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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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April 1971
THE SOVIET MODEL: FORCED LABOR CAMPS AND OTHER PRISONS
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION
Regulations on corrective labor adopted by the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR over the past decade have been designed
more to expand the forced labor colonies than eliminate them;
the most recent regulations are essentially new legal instruments
designed to facilitate arrests on a grander scale. And the newest
corrective labor legislation which is due to come into force
in all the Soviet republics as of 1 June 1971 is no different.
Most important, the new legislation fails to abrogate any of
the very broad "antiparasite" decrees adopted between 1961 and
1968 --- the decrees which have accounted for the recent
population explosion in the Soviet forced labor camp system.
Most recently, the practice of arresting social "parasites" has
spread from the USSR to both Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Soviet Antiparasite Decrees
The first in the series of "antiparasite" decrees adopted
between 1961 and 1968 was announced in May 1961 in the Vedimosti
Verkhovnogo Soveta under the title: On strengthening the Struggle
Against Persons Who Avoid Socially Useful Labor and Who Lead an
Antisocial Parasitic Way of Life." Because of the extremely
elastic definitions of the offenses which it encompassed, most
analysts viewed this decree as a new legal instrument for mass
arrests. It empowered courts to direct to labor colonies idlers,
speculators, and parasites and confiscation of their personal
property was to be a routine matter.
The 1961 decree also introduced the death penalty for the
killing Of one prisoner by another,-for-an assault on a-meinber of the
administration, and for participation in any organization preparing
such acts. This section of the decree is interpreted as intended
to be a threat against clandestine organization within the forced
labor camps and as a shield Of protection for KGB informers
within the camps.
A second decree, issued in September 1965, further expanded
the legal basis for sentencing hooligans and political offenders
to forced labor camps. It provided that sentences could be
imposed by resolution of rayon committees or by decree of peoples'
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courts and that such resolutions and decrees "shall be final and
not subject to appeal." Furthermore, "parasites" were to be
identified either on the basis of "statements of citizens" or
"on the initiative of state and public organizations."
The categories of those found to be socially dangerous
Were expanded still more by a September 1966 decree which
provided for the imprisonment of "those given to uttering or
writing material descrediting the Soviet State" or for partici-
pating in "group activities" involving "disobedience in the face
of lawful demands of the authorities." Then, in summer 1968, the
Supreme Soviet created a whole new complex of forced labor camps
for minors.
The decree for minors provided that "a convicted person
who reaches 18 years of age while serving sentence is transferred
from a labor colony for minors to a corrective labor colony for
adults.. .from a standard-regime labor colony for minors to a
standard-regime colony for adults, and from a strict-regime labor
colony for minors to a strict regime colony for adults." All
corrective labor colonies are subdivided into four basic types,
depending on the severity of the penal regime: general, intensi-
fied, strict, and special. All political prisoners are automatic-
ally assigned to either strict or special regimes.
General regime assigned the best jobs, normally
some type of work within the
camp -- sewing workshops, carpen-
try, brick making, etc.
Intensified regime : assigned to more difficult manual
labor such as ditchdigging, cement
works, or land clearing.
Strict regime assigned to heavy manual labor
such as heavy construction or to
work in plants where there are
health hazards.
Special regime
assigned to the heaviest kinds
of manual labor such as stone
quarrying, lumbering, loading
and unloading timber, sawmilling,
earth removal, etc. (special
regime prisoners are also assigned
production norms that are almost
impossible to meet).
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New Soviet Legislation
New corrective-labor legislation is due to come into force
throughout the USSR as of 1 June 1971. The legislation delineates
the three basic types of penal institutions: corrective labor
camps, prisons, and educative-labor camps (or, camps for minors).
Each of these is in turn subdivided into different categories on
the basis of the severity of living and working conditions. However,
the language is sufficiently vague to allow a variety of inter-
pretations. As previously noted, the new legislation abrogates
none of the antiparasite decrees adopted between 1961 and 1968
--- if anything the legal bases for sentencing political offenders
are broadened. Equally important, the new legislation fails to
make mention of the special psychiatric hospitals to which so
many dissident citizens are arbitrarily cohmdtted. The new penal
legislation could have shed some light on these psychiatric
institutions, but the Soviet authorities deliberately chose not
to do so.
Czechoslovakia's Emergency Laws
In Czechoslovakia in 1969, the first anniversary of the
Soviet-led invasion and occupation was marked, 19-22 August, by
massive but orderly protest demonstrations in Prague and other
Czechoslovak cities. The demonstrations, which were quelled
by the police and Czechoslovak army troops, culminated in tighter
police controls and new "emergency laws" that were issued by the
goverment 22 August. These laws, originally to extend only to
the end of December, are by now a matter of permanent legislation.
The Czechoslovak emergency laws broadened police powers and
instituted summary court proceedings for political offenders.
They provided stiff prison terms for those accused of general
disorderliness, of work slowdowns, of being antisocial, anti-
Party, or anti-Soviet. They permitted the dismissal of teachers,
scientists, unionists, writers -- all opinion molders -- who failed
to educate youths or subordinates according to the "principles
of socialist society" and for the disbandment of all organs
allegedly violating "socialist order." The new laws also allowed
a three-month detention of suspects "to ascertain if they are
organizers of actions which disturb the public order."
Under application of these laws, the campaign of party and
job dismissals had reached the point by mid-1970 where over 250,000
had been affected. Because Czechoslovakia has no provisions for
"unemployment," poverty among those fired was widespread. Scattered
reports from Prague indicated that at any given time Pankrac prison,
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the interrogation center for political suspects, could be found
crammed with scores of political prisoners all jailed without
indication as to when or if they were to be brought to trial.
By early 1971, this vast purge was devastating the economic,
political and social life of the country as Czechoslovak in-
tellectuals continued to be dismissed from key jobs and condemned
to manual labor or unemployment because they refused to express
approval of the 1968 invasion.
In February 1971, former Czech TV commentator Vladimir
Skutina, who had already been incarcerated for over a year
spending his time either hospitalized or in Pankrac prison,
was formally sentenced to two years' imprisonment for having
slandered the USSR and for other "antisocial" acts. At the
same time, additional action was undertaken to curtail the
activities of other writers. As liberal journalists were increas-
ingly fired from their regular jobs, membership in the freelance
section of the Czech Journalists' Union had more than doubled.
In a letter circulated 19 February to principle Czech media out-
lets, the union announced its intention to blackball all but 70
of its 170 freelance journalists for reasons of "political
unreliability." Ex-journalists in Prague have expressed the
fear that this latest crackdown could be the first step towards
prosecution under "antiparasite" laws.
Poland to Emulate Soviet Labor Camp System?
By the end of February this year, the Polish Council of
Ministers was working on a new draft law under provisions of
which there will be established a new system of forced labor
camps of an "educational nature" for the retraining of "anti-
social, incorrigible elements." The Polish Minister of
Justice explained to a press conference that the "draft law
affects persons over 18 years of age who do not attend school
and, being able to work, lead a parasite's life, persistently
refusing to engage in socially useful work, making a living in
a manner, or from sources inconsistent with the principles of
social co-existence, thus endangering the public order."
Sanctions provided for in the draft law are: an individual
could be warned and assigned a given job, an individual could be
assigned to a "social tutor" who would watch over him for three
years, or andndividual can be sentenced to a minimum three year
term to "enlightment by labor" in labor camps which will be run
by the Polish Ministry of the Interior. This draft law was
presented to the Polish parliament on 11 March 1971.
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.....1110.41.40..1411m0.01?041?6.
CPYRGHT
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13 July 1970
SOVIET MIS
EAL TO
C MMUNISTS
NERS?
,.. i arty was capable of reforming " During the. years of Stalin's
- tic Soviet system . and restoring dictatorship they spent more.
democratic , freedoms. , . ? time being surprised at it than
. To that case, Galanskov :says, opposing it," he says. "They
ESTEP N mand that Soviet leaders
--, IL-.
West mun
ern Comists should'
; de.: were shocked by the extent of.
the evil and the enormity of
k? (1?Carryout- a complete r ?and. ou tragedy.
"But they did not have the
I ' ,general amnesty of.- all
sons Condemned roe?? r
,
? ? ntellecttial' or moral. strength to
). .od ,rellgious beliefs oppose effectively the explosion ?
? ? 1- of diabolic. forces. They lacked
and ?
11,41)11) r1.01.)D, :Ce:lititur.rimc. gairry, Crirecutiouhriont aPiiter11 with "Brohlnd at. 1. ro ort
.11 .2 anform their nn principles. rind made political
com m
DISSPILLNI6 ,,n 'boviet prison camps have rl pollhicM , gl?9: about wriussi`antr, IggncentraPtiod:
drawn -up an: 'appeal.r,?to ',-Western , Free opposition' not hear the groans frOm the
,
,Comniunist parties to Use their influence to help , Com nunists -
?,
?free political prisonerS :and restore civil rights ?
ea., ;exert con.
' *demble,-influence over Soviet
polie '
, )/ camps, eStern intellectuals di
:belieVes -that ? Western. other &de of the barbed ivire.",
;in. the *Soviet 'Union. -..' ?
,.. , . , ? . ? '...r r epresentatives of Western
-;,. . " . ' .' ' ? "' ''' ;Communist parties -are ' becom-
, . The .appeal, .mainly the work! of Yuri Galantkoii,' 31, ring ever more frequently a sort,
Who is Serving a SeVen-Yearl. Sentence in a camp, wasi polf "ee o Iosit
.! too Soviet
iof i io
recently smuggled out of Russia, as was first reported in ' move newn.ti.tein., ...., 01,, en', C , mm,utust
The Sunday Telegraph. ; connec m
tion between the existeric , extreme importance because it
, There is, he says, a direct I " T tis circumstance acquires
the " testament."
He bases his ar gum, cnt Fn! West and the nature f So ' -
i, the tiovement and gives pro-
i of ?Communist parties in th :make a dialogue possible inside
written ay' domestic and foreign .Alicy.v-- '. misc f reform. ?
Signor Togliatti, former Ordinary people in the' West' "TF e leaders of Western
leader of the. Italian Corm assumed. that Communists, there Comm_inist parties must under-
monist party, who said that! want ,to set up the same sort ot stand clearly, that the Soviet
Italian Communists' could noti! system as in the Soviet Union.- leader; -maintain:. a ,system of!
Understand why' the Stalinis'
. . The Communists claimed thatopprepsion and ...lirnitation 'of
r6gime of opOression Con- .
tinued in Russia, ; - ' 'their' Communism- would not be d - t b ti d t
demot-atic and -personal free-
like, the Soviet version and that om, to ecause.. :ley.. o . no
Communism -did not' necessarily want bo change"it,v but. because
,? If this question evokes :sur-i involve? .suppression ,-?of demOC,, they d3 not, know 'what to do."
prise and, at the bestk,annoyance,: racy. ' ' * "'?? ? Gala-1514ov is critical of the-
m. Western Communists, for us .'They his? 'argued,' Galanskov
it is a matter o death
f life and ,". says, that the Soviet Communist
to in
the 'appeal says. fiapn ro_ moscow
failure of Western intelfrtuals:
POSEV
Pebruary 1971
(excerpts only)
A REVIEW OF PUNITIVE POLICY
The first word about an article at the disposal of samizdat by YUriy Galanskov
written from the 17th section of Dubrovlag appeared in the Chronicle of Current
Events No. 1 (12) of 28 February 1970. It is said that because of the article, Yu.
Daniel and V. Ponkin' were sent to the Vladimirsk prison. For a long time this
article was unavailable in the West until it turned up in the editorial offices of
the F7glish newspaper Sunday Televaph. On 12 July the paper carried a detailed note
on Galanskav's article, calling him "one of the principal dissidents of Russia."...
-Editor.
Through a fortunate chain of circumstances, such events as the hunger-strike of
February 1968, "The Letter of Six," and the collective hunger-strike in support of
Alexander Ginzberg, sooner or later become widely known, both at home and abroad.
The latter is the most important from the point of
Th kplfagAlmtrigitokliiite West WitRANdlnidrFtelpaMMidittaWinC4 r RaVasierirthe obwits.
Rifssian
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language, publicize facts of official tyranny and crude coersion and force governmental
organs and officials to act. In this way, the Western press and radio carry out
the mission of an organized opposition, which at the present time is lacking in
Russia, and thereby stimulate our national development. Unfortunately, the West
often limits itself to sensationalism and speculation and does not display sufficient
persistence in raising questions that are so vitally important.
During the years of the Stalin dictatorship the intelligentsia of the West
spent more timo being surprised than in protesting. It was shocked by the cruelty
of the evil and enormity of our tragedy. The intelligentsia itself lacked the
spiritual integrity and moral strength with which to effectively withstand the
--devil's powers. It proved itself -unprincipled, bargained with its conscience and
made political compromises. Western intelligentsia heard nothing about the sensational
reports of Russian concentration camps, not even the moans from behind the barbed
wire. And no sensationalism helped us protect our intelligentsia from physical
annihilation. No sensationalism helped us stop the process of exhausting the human
resources of a nation...
In 1964 the Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti,
in his "Memorandum" published in Pravda, emphatically raised the question of why
in Russia to this day a regime of suppression and restriction of democratic and
personal liberties is still retained, as introduced by Stalin. The question remained
unanswered.
But if this question preplexes and even vexes the Communists of the West, for us,
it is a question of life and death. For us a regime of suppression and restriction
of democratic and personal liberties means the suppression of the political and economic
activity of our national powers; it cruShes and strangles any creative initiative,
kills man's faith and deprives him of hope.
Human confusion and lost faith, crushed under the ruins of destroyed hope,
shattAr the magic crystal of a world outlook and corrupt the soul. This is the
danger which threatens Russia from within.
At times it is said that the West is demoralized by freedom. This is hardly
the case. I would say that even freedom is not enough to overcome the difficulties
facing the West today.
We need freedom in order to develop national self-determination.
We need freedom in order to put into operation all the necessary mechanisms
serving to accomplish that task.
We need freedom in order to fulfill our obligations to Russia and to life.
There is simply land, and then there is the Russian land on which you stand and
which feeds you. And if today in your land people who answered with faith the call
of their conscience sit behind barbed wire, then you must remember this, for you
answer for that land and for the life on that land,,
The position of P. Togliatti and criticism by Western Communist parties of
the internal and foreign policy of the CPSU is not an accidental phenomenon. There
is a direct connection between the nature of the domestic and the foreign policy of
the CPSU and the fact of the existence of Western Communist parties. It is this.
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Italians, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, Australians, Japanese, etc. ask
the Communists of Italy, France, England, America, Australia, and Japan: are you
offering us the kind of social structure in which all political liberties will be
liquidated, in which opposing ideas will be declared illegal and then opponents
will be repressed and thrown behind barbed wire under the muzzle of a submachine
gun? Are you offering us a social structure in which not only will opposition
parties be impossible, but even a "Union of Communards" will sit behind barbed wire?
Are you offering us a social system in which a mother will be torn away from her
child (the L. Bororaz-Brukhman case), a father from his children (K. Babitskiy),
husband from his wife (P. Litvinov) and deported because of an ordinary show of
protest?
"Not under any conditions!" - Western Communists will be forced to say. We
condemn such a policy and dissociate ourselves from it. Our Communism will not be
like that, we will protect all political and creative freedoms, will be tolerant
and open minded. Then Communists of the West ask:
"And why should we believe you? You yourselves insist that the criterion of
the truth of any doctrine is practice, but practice has shown tilat two great
Communist powers (the USSR and China) have carried out, and are carrying out, a
policy which even you yourselves have condemned, and are condemning. More
than that, two great Communist powers are on the brink of a war which can lead to
the annihilation of the Russian and Chinese nations. You speak to us of difficulties
and mistakes, but how can you prove that in the very nature of Communism there are
not inherent such phenomena as Stalinism and Maoism? How can you prove that your
Italian, French, or English Communism will not became a national tragedy for the
Italian, French and English nations?
You want to convince us that Cammanism can guarantee democratic and personal
liberties more fully than can the West. Consider, Communists, the Western system
to whose liquidation you are dedicated and which grants you all the organizational and
technical opportunities to accomplish that end. You have your own parties, your, own
newspapers, your own publishing houses, and your own bookstores and enjoy all
political liberties, while in Russia a group of young Marxists, the "Union of
Cannunards," sits in a prison camp....
....You condemn such a policy and dissociate yourselves from it. You assure
us that a regime of suppression and restriction of democratic and personal liberties
is not inherent in the nature of Marxism You assure us that the CPSU is able
to overcome its mistakes and to outlive the regime of suppression and restriction of
democratic and personal liberties. You assure us of this. Then, demand of the CPSU
the following:
1) to grant complete and general amnesty to persons convicted for political
and religious beliefs and
2) to reform their policy on punishment of persons for their political and
religious beliefs
For you, who think the same as the CPSU, bear a moral-political responsibility
for all this. But if you evade this responsibility, if you dismiss the CPSU policy
on punishment with the argument that you cannot interfere in the domestic affairs
of a brotherly Communist party, then we must accuse you of immorality and of being
politically unprincipled. And we will tell the electorate directly that a regime
of suppression and restriction of democratic and personal liberties is inherent in
the vpm
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communists. We will declare you outlaws, drive you underground, and will keep you
behind barbed wire so long as the CPSU keeps behind barbed wire all those who think
differently from it
....Ever more frequently, representatives of various Western Communist parties
are acting as a free opposition to the policy of the CPSU within the Communist
movement. This circumstance acquires extreme importance in view of the fact that
it makes possible a dialogue within the Communist movement.
Regardless of how much talk there is about the independent nature of the laws of
national development, it is still impossible to deny that Russia largely depends on
the character of the evolution of the CPSU as the ruling party. But the character
of the evolution of the CPSU is directly dependent not only on a dialogue with the
West, but also, and first of all, on dialogue within the international Communist
movement. The leaders of Western Communist parties must understand clearly that
the CPSU preserves the system of suppression and restriction of diemocratic and personal
liberties, not because the CPSU does notWant to renounce it, but because the
CPSU cannot renounce it, and'doeS.not 'know what to do.
For example, more than ten years have passed
since a constitutional commission was established to draw up a rtew constitution,
but Russia still lives under the so-called Stalin constitution, In which some
articles guarantee the most extensive liberties, while others completely abrogate
the liberties proclaimed in the first articles, or entrust this abrogation to
administrative organs. This shocking example of legal sterility forces us to ponder
many things.
Another example. At the 21st Congress of the CPSU a party Program was adopted
in which it was stated that in 20 years the material-technical base of Communism
Would be created. There are other fantastic Claims which force us to doubt the
theory of the Program itself'
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CPYRGHT
_LONDON OBSERVER
3 January 1971
PETER REDDAWAY
reveals for the first time
the full extent of
Russia's prison camp
system. He estimates
that about a million
people are held in 1,000
camps inside the Soviet
Union. As the overall
picture steadily builds
up,' he writes, the im-
pression created is grim
indeed.'
CIONEriall=21=2====='?
RUSSIA is ?entangled in
network of -camps, where.
despite all. the international
conventions signed by the
Soviet Government, forced
labour and cruel exploitation
are the norm, where people
are systematically kept hungry
and constantly humiliated,
where human dignity is de-
based. Through these camps
there passes an uninterrupted ?.
human flow, numbered in
millions, which sends people
back to society in a physically
ind morally crippled state.
This is the result of a deliberate
)enal policy, Worked out la ?
Approved For
experts and expounded by
them in special handbooks
with a cynicism worthy of the
concentration camp experts of
the Third Reich.'
So reads an underground
document from Soviet Russia,
one of the many now flooding
out of the country devoted to
exposing the inhumanity of the
Kremlin's treatment of dis-
senters. The eyes of the world
were opened to this inhumanity
by the revelations in Anatoly
Marchenko's book,'My Testi-
mony,' published in 1969 and
serialised in The Observer. As
the overall picture steadily builds
up, confirmed and much elabor-
ated by the new material, the
impression created is grim
ndeed.
The document just quoted
aks the(min of an open letter
o Alexande ? Tvardovsky, the
-ecently sac} ed editor of the
iterary journal Novy Mir. It
was signed y seven prisoners,
And has readied the West .to-
gether with portraits of its
authors. The artist is Yury
lvanov, hims:lf one of the seven.
He drew thvern late in 1969 in
Camp I7a of the notorious com-
plex, deep n the Mordovian
swamps, 300 miles south-east of
Moscow, were some 20,000
prisoners are detained.
The best mown of Ivanov's
tellow-prisonrs are the poet-
aacifist Yur) Galanskov, aged
30, and the Ii tdrateur (he rejects
he descripticri writer') Alexan-
der Ginzburg,? 34. A ear fter
in January 1968 for their literary
activities. Galanskov. chronic-
ally ill with stomach ulcers, is
forced to do manual labour
until, periodically, he collapses
and has to be rushed to the
primitive hospital at Camp 3. In
April 1970 the stunizdat (under-
ground) journal, A Chronicle ot
Current Events reported 7Lacy
time, in March, he spent only a
week in the camp before being
quickly sent back to the hospital.
Typically enough, his wife and
mother were being told at the
very same time by Bobylev. head
of the medical department ot
the Ministry of Internal Affairs
[MVD] irt Moscow, and his
assistant. Mrs Shakh. that the
state of Galanskov's health was
completely satisfactory and he
did not require hospitalisation.' :
Ciinzburg?a former junior
sculling champion of the USSR
?has been surviving with less
difficulty. But he has shown
deep compassion for the suffer-
ing around him. Early in 1970
he recorded a message in Camp
17a on a home-made tape-
recorder and was punished
accordingly with transfer to the
dreaded prison at Vladimir, 100
miles east of Moscow.
On the tape Ginzburg said:
' In the Vladimir prison, in that
grave for the living, are my
friends Yuli Daniel and Valeri
Ronkin. [Daniel has since been
released.] Here in the camp there
is only one doctor from among
the prisoners and everyone goes
- ?
?Jir. ?
, ? '
? ;
the Latvian Jan Kapitsins, to his
last resting-place.' The Chronicle
records that Kapitsins died on
16 January at the age of 52,
shortly after Ivanov had drawn
his portrait. He had been serv-
ing a 15-year sentence for oppos-
ing the Russification cf Latvia.
tOther deaths reported by the
Chronicle as occurring at about
the same time were those of a
67-year-old Lithuanian in Camp
and two 56-year-olds in Camp
17a, a Lithuanian. who hanged
himself, and an Estonian.
