ana-
loga proposta politica. Per fare un esemplo, lo sche-
ma, carp a tanti estremisti. di casa nostra, che iden-
tifica liberty di espressione e restaurazione del ca-
pitalismo (quasi che it socialismo senza censura e
senza processi diventasse d'un rosso piu sbiadito) basta
a liquidare ogni possibility di discorso con le forze
rivoluzionaria di un paese come la Cecoslovacchia. E
cost gli schem.i di un anticonsumismo semplificato o
di ugualitarismo ascetico. 11 vero problems di queste
society, ormai a un certo grado di sviluppo, a to stesso
su cui dobbiamo misurarci noi in Occidente: un di-
scorso radicale sull'uguaglianza, la democrazia diretta,
it superamento dell'individualismo e del lavoro alie-
nato, la critica alla scienza e ally tecnica borghesi, ma
in forme adeguate a society ormai articolate, complesse,
ricche di individuality; in grado di impiegare nel pro-
esso di emancipazione dell'uomb tutto it patrimonio
di conoscenze e di capacity accumulato in secoli di
sviluppo. Il problenza a lo stesso: difficile per noi,
ancora piu difficile per i paesi dell'Est europeo.
Ma una volta che ci sia chiaro the l'attesa d'uno spon-
taneo, e pur lento, matusare di una alternativa positiva
il'interno del campo socialists e destinata a naufra-
are come sono naufragate le speranza di una evolu-
ione aflidata ai gruppi dirigente usciti dal XX Con-
resso, o al crescere dell'opposizione tecnocratica; una
olta persuasi che, affidate al loro corso naturale, le
ose non possono che peggiorare, it proletariato euro-
eo non puo piu esimersi dalla responsabilita di aiu-
are esplicitamente la formazione di una alternativa di
inistra, rivoluzionaria, all'interno del campo sociali-
ta, prima che quanto vi resta di opposizione degeneri
una linea di destra. Giy e una lotta contro it tem-
o: le accoglienze fatte a Nixon in Romania dovreb-
ero suonare ormai come un campanello d'allarme.
una responsability d'altra parte che tocca al proleta-
iato occidentale, perche e it solo, forse, in condizioni
elaborare e di realizzare un modello di socialismo in
i si compongano le 'antinomie contro cui obbliga-
oriamente finiscono con lo scontrarsi le forze rivolu-
ionarie degli altri settori del mondo. La nostra soli-
arietA contro l'intervento militare appare,quindi, non
iu the una premessa, e non a caso suona _sempre piu
formale, ripetitiva, meno convinta. Tanto piu che quan-
do la solidarieta non a piu rivolta al partito comuni-
,sta di un paese invaso ma a masse che protestano in
piazza contro le forze di occupazione e contro it loro
stesso governo, essa cambia di natura, deve poggiare
su di un terreno piu solido, oppure, nella pratica, si
stempera. Da solidarieta diventa :< preoccupazione
da > pub diventare ? neutrality >>. Si
tratta di misurare l'internazional:isrno su un terreno
molto piu avanzato e difficile.
Per la resistenza
Il primo punto e l'assunzione di una presa di posi-
zione netta di fronte alle scelte politiche dei gruppi
dirigente dell'URSS e degli altri paesi socialisti euro-
pei. Non e' piu possibile puntare su una loro autocor-
rezione; si e costretti a puntare sulfa loro ?sconfitta
e la loro sostituzione, per iniziativa e da parte di un
nuovo blocco di forze sociali diretto dalla classe ope-
raia, un rilancio socialista che investa le strutture poli-
tiche e sia capace di esprimere realmente le potenzia-
lith immense uscite dalla Rivoluzione d'ottobre. I cauti
condizionamenti dall'esterno, le critiche generiche che
non individuano esplicitamente obiettivi, responsabi-
l.ita, gruppi dirigenti, non rappresentano ormai che
segmenti di un < realismo > sempre piu somigliante al-
l'omerty, che avalla gli stati di fatto e scoraggia sul
nascere ogni forza di opposizione. Finche la resistenza
cecoslovacca si trovery di fronte -- nel campo inter-
nazionale -- all'altcrnativa fra le simpatie degli anti-
comunisti e le prudenziali realis.tiche coperture all'at-
tuale gruppo dirigente, non le resters che l'isolamentc,
e it ripiegamento su se stessa.
Ma anche questo e un punto preliminare. Il proleta-
riato occidentale ha un solo modo per diventare u
punto di riferimento mondiale, un momento di inte!
nazionalismo attivo ed efficace: quello di portare avant.
la sua rivoluzione; essere in grado di proporre un model
to di socialismo diverso, perche lo sta realizzando. 11 cli-
scorso sulla Cecoslovacchia ci riporta cost all'Italia.
Con una nuova consapevolezza, e cioe die se la cris'
oggi aperta in Occidcnte si dovesse ancora una volts
chiudere con una sconfitta o un nulla di fatto, do
vremmo 'scontare un arretramento grave su tutto it
fronte rivoluzionario internazionale. Vi e una perfetta
coerenza fra chi perdona la politica di Brerhnev e chi
sollecita da noi una linea di compromesso. Sc in Occi-
dente i comunisti si inseriscono non c'e da attendersi
che un congelamento conservators nelle society socia-
lists. Sarebbe l'internazi~onalizzazione della rinuncia.
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TO, Rome
er 1969
Prague Is Alone
Czechoslovakia no longer excites true feelings. An occasional big
headline in the daily newspapers and ringing declarations of leaders can't
hide the acceptance of the status quo. Everyone aieeks his own benefit by
,trying to gain the greatest advantage or the least damage from what. happens
at Prague without feeling obliged to think or act.
This is true of all political forces, including the left. For
years, they have shared the hypothesis of a gradual but effective evolution
of Soviot society and other European socialisms in a "democratic" direction
under the pressure of productive development and through the efforts of
leadership groups. No one expects important ruptures, one way or the
other. This conviction goes back to 1956. The denunciation of Stalinism
was interpreted by the communists as the best proof that the socialist
system could reform itself; by the socialdemocrats as the beginning of a
rapprochement between the two systems; as a common horizon "of socialism
and freedom." The USSR. successes in the years immediately after the 20th
Congress sustained the unchanged convictions of the former and led the
latter to prefer the prospect of an agreement to that of a "roll back."
Much water has passed under the bridge since then: the increasing
!difficulties in the anti-imperialist movement, the break between China and
,the Soviet Union, the reformist crisis in the West, the economic difficulties`
and authoritarian flare-ups in the European socialist camp. Some began to
think that the process of development in these societies would be slower
and less linear than had been hoped in 1956. Togliatti, who was less
enthusiastic than anyone else about the 20th Congress, was the first to
,recognize the possibility of retreat and damage, but always within the
.framework of a line based on a positive tendency. The "unity in diversity"
formula was deduced from that conviction. And in 1968, the Czechoslovak
"new course" gave it undeniable comfort. It is true that it constituted a
now dramatic denunciation of the past 12 years after the 12th Congress and
therefore threw a shadow of doubt over the progress made in the meantime.
And it is true that it expressed contradictory forces, centrifugal thrusts,
and therefore could carry with it the danger of yielding to the West. But,
once again, it was a matter of a renewal promoted by the communists directed
by their leadership group. It seomed therefore to be evident that in that
party and in that country, despite errors, there existed a wealth of men
.and ideas such as to guarantee a continuous correction of the process of
,renewal. And in fact, within a few months, the participation of the
.workers and the people was replacing the technocratic and third force
hegemony with the beginning of the "new course," an inspiration which was
quite different and far richer.
The military intervention of August 1968 was a rude awakening. This.
was so not only because of the seriousness of the error the Soviet leader-
ship group showed itself capable of; not only because of the confirmation
of the hold which the power balance among great powers imposes on progress-
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 CPYRGHT
L; 1A
Rrg*qQ 19Tt %. c If t be hayed the still determining waight of
past plans; hut also because it was proof of such a serious internal
aa,cng the 'W'arsaw fan w 3 ~ G that it e ers tl o " "+.: i -.
any price to cut short the Czechoslovak experiment. In those days, it was
hoped that at the USSR summit there would develop a discussion, a division,.
!that would permit the possibility of a change. No sign ever came.
