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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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C ,... r-, r T August ~ 970
~r~ pag~a
Highlights
SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CPYRGHT
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Union has been assiduously cultivating relations over the past year in line
with its policy of working with what it considers "progressive".military
go~;~ernments. k~l Although the Soviet airlift is reputedly the largest dis-
aster relief operation undertaken outside .the Soviet Union, the amount of
aid i.s modest, about $1 million, compared to the $20-30 million already
donated by some 20 free world countries, including the United States, which
has contr~.buted $10 million in funds alone. c) The use of aircraft rather
than ships to carry Soviet relief supplies and equipment is obviously de-
signed for propaganda purposes which include countering the propaganda im-
pact of the considerable flood-aid that Western nations gave Rumania, as
well as trying to offset the Soviets' own tardiness in offering aid .to Peru.
Sea delivery would have been less expensive, less complicated, and as it
turns out, probably faster. The several hundred tons of Soviet supplies
would not have filled even one cargo ship, which would have taken about two
and one ha,?f weeks from the Soviet Union to Peru. As of mid-July, only five
flights had arr:i_ved in Peru, having met supply and fueling problems. The
airlift had.. been scheduled to arrive ten days earlier in a spectacular wave,
with groups of eight landing at intervals of ten minutes. I:n contrast, by
the first of July, the U.S. had made 44 flights to Peru and 1,564 within
the country. These flights alone carried over three million pounds of re-
lief supplies, with the bulk of equipment going by ship. (See attached
article for further details.)
Spanish-Soviet Warmup. If any treatment of the above story should sup-
port the theme o:f Soviet efforts to warm up their relations with military
regimes and/or dictatorships, it may be pertinent to also remind audiences
of Moscow's growl.ng rapprochement with General Franco's regime: (at the same
time as Soviet propaganda media lambasts 'the,"capitalist imperialists" for
"supporting the Fascist Spanish" regime.) Eeonomi.caZZz~ -- Spanish-Soviet
trade volume jumped from $14 million in 1966 to $34 million in 1968. Early
this year the Spanish government held out the possibility than a Soviet fuel
agreement (for th.e Soviets to sell natural gas to Spain) could double Spanish-
Soviet trade to $80 million yearly over the next three years. -ipZomatieaZZ~
-- In April. this year the Soviets opened a merchant marine office in Madrid
and established a four-man "maritime mission" wherein two of its members have
diplomatic passports. Recall that ,just six years ago diplomats were aflutter
over the news that the Spanish and Soviet ambassadors in Paris had drunk a
toast to the future establishment of diplomatic relations between their
countries Indicative of Soviet eagerness is the story of Spanish Foreign
.Minister Sr. Lopes Bravo's enforced detour to Moscow while on :his way to
Manila in December last year: Sr. Lopez Bravo's plane was scheduled to re-
f'uel in Tashkent but it was diverted to Moscow at .the request of Soviet au-
thorities to permit Soviet Foreign Ministry officials to meet with Sr. Lopez
Bravo while he "happened" to be in the Soviet capital.
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NEW YO1~K TIMES
~_~+ July 1970
soviETrosTPaN~s
PARTY'SCONCRESS
UNTILNEXTMARCH
Delay Comes as a Surprise,:
Since Brezhnev Said It _'
-Would Convene in'70 -..
ECONOMY MAY BE CAUSE,
.Planners Believed to Need
More Time to Draft News
Five-Year Program
By-JAMES F. CLARITY '`
C PYR~ HT . 3pecfel do The New York Timex . '
MOSCOW, July i3. -The:
om
Committee announced today,
that the' 24th psrtY congress
would be postponed to next
lYiarch.
The decision, disclosed by
Tass, the official press agency,
surprised the diplomatic com-
munity because as late as July
2 the party chief, Leonid I.
Brezhnev, said in speeches that
the congress would be held
"this year."
Western diplomats attribute
the postponement to economi
problems, possibly complicate
by political maneuvering in th
Central Committee and th
. Politburo. But the diplomat
said the speculation that. fac
lions were forming in the pa
in opposition to Mr. Brezhne
of Premier Aleksei N. Knsygi
or both, might be premature.