Three other signatories of the
Mordovia document beionged to
the All-Russian Social-Christian
Union for the Liberation of the
People, which was founded in
1%4. Caught and sentenced in
1967-68, this group consisted
mainly of young staff and gradu-
ates of Leningrad University. It
advocated a parliamentary
system wth democratic freedoms
and a mixed economy. One of
the three. who got 13 years, is
the orientalist Mikhail Sado. now
33. Recently he met a Swede
who was about to be released
from ?Mordovia, and osked him
to help save the group's founder.
Igor Ogurtsov, also an orienta-
list. Ogurtsov, who was sentenced
to 15 years. is in Vladimir, and is
in poor shape. The Swede found
the power and warmth of Sado's
personality?reflected in his por-
trait movingly rripressive.
The other two signatories from
this group are Vyacheslav Plato-
nov, a 29-year-old specialist on
Ethiopia, and Leonid Berodin. a
32. In April 1970
"I ill
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de?pite a serloAproVetioF
din w as still being leld in the
prison of Camp I 7a. having been
put there the previous December
for taking part in a hunger-strike.
The seventh signatory is the
Latvian poet Victor Kalnins,
sentenced to 10 bears in Riga in
1962 for alleged participation in
a ' nationalist organisation ' ; the
sentence provoked widespread
protests from the Latvian intent-
gentalai 1? highly. re.
spected for his courage. When
the camp administration denied
him a parcel from his relatives
in November. 1969 his fellow-
prisoners began a hunger-strike
in his support.
As for Yury Ivanov, the
Chronicle reveals that his lot has
been the hardest of all. Neverthe-
less. GA-aid Brooke. who met
him briefly by chance in 1969,
was struck by his high morale
and attractive personality. Born
in 1927, he is a son of the Russian
artist Evgeny Sivers, who was
shot in 1938 and posthumously
rehabilitated. Ivanov was first
jailed with two friends in 1947
--for skipping lectures on Marx-
ism-Leninism?and all three were
brutally beaten up; one died as
a result. Released early through
pressure from relatives, Ivanov
trained at the Academy of Arts
and w as admitted to the Artists'
Union. In 1955, however, the
KGB arrested him for spreading
anti-Soviet literature' and for
'forming an organisation 'whose
members were not discovered.'
He had to work, with 8.000
other politicals,' on the con-
struction of the hydro-electric
station at Kuibyshev.
His case was reviewed in 1956,
but he was not released as he
persisted in denying any guilt.
He escaped, only to be wounded,
caught within a week, and given
a new 10-year sentence. In 1963
he got 10 more years for anti-
Soviet propaganda in the camp.'
Three of them he served in
the_rtext_IWo..irt Ca.111.P
10 in Mordovia. Both these
institutions have the inhuman
T-speciar&gitne which inv517.7
amou_ oti-te,11 thin s onty 1,300
eirories ot food per day.
Ia7C4(late for a three- iea.kaals1
child). 1-6796 le was trans-
ferred to the strict-regime '
Camp 11 (2,400 calories, the
norm for a nine-year-old), then
a year later to the prison in
Saransk. the capital of Mor-
dovia. Here the KGB spent four
months trying?in vain to
make him not only recant but
also donate to the State a foreign
legacy he had received. Finally
he was transferred again in
autumn 1969 to Camp I 7a, the
MORDOVIAN
CAMP
COMPLEX
?
MOSCOW
CIA-RD79-01 4A
RUSSIA
BARASHEVO
*3 & Central
Hospital
LESOZAVOD STATION
+1141?cH-1-4-1-n
*1
z &Central
InvestlgatIone
RIVER
? Prison YA VAS
*10
RIVER
V1NDREY
5
ANAYEVO
SEL'KH Z STATION
* CAMPS
-H.His* RAILWAY
RIVER
ROAD
0 6
MILES
1
VINDREY
LEPLEY
eSNOVKA
* V19
6* OLESNOY
*18&Transit
Prison
POT'MA
ZUBOVA POLYANA
The notorious Mordovian complex. This map,
prepared with the help of Gerald Brooke, will appear
in Ferment In the Ukraine,' edited by Michael
Browne, to be published shortly by Macmillan,
home of those few prisoners
whom?as his portraits show?
the administration cannot break
and whose ideas and moral
authority they fear.
In the last two years ihese
prisoners have combated the
vindictive and arbitrary be-
havioar of their camp's admini-
stration by, at intervals, launch-
ing hunger-strikes. A prominent
part was played in these by
Yuli Daniel and his friend
Valeri Ronkin, a Leningrad
engineer.
In February 1968 a group in-
cluding these two struck for 10
days until they won several con-
cessions. In particular the ad-
ministration promised that it
would not in future deprive them
of meetings with relatives unlessl
the local prosecutor's sanction
had first been obtained. A year,
later. atter Ronkin had again
been denied a Meeting with a
relative, a similar group threat-
ened to strike again. According
to the Chronicle. however. ? the
camp
sions
sions,'
off.
On 16 May 1969 Ginzburg
began a strike in protest against
having been forbidden for two
whole years to marry his fian-
c? ' For four successive days,'
the Chronicle wrote, he was sent
out to work, although he was
losing more and more strength.
Halfway through the fourth day
Ginzburg was finally put in soli-
tary confinement. This should
be done on the first day of a
hunger-strike. On the eleventh
day they began to give him artifi-
cial feeding. -but on 31 May the
camp doctor considered that he
looked too well, and from 1 to
4 June he was not fed.'
By this -time clinzburg's friends
were protesting vigorously with
petitions and their own strikes.
In addition, ? Yuli -Daniel sent
a statement to the Attorney-
General about the attitude of the
camp doctor to the starving
*jet otaitteilawthtohe doctor
the recent mass food-poisoning
in the women's zone of Camp 17,
had left a dying woman without
giving her medical help. On
10 June Ciinzburg and his friends
ended their strike.'
In the end Ginzburg was at last
allowed to marry--and Daniel
and Ronkin were sent to Vlad-i-
mil% This vindictiveness soon
sparked off a new wave of strikes
lit Nover0b0F, fblitoVoil by moo
?tied to International Hum*
Rights Day -- in December.
Camps 3. 17a and 19 were th-:
ones involved. Further strikes
have already been reported -by
the Nobel Prize-winning writer,
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as
having occurred in December
1970.
The wealth of information on
the Mordovia camps has, until
recently. tended to create the
impression that few similar camp
complexes exist elsewhere. Now,
thanks mainly to the persistence
of the Soviet Baptists in report-
ing the fate of the 500 or so of
their brethren imprisoned in
recent years. we know that -the
camp network covers almost the
WHOle country. Already the
iT? ToCations,And addresses of
camps have been estab-
Fried, and the approximate loca-
fi?Oliiiany. more is' knoWn.
The 202 streteh?fr-oin the
Arctic Circle in the extreme
north-west to Chita Region on
the Manchurian border, from the
dreaded Yakutia in north-east
Siberia to warm and sunny
Odessa on the Black the
eth?eciallY
The setTarii-unihers in the camp
addresseTg a Tgin?:E7rp
ibbul 1.060 campsTn7a11. ATeaCh
camp appear, -t-rhola- an aver-
age of 1.000 prisoners, the
total catia.p.o_aulation at any one
time 17.4-Tuld seem t?olie of the
"Ord e -This
re-rWilli? fi g u re of 12-15
million at the time of Stalin's
death in 1953. It must also be
remembered, however, that the
number of people under one or
another form of restraint far
surpasses the camp population:
as yet there is no means of even
estimating the numbers of the
inmates of prisons and prison
mental hospitals; and also the
many people subject to various
types of exile.
authorities made conces-
after prolonged discus-
so the strike was called
Similarly, the total number of
political prisoners call still
scarcely be estimated: it is almost
certainly of the order of tens of
thousands. Whether the total is
rising or falling is also hard to
say. As regards Mordovia we
know only that as the post-war
Ukrainian and Baltic opponents
ii staiejucli Approved For Release 1999/09/02,: CIA-R6P79-01194A000300110001-1
inz r .
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0003001P0WYT
of sovietisation gradually die olt
or finish their terms, they are
more or less replaced by people
imprisoned----as the- seven signa-
tories of Camp 17a say in -their
letter---" for expressing and cir-
culating beliefs and ideas which
differ -from the official ones.'
Thev go on: ' Because of the
." intensification of the ideological
r;trugele " the number of such
eoptoi rowing, They are
sentenced for expressing public
disagreement with this or that
act of the Government. and for
reading? possesing or circulating
forbidden literature, the list of
which is longer even than the
famous Indexes of the Vatican.'
'What role does Soviet legisla-
tion play in all this ? The
Criminid Code and the so-called
'Bases of Corrective-Labour
Legislation 'proclaim as a funda-
mental principle: The imposi-
tion of punishment does not have
as :tn aim the causing of physical
suffering or the lowering of
human dignity.' This principle
is hardly borne out by the de-
tailed regulations - -many of them
semi-secret documents ? which
,govern prisoners' daily lives,
especially in the strict- and
special-regime camps.
Ration scales are secret, but
basic facts about them appear
repeatedly in underground docu-
ments. Anatoly Marchenko
writes concerning the strict-
rstinnia camps: Prisoners never
set eyes on fresh vegetables.
butter and many other indis-
pensable products: these are
even prohibited from sale at the
camp stall, as is sugar.' As a
result, some prisoners are driven
by the permanent malnutrition
to kill and eat crows and, if they
are mcky, dogs. In the autumn
of 1967 one prisoner from Camp
11 in Mord-ovia found a way of
getting potatoes : he over-ate and
died. Hunger reigns even more
harshly in Vladimir prison and in
the special-regime camps.'
As for the arbitrary powers or
the authorities, these allow them
?at whim?to torbid the saying
of prayers, obstruct individuals'
spate-time pursuits, or ban food-
parcels even after a prisoner has
served the first half of his term
(when they are not permitted)
and relatives have begun sending
them. Marchenko writes : I
don't know whether there exist
anywhere on earth outside our
country such conditions for
political prisoners: legalised law-
lessness, plus legalised hunger
plus legalised forced labour.'
At the same time he appealed
to the humanists and progres-
sive people in other countries?
those who raise their voice in de
fence of political prisoners in
Greece and Portugal, South
Africa and Spain 'to do the same
in regard to the Soviet Union.
Later he wrote to the chairman of
the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), asking
him to send a mission to Russia
to examine the conditions of
Soviet political prisoners in the
Mordovian camps and Vladimir
prison, anti to furnish them with
essential aid.' This request. he
pointed out, used exactly the
same wording as the appeal of
the Soviet Red Cross to the
ICRC published in lzwestia two
weeks earlier, concerning politi-
cal prisoners in Indonesia.
Yury Galanskov, in
a recent article of his own smug-
gled out of Camp 17a. makes
similar anneals to the Western
Communict narttrt. the out-
side world in general.
The Western Press, and
especially the Western radio-
stations broadcasting in Russian.
publicise arbitrariness and acts
of crude coercion by Soviet
official personnel and thus force
the State bodies and official to
take quick action. In this way the
Western Press and radio are ful-
filling the tasks of what is at
present lacking in Russia, an
organised opposition, and thereby
stimulating our national develop-
ment.'
TIME
6 June 1969
CPYRGHT
A Day in the Life of Yuli Daniel
The waggle against cola tlte
camp is waged in a unique way:
they took away all our belongings,
sweater, jacket and so on. Solitary
confinement is not just cold, its dog
cold, because they give you a blan-
ket only at night. The rest of the
time you get only bare boards and a
cement floor. Among the crimes pun-
ishable by solitary confinement: not
waking up when they bang on the
bars, not standing up before an of-
ficer, brewing co/Jet' or toasting bread,
not going to political lecAures, grow-
ing a few blades of dill in your area
and refusing to trample on them, or
not fulfilling your norm.
THAT cry of controlled anger
1 comes from Soviet Writer Yuli
Daniel, who is serving the fourth
year of a five-year sentence at hard
labor for "slandering the Soviet state"
in his short stories that were pub-
lished abroad. Daniel is in a labor camp at Potma in the
Volga basin, along with Fellow Writer Aleksandr Ginz-
burg, whose crime was compiling a record of the Feb-
ruary 1966 trial of Daniel and Writer Andrei Sinyavsky
(who is serving his sevenqear sentence in another part
of the same camp, also for "slandering the state").
The persecutions of camp life have not quenched the
spirit of Danie: and Ginzburg. Now, along with four
other prisoners, 1:-,ey have written an open letter to the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet, urging "corrective leg-
islation" to change the rcgul io s in car
* s:1E npAi00012
where, prove0r ?4*
gerous political prisoners" are held. Last week their let-
ter was being circulated widely in Moscow.
duce containing vitamins is impos-
sible. Any one of us at any minute
can be deprived of the right to buy
anything at the kiosk, or be put in soli-
tary confinement, where the rations
may be reduced to 1,300 calories."
*
"The camp administration can ar-
bitrarily curtail the time of meetings"
with relatives, and "a considerable
number of our letters and the letters
sent to us disappear without a trace.
We cannot write about our situation:
such letters always disappear." Thus,
the prisoners add, the lawmakers of
the Supreme Soviet "will understand
how difficult it is for us to defend
what remains of our miserable
rights."
At compulsory political meetings.
the prisoners are given a "beginner's
course of political literacy, repeated
from year to year," and conducted
by "half-educated officers mechan-
ically reading what is written or reperiting it in their own
words. A question that the officer cannot answer (and
these are in the majority) may be regarded as 'provoc-
ative' and the person who asked it is punished in one
way or. another. If you express your own view you risk
a new trial and sentence.
"The constant human degradation and physical co-
ercion must also, probably, be called 'education.' The
: Cl
'hAgortisfnatists all pa-
efsUners in solitar
7 and recommends that they use their fingers instead of toi-
let paper. Duty Officer Lient Takrichev larchas a po1itjI
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
prisoner to he handcuffed, and an overseer, in the exe-
cution of his duty, beats him up."
The letter reminds the Deputies w the Supreme So-
viet 1at it is within their power "to reinforce illegality
or to rigorously supervise the observance of our human
and civil rights." Moreover, "all this physical and psy-
choloeical coercion of political prisoners does- not lead?in-
deed, cannot?lead to the desired results, if only because
they have not reckoned on our strength. DI treatment
can only break the very weakest. Surely this is not
worth the effort."
"Our food is tasteless, monotonous and contains hard-
ly any vitamins," the letter said. "Although we cannot real-
ly speak of constant hunger"?the maximum daily ra-
tion is 2,413 calories, mostly starch?"constant vitamin
hunger is an indisputable fact. It is no accident that in
the camps so many people suffer from stomach ail-
ments." Food parcels are forbidden, the men said, and
even in, the kiosks, where they can buy five rubles' worth
of goods a month, "buying green vegetables or other pro-
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
13 September 1970
'I'm tired, tired,'
says taniel
from DEV MURARKA: Moscow, 12 September
SOVIET author Yuli Daniel, 44,
emerged frorn Vladimir jail to-
night at the end of his five-year
sentence for slandering the
Soviet State. 1 am tired, tired,'
he said.
He was met by his student son.
Alexander. who drove him 2081
miles to Kaluga, where an apart-
ment had been made ready for
him.
Daniel was sentenced at a secret
-trial in February, 1966, the sentence
being calculated from the date of
his arrest in September, 1965.
The trial, which became famous
as the Danicl-SinyavskY trial. caused
an international uproar and much
embarrassment to the Soviet Union.
Daniel's co-accusq' was Andrei Sin-
yavsky. who was sentenced to seven
years' hard labour.
Daniel and Sinyavsky were tried
and sentenced for publishing works
ibroad .under the pseudonyms of
Nikolai- Arzhak and Abram Tertz.
These writings were considered clan-
(kraus by the Soviet authorities.
They were mostly in the nature of
biting satire on tne Novict society.
Their case became a cause celebre
and many Soviet as well as foreign
writers, public figures and others
including Communists. protested.
During Daniel's incarceration
tl,,Te were periodic reports that he
? being maltreated at the Potma
labour camp. When hc was movec
to the ' hard-regime ' Vladimir
prison, dissident intellectuals ir
Moscow reported that it was at
punishment for breaches of discip.
line. including hunger strikcs.
It was in October 1968 tha
Daniel's wife Larissa was senteqcec
to four years exile for taking bar
in a demonstration against tht
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
The demonstration was held in tht
Red Square. She is now in Chuna.
in Siberia.
For the next six months, accord
ins to Soviet law, Daniel must live
under police surveillance. Accord
ing to his friends, however. he-wil
be allowed to visit his wife it
Siberia. It is not known if he r
be allowed to resume his profession
of a translator into Russian.
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
8
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030011000:4RGHT
ACE Clo FREE TRADF HNION miws
December 1970
0?51,,,h a
i'?:' ..?1 ev-, i ?fratry tzei7 Aii,4% 7,27 42) Vie) ,s,.?. 0,..v
4 a 4 0 k...;4 vo. wii.k, 4
. ?
By PAUL BARTON
oftgein
DUI
Paul Sartes is AFL-CIO representative in
Europe:
iii? Licimvis
j
S(.7WIET prison camel; today are in many The befitthose known among them are
'
respects 'different from what they were that broke out in Karagandar'
In 1952 in thenreitIrtY1-11"iv a8 iltI iliv 1nt
vc'enitrn"te.11:4YW'i11(1)ne' nftnel'' 1411?
in Stalin's tline. The change which has taken Northd.( in 1963 and Vorkuta in 1953 and medical
? place during the last 20 years or so is of 1954, in Kingir in 1954, in Taishet in early orderly go anywhere near the two
course just as important as the indubitable 1955, in Khabarovsk in summer 1965 and in OW of, of barbed wire between which he lay
.'untinuity of the dreadful institution. Vorkuta agaiu in 8mmner 1956 and once t give him first aid. So they all began tO
Unfortunately, too inany students- of this .more in fall of the same year. The most roar and howl, paying no attention to the
change tend to overlook one of the most important changes that were eventually to bursts of tommy gun five, over their heads.
basic differences ?namely, the fact that. the It went on and on for at ,least an hour and
?inmates are no longer that helpless crowd, were a half, until the wounded man WfUi taken to
transform the camps from what they
resigned to slow death, which they used to tually .agreed upon during the bargaining the itnhe guardhouse and a medical orderly called
under Stalin to their present form were ac-
he ?in the Thirties nnd the Forties when the authorities undertook with the . in'surgents:
camp system was. at its height. Tha?prison-. the right to send a letter once a month and individual and collective hunger strikes, in-
Betiveen these two extremes, there are
ers' resistance which spread through the'cOn- to receive . a family visit once a year, the ?
dividuar petitions and complaint with which
centration camps during the last years. of ? removal of the iron bars from the huts, no s
a great many prisoners keep flooding the
S. talin's rule has survived, though with vary- more locking of the huts for the night, the authorities and, last but not least, relentless
mg intensity and in forms that keep chang- ehramation. of a registration number sewn,
ing, until this very day. on the-. prisoner's-. uniform confidence of the camp officers by involvin
, the eight-hour efforts to undermine the morale and self-'
When this paramount fact is ignored, nt-- working day, the revision of ? the politica., g
.
them in perilous political arguments or just
tenton tends to be focused ecesively on prionrs' sentences, he liberation of minors
such changes as the considerable decrease in invalids. and prisoners having served two- hobylighauthoirilyig. ptohleimtic al up
to ridicule during the
ixsse t
the number of political prisoners, the lin- thirds of :their sentences. . ? so-eulled cultural eNenii:s8.truction sessions or
Droved diet, the possibility of receiving visits
by relatives, etc. So it then seems natural to And some ' of the later revolts, like those Ae a rule, these actions yield no immedi-
jump to the conclusion that the :development in Vorkuta in 1954 and 1955, took place in ate . results . and those who undertake them?
in the camps is an outstanding example of order to force the authorities to implement are often severely punished. But. they convey:
the liberalization of the Soviet regime. the measure promised in the initial bargain, a constant threat of more serious trouble,
'./ and thus constitute - a' very effective means
? ?
But that is a typical case of that distor- What is 11101'0, neyeral , improvementa in- of checking the lawlessness of the carriW
tion against which the dissident Soviet his- . troduced at the time of the prisoners' up- authorities.
8
....,.
torian Andrei Amalrik?who himself is now rising's were cancelled a few years later, .
serving a three-year term in a concentration 'when the situation in the camps was no No doubt, the intensity of the resistance;
camp?so convincingly warns When, h, his longer so explosive. This happened, for in is no longer the same as in the early Fifties.
essay "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until stance, with the, rule that one day's work On the other hand, the police and the camp '
1984?", he 'emphasizes that many observers with the fulfildient of the output quota was administration have 'to .face some serious,
take for a reform what is in fact the decline to count for more than one day of imprison- problems which did not exist then.
and disintegration of the Soviet regime. ment. The real concern of the authorities First of all, it is no longer true that in
was thus demonstrated beyond any doubt: his resistance the political prisoner is iso-
it was not to reform the inhuman institution, lated from the 111?19 of common law coirvicta
but merely to bring the resistance under or. that he even- lins to cope with their i
control. The fact that this objectivc could hostility. Nutiteroun examples ehow unmia-
be reached only by adopting far-reaching talcably that tlm resistance hes made a tie- .
changes was no merit of the Kremlin. mendous impact on all the inmatim. Tt is
At present, the resistance in the camps today by no means txceptional to see corn-
does not seem to be directed by etrictly or- mon law prismiers help and protect the
ganized underground groups as in the early "politicals" persecuted by the cainp admin-
Fifties. a takes a wide variety of forms, istration. Such was, for instance, the experi, ,
which rang,o hero simple solidarity and ence of Yuli Daniel during his imprisonment !
support given by the mass of the prisoners in Mordvia. ..
to those among them who are weak or ill It can thus be said that little liy Rae ?;
. i
or whose physical strength has been under- the camp system had become a schnolr of
mined in the punishment cells, "special re- political opposition and resistance.i?And this .1
ghne" camps or jails on the one hand to is true in still another sense. While in the
dangerously explosive mass demonstrationa early Fifties the struggle was mainly di- 1
on the other.. reeled and organized by men who, like the
One such demonstration, which took place Ukrainian partisans, had fought the Soviet 1
On October 4, 19G4, in a Mordvian earnp for regime before their imprisonment, today it 1
IOn the contrary, when the prisoners' re,
rsistance is duly taken into account, a great
kleal of the improvements introduced in the
ramps during the last two decades are seen
to be concessions wrested from the authori-
ties by their victims.