What remained was the pride, the extent "
of the ? ~r. pi , the "socialist" character,
o ague :resistance; there still could be soon, after tho first months
of, the occupation, the expression of a political potential, of a social
maturity which the party, or a part of it, could still at a certain point
,have counted upon; the existence, that is, of a line which temporarily was
on the losing side but which could have won out if Soviet pressure had
Jboen relieved. When Italian communists condemned the Soviet intervention
1w11i thout opening a front of radical discussion concerning the orientation
of the present leadership group of the USSR and of the Warsaw pact nations,
they still, with some reason, counted on this remaining card.
The End of the "Now Course"
The year 1969 forces a reassessment upon us. What Ss striking in the
Czechoslovak events after April is the definitive liquidation of the forces
which had given life to the "now course." However, if a resistance of the
masses continues, it appears to lack expression or a political future.
Disappointing the calculations of the realists, Gustav Husak showed himself
to be the least realistic of solutions: behind him there is nothing but a
void. He does not represent anything but a surreptitious resumption of
bureaucratic forces. The leaders of the new course remain, under the best
of circumstances, symbols; no longer are they exponents of power or of a
line. A resistance at the base, as desperate as it is tenacious, imposes
long term considerations; negative expression (such as passive resistance
and sabotage) could end up by losing its socialist character. What can we
reasonably expect tomorrow except that it will be more serious than today?
It is not a matter of passing from a position of non-critical
ptimism to catastrophic pessimism. But the forces which can be expected
o be revolutionary in the West are forced to reckon with reality, to
evolop in terms of what happens in the European socialist countries, to
ndicate what outlet they can hope for. The capitalist and imperialist
roups have made their own choice: not to keep a tight rein; to try to
.ntervene prudently in the crisis; to count on the Romanian secession
ather than on Czechoslovak resistance without losing sight of the funda_
ental point, that is, agreement with the present Soviet leadership group.
hey no longer count upon overturning the socialist regimes, but to con..
ition them and channel them into sharing a policy of world stability.
But what about the leftist forces? The Communists? No one better
han we, who for 50 years and with good reason have considered the USSR
he guarantee of world revolution, can assess the seriousness of the void
erging from a growing crisis in the European socialist camp. And it is
precisely to the extent that we reject the simplistic view, which considers
at the USSR has completed a process of capitalist restoration, that we
A -e obliged to clarify our hypotheses what forces we count upon when it
his become evident that present political and social balances are not
a le to guarantee those nations a,positive evolution.
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Iwo Alternatives
one point seems settled: the inconsistency of the technocratic
alternative and its offspring in the intellectual opposition. These-forces
am too weak, too closely tied to their own privileges, too submissive to
c:xpitnli ,t idoology to di roct a bloc of progros sive forces. They nook,
and sometimes find, support among the masses on the terrain of a thrust in
terms of consumer economics, but they are destined to break with it on the
level of labor and democracy. And at this point, it seeks to make a
compromise with bureaucracy -- which in turn is unstable -- in it spiral
which sees the authoritarian element become increasingly tied to the
ideology of productivity. In the final analysis, is it not analogous to
the logic which led to the failurecf reformist solutions in the West?
An opposite alternative had been proposed in the Czechoslovak
'experience itself: that based on the workers and the progressive, radical.
Ling of the intellectuals. From this came the explosion of participation
and mass maturity, a natural hostility to privilege, and an unexpected
capacity for redevelopment of ideas and for self-organization. If the "new
course" had been given the possibility of developing, there would have
grown within it an advanced class dialectic; that explosion of democracy,
of need for power, of self-examination and of its particular aims, could
not have been channeled once again into the painful framework of techno-
cratic socialism. It demanded a different type of development in which
participation and equality were the springs for technical-productive
progress. This was the common element, which, beyond evident deformities
deriving from the totally different historical condition, could unite the
Prague spring with the principles of the cultural revolution in China:
two kinds of resistance, two forms of contestation -- certainly partial
but extraordinarily promising -- aimed against the stabilization of world
balances of power, against political and social privilege, and founded on
mass mobilization and initiative. But we must not make things simpler
than they are; exchange possibilities with reality. The alternative of
which we speak in the European socialist societies is far from being
immediately accessible. Not only because it is suffocated, but because
its objective roots are still weak, because of its theoretical shoring
wwhich lacks a point of international reference. The working class of these
nations expresses, for example, a position which is still contradictory:
pressed by elementary needs and aware of the possibility of satisfying
them, it continues to be profoundly sensitive to suggestions concerning a
better way of life; not does it intend, correctly, to give up the gains
made on the terrain of full employment and.labor organization. On the
political plane, it does not trust revolutionary phraseology and demagogic
egalitarianism which too often have served to mask privilege and exploita-
tion. To believe that from it can spring, almost spontaneously and in
effective conditions of secrecy, a new revolutionary dialogue as happened
in the Chinese cultural revolution, is absurd. A"Maots Thought" is
lacking not only because there is no person who promotes such A ,radical
process of rupture from above, but because the conditions for such a
political possibility are lacking. For example, the plan, which is geared
to many extremists in our country, that identifies freedom of expression
and restoration of capitalism (almost as though socialism without censor-
ship and without trials could become a more faded red) is sufficient to
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~ijiJ1~ !f
 CPYRGHT
wipe out any possibility of dialogue with the revolutionary forces of a
nation such as Czechoslovakia. And the same holds true for projects
involving a simplified anti-consumerism, or ascetic egalitarianism. The
t.run problem of these societies, which have reached a certain stage of
development, is the some as that which we in the West must use as a yard-
stick. a radical dialogue concerning equality, direct democracy, over-
coming individualism and alienated labor, criticism of bourgeois science
and technology, But this must be done in ways which are adequate to
societies that are articulated, complex, rich in individuality, and able
to employ in the process of mants emancipation all the patrimony of
knowledge and ability accinnulated in centuries of development. The problem
its the same; it is difficult for us, still more difficult for the east
European nations.
But once it is clear to us that the expectation of a spontaneous,
oven if slow, maturation of a positive alternative within the socialist
camp is destined to fail (as the hopes of an evolution placed in the hands
of the leadership groups which emerged from the 20th Congress, or the
growth of a technocratic socialism failed); once we are persuaded that
when things are left to their natural course they cannot fail to worsen,
the European proletariat cannot deny itself the responsibility of expressly
jailing the formation of a leftist, revolutionary alternative within the
socialist camp, before what is left of the opposition degenerates into a
\rightist line. It is already a race against time: the'recaption extended
to Nixon in Romania should sound an alarm. On the other hand it is a
(responsibility which falls on the western proletariat because it is the
only one, perhaps, which is able to develop and realize a socialist model
yin which there can be a reconciliation of the self-contradictions against
which the revolutionary forces of other sectors of the world necessarily
founder. Our solidarity against the military intervention appears therefore,
as nothing more than a promise, and it is not by chance that it seems
increasingly formal., repetitive, less convincing. So much so that when
solidarity is no lonr,,er directed toward the communist party of an invaded
nation, but to the masses which protest in the .squares against the occupa-
ition force and against their own government, its nature changes, It must
'ho based on a more solid terrain, otherwise in practice it loses its
strength. From solidarity it becomes "preoccupation," from "preoccupation"
it can become "noutral-ity." It is a question of measuring internationalism
on a much more advanced and difficult terrain.
For the Resistance
The first point is the assumption of a clear position regarding
poiiti.ca7, cho .des ez the a t oa orship groups-and those o e c F
of the other European socialist nations. It is no longer possible
r< ldpon their self-.correction; one is obliged to coup up an mat
and their substitution by and through the initia vo era n
forces directed by the working 'class, a socialises rebirth-which would--
& ac political structures an be able to really express theimmensu
pa ntial which omer ed from the October Revo u ion. The cau iou
siderations from abroad, the general crz icisms which do not explicitly
state objectives, responsibilities, leadership, no longer represent
anything but the segments of a "realism" which increasingly resemhles a
conspiracy of silence, which ,justifies status quo positions and discourages
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 CPYRGHT
Any opposition force as soon as it is. horn. So long as the Czechoslovak
resistance is faced by in the international field -- the alternative
between the sympathies of the anticommunists and the prudent, "realistic"
;camouflages of the present leaders, there will be nothing left for it but
isolation and introversion.