It is more likely, the dipl
mats said, that Soviet planner
Ihave asked the leadership fa
'more time to formulate t
-five-year plan.
Revitalizing Is Urged
In recent months, Mr. Brezh-
nev has ca]led far new efforts
and increased p%uty discipline
to improve the slpggtsh ecano-
my. To a lesser extent, Mr.
Kosygin hAs also spoken on
economic problems. When Mr.
Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin de-
,posed Niltita S. Ifhrushchev s's
head of the party and the goo-.
~ernment in October, 1964, they
promised economic reforms:
;chat would presumably correct
the shortcomings in Mr. lUhrush-
(chev's policies.
The rules of tile, party require
'that a congress be held every
four years. But it is not un-
usual for ~a congress to be
delayed. The 23d congress was
com~ened in March, 1966. The
22d congress met in Octobe>'
'1961..
The Tass anitouncernent of
the Central Committee decision,
made in a plenary session to?
day. did not note that the new
date amounted to a postpone-
ment. The agency gave no rea-
son, but said Mr. Brezhnev had
made a speech on this question.
Tass alsn said that Mr. Brezh-
nev and Premier Aleksei N.
Kosygin would.: address the
March congress:- Mr. Brezhnev,
Tass said, will deliver the Cen-
tral Committee's main report
and Mr. Kosygin will discuss
the next five-year plan, ~whioh
starts in 197t.
7'he ~announcemept that Mr.
Kosygin would. address the
congress in Morels vvas consid-
ered confirmation that hey
would be renaaned Premier bye
the newly elected Supreme,
Soviet, the_ national legislature,
which convenes. tomorrow.
t7nder the Cpnstitution, Mr.
Kosygin and lis Government
submit their resignations to the
Parliament, which. either ac-~,
cepts them ar renames thee.
same government. Any decisions
to replace Mr. Kosygin would
normally have to be first ap-
proved 'by the party's ruling;
11-member Pol3tbiu'o and thei
Central Committee, which has
~aboiri 190 members.
CPYRGHT
The Soviet economy, West-
ern analysts have said, is suf-
fering from low labor produc-
tivity in industry, unpredictable
agricultural productx~n and
widespread shortage of con-
sumer gods. The economy is
also under strain, the analysts
said, from the maintenance of
its military capabid.ities.
On July 2, Mr. Brezhnev, in
a report approved by the Cen-
tral Committee, condemned
agricultural mismanagement,
acknowledged food shortages
and promised increased produc-
lion in the five years beginning
in January.
Some diplomats speculated
that Mr. Brezhnev might want
more time to improve his
leadership record, thus strength-
ening his chances of being re-
elected general Secretary in
March. The diplomats said that,,
in addition to the solution of
economic problems, Mr. Brez-
hnev might want to present
the congress with achievements
in foreign affa>rs.
These would include, the
diplomats said, accelerated im-
provement in relations with
West Germany, lessening of
tensions that could ~invalve the
Soviet Union more deeply in
the Middle Fast, positive se-'
suits in the Chinese-Soviet
border talks being held in
Peking, and next year the hold-
ing of a European security con-
ference, proposed by the
Kremlin.
Speculation that changes
!would be made in the Soviet
leadership has continued spo-
radically since spring, when
several Politburo me+nbers were
ill, including Mr. Kosygin, who
'was hospitalized for influenza.
Mr. Brezhnev, according to a
Tass announcement, did not go
to Bucharest last week for the
signing of the Soviet-Rumanian
friendship treaty because he
had a respiratory ailment. But
he was seen a few days after
the announcement at a soccer
game on a cool, rainy night.
Mr. Brezhnev, who is fi3, is also
said to be suffering from high
blood pressure.
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WASHINGTON STAR '. i ~ 1~ ~I ~ ~ a ~
l'~ Tnly ~Q`Tn
CPYRGHT
~'o ~~r~ S~~r~ S~ec~iafiao~
Fty Via Arctic
By JERI;h1IAII O'LEARY
r a r or
'The Sovie Union yesterday
sent the first plane in a
65-flight relief airlift from
Russia to earthquake-torn
Peru, arousing considerable
speculation in Washington
about whether the gesture
opens a broad new area of
Eastern interest in the West?
ern Hemisphere.
