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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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EL SIGLO, Bogota, Colombia
7 March 1970
CPYRGHT
SOVIET SPIES IN AMERICA
By Eugene Carbonaro, for El Siglo
CPYRGHT,
(Mexico, March 6) The first editions of El Universal, Excelsior and other
important Mexican newspapers devoted from six to eight columns in their 14
March issues to give coverage to the spectacular flight of the Soviet typist,
Rays, Kiselnikova, who escaped from the embassy of her country and sought po-
litical asylum from the Mexican government. Among other things, Miss
Kiselnikova confessed to the secret police of that country that four members
of the consular section, whose names she revealed in secret, spent only eight
hours per week in their job of issuing visas, while they spent the rest of
their time in secret operations involving Mexican workers and student orga-
nizations.
A couple of weeks earlier, the major presses of the country published
in clear form several UPI dispatches in which an account appeared of the
Colombian labor leaders Marco Tulio Cuevas and Jose Raquel Mercado, the're-
spective presidents of the important federations, UTC and CTC, having openly
denounced the Soviet Embassy in Bogota as a center of subversion and espionage
that was spreading its influence in the trade unions, and in the training of
several hundred Colombian students at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow
These are two more aspects to add to information coming from Europe, ac-
cording to which, in the course of the last four years -- from 1966 to 1969 --
one hundred sixty-two diplomats and high officials of Soviet and Bloc em-
bassies were expelled from Western countries to which they were accredited
because they were accused of interfering in internal affairs, of subversion
and;espionage. To merely mention the background of each one of these Commu-
nist agents would require a thick volume. To cite an example, in Mexico, it
is enough to note the expulsion, in March 1969, of the Russian "tourists"
Victor Manikoff and Vladimir Sergev, typical secret agents of the Kremlin.
The former had been arrested before, in May 1962, in Asuncion, on being sur-
prised in a blatant attempt to provoke rebellion among local workers; later
this dangerous individual also appeared in Buenos Aires, in the middle of
several rebellious unions that then existed in Argentina, but he was captured
by the police and summarily expelled. Naturally he carried no documents nor
papers of any kind and he could only be identified by his finger prints. In
July of 1966 Sergev secretly entered Brazilian territory. Expelled from they
he suddenly dumped to Canada where there were indications that he was in effe
chief of the Soviet espionage network for all Latin America, notwithstanding
his designation as "Chief of the International Section of the Central Council
of the Labor Union," a title of many words which is merely an attempt to de-
lude and deceive whoever listens to them.
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CPYRGHT
A well-known and honest newspaperman, Carlos Montiel, in an article pub-
lished February 21, 1969, in the newspaper La Nacion of San Jose, under the
title "Two Russian Agitators Expelled from the Country," said that: "After
plotting from Ecuador the disturbances of Cali, Colombia to compensate for
the failure in bringing about student disorders in those two countries simi-
lar to those they provoked for the same time in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
and Uruguay, Sergev and Manikoff arrived in Mexico using tourist visas, in
order to appear January 15th at the Mexican Workers' Congress, a task they
were not able to complete because, working swiftly and surely, the Secretary
of Government expelled them from the country." Given these facts, the Colom-
bian labor leaders, Cuevas and Mercado, were right in alerting the authorities
and public opinion to the methods that Soviet secret agents use to disguise
themselves as "trade unionists" in order to complete their tasks.
The case of Sergev and Manikdff has been cited here a little extensively
with the aim of showing how much reason and truth-helped Miss Raya Kiselnikova
-- who witnessed so much double-crossing, so much trickery and so much treason
in a noble and free country that welcomed them with open arms -- in deciding to
abandon her fellow countrymen and to seek political asylum in Mexico. Soviet
diplomats, in the literal sense of the word, do not exist. The Soviet diplo-
mat, before all else, is a man who has been trained to spy and to foment dis-
order anyplace in the world that is not his own country. Sergev travelled
with impugnity through Mexico, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay,
Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina, thanks to a tourist visa and to the collabora-
tion that he received in every country from his "diplomatic" countrymen. Now
is the time for the Latin American countries to begin thinking about the con-
sequences such cooperation and leniency will unquestionably bring them in the
future.
EL SIGLO, Bogota
7 March
CPYRGHT.
dos EspIas Sovi~ticos en America
P or p ujrpprrrio Carboruaro. parrz El. SIGIA
ci6n consular, cuye; nombres en ]a Universidad Patricio Lu`,
revpih on secreto, atendian so munii)a de 1loscu.
orbita, 11 Cron e,%pillsados do
los paises do.'occidente dondo
sc,hallaban acreditados acu a
dos do intervenci6n on asuntos
internos, subversidn.y espiona
je. Mencionar apenas ligera-
monte las histories protagoni
zadac por cada into de estos,
agentes comunistas, demanda
ria tin grueso volumen.
Para citar un ejemplo, en'
Mexico, basta recordar la ex-
pulsion de que fueron objeto'
on este Pais, on marzo de
1969, Jos "turistas(' rusos Vic-'
for Manikoff y Vladimir Ser
gev caracterizados agentes se!
cretos del Kremlin. El prime
no de los nombrados habia si;
do arrestado antes, on mayo'
de 1962, en Asuncion, al ser
sorprendido on tin descarado'
intento eneaminado 'a prove-
car la reheli6n do Jos sindica
tos obrcros locales: posterior.
mente, el poligroso individuo
CPYRGHT
hien en medio do unas revuel
tas Findicales que por enton-
ces sacudian a la Argentina,
pero fue capturado por ]a poli
cia y expulsado sin contempla
clones. Naturalmente, no ]leva
ha documentos tii papeles do
ninguna cla e y solo pudo ser
identificados por sus hucllas
dactilares. En Julio de 1966,
.Sergev se introdujo clandesti
namente en territorio brasile
ro: Expulsado do alli, salt6 do
repente al Canada donde se no
gistraron indicios do su esta
on ese e -.e Pais en calidad d' Je
fe de la red de esldona.ie so
vietico Para toda America La
tina, no obstaste su investidu
ra do "Jere do la Seccion In
ternacional del Consejo Cen-
tral de la Unidn Sindicalista".
nombre de muchas palabras
con los qua se busca deslum-
brar v de:armar a cLuienes Ios
escuchall;
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CPYRGHT
Un conocido y veraz perio-
ista, Carlos Montiel, on ar
ticulo fiublicado el 21 do fe.
brero de 1969 en e1 diario "Lit
lacion" do San 'Josd bA.'o e1
titti1o ~tob Agitadoi'oe tipd,
p'ueron" xpuleados Ae1 a $',
lnformd que "despuos de fra-
guar deFde el Ecuador los dis
turhios do Cali. Colombia, en
compensacidti por su fracaso
para montar on esos dos pal-
ses desordenes estudiantiles
mejantes a Jos que ._agitaron!
por esas mismas fechas a AMd=,
jico. Brasil, Argentina y Uru;
guay, llegaron a Aloxico Ser?.
gcv y _Manikoff_ usando visas
de turismo, para presentarse
el 15 dii encro en el "Congre
so de -trabajadores llexica-
nos" proposito que no pudle-
ron cumplir porque, obrando
can aelnvto y otiortimidiid. ID
5ecrctarla de Goblerno los ex
pulso del paif'.?Dados_estos an
tecedentes, razon tcmfan los di
rigentes obreros colomhianos.
Cuevas y Mercado cuando alert
taron a ]as aut.oridadQs y a la
opinion pitblica de su Pais, so
hre los m@todos it utiliran
disfrarados do. ?'stiidicalistas".
los agentea secretos sovibticos
Para cumplir su cometido.
XI caso do Sergev y Afani-'
koff ha sido citado aqua tin Po
co extensamente, con el pro-
ptisito de demostrar cuanta ra
a6tf y verdad asiste a la eenorJ
11# -Nsr* KiFeinikova Wen 1tss
tiada de Tanta doblez. do tints
txamposcria v de tanta trai
cion a tin pals noble y franco
que Jos acogio con Jos brazos
abiertos. resolvio abandonar a
sus compatriotasy pedir asilo
politico a Mexico. Diplomati
cos sovi6ticos, on ei sentido ii
teral de la eapresion, no exis
ten jamfaa. El diplomatico so
vidtico, antes que eso. es tin
hombre que ha lido adicstra
do para espiar y fomentar el
desorden on todo lugar del
mundo que no sea su propia
pattia. Ser ev paced sit ii ipuni
dad por 11Tiittleo, Cnnn l~, "o:
lombia. Ecuador, Peril, 1 rit
guay Bolivia Brasil y Argenti
na, gracitis al vinado turlstico.
y a In coiaboracion que rcci-
b16 en todR3 partes do sus
compatriotas ."diplomAticor ':
Ya e s ' hora de quo los panes
Latinoarnericanos; .Y' peng;in
a meditar en las conscction-
cias que tattta condescenden-
cla y hlandura habrd forrosa?,
mente de traerles el fuluro.
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EL TIEMPO, Bogota, Colombia
7 March 1970
The Russian Embassies Are Spy Nests
CPYRGHT
Mexico City -- Raya Kiselnikova, blonde ex-secretary of the Soviet
Embassy here, who asked for asylum from the Mexican government on February
9th, affirmed that "Russia has a complete espionage network in Mexico."
Since she was granted asylum, the ex-secretary has been kept in seclusion
by the Interior Ministry of Mexico until yesterday (Wednesday, March 5),
when she held a press conference to explain the reasons why she defected
.and sought asylum in Mexico.
The newspaper "El Universal" says that Miss Kiselnikova declared,
"Russia is spying in Mexico and is seeking to dominate this hemisphere.
The Russian diplomats have two missions: their usual, continuing diplo-
matic function and espionage work on the side."
She added that "they are interested in the political scene, the rela-
tions between parties, the student movement, the relations between the gov-
ernment and the people and whatever is of a military nature."
She mentioned Oleg M. Netchiporenko, second secretary of the embassy,
as chief of espionage operations in Mexico.
"When a person leaves Russia, he receives precise instructions not to
have any kind of relations or friendship with the Mexicans, who value highly
their freedom," Miss Kiselnikova said.
She said that all the embassy telephones, including private phones,
have listening devices to record conversations and that diplomats and em-
bassy personnel spy and inform on one another.
This lack of freedom, and the fact that she established a close friend-
ship with a Mexican impelled her to defect, the ex-secretary said.
She told the press that the common man could live happily in Russia,
but that intellectuals, especially the writers, poets and creative people,
are persecuted, except those who are so famous that the government would
get difficulty if it tried to persecute them.
"Although I know that my life is in danger and I know that I can be
kidnapped in order to be returned to Russia, I feel, and I have felt in the
last two weeks, more at peace than I ever have before. Now I am ready to
begin a new life, to work in freedom and to show that I am worthy of the
help that has been given to me. I sincerely hope that they [the Russians]
will let me live in peace," Miss Kiselnikova declared.
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EL TIEMPO, Bogota
7 March 1970
CPYRGHT
S.bn idos Ole 'SE2 use.
Ciudad de Mexico, G. -- Ra-
ya Kisclnikova, ruhia ex?secre
taria de la embajada sovietica
aqui. quien el 9 de febrero
pasado solicit6 asilo al gobicr-
no do ,Mexico, atirm6 que "Ru-
sia tienq una red muy compie
ta.de espionaic en Mexico".
La ex-secretat?ia habia lido'
niantenida aislada por cl ml-
nistcrio del interior de Mexico
desde que se le conccdi6 asi
.
10, 1-i?.,sta ayes Iercoles),
cuando convoc6 a una confe?,
rencia de prensa pays explicar,
]as razones por las cuales de
sert6 y pidi6 asilo on Mexico.`
"Rusia espia en Mexico y
'busca dominar este hmnisfe?.
rio. Los diplomaticos rusos
tienen dos misioncs: su cargo
d1plomatico comun y corricn?
to y labores de esplonaje at
' margen", dice el diario "El U-
niversal". que declare la se-
norita Kisclnikova.
Anadid que "estan lnteresa-' -
dos en el panorama politico,
las relaciones entre Jos parti-
dos, el movimiento estuaiantil,
las relaciones del gobierno con
el pueblo y cualquier cosa de
caracter militar".
Afenclone a' 01eg N. Met?
chiporenko, segundo secretario
de Is embajada, como jefe de
raciones de esplonaje
las Alice.
en "Cuando una persona sale
de Rusia, recibe instrucciones -
precisas de no toner ninguna
.clase de' relaciones ni amis-
tad con Jos mexicanos, quienes
aprecian altamente in liber-
tad", dijo la sc> orita Kiselni?
kova,
Manifesto quo todos los te-
lefonos de la embajada, inclu?
sive l6s privados: tienen apa-
ratos .que graban la conversa-
clen, y que los diplomaticos y
el personal de la embajada es-
plan e informan entre. si.
Esa falta de libertad, y el,'
hecho de que trabo buena a-
misted con una persona on
Mexico, me impulsaron a de-
seriar, dijo la ex-secretaria.
Manifest6 a la prensa q.ue el
hombre comun podria vivir fe-
liz en Rusia, pero,pue Ios pen.
sadores, especialmente los es?
critores, poetas y gentes crea-
tiva, son perseguidos, cxcepto
;los que son suficientemente
famosos y que al castigarlos
podrian poner en dificultadcs
a1 gobierno.
Aunque se quo ml vida'es-
'ta on pcligro y se que pucdo
ser secuestrada pare ser de-
vuelta a Rusia, me siento. y
me he sentido on ]as dns 61-
timas semanas. mas tranquila
que nunca. Ahora estoy lista
a iniciar una nueva vida. a
trabajar en libertad y demos.
tsar que merezco la ayuda que
se me ha dado. Sinccramentc
deseo que ellos (los rusos) me
de.ien vivir on Paz". declnrd Is
senorita Kiselnikova.
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EL IiERALDO, Mexico City
4 March 1970
CPYRGHT
COMPLETE ESPIONAGE NETWORK OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO
CPYRGHT
EX-translator of Diplomatic Delegation Tells of Subversive Work and Seeks Asylum.
The life of Mexico is watched in all its aspects by Russian embassy per-
sonnel who, in addition to their official work, spy on each of the aspects of
national life: political, student, the governments relations with the people
and relations among political elements, as part of the plan for domination and
world influence that the Soviet Union has mapped out.
The one who carries out the principal functions of spying on Mexican life
it Yuriy Kupliakov, chief of the consular section of the embassy, who has at
his command all the diplomatic personnel working in a complete espionage net-
work to which they devote most of their time, and for which they have special
listening devices on all the telephones of the embassy and on those of some
important Mexican officials.
This was affirmed yesterday by Miss Raya Kiselnikova, ex-employee of the
commercial section of the Russian Embassy, in which she was employed as a trans-
lator, during a press conference in a well-known hotel here in order to acquaint
the Mexican public with the reality of her situation in the country which was
misrepresented some weeks ago by different news media when she asked for poli-
tical asylum in Mexico.
Amid television cameras, microphones and photographic flash bulbs, and
showing great calmness in her words and with great fluency in the Spanish
language, Miss Kiselnikova declared to the reporters present that the student
disturbances of 1968 were in large part influenced by Russian spies who tried
to control the movement, in order to use the existing crisis situation to arouse
popular reaction against the system of government.
Before the reporters' questions she declared that she had been in Mexico
two years, working as a translator, and that since her arrival in Mexico she
had been watched and prohibited from making contact with the Mexican people,
a rule that all Russian diplomats must obey.. Inside the embassy, the atmos-
phere is one of uneasiness and watchfulness of one another among the personnel.
For her, as a daughter of a man considered in his lifetime as a public enemy,
she was watched even more carefully on orders of the chief of the consular sec-
tion.
Two months ago, when she knew that she was going to be sent to Russia, as
punishment for her conduct not being in accord with Soviet political interests,
and where reprisals on her and her family could be expected, she was advised
by Mexican friends that she should seek asylum in Mexico. She added that her
wish to live in an atmosphere of freedom -- the freedom that she has known in
Mexico -- made her renounce her family,. her past life, her friends in exchange
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for the opportunity she has obtained to live with confidence and peacefulness,
a right that until a short while ago was forbidden to her.
The real situation in Mexico, that she now knows, is totally opposite
from what they led her to believe in her own country when she was preparing
for her assignment in this city, and that life in Russia does not have even
the! least bit of oed,Om ouch are aha bag W. Who in loatrii ation that the
Russian people receive from childhood precludes their rising up against the
system of life imposed by the government.
EL HERALDO, Mexico City
l March 1970
CPYRGHT
CPYkGHT
encuentra vigilada en todos
sus aspectos por los miem-
bros do la embajada Rusa,
quo ademis de contar con
una misi6n oficial, espian
cada uno de los aspectos de
la vida nacional, to politico,
!la vida estudiantil, las
'relaciones'del gobierno y el
pueblo, las relaciones entre
los diversos politicos, como
'.parte del plan do dominio e
influencia mundial que so ha
trazado la - Uni6n Sovietica.
Quien ejerce las princi-
pales funciones como espia
de In vida do Mexico, es Iouri
Koupliakov, jefe de la sea
ci6n consular de la emba-
jada, quien tiene a sus
6rdenes a todo el personal
diplomatico trabajando en
una completa red de es-
pionaje a la que dedican la
mayor parte del tiempo, y
para in que cuentan con
instalaciones especiales,
vigilancia en todos los
tolefonos do las?embajadas y
on algunos otros de fun-
cionarios mexicanos im-
portantes.
Asi lo at irm ayer a
enorita Raya Kiselnikova,
x empleada de la secci6n
omercial de la embajada
sa, en la que desempenaba
1 cargo de traductora,
urante una conferencia de
rensa que ofreci6 en
onocido hotel de esta Ciudad
ara dar a conocer al pueblo
exicano, la realidad de su
ituaci6n en el pals, des-
rtuada hate algunas se-
anas por diversos 6rganos
formativos cuando pidi6
Entre camaras de tele-
"sidn, micrdfonos, y flashes
otograficos, y demostrando
1 -1,
na gran serenidad en sus
xpresiones y un gran do-
info del idioma espanol, la .
efiorita Kiselnikova,lingwa-
y modelo declar6 a los
eporteros presentes, que los
roblemas estudiantiles de
uidos en gran parte
or los esnias rusou aue
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
istente en el pals y pro- ? '
ocar reacciones en el por amigos mexicanos de
ueblo, con trarias al sistema ' 1 que pidiera asilo territorial a
gobtdrno. { Mexico. Agreg6, que sus
Ante las preguntas de los' deseos de vivir on un clima
porteros, declar6 quo ` de libertad, -la libertad
sde pace dos anos se en-quo ha conocido on Mexico
entra en Mexico, desem- la ha hecho renunciar a su
aftando el cargo de traduc- familia, a su pasado his-
ra, desde su llegada a. t6rico, a sus amigos, on
exico, , ha sido vigilada y se' cambio, ha obtenido is
prohibi6 entrar en con- oportunidad de vivir con
f' t ilidnd
u
n
,
q
cto con el pueblo mexi- con ianza y ra
ano, regia que deben derecho que haste hace poco
bedecer todos los di- Ie estaba vedado.
lom6ticos rusos. Dentro de Esta realidad mexicana
embajada, el clime es de que hay conoce, es to-
esconfianza y de vigilancia,.
e unos Para otros. A ells,:'
or ser hija de un hombre,
onsiderado en vida como
nemigo piiblico, se le vigila
en forma mils estrecha
or 6rdenes del jefe de la ,"I
ecci6n consular.