But even this is a preliminary point. The western proletariat
has only one way to become a world point of reference, a phase of active
and effective internationalism: that of carrying forward its own revolu-
!tion; to he able to propoue +a different socialist model because it is
developing it. The debate concerning Czechoslovakia thus takes us to
Italy. With a new awareness, and that is, that if the crisis which has
opened today in the west should once more and with a defeat or a stalemate,'
we would have to suffer the consequences of a serious reverse on the
international' revolutionary front. There is a perfect coherence between
those who forgive the Brezhnev policies and those in our country who urge
a line of compromise. If in the west the communists join the governments.
in power, we can expect nothing but a conservative freeze in socialist
societies. It would be the internationalization of renunciation.
Appeal to Brother Parties
The loth Extraordinary Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
'addresses the communist and workers' parties of all nations with this
!urgent appeal:
The principle of sovereignty and national independence represents
the fundamental premise of any specific road to socialism. But the blind
act of some groups of bureaucratized leaders, who substitute theoretical
argumentation in debate on the conception of socialism with the brute force
of cannons and tanks, tramples underfoot all the basic principles of Marxism
,and internationalism. The hogemonic and great-power tendencies, barely
hidden behind concern over the internal. Czechoslovak situation and the
struggle against the ghosts invented by the counterrevolution threaten to
compromise Marxism and socialism for an entire historical period. There-
fore, in publicly condemning the brutal and cynical military intervention
,before the judgment of the working class and the labor masses whose interests
you represent, you will be acting in your most direct interests in addition
to our interests. Promote our just cause and express your opinion energeti-
cally to.the leaders of those parties, who in regard to the military
intervention, try to halt the rebirth of socialism in Czechoslovakia and
to restore the rule of Stalinism.
In this situation we invite you all to refuse to attend the Conference'
of Communist and Working Parties scheduled to be held this autumn in Moscow,
and to consider whether, by continuing the policy already begun, the
leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of other parties
of interventionist nations should be included for the future among the
Marxist revolutionary parties.
This appeal was approved by the 14th (Clandestine) Extraordinary
Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was not made public in
order to avoid compromising the position of the Czechoslovak leaders while tl
they wore being led to the "negotiating" table at Moscow.
14 ~:'
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WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
3/4 September-October 1969
CPYRGHT
Es gent langst nicht mehr darum, ob man fir odor gegen die Inter- ti
vention vom 21.August 1968 ist. Heute lautet die Frage anders:
konnen wir uns mit den Folgen abfinden? Nach den Ereignissen
der Augusttage 1969 kann niemand meter behaupten, die im April
dutch massiven sowjetischen Druck eingesetzte Parteif0hrung unite
D. Gustav I-Iusak wo11e das Land zur progressiven Nachjannerent- ,
wicklung des Vorjahres zurUckfiihren. Kann etwas these aufreizen
de Unwahrheit starker.widerlegen als die Tatsache, daft nahezu 611e
Initiatoren and Autoren des Aktionsprogramms der KPTschent?
weder ihrer Funktionen enthoben and aus der Partei ausgestoLien
sind oiler dai3 Ausschluf3verfahren gegen sie laufen?
Gustav Husak hat im April, als er Alexander Dubcek abl6ste, eine
echte Konsolidierung versprochen. Dutch ,energische politische
Aufklarung", verbunden mit einer Sauberung der Partei von ?ante
sozialistischen Elementen" sollte die politische Krise Uberwunden
werden.
Kaum ein halbes Mir spater zeigt rich, dak sein Regime die Krise
Hoch vcrscharft, die Kommunistische Partei von der Arbeiterklasse
isoliert and das Land in eine okonomische and allgemeine Kata-
strophe hcrangefiilirt hat. Ober die Arbeiterklasse hinaus nehmen
weite Kreise der Bevolkerung and vor allem die Jugend eine Haltungi
tionell tschechoslowakischen Formen Akte, die ihrerAblehnung
des Fuhrungswechsels and der Umwandlung des souveranen sozia-
listischen Staates in ein Protektorat der UdSSR Ausdruckgeben.
Das ist die Realitat der CSSR von ?1969.
Walirend offiziell von'einer Normalisicrung and deco Sieg der Poli-
tik Gustav Husaks gesprochen wird, schatzt man in Wirklichkeit
die Situation viol niichterner ein. Die Prager Kreisleitung der ParteiA
stellte.in einer vor der.,Offentlichkeit geheim gehaltenen internen
Einschatiung w6rtlich fast: ?Die BeschlUsse des Z.K. and der Kreis-.~
and Stadtleitung finden kein entsprechendes Echo in den Grund-
organisationen, die sfe.- in ihrer Mehrheit - passiv zur Kenntnis
nehmen, ohne fUr ihre Realisierung zu sorgen. Viele Organisationeii
auf den-Sektoren der,Wissenschaft, Technik,_Forschung, de Schul- i?
wcsens, aber,auch'in.'de'n Betrieben haben.die BeschlUsse des Mai-
plenums entwe'dertiberhaupt nicht"angenommen, oder mit Vorbe
rfa1istiselze tstpd`anarchisttsche'Tendetizeit.yor. Besonders schwach
rweist s16 ,die Vtiuwig der PPrtel abe, Ifiihrem VerhBltnls zur;.
inn; eilialb - eT Partei mscht'man.kein Hehl aus dieser Lage.-So
chktztciier Sekictar for die.bthmischen-Ignder, Lubomir Strougal,
in elder Sifzung des 1'rssidiunis der Phrtei~anfangs September die
Zatil dcr`Mitgliedef, die deti &escht1~13 des April- and Maiplenums
zustimnten auf 300.000.(von 1,5 Millionen) and vertrat die An
edern, die
aIcht, dai' sick cOlePaktel ziiirtdestens von 500.000 Mitgli
;,tinter detti 1ntftc b anttsozjalistisclier utiid'itevisionistiseher Krafte
kehen?` Uher,kurioder lang wlyd trdnneh nifssen, uin umgest6rt an'
tier G`ev ih.' ng der tnderenit ceder arbelten zu konnen. Er gab tleren Zalil mit '1:00 .000 :18,1 raumte; jedoch;cm dab haute nur
CIS,Frozcnt c1 oh statue try ch hfr sic tiorgcsehenen Beitrag leisten,
wahx?nd82 Pxo enl nur (ion hf utlrnaibeitrag abliefcrn, um vorldufjg.
die Mitgliedschaft aufrechtzuerhalten. 130 Prozent der Grundorga-'
r isationen halten taut Strougal nach wic vor die Parteibeschliisse
gegen den Eintharsch - eben jene BeschlUSse, die heute von der
ParteifUhrung widerrufcn warden - ftir, riclitig.
",C harakteristisch for den ProzcL der Desintegration and Isolierung
der Parteispitze ist die Demission von drei Vierteln der Leitungs
mitglieder der Betricbsorgaiiisation der Skoda-Werke von Pilsen
and von 13 der insgcsamt 16 Betricbsrate. Es werden, ebenso wie
in zahlreichen altnlichen Fallen, keine'Neuwahlen' zugelassen. Die,
zurUckgetretenen Betriebsrate werden dutch Kandidaten der vori-,
gen Wahl ersetzt, die die geringste Stimmenzahl erhalten haben.
!Solche Praktiken ftiluen zu den groteskesten Situationen, etwa daL4
- taut ,Ve6erna Praha" - Mitgliedern der korporativ zurlickgetrc
tenon Bezirksleitung von Prag VI., die aus der Partei austraten, er-
klart wurde, es werde zuerst ein Parteiverfahren gegen sic eingelei-
;tet, bevor ihr Austritt zur Kenntnis genommen wird.
Es wurde den Rahmen dieses Reports sprengen, wollte man eine
Gesamtilbersicht fiber den Stand der Sauberung der Partei and der
Staatsorgane geben. Sic hat auch in den wissenschaftlichen lnstitu-
tionen.bereits eingesetzt: mit dem Ausschluf3 der bekannten Pro-
fessoren Machovec, ferny and Lubos" Kohout von der Philosophi-
schen Fakultat.der Karls-Universitat, mit dem Ausschluf3 zahlreicher
Professoren von der Militarakademie and mit Verboten und Kon-
fiskationen von Zeitschriften der Sozialistischen Akademic, ,Dejeni
a Soueasnost" (Geschichte and Gegenwart) and ,Mezinarodni Pour-
'tike" (Internationale Politik).