Officials were considering
what relationship, if any, the
Soviet airlift had to the recent
non-stop flights from Mur-
mansk to Havana by military
reconnaissance Bear aircraft.
The flights to Peru will be
made by AN12 and 22 civilian
model long-range transports
bearing numbers similar to
the ones painted on the tails of
planes used by the Russian
national airline Aeroflot.
Some observers believe the
Bear flights to Havana had
several motives: To familiar-
ize Russian pilots with a~r-
ways that are new to them; to
indicate Soviet solidarity with
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro
and t~ let the United States
know none too subtly what
Russian aviation can do.
EL COMERCIO,
Lima, Peru
duly 1970
The Bear flew a ong og cg
route over the Antic Ocean be-
tween the Greenland-Iceland
echannel and hooked around
Cuba to approach Havana
from the south.
The mercy flights to Peru
were delayed until this week-
end because the flrghts cannot
be made non-stag and the Rus-
sians had asked for far more
flight clearances and alf.erna-
tive landing sites than some
South A m e r i o a n countries
thought were justified.
Reports reaching Washing-
ton were that the Russians
asked for at least seven altel'-
nate landing tields, including
several in Brazil,
Washington sources said the
clearances now issued for the
Russian relief planes will pro-
vide for fuel stops at GandCr
and St. John's, Nfld.; Havana;
and Barranquilla, Colombia.
The project is said to involve a
shuttle of planes totaling 65
flights.
Communist Cuba has al-
ready sent about 25 special
flights to Peru to assist the
relief efforts of government o!
Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado.
CPYRGHT
Primary Mission
ates a wholo new dimension in
the relationship of the Soviet
Union to South America.
No one seems to doubt that
primary mission of the airlift
is earthquake relief. The Rus-
sian cargos will include food,
medical supplies, roadbuitding
eqquipment; helicopters, ports-
b1e"tFansmitters, components
for 100 prefabricated homes?a
200=bed hospital and three
nurseries. "`~
The planes may bring as~
many as 500 Soviet personnel,
including 325 crew members,
75 doctors, 25 geological engi-
neers and an unannounced
number of nurses and con-
struction crews.
The total Soviet contribution
to Peru will be about 700 tons.
The Cubans sent 200 doctors,
nurse's and technicians and,
about 10 tons of cargo per
flight, including five field hos-~
pitals, blankets and blood pease
ma.
In addition, a'Cuban refri~-;
erated trawler, the Camaron,,
recently arrived at the Peruvi--'
an ;cork of Callao with shoes`
and mobile kitchen equipment.
Aid Sent by U.S.
States made a ~ $lo million re-
lief grant; sent more than
4,000 tons of food and medicine
and dispatched the helicopter
carrier Guam to Peruvian wa-
ters to aid the relief effort.
Mrs. Richard M. Nixon made
a flying visit to Peru to show
the U.5. concern for the suf-
ferings of the Peruvian people.
The bid question on the Rus-
sian airhft is whether it is a
one-shot proposition or wheth-
er it signals a new dr~e for
increased relationships and
communication with South
America.
At present the Soviet Union
has diplomatic representatives
in eight Latin countries, not
counting Cuba which survives
because of $1.4 million per day
in Russian assistance. These
countries are: Peru, Argentin-
a, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico and Uru-
guay.
The total of Russian diplo-
matic representatives in the,
eight countries is 265, of whom
an estimated 50 percent are
intelligence personnel. In-
formed sources believe this is
twice as many a:. the intelli~;-
ence roster in ,.'~o ,region 1.0
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T] T A ('1 TJ'!T'17 /1T TTTT\ TTlY TI T1TTT' [T August 1970
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968-1970: FROM HUMANE SOCIALISM TO SOVIET ORTHODOXY
The Czechoslovaks approach the second anniversary of the 20 August
Soviet-led invasion of their country in a state of political subjugation.