It was not after Stalin's death, but kt8
'early as 1948/1949, exactly ra the time when
the resistance Was. beginning to make itself
felt in the camps, that the material situa-
tion of the prisoners started improving.
Among the most important changes brought
about at that time were the improvement of
food and clothing, the separation of the
political from the common law prisoners, the
introduction of wages and the control of
mortality.
, At the same time, however, in an obvious
effort to break the nascent resistanee, the
rules of the regime imposed on political pri- political prisoners, has been described by is with very few exceptions carried out by
moneys were made even harsher than before. Anatoly Marchenko in "My Testimony" (pp. people who learned to fight only after they
But this did? not help. Little by little, the 298-:i01). It occurred when an in /VW' Wafi got into n ramp.
'resistance got organized and the process of shot by a guard while trying to climb the Here again, Yuli Daniel's experience is ex-
change received a tremendous impetus from wooden palisade surrounding the camp. Hay- tremely interesting.' Before he was sentenced
the mass strikes and uprisings that shook ing heard the shots, prisoners from all over this main, who was tm become a Fly mbol of
the entire ca.mApproVedsForYReisiaSteet9eS/09?02coiGIA.RD R1709401194A000300110001 -1
tions. 9
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0003M1M1T1
resistance, was merely a dissident writer
so little interested in the political life of his
country that until his arrival in the camp
he believed that there were no political pri-
soners loft.
Marchenko's story is even more strik-
ing. Today it typical revolutionary who is
likely to die for his convictions at the age
of 311 or 11:1, .iarchentio was a completely
apolitieal foreman at the building sites until
he occident ally got into trouble when a fight
brolte out in a workers' hostel.
This fact that the concentration camps
have become such schools of resistance and
political opposition explains why the Soviet
authorities have been increasingly reluctant
to send genuine oppositimuists there.
While Yuli Daniel was sentenced to a
cutup for secretly publishing' a few literary
works abroad, his wife Larissa, ;1 f ter organ-
iy,ing it strcel; demonstration ii.gainst the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, vas merely ex-
iled to a remote region. More typically; the
great revolutionary, Ceneral Grigorienko, was
shut up in a special lunatic asylum where
the danger of communicating3 his ideas to
tim litimil iiimia0A iii t/V011 MOH Vnintitei And
the same is happening to many others who
are considered too dangerous for imprison-
ment in the camps?to such an extent that
the. confinement of perfectly healthy people
in special mental institutio i ts has become
an important instrument of. vhat some con-
Sider as a liberalization ot the ISoviet peni-
tentiary system. .
AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS
January 1971
7
?
,),7-71.1
ocrez,s1,rio. "2a
By PAUL BARTON
gL7 apakr5s1
I
Paul Barton k European representative or tko
AFL-CIO.
azotta
CPYRGHT
T least 10 to 15 iii lii am people perished
? in the toviure chairmen; of the NICVD
fseeret Jailice] f Tom torture and execution,
in coniPg for exiled kuinks [rich peasants]
and eampa 'without the right of correspon-
dence' (which were in fart the prototypes of
the Fascist death c:unps where, for example,
I housands of prisoners wore maehine-gunned
dovorerowdina.. of
'speeiol omlera').
"Po1,1)10 Pori:Med in I minea of 'Norilsk
mot Vorkuta from freezing, starvation, and
exhausting labor, at countless construction
projects, in timber-cutting, building of canals,
or simply during transportation in prison
trains, in the overcrowded bolds of 'death
nhips' iii the Sea of Oldtoisk, and during the
re/settlement of entire peoples, the Crimean
Tartars, the Volga Gerillalls, the Kabnyks,
nisi other Caucasus peoples" (Andrei D.
Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence and Intel-
lectual Freedom, Penguin Books, 19G9, page
47.)
, This blunt statement of the prominent So-
viet nuclear physicist and human rights
pioneer contrasts strikingly .with the tortuous
reasoning of many Western observers who
have claimed that, because of their tremen,
dous economic role, Stalin's concentration
camps fundamentally differed from Hitler's
in Ilan they wer 'cant_to .exPloit, not 66109/02
ternApproweaLECW Release 39
Ever since concentration camps wen/ est :Lb.
lished in Husain soon after the October -Rev-
nintion, out. of their main functions has been
to "liquidate" the "enemy." Naturally, this
has never been their sole function; and only
for limited periods of time did it become
the predominant inn% So the way it has been
carried out has been changing over the 50
years of the institution's existence, constant-
ly adjusting- to the changing. circumstances.
Until around 1930, when the camp popula-
tion was fairly small, the material conditions
and the work were more or less bearable.
Actual hunger was rare, the prisoners had
adequate shelter, and they received the warm
clothing necessary in the climate of the Far
North where the camps were located. At the
same time, they were subjected to all kinds
of sadistic treatment by the guards, inclusive
of executions without trial.
Then the number of camp inmates leaped
from several tens of thousands to several
millions. The loss of so many workers, at
the very time of the total mobilization of
men and resources, caused enormous damage
to the national economy. The only way to
limit the damage was to reintegrate the
prisoners into the production process by
transforming the camps into huge economic--
establishments. In this connection, purely
fitirAc- R15 rit1-131111t4A0003O011100
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extent eliminated while the material condi-,
lions deteriorated radically.
By 1.932-33, the coat of a prisoner's up-
keep had already fallen to somethiug like
one-third of the average wage of hired labor.
Due to absolutely inadequate clothing and
shelter, cold became a persistent feature, of
camp life. Working hours iocreased. Medical
care was aopalling. Food supply per prisonex
was drastically reduced.
Mortanree, the liald rations weft:, sttarnly
differentiated aceording to the degree
fillmen t of th by the
COnviet. So hunger pushed the forced
laborers to incr,l'a.W thOr Marla, while the.
extra effort required could not be compeusat-
ed by the additional food earned. 03t3:ing thia
period, which' lasted some 20 years, slow
death became the common lot. of the earap
inmateS. Far from saving their 1ive:3, eco-
nomic exploitation became the very tool of
their extermination.
What is more, though to a large extent
eliminated sadistic. treatment of convicts did
not disappear altogether, it only became more
elective and purpOseful. For instance, it, was
kipplied to punish those who had infringed
the camp regulations or systematically failed
to fulfill .the output quota, and especially to
those who tried to break out of the camp.
Even executions Without trial occurred dur-
ing those two decades. Though infrequent,
when they were carried out it was on a large
scale.
The regular extermination through ex-
ploitation became dependent on a continuous
flow of masaive new arrivala. Whenever the
flow diminished, the pursuit of tate exter-
mination threatened to reduce. the number
Of priaoners and jeopardize the Smooth func-
tioning of all those plants that relied on
forced labor. Theeefore, onethoae occasions,
temporary reforms were adopted to stabilize.;
the camp population until such time as mas-
sive inflow of fresh manpower would resume.
Such situations arose in 1939, in 1943, and
around 1950. In all three catats, the reason
was that the death toll pall by the country
foe Stalin's policy?even the 1.943 crisis was.
due not only to war losses but alao to mass
ter ;at e?resul ted in a population crisis in
which continued mass deportation of the
labor force threatened to disrupt the econ-
omy, and indeed the whole life of the coun-
try, for good. Invariably, the first Ineaaures
adopted to stabilize the camp population
aimed at keeping the prisoner longer through
introduction of 'longer sentencera refusal to
release the convicts at the end of the sen-
tence, etc. But invariably these measuces
proved inadequate as long f?ts Sc) many pris-
oners were dying tater a few years spent in
the camp.
Therefore, they were followed by other
meaaurea which sought to reduce the death
rate among the convicts through astrict
emitrol of mortality and an improvement of
roetlical care, of nutrition, of clothing and of
the material conditions of, detention in gen-
eral, as well as of working conditions.
However, *the 1939 and 1943 crises were
of short duration. The first ?vaa overcome
million, provided the ca33-ips with a new add
rich :source of supply of laboo force. 'Vile sec-
ond was over by summeo 1914 when the
camps began to benefit from the advance of ,
the Soviet army: the liberation of the Soviet
territory previously held by the Germans and
the penetration into Eastern and Central Eu-
rope was accompanied by mass deportations
of the population, closely followed by those
affecting the liberated prisoners of war and
the returning soldiers of the victorioua army.
Th O the treatment of the
camp inmates did not last longer than the
crisis itself. ?
It was not the same thing with the third
crisis which afflicted the camps around 1950.
.The population crisis, which had been steadily
growing worse since the 1930's, reached
catastrophic proportions. This time, its ef-
fects on. the deportation policy could not; bo
offset by annexations of foreign territory
with untapped sources of supply of forced
labor. Such population categories as were
still subjected to mass arrests at that time?
like the Jews deported in 1.950-51?were not
ample enough to replenish the declining labor
force of the camps.
So the reforms adopted at 'Otis stage in
order to stabilize the camp population not
only could not be abandoned after a short
lapse of time but also had to be followed by
other, more far-reaching reforms, such as
the separation of the political and the com-
mon-law prisoners, a massive capital invest-
ment in the plants attached to the colleen-
tration camps, efforts to raise labor produc-
tivity, etc.
In fact, these reforms initiated the whole
process of change which, though sa first
aimed at. stabilizing the camp population,
eventually resulted in a drastic decrease in
the number of prisonera?from several mil-
lion it was reduced to what most likely is no
more than several hundreds of thousandta
and in the camps losing the tremendous eco-
nomic importance which they 'mid ;is:nulled
from around 1030 until the early 1950'a.
Of course, this thoroughgoing trauniorma-
tion of the camp system_ was not hrought.
about by the population crisis alone. An
equally it part was played by other
concurrent factors, particularly by the calsis
of authority resulting from Stalin's death,
by the prisoners' resistance 'culminating ii.
the strikes and uprisings of 1952-55 and
persisting ever since, and by the obvious
impossibility of rationalizing the prodnction
based on forced labor. -
Deportation of entire population groups no
longer takes place in the USSR. It is true
that most political prisoners are still ar-
rested and sentenced not for a specific deed
but rather in the framework of the carefully
timed and concerted terror campaigns that
from time to time strike specific categories
of the population, such as, in recent years,
the Ukrainians,- the religious believers, and
lately the Jews. But these terror campaigns
have become selective. Rather than hitting a
aubstantial proportion of the category singled
ppliqmpect-,08r Keiease tD2 :
s.. ktrautiAtioaarro to
/von the an.noscatiou- of: Eastern -' let of_
1700,01(AbY
roddloviaa, with a total population of 22-2:3 the secret police as being particularly rep-
rese.mattive of the irt elucotion.
CPYRGHT
Appmvprl Fnr Rplpacp icicicanci/f19 ? CIA-R111D7A-fIlicutAnnnnnn1 I nnni
1 The transforaation of the camp system
has not put an end to extermination, which
in fact is one of the vital functions of the
concentration camps wherever they exist. But
the way in which it is pursued has changed
in accordance with the change undergone by
nil the other functions and by the camps
themselves.
'Vile means of crippling and ex tenni eating
the convicts which were introduced around
11180 gill exist. People in the camps still
suffer from the cold because of inadequate
shelter and clothing, they are still under-
nourished, their working conditions are still
extremely hard and the medical care ap-
palling.
1 The normal daily food ration is, theoret-
ically, 2,413 calories on strict regime (which
1 is applied to most political prisoners), and
what the prisoner. actually gets amounts to.
sone 2,000 calories; in 1937, the daily food
ration of a convict doing about the work of
an average/ free worker was theoretically
about 2,500 calories and actually some 15 per-
vent less in the Ulchta-Pechora camps, be-
yond the Arctic circle. Nevertheless, the ex-
tent to which the health of the camp in-
mates is being underinined by undernourish-
1 meat and malnutrition has undoubtedly 'de-
1 crea-Sed due to -three- other factors: .
1 (1) 'Though still extremely heavy, the
1 workload imposed on them is much less than
iit used to be during the 1930's and 1940's;
I(2) Some additional food can be purchased
in the camp's canteen because the payment
of wages to prisoners, elifninated in thc
1930's, was restored in the early 1950'S, and
ithough only small amounts of money are
involved, the additional food makes a con-,
? siderable difference in this precarious situa-
Ition;
(3) Because of the drastic decrease in the
1 ' . camp population, the food smuggled' into ,
the camps by the free workers who penetrate
into the compound (supervisors and foremen
who work with the convicts in the plant,
I' truck drivers who bring loads, etc.) now
reaches the average prisoner, while in the
old days it was all grabbed by the prisoners'.
"aristocracy"?the criminal gangs, the col-.
laborators of the administration, etc. (See.
Anatoly Marchenko, My Testimony, Pall Mall
Press, London, 1960, pp. 235-242).
Therefore, what used to be the means of
exterminating the camp inmates has rather
become the means of undermining their
strength and health, and of crippling them.
Selective Crippling
These instruments, too, are now often used
in a selective way. For instance, a prisoner
singled out to be marked for life by his
stay in a concentration camp is given the
kind of work which will ruin his health for
good. Such was the case, among many others,
of the writer Yuli Daniel. With his arm
crippled by a wound he had suffered during
his service in the Soviet army during World
War II, he was assigned to the heaviest kind
of work in the camp, the lifting of logs and
shifting of coal. When he got pains in the
shoulder and in the spot where the bone
had been shattered, his work mates shifted
him to the easiest job that there was within
the loaders' gang. But the administration
found out and immediately ordered that he
do the actual unloading (Marchenko, pp.
370-7).
In addition to this crippling .of prisoners,
both general and ,selective, there is actual
extermination. All those purely sadistic meth-
ods which survived during the 1.980's and
1940's as means of punishment have been
maintained. What is more,. the available
evidence shows their field of Ilpplication has
considerably expanded in the post-Stalin
camp system. The principal vehicles of this
expansion have been the provisions accord-
ing to which prisoners are to. be punished
by being transferred to special regime camps
and jails. The conditions prevailing in these
two institutions have been described in pre-
vious installments of this serial (AFL-CIO
Free Trade Union News, February and April
1970).
To sum up. The crippling of prisoners in
the concentration camps is as systematic as
ever. As to the extermination properly so
called, from blind as it was in the 1920's and
systematic as it was during the following
two decades, it has become selective. Thisj
unfortunately, is a far cry from the liber-
alization about which we hear-se much from
so many Western newspapermen and experts.
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CPYRGHT
AFL-CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEWS
February 1971
Role of Forced Labor in Soviet Economy
Cy PAUL BARTON
1 Paul Barton is European representative of the
AFL-CIO.
IT was not the Soviet regime that invented
-I- the exploitation of prisoners for economic
purposes. The practice was widespread in
Russia--1..old indeed in many other countries
?long before the 1917 revolution. Many of
the spectacular achievements for which Peter
the Great is praised by the historians were
due to ruthless exploitation of convicts.
Nevertheless, the historic importance of the
Soviet contribution in this field cannot be
denied. First of all, there is no other example
of forced labor assuming an important -roje
in a relatively (_._is,y.slo_ped economy Over a
peri a of 50 years. Nor is there any Other
"Example in modern?history of forced labor
becoming one of the main pillars of the whole
national economy all it did at one time in
the USSR. Filially, the remarkable continuity
in exploiting the convicts has been comple-
mented by the Soviet government's unique
flexibility in adapting the forms and the
extent of this exploitation to the changing
situation of the economy and of the country.
Without going into the minor changes
which Soviet forced labor has steadily been
undergoing during the 60 years of its ex-
istence, one can divide its history into three
distinct periods of unequal duration.
In Early Period
The first period started with the reform
of the penal system that followed the 1917
revolution. The reform was based on the
principle that economically useful work is
the best way of correcting and re-educating
delinquents. Though in this rospect the
principle did not produce the e? .;cted re-
sults, it has been upheld until this day, hav-
ing gradually become a mere propaganda de-
vice to justify the economic exploitation of
prisoners.
Naturally, during the first period, which
lasted some 10 years, the continuation of
forced labor to Soviet economy was in no
way comparable with what it was to become
eventually, especially during the 1930's and
1940's. For one, the degree of exploitation
was not the same since prison labor was
mainly imposed upon common-law convicts
who throughout Soviet history were much
better treated than the "politicals." And
then, the overall number of prison inmates
WW1 tteepialkinV1/1vOgittO
- e
second period were not yet available.
Still, the contribution of forced labor to the
national economy in the 1920's shou not
be dismissed as negligible, especially when
we know that on the eve of World War I,
when prisoners' work did play an important
economic role, less than 30,000 people were
serving a forced labor sentence in Russia;
.the number of convicts put to work during
the first decade of the Soviet regime was
much higher.
It was not the prisons for common-law
convicts but the concentration camps for
political prisoners that became by far the
most important vehicle of the spread of
forced labor during the second period, in-
augurated around 1930, at the time of Stalin's
? Industrialization drive.
The transition from the first to the second
_period was marked by a drastic increase not
only in the degree of exploitation of pri-
soners but, also in their number which
jumped, within a few years, from several
tens of thousands to several millions. Simul-
taneously, the forced labor camps spread
over the whole Soviet territory, especially
over its remote and underpopulated areas.
Most of them consisted in fact of a whole
cluster of camps which often covered a vast
territory.
In principle, each cluster of camps was en-
trusted with a particular economic activity:
gold mines in Kolyma, coal mines in VorLita
and Karaganda, coal mines, sawmills and oil
fields in Ukhtizhm, construction of the
Baikal-Amur railroad in the camps known
as Bamlag, etc. However, these were merely
the prevailing activities of each unit. For
instance, in the coal-mining Vorkuta Camp,
actual mining does not seem to have ever oc-
cupied more than 25 to 30 percent of the
inmates, a considerable number being set
aside for building sites, while others were
used for internal service in the camps and
still others were unfit for any work.
Attempts have been made by economists
in the West to determine the distribution of
forced labor among industries and the share
of forced labor in the Soviet economy, main-
ly on the basis of the Soviet economic plan
for 1941 (captured by the German army in
the Soviet Union and then by the American
army in Germany) which contains a number
of data on the economic activities of the
2 : cimitopmattts4A0003qp14000I-1
is analysis can ave no more an a rough-
ly indicative value; with this qualification,
1 3 they are undoubtedly useful
-CPYRGHT
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Sizable Share
For example, of all the centrally financed
capital investments, as earmarked for the
entire Soviet economy (inclusive of trans-
port, defense and navy), some 14 percent
were planned for the Ministry of Interior.
The share of the construction to be carried
out by the Ministry of Interior on its own
account in the overall construction was to
amount to some 17 percent; moreover, this
ministry was a big contractor Of conStree..
tion work for other ministries. The share of
the ministry in the production of timber was
to be 12 percent in the whole USSR, 26
percent in the Arkhangelsk district and over
50 percent in the Komi Republic (see Naum
Jasny, "Labor and Output in Soviet Concen-
tration Camps," Journal of Political Economy,
October 1951).
The ministry's part in the Soviet chromite-
ore mining was set at over 40 percent.
Practically the entire gold-mining was en-
trusted to the camps. The industrial output
planned for the Ministry of Labor was al-
most equal to that of the big economic
ministries: it was to amount to 1,969 million
rubles, while for example the output of the
Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metals was to be
2,129 million. Out of the total cargo of 90.7
thousand tons to he carried by the arctic
maritime route, 22.5 thousand (almost 25
percent) were set aside for the camps of
Kolyma alone.
However. the main economic function of
forced labor camps consists in their out-
standing role in the colonization of remote
and more or less unexploited regions. Already
in 1936 the control of all the programs of
migration and colonization was transferred
from the Ministry of Agriculture to the
Ministry of Interior. The achievements of
forced labor in this field are spectacular. The
best known example is the development
through forced labor of the vast territory in
the extre-ne northeast of the USSR known
under the name of Kolyma Camps.
Another example is the city of Norilsk in
in the northeast of the Siberian plain, en-
tirely built by forced labor. Founded during
the Second Five-Year Plan to exploit the lo-
cal deposits of nickel (the richest of the
entire country), Noril';k had 30,Uuu in-
habitants at the end of World War II and
some 300,000 to 400,000 in 1953. Still another
example can be founds in the Komi Republic,
in the far north of European Russia, with
the main administration centr?r in Vorkuta.
Colonization through forced labor started in
the 1930's. OH fields developed in this region
became a vital source of petroleum during
World War II. The coat production in this
region, which started in 1940, amounted to
14,153 million tons in 1955.
The second period, during which the part
of forced labor in national economy had
reached its peak, came to an end after ap-
proximately two decades, when the sources
of the continuous massive supply of convicts
dried out towards 1950. The ensuing shortage
of manpower began to put the economic
enterprises of the camp system into an in-
Some serious attempts were made at that
stage to save scarce labor through increased
capital investment. Theoretically, this should
have helped to solve the problem. But the
equation did not work. Ingreased capital in-
vestment also meant increased production
cost. Instead of the desecuction of forced
laborers, who until then could be replaced
at little cost, through moor arrests and de-
portations, there was not the wear and
tear of expensive machines with Ito un-
avoidable incidence on the unit costs. And
the eternal truth that only the most rudi-
mentary tools can be entrusted to slaves
made itself felt once again. The wear and
tear of the labor-saving equipment turned
out to be enormous.
Therefore the next step was to try to
rationalize the utilization of the prisoners
and to stimulate their productivity. The main
result was a growing pressure to reduce
the number of prisoners still further: on the
one hand, it was important to get rid of
those who were exhausted, ill or crippled;
on the other hand, the possibility of getting
one's sentence reduced was the only real
incentive for increased output. So the meas-
ures dictated by the shortage of labor led
to other measures which kept aggravating
the shortage itself. Yet the expected benefits
failed to materialize. The reasons were quite
simple:
(a) Whatever its modalities, forced labor is
slavery; the prisoners work accordingly.
(b) The camp enterprises could not pos-
sibly get the kind of manpower they needed.
Their workers could not be recruited ac-
cording to the skills and work experience
required but according to the police state's
need.