Hace 'dos meses, cuando
upo que iba a ser enviada a ;
dieron a conocer en su pals
cuando so preparaba pars
desempeflar sus funciones on
esta ciudad, y sefa16 quo la
vida en Rusia, est5 exenta
hasty en.los mns minimos
detalles de la libertad quo
;ells ha ganado. El adoc-
trinamiento que recibe el
usia como castigo a su 'pueblo ruso desde nitro, le
conducts y por no convenir a , impide revelarse contra el
los intereses de la politica t sistema de vida impuesto
ovimiento, pata apro- ? ji)jr aban represauasa.,ella,JJ,'
ether la situacibn de. crisis
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EL SIGLO, Bogota, Colombia
2 March 1970
CPYRGHT
SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
CPYRGHT
In the space of the last four years, from 1966 to 1969, 162 officials
belonging to embassies of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries,
besides some authorized personnel, were expelled from the foreign countries
in which they were stationed, under accusation of espionage, various sub-
versive activities or simply undue interference in politics and internal
affairs.
Almost half of the individuals expelled, or some eighty of them, were
Soviet citizens with such varied assignments as ambassadors, ministers, com-
mercial attaches, janitors, drivers, cooks and embassy gardeners. Also
there were artists, "Journalists" from TASS and NOVOSTI, delegates to youth
congresses and workers assemblies, "trade union" leaders, etc., etc. The
Venezuelan columnist Lorenzo Fernandez, in a paragraph welcomed by his Colour --
bi.
A Cuba, Dumont est egalement attendu et
redoute. Fidel Castr I'a invite personnellement
trois fois : en 196 , en 1963 et, la derniere
fois. en juin 1969. Sur le point de repartir
pour Cuba. Dumon avait I'idee d'intituler son
socialiste ?>. Rene Dumont ne cherche pas
a le cacher. It est revenu degu, pessimiste,
inquiet pour I'avenir. S'il se range toujours
dans le camp des fideles de la revolution
cubaine, it n'entend pas que le droit de cri-
tiquer ses amis lui soft conteste.
En 1964, Rene Dumont dedicagsit a aux Alge-
riens ' son premier livre sur Cuba (a Cuba,
socialisme et developpement x+). En 1970, it
nest pas inutile que les Africains, qui cher-
chent toujours a s'inspirer du modele cubain,
lisent et meditent c Cuba est-il socialiste? a,
a paraitre ces tours-ci aux editions du Seuil
(collection a Poltique . - 248 pages - 5 F).
A travers ce Itvre - ot) se melent d'une
-naniere parfois trop touffue ]'anecdote, 1'ex-
perience vecue et le jugement de vateur -
Rene Dumont. a retrace la tentative de cons-
truction du socialisme a Cuba. depuis la periode
place, it changeait de titre : c Cuba es -t
ou les quatre pen des d'un socialisme origi-
CPYRGHT
de x la rebellion genereuse et romantique x
jusqu'a la periode actuelle, celle des a dunes
realites A eri passant par le stade de a la plani-
fication centradisee et bureaucratique s et celui
de a la construction du communisme i,.
Finalement, a la question qui est au ceeur du
probli me (a Cuba est-il socialiste ? s), Rene
Dumont - que l'on sent partage tout au long
de cette etude entre ses sympathies pour les
Cubains et son idealisme critique qu'il appelle
sa conscience prof esskonnelle - repond par
des constatations que beaucoup trouvent tri s
severes : I'economie. se millitarise chaque jour
davantage, le culte de Fidel se transforme en
neo-stalinisme,.une blite a bienveillante a accu-
mule les privil8ges, etc.
De ce Iivre, c Jeune Afrique )o s'est assure la
possibilitC d'en publier, le premier, de urges
extraits. G. de Beaurepaire
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
LU If 1~j ~6w
0 L
Gu~i00~'~]PO~
a~
L'echec des plans speciaux
La ferme d'Etat restait encore une exploitation agrico'le
diversifi6e; par bien des traits traditionnelle. Cuba recherche
les formules d'exploitation des plus moderns, celles des
Etat-Unis, de l'agriculture industrielle a trios grande 6chelle,
pouvant utiliser notamment ('aviation (semis, 6pandages
d'engrais, d'herbicides, de pesticides...).
Vers la fin de 1967, it a donc 6te d6cid6 d'6largir a 1'6ohelle
de toute Wile da conception des plans specialises, dont nous
allons signaler des 6checs. Apr6s d'autonomie alimentaire
de chaque province, visant a r6duire les transports et pertes
en route, on cherche a localiser chaque production a cote
de son usine de transformation, sinon de son port d'expor-
tation. On vise en somme la generalisation d'un complexe
de type a grande plantation de canne We a sa centrale
sucri6re >.
Nous avons deja note ]a priorit6 absolue accord6e a la
canne a sucre ; viennent, en seconde ligne, la production lai-
ti6re et les a ufs, a cote des plantations pour ]'exportation :
surtout agrumes, cafe, ananas. En dernier lieu seulement
arrivent les cultures vivri6res pour ]'alimentation locale, et
]a production de viande. Sur ce canvas general, esquiss6
par le bureau politique et precise par la junte centrale de
planification, une carte de rspartition des cultures dans toute
file vient d'etre 6tablie, surtout sur ]a base de I'6tude des
sots, du relief et de ]'eau d'irrigation disponible...
L'histoire de ces a plans ]Fidelxx, qui furent tous trios coQ-
teux, est plutot une longue suite d'6checs que de rdussites.
Le plan horticole de Pinares de Mayari a &6 6tabli sur des
terres lerrugineuses, trop filtrantes, sujettes a I'6rosion,
inaptes aux cultures maraieh6res, qui sont en vole de Iat6-
risation, qu'il ne faut pas toucher : les for6ts de pins sont ici
mieux a deur place. Le plan cafe de San Andr6s de Ca]-
guanabo, province de Pinar del Rio, oii l'on se proposait de
passer tout de suite au communisme, a 6ohou6. J'ai note
a Pest de La Havane, sur. des coteaux calcaires non irriga-
bles, des plantations de cafe qui ne recevaient gu6re plus
d'un metre de pluie, avec de trop longs mois de s6cheresse.
En 1969, j'ai retrouve press de Bayamo des dizaines d'hec-,
.tares de vignes bien mal en point, car pilantees dans ces
argiles noires imperm6ables, ou' nous noterons plus loin
1'6chec des bananes et de la canine a sucre. Pr6s de Sancti
Spiritus, des coteaux mieux drain6s 6taient plant6s en vigne,
mais lors de mon passage on await mis pr6s d'un kilo
d'engrais It chaque pied, tout concentr6 contre le cep, ce
qui allait le bruler a ]a premiere pluie. J'esp6re qu'on. I'a
i depuis seme a la vo16e, comme je l'ai consei}16, sur tout le
vignoble. En 1965, ce sont d'immenses 61evages de eh&vres,
en 1966, de -lapins, qui doivent etre -ensuite plus ou moins
abandonn6s. En 1967-1968 on plante a travers toute file
des pois d'Angole, les Gandoul, qui ne donnent pas grand-
chose et que le b6tail refuse ; les hommes aussi, quand on
leur en propose les grains. Le kudzu tropical ne donne pas
les rendements miracle que I'on avait esp6r6...
(Chapitre III, pp. 63, 64, 65 a 67.)
Insuffisance et precipitation
L'organisation de 1'economie cubaine e'st toile qu'il est
devenu a peu pr6s impossible d'6tablir des calculs 6co-
nomiques assez valables pour mieux l'orienter, et tenter
d'esquisser un ordre de priorit6 plus rationnel des investis-
sements ; ce qui permettrait de maximiser ]a croissance de
la production. Il me parait pour cela n6cessaire de Bonner
one autonomie comptable aux unites de production ; puis
d'6tablir des rapports de prix, interieurs et ext6rieurs, qui'
soient moms arbitraires ; ensuite attribuer un certain taux
d'inter@t aux capitaux fournis aux entreprises... Pour la
production agricole, nous avons essay6 de montrer, en
6tudiant ]'agriculture sovietique, la n6cessit6 6conomique
et sociale, pour eviter trop d'injustices, d'une rente fonci6re,
qui chercherak ainsi a placer dans des situations moms'
injustes les travailleurs des entreprises ayant recu des
terroirs avec conditions naturelles (sots, 'timat, eaux..\) e\
6conomiques (d6bouoh6s, infrastructure) tort variables.!
Les plans agricoles. cubains sont surtout 6tablis en objec-
tifs physiques, en hectares a planter et a semer. Aussi la
qualitct du travail n'a-t-elk pas 6t6, jusqu'a present, prise
suffisanunent en consideration. Chacun s'affaire I alter vite,
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%J Ll
r
do prod kel
cumulent. ab.iissant les rendements. Puisqu'on a refuse, sans
jostitication, la solution de la cooperative do production,
;'. rsonno, en tant quo groups limits, nest directement into.
resse A une meilleure efficience des entreprises d'Etat ; et
cela se volt bien. Memo si les Brands dirigeants ont ggnerale-
ment une haute conscience de leur responsabilite nationale
et revolutionnaire, ils satisfont du meme coup leur soif de
pouvoir. L'ouvrier, lui, souffre sous le dur soleil et dans son
baraquement mal aere ; surtout quand it recoit de sa
famille des lettres de plaintes, relatant !les multiples diftt-
cultes de ]a vie quotidienne ; alors it conunence h en-avoir
asset ; et la production s'en ressent...
Un exemple : I'Oriente. Cette province, qui constitue
le tiers de Cuba, devait fournir trois millions de tonnes de
sucre, 30 % du total national. De belles plantations y ont
std rgalisges, mais beaucoup d'autres sont bien inegales,
tries sales Qu mal placees ; de sorts que 'le rendement moyen
y sera infgrieur h celui de La Havane. On a plants, malgre
1'avis des paysans du lieu, des zones tellement humides
que - les boutures y sont mortes. Certaines de ces zones
d'argile noire semi-margcageuses furent replantees trois fois,
avant que l'on renonce devant une coflteuse accumulation
d'gvidences.
Tout au long de ]a route centrale, ie grand axe de l'ile,
dans la basse vallee du Cauto, on pout voir, non loin de ces
cannes en perdition, de vaster bananeraies en train de
mourir, egalement faute de drainage, en sols argileux. Des
1926. los nremiC'res etudes de sols faites h Cuba concluaient
? ;',' t='t ?.. -t. t, 'a~.', V':, iiG~ nA: 11 1:J1"
, 5,eni 4..l X
sit no convenaient guere qu'aux patures et aux rizic'res.
On est enfin en train de les convertir en rizieres, apres avoir
commis bien des fautes, qui eussent ate facilement svitables,
en demandant 'l'avis des vieux agronomes que Won a mis sur
]a touche, ou plus simplement des paysans.
Une grande partie des canneraies plantges on plaines plates
verraient leur rendement fortement augmentg par un meil-
leur drainage qui permettrait, en terre moyenne, de passer
souvent de 35 3 60 tonnes de cannes par hectare, nous
dit Faustino Perez. Ce]a coOterait beaucoup moins cher h la
tonne que les cannes obtenues h plus grand travail dans les
plantations nouveiles ; surtout quand etles ont etg 6tablies
sur des terres vraiment marginales. Quand le drainage n'a
pas ate prevu, comme A la Centrale Naranjo, 1'erosion a
silencieusement ouvert de profonds ravins, qui vont. goner
la recolte mgcanique. Une partie des cannes n'a pu We
desherbee h temps ; le citadin de Bayamo, mobilise pour les
biner, grince des dents, mais ne perd pas le sens de l'hu-
mour : (Qu'est-ce qu'il y a com-me cannel, dans lee mau-
vaises herbes, cette annee )), dit-i4 vdlontiers 6. ses amis,
quand apres une longue queue it pout enfin s'asseoir avec
eux au restaurant.
II y a certes dans cat objectif exaltant quelques resultats
positifs. On esp ere obtenir un effort exceptionnel. La meca-
nisation de la recolte de canne, le nettoyage par herbicides,
progressent ; tout cela permettra bientot de produire le
sucre, en supprimant les durs travaux serviles. Cependant,,
si cet objectif si ambitieux de 10 millions de tonnes avait
6t6 retards de quelques annges, comme nous 6tions nom-
SSi~t u e pr uction
A i 9 s r~16 ceu ment affectCs:
Nous le montrerons notamment A propos des primeurs
d'hiver ; mais ?les rizi6res en ont ete, egalement affectees.
(Chapitre V, pp. 101, 102, 109, 110, 111.)
Une agriculture militarises
L'agricult*ire cubaine est de plus en plus militarises. Des
les debuts de Ia reforme' agraire, l'armee jouait un role
essential. Cette agriculture eat desormais dirigee it partir
d'un poste de commandement - puesto de mando - natlo.
nal, dont j'ai vu le chantier...
Des puesto de mando analogues - ont stg ou vont titre
etablis A 1'echelon des provinces, des regions, des Plans.
'route l'agriculture sera en quelque sorte codifiee, et chaque
poste commence a recevoir, des unites de production pla-
cees sous ses ordres, certains renseignements journaliers,
hebdomadaires, mensuels, etc... ; et ccci par diverses voies :
telephone, telex, radio, telegrammes, courrier. On s'inquii to
beaucoup, et n juste titre, de savoir quels sont les renseigne-
ments qui seront necessaires A tel ou tel echelon, A que'lle
cadence, et par quelle vole it conviendra de les transmettre.
Probleme difficile : si ]'on abuse du renseignement, les
cadres des unites de production seront noyes dans le papier,
comme ceux des granjas ; et ils n'auront plus assez de temps
pour Ic travail productif. Si le commandement n'a pas asset
d'616ments d'information, ses decisions risquent d'etre ina=
daptees AL 4a situation reelle : or c'est lui qui decide, encore
Cette structure mi'litaire, et c'est ]A sa caracttristique esson-
tielle, ne fait pas assez confiance a la base. Trop de choses
sont decidees sur papier, d'en haul ; de sorte que les travail-
leurs mobilises, embrigades, sont devenus des exscutants,
tout com.me de simples soldats. Le chef d'un lot de rizii re
- le sous-officier - recoit des instructions sur tout ce qu'il
dolt faire jour par jour, depuis le jour J, germination de la
variete de riz semee, jusqu'au jour J + 110 ou 120, date
prgvue pour la znoisson-battage.
L'agriculture cubaine realise pourtant un ensemble de
ti ches infini'ment plus complexes que cellos d'une armic
du temps de paix. Cependa.nt, une telle mgthode prescnltr
certains avantages : elle permet d'imposer une serie d'inno=
vations A tout le pays, d'un seul coup ; sans avoir A obtenir,
par une persuasion parfois difficile, 1'adhesion volontaire
d'une paysannerie comptant de nombreux entrepreneurs,
dont tour ne sont pas assez cultives pour en saisir vita
Pinteret. La dose d'engrais, le materiel, los techniques ct tu-
rales, tout est decide h 1'6chelon a technocratique v, qui
est sense titre bien au courant des techniques les lus
modernes...
On a d'abord sliming une agriculture capitaliste, qui avait
bien des dgfauts (sous-emploi des. terres et des hommes),
mais disposait d'une structure assez efficace. L'agriculture
socialiste qui lui a succkdg, cells des .cooperatives et des
granjas, a mobilise toutes les ressources disponibles, s'est
equipge et surgquipge, sans retrouver les memes capacites
d'organisation du travail. Son echec est implicitement
reconnu par la r6orientation actuelle, aelle des plans sp6-
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 aussi ra I tonne e, Mais a it es structures Sans im s-
lants materielsgO0&if6R ~~ll
moins. Et finalement, la societe militaire, le trait le plus
original de Cuba, s'est en quelque sorte imposee pour
remettre de l'ordre, car ?l'armee dtait restee la mieux orga-
nisee de toutes les administrations. Devant les velleitks de
fantaisie de Fidel, seul son frire Raul, qui le connait bien,
est capable de resister efficacement...
Ainsi s'impose peu a peu un certain aspect de cet homme
nouveau, qui nous etait deja apparu sur les affiches a 1'en-
tree do 'T'ile des Pins. L'horntnc nouveau, c'est le soldat
rnodele, toujours entre les mains de ses chefs, decide a se
sacrifier, acceptant dans la joie toutes les difficultes, toutes
les missions. Ses chefs ont toujours raison, ((Fidel ne se
discute pas. > Changer 1'homme, disait le c Chen. Dominer
la nature, ajoute l'affiche. Mais ne cherche-t-on pas mainte-
nant a donuner I'homme ; si l'adulte y resiste, le jeune
l'accepte plus souvent. Quand 'le , me disent
a moi, dont on connait pourtant bien la position, les plus
hauts responsables politiques cubains. 11 faut done que ce
soit terriblement vrai. Les militaires eliminent des postes de
commande beaucoup de vieux communistes, dont je suis
loin d'approuver toutes les theses, mais qui cherchaient
souvent a freiner un certain nombre de 7eurs abus. Voici
Fidel Castro, commandant en chef des forces arm6es r6vo
lutionnaires, dote d'un pouvoir personnel sans contrBle suf-
fisant. Nous avons vu que cela 4'a souvent conduit a des
improvisations hatives, a des g6n6ralisations prematur6es, a
des precipitations dangereuses, sinon a des erreurs 6cono-
miques caract6ristiques.
Le refus d'analyses 6cono?miques s6rieuses empeche la
determination d'un meilleur ordre de priorit6, trouble ('af-
fectation Ia plus judicieuse d'une masse 6norme d'investis-?
sements, ?rendus de ce fait beaucoup moins efficients. Et sur-
tout les travailleurs deviennent plus r6ticents, cherchent a se
reposer, vont jusqu'a noyer les phares des tracteurs : car
'beaucoup commencent a d6sesp6rer d'en sortir. ce Quelle
We a, eu ma mere de me faire naitre dans ce fichu pays n,
criait, on soir de l'6t6 1969, ce jeune d6sesp6r6, a ]a sortie
d'un cinema de La Havane.
Fidel ne se rend plus compte que d'une partie des diffi-
cult6s, car son entourage n'ose plus tout lui rapporter. Il lui
faudrait envisager une certaine limitation de ses pouvoirs,.
avant qu'il ne soit trop tard. Cette reorganisation politique,
bas6e sur un controle effectif du parti par les travailleurs, du
comit6 central par le parti, et de Castro par ledit comit6,
me parait le pr6alable a'bsolu, la condition essentielle du
redressement 6conomique, base n6cessaire d'une r6elle ind6-
pendarce cubaine. En donnant tous les pouvoirs a I'arm6e,
on affaiblit son 6conomie, donc linalement sa capacit6 de
defense nationale.
Oui, je le sail : tout ceci est facile a 6crire a la table d'un'.
vieux professeur de la vieille Europe, bien difficile a r6a'liser
par ceux qui ont la responsabilit6 du pouvoir a La Havane.