For-the Czech people the situation is tragically familiar. After the
Soviet-run Communist takeover of 19+8, their personal and political free-
doms were crushed and the country was rapidly Stalinized. Today all that
remains to repeat the process is a re-institution of political show trials.
(Whether present Party leader Husak has repeatedly promised there would be
no show trials because he deludes himself that he can resist Soviet pres-
sures or whether it is a cynical promise made merely to quiet popular fears
until fool-proof control is established, matters little now.) In classic
Communist fashion, officials and politics of the Dubcek era -are now being
blamed for all current ills of the Communist society.
Years of Soviet experience and the skillful use of salami tactics --
one slice of liberty at a time in order to avoid arousing open revolt --
paid off as the Soviets wiped out nearly every trace of the most promising
experiment ever undertaken in a Communist country. Some of the methods
used in what Moscow calls a "normalizing" process are described below.
Political normalization was a job of considerable magnitude for the
Soviets, given-the popularity and wide ranging nature of political changes
which the reformers had achieved as well as the virulence of anti-Soviet
feeling.
One of the Dubcek regime's more important political innovations was to
grant autonorc~y to various, formerly impotent non-Party organizations.
Former puppet parties in the Czech National Front, which were established
in 19~+$ as a meaningless concession to the non-Communists, were permitted
under Dubcek to organize anal formulate programs of their own. The national
trade union federation, a mere rubber-stamp front group in any Communist
regime, struck out independently, criticizing the regime and supporting the
.interests of its worker members. Quasi-political organizations such as KAN,
a group of youthful non-Party reformers; the 231 Club dedicated to rehabili-
tating some 50,000 former political prisoners; and the newly formed Society
for-Human Rights, acted as pressure groups in the body politic.
After the invasion these symptoms of democracy were wiped out. The
National Front parties were forbidden to organize independently. The leader
of the trade union federation, Karel Polacek, was co-opted into the Party
leadership, to remove him from trade union affairs and in order to use him
as a whip for controlling the workers. The new clubs were put under Interior
Ministry control and refused licenses to operate.
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The second essential step in political normalization was remaking
the Party. Under Dubcek and popular legislative leader Josef Smrkovsky,
Party membership shot up. Many formerly apathetic functionaries became
active liberals in the new cause. First they tried force; they kidnapped
and imprisoned the top leaders. But no quislings came forward; Dubcek,
Smrkovsky and the others were reinstalled for later, more gradual replace-
ment. Smrkovsky was removed from leadership of the Federal Assembly (parlia-
ment) in October 1969, Premier Cernik was replaced in January 1970, and
Dubcek lost one party and governmental post after another until he was
finally read out of the Party altogether in June 1970.
Hand in hand with the purge of the top leadership went tYie continuing
Party purge, also euphemistically called the "exchange of Party cards."
Moscow's stated aim is to insure that every member of the Party is interro-
gated. ,Under Soviet prodding some 2,000 investigating commis:~ions, abetted
by a pervasive informant network, put the purges into high ge-ar in January
197o with the evident aim of reducing the mass Party to rough]_y half its.
1968 strength of about 1,600,000. In addition, great numbers have resigned
during the past two years. Progressives, and even moderates, have been
replaced at all levels by ultra-conservatives on whom Moscow can depend.
The presidium has been reduced from 21 to 11 men. Some 70 members of the
1968 Central Committee have been ousted. The moderates, are now outnumbered
by the St aliriists.
