CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOR Y February 1971
COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ABROAD: THOSE IN TROUBLE LAST YEAR
The information below has to do specifically with Communist
officials serving their governments in the West who, between
January 1970 and January 1971, were declared persona non grata
(PNG) and expelled from the countries to which they had been
assigned. A total of 31 Communist officials were PNG'd during
the period. For every PNG case that is documented as public
knowledge, there are countless instances of officials whose PNG
cases remain unpublicized for political reasons, of officials
who leave quietly before action can be taken against them, or of
officials who through public exposure become identified as
intelligence officers operating under the guise of commercial or
other representation but against whom no action is taken.
For example, during the summer 1970 trial in Bonn, West Ger-
many, of confessed spy Joseph Eitzenberger, he named Ivan Semeno-
vich MOSKALENKO, Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Vienna as
the recipient of classified NATO and West European s,eientific
information. Vienna newspaper accounts of late June said the
Austrian Foreign Office had requested a report on MOSKALENKO
from the Interior Ministry and that if the report should indicate
that MOSKALENKO were operating against the interests of Austria,
"something will be done." MOSKALENKO remained in Vienna.
Similarly, in Mexico during March 1970 Soviet intelligence
officers were identified by Raya KISELNIKOVA during press confer-
ences held after her escape from the Soviet embassy where she
had been a secretary in the Soviet Trade Mission. According to
accounts in El Universal, Excelsior, and other major Mexican news-
papers, KISELNIKOVA told the Mexican secret police that four
members of the consular section, whose names she revealed in
secret, spent only eight hours weekly on their jobs of issuing
visas,: and the rest of their time in secret operations involving
Mexican workers and student organizations. She publicly
identified Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, embassy Second Secretary
and Chief of the Consular Section, as the "watchdog" of Soviet
personnel stationed in Mexico. She also publicly identified embas-
sy First Secretary Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV as active in espio-
nage work. No actions were taken against these Soviets.
The Second Secretary of the Rumanian Embassy in Switzerland
Ion CROITORU, left suddenly for home when he was identified as the
contact of an arrested Swiss spy whose case broke last February.
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The case involved a Swiss female employee of the Zurich city
administration who was charged with having supplied both Rumanian
and Soviet officials with blank personal identity cards, residence
permits, and other documents. A former Second Secretary of the
Soviet Embassy who had left Switzerland the year before, Aleksandr
Fedorovich GRACHEV, was also identified as the KGB contact of
the accused.
Two Soviet commercial representatives were recalled to the
USSR following publicity given them in the West German press
during January 1970. They were Viktor BAKUNOV who represented
Avtoeksport in East Germany and Vladimir Denisovich PAVLOV who
was a commercial counselor in the Soviet Trade Mission in East
Germany. Both BAKUNOV and PAVLOV were exposed as having tried
to recruit stewardesses on international airlines flying into
West Berlin to serve as couriers between Berlin and Western
countries and to bring "espionage mail" and other secret material
over the border without inspection.
In Sweden, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Ivan
Pavlovich KISELEV, was the subject of a two-part feature story
which ran in the August-September 1970 issues of the magazine
Lektyr. The articles were authored by an East German, Swedish-
aa sed free lance journalist whom KISELEV had previously recruited.
One of the articles carried photographs of actual agent meetings
between KISELEV and the journalist. KISELEV, who was assigned to
the Soviet Embassy in Sweden as of July 1967, had been one of the
20 Soviet officials declared PNG and expelled from Ghana during
March 1966 in the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah.
The names mentioned above represent a mere handful of the
examples which could be cited. The listings which follow concern
PNG actions taken during 1970.
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COMMUNIST OFFICIALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG) DURING'1970:
A total 'of 31 Communist officials were
countries during 1970.
declared'PNG by Free World
Country of Origin Type of Assignment:
and Name :
ALBANIA
Soto SOFRONI Diplomatic
CUBA
Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez Diplomatic
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez Diplomatic
EAST GERMANY.