Muchisimas gracias, Fidel, pour m'avoir donne la possibilite
01970 editions du Seu0
6
4001090(8 HT
Approved For McTease
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400100001-1
JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris
31 March 1970
Dumont's 'Is Cuba Socialist?' Reviewed
Excerpts from forthcoming book
by Rene Dumont: "Is Cuba Socialist"
Rene Dumont, who is 66 today, has carved out a,solid
world-wide reputation for himself as a "critic" and a
"pessimist." His prejudices irritate. His advice is
exasperating. While his competence in agronomy is rec-
ognized all over the world, and respected, his suggestions
as to the operation of a socialist economy or the articula-
tion of decision-making structures have consistently met
with a mixed reception. Since his "L'Afrique Noire Est
Mal Partie" lack Africa Is Off to a Bad Star came out Lm_ in 1962 he has been declared persona non grata by numer-
ous African governments.
In Cuba, Dumont is welcomed with eagerness, mixed with
a considerable dose of trepidation. Fidel Castro person-
ally has invited him there three times:, in 1960, in 1963,
and most recently in June 1969. As he was setting out for
Cuba, Dumont had tentat1vely entitled his second book on
Cuba,"Cuba, ou les Quatres Periodes d'un Socialisme.Originale"
fCuba, or the Four Phases of a New Socialism' A month
later, after his on-the-spot investigation, he had scrap-
ped that title for "Is Cuba Socialist?" Dumont makes no
effort to hide it. He came home disappointed, pessimistic,
uneasy over the future. While he is still in the camp of
those faithful to the Cuban revolution, he will not hear
of anyone's questioning his right to criticize his friends.
In 1964, Rene Dumont dedicated his first book on Cuba,
("Cuba, Socialisme et Developpement") to "the Algerians."
In 1970, it may be salutary for the Africans, who are still
trying to draw inspiration from the Cuban model, to read
and ponder Is Cuba Socialist? Seuil press is bringing it
out in the Politique series 248 pages, 5 francs).
In this book, which is a sometimes over-rich blond of
anecdote, first-hand experience, and value judgment, Rene
Dumont retraces the essay at building socialism in Cuba
from the era of "generous and romantic rebellion" to the
present period of "tough reality," passing through the
stage of "centralized bureaucratic planning" and that of
"building cosaaunism."
In the end, Rene Dumont has an ansvor to the question that
lies at the heart of the problems Is Cuba socialist? You
feel that he Is torn throughout the study between his syae
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 Ap my&O Fd}r f llI4a 4400100001-1
his professional conscience, and the answer he comes up
with is one that many will find harsh indeed: the economy
is growing more militaristic with each passing days the
cult of Fidel is turning into neo-Stalinism, a Mwellein+
taationed" Mite is piling up privileges, *too
4,eu a ri uc has acquired the rights to publish the first
extensive excerpts of this book.
G. de Beurepalre
CPYRGHT
pecial Plans A Pailure
The state farm was still a diversified agricultural operation, and In
many ways a traditional one. Ciba I. looking for the very latest operating
formulas, those of the United States, for very large-scale industrial agricul-
ture, big enough to make use of aircraft for such operations as plantings
fertilising, weed. and pest-killing.
Toward the end of 1967, it was decided that the concept of the spa-
cialized plans should be broadened to embrace the entire island. This is
the story of their failure. After the drive for making each province capable
of feeding itself, designed to cut losses by shortening shipping distances and
reducing losses an route, mum an effort to grow each crop conveniently near
to its processing plant, if not to its port of export. The idea was to gener-
alise the old vertical idea od a "big sugar plantation with its own sugar all."
We have already spoken of the absolute priority as3signed to sugar cane..
Right behind it comes milk and egg production, planned around export crop
plantations of citrus fruits, coffee, and pineapple. In the very last place
come food crops for local supply and meat production. On the overall canvass
sketched in by the political bureau and with the details filled in by the cen-
tral planning junta, they have just completed a crop-distribution map cover.
ing the whole island. It has been worked out primarily on the bads of a sure
vey of the soils altitudes and available irrigation water supplies...
The history of these "Fidel Plans" all of which were very expensive,
is the story of a long series of failures* rather than successes. The Pinares,
de Mayari garden plan was located on iron-rich soil that was too perm ble and
subject to-erosion, quite unsuited to truck gardening, which is fast: turning
into laterite, and which must not be touched: pine forests would do far better
here. The San Andrea de Caiguanabo in Pinar del Rio province, where the idea
was to leap directly into communism, is a failure. To the east of Havana, I
saw unirrigable chalk cliffs planted with coffee which received a scant motor of
rainfall, doled out over endless months of drouth. In 1949, near liayazo, I
found dozens of hectares of vinyards in very bad condition because they had
been planted in those black hardpan clay soils, the same kinds as we shall sea
further on, as proved inhospitable to bananas and sugar cane. bear Sancti Spite
ritus there wore some better-drained slopes planted to vinyards, but when I
wont through there they had just got through putting almost a kilo of fertili-
ser around each vines but all of it concentrated around the trunks which meant.
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CPYRGHT
vines would-W badly burnt when the first rain came. I hope that they
have done soma broadcast sowing of ground cover in the vinyard, as I advised
them to do. In 1963 there were starts at raising huge numbers of goats, and
in 1966 t2-bbthingere the things both projects have been more or loss abandoned
since. In 1967 and 1968 the whole island was planted to Angola peas, or Can.
doul, which did not turn out to be much, and which the livestock refused to
sat. So did the people, when the seed?grain was offered for sal. in the market.
The tropical Kudzu peas did not produce the niraole yields that were touted for
them. (Cpapter 3, pp 630 649 and 63.67.)
Shortages and Rsin
The Cuban economy is so organised that it is impossible, or nearly so,
to formulate forecasts reliable enough to give It better orientation, or to
try to map out a more rational order of investment priority, Which would make
it possible to boost production to the rroxximum. It seams to me that in order
to do this there must be some kind of bookkeeping independence for each unity
of production. Then there must be an established price ratio for the domestic
and foreign marketa, and it must be less arbitrary than the present system.
After that, there should be a calling not for Interest rates on capital made
available to businesses*** `For farm production, we have tried, by studying the
Soviet agricultural economy, to demonstrate the economic and social need for
a guaranteed Income from farmland, In order to avoid too great injustice..
Such a subsidy would took to make a little loss unfair situation for farmers
on eolaectives assigned lands with highly variable natural conditions (such
as soil, climate, eater) and economic situations (such as market availability
and Infrastructures). d
Cuban agricultural plans are not up chiefly with physical targets such
as so many hectares of land to plant and to sow. This moans that the quality
of the work done has'not so for been taken adequately Into consideration.
Everybody in eager to got It dome fast, even too fast, which perforce means
doing a sloppy job. The coats of production rise as mistakes pile up and
yields dWpole. Since there is an unjustified refusal to consider the produce
Lion cooperative solution aobody In a limited group is directly Interested
in greater efficiency for the state?run enterprises', and this is all too *vi-
dent* Ellen though the top aanag.ment people are generally highly aware of
their responsibility to the notion and to the revolution, they are also satia?
fyina their personal thirst for power. The worker, though, suffers under the
hot sun and in his airless barracks, particularly when he gets letters from
his family complaining about the manifold difficulties of everyday life. That
is when he begins to got sick of it a110 and the effect of his disaffection
shows In the production figures.
One example is Oriente. This province, which covers a third of Cuba,
,is supposed to provide three million tons of sugar, or 30 percent of the na-
tional total. There are some splendid plantations there, but a groat many more
are far from that standard, either very dirty or very poorly located. And as
a result the yield in Oriente is lower than that In La Habana. Against the ads
vice of the peasants who know the land, they have planted sugar in areas so
damp that the seedlings diode Some of these seai?marahy black clay zones were
planted three times before the planners gave up In the face of a mounting pile
of costly evidence*
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All along the central highway that runs the length of the Island In
the low valley of the Cauto? you can soo, not far from the dying cane groves,
huge banana plantations that are drowning in undrained hard clay soil. As
early as 1926, the first soil surveys takenlin Cuba concluded that these black
and very clayey soils, with their poor drainage and high magnesium aontont, were
fit only for marginal pastures and rice paddies. Nov at last they are getting
around to planting rice there, after making a lot of mistakes that could easily
have been avoided by asking for advice from the agronomists made available to
them, or more simply by just asking the local peasants,
Most of the sugar cane planted on the flat plains would produce far
higher yields is there were better drainage, which, on average land, would boost
harvests from 33 tons per hectare to as much as 60 tons, Faustino Peres told use
This would cost for loss per ton than the cane grown with far more work on the
new plantations, particularly those that have been established on really mar-
ginal lands. When there has been no provision for drainage, as at the Naranjo
Centers, erosion has crept in and silently carved deep ravines which are going
to cause trouble when they try to use machinerylin the harvest. Some of the
cane has not been wooded soon enough. A man from Baysma, mobilized to weodtthe
cane fields, Is none too happy about the job, but keeps his sense of humor all
the samoi "What a lot of cane there I. In the woods this year," he comments to
his friends when, after a long wait In line, he finally gets a seat with them
in the restaurante d
Of course, there are some good results from this heady objective. They
hope to got an all.out effort. Mechanization of cane harvesting and woad cone
trot with herbicides are making progress. All this will shortly make it pos-
sible to produce sugar without all this backbreaking manual labor. Meanwhile,
since this vary ambitious target of a 10-million-ton harvest has been delayed
for several years, as a great many of us predicted'It would be as early as 1964,
the available production factors could have been distributed more judiciously.
We shall demonstrate this most dramatically In connection with winter vegetable
crops, but the rice paddles have also been afdectedo (CA.), pp 101,102,109,110,
111.1
J i 'i rod Asxi cum
Cuban agriculture Is becoming more and more militarized. From the very
beginning of land reform, the army has played an essential role. Agriculture
here is now run from a command post `e puesto de mando ee in the capital, and I
have seen it at work...
Similar command posts have been or will shortly be not up for every roe
glen, every province, every Plan. All farming will operate under some sort of
code, and each command post is beginning to receive from each production unit
under its orders certain Information on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis.
The reports come in by telephone, telex, radio, telegram, and courier. There
Is considerable concern, and rightly so, over what information has to be sent
to such and such an echelon, and how that Information ought to be sent. This
is a tough problems If there is too much demand for Information, the cadres
out in the production units will be drowne4 in paper work like those In the
granjas, and they will not have enough time left over for productive cork. If
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the commnd+;post does not got enough data, Its decisions may moll be unsuited
to the real situations but it is the puesto that wakes the decision, and makes
it at considerable distance from the field.
This military structure, and that is essentially what it is, dons not
have enough confidence in the-rank and file. Too many decisions are made on
paper, from above. Which means that the mobilised vorkora, put into brigadaa,
have bsooma more carriers-out of orders, exncstly like privates. The boas of a
plot In a rice paddy ?. the non-com -- gets his orders as to what he In to do
day by day, from D-day when the kind of rice he has planted should germinate,
.to D-day plus 110 or 120, when the rice is to be harvested and thrashed.
And yet Cuban agriculture parformis a group of tasks far more complex
than those of a peacetime army. Novorthslosa, such a method has certain advan?
tagoa. It makes It possible to impose a whole series of innovations on the
entire country at the same tiaw, without waiting for sometiEzoa difficult par*
suasion to achieve the voluntary cooperation of a peasantry with a number of
Individual farmer-owners, all of whom are not sufficiently educated to grasp
the advantage of the Innovation at once. The amount of fortilisor, the equip.
a~ont, the cultivation techniques ?? everything is decided on the "technocratiddl
lovol, where they are supposed to be thoroughly up-to-date on all the latest
techniques...
d
They began by eliminating capitalist agriculture, which had Its faults
(including under-use of land and.mon), but had a fairly efficient structure.
The socialist agriculture which has peplaced it, the agriculture of the coop-
eratives and the granjas, has mobilized all available roaoureea, is equipped
and over-equipped, but tins yet to find the same capacity for organising the
work. Its failure is implicitly admitted by the current reorganization under
the special plans, which we shall study shortly. And In parallel with this,
within the fraate'eork of the revolutionary offensive* we see the formation of
s4litarisation of the entire Cuban eoossoaay.
All the important jobs are now hold by the army. All the sizeable opo-
rations are headed by a major, a captain, or a first lieutenant. The drags
rehearsal for this army takeover was apparently staged In October 1967 by the
Cho Guevara brigade. Almost a thousand tractors, bulldozers, and tanks assccab-
lod In the Cauto bottomlands In parade formation,-got the go signal from Castro
himself as he reviewed them in his jeep. This brigade went out to cut its new
enemy, nature, to pieces, indiscriminately rolling over everything that gave
the island Its chars, all that had enchanted awn from Christlphor Columbus to
Alexander Uua aboldt.
This was a genuine takeover of s p"tty shaky socialist agriculture by
the army, because the army controls all the motorised equipment. Mkt a =r
vslous training-school for roctuits these 50,000 tractors, more or loss miatrsa?
tad by those ignorant agriculture people, would bei" a famous commander must
have thought one day. Starting in March and April 1968, the bossou of the
emaquinaris on the granjas were replaced by lieutenants, and the militarised
tractor operators now have fixed wages (no =ore overtime), and work on a mi-
litary timetables 23 days straight work, Ao Sundays oft, and 3 days leave per
month..e when the work load allows it.
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also schools for young recruits. They plow at full speed In fourth Soar.
You hear about extraordinary records ?. 24 hours, even 72 hours of continuous
workd Tanks whose turrets have been removed are linked together two by two
with heavy chains, and simply maw down the trees, without a thought as to the
tress that should have been spared. But it Is a great sight to sea those big
trees topple like strawstacka we except when an exceptionally sturdy one rolls
over even the mighty Soviet tanks.
Agriculture, in addition to a problem that they hope to solve, thus
becomes a magnificent maneuvering ground for the army. Militarization is
sold as a solution to the general mass as well as to the passive resistance of
a ;crowing proportion of silent workers. The Cuban people are Increasingly
subject to the party and to the army, and It Is increasingly difficult to tall
the partyhmen from the army son, since they all carry revolvers. (Ch. 3, pp
141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148.)
eta MM Man Is tba S d a
What, than, has become of these original charactQrs in Cuban 60041104
w1um I reported with such pleasure in 1960 and 1963, and whom I came back to
ace again with such grsateexpectations in 1969* even though I did not agree
with some of them? Do they still justify the title I had tentatively chouon
for this book? (Before I left* I had planned to call It "Cuba, ou lea Quatre
Periodos d'un socialisaae original." Pursuit of the study unfortunately lead
me to change that title.) Here they are, essentially roducad to a more mills
tary society* In which Raoul Castro often repeats the arayls shibboleths "For
whatever It may be, wherever it may be* and under any clecumatances vhatmrs
we omit your orders, Comunder.in?ableti"
Then came the farm mobilis,ationa, In which Castro seems to use to show
the Eastern countries the kind of obedience HE can coxwand. then cam* the 4bOlft
ition of overtime pay. And In the lost analysis, it is all similar in some says
to Stalinisa* without the same kind of torror,obut with a lot of police. And
va find another trait of Stalinism here In the simplification of theory., You
need not stay long In Cuba to see that visions which you fool is magnificent,
though hard to imagine, of the now man living in a fraternal society,blur and
grow dim...
"Two thousand years of preaching Christianity," I said to Mgr. Zachi,
who represents the Vatican in Cuba and maintains cordial relations with Fidel
Castro (thatq too* is a point for Castro), "all to make men betterm have pro-
duced only limited results," "ohs how limitedi" answorcd Monsignor. I read
somewhere that we had moved from the cave+oaan are Into that of the ls,?rracks mane
And the barracks an swaggers in triumph In Cuba* Where the posters boast of
national prides and the little "eamillitos," the disciples of Camillo Cion?
fuegos, the cadets In the school for future officers, are trained from child-
hood In very special courses designed to hake them the future rulers of their
country, not merely future fighting none
A revolution might hope to make men progress faster than Christianity
did, which soon degenerated Into Constantinian conformity. It it could keep
than beat of "che," and make everybody participate as It weaned the majority of
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Cubans away from their Inborn lasineaa which is also traditional. But estab?
liahing structures without material Incentives had as its first result making
the musses work less, rather than more. And lastly, the military society, the
most striking trait In Cuba, was In a gray inevitable In order to restore orders
because the army was the boat organized of all the administrations. The Only
an who can put up any effective resistance to Fidel Castro*a imaginative
whims Is his brother Raoul, who knows his well*
And so, little by little' a certain aspect of this new man, whom we had
already soon a glimpse of on the posters at the entry to the Isle of Pines,
is imposed. The new man is the model soldier, always obedient to his leaders,
determined to sacrifice h1m9e1f, joyfully accepting all difficulties, ready
to take on any mission. His leaders are always right. "Fidel is not to be
argued about." Change people, said "Cho*" Dominate nature, adds the poater.,
But are they not trying now to dominate the stisn? If the adult puts up some
resistance, the child most often accepts it. When "Cho" began to understand
where all this was leading, might not such a trend have ooittributed to his
decision to leave?
(Chapter 7, pp1810 182, 183, 184, 183.)
h ' st t rt , th ?1oet 8oaialist of Rog uc,a
When It began, Cuba set up the most socialist of existing regimes,
with more popular enthusiasm and more freedom of expression than in the rest
of the socialist camp. But alas, things have changed greatly. Of course there
are still a groat many factors in this country that favor the building of
socialism. It has solidly established its national independance by rejecting
its dopendance on the Yankees.. And yet It depends economically on tho Soviet
Union, which makes a certain form of socialism easy for it, but does not allow
It to consider any other structure and to draw closer, for examplo, to the
Chinese Ideology* The state here has economic and political powor, which enables
It to give top priority to satisfying a great many collective needs. Some of Its
induutrial achievements constitute very marked progress (cement
electricity
,
,
sugar). Fishing In making progress, and the importance Fidel has given irrigatio,
is essential. Cattle raising, forage crops, and plantations are advancing in
disorder, but they are advancing. Some of the workers are still enthus1a8CIa,
seven under difficult conditions. But Is this state really run by the people,
the workera, the oppressed? It would sac= excessive to may so. Gradually a
ruling group has emerged, through successive elimination of certain factions
and of other leaders. The same leader has been at the nation's head since 19590
and still nobody has challenged hies. Amd right there Is the thing that hurts
uk)at. Because, In my opinion, no country can call itself socialist If there Is
almost no chance for the people to challenge their leader. And this is Al trait
common to greater or lesser degree to all the countries which call themselves
socialist these days. Hance the doubts we feel as to Cubans socialist charao?
tar extends to the entire socialist camp. And that is riot a thingathat will
sake us happyi
Discipline is noceasary, of course, to ensure continued development,
which requires increased savings ?? some say enormous investments. And this
involves austerity, which mould be more acceptable If It were truly generals
or also stop talking about building communism at the same time, if you also
call yousolvas very pragmatic. You feel it necessary to give greater revards
to the most loyal laadors, those who are In charge of making others work.