Normalization of information media got top priority. Freedom of infor-
mation, the lifeblood of an open society, had been restored iri February 1968
for the first time in twenty years. The Czech people discovered their own
country; television introduced them to their modest new Party First Secre-
tary; magazines and newspapers proliferated, reporting the astonishing new
Party developments. All government and Party officers were put under the
close and critical scrutiny of the free press. Circulation oi' popular
magazines like Literarni Listy, Reporter, and Politika rose astonishingly
as they. opened their pages to free-wheeling discussions of long suppressed
social topics. This heady climate of public debate inevitably brought
charges against the Party for failure to liberalize fast enou?;h and against
the Soviet Union for its attempted domination of Czechaslovaki.a. But in the
pre-invasion period the popular press gave nearly unanimous support and a
"stand firm" edict to Dubcek as he desperately negotiated with the Russians
for Czechoslovakian sovereignty at Cierna and Bratislava. Latter, in the
five days following the invasion, many magazines and newspapers, including
the Party's Rude Pravo, continued publication underground. Twelve mobile
TV and radio units kept the people informed of what was happening; radio
stations continuously repeated the Party leaders' statement that, despite
Soviet propaganda claims, no request had been issued to Warsaw Pact troops
to enter the country and no forewarning of the invasion had been given.
On 21 August, the Russians tried to clamp censorship on all news media.
One by one, publications were suspended or banned, among them the-Czech Journal-
ist Union's respected Reporter and the Central Committee's owri weekly Politika.
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The staff of Rude Pravo was entirely replaced as was that of the trade unions
Pr ace. The present Rude Pravo chief editor is a militant Stalinist and a
member of the Central Committee Secretariat. The new Prace chief editor and
the new director of Czech radio were themselves later replaced as Soviet
pressure for orthodoxy increased. Purges dug deep into all media staffs,
where Soviets correctly feared Czech democratic traditions. Standard Com-
munist purge tactics were used: firing, recantations and self-criticism.
Journalist groups continued their protests late into 1969 but were even-
tually quieted.. Some disbanded rather .than kow-tow. Large numbers now
have difficulty finding jobs. Jiri Hochman, formerely well known on the
Reporter, wrote friends in June that he is now working as a mechanic and
expects to be put on trial after the invasion anniversary. Occasionally a
newspaperman is hired by a sympathetic factory manager only to be fired under
Party pressure. When he can no longer find any such work, he may be arrested
as a "parasite" for not working!
Cultural normalization was also a part of Moscow's program. When Dubcek
appointed Eduard Goldstuecker, vice rector of Prague's world famous Charles
.University, to head the Writers Union and freed it from Interior Ministry
control, intellectual expression bloomed freely. Artists wrote, composed,
and painted with uncontrolled freedom. Czech film makers earned artistic
acclaim in the west. Twenty years of Communist education fell away as
students who had led the first mass protests in 1967 became vociferous sup-
porters of the progressive Communists, often outreaching Dubcek's stated
limitations of freedom. They continued to demonstrate against the Soviet
occupation for months after the invasion
The invaders quickly reduced artists to the sterility of state-censored
"socialist realism" under control of the Ministry of Interior. An occasional
film maker still retains limited independence because of the foreign exchange
his films earn abroad. But playwright Vaclav Havel, winner of the 1969
Austrian prize for European literature was not permitted even to go to Vienna
to receive his award (shades of Boris Pasternak). The purges hit hardest
among the Charles University intellectuals whom Moscow has always fea:r?ed.
Thousands have now fled or resigned. The new Education Minister opened an
inquisition by requiring all higher school officials to report any public
statement or act of "rightist opportunism" from school faculties or students
during 1968-69. Should any official be reluctant to turn informer, he was
assured that the Ministry's own investigation would find him out! At the
same time each Ministry emp:Loyee was required to evaluate himself and ten of
his colleagues in intimate, personal detail. Nearly all school curricula
are now under control. Studies in humanities, such as social sciences,
have been banned, all foreign source material prohibited and the granting
of all higher degrees in Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) suspended. Auton-
orr~y, even for ,higher schools, has been wiped out.