Siegfried BUETTNER Diplomatic
HUNGARY
Janos HEGEDUS Diplomatic
POLAND
pert BALAWENDER Diplomatic
Wlodzimierz KWIATKOWSKI Diplomatic
Janusz PRYSTROM Diplomatic
Jan RODAK ' Diplomatic
Czeslaw TANANA Diplomatic
USSR
LEKSANDROV, Vladimir Ivanovich
BOROVINSKIY, Petr Fedorovich
LEBEDEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
MAMONTOV, Yuriy Leonidovich
MESROPOV, Valeriy Moiseyevich
NETREBSKIY, Boris Pavlovich
OREKHOV, Boris-Mikhailovich
PODKILZIN, Boris
RYABOV, Yuriy Ivanovich
SAVICH, Boris Trofimovich
Embassy employee
Diplomatic
Diplomatic
Trade mission
Commercial
Nov stand'Diplomatic
Pravda
Diplomatic
Inturis
Commercial
Country from
w iTi' h expelled:
Italy
United Nations
United Nations
Belgium
Belgium
United Kingdom
France
United Kingdom
Italy
West Germany
Norway
Argentina
Norway
Netherlands
United States
Congo (Kinshasa)
Argentina
Belgium
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USSR (Cont.)
SAVIN, Nikolay Andreyevich Diplomatic
SHAROVATOV, Vladimir Semonovich Embassy employee
SIMANTOVSKIY, Oleg Vladimirovich Diplomatic
STERLIKOV, Aleksey Petrovich Diplomatic
STUDENIKOV, Igor Diplomatic
TIKHOMIROV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Translator
TUMANOV, Boris G. TASS
UTKIN, Stanislav Grigoryevich Diplomatic
VALYALIN, Fedor Fedorovich Diplomatic
ZAMOYSKTY, Lolliy Petrovich Izvestiya
ZHEGALOV, Leonid Nikolayevich Press corps
Switzerland
Netherlands
Congo(Kinshasa)
Switzerland
Congo(Kinshasa)
United Nations
Congo(Kinshasa)
Norway
Congo(Kinshasa)
Italy
United States.
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COMMUNIST OFFICIALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG) DURING 1970
(By case, within geographic areas where the action was taken.)
AFRICA
Congo (Kinshasa)
On 16 May 1970, the Kinshasa daily Le Progres reported the ex-
pulsion of four Soviets -as'the-result of the'Congo (Kinshasa)
Government's discovery of a Russian spy network operating within
the Congolese army, Ministry of Information, and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.' The Soviet diplomats were accused of holding frequent
meetings;with student elements to spread "false rumors." The press
cited a reciprocal agreement made between the governments of Congo
(Kinshasa) and the USSR to limit to seven the number of diplomats
in the embassies of each country and noted that the USSR had upped
the number of Soviets in the Kinshasa diplomatic community to 42.
Kinshasa, meanwhile, had four diplomats in Moscow. The 20 May
issue of La Tribune Africain identified the expellees and named
three additional Soviets whose nefarious activities had been re-
vealed during government investigations.
The Soviet diplomats expelled were: Oleg Vladimirovich
SIMANTOVSKIY, KGB official and embassy attache; Igor STUDENIKOV,
KGB official and interpreter; Boris PODKILZIN, KGB official in
the embassy consular office; and Fedor Fedorovich VALYALIN, long-
term embassy visitor. VALYALIN first arrived in Kinshasa as an
escort officer for a Soviet football team which visited the Congo
in December 1969. He carried a diplomatic passport with a visi-
tor's visa. When the football team left, VALYALIN stayed. He
moved into the Soviet embassy and a few weeks later quietly asked
for a permanent visa and a diplomatic identity card, both of which
he got.
The other Soviets' implicated by the article in La Tribune
Africain were: Vitaliy Grigoryevich NOVIKOV, embassy Counselor
and official; Ivan Ignatyevich STOVBUN, press attache and
GRU official who had been previously expelled from Israel; and
Boris G. TUMANOV, TASS representative. By late July, TUMANOV
too had been expelled. The 6 June issue of the government-
controlled newspaper, Tribune Diplomatigue, had charged that
TUMANOV was in reality an officer in the Soviet GRU intelligence
organization who disguised himself as a newspaperman. The article
called for TUMANOV to leave the country; he ignored the suggestion.
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often posed as a Frenchman during his assignments as TASS man in
the Congo, was formally invited to leave on 28 July. The Congo-
lese Ministry of Information announced that "TUMANOV was ordered
to leave the former Belgian Congo within 48 hours" and noted that
"the Ministry had informed TUMANOV that the measure was taken
against him personally."
Following investigations of charges that East German aid
officials, including some teachers, had been actively "meddling
in internal affairs," the Zanzibar government announced PNG
action taken against East German Counselor Siegfried BUETTNER
as of mid-June 1970.