(c) Because of their location, the kind of
materials they were using, etc., a great
inany enterprises built by: the camps could
be profitable only on condition that a very
high price in human life continued to be'
paid.
. Therefore, the efforts made around 1951-
1954 to stimulate the prisoners' output
were pursued no further in the following
years. Some important measures adopted to
this effect were actualy dropped in the late
1950's. That is, for instance, what happened
to the transfer of the camp enterprises from
police jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of eco-
nomic ministries. At present the police is
once more the prisoners' only master and
the crisis of the tremendous economic em-
pire built up by the concentration camp in-
mates in the most inhospitable regions of the
country goes on.
However, this was not to be the camp
administration's last word. Simultaneously
with the decrease in the number of prisoners
and with the failure of the attempts to
rationalize forced labor, the maner in which
the convicts were exploited began to change.
As reported in a previous instalment of this
serial (Free Trade Union News, May 1970).
the following new features could be observed
In recent years:
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CPYRGHT
(a) In such huge camp agglomerations as
were threatened by riots and revolts, the
"politicals" were replaced by common-law.
convicts to ensure the continuity of work.
(b) The tendency to concentrate- the
prisoners in thinly populated areas, which
were thus becoming a kind of prisoners' re-
serves, has to some extent been replaced by
the opposite tendency to spread the camps
more evenly over the Soviet territory. This
not only reduces the danger of major re-
volts but also makes it possible to use
forced labor in a greater variety of eco-
nomic pursuits.
(c) There has been a growing emphasis on
the easy transferability of forced labor. Ac-
cordingly, the work of camp inmates seems
to have been increasingly supplemented by
other forms of forced labor, such as de-
portation and banishment, "corrective labor
without deprivation of liberty," forced labor
Imposed upon convicts released on parole,
etc.
These new trends are not only due to the
crisis of the camp system built by Stalin,
they also represent an important adjustment
of forced labor to the present needs and dif-
ficulties of Soviet economy. One of the most
unmanageable problems is indeed the acute
shortage of manpower in certain areas and
In certain industrial sectors, accompanied by
unemployment in others. It is therefore vital-
ly important to have a mass of easily trans-
ferable labor.
In this way, despite the crisis, forced la-
bor continues to play an important part in
Soviet economy. And it is a much more im-
portant part than prior to the 1917 revolu-
tion: nearly 30,000 convicts slaved under
the last Tsar; they are now several hundreds
of thousands.
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25X1 C1 Ob
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April 1971
OTHER THOUGHTS ON THE -POW 'QUESTION
The government of North Vietnam attempts to project the
image of David confronting Goliath, but without David's
aggressiveness in going out to meet the Philistine champion
halfway to give battle. Obviously the image-projection is a
gambit designed to present the North Vietnamese as a brave, simple
and, above all, totally blameless people engaged in the defense
of their homeland against a technological monster. This image
is crucial to the all-important political side of the war they
are waging.
Those who are predisposed to take the North Vietnamese at
their word have little difficulty in maintaining their belief
in the justice of North Vietnam's cause because Hanoi has never
officially deviated from this fiction of nonintervention which
is vital to the myth surrounding their refusal to admit that the
Geneva Conventions (which they must admit to having signed) do
apply to their American prisoners. According to Hanoi's plot,
U.S. air strikes against the north are simply an unprovoked
act of banditry and the U.S. airmen (and other military and
civilian personnel) who fall into their hands are criminals,
Since they are criminals, by North Vietnamese fiat, they do
not fall under the protective provisions of the Geneva
Conventions Hanoi applies a similar standard to Allied
personnel who fall into the hands of other Communist forces
fighting in Southeast Asia using the flimsy pretext that the
Viet Cong is an entity unto itself in South Vietnam, as are the
Pathet Lao in Laos and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Hence,
according to Hanoi, any prisoners taken by these "indigenous
patriots" are the problems of their local commands. This mosaic
of deceit in three countries in Southeast Asia where Hanoi has
deployed thousands of her own troops makes Allied efforts to
help or retrieve Allied prisoners doubly difficult, for there is
no one, no place, to which an appeal can be made.
Had Hanoi's troops remained at home, then Hanoi's claim
to have no knowledge of the whereabouts of Allied prisoners,
including many newsmen, captured in Laos and Cambodia as well as
South Vietnam might be more plausible. But Hanoi's troops are
present in three areas of Indochina in overwhelming force.
Their numbers, as the U.S. has been able to piece them out from
a variety of sources, were presented in President Nixon's State
of the World report on 25 February 1971.
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"Since 1965 at least 630,000 North Vietnamese troops
have streamed down the (Ho Chi Minh) Trail. They have
brought with them more than 400,000 weapons, over 100
million pounds of ammunition, and at least 200 million
pounds of food." These figures exclude the number of
"patriotic individuals" and weapons landed on coastal
beaches and through the Port of Sihanoukville. In his
report the President went on to say, "Hanoi had made the
war an Indochina conflict. In South Vietnam there are
some 100,000 North Vietnamese troops. In Laos there are
about 90,000. In Cambodia there are over 50,000 North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong."
It should be noted that the recent South Vietnamese move against
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos met no resistance from
Pathet Lao elements, but from massive formations of North
Vietnamese.
A revelation regarding the overwhelming presence of the
North Vietnamese Army in Indochina came from an impeccable
North Vietnamese source in March 1969, Defense Minister
General Giap. The West learned about Giap's now famous revela-
tion regarding NVA casualties in the South when a Milan periodical,
l'Europeo, featured an interview which Giap had granted to an
Italian newspaperwaman named Oriana Fallaci on 27 March 1969.
The following excerpt (from a special feature translation,
Washington Post, 6 April 1969) begins with her statement to him:
"General, the Americans say you've lost half a million men.
That's quite exact.
He let this drop as casually as if it were quite unim-
portant, as hurriedly as if, perhaps, the real figures
were even larger."
Naturally, the official transcript of the interview published
by the North Vietnamese on 7 April 1969 omitted Giap's reply.
The President has accused Hanoi of massive intervention
throughout Indochina; Giap's admission of massive losses lends
confirmation. Hanoi coordinates and controls all theater activ-
ities, and in so doing presumably concentrates most, if not all,
prisoners taken beyond its borders safely within North Vietnam
where they remain as unlisted, dehumanized bargaining counters,
denied all international rights and suffering the cruel and unusual
punishment of seemingly endless captivity. So long as Hanoi can
officially sustain the fiction of nonintervention in the south
and west, it can officially maintain that Hanoi holds captive only
L.S. airmen accused of attacking the north.
2
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There is little awareness: of the fact that there are approx-
imately 9,000 North Vietnamese POW's held by the South Vietnamese,
concentrated primarily on the South Vietnamese island of Phu
Quoc, off the Cambodian coast. These prisoners live in wood and
tin barracks, neatly aligned in a Spartan military manner. Raw
and bleak as these compounds seem, they are open to regular
inspection by teams from the International Red Cross with access
to all of the prisoners, even for private sessions if the team
wishes. These POW's are not cut off from all contact with the
world and their homeland, Their peculiar doom is their own
government's disinterest in their fate.
3
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EXTRACTED FROM
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 70'S
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON, 25 FEBRUARY 1971
PRISONERS OF WAR
We have the deepest concern for the plight of our prisoners
of war in Indochina. Some 1600 Americans, including pilots and
soldiers and some 40 civilians, are missing or held iq North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Some have been held
as long as six years, longer than any other prisoners of war in
our history.
The enemy violates specific requirements of the Geneva
Prisoners of War Convention, by which they are bound. They
violate common standards of decency as well.
They have not permitted Impartial inspection
despite constant attempts to arrange such visits.
refused to repatriate seriously sick and wounded p
They have failed to identify all prisoners and to
'of them to correspond with their families.
of prison camps
They have
risoners.
allow many
We and the South Vietnamese have made intensive efforts in
the past year to secure better treatment and the releae of
allied prisoners -- through global diplomacy, through Oroposals
in Paris, and through the courageous raid at Son Tay. 'Congressional
expressions have been valuable in underlining American public
concern. The world increasingly condemned the other side's_
practices, and the UN General Asembly passed a resolution this
fall which underscored the international obligation to treat
prisoners humanely.
I repeat my October 7 proposal for the immediate and
unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.
All prisoners, journalists, and other civilian captives should
be released now to return to the place of their choice. Such
action would not only meet humanitarian concerns; it might also
lead to progress on other aspects of a peace settlement.
As first steps, the Republic of Vietnam, with our support,
has offered to repatriate all sick and wounded prisoners of
war. It has unilaterally returned groups of such prisoners,
despite North Vietnaes refusal to make orderly arrangements
for their repatriation. And it has proposed the release of
all North Vietnamese prisoners of war in return for all U.S.
and allied prisoners in Indochina and any South Vietnamese
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prisoners held outside South Vietnam. We profoundly regret
the other side's refusal to respond to these initiatives.
The treatment of prisoners of war anywhere is not a
political or military issue, but a matter of simple humanity.
As I said on October 7:
"war snd imptitionmont eheuld be ever
for all these prisoners. They and their
families have already suffered too much."
This Government will continue to take all possible measures
to secure the end of imprisonment as well as the end of the war.
No discussion of Vietnam would be complete without paying
tribute to the brave Americans who have served there. Many have
sacrificed years of their lives. Others have sacrificed life
itself.
These Americans have fought in a war which differed from
our previous experience. We have not sought a traditional
military victory. The complex nature of this conflict posed
unprecedented difficulties for those involved.
It is to their lasting credit that Americans in Vietnam
have overcome these difficulties and conducted themselves in
our best tradition.
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CPYRGHT
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
January 1971
Release and Repatriation of Vietnam Pr sorters
by Charles W. Havens Ill
A number of questions involving
international law have arisen as a
result of the Vietnam conflict. In
spite of growing public: interest in
the release and repatriation of
prisoners of war, there has been.
little, if any, legal analysis of the
obligations of the combatants to
release and repatriate the other
side's soldiers captured during the
conflict and held as prisoners.
CPYRGHT
ARTICLE 4 of the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War' sets forth the stand-
ards for classifying captives as prison-
ers of war. This article provides in part
that prisoners of war are persons who
are members of the armed forces of a
party to the conflict. MI captured
American servicemen, inclUding the pi-
lots and aircrewmen detained by North
Vietnam, were uniformed members of
the armed forces .of a party to the
conflict and are prisoners of war
clearly within the provisions of this ar-
ticle.
The United States and the govern-
ment of Vietnam have accorded pris-
oner of war status on North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong forces even be-
yond that required by the convention.
The right of these captives on both
sides to be accorded prisoner of war
status should be above question.
There are now more than 1,500
American servicemen who are legally
considered "missing" in.. Southeast
Asia and who may be in the hands of
North Vietnam Or its Pathet Lao and
Viet Cong allies. Approximately 460 of
these Americans are listed by the De-
partment of Defense as "captured", but
since the other side has not provided a
list acknowledging all the men who are
captured, the total number Of men who
may be pArprbliettrFtbott keitattg
still not known. Previously, the other
sine has stated that the total number of
prisoners is a military secret which
would not be revealed. From time to
time we have learned from various
sources that men previously known
only to be missing were captured. This
fact, when coupled with the large num-
ber who are known only to be missing,
has led many to conclude that the ac-
tual number of men captured is signif-
icantly higher than the number now
kJ as "captured". Unfortunately,
oo, 'sone of the men now believed on
.he basil of the best available evidence
.o have been captured probably did not
urvive. It is hoped the number of fam-
lies wl ich will receive this crushing
-Jews will be small.
Also, there are members of the Free
World Military Assistance Forces and
he Armed Forces of the Republic of
Vietnant who are in a missing status
Ind may be in the hands of the enemy.
'fere, however, the basic information
s not as readily available.
On the other. side of the fence, there
are no more than 33,000 Viet Cong
and Nc rth Vietnamese soldiers held
:n six prisoner of war camps operated
ny the Army of the Republic of Viet-
nam. Er ch of these- has been classified
? s a prisoner of war. Approximately
,000 o r these prisoners of war are
North Vietnamese, and the remaining
number are either Viet Cong from
South Vietnam or regrouped south
Vietnamese who elected in 1954 to go
r orth, h ter retu'rned to the South and
book up arms with the Viet Cong.
The first American pilot known to
have been captured by North Vietnam
is Lt. Everett Alvarez. Ile was shot
c own and captured on August 5, 1964.
The besi available evidence today sug-
ests thLt he is still a prisoner. Last
.i.ugust, Ti Alvarez had been a pri-
any American serviceman. The fact
that Lt,: Alvarez's fate is shared to
almost :as great an extent by hun-
dreds of other men, many of whom are
known to be sick or injured, without
any prospect of release in sight, dram-
atizes the need to effect the repatria-
tion of all captured servicemen in
Smallest Asia.
The fate of the more than 33,000
servicemen of the other side who are
prisoners of war in South Vietnam is
important to them, their families and a
resolution of the conflict in Vietnam.
Although these latter prisoners are re-
ceiving food and treatment generally in
accordance with the requirements of
the Geneva Convention, years of cap-
tivity with attendant separation from
family and banishment from society
are not productive humanitarian goals.
Rather, their imprisonment serves only
to delay an ultimate settlement and
their assimilation into society.
All parties to the conflict have an
easily identifiable interest in the
prompt release and repatriation of the
prisoners of war. All persons interested
in seeing the realization of the humani-
tarian aims of the Geneva Convention ?
should have an equally strong interest
in the realization of this same goal.
How do we get there from here?
Recent Conflicts Give
Historical Lessons
At best, the lessons of the more re-
cent international conflicts can serve
only as guide posts or danger signs to
us in seeking to resolve questions vf re-
lease and repatriation in the Vietnam
conflict. Vietnam is not the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, nor is Vietnam the
1. Unless otherwise noted, all references to
e311999/99102N:0011AiRDP74411aAinNadaratolge
e.4o the Third
lo the Treat-
, a I ulip JLULCJ JUItIUMI fun "^lir t ef Pri9401 Of W.. .f Aubuen 14194v
?
3
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Korean War of 1950-1953. Vietnam
today is not even the French-Indo-
china war which supposedly was re-
solved by the 1954 Geneva agreement.
Still, each of these historical conflicts
has something of value for our exami-
nation.
The Arab-Israeli War shows us a
relatively good lesson of prompt whole-
sale repatriation of prisoners of war
soon after the formal cessation of con-
tinuous hostilities. The fact that Isreal
promptly repatriated far greater num-
bers of Arab prisoners than the Arab's
side is a400d expression of the proper
humanitarian intent which should mo-
tivate any repatriation. Repatriation is
not a "trade", or "barter", or "ex-
change" in the language of the trades-
men. It is a plain and simple require-
ment that all parties to a conflict per-
mit all their prisoners of war to return
home.
The 1954 Agreement at the conclu-
sion of the French-Indochina War
shows us that even a sound agreement
requires good faith performance before
the results are satisfactory. Article 21
provided:
(a) All prisoners of war and civilian
internees of Vietnam. French, and oth-
er nationalities captured since the be-
ginning of hostilities in Vietriam dux,
ing military operations or in any other
circumstances of war and in any part
of the toTitory of Vietnam shall be
liberated within a period of thirty (30)
days after the date when the cease-fire
becomes effective in each theater.
(b) The term "civilian internees" is
unrierstood to mean all persons who,
having in any way contributed to the
political and armed struggle between
the two parties, have been arrested for
that reason and have been kept in de-
tention by either party during the
period of hostilities.
(c) All prisoners of war and civilian
internees held by either party shall be
surrendered to the appropriate author-
ities of the other party, who shall give
them all possible assistance in proceed-
ing to their country of origin, place of
habitual residence, or the zone of their
choice.
Since this agreement called for the
surrendering of prisoners in the first
instance to "the other party", presum-
ably it made no provision for instances
wherein a prisoner did not want to
return to the control of his own forces.
In practice, significant numbers of
prisoners of war were released by both
sides within the prescribed thirty-day
period or shortly after. Nevertheless,
there were charges and countercharges
that thousands of prisoners of war had
not been released. The International
Control Commission was ineffective in
obtaining additional releases from
North Vietnam. Thus, the agreement
for release was sound, but its execution
left something to be desired because of
the significant number of prisoners
who did not return and for whom
there was no satisfactory accounting.
The 1962 Protocol to the Declara-
tion on the Neutrality of Laos dealt
with the release of captured personnel
in a' clear, uncomplicated manner. It
simply provided in Article 7 that:
All foreign military persons and ci-
vilians captured or interned during the
course of hostilities in Laos shall be
yeleas'ed- within thirty days after the
entry into force of this Protocol and
handed over by the Royal Government
of Laos to the representatives of the
Governments of the countries of which
they are nationals in order that they
may proceed to the destination of their
choice.
Again, execution was less than com-
pletely satisfactory.
In Korea, the release and repatria-
tion of prisoners of war was the single
most controversial aspect of the nego-
tiations and certainly the agenda item
which required the longest time to re-
solve. Some might say that it was
never resolved in view of the large
number of Americans who were not
satisfactorily accounted for and who
were much later classified as "died
while captured" or "died while miss-
ing". In July, 1951, the Korean armi-
stice negotiations began, and although
the fighting continued, there was no
major ground offensive. By the end of
May, 1952, substantial agreement had
been reached on all but one major
point of negotiation?repatriation of
prisoners of war. In this regard, the
difficulty lay in resolving the question
of "voluntary" repatriation. In short,
would there be forced repatriation of
unwilling prisoners? After many
months of stalemate, the issue was
finally ref.olved. There was no forced
repatriation of prisoners. But in the
meantime, all prisoners on both sides
suffered the pains of captivity for
many more months, and, indeed, many
died during this period of internment.
North Vietnam adhered to the Ge-
neva Convention on June 28, 1957.
The United States ratified it on August
2, 1955, and it came into force six
months later. The government of Viet-
nam acceded in 1953. The Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross
(I.C.R.C.) in 1965 declared that the
Geneva Conventions are fully in force
in the Vietnam conflict and that all
parties are bound to adhere to their
terms. North Vietnam has stated that it
does not consider the convention appli-
cable to Americans because the pilots ?
and aircrew held by it are criminals,
or "air pit ales", subject to the laws of
North Vietnam and not prisoners of
war. The relevant article of the conven-
tion dealing with classification of cap-
lives is Article, 4. As previously men-
tioned, American servicemen held by
North Vietnam clearly qualify as pris-
oners of war under this article and
are entitled to treatment in accordance
with the precepts of the convention.
North Vietnam's contention that the
convention is not applicable because
there has been no declaration of war
is not recognized by the I.C.R.C. or,
to my knowledge, by any other non-
Communist bloc nation. As a legal ar-
gument, it is simply not taken seri-
ously. Article 2 of the convention
states that it is applicable "to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two
or more of the parties to the Conven-
tion, even if the state of war is not rec-
ognized by one of them". As the
I.C.R.C. has declared, the Vietnam war
is clearly an armed conflict of an inter-
national character in which the full
4
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convention is applicable. The existence
of ? this international conflict has been
recognized by the United States and
the X XIst Conference of the Interna-
tional Red Cross. Although it claims
that the convention does not apply to
its captives, North Vietnam has main-
tained consistently, even in the force of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
that it treats the 'Captured servicemen
humanely.
Due Process Guarantees
Not Observed
Any contention by North Vietnam
that its reservation to Article 85 of the
convention permits it to deny prisoner
of war status to captured American
servicemen is also without merit. Arti-
cle 85 provides that "prisoners of war
prosecuted under the laws of the De-
taining Power for ads committed prior
to capture shall retain, even if con-
victed, the benefits of the present Con-
vention". Initially, the clause presup-
poses prisoner of war status, which
North Vietnam has denied. Secondly,
there have been no convictions that,
in any event, require certain due proc-
ess guarantees which North Vietnam
there are no known grounds for any
such convictions. The bombing policy
for North Vietnam observed to an un-
preceilented degree the laws of war.
The targets were military supporting
facilities, and the operating instructions
were strictly drawn to minimize collat-
eral damage and injury to the civilian
populace. In fact, in pursuing such a
restricted air war, the pilots were in-
curring greater risks to their
safety. In short, there has been no
fication of North Vietnam's charges
that the Americans are war criminals.
Th-) Viet Cong does net claim that
the soldiers captured by its forces are
other than prisoners of war, but it
maintains that it is not a party to the
convention. The I.C.R.C. considers the
Viet Cong bound by the adherence of
both North and South Vietnam.
The .United States, the Republic of
Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, Aus-
tralia, TAPPEPTellipRitts Release 1
own
veri-
Zealand have acknowledged the appli-
cability of the convention and assured
the I.C.R.C. of their intention to honor
it.3
In South Vietnam, prisoners of war,
whether Viet Cong or North Viet-
namese, are turned over to the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam for intern-
ment in sLx prisoners of Wdr camps.
This procedure is sanctioned by Article
12 of the convention because South
Vietnam is a party to the convention
and is willing and able to apply the
convention. South Vietnam also 'per-
mits the I.C.R.C. to inspect regularly
the camps where these prisoners are
held.
United States Bears
Special Concern
As mentioned previously, both
North Vietnam and the Viet Cong hold
prisoneis. Therefore, the critical par-
ties concerned with the actual release
or repatriation of prisoners are South
Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet
Cong.4 Of course, in terms of humani-
tarian interest as well as governmental
and public preoccupation, the United
States bears a special concern.
If we look to the convention as the
principal authority, Article 118 states
simply that "Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay
after the cessation of active hostilities."
It provides that this should be done
with or in the absence of any agree-
ment. Article 118 also deals with the
costs of repatriation.
Article 119 and
Articles 46-48,
which it references, deal primarily
with the obligations of a party to see
that repatriation is effected in a man-
ner that is in the best interests of the
prisoners of war, e.g., the captor must
provide sufficient food and water to
maintain their health, provide proper
care of sick and wounded and return
designated personal items. The last
three paragraphs of Article 119, how-
ever, provide for the retention of pris-
oners of war against whom criminal
proceedings for indictable offenses are
ita ifte1feilr9 4
I ' III
? ? I ?
The preceding articles drait w ith re-
patriot ion tit the close of hostilities.
Articles 100 through 117 cover direct
repatriation and accommodation in
neutral ceuntries even when the hostili-
ties may 'very well be continuing at an
active pace between the belligerents.