Innerhalb dieser ailgetneinen gesellschaftlichen Krise treten scharf
die Versorgungsscliwierigkeiten and das stetige ?Absinken der Ar-
beitsproduktivitat in alien Zweigen der Wirtschaft hervor. Die all-
gemeine Arbeitsunlust hat hire psychologische Wurzel darin, daQZ
man eiftfach nicht daran denkt, rich mit der sowjetischen Beset-
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zung abzufinden. Die offizielle Presse gibt zwischen den Zeilen
sierenden Losuneen ..Wozu far die.Russcn arbeiten?", ,Je arger
viele Arbeiter zwar on Stteikaufrufen fur den 21.August nicht
gefolgt sand, abet nur so getan haben, als warden sie arbeiten"
(Rude Pravo). Das Ausnahmegesetz, das bereits dazu beniitzt.wurde,
gegen 2.400 Personen Gerichtsverfahren einzuleiten, hat lediglich I
ir .
CPYRGHTbISSIDLNT FACTION BREAKS WITH SWISS LABOR PARTY
romoting Trotskyite theories."
ern. The disagreements which have existed for some time
ow between certain, leftist members and the leadership of the
wiss Labor Party (communist) have just exploded on the surface.
as.t month, the communist daily Voix ouvriere, commented for
he first time on an "internal crisis," created within the
and section of the party "by the factionist activity of a group
A special congress of the members in the canton of Vaud
arty and swiss parliament dPpl,tg. vntp.1 4n ..Yr 1 tit five key
kttended by Mr. Jean Vincent, secretary general of the Labor
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 CPYRGHT
activists in this movement, including a Lausanne municipal
councillor. A week ago, one of the two communist parliamentary
deputies from the canton of Zurich was in turn expelled for
similar reasons. lie was simultaneously relieved of all his
duties, including his responsibilities as editor of the German
language organ of the party. This expulsion brought about the
dissolution of a section of the party youth organization in
Zurich, as well as the resignation of one of the leading commun-
ist theoreticians in German Switzerland, Mr. Konrad Farner, who
had been removed from the Central Committee last year.
About one hundred members who were recently expelled or
who resigned met last Sunday in Zurich to decide upon a defini:
Iti.ve break with the Labor Party. They voted to coordinate
their activities with other organizations with a view to estab-
Ilishing, in the long range, a new revolutionary organization in
Switzerland. The Labor Party dissidents charge that it h.as
given priority to electoral interests above all other
' derations and that' it is too subserviently pledged to
osi io e wiss c6Wmunists are represented
1by five deputies in t e Parliament of, the confederation. which
has 200 members.
RUDE PRAVO, Prague
29 October 1969
(Original translation follows)
JOINT CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE
CPYRGHT
At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,'
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) and the Soviet Government, a Czecho
slovak Communist Party and state delegation was in the Soviet Union from Oot 20;to
Oct 28, 1969, on an official friendly visit. The delegation consisted of the'First
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Gustav
}lusak, head of the delegation; member of the Presidium of the Communist Party Central'
of tltra Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and Premier of.the Czechoslo
yak Socialist Republic Oldrich Cernik; member of the Presidium of the Communist Party
Central Committee and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Lubomir
Strougal; member of the Presidium of the Communist Patty Central Committee and Secretary
of the Communist Party Central Committee Vasil Bilak.; member of the Communist Party '
Communist Party of Slovakia Stefan Sadovaky; m,aMber:of-the: Central Committee of,the,
of Foreign Affairs Jan Marko; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Mini ~<
ester of National Defense Colonel-General Martin Dzur; member of the Communist Party Central
Committee and Czechoslovak Ambassador to the Soviet Union Vladimir Koucky..
The Czechoslovak comrades made trips to'Volgograd and Kiev, visited a number of industrial
enterprises, kolkhozes, and scientific, cultural and. educational institutions. E1-orywhere
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they met with warm reception and fraternal hospitatlity. The Soviet people extended a
cordial welcome to the Czechoslovak party and state delegation, expressed warm feelings
of friendship for the Czechoslovak people, and wished successes to the Czechoslovak
working people in the construction of socialism.
The leading officials of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic--Ii'tr'{'. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
1(Oustav 1fusak, member o',' he Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee and
]President of the Czechs, vak Socialist Republic Ludvik Svoboda, momho;r '(f the
Presidum of the Communi:., rarty Central Committee and Premier Oldrioh Cernil, and
,other Czechoslovak comrades, togethtr with Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the.
Central Committee of the Communist arty of the Soviet Union, AN. Kosygin; chairman
r of defence
t
i
i
r
,
n
s
e
echko, m
of the council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, A.A. G
'nnd other Soviet official personalities visited the Cosmodrome whore they were shown
various kind; of space and military equipment, and witnessed the launching of rockets.
During its stay in Moscow, the party and state delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist'
Republic had talks with a party and state delegation. of the Soviet Union, whose
members were: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, head of the delegation; member of the Political
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman
Hof the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgornyy; member of the
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin; member of the Political Bureau of the Communist
!ratty Central Committee and Sedretary of the Communist Party Central Committee A.P.
Kirilenko; Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee K.F. Katushev; member of
the Communist Party Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of theCouncil'of Ministers
and Chairman of the State Planning Commission N.K. Baybakov; member of the Communist
Party Central Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers M.A. Leseehko;
member of the Communist PartyCentral Committee-axed Minister of Foreign Affairs A_.A,__.-_. -_
Gromyko; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Trade
'N.S. Patolichev; member of the Communist Party Central Committee and Soviet Ambassador
to Czechoslovakia S.V. ChervonenkoJ,__ The talks were held in an
atmosphere of comradeliness and brotherhood, and in a spirit of mutual trust ahd
respect, sincerity and cordiality."
The talks have confirmed absolute unity of views on the further ways of all-round
development of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations,,
{Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are fraternal 'countries linked together by
relationship of historical development, the same social system, Marxist-Leninist
ideology, the same aims and interests in the fight for peace and social progress, for
communist future of their nations. The Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship was sealed
by blood shed together on battlefields. It is developing on the basis of ideas of the
Great October), Illustrious traditions of the common revolutionary fight against
capitalism, anti-fascist war of liberation and creative constructive work in the
building of socialism and communism. It has survived grave tests and proved its indomit-
?able viability.
The Czechoslovak-Soviet relations are firmly based on.confidence, mutual comradely help
and- support, a-cti iaternatiofa-list--solidarity equality of_mights,_-inde.pendenee non-
interference in internal affairs, mutual respect of the sovereignty, inseparably linked
with common concern for the further strengthening of socialism. The fraternal
relationship represents one of the most useful values for both parties and for! the
nations of both countries, and is an important factor in their common work and` common
fight.
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 CPYRGHT
Approved or Release - - - ,
Questions of the development of socialist economy and economic cooperation of both oountr}fe9
had a prominent place in the talks. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union try to make
:use, to the full degree, of all objective advantages provided by the planned management 1j
of the economy, linking. central management and a broad 'initiative of enterprises and
working collectives., They attach great importance to. a consistent carrying out of
measures aimed at improving the structure of the economy, the system of planning,
,management, and economic methods. An extensive exchange of experience obtained
from th
ti
t
e prac
cal applica
ion of the economic policiesf fratrala)lnti
, oen ores con-
tributes towards increasing the effectiveness of the economic management.
The economic and soientific-technical cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union is beneficial for the development of the national economy, helps with the
(solving of the most important tasks in the building of socialism and communism, and
,serves vital interests of the nations of both countries. In comparison with 1960,
the present volume of the mutual exchange of goods has (?grown) 1.8 times greater.
O
f this Mutual suppli ofhidnt
,es macnery an equipme have increased 2.3 times.
eonarete questions relating to the coordination of
,national economy plans for the period up to 1975 reviewed.