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in this case, do not forget that the humblest workers would also be very
sensitive, in the present phase, to material incentives. Organized into little
working collectives, Into production units (agricultural, artisrnal...) and
distribution unite, they would have a personal interest in sucking them prosper.
This kind of socialism would be quite imperfect, you will say,;"and you would
be right. But it could fill the tables and the cupboards a lot faster, and
that is very important. And above all accept the standard of the struggle
against bureaucracy, which could take a form suitable to this country of cul?
We see the socialist elements in very marked retreat in Cuba, particu?
larly since the military have taken over effective managotaont of the entire
economy. The giant plan structure. scarcely permits an effective organisation
of labor. Battalions of workers and equipment, in such a structure, cannot
ensure the quality of work or full use of'costly equipment. The cadres are -
in over their heads,.and are not always well informed. Cuba's production coats
are going higher and higher, and the . demand', for effort and sacrifice is rising
at the same rate as privation. The country is not managing to put its economy
back in order, despite constant reorganization. ~"No domocratio discussion in
the party," o was told, despite their knowledge of ay poaition, by the hi h.
oat-ranking Cuban politicians. That means that it must be all too terribly
true. The military are ousting many old communists from their jobs. Although
I did not approve all their views by a long shot, they often tried to put a
brake on some of the military's abuses. Look at Fidel Castro, ooamuindor?In?
chief of the revolutionary armies,, given personal power without sufficient
contooi. We have seen that this has often led him into hasty improvisations,
premature generalisations, and dangerous precioltatlon, if not into typical
economic errors.
The rejection of serious economic analysis prevents the establishment
of a better order of priorities and hampers the most judicious poaeiblo use
of an enormous mass of investments, which are thus rendered far loan efficient.
And most important, the workers are growing sullen, looking for a chance to
loaf, even going so taraas to break the headlights on the tractors, because
many of them are beginning to despair of things' ever getting any batter. One
evening in the summer of 1969, a youngster coming out of a movie in Havana
cried, "What a fool my mother was to let me be born in this lousy country!"
Fidel is no longer aware of more than 'a part of his problems, because
those around him do not dare to tell him everything. He must start considering
ome degree of limitation of his own powers, before it is too late. This poo
litical orgrganiration basodoon real control of the party by the workers, of
the central committee by the party, and of Castro by the committee, seems to
me to be the sine qua non, the essential condition for recovery of economic
balance, which is the necessary foundation for real Cuban Independence* By
giving all power to the army, it Is weakening its economy, and, in the long
run, Its capacity for national defense.
Yes, I knows all this Is easy for an old professor to sit at a desk
in old Europe and write, but it is hard indeed to do for those who have the
responsibility for governing in Havana. Nuchisimas gracias, Fidel, for
giving as a chance to do a fascinating study. (Chapter 9, 9p 233.236.)
14
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Fidel Castro often says that if a moan who has fallen into a well makes
a little efforts a medium effort, or even a great effort, he will never gat
out. He can only get out by moans of an utterly extraordinary effort. And
it is precisely that sort of effort which he demands of his pooplo and of
himself, in order to clamber out of the well of underdevelopment.
Tidal Castro is an historic figure, an exceptional parson, who has given
his country and his revolution an extraordinary place in hidtory, one quite
out of proportion with its geographical Importance. There are two common at-
titudes toward him today. For the Yankees and their allies, for the world that
all too glibly calls itself tree, and which I should rather call the rich
world, and which its enemies a little glibly call 1aperialisnts Fidel Is a
dangerous enemy, a dictator.
For the unconditional supporters of Cuba, particularly those outside
Cuba, the dominant feeling to one of odalratlon pushed to the point when it
generally blunts any critical seas....
In the last analysis, Didol Castro trusts nobody but himself, and he
cannot entirely delegate responsibility. No is still the sole leader. He
fools that he must see to everything himself, put everything to rights himsdlf.
Of course, he is tho universal inspiration. His goals inspire people towwork,
his speeches still stir a dogrea of enthusiaum, particularly among those most
loyal to himp the sugar-cane workers. But when he begins promising them the
moon, many of his Cuban listeners simply tuon off therradio.. They don't bollove
it any more, no wants to do everything himaolf, and he has too many ldeas at
one time, ovary day, wary minute, all of which he wants implemented right
then, without stopping to take a close look at all the difficulties involved.
Many of his projects had a certain vacua, and the failures failed bocrauae
they were launched at the whim of the "ilder maximo," without adequate prior
study, too fast and on too large a scale. Fidel thinks he knows everything in
many areas better than anybody else, and it is his pride that way one day prove
to yo before his fall.
1 V I l 1 1 A u n o t
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Excerpts fromt.
Arms
for the Third .World
SOVIET MILITARY
AID DIPLOMACY
WYNFRED JOSHUA AND STEPHEN P. GIBERT
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
BALTIMORE AND LONDON
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CONTENTS
8. Challenge and Response: Soviet-American Military Aid Competition 127
I. Soviet Military Aid in 1=crnationa1 Politics ......-..........---
Priority Regions-in Soviet and American Military Aid Programs .. 129
Changing Soviet Images of International Politics . .............. .
The Sources of Military Aid ... ........................... 134
Approaches and Scope of This Book ......................... ,
Foreign Policy Orientations of Military, Aid Recipients .........: 140
Twelve Years of Aid Competition ............................ 145
2. The Middle East ....................................... .
-,
7
9, Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy in Perspective .................... 149
The Middle East in
oviet Foreign Policy .. ........ . .........
Soviet Arms Aid Relations with the Arab Nations ..............
Patterns and Magnitpdc of Soviet Arms Aid ...................
The Aftermath of the June 1967 War ........................
7
8
17
25
Aid Patterns, Characteristics, and Themes ..................... 149
Achievements, Failures, and the Future of Arms Aid Diplomacy ... 154
Selected Bibliography .................................... 161
Index ..................................................... 167
3. Sub-Saharan Africa .....................................
31
Africa in Soviet Foreign Policy s
.................
31
............
Soviet Arms Aid to SubSaharan Africa ........ ...............
33
LIST OF TABLES
Common Factors in Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy ...............
The Balance Sheet of Sie.t Arms Aid to Africa ................
45
50
2-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to the Middle East: _
1955 to June 1967 .......................................... 23
4. South and Southeast Asia .................................. .
53
3-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa:
1959 through 1967 ............................ .
45
South and Southeast Asa in Soviet Foreign Policy ..............
Arms Aid Initiatives in Neutralist Asia ........................
54
56
......
4-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to South and Southeast Asia:
The Scope of Soviet Ants Diplomacy ........................
72
1956 through 1967 ...................................... 73
6-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Assistance to Military Aid Recipients:
5. Latin America ....... ..................................
79
1955 through 1967 ...................................... 102
Latin America in Soviet Foreign Policy .......................
Cuba: The First Latin American Collaborator ................
79
83
6-2 Estimated Soviet Bloc Economic Aid to Developing Countries
Receiving Economic Aid Only: 1954 through 1967 ............ 103
The Impact of Soviet ? nary Aid to Cuba ....................
88
8-1 Estimated United States Military Aid to Third World Countries:
FY 1956 through FY 1967 ......................
130
6. Soviet Bloc Aid Diplomacy: Policy Alternatives .................
97
..........
8-2 Comparison of Regional Priorities in Soviet and United States
The Choice of Donors: Which Member of the Wareaw Pact? ......
98
Military Aid ............................................. 131
The Choice of Instrum
nt
/Lies?
Mili
i
E
100
..........
e
s:
c
tary or
conom
The Interrelationship of Military and Economic Aid! ............
105
S-3 Number of Countries within Regions Receiving American and
Economic Aid and the Soviet Military Posture ...................
107
Soviet Aid: A Comparison of Two Sources of Aid, 1956
Trade and Aid ............................................
108
through 1967 ..... ....................................... 135
7. Wars of Liberation and Military Aid Policy ...................... III
Concepts of Wars in Soviet Doctrine ...... , .. ............. 112
Wars of Liberation Posies ............................... ... 116
Policy Assessment ...................................... , . 11.5
8-4 Scores of Agreement between Aid Donors and Aid Recipients on
Political and Security Roll Calls in the United Nations:
1958 through 1964 ...................................... 142
9-5 Scores of Agreement between Aid Donors and Aid Recipients on
Colonial Roll Calls in t e United Natio ,s: 1958 through 1964 .. 144
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PREFACE
Since peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the western
nations has gained prominence, the USSR has sought ways to compete
for influence in the Third World. Military assistance to the developing
nations has? emerged as a key element in Soviet-American rivalry.
Soviet foreign policy has been extensively studied, including efforts to
penetrate the Third World through economic aid. Scant attention, how-
ever, has been paid to military aid as a major component of Soviet
foreign policy. This study, therefore, attempts to round out further our
understanding of the instruments of peaceful coexistence and Soviet
policy in the Third World.
This book grew out of research we originally undertook between
1964 and 1968 for the Georgetown Research Project of the Atlantic
Research Corporation under contract with the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research. We are grateful to the Atlantic Research Corpora-
tion and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research for permission to
use some of this material as the basis for further research and analysis,
- We alone are responsible for the accuracy of facts and interpretations.
The views expressed in this book are our own and do not reflect the
opinions of the institutions with which we have been or are now affiliated,
nor of those who have so generously given us their assistance and
counsel.
WYNFRED JOSHUA
Stanford Research Institute, Washington
STEPHEN P. GIBERT
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.
APPROACHES AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK
The Soviet military assistance program can only be understood as an
integral part of contemporary Soviet global foreign policy. While not
neglecting its paramount interest in maintaining preeminence in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin has accorded a much
higher priority to extending its influence into the less-developed regions
of the world. This objective is pursued by a variety of instruments, a
key one of which is the furnishing of military aid to selected cou-;tries
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Dependent upon
individual circumstances, aid includes weapons, spare parts, military
training, and the construction of military and para-military operational
facilities. The program appears designed to promote the image of the
Soviet Union as the champion of anti-colonialism and to support those
objectives of aid-recipient nations consistent with Soviet foreign policies.
Further, Soviet leaders hope to forge or strengthen links between the
armed forces of the recipients and the Soviet Union, and to foster diplo-
matic and military dependency on the USSR. Soviet decision-makers
apparently anticipate that accomplishing these aims will strengthen the
international position of the Soviet Union at the expense of the United
States. It also will prevent Communist China from establishing itself
as the champion of and model for the developing countries.
Soviet military aid policy appears to operate within the parameters of
two constraints: the necessity not to take actions in furnishing military
aid that will bring on nuclear confrontation with the United States; and
the requirement that aid programs be consistent with the level of de-
velopment of the recipients, as well as with the conditions imposed by
the nations themselves. Throughout the book an attempt has been made
to assess the impact of these constraints on Soviet military. aid decisions.
For this reason, although the study focuses on Soviet military aid
diplomacy, the conditions in the recipient countries and their objectives
in requesting military assistance have been discussed where relevant.
This approach permits an emphasis upon the international security im-
plications of Soviet arms diplomacy and avoids a mere accounting sheet
of weapons transfers. Stated differently, this study analyzes the impact
of Soviet military aid to the developing countries on the international
diplomatic scene in general, and on the great powers' struggle for in-
fluence in the Third World in particular.
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. The study starts with an analysis of Soviet military aid to the major
regions of the developing world. The regional approach has been
selected because the impact of Soviet arms deliveries is seldom limited
to the particular recipient country. More often, it affects as well the
politico-military strategy of the major world powers and lesser states
adjacent to or near the recipient. Within each world region the key
nations receiving aid, such as Egypt in the Middle East, India and Indo-
nesia in Asia, Somalia in Africa, and Cuba in Latin America, have
received special attention. ?
Subsequentlycertain functional topics important to an understanding
of Soviet military aid diplomacy are considered. These include the alter-
natives open to the Soviet Union in pursuing military aid policies, arms
aid used to support wars of liberation, and the competitive aspects of
Soviet and American milkary aid programs.
This analysis is concerned only with Soviet military aid diplomacy in
the so-called non-aligned or Third World countries of the Middle East,
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. No consideration, accordingly, has
been given Soviet aid to East European countries or to other communist
countries such as China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam.'
This restriction Was necessary because the objective of the book is to
assess Soviet arms diplomacy as an instrument of competition for in-
fluence among non-European and non-committed nations rather than to
consider relationships armitig communist countries themselves. Also, it
is difficult if not impossible to secure reliable estimates of weapons flows
among the communist countries. This limitation, however, has been
modified to allow the inclusion of Cuba, since its position in interna-
tional affairs is quite distinct from that of other communist states and
because reliable data on Soviet military aid to Cuba is available.
Throughout the study value estimates of Soviet military aid have
been given in U.S. dollars. The choice of dollar estimates was arrived
at since dollar figures are usually cited in the press. Although the terms
of an agreement frequently specify that Soviet arms aid has to be repaid
in raw materials or commodities, the use of dollar values permits a ready
comparison of the magnitudes of the various arms aid programs.
While Soviet arms diplomacy is referred to throughout the study as
"military aid" or "military assistance," in fact the more technically
accurate term in most cases would be "military loans." While much
American aid has been in grants, almost all Soviet military aid has been
in the form of long-term, low-interest loans. Since this is a marked
difference between the Soviet and American programs, the technical
distinction between loans and grants has been discussed separately, as
have the relationships among military aid, trade, and economic aid.'
The terms "Soviet aid" and "Soviet bloc aid" are used interchange
ably except where noted otherwise. Nearly all Soviet bloc aid has in
fact been aid from the USSR itself. Only Czechoslovakia among the
Soviet bloc countries has contributed a measurable amount of military
aid. "Soviet bloc" refers to the USSR and the members of the Warsaw
Pact. The use of the term "Soviet bloc" is merely a shorthand expres-
sion and does not imply monolithic unity among the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. Military aid by Communist China is not included in computing
Soviet bloc aid totals.
The history of Soviet military aid is now sufficiently developed to
permit an assessment of the program's current usefulness to the Soviet
Union and its utility in the foreseeable future. Since present indications
are that military aid diplomacy will assume an even greater role in
Soviet foreign policy in years to come, an understanding of its impact
on the security of nations has become of vital importance.
PATTERNS AND MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET ARMS AID
Between the start of Soviet arms aid in 1955 and the present, suffi
cicnt time has elapsed to permit drawing a distinction between the more
enduring and the more ephemeral factors and patterns in Soviet arms
aid diplomacy. In providing military assistance, Moscow plainly at-
taches importance to some factors and is willing to overlook others.
Most arms aid candidates have to meet certain qualifications, although
since 1964-65 the Soviet Union has apparently been prepared to dilute
some of the requirements for becoming an aid recipient.
As a rule, the USSR displays little concern for the domestic political ori
enaction of the recipient states. Egypt, like most other Arab recipients, con-
tinues to enjoy Soviet military assistance in spite of its measures outlaw-
ing or restricting internal communist activities. In only one instance in
the history of Soviet arms diplomacy in the Middle East did the Soviet
Union halt its aid program to register its protest against the recipient's
anti-communist policy at home. This case involved the Baath regime of
Iraq, which had ousted General Kassem in February 1963. The Baath
leaders, members of a militant Arab nationalist and strongly anticom-
munist movement, embarked on a violent purge of indigenous com-
munists. Moscow's intense disapproval of Baghdad's domestic course
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was expressed in a warning that Iraq's persecution of local communists
prejudiced the future of Soviet economic and other aid-16 Exacerbating
Soviet-Iraqi. tensions was Iraq's armed offensive against the Kurds, who
had started a guerrilla war to win autonomy. The Soviet Union, which
sympathized with the Kurds' demands for autonomy, threatened to
terminate its aid to Iraq if Baghdad continued its military operations
against them.17 When the Baath leaders refused to stop their actions
against Iraqi communists and Kurdish insurgents, the Soviet Union in
the summer of 1963 halted its military supplies and training programs
for-Iraq.18 A thaw -in Soviet-Iraqi relations did not occur until the most
extreme Baathist ministers were dismissed in November 1963 and a new
government began to relax the repressive measures against domestic
communists. In May 1964 Iraq obtained new military aid credits.'9
Although the offensive against the Kurds was resumed with full force a
year later, Soviet arms supplies continued to reach Iraq without
interruption.
Except for Iraq, the Soviet Union did not use its arms aid instrument
to try to effect a change in the recipient's policies toward domestic com-
munism, nor did Russian arms aid imply approval or disapproval of
these policies. Military aid transactions reflect Soviet recognition of the
value of tolerating the personal attitudes and preferences of leaders who
have a national, if not also a regional, following. This explains Soviet
forbearance of Nasser's frequently arrogant and scornful attitude toward
Soviet ideology and at times even toward the leadership. Similarly, the
Russians lionized Ben Bella, notwithstanding his repression of the
Algerian Communist Party.
Moreover Nasser and later Ben Bella, because of their anti-western
bias and their relentless commitment to wars of liberation, promoted
Soviet interests by transferring some of their Russian-made weapons to
other militant regimes and to insurgent movements in white-dominated
and so-called neo-colonial African states. While Moscow may not have
originally intended to supply arms for re-export purposes, the Russian
arms carried by the Egyptian army into Yemen served to effectuate
Soviet hostility toward Saudi Arabia. The Soviet weapons Egypt and
Algeria shipped to the Congolese rebels who fought the Tshombe govern-
Pravda, February 20, 1963.
'r Ibid., June 20, 1963.
"U.S. Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organiza.
tions, 18th Annual Report (Washington, 1966), p. 101.
" Daily Telegraph (London), May 24, 1964.
ment in 1964-65, helped to enhance Soviet prestige in militant Afro-
Arab circles. This tactic of supporting wars of liberation by proxy
partly offset Chinese charges that the Soviet Union had betrayed the
wars-of-liberation commitment. The re-export device also helped to
protect the Russians against risks of escalating a local conflict into a
confrontation with the western powers.
Another key factor in the framing of Soviet military aid policy was
the importance of the military elites in the Middle East. Soviet military
aid strategy could succeed only with the support of the military, which
plays a crucial role in the political life of Middle Eastern countries. On
the military devolved a large institutional responsibility for sustaining
national efforts toward modernization. In several Middle Eastern coun-
tries, notably Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, and Turkey,
the military establishment provides either the national leaders or the
most vital organizational support of the government. In the long run,
this ascendancy of the military may appear in Soviet eyes as a negative
force in the building of socialism. But in establishing a foothold in the
Middle East, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to exploit the military
elites' ready perception of the advantage of armris air) hots- `:.. the :-
and for their own political role. -
Table 2-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to the Middle East: 195S to June 1967 (In Millions
ai U.S. Dollars)$ -
VAR ........................
............
Syria .................................................. at least 300
Yemen .................. :........... ................ .......
..... ......
Iraq .....................:................... ..........
Morocco .............. .at least 500
.......................... .
Algeria ............................... ............ 20
Cyprus ........................ . .. ........ 200
Iran .................. ................ 28
........... .................. 100
Estimated Total: $2,748
I These figures do not fully convey the true costs of the arms aid. As far as the Russians are
concerned, much of the early materiel was obsolete and had lost much of its value for them.