Belgium
On 31 March 1970, Brussels daily La Lanterne reported the
arrest of Boris Trofimovich SAVICH, a Sovietyee at the joint
Soviet-Belgian motor vehicle business corporation, Scaldia-Volga.
SAVICH was arrested in a Brussels restaurant where he was caught
attempting to get Western military data. The Belgian Justice
Ministry charged SAVICH with trying to set up "a spy network in-
side the NATO military nerve center in southern Belgium." SAVICH
was also accused of showing undue interest in the French Mirage-5.
A few days later, he was declared PNG and expelled from Belgium.
In mid-December 1970, the Belgian Security Service apprehended
Assistant Polish Military Attache, Lt. Col. Wlodzimierz KWIATKOWSKI,
"in the act of taking possession of NATO documents," according to
press reports. KWIATKOWSKI and his chauffeur, Albert BALAWENDER,
were subsequently expelled. In describing the incident, The Hague's
Haagsche Courant noted, 28 December, that the Polish military
attac returned home "for reasons of health."
AP and Reuters Paris dispatches, of 23 July 1970, revealed
that a Polish diplomat, Jan RODAK, had been caught "red handed"
spying and that the French Foreign Office had demanded his imme-
diate recall to Warsaw. RODAK was described as Second Secretary
of the Polish Embassy, posted to Paris since 26 June 1970 and
apprehended on 4 July 1970.
Italy
On 13 February 1970, Rome's La Stampa, Il Messaggero, and other
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big dailies reported PNG action taken against two Soviets earlier
that month. Vladimir Ivanovich ALEKSANDROV, an employee in the
Soviet Military Attache's office in Rome since mid-1968, was expelled
on the charge that he had obtained military information involving the
security.of Italy from an Italian Air Force sergeant. Lolliy Petro-
vich ZAMOYSKIY, Izvetiva representative in Rome since March 1968,
was expelled for "infringing the rule governing the residence of
Soviet journalists in Italy." The Zamoyskiy case was actually in
retaliation for the USSR's earlier expulsion of Ennio Caretto,
Moscow correspondent for Rome's La Stampa.
On 10 March 1970, the Italian Government took formal PNG action
against Albanian Foto SOFRONI, embassy Second Secretary. SOFRONI
had been:involved in the collection of military intelligence through
an Italian Air Force soldier based at the Italian Air Base, Foggia.
The Italian Security Service decided to roll up the case when the
Albanian sought detailed information on Italian Air Force radio
frequencies. SOFRONI was also interested in NATO strength, NATO
classified documents, and U.S. Air bases in Italy.
The Dutch Government, on 6 May 1970, named as spies Soviets
Boris Pavlovich NETREBSKIY, who acted as both Novosti representa-
tive and embassy Second Secretary, and Vladimir S emenovich SHAROVATOV,
a Soviet embassy employee without diplomatic status. Stories in
De Volkskrant and Algemeen Dagblad of 8-11 May said the pair had
come to of icial attention after a 17 February auto accident near
Schipol airfield where their Volga car ran off the road and sank in-
to a canal. Both were unhurt but were unable to get their belong-
ings out of the car. The Foreign Ministry announcement said police
had found a map of Dutch military installations and other incrimi-
nating documents in the vehicle. At the time of the announcement,
SHAROVATOV was in the USSR; he was refused re-entry. NETREBSKIY was
given 48 hours to leave. (See attached reprint from Algemeen Dag-
blad, "Novosti: Cover for Spies.")
Norway
On 29 January, stories broke in the Norwegian press regarding
two Soviet diplomats who had been quietly expelled during 1968 as
a result of two separate unpublicized military espionage cases.
The officials were Sergey Mikhaylovich LEBEDEV, embassy Third Sec-
retary, and Stanislav Grigoryevich UTKIN, embassy Second Secretary.
The Norwegian Defense Association had recently issued a resolution
calling for greater openness on the part of the authorities with
respect to matters of a military or politico-military character.
The resolution also indicated that "active intelligence agents
having diplomatic status had been expelled from the country."
Articles in Oslo's Morgenbladet of 29 and 31 January expressed Nor-
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wegian concern over the growing Soviet representation which totaled
80 members of the diplomatic community, and asked why the Soviets
had been so quietly expelled and why the Norwegian people had not
been previously informed of the cases.
In mid-May 1970, a Soviet engineer who had been living in Osld
since about October 1968 was declared PNG on charges of espionage.