Complying with the wish of the Czechoslovak side, the Soviet Union will increase, over
the volume envisaged earlier, its supplies of crude oil, pig iron, cotton and several
.other important raw materials for Czechoslovak: industry
as well as of the e
ui
ment
,
q
p
,which Czechoslovakia urgently needs. Preconditions are being created for the further
;advantageousness.
The Soviet side has agreed that it will make additional supplies in 1970 of durable
(goods, and will assist Czechoslovakia in purchasing certain kinds of goods which are
at present in short supply in Czechoslovakia on foreign markets.
"The two sides state that in the
present conditions, specialization and cooperation are acquiring greater and greater
importance in the mutual economic relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
.
,
first of All, in machine-building, power industry, chemistry, electronics as well as
in the production of consumer goods. This promotes a creation of favourable conditions
process of sooialist economic integration both between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia"!
An agreement has been reached on"the development of cooperation in the sphere of nuclear,:
power engineering. The Soviet Union will provide Czechoslovakia with scientific and
technical aid, and supply necessary equipment for the construction of large-capacity
The sides have agreed that they will develop--on a long-term basis--broad ' cooperation
m
ers
h
..
pu
. s
e help of one Soviet union in the construction O? the metro (underground
rapid transit system) in Prague will .be substantially increased, which will speed up
or lorries in Czechoslovakia will be jointly reviewed..
An important result of broader economic cooperation will be fuller and more effective
use of engineering production capacities in Czechoslovakia by Soviet orders for supplies
In order to ensure rational utilization of the scientific-technological base and the
concentrate their efforts, according to plans, on joint solving of certain scientific
and technical problems of considerable interest for the national economy.
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The Czechoslovak side has noted that the economic and scientific-technical cooperation
with the Soviet Union, which is permanently the,biggest and reliable economic partner
of the Czeehoslovak.Socialist Republic, creates to a decisive degree long term, stable.
preconditions for an optimal development of the Czechoslovak national economy.
In the present stage, both sides regard it as the most important task of their cooperation
to help speed up the introduction of the results of the scientific-technical revolt[tiet
in all branches of'the national eeotomyj to increase the effectiveness of social
sroduabion, and an this basis also the obandard Of 1011V Ot the-Vorking people:
iNecessary for achieving a higher standard of the ;economic'. and scientific=technical'
Cooperation is continuous oars of'party and'state organs-for extension aryl improvement
Of planning activities, inoluding mutual consultationes on edonomie policies.and.
coordination of?national ee3Ofl y plans. The participants in the talks have come.
to the conclusion that the work of planning, economic and foreign trade organizationd
pf bath nQ~lTltCieee encl of the meter-Sovarnmentsl Aseohavlovalc-Soviet oomm1asien for
at1 th1e ~lie~ ~31IhtiPir!-1i ~hiii di yea ei~aliir~ti Blubt be Orientated towards ensuring
the further fast development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation and
socialist economic integration of fraternal.countries.
The (two) sides have agreed to further extez and deepen cooperation:-between state
Organs and social'organ1zationd and to develop friendly'tontacts among regiOns, towns;
and districts, among colieotiveg of Czechoslovak and Soviet enterprises, agricultural
'dooperatives and institutidnso The important positive role was appreciated which' was
and is being played by the Union-of the Czechoslovak-Soviet. Friendship and the Society
Of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship for the strengthening and development of fraternal,
relations between the nations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the USSR.
Roth sides ascribe great importance to the strengthening of friendship and close
cooperation of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia,.the Soviet Union and the other
fraternal countries. In accord with this, there will be intensification of cooperatialli'
and friendships between units of the Czechoslovak Peoplees Army and the Soviet troops,
temporarily stationed on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
both sides will promote further development of cooperation and broaden contacts in
the spheres of science, pulture, the arts, education, film, the press, radio and
television, in health service, sports and tourism. The expansion of direct contacts
htrtween.:Czechoslovak and Soviet working people is an important factor for the further
strengthening of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and the education of the masses
ifi the spirit-of internationalism.
Proceeding from historical experience, the Czechoslovak bide stressed that the
trengthening of the friendship with the Soviet Upien.is at indoparable'?'part of the
socialist patti tism of. the nations of Czechoslovakia,,'-The gapty and state delegations
of both-countries declare that Czechoslovakia and the eviet tYpton are unsiervingiy
determined to..strengthen their- fi ate"rnal alliancii, :and to" 'corxtriblite -iii-all peaslbii. _
tiiays towards-the cohesion of the whole, socialist community and to a growth of its
strength .and power:
Wring' the talks,,infortgatien was. exchanged on questions of party and stems life in both
dountrieso.'
The Soviet leading representatives spoke about the efforts of the nations of
the Soviet Union, aimed at implementing'the nearest and perspective plans of
communist construction, at ensuring economic prosperity, and advancement in science
and culture, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is devoting in its work
great attention to the education of the working people in.the spirit of'the Marxist-
Leninist ideology which enriches the intellectual. world of man, and gives the builders
of a new society inexhaustible strength.
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Czochonlnvak JeAdtng rofrnnentativea informed in Soviet delegation how the line is
being implemented which was worked out at plenary sessions of the Cehtral Committee
to improve socialist democracy, to apply Marxist-Leninist, principles in ndtionality.
policy, to remove difficulties in the economy and to achieve higher standard of
living of the people. This line is an expression of the struggle for a victory
of Mzrxist-Leninist principles, and.for surmounting the deformations and
mistakes of the past davelopment. It is aimed At dovolopttng pasi.tivo aspects of the
resolutions adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of. Czechoslovakia
in January 1968. i?.
The Soviet delegation expressed full understanding and support for this political
!Both sides are of the same view that the lesson from the events in Czechoslovakia
ii 1968 and 1969 are proof of continuous attempts:: of imperialism to .obstruct
socialist community, to weaken relations between its individual links, and to
.drive a wedge into the socialist system.
The lessons drawn from the' Czechoslovak events reveal the strategy and tactics of
the enemies of socialism, their attempts to make use of the difficulties and certain"
l,inronolvnd urgent problems in order to undermine the leading role of . the,,.;Communist
Party and to shake the foundations of socialist society.
.The activity of the antisocialist and counterrevolutionary forces is all the more'
dangerous, the deeper the expressions of revisionism In theory and of opportunism
The Czechoslovak comra. , stressed that in consequence of the activities of rightist
opportunist forces in Gkie leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, various
petit bourgeois and anarchist tendencies grew in the political and economic life
of the country.
An energetic fight was organized neither against these tendencies nor against the
antisocialist counterrevolutionary forces which were making an active use of the
situation which had arisen. Ely the joining of the rightist-opportunist, revisionist',!,
,stream and the internal antisocialist forces which had striven, with the support
of the imperialist reaction, to disintegrate the Communist Party and the socialist.
state, to destroy the class alliance of Czechoslovakia with the socialist countries;
a real danger had arisen of a power-political reversal,. and a direct'threat to-the
socialist social system in Czechoslovakia. All this . seriously. harmed the interests
,+Ril1 over the world.
,n accord with the conclusions of the September plenary session of the Central Committee
`
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
and with the decisions of the highest
Czechoslovak legislative and government organs, the Czechoslovak delegation
appreciates the action of the five fraternal socialist countries in the critical
August days of 1968 as an act of internationalist solidarity which helped block
the way to antisocialist, counterrevolutionary forces.
The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have identical cliss concept of the sovereignty
of a socialist state as an expression of the power of the working class and all
working people.
Both delegations proceed from the principle that the class concept of sovereignty
includes both the inalienable right of-every socialist state and of evert eomiRunist
or the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April, May, and September this year,
and whose aim is to strengthen the leading role of the party, to bring to the end
the struggle against rightist opportunism, to strengthen socialist social relations,.
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 CPYRGHT
party to determine the forms and methods of socialist construction, As well as
the prime duty to protect the power of the working class and all working people,
,and their revolutionary socialist-achievements. In this sense, every communist
!party accounts for its activity to the people of its country, and bears internkti.onalist
{responsibility towards the countries of the socialist community and the international
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union regard, in absolute accord with the Bratislava
Declaration, the protection, support, and strengthening of socialist achievements
1which had been won by heroic efforts and selfless work of the people of every
country, as common internationalist duty of all fraternal countries. They express
,firm determination to oppose--together with all fraternal countries--the
,counterrevolutior.ary designB of imperialism and all the other reactionary forces,
jin the interest 61 peaceful, creative work of nations.