As far as the recipients are concerned, occasionally they obtained Soviet arms at a discount
rate. The figures, moreover, do not reflect what it would have meant to the recipients had they
been required to make repayments in hard currency. Nor can these figures be compared with
figures for U.S. arms aid to the Middle East, since the United States made most of its aid
available as grants. The problems in assessing the dollar value of Soviet military aid are
discussed in Chapter 6. Data presented for the UAR, Cyprus, and Iran are derived from sources
documented in previous pages. For the figure for Algeria, see Joseph Palmer 11, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Address, U.S. Department of State Press Release
No. 109 (May 9, 1967), p, 7, The figures for Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Morocco are based on
reports on the successive w4iiitary assistance accords in daily newspapers and journals.
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, Continuity in Sov er Arms Aid Dip?o,m y. The persistence of the
basic trends in Soviet military aid policy in the Middle East was re-
flected in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. Soviet efforts to shore
up Egypt's position after the war suggested that Egypt remained the
main target of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. _The Russians
recognized that Egypt retained the leadership of the militant Arab
world, that it offered easy Soviet access into Africa, and, last but not
least, that it controlled the Suez Canal, the major route for Soviet ships
to the Indian Ocean. As long as Nasser, and other Arab leaders ap-
peared to command popular acclaim and mass following, Soviet policy-
makers were prepared to support them. Ideological considerations as-
sumed at best a secondary role in Soviet arms aid diplomacy, as re-
peated'Russian offers of military assistance to King Hussein of Jordan
indicated.
The rearmament campaign permitted Moscow to deepen its penetra-
tion of the military establishments of militant Arab states and of
Egypt's armed forces in particular. Soviet participation in retraining
and reorganizing the defeated Egyptian army and air force provided the
Russians with more effective access to Egyptian military elites and with
greater opportunities for influencing Egyptian military policies.
Moscow's arms diplomacy and aggressive penetration goals had
undergone no change. In fact, the aggressive pattern in Soviet policy
evolved more distinctly than ever. Soviet leaders did try to exclude the
risk of a direct armed encounter with the United States. At the same-
time, however, they proceeded to restore the distribution of military
power in favor of the militant Arabs, undermining thereby western in-
terests in the preservation of order and stability in the Middle East. The
USSR reinforced its military aid presence at the eastern flank of the
Middle East along the Red Sea coast in Yemen, in the. center of the
region in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and at the western gate of the Medi-
terranean in Algeria.
The growth of the Soviet Union's military presence in the Middle East
was further demonstrated by the buildup of its surface task force in the
Mediterranean, where only token Russian naval forces had previously
operated. By 1968 between forty and fifty Soviet warships were de-
ployed in the Mediterranean." The Soviet fleet received permission to
utilize Syrian, Egyptian, and Algerian ports. France's decision of Oc-
tuber 1967 to return to Algeria the large naval base at Mers-el-Kebir in
early 1968-ten years ahead of schedule-raised the possibility that a
base across from Gibraltar would become available to the Soviet fleet in
the near future.
Soviet naval presence in the Middle East did not necessarily imply an
intention to acquire formal base rights, which would involve sensitive
political issues. It is important to distinguish between base acquisition
and base utilization. Rather, the Soviet Union appeared to be developing
a capability similar to that of the United States in being able to project
its naval power beyond immediate coastal waters without the benefit of
fixed overseas bases with fuel, supplies, and repair facilities. The Rus-
sians accomplished this by means of a supporting fleet train consisting
of oilers, store ships, tenders, and repair ships which could anchor in a
harbor or other shallow, sheltered waters. Compliant Arab countries
were the likely candidates to supply such harbors and anchorages, espe-
cially since the outcome of the June war had driven the militant Arabs
closer to the Soviet camp.
The Six-Day War reflected the impact of the nuclear balance of power
between the Soviet Union and the United States and emphasized thereby
the growing importance of the military aid instrument. Because the
nuclear balance has dictated a tacit understanding between the two
superpowers to try to avoid an armed confrontation between them on
behalf of a third party, the Soviet Union did not intervene during-the
fighting. In fact, both the Soviet Union and the United States delib-
erately limited their actions once the war had broken out; both were
eager to halt the shooting. In the end, they had no choice but to accept
the fait accompli of Israel's victory. Moscow's unwillingness to come to
the aid of the Arabs threatened to result in a serious political setback
for t he Russians. The one option left to the Soviet Union after the
defeat of the Arab states was to resupply them with substantial military
aid. This was the only effective response the Russians could take to re-
trieve their losses in the Middle East, and although undoubtedly expen-
sive, it proved to be a highly successful course.
On the whole, Moscow emerged from the June 1967 crisis with its
position in the Middle East greatly enhanced. To the extent that Arab
dependence on Soviet military and other support deepened, Moscow's
leverage in the Arab world did increase substantially. This does not
mean that the Soviet Union achieved full control over Arab leaders, but
it is reasonable to conclude that the latter are now unlikely to pursue
'* New York Times, December 31, 1967; Washington Post, December 29, 1967. a policy that would antagonize their principal backer, and certainly not
as long as they need Moscow's arms. For the near future, therefore, it is
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justifiable to assume that the Soviet Union succeeded in turning the
Arab catastrophe of the Six-Day War into a major Soviet victory=
In terms of the more distant future, however, it is possible that the'
large-scale Soviet arms shipments after the June war may put the Soviet
Union in the role of the sorcerer's apprentice. While the chances of a
fourth Arab-Israeli war may be presently remote, Nasser or another
Arab leader may feel forced to resume hostilities against Israel in order
to protect his position at home. Indications are that the Russians did
not want the-19?7 crisis to escalate into a full-fledged war. It must be
remembered, however, that in spite of extensive arms aid, the Soviet
Union was unable to prevent Nasser from taking the provocative actions
that led to the June fighting. Although after the June war Soviet con-
trol over the militant Arabs increased, Moscow may again be unable to
restrain its Arab prot6g6s from launching another war against Israel at
some future date, thereby drawing the Russians deeper into the Middle
East quagmire.
COMMON FACTORS IN SOVIET ARMS AID DIPLOMACY
The Limitations. In terms of dollar value, Soviet military aid to sub-
Saharan African states reflected the region's secondary role in Soviet
policy toward the developing world. Cumulative arms aid to Africa still,
totalled under $100 million by 1967, and with the exception of the
credits to Somalia, the various programs were relatively small, as Table'
3-1 illustrates.
Table 3-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: 1959 through 1967(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Congo-Brazzaville...._.. .:.................
................
CongoKinshasa.......................... . $l!
1.5
Ghana ...... ................... . ... ..............
Guinea ...... ....... ......
..... ........................ . .. to 15
Mali.......... ......................... at least 6
................
least
Nigeria ............................... at
.... 3
....................
1 0
15
Somalia ............................... Ot
... .....................
Sudan.......... 35'
Tanzania .................................................................. N.A.
Uganda .................................................................. 5 to 10
N.A.
THE BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIET ARMS AID TO AFRICA
A crucial element in Soviet arms diplomacy in Africa continues to be
the objective of eliminating western and especially American influence.
At times Soviet action was a specific response to U.S. military aid poli-
cies. The $35 million Russian arms deal with the Somali Republic,
aimed at countering U.S. influence in neighboring Ethiopia, derived at
least in part from the $72.6 million U.S. military assistance program
there.7e Russian involvement in the 1964-65 Congo rebellion was to
some extent a reaction to U.S. military assistance to the Congolese
government. But the existence of a U.S. arms aid program was not a
necessary condition for the Soviet Union to act. Guinea and Nigeria
were specifically turned down by the United States for arms aid before
the Soviet Union moved in with military assistance, and American mili-
tary aid to other west African countries was insignificant. As a rule,
Soviet military aid policies were formulated with broader goals in mind
than offsetting a nearby U.S. arms aid presence. They were designed
to erode in general the western position in Africa. Whenever the climate
suggested receptivity to Soviet overtures, Moscow proved ready to offer
arms assistance to African governments. In consequence, no ideological
restrictions inhibited Moscow in its arms aid ventures.
This flexibility and pragmatism was facilitated by the relatively modest'
allocation in Soviet resources required to support arms aid to Africans.
No African state could be expected to use great quantities of weapons
or highly sophisticated arms. Even the operation of standard weapons
required training. Thus a relatively small investment could yield sub-
stantial political benefits for Moscow. The training programs, further-,
more, provided the USSR with an opportunity to attempt to influence
African military elites. In light of the growing number of military coups
d'etat, the good will, if not support, of the military could be essential to
the success of Soviet policies in Africa. For all these reasons arms aid
will remain a vital instrument in Moscow's African policies.
Soviet direct and indirect military assistance to African insurgent
groups has shifted in emphasis. Initially supporting dissident factions in
both independent black and in white-controlled states, the Russians later
rendered aid primarily to the national liberation movements, which
wanted to overthrow the white regimes. This aid remained more noted
for its political effects than its contribution to the military capability of
the freedom fighters. By their support of the freedom fighters, Soviet
leaders sought to appeal to militant Africans throughout the continent
"The $72.6 million represents cumulative U.S, military assistance to Ethiopia
through FY 1964. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Wash-
ington, May 1966). p. 14.
Sources: Data presented are derived from sources documented in previous pages, except
for Ghana, Nigeria. and Tanzania, where cost of equipment reported in the open press
has been listed. Costs were calculated on the basis of approximate costs of comparable
U.S. equipment and assumed to include such additional items as support equipment for
aircraft, tools, spare parts, and oibea;conaornilant equipment.
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and to respond to Chinese charges of betraying the national liberation
movements.
Efforts to offset Chinese influence were reflected not only in Soviet
activities with dissident groups, but also in Russian aid to African gov-
ernments. To be sure, the prospects of Chinese inroads and the signif-
icance of Chinese competition should not be overrated. China's logistic
problems and limited support capabilities place Peking at a great dis-
advantage with respect to Moscow. Nevertheless, rivalry with China is
likely to remain an influential motive in Russian arms diplomacy and
could trigger Soviet pre-emptive action to provide arms aid. Chinese
operations in east Africa helped to focus Soviet attention more closely
on this area.
The evolving power vacuum in the Indian Ocean region, owing to the
accelerated British withdrawal from the area east of Suez, further por-
tends increased Soviet efforts to penetrate eastern Africa. Within sub-
Saharan Africa the Indian Ocean littoral appears to command priority
in future Soviet arms diplomacy.
In retrospect, the Soviet Union has not realized any dramatic results
from its military aid programs in Africa. In fact, in Ghana and the two
Congos Russian arms aid met with failure. These setbacks have not
deterred the Russians from embarking upon new military assistance ac-
tivities, as recent agreements with Nigeria and the Sudan might suggest.
Moscow's arms diplomacy in Africa is an integral part of its overall
policy of undermining western influence. By 1967 more than one-
fourth of the military establishments in sub-Saharan Africa had received
Soviet military assistance, whereas ten years earlier external military in-
fluence came solely from western sources. Although Soviet arms aid
diplomacy has created neither African satellites nor substantial de-
pendency on the USSR, the Russians are now active competitors for
influence over the destinies of African states.
THE SCOPE OF SOVIET ARMS DIPLOMACY
The early years of Soviet arms diplomacy in South and Southeast Asia
reflected an emphasis on orthodox Soviet objectives. These included
encouraging a newly independent state to sever its ties with the former
European metropole, countering the defense initiatives of western alli-
ment to single dependency for arms buildup and replacement. While
not losing sight of these objectives, around 1960-61 Russian arms aid
policy was forced to respond to the growing threat of the establishment
of paramount Chinese influence in the area. Soviet arms aid activities
intensified, particularly in the wake of the November 1960 Conference
of Eighty-One Communist Parties in Moscow, where Russian leaders had
failed to compose the developing Sino-Soviet controversy. Soviet. mili-
tary aid increased both in terms of dollar value and in number of com-
mitments. After 1964 the Vietnam war progressively became the focus
of Soviet attention in the region and affected Soviet policies. Arms aid
to non-aligned recipients decreased and became mainly confined to the
Asian subcontinent. Nevertheless, Soviet military aid had reached sub-
stantial amounts by the end of 1967, as Table 4-1 illustrates.
The distribution of Soviet military aid in South and Southeast Asia
shows that Indonesia, India, and Afghanistan were the countries to
which Russian leaders attached the greatest importance. Indonesia re-
ceived by far the largest share of the Soviet arms aid dollar in the
region. While aid to Afghanistan in absolute dollar amounts was rela-
tively limited, in relation to the size of the defense budget of a recipient,
Afghanistan had received more aid than any other recipient.68 The
Table 4-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to South and Southeast Asia: 1956 through 1967
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
1260
Afghanistan ............................................................
to 10
Pakistan ...............................................................
India .................................................................. 600 to 700
Indonesia .............................................................. 1,200
5
Laos .................................................................. 3
Cambodia ............................................................. S to 10
Estimated Total: $2,185
Sources: Estimates for Pakistan, India, and Indonesia are derived from sources documented
in previous pages. Estimates for Laos and Cambodia are based on costs of equipment reported
in the press. Costs were calculated on the basis of approximate costs of comparable U.S.
equipment and assumed to include support equipment for aircraft, tools, and spare parts.
The estimate for Afghanistan is similarly based on equipment costs and on a comparison of
bloc economic aid with total bloc aid to Afghanistan as reported in the New York Times,
May 28, 1967.
transfer of highly sophisticated weapons systems to these three recipients
further underlines their significance in Soviet policy. Each acquired the
MiG-21 jet; in fact, Indonesia was the first country outside the bloc to
receive the MiG-21. India, although receiving less total aid than Indo-
nesia, appeared to be the most privileged recipient among the three
antes, preventing "reactionary counterrevolution," and consolidating 66 In 1965, for example, Afghanistan's defense budget was only $23 million.
Soviet influence in the recipient state by reducing the military establish- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World-Wide Military Expenditures
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states, in that India was the only one to obtain a licensing agreement to
produce and assemble MiG-21s at home. All three acquired batteries
of SA-2 Guideline miissiles. Indonesia and India were the only two
countries, other than Egypt, which were able to negotiate agreements for
submarines.
The record of Soviet military assistance diplomacy in the South and
Southeast Asia region shows that between 1956 and 1968 the Soviet
Union managed to establish a military aid presence from Afghanistan in
the northwest to Indonesia and the Indochina peninsula in the southeast.
Receptivity to Moscow's initiatives on the part of recipients who had
failed to acquire weapons from western sources greatly facilitated Soviet
efforts. The balance sheet of Soviet arms aid policies included both
gains and setbacks; the record dictated caution in the Asian sub-
continent and the Indochina peninsula.
In Afghanistan, the first recipient in the region, the armed forces de-
pended almost entirely on Soviet weapons aid. It seems doubtful
whether they can function for any length of time without Soviet spare
parts and fuel.111 While the Russians have not tried to turn Afghanistan
into a satellite and have generally avoided open interference in the
country's internal affairs, it is highly unlikely that Kabul can pursue any
foreign policy to which Moscow strongly objected.
Farther east, Moscow has made considerable progress toward replac-
ing western military influence with its own. The Soviet Union has be-
come India's largest source of military supplies and has succeeded in
creating
limited arms aid ties with Pakistan. Yet Soviet military aid
policies in these countries turned out to be extremely vulnerable to pres-
sures caused by actual and potential changes in the political-military
power constellation on the Asian subcontinent. The potential threat of
China in south Asia and the regional conflict between India and
Pakistan circumscribed the Soviet Union's freedom of maneuver in its
aid policies. The Russian dilemma resulting from the Sino-Indian border
war in October 1962 caused delays and obstacles in Soviet-Indian arms
aid discussions. When the negotiations were finally resolved in favor of
India, it served as a warning to China to restrain its ambitions in the
region.
"See Welles Hangen, Afghanistan," Yale Review, vol. 56, no. I (October 1966).
p. 66.
The subsequent rise of Chinese influence in Pakistan led the USSR to
intensify its efforts to improve relations with Pakistan, a process already
under way as part of a broader endeavor to turn the erstwhile northern
tier of western defense into an area open to east-west rivalry. Little per-
haps was more galling to New Delhi than Moscow's arms aid agreement
with Rawalpindi in 1967. The new Soviet military aid relationship with
Pakistan, however, posed serious problems for Moscow in view of the
danger of antagonizing New Delhi and the attendant risk of India's turn-
ing to the west again. Since Indian good will remains an important asset
to the Russians, particularly if Chinese influence grows in the Asian
subcontinent, a decision to offer additional Soviet arms aid to Pakistan
will probably be accompanied by political concessions to India and by
compensatory weapons aid.
The history of Soviet aid activities in the states of the Indochina
peninsula demonstrates Soviet capability to react promptly to emergency
requests. While military aid generally arrived by ship and with a to-be-
expected time lag between the agreement and the delivery date, in Laos
the Soviet Union in December 1960 responded immediately with an
arms airlift to Souvanna Phouma's request. The Russian airdrop of
arms to the Viet Cong in early 1961 also attested to Moscow's rapid
reaction capability.
Soviet emergency aid to the coalition of Laotian neutralists and com-
munists helped to bring Souvanna Phouma back into power. But the Rus-
sians were unable to consolidate whatever influence they had in Laos or
with the Viet Cong. Hanoi began to control the flow of arms, including
Soviet arms, to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. In fact, formulating
policy for the former Indochina states proved most difficult and com-
plex for Soviet leaders, since it also involved Chinese and American rela-
tionships. Moreover, as Hanoi's demands increased, the flexibility of Rus-
sia's response diminished. To reject an appeal from a communist ally
fighting the major power of the capitalist world carried not only the risk
of driving North Vietnam into China's arms, but the threat that such a
rejection would erode Soviet influence in other states as well. Under
these circumstances the Soviet Union stepped up its military aid to
North Vietnam. By the end of 1967, except for a modest military
assistance program in Cambodia, Hanoi clearly had priority in the
allocation of Soviet arms aid resources for Southeast Asia.
In Indonesia, intensive Soviet military aid diplomacy eventually failed
to achieve the Soviet objectives of insulating Indonesia from western
influences and turning its government into a supporter of Moscow's poli-
cies in the Afro-Asian world. Moscow's lavish arms shipments, per-
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sistent encouragement of the Irian policy, and somewhat cautious sup-
port of the Malaysia confrontation could neither win the allegiance of
Indonesia's army leaders nor alter Indonesia's increasingly pro-Peking
position in international relations between 1963 and 1965. Indonesia's
return to a more impartial foreign policy after the October 1965 coup
was prompted by changes in the domestic power structure and not by
Soviet persuasion. Its new military regime, in fact, sought to improve
relations with the west rather than with the Soviet Union. It may also
have been that the persecution of indigenous communists was too brutal
and created a climate too hostile for Indonesia to be able to re-establish
close relations with a communist power. The prospects are that Indo-
nesia will pursue a more truly neutralist policy, not only concerning the
Sine-Soviet quarrel but regarding east-west relations as well. The Soviet
Union's marked disinterest in renewing its extensive military assistance
program in Indonesia suggests a recognition by Soviet leaders that for
the near future few gains are to be made in Indonesia.