The engineer, Valeriy Moiseyevich MESROPOV, was an employee in the
joint Soviet-Norwegian commercial venture, Koneisto-Norge A/S in
Drammen. The Norwegian press reported 15 September that "a Soviet
engineer was arrested after the authorities felt they had proof he
had used his stay in Norway to recruit contacts who might be useful
in illegal intelligence work." (See also the attached reprint from
Morgenbladet of 22 September concerning the affairs of Koneisto-
Norge and the MESROPOV case.)
An espionage case in Switzerland during early 1970 resulted in
the departure from that country of two Soviet officials and the
identification of an additional Soviet intelligence officer. On
3 February 1970, Marcel Buttex, a Swiss official in charge of immi-
gration and residence permits in Lausanne, was arrested as a Soviet
spy. Buttex was responsible for supplying Soviet diplomats with
large quantities of Swiss identity papers and other material that
would enable Soviets to smuggle illegals using Swiss documents in-
to Switzerland and other countries.
The case of Marcel Buttex resulted in the expulsion from
Switzerland of Soviet diplomats Nikolay Andreyevich SAVIN, Second
Secretary, and of Aleksey Petrovich STERLIKOV, First Secretary.
Former Second Secretary Aleksandr Fedorovich GRACHEV, who had
returned to the USSR in July 1969, was also exposed for his role
in the Buttex case.
United Kingdom
In October 1969 Polish Ambassador DOBROSIELSKI in London was
called to the British Foreign Office and told that four members
of his staff had been involved in "inadmissible activities" and
that he should draw his own conclusions. Colonel Czeslaw TANANA,
Assistant Military Attache, departed in early December 1969.
When the other three Poles, Second Secretary Janusz PRYSTROM and
two clerks in the Military Attach6's Office, had not left by 16
January 1970 they were ordered to leave the country. (See the
attached reprint from The Daily Telegraph of 28 January 1970,
concerning this case and retaliatory PNG action against British
diplomats taken by the Polish government.)
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West Germany
On 19 December 1970, Die Welt and Bild Zeitun carried stories
of an espionage case involving an un-named- oviet diplomat. At
about the same time, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the
USSR, Petr Fedorovich BOROVINSKIY, went home for the Christmas
holidays. By 7 January 1971, the Bonn Government let it be
known that BOROVINSKIY had been asked to leave the country and a
Die Welt article asserted that BOROVINSKIY was a leading figure
tH67Toviet intelligence service and that two West Germans
who had been working with him, a Daniel Walczak and his son, had
been arrested. The 20 January 1971. issue of Quick describes the
Soviet diplomat as "GRU Colonel Petr Fedorovic OVINSKIY,
legal resident and chief of an approximately 20-man GRU spy
group in the Soviet embassy." Through his contacts with the West
Germans, the article said, BOROVINSKIY had acquired infrared
and other electronic gear from a West German Leopard-type tank,
an ABC gas mask, NATO troop, maneuver maps, and other classified
military data.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina
After 1 Soviets Yuriy Ivanovich RYABOV and Yuriy Leonidovich
MAMENTOV were arrested on 4 November 1970, and expelled three
days later, the Argentine Government issued an official statement
to the effect that the two had been discovered carrying out
activities "incompatible with their positions." According to
articles in El Universal and other Buenos Aires papers of 6-8
November, RY arrived in Argentina in May as a representative
of the Soviet travel bureau, Inturist, and MAMONTOV represented
two Soviet commercial trade organizations, Medeksport and
Soveksportfilm. As employees of the Soviet trade mission, neither
had diplomatic immunity. Press reports at the time of their
arrest said both men had been under police surveillance for
several weeks and suspicion that they were KGB agents was confirmed
to the government's satisfaction when, upon arrest, one was found
to be carrying a metal tube which authorities said contained
microfilmed data on military and industrial complexes. At the
time of their arrest, RYABOV threw himself on the ground in an
effort to; injure himself and thus prove mistreatment, and MAMONTOV
tried to swallow a page of writing from his notebook.
Janos HEGEDUS, First Secretary in the Hungarian Embassy in
Ottowa was declared PNG on 7 January 1970. HEGEDUS was involved
in an intelligence operation with a naturalized Canadian of
Hungarian origin who fled Hungary in 1956 and was employed by a
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Canadian Government department. In retaliation, Canadian Consul
S.G. Noble was PNG'd and left Budapest on 31 January 1970.