On the babis of hist.:rical experience from the fight against the German imperialism
and fascism, the Czechoslovak people have been clearly con4inced of the importance
of the safeguarding of Czechoslovakia's western borders for the national existence
and state sovereignty. The nations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic are aware
that these borders are also an advanced western outpost of the whole socialist
community, and.thn.t their strength is one of the key factors for the preservation
,of peace and security in Europe. In this sense, the treaty on the temporary
stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia is of fundamental
importance.
The party and etate delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic declared that
it cors'.ders all-round cooperation and close alliance of Czechoslovakia with the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the. fight against the common
enemy--imperialism--to be a guarantee of the genuine. sovereignty of Czechoslovakia,
to be a guarantee of its national security and socialis" development..
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union pursue in interna.tioral questions a coordinated
(line, whose purpose is to ensure favourable conditions for the building of socialism
and communism, fight for peace and freedom.of nations, against the aggressive
policy of imperialism.
Both sides consider it to be their, greatest duty to help strengthen the cohesion
of the countries of the socialist community, and contribute to the deepening and
i.mproving their cooperation both on multilateral and on .bilateral basis. In
(future, they will 'continue to devote undiminished attention to the stepping up of
the defence ability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which ties the main aggressive
lforees aT Imperialism and which has at his disposal all means necessary for waging a
resolute fight against any desi ns of imperialist aggressors.
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will consistently implement the resolutions of the
!23d extraordinary session of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, aimed at develop-
ing further the socialist integration as an objective necessity for economic advancement
,and for increasing the effectiveness of social production in both countries and in the
jwhole socialist community.
The Czechoslovak Socialist Rep~ih?.i.n, the Soviet Union, the Communist Partvr of Czechoslovakia
and the Communist Party of USSR are striving-tb. achieve unity of ; the.. countriet .6f. the:'.,.
!world socialist system on the, basis of Marxist Leninist:'. principles, and condemn any activity
aimed at causing:'a split:among'the. socialist Countries, or:at'creating mistrust in..their
mutual..relations., The weakening."laf.the pontraGts. and cooperation between, the socialist
countries plays into._the hand of imperialism.
Against the aggressive doctrine of imperialism, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet -Union,
together with the other socialist countrie, have formulated a constructive peace program
25
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which is based on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different
international nuestionu through negotiations, at the solving of.the problems of disarmament
by stages, and at the development of.a broad cooperation on the basis of equal rights.
The delegations affirmed their determination to continue their support to the just struggle,
-r
e
.tee
a
_ ??- ?_._ ? -?-_?.. ? - _
-__.---_i __- _
--__.-
_
th
Viet
op
e
agai st the
ontin ing
f t
jthat the bravery and heroism of the Vietnamese patriots and a broad international support
of their fight will lead to a deepter international isolation of the aggressors, and will
force them to halt the imperialist intervention against the Vietnamese people.
;Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union express solidarity with the fight of the Arab nations
against Israeli aggression, supported by the imperialist circles of Europa and America.
They insist on the withdrawal of the Israeli troops,.from the occupied territories
of the Arab countries, on a just settlement of the conflict in the Year and Middle East'
on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 1967,
.Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will grant all-round support to the fight of the
nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for national liberation, political and
economic independence, and to develop with them mutually beneficial contacts and grant'
them aid.
In their peaceful policy, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet union consider the ensurance
of European security to be of great importance, The extensive social and political
changes in the past 20 years-- the vict=ory of socialism in many,Europeancountries ar'?
their unification in the socialist community, the establishment of the first German'
state of workers and farmers--all that decisively strengthened the forces of peace and
democracy in Europe,,,!-'
At the same tithe, however, factors which complicate international relations and increase
tension continue to affect Europe. A serious danger is the activity of the aggressive
NATO--a support to all reactionary forces on the European continent and the center of
r
international complications. NATO fulfills the role of a.collective instrument of the
anti-communist policy of imperialism.
The dangerous tension in Europe is created by the attitude of reactionary forces, especially'
of the neo-Nazi forces in West Germany, which bet on the revision of the resulty 'of the,
Second World War.
The criterion of the 'sincerity of the declared peageful intension ? of the West .. ;
German Government policy and the essential prerequisite for itianauring permanent,
peace in Europe can. be a realistic attitude of the new, German' Govepnment towards,
suet .dust demand& as the recognitlon?d .the. permanency o;' the present. European
borders, international recognition of the socialist German state--'the >}ertnan
Democratic Republic,.a giving up the West German claims to act Non behalf of all 11 Germans," designs against the independent political units--West Berlin, and demands
bf nuclear weapons, and an unconditional recognition of,.the invalidity of'the Munich,
Agreement from the very beginning theWest;German Government,
Permanent peace in Europe, can be.ensured, by ,creating a system of collective seouritrA,
Czechoslovakia and the. Soviet Union will actively., assist an, preparing. and. realizing:,
an all-European conference, suggested 'inthe Budapest Appeal by the. Warsaw Treaty,
member-states., The two countrietsbelleye,;that realistic conditions now,.e;c1a sor..
holding'this conference. The. positive., response of the absolute. majority of: European,
states to the convening of aq all;:Buropean,;ooaxeronoe..angrepsfi,,tM bopes.:o>T.'nat"t,Qne
for the strengthening?c '
26
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 CPYRGHT
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union highly.value in this connection the iliitistiyr.,
of the Finnish Government ,,which assists ,the,preparations and convening of,_a,
conference of all European stitea
The two aides have voiced their .firA.oonviction;that, q,..consietent peaceful polio
of the socialist countries and active -efforts o,f the nations the ,_,whole ,wort ,
are able to strengthen international security? and,to remove the danger,of.,war4
That the long'-tixn eatperienoe in the fights and
victory of the international workers class and experience gained in many difficult...
tests prove that socialism as a social system,can win and be strengthoned ,only ,under-;,
the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party. Only a. party' armed''with"a scientific.
Marxist-Leninist-concept of the road of social development is able to set a Blear
programme of the fight for communist ideals, to. organize and unite the'working
people to realize them. To influence social development purposefully and systematieally,
to.protect and develop the achievements of the socialist revolution..
The strength of the communist. parties rests in their.inseparable,.link with the working;
people, the . revolutionary.workers..class, in..their.;loyalty to.._the1r..anternationali$t
duties and in the creative implementation of the laws of scientific communism.
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Communist Party of the. Soviet Union,,
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
have a common concept of,the roads and methods of the construction of socialism
and communism.
The nations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and of other. fraternal countries
are constructing a new society, while being guided by the general laws of the
development of socialism, which were discovered and formulated by the founders
of scientific communism and further developed (in]--,,the programme documents._S the,.,
international communist movement and the Marxist-Leninist parties.
The communist parties are enriching international experience of the construction,
of soclalism,.]ry implementing these laws in the concrete conditions of their countries,
in keeping with thei +.pro read i ionai t gdi t ns; spe~p a natioaaal characteristics
aci ,th4 l.eveot Oil, speiat . ^oar;omia de~yetolp-~.
The Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider as one of their
most important tasks to improve the ideological standard of communists, to form the
communist world opinion, internationalist consciousness and the socialist patriotic
feeling of all society members. The strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist ideology,
the defence and strengthening of socialist democracy are going on in a hard and sharp.
fight against anti-socialist opinions and conceptions, against bourgeois nationalism,
rightist and "leftist" opportunism and revisionism in the communist movement,
In the present situation, when the. enemies of communism are ever
more resorting to ideological, subversive activity against the communist parties and
socialist countries, the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union
consider it necessary to Intensify ideological educatton and to face decisively all
expressions of anticommunism. .
An especially important instrument-of the party and., the socialist power in this
sharp classical and ideological fight are the mass media of information, whose duty %
is to fight consistently for the implementation of the partyls line, to serve loyally
the working people and cause of socialism.
Experience shows that the interests.of socialism are seriously impeded by a weak
party directing of the mass media of information,
2
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Aooroved For Release 1999/09/0? ? CIA- DP79-01 i 94AA050q(~~ 0~~1-0:
r K
aa" y.