These Betides could apply to the Viet-
twit conflict now, and to what many
believe will be the prevailing situation
for the iorsecable future.
Article 109 requires a party to
to liheir own country all willing
"seriously wounded and seriously sick
prisoners of war after having cared for
them until they are fit to travel". The
succeeding article provides further def-
inition:of these categories of sick and
wounded who are entitled to direct re-
patriation: "(1) Incurably, wounded
and sick, whose mental or physical fit-
ness seems to have been gravely dimin-
ished. (2) Wounded and sick who, ac-
cording to medical opinion, are not
likely to recover within one year,
whose condition requires treatment and
whose mental or physical fitness seems
to have been gravely diminished. (3)
Wounded and sick who have recovered,
but whose mental or physical fitness
seems to have been gravely and perma-
nently diminished."
Article 110 also provides that the
following may be accommodated in a
neutral country: "(1) Wounded and
sick whose recovery may be expected
within one year of the date of the
wound or the beginning of the illness,
if treatment in a neutral country might
increase the prospects of a more cer-
tain and speedy recovery. (2) Prison-
ers of war whose mental or physical
health, according to medical opinion,
is seriously threatened by continued
captivity, but whose accommodation in
a neutral country might remove such a
threat."
2. See Articles 85 and 105.
3. See Joint Manila Communique, October
24, 19G(i.
4. Prisoners held in Laos by the Pathet
Lao forces may be subject to control by th
more than 40,000 North Vietnamese force;
there. To the extent that they are not, th.,
Pathet Lo forces might be held bound by
the Geneva Convention by Laos's adaliyherence!
aCt8,011P,a9ittetesInhrTasev pTi.
le1.
oners by the Royal Lao Army are now ao?
5
knowiedged as tailing within the conven.
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If the parties do not agree on a
method f;:ir determining which prison-
ers qualify for direct repatriation or
accommodation in a neutral country,
Article 110 provides that the principles
enunciated in the Convention's Model
Agreement and Regulations Concern-
ing Mixed Medical Commissions shall
be applied.
The provisions of the convention re-
lating to direct repatriation at the close
of hostilities and those covering repa-
triation or internment in a neutral
country of certain sick or wounded
prisoners of war are straightforward
and clear. If the war is over, prisoners
of war should be given the opportunity
to return to their home country. Dur-
ing the war, the seriously sick or
wounded who are willing should be re-
patriated directly or interned in a neu-
tral country for the duration of the
hostilities.
The convention does not establish
equally detailed principles and proce-
dures for the general release or repatri-
ation of healthy prisoners of war while
the hostilities continue. Article 109 does
state that the parties to a conflict may
conclude by agreements for direct re-
patriation or internment in a neu-
tral country "of able bodied pri-
soners of war who have undergone
a long period of captivity". This provi-
sion does not seem necessary because
the parties could repatriate all prison-
ers at any time with or without an
agreement to that effect. The result in
any event clearly would be in keeping
with the humanitarian purposes which
the convention was designed to effect.
Apparently, however, it was beyond
the realm of the realistic to include
within the coverage of the convention
requirements whereunder the combat-
ants were expected to release able-bod-
ied soldiers during the course of hostil-
ities. Yet we have Article 117, which
declares flatly that "no repatriated per-
son may be employed on active m111.
tary service". The scholars have sug-
gested that this applies only to prison-
ers of war repatriated because they are
sick, wounded or long-time prisoners
of war who might return to battle their
former captors. The United States,
however, as a matter of policy does not
return former prisoners of war who
have been released to combat against
their previous captors.
Obligation To Release Prisoners
After Eighteen Months
Assuming that the present state of
hostilities in Vietnam continues indefi-
nitely, what obligation does the con-
vention place on the parties to release
or repatriate prisoners of war? Liter-
ally read, the convention might lead
to the conclusion that the only
obligations would be for those who
qualify as -sick or wounded. Yet the
convention's anticipation that the dur-
ation of some .hostilities might war-
rant the repatriation or internment in a
neutral country of "long-time" prison-.
ers of war, permits me to conclude that
the very basic humanitarian principles
which underlie the entire convention
require that prisoners of war not be
kept interned indefinitely.
When there is no end of hostilities
in sight, all prisoners of war who have
remained in captivity longer than eigh-
teen months should be repatriated by
the captor so long as the other pally
agrees to honor the requirement of
Article 117. There are now thousands
of North Vietnamese and Viet Corti?
and hundreds of American prisoners of
war who have, been interned for mores
than two years, and there is no end of
their captivity in sight.
To achieve fully its purpose, the Ge-
neva Convention should provide a solu-
tion for this situation. It is reasonable
to conclude that eighteen months of
captivity with no likelihood of release
in sight is sufficient to require accom-
modation in a neutral country under
Article 110 and the model agreement.
Indeed, the evidence that we have eon,
cerning the Americans held in North
Vietnam and those held by the Viet
Cong in South Vietnam would support
a finding that many of them are seri-
ously sick or wounded and entitled to
direct repatriation under Article 110.
The fact that the other side does not
-permit impartial inspection of its pris-
oner of war camps, when added to the
information we have, e.g., significant
weight losses, intestinal and skin dis-
eases, use of crutches years after cap-
ture and confinement in isolation, pro-
vides a sufficient basis for a presump-
tion that the American prisoners of
war should be repatriated or at least
interned in a neutral country immedi-
ately. To conclude otherwise, would
'constitute a gross step backward in the
evolution of basic principles of human-
itarian law.
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6
CPYRGHT ger for real negotiating if it could be re- Cr ?winder Wilber saki he got letters
CPYRGHT
TIlE
4 January
v,ecLFoi1ReIeas $301069/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011944000300411000+4 once every two
months. "My packages contain candy,
variqns food items, special little snacks
like peanuts, and sometimes underwear.
Small items, chocolate and
things
The official positions of the two govern-
1971 ments seem, so far as their public pos-
tures go, to be clear, adamant, and irre-
concilable. The United States wants to talk
about prisoners as a separate issue, di-
vorced from other questions in the nego-
tiations. Hanoi insists that it won't talk
about the POWs until all U.S. troops are
withdrawn from South Vietnam.
With Propaganda,
At Least, Hanoi
Reacts? on POWs
North Vietnamese Deliver
A I10;iday TV 'Special';
Both Sides Stay Adamant
By Wesley Pruden, Jr.
Like pawns in an unending chess game,
the American prisoners of war were
moved to new squares last week.
Items:
lor Timed to exploit the holiday season,
North Vietnam invited a Canadian televi-
sion correspondent to talk to and film sev-
eral U.S. prisoners in a carefully tended,
scrubbed-up compound in Hanoi. The
filmed interviews were shown to Ameri-
can television viewers.
The U.S. Defense Department dis-
missed the gesture with contempt. After
first saying there would be no comment, a
department spokesman in Washington
called the gesture "one more example of
the refusal of North Vietnam to conduct it-
self as a civilized signatory of the Geneva
Convention."
10? The next day, Radio Hanoi' broadcast
a Christmas program from an unidentified
prisoner-of-war camp, featuring carols
and conversations with prisoners who
promised their families they ' would be
home soon. Static erased 'some of the
words, but not before a man identified as
Bui Van Thu, a minister of the Vietnam
Evangelical Church, preached a Christ-
mas sermon about the peace of Christ, the
love of God.
ea' In Hanoi, Pham Van Dong, the pre-
mier of North Vietnam, reacted sharply
?and defensively? to suggestions that
prisoners were badly treated in his camps.
Said he: "I swear to you that these men
are being well treated."
These chess moves, diplomatic sources
in Washington were quick to say, might be
best read as efforts to score propaganda
points, perhaps only -to even the score.
Since late summer, when President Nixon
dispatched astronaut Frank Borman on a
12-nation trip to build diplomatic pressure
In behalf of the prisoners, this issue has
evolved as the sticking point in, the nego-
tiations between the United States and
North Vietnam.
Adamant Positions
Says one feUradijoisrUralti-
ton: "The pri r ng 2S
Nevertheless, bits and pieces of evi-
dence clearly suggest that the Commu-
nists are treating the issue, as well as the
prisoners themselves, with more care than
they once did. Hanoi once threatened to
put U.S. fliers on trial as war criminals,
with death for those judged guilty. But in
recent months the Communists have
seemed eager to portray themselves as
humane captors.
In last week's interview with Michael
Maclear of the Canadian Broadcasting
Corp., the North Vietnamese premier said
the list of prisoners ?with 368 names on it
? given in late December to two U.S. sen-
thra
tun
"full and complete." He reacted q
angrily whe i M. Maclear reminded him
that the Umted States insists that Hanoi
holds prisomrs whose names were not on
the list.
"The Nixon people are scoundrels,
really scoundrels, to talk of this," Pham
Van Dong r ?lofted. "It is they who show
no humanitarian concern by talking like
this. We Vietnamese know all too well
what it's li e being prisoners?under the
French. Yet when they were our prisoners
we treated them well. Ask them. Ask the
Americans In our camps. I swear to you
these men are well treated."
The premier wouldn't allow the corre-
spondent to take him at his literal word;
he wouldn't allow him to talk at random
with the Am )ricans in his camps. But soon
Mr. Maclear was taken to a prison com-
pound in downtown Hanoi for interviews
with two prisoners, and a look at five oth-
ers. He was riot allowed to talk to the addi-
tional five prisoners.
The interviews were recorded on tape,
and later ce isored by the North Vietnam-
ese. The interviews were .authorized by
the North V .etnamese Politburo, the poli-
cy-making E rm of , the North Vietnamese
Communist Party.
War Is 'lad'
In them, the two Americans said the
war was "bk.d" and ought to end, that the
United Stat et ought to withdraw. The two
were identified as Cmdr. Robert James
Schweitzer, 38, of Lemoore, Calif., and
Cmdr. Walter Eugene Wilber, 40, of Co-
lumbia Cros ;roads, Pa.
They answered four. questions each.
Each question had been submitted first to
the government authorities, then to the
prisoners. The questions allowed were
about their identities, mail privileges,
their dairy acmes and routines; and their
feelings abo it the war in Vietnam.
Commander Schweitzer identified him-
self and said he had been shot down on his
11th mission over North Vietnam, just out-
side Haipheng, on Jan. 5, 1968. Corn-
candies
we appreciate all the time."
Both men said they send out one letter
a month, on a form provided by the eamp
authorities. Other occasions on which pail
was permitted, Commander Wilber* ex-
plained, are Christmas and Mother's Day.
"If we have a special occasion," he said,
"an anniversary, children's birthday? all
we've. got to do is say we want to send a
[radii)] message and it's transmitted. I
understand these things go through
Cuba."
Speaking for both men, Commander Wil-
ber described the daily routine of camp
life: "We eat three meals a day and we
rise about sunrise, have exercises, get our
room cleaned up, and have breakfast. We
usually play volleyball or have other
sports in the mornings, then have our noon
meal. However, in addition there's music
and the like, and I'll let Bob continue on."
Commander Schweitzer picked up the
narrative: "We observe the Vietnamese
siesta in the afternoon. The volleyball
court and the basketball facilities are
available to us all day. We also have a
great deal of literature, notable among
which are many books by American au-
thors."
'A Lovely Film'
He said the prisoners often see Viet-
namese movies: "For instance, we saw the
Folk and Art Ensemble Tour of Europe,
which is a very lovely film.- Only re-'
cently, he said, the prisoners were treated
to a Russian production of Shakespeare's
Twelfth Night.
He described a visit the prisoners were
allowed to make to a Hanoi Roman Catho-
lic Cathedral on Christmas Eve. "We vis-
ited the cathedral for midnight mass,
which is a very enjoyable and very mov-
ing ceremony. The place was tremen-
dously crowded with Vietnamese."
The prisoners discuss the war often,
Commander Schweitzer said, "because
the war is very close to us here. We are all
Involved." Commander Wilber said he
thought the war must end.
"We've just got to stop this thing.
We've got to grip the facts as they lie and
stop the war. And of course we must with-
draw our troops to stop the war. That's a
condition we have to face. Then the Viet-
namese can solve their own problems. I'm
confident of that. Stop the war. Get our
troops out. That's what the big job is."
Said Commander Schweitzer: "I of
course agree. As I say, I'm terribly con-
cerned about my country and I feel that
the future of our country as well as Viet-
nam and Indochina cannot be served by
the prolongation of this war, whatever the
reasons and causes. I don't feel that it's
necessary even to rake over the old rea-
son of who was wrong, who was right. It
has been proven as far as I'm concerned."
atigagaggialligitiMat94ACtenelirli0051i -1
mission J me ma. Cu sunk/ Wilbci o uhaailed lib
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WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS CPYRGHT
27 January 1971
opinion; "This war is bad. It's bad. Given
our situation or the Vietnamese or Indo-
chinese people's situation, we've got to
get out and let them solve their own
problems. We've got our own problems
to strive."
The answers seemed to have been re-
hearsed; the language was repetitive and
occasionally clumsy. The Defense Depart-
ment said both men had been quoted be-
fore; their families discounted their words
as Rewrote ThaUratnentli 81 UMW Mils
Ings.
"He looks great on film," Gwen
Schweitzer, the commander's wife, said
the next day in California. "But that's not
my impression of his life. I'm certain it
was staged." Commander Wilber's wife,
Jeanne, said she didn't know her husband's
true feelings. "At least I know he's fine. I
couldn't have received a nicer gift." She
heard it on their 18th wedding anniver-
sary.
The Defense Department said the
camp, which correspondent Maclear
placed in downtown Hanoi, surrounded by
the thatched huts of the poor, appeared to
be a showcase prison camp the GIs call
"the Hanoi Hilton." Mr. Maclear said he
couldn't tell whether the camp was ac-
tually used as prisoners' living quarters,
but he, concluded that it probably was.
To some people, the significance of it
all was that Hanoi wants desperately the
rest of the world to believe that it does, in
fact, treat its prisoners humanely. It
might be a prelude, some diplomatic
sources suggest, to real negotiations.
Prisoners were the sticking points M
the Korean War, in a different way. The
cease-fire talks began in July 1951, and an
agreement was signed two years later.
The Chinese and North Koreans insisted
on talking to all of 60,000 , Communist
troops who said they wanted to stay in
South Korea. More than 6,000 Indian sol-
diers were posted as guards during these
talks.
Finally, beginning in August 1963, the
United Nations command returned 70,150
North Korean and 5,640 Chinese troops,
and in return received 7,850 South Kore-
ans, 3,597 Americans, 945 British, and 228
Turks. Thirteen Americans elected to stay
In Communist hands, and later went to
China. Most later returned.
More than 8,000 North Vietnamese are
now being held in prisoner-of-war camps in
South Vietnam, and recent interviews indi-
cate that perhaps 90 per cent of them don't
want to return. Saigon has offered to ex-
change those who want to go home for
American prisoners at a 10-1 rate, but
Hanoi so far has not been interested.
The chess game goes on. President
Nixon himself last week took note of the
slow pace, and the growing quotient of
frustration in the lives of the prisoners'
families. Said he: "I know there is nothing
I can say that would truly comfort you."
Send POWs to Sweden plan
Nv Scripps-Now Newspapers
PARIS?Two Ametitan womeit whiaca hum
.ado aro miffing in Vietnam have a plan
to get all American prisoners out of Vietnam-
ese communist hands.
The women want Hanoi to turn the prisoners
over to neutral Sweden and Denmark for de-
tention until the end of the Vietnam war.
Mrs. Bonnye Vohden, wife of Navy Cmdr.
Raymond Vohden, and Mrs. Charlotte Lan-
nom,. wife of Navy Lt. Richard Lannom, will
go to Copenhagen and Stockholm next week to
make that proposal to those two governments.
The wives, both from Memphis, Tenn., plan
also to go on to Moscow?"if we can get per-
mission, get a visa"?to ask the Soviet Union
to use its influence with North Vietnam to get
ft to agree to the novel plan.
"It would at least assure humane treatment
for the American prisoners," said Mrs. Vo-
hden, whose husband is known to have been in
North Vietnamese custody nearly six years.
Mrs. Lannom's husband was reported "miss-
ing in action" over North Vietnam three years
ago. She does not know whether he is dead or
in Red hands.
Mrs. Lannom echoed her companion's view
that transferring all the estimated 500 to 600
Americans held by the communists to Scandi-
navian custody would "take them out of the
awful, inhumane treatment they're getting
now.
"And it would show the world just who the
communists hold and who they don't, so that
people like us would know where lye stand."
The two wives can to Paris this week with
the help of the Memphis Junior Chamber of
Commerce and The Memphis Press-Scimitar,
a Scripps-Howard newspaper.
The Press-Scimitar and the Jaycees gath-
ered a ton of letters from people in Memphis
and thruout a six-state area In the mid-South.
The letters?an estimated 550,000 of them?are
addressed to North Vietnamese leaders and
urge them to treat the prisoners humanely or
release them:. a,
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THE WASHINGTON POST
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State Department Is Skeptical
Crosby Seeking to Ransom POWs
Larry Crosby, 76.year-o1d
brother of millionaire
crooner Bing-Crosby, said
yesterday that he II sup-
portiria an attempt to ran.
som U.S. prisoners of war
held by North. Vietnam.
State Department officials
expressed total skeplicism
about the plan. They said
they were 'aproached two
years ago, by, the originator
of the idea, John Fair-
fax, who attempted insuc-
,tessfully to obtain -tax-ex-
empt status from the Inter-
nal Revenue Service for his
'Prisoners of War Rescue
Mission."
In Los Angeles, .Larry
Crosby identified Fairfax as
4t retired San Francisco,
building tontractor, and
said Fairfax is now in Vien-
tiane; Laos, Where 'h& "got,
:some 'response" from a;
.,man "from Hanoi." :State.
Department officials ex-
Pressed doubt about that
also. ?
- "Bing," Larry Crosby told
the Los Angeles Times, is
now on a lengthy safari in
Africa and "didn't know a
damn thing about it" until
recEntly, when Larry asked
the singer for some finan-
cial support.
"Right inny Bing and I
are paying the expenses,
half-and-half," said Larry.
The costs so far, Crosby
said, involve sending Fair--
fax to Vientiane and paying
his hotel bills.
U.S. officials said Fairfax
has been trying to 4rouset
interest in his plan for
about four years. When
Fairfax came to the State:
Department about two years'
ago, they said, he was wear-
ing a blue uniform and a
peaked cap with silver
wings, which Fairfax des-
cribed as the uniform of his
reseue mission.
"There is no indication,"
one U.S. official said, "of
any interest in this (Fair-
fax's) proposal by the other
side."
Larry Crosby initially in-
dicated yesterday that the
Nixon administration had
encouraged the idea. State
Department officials imme,
dlately denied that.
"Our position is that the
release of prisoners of war
is a humane question which
should be settled on the
basis of the Geneva conven-
tion" and "not on the basis
,of ransom," said State De-
partment Press Officer Rob-
ert J. McCloskey.
Larry Crosby said he was
undeterred. "What can they
do about it?" he asked.
"They'd look pretty funny
if we accomplished some-
thing, wouldn't they?"
He said he last talked to.
Fairfax about five days ago;
and "he told me I should
start getting a negotiating
committee of prominent peo-
ple together. I've started
doing it, but I'm not releas-
ing the names yet."
frhe iLainiii;;;" Daily News, Friday-, *March 19, lair
? Larry Crosby, Bing's brother, said in Bever-
ly Wits that he may have to collect $1 billion
to rebuild North Vietnam after the war in ex-
change for freeing of U.S. POWs.
THE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, March 17, 1971
VFW Chief Si-64 .?th 'Huy' a POW
KANSAS CITY (AP) ? The commander of the Veter-
an.,
1 1J
buy the rele aase of an American prisoner of war for
$100,000.
The commander, Herbert R. Rainwater, said yesterday
he would not try to do business with the Hanoi government
but with some individual North Vietnamese interested in
making money. ,
"If the leaders in Hanoi see that we can buy one prisoner
through the underground, they might well believe we could
buy more and show to the world that their people are
vulnerable," Rainwater, of San Bernadino, Calif., said in a
statementissued here.
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CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
? THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, March 20,1971
Nixon Declares Week
Of Concern for POWs
President Nixon yesterday
proclaimed next week a Spe-
cial period of observance for
the 1,600 Americans missing in
action or held prisoner by
Communist forces in South-
east Asia.
Mr. Nixon issued the procla-
mation at a special White
House ceremony.
"I call upon all the people
of the United States to ob-
serve this week in heartfelt
prayer, and in ceremonies and
activities appropriate to voice
deep concern for the prisoners
and missing men, to inspire
their loved ones with new
courage and hope, and to has-
ten the day when their ordeal
may end," the proclamation
said.
About a dozen wives of
missing American servicemen
were present for the cere-
mony. The proclamation was
requested by Congress in a
special resolution.
Mr. Nixon told the wives
that 'among all the proclama-
tions he has signed, "there is
none that has a deeper mean-
ing" than this one, for a week
labeled "National Week of
Concern for Americans who
are Prkoners of War or Miss-
ing in Action."
A reception will be held for
the families of the POWs Mon-
day on Capitol Hill as part of
the "National Week of Con-
cern."
In New York, the Commit-
tee of Liaison with Families of
U.S. Prisoners of War said it
received 193 more letters?
from the prisoners, hand-car-
ried by a delegation of women
, who returned from Hanoi.'
Cora Weiss, an official of
the Committee of Liaison, said
the 193 letters bring to more
than 3,400 the total number of
letters from the POWs re-
ceived by the committee since
December 1969.
She said that the letters re-
ceived yesterday were immedi-
ately sent by mail to families
of the POWs and that letters'
from the families to the POWs
have been forwarded to North
Vietnam.
Earlier, families of the pris-
oners had denounced Hanoi
for a three-month stoppage in
the delivery of mail.
Thursday, March 25. 1971 THE WASHINGTON POST
Borman Asks
Release of
Allies' POWs
News Dispatches
ormer astronaut Frank
Borman recommended yester-
day that the United States and
South Vietnam release'
huqdreds of North Vietnamese
priSoners of war in an effort
to prod Hanoi into freeing
American POWs or easing,
their plight.