United Nations
In February 1970, Ale:ksandr Vasilyevich TIKHOMIROV, a Russian
translator with the United Nations Secretariat since June 1965,
was arrested in Seattle, Washington, and charged with conspiring
with an un-named U.S. Air Force sergeant to get secret materials
concerning the air defense system of the Pacific Northwest.
TIKHOMIROV was declared PNG on 16 February and expelled on 17
February. The Soviets attempted to claim diplomatic immunity
for TIKHOMIROV. Their claim was rejected on the basis that he
was an employee of an international organization and had "functional
immunity only when performing duties of an official capacity."
Two members of the Cuban mission to the United Nations were
asked to leave in October 1970 on charges they had used a female
employee of a "friendly embassy" in Washington to collect political
intelligence about the Americas. The officials were Counselor
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and First Secretary Orlando PRENDES
Gutierrez.
United States
In retaliatory measures, two Soviet correspondents were
declared PNG by the United States in 1970. Pravda correspondent
in New York, Boris Mikhaylovich OREKHOV, was-ceclared PNG on 26
June for having engaged in "non-journalistic activities."
OREKHOV was also charged with having twice violated travel restric-
tions. Washington press corps member, Leonid Nikolayevich
ZHEGALOV, was declared PNG in November. (See the attached reprints
from the 23 December 1970 Newswee concerning Moscow's actions
against U.S. correspondents in the USSR.)
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LA MEUSE-LA LANTERNE, Brussels
1 April 1970 .
THE TWO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:
The Soviet Union has two large intelligence services: the KGB, which is
the state security committee, and the GRU, which is the intelligence command
of the Soviet general staff. The KGB is the more powerful of the two. It is
directly under the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, while the GRU
comes under the Ministry of Defense.
The GRU is connected with the KGB in many areas, particularly with regard
to the central files, which are kept by the KGB. All intelligence is kept
there, regardless of subject or origin (even if it is from the GRU). In addi-
tion, the KGB has two missions: one offensive (espionage) and one defensive
(counter-espionage). The GRU has only one, principally: offensive intelligence,
specifically related to the military domain. The KGB carries out its defensive
role even inside the army and the GRU.
CPYRGHT
Les deux services russes
de renseignements
le K.G.B. of Ic G.R.
L'Unlon sovietlque dispose
de deux grands services de
renseignement : is K.G.B.,
qui est le comitf de securite
de l'Etat, et le G.R.U., qui
eat la direction principals du
. renseignement de i'etat-ma-
Jor general sovietique. Le
K.G.B. cst Ic plus puissant
des deux. fl depend diree-
tement du Conseil des minis-
tres de l'Union sovletique
Is G.R.U. reieve, lul, du
ministers de la Defense.
4e G.R.U. cat Ili au K.G.B.
A blest des titres, notamment
en cc qul concerne leg
ri It i 1LIIH I. W{ IIII~I 1 ~I,
archives centrales qui sont
aux mains du K.G.B. Tous
lee renseignementa, quelle "
qu'en soit Is teneur ou 1'ori-
gine (done is G.R.U. egale-
ment) y sent classes. Le
K.G.B. a, en outre, deux mis-
sions, lone offensive (es-
plonnage). et I'autre defen-
sive (contra-espionnage). Le
G.R.U. n'en a qu'une princl-
palement : le renseignement
offensif, qui releve plus par-
ticulierement du domains
militaire. L'aspect defenaif
du role du K.G.B. sexerce
meme au mein de 1'armee et
d^ Q.R.U.-
il'1'!~'gl'lii I glml to I' i.inll,l Ij
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LA MEUSE-LA LANI'ERNE, Brussels
1 April 1970
SOVIET SPY IN BELGIUM FOR THREE YEARS
Boris Savitch, an intelligence agent for the GRU (the chief intelligence
unit of the Soviet General Staff), who had been working in Belgium since Oc-
tober 1967 under the cover of the Scaldia-Volga automobile company in Diegem
(Brussels) was arrested by State Security last week as he was finishing a meal
with a "contact" in a Linkebeek (Brussels) restaurant. Savitch was carrying
a Minox miniature camera, a large amount of film and a great deal of money.
He was interested in the activities of NATO-SHAPE and in the Mirage 5, the
French fighter-bomber ordered by the Belgian army.