The Co u 1st Parties of Czechoslovakia and he Sovie Union ec aro ep
with the workers movement in the capitalist countries, they support the fight of the
working people against nationalist and social oppression?'
.In keeping with the evaluations and conclusions of the international conference of,
communist and workers parties held in Moscow in June 1969, the Communist Parties of
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union consider it their duty to strengthen the fighting
solidarity of cormunists of the whole world and to fight for the stren,S:he i g of the
,world anti-imperialist front. The strengthening of ideological cohesion and action
unity of the communist parties on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
Internationalism are considered by the Communist Parties of Caechoeiovekia and the
Soviet Union to be the most Important task, on the fulfillment of which depend all
further successes in the fight for peace, democraoyand socialism,
The Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet; Union consider it important
to develop party cont.-hr at all levels: between the central committees of the parties
between regional, cit-A district committees, primary organizations, press bodies
and ideological instil,, '.ons. Close contacts between the communist Parties of the
Soviet Union and Czecho~slovnkia are the fundamental pillar of confidence and friendship
An rutuai relations between the two countries,
On the eve of the centenary of the birth of the great genius of proletarian revolution,.
V. I. Lenin, the Communist Parties of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union voice their
unswerving loyalty to his legacy and determination to implement consistently in their
activity and in mutual contacts the Leninist principles of internationalism, to lead
the nations of their countries to the victory of communism,
Maintaining loyalty to the treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar
cooperation, signed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on December 12, 1943
In the period of the common fight against fascism and prolonged in November 1963,
the two delegations unanimously decided, in the interest of further stengthening
the friendship and fraternity of their nations, to sign on the occasion of the
25th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Hitler occupiers a
new treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, corresponding to the
higher level of Czechoslovak-Soviet fraternal relations achieved in the postwar
period.
On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovak President and Czechoslovak Government, the party and state delegation
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic conveyed to the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and
the Council of Ministers of the USSR an invitation for a delegation of the Soviet
Union to officially visit Czechoslovakia. The invitation was accepted with thanks,
The party and government delegations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union voice
their deep satisfaction with the talks and absolute unity in opinions and standpoints
of the parties evident during the meeting.
The extension of bilateral and multilateral political, military, economic and cultural
cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union helps to strengthen the
forces of world socialism and to make it more attractive,
The unity of the socialist countries serves the cause of the communist movement '0
freedom of nations peace, socialism and progress.
iiT
The communique is signed an behalf of the'Czeohoslovak Socialist Republic by Dr
28
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Gustav Husak, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia; L.ldvik Svoboda, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republid
and Oldrich Cernik, premier of the Czechoslovak Federal Government,
ion behalfo.f the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the communique is.signud
by Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary-of the Central Committee of tho'Communist`j?arty
of the Soviet Union; Nikolay Podgornyy, chairman,of the Presidium of"the Supreme.
A;6Si d k1163--eit r..rv ?n nhet ~nnrn of .tth^ (ntinnl.i of Itiniatera nt
ti . Hollow, 27 October, 2969.
CPYRGHT
RUDE PRAVO
29 October 1969
Na pozvini UV KSSS, presidia No]-'
vyirliftan aovdtu SSSR a sovdtske v16-
dy hyla ad 20. do 20. ffjna 1969 v So-
vgtskean svazu no oficidlni pfdtelskd
navstgvfi Ecskoslovensk6 stranickd. a
statni delegnce v tom,to sloieaaf:prvnl
tajemnik fialfednfho vyboru Komunis-
ticke strauv Ceskoslovenska Gustav
ilnstik.. vrrlnncf rtelenare, Clan p"rad-
seraaaaCeri tT' l::f.. t lanxitlunt y:a.ltm-
sinveaiskc sucaalistictcc rrpuullt:y :.ut
vik Svoboda, Cie" .predsednictva UV
KSC a pi?edscda v16dy Ceskosloven
skd socialistick6? republiky Oldfick
Cerralic, Elan pi?edsednictva OV KSC a'
tajemnik OV KSC Lubomir Strougal,
glen pfcdsednictvo UV KSC a tajenf
nfk CV KSC Vasil Birak, Olen pfed-
'sednictva OV ICSC a prvni tajemnik!
10V KS Slovenska Stefan Sddovsky,s
flea C]V KSC, mfstopfedseda vlddy,
CSSR a niinistr znhranigniho obcho-?
it,, CSSR Fronlisek Hamouz, Olen 0V';
KSC a ministr zahranit nicla vdci .CSSR
j. a Marko, Olen OV KSC a ministri
n6vodnf obrany CSSR gener5lplukov-
n1k Martin Dzfar, Elan CV KSC a vel- is
vysiance CSSR v SSSR VladimirE
Koucky.
Ceskosloveni;tf soudruzi uskutebnill'11
~estu do Volgogradu a Kyjeva, navitl- E
.ili fadu prumyslovych podniku, kol-
t hozu, vddockyeh, kulturnich a iikol
skycla inslituci. Vsude se setkdvoli
s vfelynt pffjetim a bratrskou pohos-
tinnosli. Soviet ti Tide stranickou a
sidlni delegaci CSSR srdetn* Atoll,
vyjadravali viceid city pfdtelstvi
k Ooskoslovenskemu lidu a pfdni
uspdeha5 l eskoslovonskym pracujic(m
ve vystavbi sorialismu.
Veduucf dinitele KSC 'a CSSR -.
prvni tajemnik OV KSC G. Husdk,
glen fedsednictva OV KSC a presi-
dent CSSR L. Svoboda, glen pfedsed-
nictva OV KSC a pfedseda Addy 0..
Cernik a debit deskesiovenitt soudru-
zi spolelnd s generbinim tajemnikem
OV KSSS L. 1. Bregndvem, pfedsedou
rady ministrd Sovdta''kdho svazu A. N.
Kosyginem, ministrem obrany SSSR
A. A. Gregkem. a. dalifmi sovdtskymi
ofinitlniml osohnostmi navitivili kos-i
modrona, kdn so sezn8mili s rfaznymi
druhy kusntiekd a vojensk6 techniky!
a hyli pfitomni pfi vypui:t ni raket.
Za pobytu v Moskva so stranickd
a stttni delegate CSSR setkala a led-
nalo se stranickou a stStnt delogaci
Sovdtskeho svazu, jejimil Oieny byli:
generbini tajemnik dstfedniho vybo
ru Komunistick6 strony Sovdtskdho
svazu L. 1. Brc ndv, vedouci deloga-
co, Elan politick6lto byra OV KSSS a
pfedseda presidia Nejvyiifha sovdtu
SSSR N. V. Podgornyj, Elan politic-
kdho byre OV KSSS a pfedseda rally
miasistrd, SSSR A. N. Kosygin, blen
politick@ho byre, OV KSSS a tajeui
uik OV KSSS A. P. Kirileaako, tajem-
nik OV KSSS K. F. Katuifev, Elan OV
KSSS, ndmdstek pfedsedy rady ml-
nistrfa SSSR a piiedseda Stdtni pldno-
vaoi komise SSSR N. K. Bajbakov,
!Olen OV KSSS a ndmdstok pfedsedy
rady miaistrfi SSSR M. A. Lesedko,
idlen OV KSSS a ministr zahranidnich
vdrf SSSR A..:1. Grnmyho. glen OV
T,:i:g >.: iumcn- nu:un* uUUL. ?nur:ial
5ovutsicduo avazu A. A. Gredice, Olen
VV KSSS a ministr zohranibniho ob-
ohodu SSSR N. S. Potoll ev, bleu
OV KSSS a'velvysloneo SSSR V CSSR
,S. V. Cervondnko.
Pfi jedadni so potvrdlianaprosW
jednota ndzoru no testy dofiflle vio-
strann6ha rozvojo Oeskosiovensko-so-
vdtskyoh vztaitu.