Latin America is correct only from a short run pest of view. The Rus-
sians do feel that the Cuban Revolution is not a '!?d example for the
rest of Latin America to follow and that the lack !,f cohesive leadership
and ideological unity among guerrilla movements h.s for the time being
doomed them to failure. Soviet strategists, howe?i r, remain convinced
of the revolutionary potential of the continent anti strongly imply that
when "conditions are ripe," a return to subversi(n and revolution will
be feasible.55
Finally, it is misleading to conjecture that Soviet disenchantment with
Fidel Castro has led them to harbor thoughts of disengagement from that
alliance. While Castro's purges of pro-Moscow communists and his
continued advocacy of aid to insurgent movements present the Soviet
Union with a constant dilemma, "the Soviet Union would presumably
rather have these worries . . . and the controversies than have no
Castro."66 While the Soviet Union does profit from its increased con-
tact with other Latin American governments, the advantages of having
an ally in Cuba (even at the $1 million-a-day price tag) appears to be
valued by the USSR highly enough to justify its investment. -
Cuba still remains of military significance to the Soviet Union. In
spite of past failures and the historical evidence discussed before, it
could be argued that Cuba remains a potential missile base. Cuba is also
a potential naval base and refueling stop, which -would permit Soviet
vessels to remain on station longer in the Caribbean. It is even now an
invaluable intelligence center for monitoring U.S. missile range activities
in Florida and Texas and will shortly be used as gt tracking station for
Soviet space shots. The use of Cuba as a military diversion is also occa-
sionally mentioned oT although at present Cuban diversionary potential
would amount to little more than harassment.
Even though the net benefit that the Soviet Union has received from
its association with Castro has been substantial, Caere are indications
that the Soviet Union would not at present be as enthusiastic in its re-
sponse to a request for military aid if another oourgeois revolution
should succeed in Latin America.
the Middle East after the June 1967 war are a case in point. It is more u The Russians did sign the agreements arrived at dueing the January 1966
likely that the Russians fear that communist penetration of another Tricontinental Conference of Havana, calling for insurra?st on throughout Latin
Future Alternatives for Soviet Military Aid Policy. There are several
theories that could be developed from the failure of the Soviet Union to
promote an aggressive military aid program in Latin America. It could
be argued that the Soviet Union, as part of its attempted detente with
the United States, does not wish to take any action in Latin America
which might jeopardize Soviet-American relations. Or, the Soviet Union
might be acting upon its own theories about the "peaceful alternatives"
to armed revolution in Latin America and, therefore concentrating on
united front tactics. Finally, one could conclude that the hazardous
association with Fidel Castro has discouraged the Soviet Union from
considering a possible repetition. Each of these theories contains ele-
ments of wishful thinking about Soviet intentions.
First, the Soviet Union is not likely to be restrained from taking any
action which it deems advantageous to its interests merely out of con-
sideration for a Soviet-American rapprochement. Russian activities in
Latin American country, or even the threat of this, will be met by firm A1itnca'
and probably successful U.S. intervention. u Leon Lipson, "Castro and the Cold War," p. 199.
" Baldwin even believes that the United States has fi *d to divert a
Second, the notion that the Soviet Union has renounced the use of fr " what , essent?ly a static,
force and denied that r:AiaP xSall}~ i s Pw s Q19W2 : CWrRs Vi ~ ~ t P1rspecti`w,- p. 220.
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Cuba is likely to retain for some time its exclusive status as the only
Latin American nation receiving Soviet bloc military, aid. The sensi-
tivity of the U.S. government and the anti-communist tradition of the
Latin American military are major obstacles to new Soviet military aid
inroads in the western hemisphere. But if and when any additional
Russian arms aid agreements are made in the region, they will be
modest and will probably take the form of inter-governmental trans-
actions rather than covert assistance to anti-government groups. Agree-
ments are unlikely to include weapons of a primarily offensive nature
but may involve transport and communications equipment. In these
categories commercial purchasing practices, rather than political con-
siderations, are apt to guide Latin American governments, leading to
possible trade or aid in Soviet military equipment which has a competi-
tive edge in price or quality over similar offerings from western govern-
ments.
The Soviet. course in the later 1960s, although ambiguous enough to
draw substantial criticism from Maoists and Castroites, enables the
Soviet Union to pursue a gradualist policy of helping to overturn the
U.S. monopoly of influence in the Latin American region. The con-
tinuing, if reduced, military assistance program in Cuba, while not im-
periling the success of this major policy, may still afford the Soviet
Union long-term opportunities for the support of militant revolution in
Latin America.
CONCEPTS OF WARS IN SOVIET DOCTRINE
Soviet doctrine distinguishes three basic types of wars: (1) general
and strategic war; (2) local-limited war; and (3) wars of liberation.
Soviet spokesmen strongly condemn the first two types of wars but
emphasize the duty of communists to support wars of liberation. Soviet
sources, however, are somewhat ambiguous in distinguishing between the
various types and are occasionally even contradictory. While Soviet doc-
trine is fully developed as regards general and strategic war, other
types of war concepts are not fully articulated. Accordingly, Soviet
policy toward non-strategic wars, whether local wars or wars of liberation
in doctrinal terms, must be interpreted not only from Soviet statements
but also through empirical analysis of Soviet behavior toward these
conflicts.
. . a p
In no area of discussion about the use of force to achieve interna-
tional objectives are Soviet statements more vague and more contra-
dictory than in the case of wars of liberation. It is frequently assumed
that these types of wars refer solely to conflict initiated by communists
or other revolutionary elements within a society, usually the so-called
national bourgeoisie, against a capitalist-colonialst incumbent govern-
ment. This interpretation, in fact, has been given credence by Khrush.
chev's extensive review of world politics in a speech before a group
of world communist leaders meeting in Moscow in January 1961.1
Other Soviet statements seem to suggest, however, a much broader
definition of wars of liberation.
A 1964 article written by two Soviet army colonels identifies Soviet
military aid to incumbent governments in Indonesia, Egypt, and Algeria
as aid to "national liberation movements .112 Another article justified
Soviet military aid to newly independent nations as necessary to assist
these nations in their "fight against colonizers."3 This theme, that in-
cumbent governments are also forces of national liberation, was re-
peated in a 1965 commentary which stated that the Soviet Union grants
new nations "long-term credits at favorable terms . . . to strengthen
their national-liberation armies and provide them with modern military
technology."4 The military of the new nation-states are regarded as
forces of national liberation in conflict with capitalism and colonialism,
whether at home or abroad. Military aid to these incumbent revolu-
tionary-type governments is justified, since the "armed forces of these
countries have acquired an anti-imperialist character" and are struggling
to free themselves from foreign control .5
These statements, coupled with Soviet aid behavior, suggest a broad in-
terpretation of wars of liberation, which includes at least three distinct
elements: first, struggles by revolutionary elements, communist or not,
'See Charles Burton Marshall (ed.), Two Communist Manifestoes (Washington:
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961), passim.
' Lt. Col. G. Eckov and Colonel Prilepskii, "World Socialist System: A Decisive
Contemporary Factor, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sit (Communist of the Armed
Forces), no. 22 (November 1964), pp. 34-41.
'Colonel S. Kukonin, "The Character of our Epoch and the General Line of
the World Communist Movement," ibid., no. 21 (November 1964), pp. 15-22.
"Contemporary Stage of the National Liberation Movement," Ibid., no. 6
(March 1965), pp. 67-71.
'Colonel E. Delgopolov, "Armies of Liberated Africa," Krasnaia Zvezda (Red
Star), September 25, 1965, p. 3.
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within a state against an incumbent capitalist government; second,
conflicts of communist states in the less-developed world against capi-
talist governments; and third, wars by non-communist but left-oriented
new states against capitalist nations. All three types of wars of libera-
tion are to be supported and encouraged by the Soviet Union through
the provision of military assistance. These wars are "holy wars," "just
wars"-legitimate instruments for hastening the day of world com-
munism.
The Soviet government would prefer, of course, to back recipients
who have some reasonable chance of winning their wars of liberation.
At the same time, Soviet decisions must also take into account the
opponents of the wars-of-liberation forces. Thus the Russians might
support even a losing side if the other combatant were a western coun-
try or strongly oriented toward the west. On the other hand, they would
not support a preferred but losing side in a case where neither pro-
tagonist was closely linked to the western powers. With these standards
in mind, it should be noted that the Soviet Union has not supported
indigenous communist movements in wars of liberation against and.
colonialist, nationalist-bourgeois regimes when it appeared that the
communist forces could not possibly succeed. Examples of this policy of
restraint include Soviet disinclination to aid communists in Egypt and
Indonesia against friendly regimes or even Indian communists against
the neutralist government of India.
In instances where insurgents faced neutralist regimes not friendly to
the USSR, but where the insurgents had little chance of success, the
Russians have displayed some ambivalence but generally have opted for
the winning side-, notably in Iraq. Despite frequent strains in Soviet-
Iraqi relations, particularly in the 1960-63 period, the Soviet Union did
not materially assist the Kurdish insurgency except by attempting to
persuade Iraq to seek a negotiated settlement with the Kurds. In 1964,
when Iraqi policy became more favorable to Moscow, Kurdish aspira-
tions were disregarded; both Iraq and Syria received Soviet military aid
for almost certain employment against Kurdish wars-of-liberation forces.
i _ _ ~_ _.v .......-..e.s.. ...hafnr r^mmiinict leftict nr
moderate nationalist-bourgeois, faced regimes clearly hostile to the
USSR, they benefitted from Soviet support, at least on a limited basis,
even if they had little probability of success. Hence Soviet arms arrived
for Lumumba and his followers in the Congo in their efforts to liberate
territory controlled by the Belgians. The chance of success in this con-
flict was minimal. Illustrative of the same policy would be the limited
amounts of weapons supplied to clandestine, sublimited warfare oper-
ations in Portuguese Africa.
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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25 March 1970 -
Thipti, at y e omorrow, i ar . an e orin
. SAIGON, South Vietnam,
March 24--Presidential Nguyen
MI VanThicu Is scheduled to prom-
ulgate on Thursday a sweep-
ing land reform program de-
signed to make the Government
a.bigger benefactor of the land-
less peasant than the Vietcong
have been.
The revolutionary program
prohibits virtually anyone from
owning land he or his family,
numbers are not themselves
cultivating. It provides for the
Government to buy up such
land-more than two million
acres-arid distribute it free to
the one million families who
have been working it as tenant
farmers for absentee landlords.
The land reform, called
"Land to the Tiller," is, on
paper, one of the most ambiti-
ous and progressive land re-
distribution , programs ever
promulgated in non-Communist
Asia.
However, said one official,
who is enthusiastic about the
program and who has worked
closely with the South Viet-
naniese to put it into effect,
"the administrative cpacity and
political will of the Govern-
ment is a moot question."
One high-ranking American
pacification official who has in-
vestigated- some of the Viet-
names officials who will ad-
minister the program at the
CP OMIS
local levels reported having
found them either corrupt or
inefficient.
U. 5.-Action Urged
His recommendation that the
United States Embassy take an
immediate and firm stand
against' such appointments,
which could doom the program
before it has a chance to take
o
_
-
__t _
h
ff
d
od has
f the crop to the landowners.
The Government is to pay
absentee landlords a purchase
price for their land set at two
and a half times the value of
the average annual paddy yield.
The land will then be given
free to the tenants who have
been cultivating it. Tenants in
the rice-growing Delta are to
be given 7.4 acres while those
in the more rugged central
highlands will get 2.4 acres.
Under terms of the legisla-
tion, landlords who farm their
own land will not be allowed
to keep more than 37 acres.
Exempt from the redistribution
program are small plots set
aside for ancestor worship, land
owned by religious organ-
izations, Industrial crop-and-
orchard land, Industrial building
President Thieu to the program,
which he introduced in a Na-
tional Assembly bill last July 2,
has not been questioned. The
President has called it his first
major piece of social legisla-
tion.
The lower house approved the
bill Sept. 9 over the objections
of landowners, who denounced
it as "an inhuman, immoral, un-
scientific, Communist policy of
prolctarianizing the people."
The Senate gave its approval
March 9. Thursday, the day
President Thieu has set for
promulgating the program at a
ceremony in Cantho in the
Mekong Delta, has been de-
clared a national holiday.
Landlords to Be Paid
The program is designed to
give land ownership for the
first time to the tenant farmers
who now work 60 per cent of
the s of (. y_, ~rjgi nd pay
rents of ((sariritrfft~iEt W cent ~i cent of
Lan a -Eo The Tiller
Now that President Thieu has signe
the "land to the tillers " bill, the govern
ment of South Vietnam can get unde
way with its ambitious new programm
of land reform. As many as 8oo,ooo tenan
farmers may be given free title to thei
fields.
The new law provides for the transfe
of up to 2,1 million acres now held b
big landowners. If it works, it will treat
a whole new class of. small peasant pro
prietors with a stake in the country an
-the government hopes-a personal com
mitment to the anti-communist cause
From this angle, it may be the mos
intelligent political move that has sofa
been made in South Vietnam.
Land reform has been tried: , before
with -little, success. President Diem brok
up some of the: big estates 'and . bough
u the French plantations. But his reforms
were mited in scope and foundered on
officia corruption and the landowners'
strata ems. Since 1968, the 'present
gover ment has been handing out land
more uickly and has offered credit facili-
ties for peasants wanting to buy their
plots. These measures naturally had little,
appea for those who had been given,'
or pr iced, land by the Vietcong.
The new law goes beyond these "rather
grudg g concessions. Any farmer tilling
rented or vacated land can lay claim to
21 ac es in the central regions, and u
to 7f cres in the Mekong delta--enough
for a omfortable living. Landowners are
allow" I to keep about 37 acres, providing
that t ey work on their own estates. The
goverr. ent will pay compensation -for
confi ated land.
The most enlightened feature of the
new is the prescribed method of
dealin with Vietcong land grants. The
Rove ent's position used to be simple :
ant Farmers
jsites, salt fields, lands. desig-
nated for urban planning and
some other minor categories.
Expropriated land, ib cases
where there are no tcnapls, will
be given to families of var vic-
tims, soldiers ad displi}yrd ref-
!ugees-in that order-who file
'applications.
To prevent a new c}'cle of
absentee ownership':, and
tenancy, sale of redistri uted
land is prohibited for 15 l"ears
a provision that some' ex-
perts consider too sweeping in
view of the need to create
farms of more economical size.
But that prohibition can bb re-
vised in forthcoming legisli~??tion.
The landowners forced t6' sell
will be paid 20 per cent in: cash
and the remainder in eight-year
guaranteed government bonds
gearing 10 per cent interest.
after pacification, the landowners dri n
out by the communists would be restored.
And as long as the communists could 11
the peasants in areas they controlled ti at
the landlords would follow the South
Vietnamese army, they had a power ul
propaganda weapon. But now pacificati n
need hold no terrors for the peasant male
a proprietor by the Vietcong. He, ill
be allowed to go on farming his lard. It will ?c
"-
ship. There is no automatic confirmation
of ownership, and the delay may give
rise to counter-claims or intimidation. But
there is security of tenure, and a clear
statement of principle.
The reforms will not be easy to apply.
Money to compensate landlords will come
from the Americans, through their general
programme of budgetary support. The
total runs to more than 46 billion piastres
(between $ioo million and $400 million,
at' the official or the prevailing black
market rate). The issue of goverment
bonds will help to spread payment over
several years.
. But insecurity and lack of confidence
are the biggest problems. So long as
villagers cannot sleep soundly at night
it is unlikely' that they will place
much value on a piece of paper giving
them legal title to their land. More than
a thousand civilians and village officials
have been murdered by communist
terrorists so far -this year.
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May 1970
May 8
D ATE S W 0 R T H N 0 T I N G
Europe
25th anniversary of end of World War
II in Europe (VE Day).
May 9
25th anniversary of "liberation" by
the Red Army.
May 7-10 Beirut World Conference of Christians on
Palestine, supported by the (Communist)
World Council of Peace. A publicity-
seeking effort.. abut it is expected to
have only limited impact. (Avoid pub-
licizing.)
Ulan Bator, Soviet-sponsored World Buddhist
Mongolia Conference.
Conference on Portuguese Colonies
sponsored by the (Communist) World
Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian
Peoples Solidarity Organization.
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May 1970
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(21 March - 17 April 1970)
1. Oddities about Soviet Liberation Anniversaries
This year marks the 25th anniversary of the end of World War II, which
the Soviets are utilizing to remind their European Satellites of the Soviet
"liberating" role and their claim to continuing hegemony over their Satel-
lites. The instances of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are especially interest-
ing, because of odd aspects of Soviet behavior in respect to the anniversa-
ries, and because both countries had to be "re-liberated" by invading Soviet
troops: Hungary in October 1956 and Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The
celebration in Hungary of the liberation anniversary took place on 3 April;
the anniversary in Czechoslovakia is to take place 9 May.
a. Hungary
The most important personage among the mixed bag of Satellite
big-wigs attending the Hungarian ceremony was CPSU Secretary General Leonid
Brezhnev. On arrival he took the unusual step of granting an interview to
a Budapest newspaper in which he expounded at great length on how well the
Soviet Union was doing domestically. As the attached New York Times article
points out, this seemed odd considering the international nature of the oc-
casion. The explanation undoubtedly lies in the increasing international
awareness that the Soviet Union is actually in trouble in many domestic sec-
tors, most notably its economy, which is marked by stagnation resulting from
the conservatism of the Soviet leaders. It seems quite clear that Brezhnev,
first among the conservatives, has become alarmed at the low opinion in which
the USSR is currently held. Thus, Brezhnev took this occasion, as he will
undoubtedly take many other occasions, to try to polish up the drab image.
The Hungarian occasion was being watched keenly to see what sort of
attitude Brezhnev would register concerning the slightly off-center, un-
orthodox approach to economic management and intellectual freedom exercised
in Hungary. The Hungarians have carefully experimented with decentralizing
the economy and giving their intellectuals freer rein. This behavior clashes
with the tight centralization of the economy and the stringent control of
intellectuals in the USSR. To the Hungarians' surprise and relief, Brezhnev
publicly professed himself pleased with the way things are run in Hungary.
Nevertheless, Brezhnev also reiterated his doctrine of limited sovereignty
according to which the international interests of Socialism [read: Soviet
national interests] take precedence over mere national interests. Thus, it
is safe to assume that while Brezhnev may be concerned with signs of un-
orthodoxy in Hungary, his main concern is that boss Kadar not boast about
his experiments, that he keep reform within bounds, and that above all there
be no anti-Soviet noises that might cause Brezhnev to invoke his doctrine
after the manner of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
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b. Czechoslovakia
To the Czechoslovak people, the Brezhnev Doctrine is no theoreti-
cal idea. It was invented and invoked as a justification for the Soviet in-
vasion of 1968, a second "liberation" from "counterrevolutionaries" and "im-
perialist enemies." The date of the first liberation, from Nazi Germany, is
fixed as 9 May 191+5, and festivities of some sort are planned for 9 May this
year. The curious thing is that while a new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is
to be formally signed (it has already been initialed by the contracting par-
ties) as the highlight of the occasion, the text of the treaty is being kept
secret! And it is not even certain it will be made public after the signing!