At the moment of his arrest, the spy attempted to escape. Both Savitch
and his contact were taken into custody. They are still being interrogated by
the Belgian Security forces, which is continuing its investigation throughout
the country. Other Soviets ostensibly working in Belgium may be implicated in
the affair. Savitch is the eighth Soviet agent whose activities have been
discovered in Belgium in the past three years.
Boris Savitch was born in Zhitmir, a city in the Ukraine (USSR) in 1934.
He is 36 years old. Small, broad-backed, with wavy black hair, he is very
talkative. He is married and has two sons. His apartment is located in the
Scaldia-Volga building in Diegem, near the offices of the secretary-general
of NATO, located in the commune of Evere. Savitch was sent to Belgium by the
company in October 1967 as an engineering specialist. He obtained a work
permit for Belgium, stating his official occupation as selling Scaldia-Volga
trucks. This cover gave him great freedom of movement.
Truck Salesman
Savitch began his clandestine activities by first attempting to utilize
radical left-wing anti-NATO groups to achieve his purposes in SHAPE. He was
looking for collaborators. During a routine operation, the State Security
became interested in him and began a close surveillance, shadowing him con-
stantly-Shadowing is one of the techniques utilized by the counter-espionage
services. It is not an absolutely reliable technique, but at least it helps
determine whether or not the subject is a professional spy. In this matter,
his behavior during movements is very significant.
This surveillance led to the arrest of the "truck salesman" on Wednesday,
March 25. On that day, Savitch and a contact were in a restaurant in the
Linkebeek suburb of Brussels.* It is a fine, well-run place; the owner pre-
pares the meals and the wife waits- on the table. "Open-air dining in a private
and quiet location," the restaurant's advertisements say. It is the perfect
spot for a rendezvous! A large parking lot surrounds the house. The property
forms an enclave in the surrounding property. An access road is big enough for
one car at a time to pass. It is an ideal spot: 1. for the location; 2. for
its respectability;,. for its reputation; 4. for its food.
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Savitch was able to appreciate all this. In fact, he had reportedly gone
there several times before with a guest: a "contact" or a "truck salesman" or
even a comrade from the Soviet Embassy, which he visited frequently and where
he enjoyed certain privileges.
On this particular day, Savitch and his guest were eating in the inside
dining room of the restaurant. They were just finishing their meal. It was
near 1500 hours. At that moment, a car entered the grounds. Four State
Security agents got out. The two diners were confronted. Savitch, obviously
panic-stricken, started to run, abandoning his guest, who stood rooted to,the
spot. The agents caught the fugitive. The two-men were searched and taken
into custody.
A Miniature Camera
When they searched Savitch, the Security Force found he was carrying a
Minox miniature camera, a large supply of film, a great sum of money, and a
map of a clandestine rendezvous. At the time of his arrest, the "truck sales-
man" was trying to obtain information about Belgian military bases and about
SHAPE-NATO. Savitch was especially interested in the Mirage, the French-made
fighter-bomber which has been ordered by the Belgian army. Pilot training
courses for the aircraft have already been set up.' The Soviets wanted infor-
mation concerning the manufacturing of the Mirages.
Other Soviets may be involved in the affair. An investigation is under-
way in Brussels and in the provinces. The Minister of Justice announced
yesterday that he had issued a deportation order against Savitch. The order
had not yet been carried out.
With this new affair, Soviet espionage again reveals the multiplicity of
its "cover" activities, and shows that it does not hesitate to utilize all the
machinery of the Soviet Union, but in the USSR and in Soviet enterprises a-
broad. Thus, another of its covers has been unmasked. There have been other
cases where a Communist "private" enterprise was serving as a cover for in-
telligence agents. Notably, there was the case of Aeroflot in 1967.
The many-armed structure of the Soviets' specialized organizations in-
volved in espionage covers many areas: diplomacy, the press, tourism,
scientific exchanges, and even commerce.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : blA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8
 CPYFj loved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 '
,L-A MEUSE-LA LANTERNE du mercredi, 1"-4-1970
CPYRGHT
Boris Savitch, officier de
renseignement do G.R.U. (di-
rection principale du rensei-
gnement de 1'etat-major ge-
neral sovittique), travafilant
on Belgique depuis octobre
1867 sous to couvert de Is
firme automobile a Scaldia-
Volga s. i Diegem IBruxel-
ies), a etE arrete, Is semaine
derniere, par is Sfiretc de
1'Etat slots qu'il terminait de
diner to compagnie d'un
a contact . dans an restau-
rant de Linkebeek (Bruxel-
les). fl avast Siff lul on . Ml-
nox s (spparetl photographi-
que miniature). one impor-
tante reserve de films et one
grosse Somme d'argent. 11
L 'interessait aux activates
.T.A,N,-Shape et au . Mira-
ge 5 , avion chasseur-bom-
bardier frangais dent I'armee
beige a passe commando.