Personal freedom has been reduced to the standard of other Communist
countries. The security police apparatus has been reconstituted, complete
with links to a spy network under the Soviet ambassador. An "emergency"
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law of indefinite duration allows police to hold a suspect inconununicado
and without trial for a renewable period of 21 days, despite the fact that
the Czech constitution permits a maximum of only 48 hours. Free: assembly
.s no longer possible. Individuals are no longer permitted to travel to
the west, a privilege which had been fully restored in 1968, an~i no Czech
citizen may live abroad. The Czech border "iron curtain" is being re-built
and re-electrified, but an estimated 800 flee the country weekly, mostly
through other Communist countries. More than 100,000 have fled abroad since.
the invasion. The amnesty law which would permit them to return without
punishment has expired. Churches and church schools are again restricted
after a brief revitalization and big rise in membership. The Ck~ief Justice
of the Supreme Court recently attacked the 1968 law for rehabilitatipn of
former political prisoners as "not in harmony with socialist legality" and
urged its immediate repeal.
The above Soviet program of "normalization" of Czechoslovakia -- on the
political, propaganda/information, and cultural fronts, including the severe
abridgement of personal freedoms -- offers only a partial picture of the two-
year transformation of afresh and humane brand of socialism invitiated during
~:he "Prague Spring" to the bleakness of Soviet orthodoxy.
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THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS 196
Robert Rhodes James, ed.
Selected Chronology
January-December 1968
S January. Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Com-
mittee plenum decides to separate the functions
of party First Secretary and President of the
Republic, `in accordance with the process of
democratization which has begun'. Antonin
Novotny, while retaining the Presidency, resigns
as First Secretary and is succeeded by Alexander
Dubcek, previausiy First Secretary of the Slovak
Communist Party.
29-30 January. Dubcek pays unaccompanied visit to Soviet
Union. The communique at the end of the visit
announces `full identity of views on all questions
discussed'.
5 March. Czechoslovak Party Praesidium transfers res-
ponsibility for ideology from the conservative,
Jiri Hendrych, to Josef Spacek.
6-7 March. The Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact meets in Sofia.
16 March. Dubcek, in a speech at Brno, reaffirms that the
alliance with the Soviet Union remains the basis
of Czechoslovak foreign policy.
23 March. Meeting in Dresden of Bu?rattan, Czechoslovak,
East German, HungariarE, Polish and Soviet
party leaders. Communir _ e refers to a forth-
coming economic summ`?. tieeting and to agree-
ment on practical mews~~es to st.::.,+.hea the
Warsaw Pact and its arr.-~~d forces.
26 March. SF4:ch by ;amiaber, Secretary of the SED Central
Committee, criticizing Czech policies and
Smrkovsky's speeches. (Later the subject of
formal exchanges between the Czech and East
German Governments.)
1 April, At resumed meeting of the Czechoslovak Party
3 April.
4 April.
6 April.
Central Committee Dubcek says: `We ,must
continue to build up our army and improve it
according to Socialist principles; as a defensive
barrier against the enemy outside, the imperialist
aggressors. We must build it up as a firm link in
the alliance of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty.'
Resignation of Czechoslovak Minister of Def-
ence, General Bohumir Lomsky.
New Praesidium of Czechoslovak Communist
Party elected.
Oldrich Cernik succeeds Jozef Lenart as Prime
Minister.
8 Aprii. New Cabinet announced.
9 April. Czechoslovak Party's Action Programme pnb-
lished.
23-26 April, Session of Rumanian Central Committee adopts
resolution noting that the Rumanian Party had
not been invited to Dresden Meeting at which
questions of importance to Warsaw Pact and
C M E A were discussed.
24 April. Announcing in the National Assembly the pro-
gramme of Czechoslovak Government, Prime
Minister Cernik says: `As long as NATO exists,
we shall contribute to the strengt'~.: Wing of the
Warsaw Treaty, we shall strive to make the
Czechoslovak People's Army a firm link of this
alliance, and we shall develop greater initiative
towards the intensification of the work of its joint
- command. The government will ensure the weds
of defence in harmony with the possibilities of
our State.'
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26 April.
30 April.
4-5 May.
6 May.
6-7 May.
Czechoslovak-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendshila`
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance renewed.
Prati~da carries account of Czechoslovak pro
vincial party meetings, quoting fears expressed
by conservatives of consequences of lifting o$
Press and TV censorship and expressing anxiety
over subversive attacks against the Action Pro-
gramme.
Dubeek accompanied by Cernik, Smrkovsky and
Bilak had what Tass describes as a `brief friendly
meeting' with Soviet leaders in Moscow.