There is a ready, logical explanation of this odd reticence, though
there is no guarantee of its accuracy. Like the 20 British Members of Par-
liament who wrote an advance protest to the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain,
one might surmise that the treaty contains provision for the permanent or in-
definite stationing of troops in Czechoslovakia. If this be the case, it is
only natural that the Soviets would not want to advertise it, particularly
since the Czechs so fervently hope that the treaty will contain some indica-
tion of withdrawal. What seems more likely is that the treaty will contain
a reiteration, in veiled form, of the Brezhnev Doctrine and a reaffirmation
of the platitudes on international solidarity codified in the June 1969
World Communist Conference, with no reference to troops.
Presumably the treaty will eventually be made public, possibly with
protocols concerning Soviet troops being kept secret! The original Soviet-
Czechoslovak treaty was signed in 191+3, and was renewed for another 20 years
in 1963. There clarity ends -- why was it not continued to the end of its
span?
2. French CP vs Yugoslavia over L'Affaire Garaudy
Roger Garaudy.,, di.ssideiit French Communist leader and theoretician who
was purged from his positions of leadership in the Party last February, is
famous among the growing corps of his fellow Communist dissenters for putting
his finger most accurately and eloquently on the reasons for breaking with
the Soviet Union. In the Czech invasion, Garaudy saw the imperialist quality
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, but cast his criticism of the Soviet Union less on
the Doctrine than on an important ramification of it, i.e. the fact that the
Soviet Union cannot tolerate in any Communist party, least of all in Eastern
Europe, any essential departure from its own practice of Marxism-Leninism.
Garaudy is a prominent exponent of the belief that Communism can succeed only
if every Communist party and Communist country can follow its own road and
not be forced to imitate the Soviet model on Soviet terms. This same belief
is precisely what caused Tito to break Yugoslavia away from Stalin's bear-
hug in 1948, and it has remained Yugoslavia's fundamental belief ever since.
It is quite natural therefore, that the Yugoslavs would support Garaudy in
his quarrel with the French Communist Party (PCF). It is for this reason
that last September, they published in their most prestigious journal, Komu-
nist, an interview with Garaudy in which he freely expounded hi.s. "heretical"
views. Now, expressions of support for Garaudy in less well-known Yugoslav
periodicals have caught the eyes of PCF watchdogs and have prompted them to
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accuse Yugoslavia of "crudely interfering in the PCF's internal affairs in
the name of 'anti-Stalinism' and 'anti-dogmatism.'" (See attached L'Humanite.
attack and Le Monde account of the Yugoslav articles.)
3. What Do Dissenting Comrades Complain About?
Attached is a collection of complaints by members of what might be called
the Dissenting Communist Community. They have been arranged in three group-
ings: a) the Brezhnev Doctrine and National Roads to Socialism, b) the In-
vasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, and c) Democracy and Democratic
Centralism. While they have been grouped under three headings, it is recog-
nized that they are all very closely inter-related. Even this partial selec-
tion gives some notion of the common interests, despite geographic remoteness,
of the Dissenting Communist Community.
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4 April 1970
WASHINGTON POST
zh e , y .' ,
Oral Ident Abou. t 11'utuk e*
By Dan Morgan .
washington Pos? P?orei?n Service
BUDAPEST, April 3-Sovie
after his arrival in Budapest
,to commemorate the 25th an-
niversary of the liberation of
basis of Communism." whe}'e Soviet, tanks crushed
The ,publishing of the inter- the 1956 uprising, was, taken
View in- the Hungarian daily as` a reaffirmation of 'the So-
Nepszabadsag on the morning, viet leader's` 1ine~of consolidat-
rectly refuted. reports of grave.
ieonomic and political' trouble
in Moscow in a rare newspa
per, interview printed here,
today.
"The situation 'of the Soviet
Union is firm,'he said. "The
Soviet: people look with self-as-
surance into- the future and
are firmly, resolved to realize
the plan set: The creation of
the material and technical
as that of a??man in a particu? strength of initiative 4ot the
['laxly weak position within his 1 Soviet workers
He rephrased the Brezhnev These are trends ? already.
doctrine of limited : sover- being fostered by the Hungar 1
eignty for socialist nations in a !an regime of Janos Kac~ar.
parliament in the afternoon week viewed the attendance of
wh'e i, he declared that no 4a- Brezhnev here as an achieve-
tional interests of a socialist ment for,the Budapest regime,
and a confirmation of Soviet
country-should be enforced 'at
the expense of the interna'- approvaur for its cautious re=
ticnal interests of socialism. form course ..
At the same time he made a
strong new pitch for .a Euro-
istic" way rather than by
"spectacular actions in the po-
in December could mean a pe-
riod of more economic, ortho-
doxy and centralized discip-
line,, which could put, the
brake on, reforms being Initi-
ated -in Frungary and else-
where in 'Eastern Europe.' r
However, Brezhnev said in
his, interview that he favored
itechnical advances and.: by the "further improvement of
"`raising, the ..efficiency of..theIsocialist .democracy,".;, and at
direction .
Sans tenir compte de 1'opihi6n
du dirigeant hongrols, qu'il a
qualifie des grand communiste,
bon fils du peuple hongrois et
ami B m fiddle de 1'U.R.S.S.), M.
pas hesite e. dire :
s Nous partageons entierement le
point de vue qu'a exprimd souvent
le camarade Kadar et selon le-
quel it convient que des pays so-
ciallstes ne cherchent pas d dd-
fendre leur intdret national au
detriment des Intdrdts interna-
tionaux du socialisme.
Evoquant les problemes inter-
nationaux, M,Brejnev a cons-
tate qu'on ne s pouvait pas nier
que des signes d'amdlioration se
sont fait four ces derniers temps
dans l'dvolution du climat politi-
que en Europe)). II a affirmb
neanmoins que la situation de-
"A Difference of Tone as Mr. Kadar and Mr. Brezhnev
Discuss the National Interests of Socialist Countries"
CPYRGHT
It was with pageantry that the Hungarians celebrated the 25th anniver-
sary of the liberation of their country. It was on 4 April 1945. that the
last German units departed the,?.territory of Hungary....
During a solemn session of Parliament Mr. Brezhnev made a lengthy address
during the course of which he particularly noted that in spite of the aspira-
tions or the whims of certain countries, the U.S.S.R. intends to continue
as the uncontested head of the Socialist camp.
CPYRGHT
tes, rdsultant de la seconds
guerre mondiale et des dvdne-
ments ultdrieurs. Ces rdalitds et
d'autres doivent titre reconnues,
jr compris le respect de la sou-
verainetd nationale de la Repu-
blique ddmocratique allemande)),
a-t-il ajoute.
De son cote, M. Walter Ulbricht
a dit r1otamment : < Ces ques-
tions ne peuvent titre negligees.
La rencontre d'Erfurt, une initia-
tive de la Republique ddmocrati-
que allemande, a donne l'occasion
au gouvernement Brandt de s'en-
gager sur la route conduisant a
la paix. Mais M. Brandt a elude
des questions fondamentales a
Erfurt. It s'est retranchd derriere
les accords de Paris de 1954 qui
-- c'est un fait bien connu -
ont scelld la division de la nation
allemande.
Le chef du parts communists
est-allemand considere que Is
Pierre de touche pour connaitre
les intentions relies du nouveau
gouvernement d'Allemagne occi-
dentale est de savoir s'il recon-
naltra inconditionnellement les
frontieres europeennes existantea
et renoncera a ses s revendica-
tions, ilidgales sur Berlin-Ouest A.
rove or a ease
0TMI04
Ti 19
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Mr. rez nev declared that "all fraternal countries struggle to estab-
lish the division of socialist labor and for the development of socialist
integration. The national and international interests of socialist states,
the same as their political and economic interests, are intertwined in
close unity. The socialist states should not seek to defend their national
interests to the detriment of international socialism."
This declaration was made by Mr. Brezhnev after he had listened to
Mr. Kadar affirm that "the decisive question concerning the development of
socialism rests in the coordination of the fundamental laws applicable at
the international level with specific national characteristics."
Without taking into account the opinions of the Hungarian head of state
(whom he described as a "great communist, son of the Hungarian people, and
true friend of the USSR"), Mr. Brezhnev did not hesitate to say; "We com-
pletely share the view often expressed by Comrade Kadar according to which
socialists states do not endeavor to defend their national interests to
the detriment of international socialism...."
DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm
Thursday, 26 March 1970
. ,k rssarna
Ur kvar
i Pray
PRAG, onsdag
De sovjetiska soldaterna har
kommit till Tjeckoslovakien for
att stanna. Den tillfalliga statio--
neringen av ryska trupper liar nu'
blivit permanent.
Det framgbr av det tjeckoslo-
vakisk-sovjetiska vanskaps- och
? samarbetsavtal som underteckna-
des forra veckan i Prag, omtalar
AFP. En artikel i den tjeckoslo.
vakiska partitidskriften Tvorba pi
.onsdagen tolkar avtalet sfi..
`Nar sovjetiska trupper ingrep I
Tjeckoslovakien i augusti 1968
skedde det med motiveringen att
';dot var_socialistliindernas plikt att
skydda socialismens landvinning-
ar. Den tillfOlilga stationeringen
?'av trupper i Tjeckoslovakien skul-
, le upphora nar en "inre konsoli
dering" intratt.'',
Det nya fordraget innebar att
stationeringen blivit permanent,
med syfte att forsvara socialist
varidens vgstgrans, menar Tvorba;
som ocks$ tillagger att det nya
-fordraget sakert kommer att for
talas av antisoclalistiska krafter I
Tjeckoslovakien ach av deras pa-
drivare utomlands
CPYRGHT
THE RUSSIANS STAY ON IN )PRAGUE
Prague, Wednesday
The Soviet soldiers have come to Czecho-
slovakia to stay. The temporary stationing
of Russian troops has now become permanent,
This is made clear by the Czech-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship and. Cooperation which
was signed [sic] last week in Prague, reports
AFP. An article in the Czech party newspaper
Tvorba Wednesday interprets the treaty that
way.
When the Soviet troops came into Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, they came under. the
justification that it was the duty of the
socialist countries to protect their terri-
torial gains. The temporary stationing of
troops in Czechoslovakia would end when an
"internal consolidation" took place.
This new treaty means that the station-
ing has become permanent in order to defend
the western border of the socialist world,
comments Tvorba, which also adds that the
new treaty surely will be criticized by anti-
socialist powers in Czechoslovakia and by
their instigators abroad.
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LE MONDE, Paris
2 April 1970
CPYRGHT.
Des philosophes you
leur solidarite a
goslaves iemoigne, t
m
M. Roger Garaudy
(Corrospondanc
Zagreb. -= Le a cas )) de M. Ro-
ger Garaudy a ete suivi avec
beaucoup d'attention en Yougo-
slavle. La presse a soigneusement
enregistre chaque critique et cha-
que justification des points de
vue du philosophe frangais. Ainsi,
avant m@me que le Grand tour-
nant du socialisme ne paraisse
en libralrie, 11 avant ete publi@
Presque integralement en feullle-
tons par differents quotidiens, tels
que le Politika de Belgrade ou le
Vjesnik de Zagreb. .
Mats en depit de l'attitude de
la presse et de la sympathie evi-
dente qui pergalt a travers les
informations fournies, les milieux
officlels ont reussi d. eviter toute
prise de position ou commentaire.
Cette discretion s'explique sans
doute par la volonte des autorltes
yougoslaves de ne pas enveni-
mer davantage leurs rapports
- gravement endommages. apres
aoQt 1968 - avec les partis com-
munistes des pays de 1'Est.
Cette prudnece officlelle vient
d'@tre largement compensee par
une manifestation de solidarite
des philosophes yougoslaves avec
M. Roger Garaudy. Ainsi, M. Pre-
drag Vranitzki, auteur d'une mo-
numentale Histoire du marxisme
et membre du comite de redac-
tion de Praxis, revue philoso-
phique connue pour on non con-
formisair, a recemment exprime
son opinl6n sur la condamnation
des thescs de M. Garaudy par le
XIX,, congres du P.C.F.
uomaaaire nelgraUols, 11 @cri-
vait . a Pendant de tongues
annees Garaudy a "pratique lui-
mdme une variante stanilisee
du marxisme, tout comme ceux
qui le critiquent a present dans
la Pravda, Konstantinov et les
autres. A cette difference prds
que, ehea lui, l'esprit createur et
autocritique l'a emportd d'une
maniere decisive sur un dogma-
tisme qu'il a su reconnaltre et
dont it a pu prendre conscience.
Mais ceci ne serait pas suffisant
pour permettre de Jeter t'ana-
theme sur tui. (,..)
> Roger Garaudy a dtd boule-
verse par les dvdnements de ces
dernidres annees et surtout par
le fait que, si tant de choses ont
change dans le monde, la poli-
tique des partis communtstes est
restde, elle, la mdme. Ainsi, la
place de la classe ouvridre et des
intellectuels dans lea pays ddve-
I partiCullare,)
contre to Yougoslavie se ss nt.
montrees sans
Ll__-t-_. _ _ _. ,londement: (.,.1 La
La. chance hisforique
rafoe en France
d'approfondir tit d6mocratfe
cial#ste par t'autooestion. lea f
parses communtstes reunis a Matr-
cou n'ont pas eu le courage d'e -
gager une discussion ouverte t.
creditd I'idde du ' commun#sn~e
plus que ne seraient varvenupcla
personne de Roger Garaudy.
glement se fait selon 'ti.n Pont j 3
bien connu ' le prdtendu trava 1
de sape contre la conception 1
niniste du parts rdvolutionnair
P 0 S t t t 0 n s fondamentates d
marxisme, 1'antisovidti3me, et f
riciens du marxisme sovidtiq
eomprennent une fois pour tout
que cr#tiquer des structures st
liniennes n'est Pas faire nreill)
Spektar l'o'uvre de Ni. Roge#
lution de sa pensee. (Ch /au
espdrer, derit I'editoriallste de 1
publication xagrdboise en dvo
quant le cas de M. Garaudy, qu'
s'n'it dune crise qui aura you
'_--"
CPYRGHT
YUGOSLAV PHILOSOPHERS DECLARE
THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH MR. ROGER
GARAUDY
By Predrag Matvajavitch
CPYRGHT
Zagreb. The Roger Garaudy "case"
has been followed with much atten-
tion in Yugoslavia. The press has
carefully recorded each criticism
and each justification of the points
of view of this French philosopher.
In this manner, even before Le Grand
Tournant du Socialisme (Socialism's
Great Turning Point) appears for sale
it has been published almost entirely
in serialized installments by various
daily papers, such as the Belgrade
Politika or the Zagreb Vjesnik.
But despite the attitude of the
press and the obvious sympathy which
can be glimpsed in the information
given, official circles have suc-
ceeded in avoiding having any posi-
tion taken or commentary made. This
discretion is undoubtedly explained
by the desire of the Yugoslav autho-
rities not to embitter any further
their relations -- which were
seriously damaged after August 1968 -
with Communist parties\of the countri
of the East,
This official prudence has just
been greatly counterbalanced by a
demonstration of solidarity of Yugo-
slav philosophers with Roger Garaudy.
Mr. Predrag Vranitzki, author of a
monumental Histoire du Marxisme
(History of Marxism), and member of
the editorial board of Praxis, a
philosophical journal known for its
non-conformism, recently expressed
his position on the condemnation of
Mr. Garaudy's opinions by the 19th
Congress of the PCF [Party Communiste
Francais; French Communist Party].
1
7r "IT17117 V. 7111; T"
~ ~t9~1~7~t1T'1~T~ii('l4rtisl,i~~(1~,'i',1~11?'i'7f1;11Piillt;zlE~(r);+,s~f( - :a~ t,~,~ }t?sr
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 CPYRGHT
In an interview with Nin, a Belgrade
"It is there, very briefly, that
weekly, he wrote: "For many years must be sought the true reasons for
Garaudy himself practiced a Stalinized the conflict surrounding the person of
variant of Marxism, just like those Roger Garaudy.; I want to add also that
who are now criticizing him in Pravda, this settlement is being made accord-
Konstantinov and the others. With ing to a well known cliche: the
just, this difference, that for Garaudy, alleged undermining of the Leninist
the creative spirit and the spirit of conception of the revolutionary party,
decisively m
self-criticism the so-called questioning of basic posiu
dogmatism which he learned to recognize
cognize tions of Marxism, anti-Sovietism, etc.
and of which. he became aware. But this However, the theoreticians of Soviet
would not be enough to have him denounced.... Marxism will have to understand once
"Roger Garaudy was distressed by events
of recent years and especially by the
fact that, while so many things have
changed in the world, the policy of Com-
munist parties has remained the same.
For the place of the working class and of
intellectuals in developed countries in
our times is quite different from the
place they held in the past. New trends
are appearing within the left in general.
We have been witnesses of a profound move-
ment among students. Under our eyes,
peoples are achieving their liberation.
The attacks against Yugoslavia have been
shown to be without basis.... Czecho-
slovakia has also chosen for itself
its own course."
Historic Opportunity Missed in France
"'And, despite all that, the Communist
movement missed an historic opportunity
in France during the general strike, the
attacks on Yugoslavia have resumed be-
cause of its desire for independence and
its attempt to deepen socialist democracy
by self-management, the armed forces of
the socialist countries prevented the
Czechoslovakian Communists from choosing
their model of socialism.... In addi-
tior.L, the Communist parties that met in
Moscow did not have the courage to begin
an open and critical discussion of the
act which had discredited the idea of
Communism more than tens or hundreds of
theoreticians could have done.
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and for all that criticizing Stalinist
structures is not a proof of anti-
Sovietism!"
In additon, the cultural weekly
Telegram has just dedicated its entire
supplement Spektar to.the work of
Roger Garaudy and to an examination
of the evolution of his thought. "We
must hope," writes the editorialist of
the Zagreb publication in discussing
the case of Mr. Garaudy, "that this
is a crisis which will have as its
final consequence a positive result,
for we have seen only too many dogmatic
usurpations, confusions, and either
voluntary or unconscious mystifica-
tions."
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_ L'Humanite'', Paris CPYRGHT
3 April 1970
? event a c asse ouvrrere. On no aux < usurpations dogmatiques a. Quest.
peut pas an dire autant cle P. Vranitzki, cc a dire
sinon
u'
,
q
on on appelle ainsi a la
mai-iuin 1968 c Is
q ~
~4. Is a rate one chance histori ue tanoFranceste '.."CoCe uin steugF a Caper utilisc eurraQu avecPGal , Plutte arti ? oppositionnelle ll ne devra t pas tondo
Avtrement dit, s'il n'a pas ate possible ,raudy des methodes staliniennes n. P. d'espoir la-dessus. Au lendcmain du XIX-
d'en finir a cc moment avec Is pouvoir Vranitzki cache soigneusement a ses lee. '; . Congres, noire Parti le plus uni que ja-
des monopoles et de leur substituer on re? teurs que les theses at l'activite de Garau- '? mais. Plus uni clans
le refus des theses
propos de deux articles de Ia presse yougoslave
sur 1!activit~ de.'Garaudy
D EUX hebdomadaires yougoslaves ant ' geolsie' reactionnaire; aurait; pu later la, niste ? A Is suivre, II aurait faflu qua tout
cru devoir exprimer four solidarite fraction la plus avarlcee de la classe ou. Is Parti se soumette aux idees d'un soul
avec Roger Garaudy.. ,vriere clans on bain 'de sang, briser pour hamrne... Curieuse demarche de pensee pour
Les citations donnees dens la presse longtemps to mouvement ouvrier revolu? quelqu'un qui se vent aussi #arouchement
francaise a ce propos montrent sans equi. tionnaire of instaurer one dictature mili-- ? antrstalinien > !
vogue qu'il s'agit an fait d'une attaque en faire. Quant a I'autre hebdomadaire, Is ? Spek?
regle, Contra Is Parti Communists Francais. Le reaction Is souhaitait. Notre Parti a de- far ', de Zagreb, evoquent le cos de G.