An moment de on arres-
tation. I'espion a tenth de
fuir. Savitcb et son contact
out Ste emmenes. ILc sont
encore Interrogea par Is Sfi-?
rate beige, qua poursult son
enquete dens tout It pays.
D'suttes Sovietiques . tra-
vaillant+. en Belgique pour-
ralent 2tre ampllques dans
1'affaire. Saviteh est It hui-
tlcme agent sovtetlque connu
pour -es activates en Belgique
durant lea trots derni6res an-
nee%.
Boris Savitch est rid A Jitomir,
ville d'Ukraine (UR.S.S.). enr
1934. If a done 36 ans. Petit,
rAble. cheveux noirs ondules.
l'homme est volubile. 11 est ma-
rie et a 2 gargons. Son loge-
ment eat sltut dans le complexe
Scaadia-Volga, A Diegem, a pro-
xUm)tk des instaliatlonsr du se-
cretariat gbndral de 1O.TA.N..
inota 1 our le terrltoIre de Is
commune d'Evere. Ehn octobre
1967, it est envoy* en Belgique
par to firme oomme ingenieur-
sp8clallste. 11 obtlent ainst un
perrnls de travail daps notre
pays, sea occupations officielles
oonsIstant A vendre des camions
de Is .marque. Cette oouverture
lut assure de grander llbertks
" dEplacentent,
Marchand
de camions
Savitch commence des aoti-
vlter clandeotines en tentant
tout d'abord d'utiliser des mou-
vements anti-O.T.A.N. d'extrd-
me gauche pour arriver a ses
fins au Shape. I! cherche des
agents compiaisants. Lord d'un
travail de routine. Is Siarete de
]'Fiat s'interesse a lui et com-
mence une surveillance serree.
filature sur filature.
La filature est one des'.
techniques utllisece par lea
services de eontre-espionna-
ge. Cc n'est pas one techni-
que de tout repas. Elle per.
met an moins de determiner
si It a file > est oul ou non
on profesolonnel de i'esplon-
nare. Son comportement en
tours de depiacement eat tree
significatlt pour eels.
Cette surveillance a abouti, It
mercredt 25 mars dernier, a I'ar-
restatlon du + vendeur de ca-
talpa *, Ce jour-1h, Boris Sa-
vltch et un ? oontact. dtaient
dams un restaurant de 'la ban-
lieue de Bruxelles, A Linkebeek.
Endrolt carAn et blest tenu : le
patron prbpare lea repas, sa
femme Bert A table. ? Le grand
air daps on site retire at tran-
i uille ., dit Is publialb6 de 1eta-
blissement. N'est-ce pas ]a le
lieu reve pour une rencontre f
Un vaste parking entoure Is
matron. La propridte constitue
une enclave dans Ies proprietks
volslnes. Un sentier permet It
passage dune seule voiture a
is tots. C'est un endrott ideal :
1) pour sa situation : 2) pour
son serleux 3>` pour son cadre
de standing ; 41 par sa r table .
Savitch a su appreeier tout
cells. Il s'y strait, en effet. rendu
plusteurs fold precedetnment
avec un Invit@, < Contact v ou
< acheteur de camion.s ou en-
core camarede sovletique de
I'ambassade. ambassade of) 11 se
rendalt frequommcnt et ou 11
benkficiait de certaines faveurs.
Ce mercredl-13, Savitch et son
invite du jour &talent a table
dans Is sa11e inttrieure ?u res-
taurant. Its terrnfnaient le repass
IJ 6tait prAs de 18 heures. Une
volture pCn,tra a ce moment
daps Is proprietb. Quatre ins-
pecteurs de Is SAretk de I'Etat.,
en descendirent, Les deux oonvCr
vas furent interpeilEs, Savitch,
manlfestaxnent affole, prlt Is
futte, abandonnant IA son invite.
qua recta figk sur place. Les
inspecteurs rattraperent It fugt-
tif. Les deux homtnes furent
fou1116s et emuneneas.