The retired Air Force colo-
nel, Who traveled around the
world last fall as President
Nixon's emissary on POW
matters, testified before a
House Foreign Affairs sub-
committed,
He said a number of cap-
tured North Vietnamese equal
to the number of Americans
missing or captive, about
1,600, should be released un-
conditionally. Such a proposal
has been introduced in Con-
gress by Rep. Paul Findley (R-
M.).
Acknowledging that Hanoi
would not necessarily recipro-
cate, Borman said the risk was
,nevertheless "acceptable," and
"emphasize this country's con-
cern and willingness to ap-
proach" the issue.
Borman said U.S. insistence
on prisoner release as a con-
dition of withdrawing troops
from Vietnam would have
little effect on the CommtP
nists. "In essence the prison-
ers are now hostages," he
said.
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April 1971
AUSTRALIA: COMMUNIST DISSIDENCE "DOWN UNDER"
The case of dissidence on the part of the Australian
Communist Party (CPA) supports the major anti-Soviet theme
of the continuing conflict caused by Soviet efforts to
maintain hegemony over world CP's against the expression by
many Communists of a desire for autonomy. In the recent past,
Perspectives has dealt with Soviet treatment of dissident
factions in the French (Garaudy), Italian (the "Il Manifesto"
group), Spanish (Carrillo vs. Lister), and Venezuelan (Petkoff)
Communist parties. We take this occasion to add to this roster
the CPA, outlining its quarrel with the CPSU --- a quarrel
which is1 still unresolved but apparently coming to a head.
(The CPSU may prefer to postpone decisive action on the CPA
until after the 24th CPSU Congress.)
Suggested themes fciy exploitation by media assets are
(in addition to the above mentioned conflict):
a. the case of CPA dissidence as another illustration
of the fragmentation of the world Communist movement;
b. the cynicism of the CPSU in its use of various
tactics and pressures to eliminate dissidence -- tactics
in which cash weighs more heavily than the smoke screen of
ideology;
c. the absolute Soviet intolerance of deviation which
they see as a threat to their claimed leadership of the
Communist world;
d. the pervasiveness of dissident sentiments and the
univeral desire Amon CP's for autonomy;
e. the existence of publicly expressed dissidence
as the tip of the iceberg;
f. the refusal of the Soviets to accept the uniquely
nationalist (as opposed to the international) program of
CP's, as exemplified by the CPA.
We believe Aaron's exposure (in the attached Wiener Tagebuch
article) of the Soviet tactic of preparing ideological pronounce-
ments for CP's to issue as if they were theit own is newsworthy
and deserving of wide play.
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-1-1 rwonnT min i TQP CATT
?AUSTRALIA: COMMUNIST DISSIDENCE 'DOWN UNDER"
April 1971
The lack of tolerance in the Soviet Connunist Party for
other Communist parties (or elements within them) having views
differing from its own is well known and has been illustrated
in the recent past a number of times; for example in the cases
of dissident factions in the French, Austrian, Venezuelan, and
Spanish CP's. In the last three cases, the CPSU succeeded in
splitting the parties, and in throwing its not inconsiderable
support to the faction willing to mouth the Soviet line.
The next victim of this continuing, methodical Soviet
campaign to destroy dissident tendencies in free world Communist
parties seems to be the Party from "down under," the Australian
Communist Party (CPA).
The CPA's first sin was to denounce the 1968 Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia -- and to continue to denounce it periodically
right up to the present. Also, it was one of the few parties
refusing to sign the joint communique of the World Communist
Conference of June 1969. It has opened the columns of its
newspapers and journals to anti-Soviet statements by such
prominent dissidents as the French Communist Roger Garaudy and
the prominent Czech Communist-in-exile, Jiri Pelikan. Eric
Aarons, brother of the National Secretary of the CPA, recently
submitted to the Austrian dissident journal, Wiener Tagebuch
(Vienna Diary) an article explaining the CPA's program and
criticizing Soviet machinations vis-a-vis the CPA. At its last
Congress in March 1970, it outlined an unorthodox program bearing
a substantial resemblance to concepts voiced far away, e.g., by
Garaudy in France and Petkoff in Venezuela. In effect, it is an
elaboration of an Australian, national "road to socialism,"
anathema!to the CPSU. The CPA also added its voice to the chorus
of criticism of the Soviet Union expressed at the unique
gathering of international Conumnist dissidents in Paris,
26 November 1970.
In the face of these "provocatiens," the Soviet internation?
al weekly, New Times, of 1 January 1971 strongly attacked the CPA
for its defiance of "proletarian internationalism" as conceived
by the Sbviets, i.e. obedience to the Soviet line. (The article
is a follow-up to an earlier article from the Czech Communist
Party's Main newspaper, Rude Pram, reprinted in the New Times;
articles are attached.) In fact, CPA leaders had simply
expressed views common to Colimun ist critics around the world
who accuse Soviet-dominated Communism of:
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denying denocracy and self-rule in the name of
proletarian internationalism;
clinging to outmoded and unrealistic social concepts
which today's technological societies have long since outgrown; and
assuming a basic right to interfere in the affairs
of other parties, a variant of the notorious Brezhnev Doctrine.
The fact that the CPSU uses the widely distributed
New Times (Novoye Vremya) which is published in the major
languages of the world, to launch its attack on the tiny,
relatively unimportant CPA clearly means that its target is
not merely the CPA, but the large audience of actual and
would-be dissidents throughout the world. It is a warning to
such dissidents and even a catalogue of their sins.
For its part, the CPA, significantly, chose the dissident
organ of the Austrian Communists, the Wiener Tagebuch, for its
criticism, pointing to the tactic the Soviets are likely to use
to exterminate CPA dissidence: the sponsoring of the pro-Soviet
minority as the CPSU-sanctioned "regular" party, exactly as it
did with the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). Aarons pointed out
that the minority opposition has begun to publish its own news-
paper, just as the orthodox, minority faction of the PCE is doing.
(The Wiener Tagebuch article is attached.)
An interesting sidelight of Aarons article is his public
exposure of a widely used Soviet propaganda technique. During
a visit to Moscow by Aarons, the Soviets pressed him to publish
in the CPA press a "major" article which the Soviets themselves
would compose. It can be concluded that thousands of articles
appearing in local Party newspapers and journals throughout the
world as statements of the individual Party were in fact written
in Moscow by Soviet propagandists. ?The monotonous uniformity and
ponderous style of so many articles published locally in Communist
newspapers evidently derive from their common Soviet origin.'
The resolution of the long-standing CPA-CPSU quarrel is yet
to come. Whether the majority group can survive an all-out
assault by the CPSU or whether it will succumb to the CPSU's
superior resources and forego its independent criticism of the
CPSU remains to be seen. The CPSU is clearly threatening to
split the Party, and if some compromise with the Aarons group is
not found, it will undoubtedly attempt to do so. It can, for
instance, WithdtaW its financial support from the Aarons group
and increase its support to the pro-Soviet faction, over and
-
above financing its newspaper as it seems to be doing now.
2
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In the interim, the CPA continues to express the secret
desires of uncounted Coithaunists of all ranks who wish for
freedom from Soviet tutelage but Who, for varying reasons, are
forced to keep silent.
3
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CPYRGHT
ASAHI EVEN/NO NM, *Igo
1 February 1971
World communist Movement
New Kind of Split Troubles Moscow
boy Murarka
Tim Observer Service, London
MO('0W?The World Com;?
mist movement has still
not recovered from the major
schism between the Soviet Un-
ion and China which took
place at the beginning of the
1960's and shows no signs of
healing. But a new kind of
. split is now threatened in thq
'?movement from a curious and
unexpected source ? the Ans.
tralian Communist Party.
now found vigorous public ex-
pression. The basis of criti-
cism is the 22nd Congress of
the Communist Party of Aus-
tralia held last summer. At
first Moscow remained silent
but in September the weekly
New Times reprinted an article
from the Czech party paper
Rude Pravo which attacked the
CPA for insisting upon discuss-
ing the Czechoslovak question
at the Congress in spite of pleas
The party split into pro-Sol from Prague to the contrary.
viet and pro-Chinese sections The Australians were also cri-
?some years ago. But now it ticised for leaking a letter sent
looks as if the pro-Soviet party .to them by the Czech party.
can no longer be so described The article accused the CPA
and is travelling a path of its Of paying insufficient attention
own. If a label is required for to Australian participation in
it, perhaps the nearest is to call the Vietnam war while busying
it a case of "Dubcekism." By, itself with problems of democ-
itself the Communist Party of racy in Socialist countries.
Australia may be of no weight For some time no more was
or great significance, but its
almost total rejection of the So-
viet party ideologically could
, mean that Moscow will be left
without ? any significant Com-
munist support in the Far East.
The New Zealand party long
ago switched to Maoism, and,
the Japanese party's ideologi-
cal twists and turns have prov-
ed to be too complicated for
Moscow to fathom.
, Still more curious, the os-
tensible reason for all these .
ideological fireworks is
Czechoslovakia, an episode
? which has been virtually re-
legated to the pages of history
for all practical purposes, its
great impact in 1968 notwith-
_standing. To judge from Sovi-
et comments it would appear
that the Australian Communist '
?Party is now committed to
:applying some of the Dubcek,
policies in its own affairs.
heard about it. But at the
beginning of this year New
Times returned to the fray
with a two-page editorial arti-
cle attacking; the CPA's posi-
tion. The editorial did not
merely confine itself to recent
history, but traced Australian
development for some years
back, specifically froth the 21st
Party Congress held in 1967.
The main charges by the
New Times were that the CPA
leaders have ceased to criticise
China and instead are talking
in terms of their interest in the
Chinese experiment, ; particu-
larly the Cultural Revolution;
that the Australian delegation
at the World Communist con-
ference in 1969 refused to sign
the main document and in fact
did not even publish it fully in
the party press. ,One leading
member of the .delegation even
went so far as to claim that
Though formal ties between the "deliberate efforts were made
Soviet and Australian parties to prevent free and comradely
have not been broken, there is discussion" at the meeting, said
ino longer any love lost between the New Times.
the two. Some six months ago
Russians' Worry
the Moscow representative of
the Australian party paper Tri- ' But what hurt the Russians'
bune was -.'ecalled and has not ' most was that the main docu-
been replaced. From all ac- ment adopted by the 22nd
counts the Tribune bureau in -Congress of ,the CPA even de-
'Moscow has in ' fact been.. nje61i t _he _ Una 44 fr,
.closed w
. Approved Foihttaw -1 d
. , Moscow's dissatisfaction bas merely allied ? theirs "SOciallst- ;
isnisprla .. '?
? ?16?1. t4t.L:
? Ideologically, the Australian.
"crimes" are the opening of the
party to diverse leftist elements
of a non-Communist character
and the rejection of the notion
of monolithic control of the
,Party and the principle of de-
niocratic centralism, the two 1
'cornerstones of Communist
Ideology. Besides, Moscow is
also extremely disapproving of
the CPA's call for a new "coa,
lition of the Left" which would
include, according to the vague
formulation of the CPA docu-
ments, alnlost anybody and
everybody. This ?is unforgiv-
able in Moscow's view because
it will erase the distinction bet-
ween the , Communist' Party'
and its coalition partners.
Moscow complains that eight
leaders of the old party who
spoke up against the new pro-
gram were dropped from the
leadership. As seen by Mos-,
cow, the Australian party, is
virtually controlled now by
brothers , Laurie and Eric Aa-
rons and Bernard Taft. Above
all, Moscow is alarmed at the
opening of the party doors to
Ttotskyists, one of whom, D.
Fteney, has been taken on to
the editorial board of Tribime.
Faint hints have also been.
dropped that if the Australian-
party does not see its way to
returning to a more orthodox
path a new party tnight be
formed which would be more
sympathetic to the Soviet view-
point. The leader of the mill-
tant Australian building work-
ers' union, Pat Clancy, has been
mentioned as a possibility be-
cause , he resigned from the
CPA's national committee in
disagreement with the new
party policy.
The problem of relations-
with the Australian Communist
Party is now becoming the
more acute for Moscow in
I view of the approaching 24th
'position. But unless a new
' party is formed before the
Congress the existing Party will
have to be invited for the sake
of party form. The fact that
I Moscow has chosen to voice its
, dissatisfaction with the Austra.
lian party in the pages of New
Times, which has an interne i -
!..tional audience, s also signifi-
! Cant. '
Moscow's Message
Through New Times AUs-,
tralian Communists as well as
'others 'interested in the pro-
blem, will be able to read
'Moscow's message.
Moscow cannot be entirely'
' happy at the new faction being!
formed at its behest because
'it sets up bad precedents. In!
the past the Russians have
fattacked the Chinese for en- '
..couraging similar factional,
splits. But the , Australian party!
seems to have gone so far in,
; the direction of what is here ,
termed right-wing revisionism
that there is little choice left
for the Soviet party.
The fact of the situation ap-t
? pears to be that, like all small
political parties with no pros-
pect of power or influence
? even in the distant future, the
Australian party is beset with
problems. Even the old party
members are subject to enor-
mous psychological pressures.
Rupert Lockwood, -formerly a
Tribune correspondent in
Moscow, argued vigorously in
1967 against an article in his
paper which criticised short-
comings of Soviet democracy.
Yet, upon his return to Aus-
tralia, Mr. Lockw6od left the
party precisely because he found
it too pro-Soviet, although the
party was already moving away
from ally identity with Mos-
cow.
The case ? of ? the Australian
party demonstrates the stress
and strains through which the
Congress. of the Soviet Party, whole of the Communist
movement is passing at the,
due to begin at. the end of
March., ?Clearly;, the party moment., _ For MoscoW, the
leaders would not like to pro- . really serious worry ? is that
:vide a
latform for, .there appears to be no sign of
.
' F.001404A0 0301)m
tvieo furl better, Sithough'
?Iolisiatess ? use it to criticise cn.. At maintains a public postura
pctly indruectly Abe SoViet, that 'milling la leri?ualY Wirl)132
'7
4
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THE WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1971
Australian Communists
ose Moscow
By Dusko Doder
Wash[Won Pod Stift Writer
? The Soviet Union is engaged
In a sharp public dispute over
basic liberties ;with the tiny
-Australian Communist Party
which continues its criticism
of Kremlin policies.
- A leading Australian Com-
munist, Eric Aarons, recently
, published an article in which
he said his party Could not
;side with the Soviets because
? Since the fall of Nikita
Khrushchey "the process of
?de-Stalinization was halted,
_then reversed."
"We didn't mifice our
words," said Aarons, "when it
came to questions of principle
?for example the Jewish
questions, the way in which
Khrushchev was ousted, the?
violation of artistic and intel-
lectual liberties and the ques-
tion of Socialist democracy in
general."
`oviet Criticism
- The Soviets responded with
a highly critical article in
.Novoe Vremya, a weekly inter-
national affairs Oeriodical, last
month which accused Eric
Aarons. his brother Laurie,
who is secretary general of
(he Australian party, Bernard
.Taft and other Australian
leaders of making "unfriendly
find even hostile statements"'
about the Kremlin.
The Soviets, in effect, called
on loyalists to split away from
the party because its new pro-
gram is "basically unaccepta-
ble and is pushing the Austra-
Ilan party onto 5e path of sec-
tarianism, anti-Sovietism and
-Isolationism from the interna-
Monet Communist movement."
State Department analysts
say that the exchange, while
stopping short of an open rift,
disclosed differences between
the two parties that are almost
*reconcilable.
; The Australian party claims
a membership of 5,000. Its can-
didates received 0.4 per cent
Of the total yote In 1966 elee-
Hons.
The two partittp mini& FO
divided on the Jewish que8-
tion, with the Australians crit-
icizing the clreuldthan UI
t'anti-Semitic material" in the
Soviet Union.
? The Vistralians have taken
an active role in the defense ?
of Soviet Jewry after a long
'public discussion Of the issue,
As early as 1965 an Australian
party document urged the So-
viets to launch a campaign "to
eliminate all surviving rem-
nants of the virulent anti-Sem-
itism promoted under Czar-
ism." -
i Eric Aarons and other lead-
:ers described as anti-Semitic
!SoYiet propaganda "whether
In the form of crude anti-reli-
gious propaganda or crude
anti-Zionism."
Tho Soviet,' rejected thaS0
charges and told the Austra-
lians that there was no anti-
Semitism in the Soviet Union.
The Australians did not chal-
lenge the Soviet position that
anti-Semitism was not offi-
cially inspired, but blamed the
Kremlin for failure to actively
fight against it.
Laurie Aarons used the
World tommunist Conference
in 1969 in Moscow as a forum
? to propose clear condemnation
of "all anti-Semitism, wher-
ever it may exist, and this '
without any reservations or
qualifications."
Motion Rejected
The conference rejected
Aarons' motion. He further in-
furiated the Russians by
openly criticizing the invasion
of Czechoslovakia. They de-
cided not to invite him to the
Lenin centenary last year. In-
stead, William Golan, member'
of the party's presidum, led
the Australian delegation.
In private talks with Polit-
buro member Mikhail Salov,
Boris Ponomarov, a secretary
of the Soviet central commit-
tee, and other officials, Golan
said his party could not accept
the Brezhnev doctrine, which
the Soviets used as justifica-
E,s116WaStb
lion la* the inyittub
said, would set a dangerous
2
precedent the Australians
were not prepared tO P'"CfPf
because of, their proximity to
China.
Golan's fears of possible
Chinese interference in Aus-
tralia was described as "na-
tionalistic" by the Soviet offi-
cials, according to Australian
sources.
Golan told Suslov and Pono-
marov that the Australian
party had decided to close
down the Moscow office of its
party paper Tribune. But the
paper would continue main-
taining its correspondents in
China and the United States
because they had "revolution-
ary societies," Golan said.
Golan's criticism of internal
Soviet developments and his
interest in- novelist Alexander
Solzhenitsyn had also annoyed
the Soviets. Their talks were
inconclusive and after Golan's
return to Australia the party
held its 22nd congress last fall
and adopted a program that Il-
lustrates the full extent of the
Soviet-Australian differences.
A, group of Moscow loyalists
were decisively defeated at
the congress which was highly
critical of "crimes and errors"
that developed in the Soviet
Union. The congress rejected
.two cornerstones of Commu-
nist ideology?the notion of
'monolithic control and the
principle of democratic cen-
tralism.
The .Novoe Vremya article
charged the new Australian
program fails even to ?"men-
tion iViarxism-Lorilnism ea the
theoretical base of the Com-
munist movement." The Sovi-
ets said the Australian party
narrowed its activities down
to supporting the national lib-
eration movements in New
!Guinea, and other Pacific Is-
lands.
'Proletarian Support'
"Naturally these tasks are
Important but it is clear that
such regionalism is very far
from internationalism," Novae
AS&
letarian support."
A small group of pro-Mos-
....me/y.1,0ra pat the Anctrsa.
Han party. The party leader-
ship expelled this winter two
leading pro-Moscow officials,
Edgar Ross and All Watt,
while Pat Clancy, leader of
the Construction Workerg
Union, left the leadership in,
protest.
With Soviet encouragement,
4 these conservatives are likely
to set up a new party. This
would further weaken the
Communist movement in Aus-
tralia. The party split in 1964
into pro-Moscow and prop-Pe-,
king groups but the_ pro-Mos-1
cow party of the Ahrens broth-
?terS gradually changed its anti.
Chinese stand.
At the moment, however,
the Kremlin finds itself with-
out any significant support an
the Far East. The New Zea-
land Communists switched to
Maoism seven years ago and
the Japanese party has per-
sistently opposed the Soviets
on a variety of issues.
Chinese Contacts
The Australian party has
strengthened its position by
maintaining close contacts
with the Japanese, Chinese
I and Romanian parties. A Ro-
manian party delegation vis-
ited Australia last October.
The Australians also have
been courting leftist groups in
Europe. Aarons, significantly,
published his article in the
dissident Communist journal
Tagebuch of Vienna.
For the time being, how-
ever the Soviets seem to have
decided against an open break
with the Australian party, ap-
parently hoping it would send
delegates to the 24th Soviet
Party Congress next March 30.
The absence of an Australian
delegation wbuld be a serious
propaganda blow to the Sovi-
ets because .It would deprive
thein of claims that they have
a following in Australia. '
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TRIBUNE, Sydney
23 September. 1970
Proktdri viech zemf, spojte set
1121170
ORGAN OSTREDN(110 Y/RORU KOMUNISTICKi STRANY eESKOSLoVENSKA
The Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party daily, Rude
Pravo, on July 15 carried
this article headlined:
, Report on the 22nd Con-
gress of the Communist
'Party of Australia ? Re-
treat from the Principles of
Marxism-Leninism.
CPYRGHT
As only the Czech
language text was available
to Tribune, the translation
that we have made must be
regarded as unofficial.
ware printing the Rude
Pravo article, and Tribune's
reply in full.
In a letter to the Czecho-
? slovak Communist Party,
the CPA National Secre-
? tary, Mr. Laurie Aarons,
has proposed that Rude
Pravo publish Tribune's
reply, in a similar service
to freedom of information.
CPYRGHT
R
ECENTLY the Corninun..t
Party of Australia held its
22nd National Congress ht
Sydney.
The preparation and conduct
a the Congress, as well as the
policy of the party, confirmed
that ,the leadership of the CPA
is under the influence of right-
wing opportunist revisionist ele-
ments. The rightwing group under'
the leadership of .the brothers
Laurence and Erie Aaron.s and B.
Taft led the party to the greatest
decline and loss of authority
which it has known in the last
30 years.
At the same time, today's lead-
ership of the Conununiat Party
of Australia feels itself able to.
.bring categorical Judgment on
other brotherly parties, .including
the CoOrtniF4DVock RovzRalease
slovakia, but the party of Aus-
tr lian cent:nu?W. 14. 'loaf Lu
grave CrLsis. At a guess, the com-
munist Party of Australia has
about 8000- members today.
Without going into the poll?
-
. tical credo 0 the Australian daily
paper the Sydney Morning Her-
ald, it would not seem to be far
from the truth when it cited, in
connection with the 22nd con-
gress, the opinion of a rank and
file conununist: "The National
Congress to trying to avoid a
ghost ? the ghost of Maridsts-
Leninists."
Prom the example of the Com-
munist Party of Australia it is
Possible to demonstrate in reality
how the representatives of the
international rightwing opportun-
ist and revLsionist movement are
?tibmgcmVOM-01
steteotvrod Drawn...sag and
vas througnout the whole inter-
hational communist movement..