C'est ainsi que P. Vranitzki, clans le '*6 Is calCul de I'adversaire do classe. raudy, it place ses espoirs daps ce qu'il
journal Nin a; de Belgrade, pretend que Parce qu'il est conscfent de ses resnonsa? appelle one issue positive a metrant fin
? des tend
bilites d I !
n
ll
s
a
ces nouve
e
se font jour au
esr pas - seron P. vranitzki - a crux tout It Parti, qua cc debal s'est der"
des partis de gauche qui ont refuse Von. publiquement, qu'il_ me s'est trouvc (]Us
tente que four proposait noire Parti en huit collules sur 19.250 pour soutonir tells
ce sans, mars... d noire Parti Iur-meme I nu toile des positions de Garaudy at qu'au'
C'est, cerles, le droit de quiconque, y 'terms de celte longue of Itbre discussion,
compris d'un journal d'un pays socialists, Is XIX? Congres a r< unanime a rejeter
de porter 'one appreciation .critique sur tel ' ' cos, positions, Notre Parti a ainsi fait preu?
ou tel aspect de notre action. Mais c'est ve d'un democratisrne profond,_ authenti-
aussi notre droit de relever les calomnies, quement Ieniniste. Les nombreuses delega?
II fact vraiment Etre aveugle ou irrespon- lions de partis freres 'presentes a notre
sable pour me pas comprendre qu'en I'absen? congres, y compris la delegation do la Li-
ce dune union solids des forces ouvrieres gue des Communistes 'yougoslaves, ont pu
of d4mocratiques - union refusee par la s'en rendre compte. Mais P. Vranitzki sait-'rl
gauche non communiste - Is grande bout'- ce Quest la democratic proletarienne, leni-
a:uvre dune politique creatrice et nova-
trice.
Cela dit, it est curieux qu'au nom de
I' a antistalinisme et do I' ? antidogma?
tisme j,, le journal de Zagreb se permette
'one ingerence aussi grossiire clans les
affaires do noire Parti. Le Parti Commu.
piste Francais se fait, quant a lui, one rk.
gle de me pas s'immiscer dans les affaires
de la Lique des Communistes Yougoslaves.
If no manquera pas de reclamer le respect
de cette role par autrui chaque fois qu'il
sera necessaire,
WITH REFERENCE TO TWO ARTICLES IN THE F`JGOSLAV PRESS ON GARAUD 'S ACTIVITIES
Two Yugoslav weekly periodicals considered it their duty to express their
solidarity with Roger Garaudy.
The excerpts published by the French press in connection with this indubitably
show that a regular attack against the French Communist Party (PCF) has been launched.
:P. Vranitzki, for example, asserts in the Belgrade paper NIN that "new trends
are appearing within the left in general." but that in May-June 1968 "The communist
movement missed a historic chance in Prance."
In other words, if it was not possible at that moment to liquidate monopoly power
and replace it with an advanced dergocratic regime, it was not the fault, P.
Vranitzki says, of the leftwing parties which declined the alliance that our
party proposed to them with a view of achieving this aim. It was the fault of
our party! Obviously everyone, including a paper published in a socialist country,
is entitled to Judge critically certain aspects of our activities. But we have
the right to refute slanders. Indeed one has to be either blind or irresponsible
not to understand that without a powerful alliance of workers and democratic
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
forces, an alliance which had been rejected by the noncommunist left, the reactionary
high bourgeoisie would have,been able to subject the most advanced faction of the
working class to a bloodbath, crush for a long time the revol ti nary workers
movement, and establish a agilitary d.atatorship
The reactionary forces wanted thig to happen. Our party frustrated the class
enemy's design because it was conscious of its responsibilities toward the working
class. This cannot be said of P. Vranitzki.
P. Vranitzki also suggests that the PCP has used "Stalinist" methods with respect
to Garaudy. The author has been careful to conceal. from his readers the fact
that Garaudy's theses and activities were the subject of a wide-ranging discussion
within the entire party, that this discussion was public, that only eight
cells out of 19,250 supported some of Garaudy's views, and that at the conclusion
of this long and free discussion the 19th congress unanimously.rejected these
views. Thus our party showed that it is profoundly democratic and truly Leninist.
The numerous fraternal party delegations, including the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia delegation, which were present at'our congress were able to ascertain
this. But does P. Vranitzki know what proletarian and Leninist democracy means?
If one were to pursue his way of reasoning the entire party would have to submit
to the ideas of one man...a strange way of thinking for someone who pretends to be
so fiercely "anti-Stalinists"
As for the other weekly periodical, the Zagreb SPEKTAR, when mentioning the jaraudy
case it pins its hopes on what it calls a"positive conclusion" which would bring
"dogmatic usurpations" to an end. What is this.-
but an incitement,to an opposition,
struggle within our party? 8PEKTAR should not base its hopes on this.. Following
the 19th congress our party is more united than ever before. It is more united
in its rejection of any opportunist and dogmatic theses and In the formulation and
implementation of.a creative and..innovatory policy-
This having been said, it is strange that the Zagreb paper should venture to interfere
in such a crude manner in our party's affairs in the name of "anti-Stalinism" and
"antidogmatism. For its part the PCF follows the rule of non-interference in the
affairs of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It will not hesitate to demand
that this rule should be respected by others every tiste- this proves necessary.
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CPYRGHT
What Do the Dissenting Comrades Complain About?
Brezhnev doctrine and national roads to socialism
"The doctrine of .li 'ted sovereigpt or socialist community was not
invented either b Western ro anda or the so-celled revisionists, but
by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries whose troops
intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The article we mentioned in
Soviet Russia clearly confirms this. It says, among other things, that
the sovereignty of a state not only says, among other things, that the sov-
ereignty of a state not only is a concept of international law but it also
has class character. This reference to class character actually represents
the arrogation by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every
socialist country which, but its criteria, is building socialisn in accord-
ance with its own specific conditions and not on the basis of foreign
models.
"According to the paper [Soviet army Red Star], varying models of
socialism are not acceptable and deserve only to be condemned because the
Soviet experience has allegedly shown that there is only one road to
socialism.
"These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous and
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia rejects them as dangerous for the
unity of socialist countries and the Communist and workers movement. It
is all the same to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country
is part of the doctrine of limited sovereignt or whatever other name this
doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but the essence
of the policy."
Milika Sundic (Yugoslavia) Zagreb Radio
31 January 1970
CPYRGHT
"As it happens, the current Soviet leaders are opposed not only to
changes which have become necessary in the Soviet Union but to all attempt
by Communist parties (especially in the socialist nations) to develop
models of socialism corresponding to their social structures and national
histories."
Roger Garaudy (France) in The Great Turning Point of Socialism, 1969
CPYRGHT
"This campaign has assumed such proportions that in order to insure
their hegemony based on dogma of the single model the Soviet leaders, like
the Chinese leaders, became involved in a decisive policy at the international
level, not hesitating to require in each country a purge of those who opposed
this principle and to bring about deliberately a split in the communist
parties where this opposition was too strong....
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 1-1CPYRGHT
"...'Stalinism', that is to say that specific form of dogmatism
which consists in presenting as a universal and single model the form
of socialism which history imposed in Russia, in a country, where,there
was conflict between the problems of building socialism and those of
fighting underdevelopment with all that implies by way of rPconomic cen-
tralization to the n-th degree and of limitations on demog.ac ."
_
Roger Garaudy (France) in The Whole Truth, 1970
Transition so-
cialist democracy from the undemocratic Stalinist system represent a complex
of two problems and one of them cannot be solved without the other. It is a
fateful international consequence of the Stalinist development that the taus
of the development of socialism in Russia lost the power of a common cause
among European movements in relation to socialism. It is not true that the
Frenchmen or the Italians are socialists because they would like to live as
workers in the Soviet, Union live. They would not want to live like that.
If they are true socialists , they want a socialist life and they do not
consider the life of a worker or a collective farm member in the Soviet Unio
a socialist life."
Gyorgy Lukacs (Hungary) interview for Borba, Belgrade
1, 2 January 1970
"The Moscow leadership considers the order prevailing in the Soviet
Union as being the generally valid, obligatory model of socialism, and it
reserves itself the sole right of deciding what is socialist, communist,
and Marxist-Leninist, and what is not. The Moscow leadership sent its tro ps
into Czechoslovakia, there to 'save' socialism -- because the Czechoslovak
communists had dared to propose another model of socialism, and even to begin
implementing it. The Moscow leadership undektook its 'rescue mission' atit -
cratically and unasked, without consideration of the principles of nations
self-determination and sovereignty; the fact alone that it was able to do
so already gives reason to seriously doubt 'its socialist character."
Tagebuch Zeitschrift fuer Kultur and Politik (Austrian Communist)
May 1969
CPYRGHT
CP1 F GHT
"Soviet Neoimperialism. In the light of Marxism, everything would
indicate that if contradictions are more antagonistic in the east than in
the west, war, rebellion and national liberation movements will be greater
where there are more contradictions. War between the USSR and China can
be nearer, be more probable than between China and America or between America
and the Soviets. But there are some whose ideologies will not let them see
the realities of our times, when it is a matter of applying.:'Marxist dialectics
to the resolution of contradictions in the east, where there is state capi-
talism and not socialism."
.Action Montevideo,, Arapey.(Uruguay)
1 September 1969
CPYRRGHT
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"Identifying the USSR with socialism is a dangerous expedient.... But
it is even more inadequate to establish an identity between socialism and
the leadership of the CPSU. Historical experience should teach us be to
very cautious on that topic since the political changes which have occurred
in the USSR are, among other things, characterized by the `fact that each new
leadership team denies and almost absolutely denounces the preceding team.
Once upon a time, socialism supposedly was Stalin, then Malenkov, then
Khrushchev, and now Brezhnev. But, if the incarnation of socialism comes
down to being what each one of these leaders says about his predecessor,
then socialism would be a very poor thing indeed."
Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem, 1969.
CPYRGHT
Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia
"We assert that the [1968] Czechoslovak CP firmly but with a clear
spirit of tolerance and with a broadminded approach confronted the conspir-
atorial manipulations of its conservative wing. It prevented vengeance
and retaliation and, with undeniable feeling for democracy and socialism,
it effected the necessary changes in terms of personnel in the government
and party apparatus, without resorting to the police methods of the past.
"We assert that the lack of understanding on the part of the current
leadership group in the USSR was the principal factor for instability in
Czechoslovakia. The conduct of the Soviet government aggravated the contra-
dictions, stimulated negative or chauvinist positions, and enabled the
counterrevolution to conceal itself behind the banners of the defense of
the fatherland.
"Why did the USSR deliberately risk its prestige in so disastrous an
adventure? In the final ana ysis, this represents the ultimate argument
of those who believe that the intervention was right or necessary. If the
Soviets did this, then there must have been some extremely powerful reasons
to do so since people as responsible as they cannot deliberate) perpetrate
such stupidity. This is reason based on faith; the reason that springs
from blind confidence in the USSR; this represents the remnant of a simple
and naive past in which the word of the USSR was the sacred word of the
fatherland of socialism of the heirs of Lenin, of the heroic builders of
socialism.
"Fortunately -- or unfortunately, depending upon the individual's view-
point, that past has been smashed to bits. One cannot go on being a communist
and a Catholic at the same time. Right now, is it more difficult to be a
communist."
Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia - Socialism as a Problem, 1969
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 CPYRGHT
A Japanese Party leader denounced the invasion and occupation as
"an unwarranted armed intervention, trampling underfoot Czechoslovak sover-
eignty and independence."
Tetsuzo Fuwa (Japan) Akahata, 21 September 1969
'Moscow was accused with the intervention in Czechoslovakia "to have
betrayed the confidence of the peoples of the world," and the party organ
condemned the intervention as "disgraceful and unequalled episode in the
history of the international communist movement." On the occasion of the
anniversary of the invasion, the party organ referred to the self-immolation
of Jan Palach and to the demonstrations of the Czechoslovak people, and de-
clared, "Open criticism of the intolerable violation of the sove:reighty of
the country has been banned under the pretense of 'normalization' of the
situation." Once again it was demanded thpt foreign troops be immediately
withdrawn from Czechoslovakia.
writing about the Japanese Communist Party
27, 30 December, 2 January 1970
The awesome, iron consistency o the ovie moves In the U6 since
August no longer leaves any room for illusions. The Czechoslovak experi
ment has been terminated; this does not mean that it was unsuccessful.
experiment must be called unsuccessful if it does not provide any new-in-
sight. The Czechoslovak experiment brought more than one new insight.
First -- in the seven months of the "Prague spring" -- the realization t at
socialist democracy is not an utopian idea but a realistic possibility;
and in connection therewith a whole series of concrete insights into the
nature of the means and ways, and into the methods and forms which permi
in the age of the scientific-technical revolution to realize the initial
ideas of the founders of scientific socialism; and finally, insights int
the true nature of the results of 50 years of development after the firs
successful proletarian revolution in the concrete reality of history. W
know incomparably more today about what socialism can be than we knew
prior to the Czechoslovak experiment; and we also know why Czechoslovakia
was not allowed to complete the experiment at a time when it just began to
show the most promising success.
Tagebuch Zeitschrift fuer Kultur and Politik
(Austrian Communist) May-June 1 969
"The undersigned believe that the condemnation of the occupation of
Czechoslovakia expressed in August 1968 by a significant segment of the
communist movement constituted an act of positive value at that time.
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
demnation in our country of a so-called 'normalization' imposed by a for-
eign army on a nation 87 percent of whose people had approved of its poli-
tical orientation towards a 'humanist' socialism.
"Approving the essential decisions of January 1968 which tended broadly
to enlighten the working masses, to recognize their real aspirations, and
to train them for the task of managing a socialist state, the undersigned
condemn the present attempts to mask, minimize or cause France to forget
the effects of the Soviet military intervention against socialist Czecho-
\tslovaki a. Thus they reaffirm their solidarity with those who tried to
create a socialist society in which political power would be transferred
from the hands of the bureaucrats to those of the workers."
other leftist parties and public opinion -- should be followed by the con-
till, if the workers' ho
e for the advent of a genuinely socialist
is to be kept alive in the long run, that condemnation -- lest it
seem a mere inconsequential and pln+tonic gesture designed to impress the
Declaration by French Communist militants, Le Monde, 16 January 1970
CPYRGHT
I
"We must really sit up and take notice as we see that, in the new situ-
ation estimates, which we learned about in connection with this problem
from the publications of the Czechoslovak party assemblies, there is-not
a single element pointing to a concrete preparation of a counterrevolution
which allegedly might have endangered socialism in Czechoslovakia in August
1968. More than that: arguments which were brought up in the past (about
suspected weapons caches and the like) are not even being mentioned anymore
now. Today, the discussion is concentrated on whether the policy and the
methods, applied by the Czechoslovak party on a number of issues, were cor-
rect. The issue now revolves around internal party questions, around prob-
lems of relationsships with other forces in the National Front, around forms
of managing the press organs, etc. The fact that things shifted to this
area can only strengthen us in our conviction that there can only be a politi-
cal solution for this kind of problem."
"d `?'N~?~-?ii vt , ntciici- i. euueu, tanuary-reoruary lyfo i
CPYRGH~T
"In 1948, Yugoslavia having been the first socialist nation to confront
authoritarian dogmatism and seek its' own approach to the construction of
socialism, its leaders were denounced as counterrevolutionary agents, spies,
murderers, and fascists. These accusations were again levelled 20 years
later, in the name of the same postulates and even more brutally, when on
21 August 1968 Soviet tanks crushed the attempts b Czech communists to
develop a "model" of socialism corresponding to the requirements of a
highly developed society. Brezhnev thus went beyond the limits of Stalinism;
at least Stalin did not invade Yugoslavial"
Roger Garaudy (French) The Great Turning Point of Socialism, 1969
-.?:r "i^ .-q'T .:,.} I ~-t7a iT7Till? rrvnn i ri_: rr
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Democracy and Democratic Centralism
An underground letter, now circulating in Moscow, purportedly by well
known Soviet citizens, urges major changes in Soviet society including "anti-
democratic traditions and norms ... which appeared during the Stalin era
and have not been completely liquidated."
From Washington Post, 3 April 1970
CPYRGH
n or zec os ov is has crushed a unique c ance socialism
had in Europe. Nevertheless, the nonviolent democratic revolution in Czecho-
slovakia has made it clear unforgettably how great the possibilities of
socialism are in a no longer capitalist society. It is to be hoped that
the realization will prevail in the Soviet Union -- someday -- that the
competition with the capitalist world cannot be won without democracy,
that a gigantic power, which more than 50 years after the victorious revo4
lution trembles every time somebody drops a leaflet, that such a gigantic
power throttles the development of its own creative forces.'
Ernst Fischer (Austria) Wiener Tagebuch, January-February 1970
"I think that around this revolves the problem of "socialist democracy"
(in fact, I believe there can be no socialist democracy without democracy
within the party and without a leadership function of the party understood
in Lenin's terms.) Also around this problem revolves that of the national
road." It seems to me beyond question that the clash between the Soviet
and Czechoslovak comrades was about this, and not about the "national road."
The Soviet comrades continue to hold a concept of the leadership function
of the party in which the party as the center of everything, becomes identi-
fied with all of society and does not recognize any independent power center
except as a "transmission belt."
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
8, Because ol its very own status, ecause o Its level of awareness,
because of its Marxist upbringing, because of its cultural education and
because of the availability of information, this intelligentsia, as a prior
condition for its development, demands socialist democratization on an
urgent basis.
The [Soviet) bureaucracy, which feels that this socialist democratiza-
tion means the progressive diminution of its power and its privileges,
forcefully opposes this and punishes its most apparent manifestation, the
intellectual rebellion, with a strictness that claims to be a warning and
that, as far as we can see now, only stimulates the call for democratization.?
Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem, 1969
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"The speech of the secretary-general of the Spanish GP, Mr. Santiago
Carrillo, at this same Moscow conference backed the statements of the
Italian delegate. Roger Garaudy quotes it under the heading "Socialism
Has No Mecca."
"We would liko to otress 'f Mr. Carrillo said, "that contrary to what
oceuro in our partica, the international communist movement is not guided
according to the principle of democratic centralism. Problems of principle
cannot be solved here either by ballot or by majority rule."
Review of The Whole Truth by Roger Garaudy in Le Figaro, 24 February 19
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