Ceskoslovensko a Sovdtaky eves
jsou bratrskd zeani4, spjati navzdjem'
pflhuzaosti bistorick ch osndi, totoft
nosti spaleienskeho zffzenf, marxis-
ticko-leninakon ideologli, jodnotnyml
cfli a zdjmy v boji za mir a spole-
tensky pokrok, za komunialickon ha-
doucnost svycla udroda5. Ceskosloven-
sko-sovdtske pfatelstvi byte zpebetd
1ao krvi spolebnd protiteu no bojii-
tich. Rozviji se no zdkladd ideji Vell-
keho fijna, slavnycla tradic spuleOnE-
ho rovolui.'niho boje proti kapitalis-
nua, osvobozenecke protifaffiistickd
villcy a tvolive budovatelskd prAce
pFi vystavbP sociulismu a komunis-
mn. Pfetrvalo v tdfkych zkoui;kdclt a
doktiznle svou nezdolnou Sivotaschop-
nest.
Povnf+m zilkladean ,eskosiovensku-
sovAtskych vztaiaf je dAvera, sou-
drugskA vzajemntt pomoe a podpora,
akllvnf intornaciondlni salidarita, rov-
noprdvnost, nezdvislost, nevmdgovdni
do vnitlntch sdlelitosti, vztijemnd
respektovtnl suverenily, nerozluEatif
spojoud spolebnou p6At'o dai3l upev-
fioviini sociallemu. Bratrakb vztahy
znaauenaji pro obd strany i pro ntf-
rody oboe semi jednu z nejconndj-
Ifela hodnot a jsou diilefitfm Olnite-
lam v jojich spolodnd pratl a apu-
leOndnt boll.
Vyznamn6 mtsto v jedndnl za-
ujimaly otdzky sociallslick6 oko-
nomlky a hospoddtskd spotuprbce
obou zemi. Ceskoslovensko a So-
viIisky svaz so snaii v plnb mite vy-
uiivat viech objekiivnlch, pfodnostl,
kter6 poskytujo pldnovitd fizent bas-
podAfstvl, spojuitci dsti'edni fizent a
>firokou Iniciativou padniku a pro-
covnichl kolektivil., Pfiklfidajf velky
vyznam dilsledn6mu . uskutebidovAnt
opatfent, zamAfenjich, na zdokonalo-
vAnt ` atruktury ekouomiky; ` soustevy
plAnovint, fizeni a meted hospoda-
r'ohi. Ke zvylionl fidinnosti fizeni hos-
podAfstvt prispivd rozsdhld vymdna
skuionostt s provAddut ekonomickO
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :.CIA;RDP79-01194A000500010001-0
 CPYRGHT
politiky bratrskych zemf. tea' nakterych vddeckyeh a technic-
Hospodtifskd a v6deckotecitnick& kych probl6m6, kter6 malt snatnjf
spoluprdce mezi Ceskoslovenskein a a2rodohospadfifaky vyznam.
Sov6tskym svazem prosptv6 rozvojt Coskoslovenski strana konstatuje,
n6rodulbo hospod2r'stvi, napomalti fe hospod21skd a v6dockotechnickA
bminm -utttiiuWtuit:ieit W:aiit ?trt ca- spolupr6ce so SovAtskym svazem,.
suoybi; sucxulx.:mx. V tcnnmuiamt,, uuu- ktory le trvale nejv6tilm, spolehli-
21 2ivotnim z6jmum narudu obou ze- vym ekonomickym partnerem CSSR,:
mi. Vzfijemn6 vym6na zbozl v son- vytvafi v rozhodullcl mire dlouho
6asn6 dob6 vzrostia we srovninf a ro- dob6 a stabilni pfedpoklady pro opts
kem 1960 1,8krfit, z toho vz2lentne m6lnt razvoj 6eskoslovenskdho nA-
dod6vky strojfi a zafizent 2,3kr6t. todniho hospodd zfvf.
Pyly posouzony kankrdlnl ntAzky Obb stranyy nvaiull v nyna it sta.
kebrdinace uiradohuspodafskych p12- pa za nojdSle lt6jtt fikol epoIupr6ce
nix na obdobi do roku 1975. Vychfizoje napom6hat urychlendmu zavfid6nf vy-
vstfic pffini 6uskoslovensk6 strany, slodkit v6deckotechnicki revoluce do
Sovbtsky svaz zvyti and dffve pled- vilech odvbtvi ndrodniho hospodbf-
pokl6danou 6rovefl dod6vky ropy, stvf, zvytovat efcktivnoc, spbladensk6
surovdho leleza, bavlny a n6kterych vyroby a no tomto zdklada 12ivotnl
dalkich dfilelitych druhil surovin pro droved pracujicfch.
6eskol:ioveusky priimysl, jakai I za- K dosaleni vyiAf firovn6 hospod2f-
fusel, kter6 Ceskoslovensko nalLsha eke a vadeckotechnlck6 spolupr6ce?
v6 patfebuje. Vytv6feji se piedpo- le nezbytn6 noustdl6 p66e stranic-
klady pro daltif znafny mist ubchod- kych a st6tnich erg6nii o roz>IR'ov6ni
of vym6ny v pi'idlt p611letco no si- a zdokonalovfint pl6novacf Cinnostl,
klad6 vzbjemn6 vyhodnosti. zahrnujicf I vz5jemn6 konzultace
Sovdtsk6 strana souhlasila s tim, o ekonomlckd politico a koordinacl
to dodate6n6 dod6 v race 1970 zbo- nArodoltospod6lskych pifinfi.
It dlouhodob6 spotfeby a poskytne 06astnici tednbnf dospdll ke spa-
an zahrani6nich trzich ponioc pfi letln6mu zbvdru, to dinnost pl6nova-
n6kupn nbkterych druhfi zboll, kte. cirh, hospod5fs1c4ch a zahranidna
rd jsnu v son asnd dob6 v CSSR do- obchodnich organizael obou semi
ficitol. I mozivlbdni teskoslovensko-sovdtsk6
Obb strany koustatujf, le v sou- komiso pro hospodiii'skou a v6decko-
6asnych podminkdch uabyv6 ve vz6- tochnickon spoluprdci must byt ze
Jemnyeh ekonontickyclx vztazich me- mafona no zalitt6ni dnlAlhe rychid-
zi Ceskusloveuskem' a Sov6tskym sva-
zem stele vettiho vyznamu speclall-
zace a kooperace, pfedevifm ve stro-
Jtraustvi, energotlce, chemii, elek-
Ironies I ve vyrob6 spotfebniho zbo-
if. To pfisplv6 k vytvhfent pfizul-
vych podminek pro progrosivat sm6-
ny we struktufe nerodniho .hospo-
d6fstvf, k rozvoji procesu suclalis-
tickd' ekonomlckd Integrace mezi
Ceskostaveuskem a Sov6tskym ^va.
zem, jakol I v rimel sacialistickdbo
npoletenstvi.
Bylo dosaieno dohody a rozvlJent
spoluprdce v oblestl jadern6 onerge-
tiky. Sovdtsky svaz poskytne vedee-
ka-technickou pomoc a dod6 potteb-
nfi zaftzeni pro vystavbu novych ato-
movych elektrbren a velkd kapacit6
v CSSR. Strany se dohodly, to budou
no dlouhodobdm zdklad6 rozv1Jot li-
rokon koopereci pit vyroby zaffzent
pro atomovb elektrdrny a pfl.vyro-
bd ? vypoCetnt techniky. Podstatnti se
roztftl pomoc Savfitsk6ho -sworn pfl
stavba metre v Prase, cot umotnt
urychlit prftb6h John vystavby. Bu.
don spolc6n6 posouzeny molnosti
t6sn6 spolupr6ce I pfl rozvfjent vy-
roby n6kladnich automobilik v CSSR.
Vyznamnym dfisledkem roztlfenl
hospoddfsk6 spolupr6ce buds dpln6j
tt a efektivndjif vytlteni strajfren-
skych vyrobnich kapacit v CSSR so-
vdtskymi zakfizkamt na dod6vky stew-
JA a zaffzonf.
Aby byla raciondlna vyutivdne vi
deckotechnick6 kAkladua a vedecki`
kddry oboe semi, budou Ceskosloven
eke a SovAtsky svgs plfinoviti son-,
stfedovat evi delft as spoleAne f!-
d4fak6 spoluprdce a socielistlek6 eke-
nomick6 Intograce bratrskych zemf.
Strany so dohodly no dalAfm rozAf-
Poai a proliloubeni spolupr6co me-
ss stbtniml orginy a spoleConskyml
organizacemi, no rozvoll pi