1====t1
The roots of the present crisis
In the CPA can be found within
the last 16 years. Already then
after the defeat of the. Hungarian
Uprising the Australian revision-
ist grouping Joined in the anti-
communist movement and tried
to pull the leadership to their
side. The Mandst-Leninist group
Was at that time strong enough to
counter this move but since then,
has not shown enough power to
protect the Party from the 1r:ow-
ing influence of the rightwing
opportunist group.
These forces, following the
practices used in other parties,
began in the CPA to detract
104tgsZtant111-1P?Ii-
. evolution-
1117 't"d
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presented new questions in a
"creative" way. ThLs is already a
'-;i'ell-known method of disrupting
the unity of the international
.communist movement and more
or less of masking anti-Sovietism.
This new IMportant step of the
rightwing opportunists in Aus-
tralia WW1 Med in 1067 after the,
21st Congress.
The CPA primarily has its
strength in the cities where it
allowed itself to be influenced by
certain economic conjectures of a
home-grown capitalism flowing
primarily 'from Australian co-
operation in the plans of aggres-
sive American imperialism in this
part of the world. The CPA
evolved from the thesis of organ-
isation, "Coalition of the Left",
which embraces all that stand
against the monopolies, but at
the same time the ? parts' over-
estimated its powers and oppor-
tunities.
Instead of trying to reach the
forefront of the broad masses
through Marxist-Leninist prin-
ciples of a working class revolu-
tionary party, they step by step
turned their ideological platform
and opened their doors and lead-
ership to a new type of political
following, e.g., middle class soc-
ialist groupings. A social-de-
mocratic revisionist trend began
to seep into the leadership of the
Communist Party. It is at this
point typical that, with its general
decline of interest in national
politics, the Party had the ten-
% dency to speculate on various
theories in the international com-
munist movement. ,
Representatives of the right-
wing, always vocal In the scene
of the International communist
movement, began to give atten-
tion to the rightwing revisionist
?and opportunist "specifically Aus-
tralian" movement; of course
without reference to the actual
position.
In fact this comprised a revi-
sion of Manxism-Leninism on the
ground that the main problem of
the Party was to overcome "blind
copying" of the examples of other
parties, and also regarding unity
in the International Communist
1:1119. 515f Mbtrinhat e 19
The rightwing movement of the
CPA is so close to the views of
the rightwing of the Czechoslo-
vak party that it Is hard to be-
lieve that Sydney is 16,080 kilo-
metres away from Prague.
Rather than interesting them-
selves in the problems of the agri-
cultural workers, the social stand4
Ing of the Aborigines and with.
the Australian participation' in
the American aggression in Viet-
nam, the leaders of the rightwing
of the CPA interested themselves
the questions ot democracy In' '
the socialist countries and espe-
cially a lot of space was allocated
in the party press to applauding
the "liberalisation" in Czechoslo-
vakia.
One does not wonder that they
admired Israeli aggression against
the Arab national liberation move-
ment and that they discussed the
necessity to fight against anti-
semitism in the socialist coun-
tries. The pages of the Party
paper began to encourage hysteria
and an intolerable interference
In the affairs of brother parties,
.quite unoriginally copying to. the
very word between the statements
of/the leaders of the international
? rightwing opportunist influence,
as shown even in their .stereo-
typed "specifically national AUS-
trallan" path to socialism.
One of the leaders of the right-
w1iit,. of the CPA announced at
the Left Action conference in
April 1969 that Australia under .
the leadership of the Communist
Party of Australia would show
the world the example of. a true
socialism.
It is not hard to imagine how
great must have been the ideo-
logical harmony between the
rightwing opportuniat forces in
the leadership of the Communist
Party of Czechoslovalsia and. the
Aarons group in the leadership
of the CPA.
The Party press under the in-
fluence of the rightwing of the
CPA, as welt as the Australian
bourgeois press, followed with great
Interest and satisfaction, the blos-
? ? 1- ? II
II. ?
It is not surprising that in this
situation, the defeat of the Cze-
choslovakian counter-revolution
and the political liquidation
of the rightwing opportunists
and revisionists in the lead-
? ership of the CPC led to a
CPA campaign against the new
leadership of the CPC and the
anialiat Mugs oi
In June 1969 in Moscow at a
meeting of the Communist and
Workers' Parties, the representa-
tive of the CPA did not take into
consideration in any way what-
soever the viewpoint of the CPC
and tried to open Up the so-called
Czechoslovakian question. The
rightwing-led CPA once again
brought forward their middle-
class policy re the "Czechoslovak-
ian question" in preparation for
their 22nd Congress. In the light
of this . their general secretary, L.
Aarons; at the beginning of Octo-
ber was not prepared to accept
the views of the central commit-
tee of the CPC which were unani-
mously accepted by the Plenum
in September 1969.
The leadership of the CPC dis-
covered from the Australian party
press that the "Czechoslovakian
question" was to be once again
brought up at the 22nd Congress.
In its anxiety to eliminate mis-
understandings in the party and
In an attempt to strengthen the
unity of the international corn-
munist movement, a letter was
sent which was to pave the way
for comradely unifying of diverse
opinions. In the latter there was
expressed the maximum effort to
allow for the lack of information
of the CPA concerning the situa-
tion in the Czechoslovakian re-
public. The leadership of the
CPA was Informed of the results
of the efforts of our party to
lead our country out of the poli-
? tical and economic crisis. Filially,
there was our request that the
CPA, whilst commenting on the
development In the Czechoslovak-
ian republic, should consider the
points and opiniOns of our party
and so that they should not put
forward for discussion the so-
called "Czechoslovakian question"
at the CPA, 22nd Congress.
LAZ-Vona;.61194A000300110001-1
4
WITHIN 24 hours of the
August, 1968 intervention
in Czechoslovakia the 'Soviet
authorities gave several differ-.
and Government leaders of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Repub-
lic have asked the USSR and
other allied States to give the
ent explanations of how it all fraternal Czechoslovak people
happened. One was by Pravda urgent assistance, including
r01/490 fr_411PsR at81581996A9/02assiakarAREUR704411)4421)
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1704' "-%"t to pt Zorwaid
anis eriort or the CPC to for-
mulate some understanding was
not understood by the CPA. In
lieu of assent to this request,
there was an effort to use all
potsibilities to strengthen the in-
fluence of the rightwing.
rl......,????????????????????????????1
The letter of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPC was circulated
to all delegates with the com-
ment by the leadership of the
CPA that the so-called ."Czecho-
slovakian question" should be dis-
cussed and further, obviously in
the iriterests of increasing the
authority and the international
standing of the leadership of the
CPA, the letter was in some mys-
terious way delivered to the 'Aus-
tralian bourgeois press. This fact
alone is a sufficient example of.
the lack of seriousness and the
lack of Comradeship on the side
of the rightwing, leadership 'of the
CPA to the solution of mutual
internal relationships between two
brotherly parties.
' 12::===2
The 22nd Congress was itself
the meeting point of two diverse
tendenciai.. The Marxist-Leninist
part of the leadership put forward
. to the Congress its own alterna-
tive program, which was easily
outvoted by the skilful rightwing
direction of the Congress. At the
finale of the 22nd Congress of
the CPA appebred a document
exprasing the departure from the ?
principles of Marxist-Leninist and
proletarian internationalism. It
contains a number of revisionist,
theses under the badly disguised
anti-Soviet and anti-socialist at-
tacks. The rightwing group of the
brothers Aaron s allowed the Con-
gress to accept resolution which
does not recognise socialistic
States as socialist, but only as a
number of States ? which are
emerging from socialistic prin-
ciples. The position of the right-
wing was further atrengthened
after the Congress.
We are afraid that the head-
lines of the Australian bourgeois
press talking of the' triumph of
the anti-Soviet revisionist group
are not far from the truth.
1111=Thasmi
TRIBUNE, Sydney
2,3 September 1970
0
11111.11:1_
any critical judgments or to give
instructions and advice as to the
Solving of internal problems of
another brother party, but we
would like to mention that no
political party which wishes to
be a proletarian Marxist-Leninist,
revolutionary party, ever got any-
where whilst riding the waves of
anti-Soviet nationalism.
We can only hope that a healthy
Marxist-Leninist core of the CPA
Will gradually overcome the com-
plicated internal and ideological
crisis of the CPA, and will Over-
come the,: unsympathetic influ-
ences and the results of the Un-
bridled international anti-com-
munist. campaign and gradually
elevate to the leadership of the
CPA those forces that would, with
decorum, continue the proletar-
ian internationalist traditions Of
;the 60 years' old fight of the Aus-
tralian Communist
? Pavel Nejedly
410 For Tribune's- Treply, 'see
? below.
CPYRGHT
App
5
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Nearly two years after the
event, these "leaders" still re-
main anonymous, although there
are signs of ideological prepara-
tion in Prague for their identi-
fication and retrospective recog-
nition as the "genuine Marxists-
Leninists".
This "crs of information",
obscuring reality and obstracting
regi political life, is one of the
most serious obstacles to demo-
cratic development in socialist
countries. In this cybernetic age,
computers can rapidly answer the
most complicated questions ?but
. only U they are fed the correct
Information.
The Rude Provo article by Pavel.
Nejedly reprinted here is rich in
examples of spreading wrong in-
formation, either from ignorance
or from ? using untrustworthY
sources, or from 111-will ? or
perhaps a combination of all
three.
it would take too long and
would scarcely be worthwhae to
rebut every misstatement of fact.
or intentional distortion of
-reality in Nejedly's article. Apart
from the barren statement of fact
that Sydney is 16,082 kilometres
from Prague, the article reveals
an abysmal ignorance of Austra-
lia generally, of the Communist
Party of Australia specifically.
Thus, the author openly de-
pends, for most of his estimates
upon one of the most conserva-
tive Australian newspapers, and
the bourgeois press generally.
And he omits to inform his read-
ers that the Sydney Morning Her-
ald "expert" on CPA affairs is
an ex-commtmist who is known
for his anti-communism ? and
that this "expert" displays in his
writing a sympathetic bias to-
wards what Mr. Nejedly calls the
"healthy core" in the CPA. (Inci-
dentally, this gentleman knows
better than anyone else in what
"mysterious way" he secured a
copy of the CPC letter to the
CPA at the time of . the CPA
Congress. He also knowa that he
did not secure it from one of
the CPA majority.)
E====I=3
After the CPA Congress, the
Sydney Morning Herald wrote
editorially that the OPA was in
deep crisis, and that its influ-
ence is diminishing ? just as
Mr. Nejedly now does. When
Aarons replied in a letter to .the
SMH at the time, he` said: "We
state quite clearly that the essen-
tial cause of revolutionary poten-
tial in Australia, as in other
countries of the world, js to be
found within monopoly capital
society, and cannot be imported.
"Nor does it depend on moral
or financial support from outside.
r t. is to be found in the tensions
and contradictions of modern
capitalism which can neither con-
tain nor give a human direction
to the scientific and technological
revolution.
"That is why we are convinced
that the Herald will fairly soon
rediscover the 'communist men-
ace'."
Although the Herald suppressed
this letter, it verx soon did pre-
cisely as the letter predicted, as
the struggle developed. Mr. Ne-
jedly would also find, if he read
even the Australian bourgois
press carefully, that the Austra-
lian ruling class fears CPA pol-
icy, because it is too militant for
their taste. Such extreme right-
wing joarnals as the Bulletin,
Newsweekly and the NSW Em-
ployers' Federation Journal con-
demn CPA policy 0.5 "Left ad-
venturist" unfavorably contrast-
ing it with that of Mr. Nejedly's
"healthy core".
Indeed, he is not even well-
informed about the minority
group he blesses. in the CPA, who
are now all for caution, conser-
vatism and respectability, con-
demning CPA policy as "Left
adventurlst".
He also departs from the views
. of that group, as from facts and
logic, in accusing the CPA of
detracting from and a decline in
Interest in Australian 'politics.
One of I he -major. arguments in
the CPA has been precisely over
the real meaning of proletarian
Internationalism. The CPA maj-
ority has stressed the decisive and
overriding internationalist respon-
sibility of opposing one's own im-
perialism, in particular Austra-
lian ? government support of the
US imperialist war in Vietnam,
Australian colonialism in New
Guinea and the oppression of the
Aborigines. The minority have
opposed this stress as nationalism
and regionalism. In fact, for this
minority as, apparently, for Mr.
Nejedly, internationalism is re-
duced to support of every policy
of ? the USSR.. '
Timing of this Rude Pravo
article was a bit unfortunate,
coming long enough after the
May Moratorium to expect that a
cPA ItntbatienritgPeasewrlitir997159ictr.liCIA?1149
least have had some idea of how
broad is the opposition to the
war, how active the CPA has
been in this broad movement,
and how passive has been the
contribution of the minority group.
Unfortunately for Mr. Nejedly,
too, his article appeared just be-
fore the big Sydney demonstra-
tion in support of the Aboriginal
Ourindji land rights,, another
broad activity supported by the
CPA (its national secretary hap-
pened to be arrested and asd
saulted by police in this demon-
stration), while the group sup-
ported by Rude Pravo has notice-
ably failed to give it any support.
Nor is Mr. Nejedly any more
fortunate in his efforts to find a
social cause for alleged "right-
wing opportunist revisionist" poll-
des, in the CPA's "base in the
cities". In fact, this means its
base among workers in industry,
blue collar workers first of all.
The CPA's membership is pre-
dominantly working class; so was
the Congress; so was the leader-
ship elected by Congress. Far
from having "opened their doors
and leadership to middle class
socialist groupings", the Party
remains proletarian in composi-
tion. At the same time the party
is working to develop its sett-.
vities among the sections of Soc-
iety such as students and intel-
lectuals, as Lenin advocated so.
clearly and so often.
Some other misstatements of
fact are scarcely worth dignifying'
with a reply. For example, Mr.
Nejedly asserts that the CPA
"admired the Israeli aggressidn
against the Arab national libera-
tion movement" which is an ab-
surd lie, easily nailed. Similarly
no CPA leader or anyone else
"announced at the Left Action
Conference that the CPA lead-
ership would show the world the
example of a true Socialism."
However, this reveals a most
sensitive spot. There is a con-
nection between revolutionary
struggle for socialism in capital-
ist countries and social reality in
countries where revolution has al-
ready taken place. That connec-
tion lies in the world appeal of
socialism, in competition with cap-
italism. This competition cannot
be confined ? to the economics.
Socialism can only win if it com-
petes successfully' on all . fronts,
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uHT
CPYRGHT
and I s nuktvertcd revaulionary
verve and continuous Ovence in
nil spheres of social life.
Socialism must also In In the
field of human liberty and demo-
cracy, It cannot, for examPle,
appeal to trade unionists if union
leaders, elected by the workers,
are replaced by decisicin of some
small body of the Party. n can-
not appeal to democrats if Mem-
bers of Parliainent are changed
by it top body of the party with-
out the people being allowed by-
elections. It cannot : appeal to
communists if Party ie-registra-
tion depends upon acceptance of
a foreign intervention and a pol-
icy imposed from on top, without
a Party Congress, or if this re-
registration is planned to secure
a "majority" by removing nearly
half the membership.
ac
Marx wrote of the need to
"vindicate the sixnple laws of mor-
als and justice which: ought to
govern the relations Of private
Individuals, as. the rides para-
mount of the intercoutse of nat-
ions."
No one can so stretch this clear
and simple Marxist definition into
a cloak to cover the Ifive-power
military intervention In Czecho-
slovakia, or the gradual authori-
laden __enforcement from outside
and oir top of an almost complete
reversal of policies and .a virtually
complete change of leadership
and personnel in all areas, with-
out a 'party congress, a ' trade
union congress or national elec-
tions.
It avails nothing to blind one-
self deliberately to reality and
truth. The whole world knows
that the Czechoslovak people ?
workers, farmers, intellectuals,
youth ? did not voluntarily ac-
cept and still resent deeply the
occupation of their country.
We continue to 'accept as re-
flecting popular opinion the fol-
lowing statement by Dr. Husak.
g on August 28, 1963: "I know that
demands ? stringent and, let us
admit it, for I do not want to
mince words, justified demands?
were made for the departure of
the Soviet troops from our coun-
try; but for your demands to
be met you need two aides.'?- ?
Great social problems are
. created by the continuing occu-
pation and Its consequences,
? h an be nv ren
whicAcp pn Pot vetleF ?Pr e Kverfise
number of generalised assertions
of adherence to Marxism-Lenin-
ism and proletarian internation-
.olism.
116,44.66..karirraWii
Rude Pravo may assert its
authority is cuatOdian of Mary.
1st-Leninist orthodoxy and truth
as much as it wishes, whether
self-bestowed or derived from
the highest authority in Mos-
cow. It may even consider itself
entitled to pass on by proxy the
accolade to a group in the CPA.
-All this means nothing. unles3
It is substantiated by facts, ideo-
logical argument and serious de-
bate.
Affixing of labels like "revis-
ionist", without substantiation, is
ludicrously like theological de-
nunciation of heresies and threat
of excommunication, when even
the most authoritarian of
churches is learning the hard way
that this is no longer easy or
efficacious.
Still less 13 it successful to give
dispensation to a factional group'
and to try to characterise the
majority of a Party as being de-
ceiVed by another group allegedly
led by the brothers L. and E.
Aarons and B. Taft, or anyone
else.
As the CPA national executive
recently pointed out, analysing
just the same argument as Mr.
Nejedly develops:
"Just think what you are sug-
gesting! The district and state
conferences were attended by over
700 delegates, one for each six or
so Party members. These delegates
:toted by four to one in favor of
the Party's general line, and
elected their delegates to Congress.
Are you seriously suggesting that
these hundreds of delegates, most
of them workers off the jobs,
were manipulated by a few 'lead-
ers'?"
The real insult of this is not to
the "leaders" but to those pic-
tured as thoughtless, loyal and
misled sheep.
Australian communists have
keenly discussed their policy lines
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over the period since their 21st
Congress in 1967. They are eager
to enter into debate on these
questions, but the method of ar-
gument used by Mr. Nejedly In
Rude Pravo is entirely unconvinc-
ing. 1
The experience of political life
In Australia over the past three
years has by and large Confirmed
the validity of the policies de-
cided by the party. Mr. Nejedly's
sterile strictures notwithstanding,
Australian commtmIsts will cer-
tainly go on with their efforts to
Implement these policies, and to
make their party a still more
effective instrument of revolu-
tionaa7 socialist challenge to the
eriatin gta italbit ?nrciar
...Malcolm Salmon
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NEW TIMES, Moscow
1 January 1971
The Situation in
the Communist Party
of Australia
leadership, annulled the programme
"Australia's Way Forward" adopted at
the previous Congress (in 1964). At the
same time, the principle of democra-
tic centralism?the fundamental prin-
ciple in the building of any truly re-
volutionary partyteewat to all intents
and purpomea deleted Atm the %dem
The leaders of the CPA, specifically
Leer'e Aarons, Eric Aarons and Ber-
Editor's Note: Following the publicae?
tion in New Times (No. 36, Septem-
ber 9, 1970) of an abridged translation
of the article by Pavel Ncjecily in the
Czechoslovak Communist Pariy organ
Rude Prove, concerning the 22nd Con-
gress of the Communist Party of Austra-
lia, we received a number of letters
from readers cricking for more details
about the situation in the Australian
Party. "From the speech 'delivered by
the head of the Australian delegation
at the international Meeting of Com-
munist and Workers' Parties in 1969,
which was published in our press, we
know that the leadership of The CPA
took a dissentient position, which was
criticized by a number of other delega-
tions," reader N. Glazunov of Novo-
sibirsk writes. "I would like to know
more about the latest developments in
that Party."
THE author of the above letter to
New Times rightly recalls the stand
taken at the 1969 Meeting by repre-
sentatives of the Australian Commun-
ist Party. That stand did not emerge
. overnight. Developments in the Aus-
tralian Communist Party in recent
years cannot but cause concern to
those who follow with sympathy the
struggle of the working class and all
working people of Australia against
the domestic and foreign policy of the
ruling 'element, for the socialist future
of their country.
The Australian Communist Party,
which celebrated its 50th anniversary
In 1970, has inscribed many a glorious
page in the history of the Australian
and the international working class
movement. The Communists, as the
ideological vanguard of the working
class of Australia, gave the working
people a clear perspective of struggle
against capitalist exploitation and con-
sistently defended the interests of the
masses. The names of Australian Com-
munists and true internationalists like
the CPA leaders G. B. Miles and Law-
rence Sharkey, the prominent trade
unionist James Healy, anct the renowned
novelist Katharine Susannah Prichard
are known throughout the world. The
Party has long-standing internationalist
traditions. Its close ties with the inter-
national working , class and communist
movement have always been a source
of strength for the Party, helping it to
overcome the difficulties arising in the
course of the class struggles.
.:11 the more regrettable is it to
observe the turn developments have
taken in the CPA in the recent period.
In 1967 the 21st Congress of the Party,
on the recommendation of its??? new-
nie Taft, began to come ,out with un-
frien fly and even hostile statements
about the socialist countries and their
policies. They took an ambiguous stand.
with regard to the events in. the Mid-
dle 2ast, evading condemnation ef the
Israeli aggression against the Arab
peoeles. They gradually ceased to cri-
ticize the splitting, adventurigtic policy ,
of the 'Peking leaders. Instead of com-
bating the subversive activities of thp
latter, from which the Australian Corn-
murust Party itself suffered, the CPA.
lead .trs began demonstratively to stress
theii interest in the Chinese "experim-
ent,' particularly the so-called "cultural
revelation." ?
In the past two years many political
lead ?.rs who at first 'were disoriented'
by the events in Czechoslovakia have
beet_ able to see the situation in pro-
per perspective and have supported
the efforts of the sound, forces in the,
Cierhoslovak Communist Party to nor-
malize the situation in the country and
defend their socialist gains. The CPA
leaders, on the contrary, continue medi-
a seubboreness worthy of better appli-
cati m to uphold the Right-opportunist.
"Dubcek line," although that line ,has
been fully exposed and rejected by the
Cze :hoslovak Communists.