Le Mande reports a CPSU meeting of 23 April
Brezhnev described as worried over Czech devel-
opments and believing Dubcek a prisoner of
`reactionary and anti-Communist elements'.
General Epishev (head of the political control
department of the Soviet armed forces) quoted as
speculating on appeals for intervention from
"faithful communists' in Czechoslovakia. Should
this happen the Red Army would be `ready to do
its duty'. The same article claims that a similar
line is prevalent in Bulgarian Party circles.
Polish Government protests to Czechoslovakia
about `anti-Polish campaign'.
New Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow,
Vladimir Kouchy, presents credentials; Fresident
Podgorny refers to `anti-Socialist' elements in
Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek,
visits Soviet Union.
Czech trade union newspaper, Prace, takes up
Epishev's remarks, saying it is `unbelievable'
that Soviet Central Committee would consider
military intervention. '
Meeting in Moscow of leaders of Soviet, Polish,
East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian parties.
There is little publicity and no communiqu6.
Statement by Chairman of the Czechoslovak
National Assembly, Josef Smrkavsky, as
Dutcek's visit to tYf asco~v, says: `We must under-
stand the fears of the Soviet Union which has in
mind not only (:'zechoslovakia but the security
of the whole Socialist camp. Even so, the Soviet
comrades declar~.~d that they do not want to, and
wilt not, interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal
affairs.'
17-22 May. Soviet Defence Prlinister, Marshal Grechko, and
General Episheti~ visit Czechoslovakia. Commu-
nique states, intr=r olio, `...concrete steps have
been outlined for' the further development of the
friendships betv,~een the Soviet Army and the
Czechoslovak Pt~ople's Army and the strengthen-
ing of their co-c,peration within the framework
of the Warsaw 't'reaty'.
17-25 May. Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, visits
Czechoslovakia for cure and consultations.
18 May. Czechoslovak protest to East Germany about,
article in Berliner Zeitung of 9 May alleging US
and Western Gc;rman military units in Czecho- cv
Slovakia.
19 May. Czechoslovakia news agency, CT'K, reports
denial by General Epishev of Le Monde report
on possible Soviet Army assistance to Loyal
communists.
24 May. Announcement in Prague that Warsaw Fact
command staff' exercises wilt take place in
Czechoslovakia in Lune.
7 May.
8 May.
15 May.
30 May: Novotny dismis-~;ed from the Party Central Cc*nz-
mittee and suspended from Party membership.
1 June. Czechoslovak twentral Committee decides to
convene an extraordinary party congress on 9
Septembee.
3-IS June. Czechoslovak ~l'dational Assembly dele;ation,
led by Smrkovst:y, visits Soviet Union.
4 June. Dubcek, addressing meeting of party activists at
Brno, says: `Anti-party and anti-Communist
tendencies exist ... what do we mean by the
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12 Juae.
16 June.
20 June.
26 June.
27' June.
2 July.
4 July.
5 July. In a note to the West German Government, the
Soviet Union refers to the `enemy states' articles
in the UN Charter.
Smrkovsky criticizes the `2,000 Words' for
`political romanticism', while admitting the
`honour;:ble intentions' of its author.
8 July. Czechoslovak Communist Party Praesidium
issues a statement expressing willingness to
confer bilaterally with any of their allies.
$-10 July, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek,
visits Bulgaria.
9 July. Bill granting every Czechoslovak citizen right to
obtain a passport without restrictions passed by
National Assembly.
General Dzur, Minister of National Defence,
announces that 35 per cent of the troops in the
Warsaw Pact exercises have returned to their
permanent gamsons.
l0 July. Czechoslovak General Vaclav Prchlik announces
that a `new situation' had developed since the
original official statement that the troops in the
Warsaw Pact exercise would be withdrawnimma
diately on July 2.
The Soviet Literatur~raya Gazeta attacks `2,000
Words'.
11 July. Article in Pravda attacks `2,000 Words' and
compares situation with that in Hungary in 1956.
Prague Radio br