Un apparel!
photo miniature
Au court de la foutIle, la Bare-
tE trouva sur Savitch un ~iga";-
'd fraudula t elections is the Pa:: Vy-IV gain., rather than loss. l:~ose k,.o
ave left the Pai dt c f "far long f rs o C e1tilu'i1l u t n "'`al's il~aEa.bi v' ne;y k "r
e.a a~17eJ .r
.. I.t, as do hove o v 's C: ho ars Still raxt~T il~ l:~tGy^ i o Nho would ZOlv'
egret the dese t:iori of a corrade? But it is not the nature of Co,-=a nie s
to beg those V2o do Flo t 4 h to be Ca.ai.unis is tO 'continue as such.
his is the Party of ` he rJ:.ii~t"'~: s of t+o:,wn and coa?try th a -L Pa t~7 of
~t J the y J. :.
vVOl.Lu
IO:aFir'y i+x'~Es.1CE; uLe~+',...:e ;L~''tErC.1 wncan place t1ntr:lr skills al:
he d ncs
c,1. of a social C,:.ciuadi that is di:i'iEl"Eatt from 'L:iEfi.:: but more
evol tio+la y. he f a+ ' re ;ad workers, J4.4_..1 remain in this Party, because
they need i t as an ins--tx t-mnt for t eir battles, lust as the
guerC illy
1~'Pubor needs his o=. The' Cotrr:lJ:nist Party Ur. 1 staunch it s wounds, acid
ebuild what has boon destroyed. it well emerge from this crisis more
" n fed and more pow r i'u3 , as the only ho pa for liberation among the op- s
d masses of Venezuelan people.
the PCV Harbors No 111-Will
In the case of professionals arid other individuals who have legit the
arty, on the assumption that they may have been supra and might E. sh &c
return to their positions as combatants in the Communist Part-Y3 their, re-
ords will be studied indiv=idually, without any ill-,?i11 or retaliation.
his Party., as alma s, belongs to all revolutionaries. No-one here is de-
fed an opportunity to fight for a just cause. In this Party, as in no
ther, one can disagree aai h the views of the majority within any of t e
pities which comprise the. Communist Party str .cture.
he eWillPass
At the moments the splinter groups ar in style, both on TV and radio
d. in the big newspapers. It suits both the imperialists arid the bowrgeoi-
ie to show those willing to desert that they 411 be well received and
incorporated into the systexa. Any force which dissociates itself fro.r. a
ommunist Party, whether large, suall or miniscule;, trill be built up by the
dvertising media in the service of the ens ies of the people, at least for
while. That is how it has always been, and always will be. The
func ons
f the new Party will be attanded, as proof that, in order to succeed, one
eed only cease to be a Corrm nist.
Eir Fate
Sooner or later, these splinter groups which have been harming the
V organization for years, will be confronted with internal problems. For
e time being, they are united by the mutual desire to bring the yr eatLS t
ossible harm to the Communist Party; but this "vein" will soon give out.
afore the New Years sun has warmed, disputes will crop out, and those
to had illusion s ' of princ::;-les outside the Communist ranks will get a
asta of hours of 'endless oittcxrness.
Approved For Release 1999/09/0: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8
 CPYA I?ved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8
Today, 11:: ~' O?,".' 1 is .u'U ioc3x``Lay r. c Zi o1;a:i-I a slight recovery, whole 1-6-
v gions have remained t:y l to ''who -~w-'ty'u Individuals 1;7'10 differ ma ^ked f
from me have ret,4ainod in the l artyutp .tolding their point of it iCti.'+ a Enccur-
grog nos has arrivod from a"22. parts of the, cool t17, about individuals,
both o Ld and young, who hater-, c i`e,. sed their loyalty to the Col;ur uhist Cause.
Our fellow ?1'rrrt:r.tis i6:1e t$iai':;t ovsr4,""Iv .AAQ `~~" ia~?a?Y7r; ilia L3~ro~i 0 t.01idi city. C:Cii1i-
a`}'Ea not aid a=:4 Fral.":ti...re- CL-:3s3 and the W70"kii^iZ farmers are
on ?u,. side a These soc. i l classes do not believe i i -Iairy tales. The I,nork-
iig People have faith in Cca:l:':t:rra.ist Party; and., even though taey r atir
SS .^ye r Lndiffs';ont or ai.oof, they are on the side of the Lv:i,1iLZ7i;7t+S,
'-',t i6 CtiJ a.a ,. U L ?;iv tii ' U ` pr.ista sing democr