.Ais we know, the CPA delegation at
the International Meeting of Commu-
nist and Workers'. Parties in 1969 re-
fused to sigh' the collectively.. drafted
doe iment "Tasks at the Present Stage
of he Struggle Against o Imperialism'
and United Action of the Communist
and Workers' Parties and 011 Anti-Impe-
rial St Forces." The Tribune, weekly
organ of the Australian Communist
Par y, confined itself merely to publish-
ing a brief report of Section III of that
docament, while the contents of Sec-
tier s I, II and IV did not appear in
the Party press in any form. Moreover,
on returning to Australia, the delega-
tion did its utmost te minimize .
the significance of the Meeting, to
vilLy its results, not stopping at down-
right falsification. Taft, for example,
on returning from the Meeting, declar-
ed that in Moscow "deliberate efforts
we e made to prevent free and com-
radely discussion." Yet the head of
the Australian delegation L. Aarons,
wh le in Moscow, spoke highly of the
atraosphere prevailing at the Meeting.
"Every Party," he said, "tan state its
views freely," and he stressed that
"everyone is.. heard in a comradely
atmosphere." (See interview In Ta-
bu le, June 18, 1969.) . ?
Aftehe4969.Meeting tho..aopi)0r
-
tuniatic colouring of the Party's posi-
tion became more marked and the
'tendency to depart from opinions shared
by the communist movement as a
'whole more pronounced. This Was parr
ticularly evident during the prepara-
tions for the 22nd Congress of the
Atiatfallen .Cerrunkirilet Patty, bold in
March 1970. The columns of the Tri-
bune were given over to the most un-
friendly and biassed criticism of the
U.S.S.R. and the CPSU, their past and
present. The Tribune misrepresented
the motives of Soviet policy and many
facts pertaining to Soviet life, It attack-
ed the leadership of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party and its policy of
strengthening socialism in Czechoslo-
vakia. At times it was hard to escape
the impression that the organ of the
CPA was trying' to outdo the bourgeois
press in denying the successes of so-
cialist construction and smearing so-
cialist democracy.
. The unfriendly attitude of the CPA
leadership towards the countries, of the
socialist community was reflected in
the documents of the 22nd Congress.
In the main document of the Congress,
"Aims, Methods and Organization of
the CPA," these countries were even
denied the right to be called socialist;
they were referred to as "socialist-ba-
sed countries" (!) The authors of this
"discovery" are trailing in the wake ,
.of bourgeois propaganda which hasi
long since gone out of its way to avoid
calling the socialist countries socialist.
Add to this that the entire section of
the new programme dedicated to the
socialist system ("the socialist-based
countries") literally bristles with ini-
inical remarks and unfounded accusa-
tions., The authors ? of the document
invented a long list of "sins" commit-
ted by socialism, echoing the usual
assertions of its bourgeois opponents.
? The CPA leaders are endeavouring
in this way to blame others for the
difficulties experienced by their Party,
for their own failings and weaknesses,
and to attribute them to the "mistakes"
of the socialist countries. The ground-
lessness of such manoeuvres is obvious.
'This was pointed out by many of
the participants in the 1969 Meeting
.of Communist and Workers' Parties.
Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary of
the Central Committee .of the Urugua-
yan Communist Party, for example, said:
"We cannot agree with those who
evaluate the relations between the
CPSU and the revolutionaries of the
capitalist world according to a special
measure: they take credit for the suc-
cesses deriving from the historic trans-
formations in the socialist countries,
while the inevitable Consequences of
the class struggle in the world arena
end the needs linked up with the de-
fence of the socialist system, which
are also prerequisites of the develop-
ment, of the world revolutionary pro-
..cess, they regard as.,an obstacle to
?their own ? successes...."
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CPYRGHT
. The stand fiken by the CPA leader-
ship offers a striking example of the
consequences of inability to resist the
pressure of bourgeois ideology and
direct blackmail on the part of reac-
tionaries who for purposes of provoca-
tion demand of the Communist leaders
In the capitalist countries that they
prove their "independence" by making
anti-Soviet statements and attacking
tie-a socialist states. The same thing, .
incidentally, is being demanded also
' by the vociferous blackmailers "from
the Left," the diverse anarchist, Trots-
kyite and other anti-Marxist groups,
for whom anti-Sovietism is practically
the hallmark of "revolutionariness."
The CPA leadership has clearly been
.unable to withstand pressure of this
kind.
In the international section of the
new CPA programme the principles of
proletarian internationallsm, the inter-'
nationalist duty of Parties are inter-
preted in a very narrow sense. Even
the necessity to fight for an end to the
Vietnam war Is motivated by consi-
derations of abstract humanism rather
than the desire to rebuff imperialism.
The world-wide fight for peace is bare-
ly touched upon. No mention is
made of the acute situation in the
Middle East, where the Arab nations
have fallen victim to an imperialist
conspiracy. Apart from the problems
of the Vietnam war; the international
horizon of CPA activity is essentially
limited to support for the national
liberation struggle of the people of
New Guinea and the other Pacific
!Meads, and also the liberation move-
ment of the Australian aborigines.
These, of course, are important issues,
but it is clear that suc regionalism
-
is very remote from Internationalism in
'the broad sense as it has always been
understood by Communists.
This singular interpretation of the
internationalist obligations of the par-
ties is closely tied up with the general
evolution of the progranime principles
of the CPA leadership which found
expression In the "Aims, Methods and
Organization," a document, in which
the departure from the principled po-
sitions of the international Communist
movement under the flag of struggle
against "theoretical conformism" is
dearly evident. The very! fact that the
decisions of the 22nd Congress make
no mention whatever of Marxism-Lenin-
ism as the theoretical foundation of
the communist movement is in itself
indicative. The concept of a "future
society" is treated in the: vaguest and
most general terms, the Main emphasis
Jbeing placed on drawing a line of
distinction between the Australian
"variant of socialism" and .that -which
already_ exists.
The authors of the neW prOgramme
reject also the Leninist principles of
Party building. 'We reject the idea of
so-called 'monolithic' organization,"
says the programme, and further; ? Pit-
[the Party] .alms to subject all theories
and forms of organization to critical
analysis." "The Communist Party, in
seeking to add to its members and
influence, welcomes into its ranks all
socialists who share its basic ideas,
even though they may differ on some
points...." A party .based on such
principles is liable to become a deba-
ting society rather than a militant or-
.ganization of likeminded revolutions-
.
ries.
The idea is advanced of a "coalition
of the Left" for the purpose of effect-
ing "revolutionary social change" in
Australia. This amorphous coalition is
conceived as a very broad and free
union of "Communists, the growing
Left within the Labour Party, union
militants, students,. intellectuals, anar-
chists, libertarians [i.e., proponents of
unrestricted liberty.?Ed.], etc." From
the whole context it is evident that
the idea of such a motley coalition
? with vaguely defined common ideals
and objectives is counterposed to the
Marxist principle of the leading role
of the working class he the struggle
to overthrow capitalism and build a
socialist society. Although the authors
of the new programme do speak of
drawing on working class support, this
Is not backed up ,either by the new
organizational 'principles of the Party
or by tbe plans for the establishment
,of a new "coalition of the Left".
Of course, rapprochement and united
action of the Left is an iinportant
thing and an imperative of our time.
This is set forth clearly in the final
document of the 1969 International
Meeting of Communist and Workers'
Parties. But struggle for the unity of
the Left forces does not mean that the
Communist parties should lose their
identity, their class character, by mer-
ging in broad coalitions. The entire
experience of the communist move-
- ment militates against' such a step. Yet.
the "liberal" leanings of some ?,Austra,,
lian Communists who preach "tolerance"
of views inimical to; communism
lead to erasing the distinction between
the, Communist, Party and its "coali-
tion" partners.
Such in general outline is the situa-
tion that has emerged of late in the
CoMmunist Party of Australia. j'It can-
not but cause concern to many mem-
bers of that Party. The pre-cOngress
Party conferences at district and city
level were marked by sharp struggle
against the leadership's "new course."'
To avoid a split, the Communists
opposed to this course proposed that
the Congress refrain from adopting
new programme documents and that ,
"unify ? conunittees" be set up 1,at the
level of district and state PartY orga-
nizations to work out p strategic line
and tactics acceptable to the Party as
a whole. They pointed out that the draft
programme submitted by the leadership
does not reflect the opinion of a subs-
tantial section--of the-membership,_lhat
It is basically inacceptable and Impels
the Party onto the path of sectarianism,
anti-Sovietism and isolation from the
international communist movement.
Eight members of the National Com-
mittee of the CPA who spoke at the
Congress against the "new course" and
the new programme were dropped
from the leadership. Pat Clancy, mem-
ber of the National Committee, leader
of the militant Building Worker& In-
dustrial Union and a member of the
Australian Council of Trade Unions,
sent a letter to the Party leadership
announcing Iris decision to resign from
the National ,Committee because he J
could not accept the present policy
and methods of the leadership. The
Party leadership has to ell intents and
purposes broken with the Communists
In the trade :unions who have traditio-
nally been the proletarian maiestay of
the CPA, the source of its influence.
At the same time elements patently
hostile to communism are coming into
the Party. The door has been opened
to Trotskyites and members of other
trends inimical to Marxism-Leninism.
They were evert invited to attend the
'Congress :and they used its platform to
demand, almost in the form of an ulti-
matum, that the CPA dissociate itself
completely from the CPSU. The leader
of one of the two Trotskyite groups in
Australia (at loggerheads with each
other), D. Freney, praised the pro-
gramme as the "final step in the quali-
tative turn in the Communist Party."
Now this headman of the Sydney
Trotskyites has been included in the
editorial board of the Tribune. At the
same time the decision on "unity of the
party" adopted by the Congress is full of
undisguised threats against Communists .
who reject the anti-Soviet course. That
these are not empty threats is seen by
the expulsion from the Party for that
reason Fof two of its veteran members,
Edgar Ross and Alf Watt, and also the
recent decision of the Sydney Commit-
tee to disband a militant Party organi-
zation which is the Marxist-Leninist
'core of the seamen's, dockers and ship- !
builder& unions.
In the present world situation in
which the class struggle continues with
unabated force, when the imperialists
are stepping up machinations against
the socialist countries, and Ideological
subversion against the international !
communist movement is mounting, the
struggle for the purity of the creative j
teachings of Marxism-Leninism assumes !
a special significance. In Rs mes-
sage of greeting to the Communist
Party of Australia on the occasion of
Its ' 50th anniversary, the CC of the
CPSU expressed the hope . that the
Australian! Communists, "on the basis
of a Principled Marxist-Leninist
approach, will be able to overcome the
difficulties that have arisen in the
Australian communist movement and
will follow the revolutionary traditions
of their Party."
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WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
10 October 1970
Australia: An Autonomous CP
The 22nd Party Congress of the CP of Australia (CPA) which took
place at Easter in 1970 confirmed the new organization which had
developed in the '60's, especially in the second half of the decade.
It meant a decision to break with many practices, methods, and ways of
thinking of the past, and still it meant continuity and a revival of
old socialist ideals and aspirations. Eric Aarons, member of the Central
Committee of CPA and chief editor of the Left Review wrote to us about this
new orientation and its causes.
The new orientation of the Australian CP (CPA) crisis arises from many
sources. The most important of these are: the problem of Socialistic develop-
ment in the existing socialist countries and their relationship to one
another; the scientific-technical revolution and the changed economic develop-
ment in the modern capitalistic states; the changeable course of the revolutionary
struggle in the Third World; the rise of new spheres and forms of political
struggles, such as the student movement and the May 1968 events in France,
which represented a proof of revolutionary potential in the developed
capitalistic countries. Every socialist and Communist party must came to
terms with these problems; but one icannot: do justice to the position of
the CPA, concerning these problems without knowing the special characteristics
of its situation.
Russian, China, and Australia
The year 1956 caused a great shock in Australia as it did everywhere
in the Communist movement. But at first not much changed, for a number of
reasons but two were of special importance, in my opinion. The first was
the boldness with which the serious errors were admitted, and this boldness
served as a proof of the good will of the CPSU leadership to set things
straight if only they were given time and understanding. Such a reaction naturally
, depended on insufficient insight into the real essence of "Stalinism." The
second important (and associated) reason was the influence of the concepts
of the Chinese CP, concepts which seemed reasonable and well considered.
They were listened to so much the more willingly because the Chinese Communists
commanded the greatest respect. The serious conflict between the CCP and
the CPSU, whih broke into the open in the beginning of the '60's, carried
over into our party: E. F. Hill, member of the Party Secretariat, supported
the Chinese concepts and threatened a split, which later became reality.
Although well known international problems were the prominent in this conflict,
there were other more important ones which affected the intra-party practices
and strategy of the CPA. In order to surviVe, we had to occupy ourselves
with the problems in the most fundamental way and to try to solve them in
our owc.,way. This was in fact a "declaration of independence," but was
regarded by many (as it turned out, also by the CPR) as a matter of
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partisanship in behalf of the Russians because for the most part, we
rejected the Chinese conceptions. That we didn't take the Russian
side became gradually clear, particularly when-the process of "de-
Stalinization" came to a stop after the overthrow of Khrushchev and
then actually retrogressed. Nor were we shy about talking about
questions of principle (for example the Chinese question, the manner
of deposing Khrushchev, the violation of artistic and intellectual
freedom, and finally the problems of socialist democracy).
Perhaps it would be fitting to mention a personal experience which
I had at the end of 1965 on my return from Chile and Cuba to Moscow.
I was subjected to all kinds of pressure to have the Australian Party
publish a "major" article which the CPSU would make available to the CPA.
It also would be the answer to the most recent propaganda shot from the
CCP (in November 1965). The manner in which this matter was handled
made it clear that other "major" articles had been placed in this manner
before. In increasing degree we recognized Soviet intervention and
the (often very cluOsy) attempts to provoke comrades against the party
leadership, obviously in an effort to overthrow them and to substitute
leaders acceptable to the CPSU. It is a practice which has been followed
in many instances against Communist parties throughout the world.
Overcoming the Stalin Myth
As important as it was to insist on our independence in organizational
and political methods, it was even more important --- and more difficult
to break with the ideology that supports these methods. This ideology
has been very vividly described by Marek in his article, "On the Structure
of the Stalin Myth," which has also been published in Australia.
However, it was not enough to reject this ideology: it was necessary
to understand it. And it was even more necessary to develop a new
outlook which was based on Marxism as a whole but especially on its
methodology and which offered the possibility of solving some of the
difficult problems which arose out of the developments mentioned in
my introductthy paragraph above.
In a short article it is impossible to go into all aspects of the
progress which developed or into all problems which needed solution.
But the question of democracy was clearly a central problem which we
ran into at every step. We ran into it when we spoke openly about the
principal problems in the world movement and we didn't let ourselves be
deflected by opportunistic considerations ("What 1411 they think and do
if we say that?") or by pathetic appeals to "a class stand" or
"party loyalty." We knew that it would mean obscurantism, if we
beforehand set limits beyond which we were not suppose to go,-and we
knew that man* closed books and settled questions would: havejo be
re-opened and dealt with and that freedom of thought is an essential
precondition for all intellectual effort. We ran into it also in our
intra-party discussions, which had to be really free of all limitations
(not "directed" from above and only apparently free), if it were to
lead to a clarification of ideas and a working out of the problems.
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Shift to the Right
When the Czechoslovak crisis broke out and the Action Program showed
how the suppression of democracy under Novotny and the others, how the
monopolization of power in the hands of the party leadership had led to
this crisis, we took a completely unequivocal stand from which we did
not permit ourselves to be dissuaded either by threats or by promises
of the CPSU and itp_supporters. Czechoslovakia changed nothing in the CPA;
it merely brought more freshly into our consciousness the significance
of democracy for socialistic societies and the Communist party, and
the necessity for a decisive defense of independence. It also hastened
the process of re-thinking and renewed study which was already in process.
Many well meaning people --- and others --- were of the opinion that
our emphasis on freedom and democracy was a shift to the "right," in
the direction of bourgeois liberalization. And in fact the concern for
democracy can lead in this direction. But it can also lead in the direction
of an even more revolutionary criticism of bourgeois democracy. to
reformulation of socialist goals in the sense of freedom, self-rule, and
control by the workers, as Marx and Lenin understood them. It can lead
to more militant action with the objective of breaking out of the
"consensus politics" which so often in the recent past have had the
effect of limiting Communists to actions which are acceptable to the
ruling order. It is in this sense that the CPA understands the emphasis
on democracy; and this is understood also by the pro-Russian party
opposition which, conservative to its very bones even in intra-party
questions, constantly screams about "left adventurism." The capitalists,
their governments, and their press have also understood this, as is
evident from many articles and speeches. It is also no secret that the
bourgeoisie constantly supports the opposition against the new orientation
of the party --- it knows that this opposition is not dangerous and can
only serve to frighten people away from the Communists.
The Cause of the Split
The trade unions are the traditional arena in which the Australian
Communists develop their mass activity and their influence. It is
therefore not surprising that they were also an important area for the
Party's rethinking and reorientation. For a long time there was
dissatisfaction in the trade unions with the narrowness of view (almost
exclusively limited to the' traditional economic demands), with conservative
tactics (relying on a defensive stance which h4d been taken twenty years
earlier from a totally different situation), with the subordination of
action to the effort of functionaries to maintain their jobs, and with
the general conservatism in organization and attitude which alientated
the youth and also weakened the reputation and power of the trade unions.
Perhaps the most crass example was the opposition of many Communist
trade union functionaries to the call of the Central Committee of February
1969 to take action against the anti-trade-union laws. That this call
was not "adventurism" was demonstrated three months later when a million
workers went out on strike because a trade union functionary had been
locked up on the basis of these laws. The decision in the long intra-
party struggle came in the factories, where the majority of Communist
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workers --- no doubt recalling their own experiences --- closed ranks
around the new orientation, despite the fact that half of the Communist
trade union functionaries remained in the opposition.
In the regional and district conference before the Party Congress,
the conservative opposition suffered a decisive defeat. It received
on the average only about a fourth of the delegates and votes. At the
Party Congress itself, it shriveled up into a small group of less than
a tenth of the 150 delegates. Not without justice they complained that
this number was not "representative," but it is the result of the
"democratic centralism" which they so fervently defend (as happens
in other parties as well), a democratic centralism which we consider
unsatisfactory and are undertaking to replace with a better principle.
At that Party Congress many young non-communists participated as guests
and followed the deliberations with lively --- and critical --- interest.
The behavior of the conservatives after the Party Congress was to
be expected. They have formed a newspaper to "popularize the achieve-
ments of the socialist world" (that is, the Soviet Union and the socialist
countries belonging to her), they pay no party dues, and they are
? building their own party de facto. Even if it has not yet been formed
de jure, the reason is toe foundin their regard for the tactics of
The Soviet Union, which apparently does not consider it yet opportune
'to promote a splinter party.
The attitude of the CPSU toward the CPA was also foreseeable, but
it is interesting in that it in fact demonstrates the Soviet attitude
toward the world movement. The CPSU refused to take a position on the
documented proof of their intervention in our affairs or to discuss
basic problems with us. They made scarcely any secret of the, fact that
they claimed the right to intervene in our affairs and to support an
,opposition devoted to them. This can only lead to a further division
and weakening of the already bitterly divided and enfeebled world
Communist movement and is of ill'gmen for all those (if there still are
such people left) gullible enough to believe that the CPSU's relations
with them are based on socialist premises, and not on what the Soviet
Union considers to be 'her self-interest (Which in Soviet eyes is, of
course, identical with the interest of world socialism).
For a Coalition of the Left
Nhat is the orientation of the CPA today and how is it expressed
in practice,since the Party Congress? Here the main document of the
Party Congress deserves mention apart from the important points
sketched out above. It breaks down into four sections: Capitalism,
the Society of the Future, Methods of Realization, and the Communist
Party. In the "Capitalism" section an effort is made to define the
scientific-technical revolution, and the changes in the structure of
classes, imperialism, and the national liberation movement are investigated,
Similarly, the influence on the world situation of the countries "with
a socialist basis" (that is, the countries which are socialist economically
but not in any other respect) is studied. The section "Society of the
Future" contains an outline of all our main goals, with the accent on
socialist democracy and self-rule. In the section 'Methods of Realization,"
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the class structure is more closely analyzed, and the role of the
state under present-day conditions and the meaning of a "hegemony" and
"counter-hegemony" are studied. Here our stand toward the struggle for
partial demands, toward control by the workers, toward the Labour Party,
and toward the trade unions is defined and contrasted with the position
of the "conservatives" and the "anarchists" or the "left." In this,
the accent at the present time is on the struggle against the former.
Here too, the conception of a 'coalition of the left is discussed, and
I would like to say a few words about that.
The idea of the 'coalition of the left' was formulated for the first
time at the Party Congress in 1967. Naturally it is not without
connection to early ideas and experience of the "United Front" and
"People's Front," but it extends beyond this framework. In this
connection the Party Congress document says that "the complex nature
of modern society, the variety of social forces interacting on one
another, the number of problems setting these forces in motion, the
considerable measure of spontaneity, and the reaction to negative
experiences of the past, such as overcentralization and ideological
conformism, have made it clear that an organization for social change
must be so fashioned that it corresponds to contemporary conditions.
The Australian Communists suggest 'a coalition of the left for a revol-
utionary change of society.' The point of departure for this suggestion
is that today---and apparently also in the future---there are a number
of tendencies which in their general orientation agree on the need
for socialist change in present society but have differing opinions on
important points of ideology, program, and organization. Among those
tendencies the Communists count the growing left in the Labour Party,
trade union activists, students, intellectual, anarchists, civil-
rightists, etc.
'Tt 'coalition of the left' implies the most varied forms of common
action and co-operation among all these groups, but not only that.
While the conscious revolutionaries make up the nucleus of each coalition
for the radical alteration of the social system, other forces have
limited generally themselves to specific problems--=Vietnam, civil
rights, reform of social and health welfare, the school system, etc.---
and must be supported, and, in certain instances, taken into the coalition.
Within such a coalition there will naturally be discussions on theoretic,
programmatic, and organizational questions in the course of co-operation
and action; and there will also be a competition of opinions. Only on
this basis can influence be exercised and a leadership formed.
"Thus we are oriented to the thought that such 'a coalition of the
left' will develop and change on the basis of experience and of the
development of the situation up to the revolution and even into the
revolution itself.
"Such a 'coalition,' which assumes mutual respect, tolerance, and
openness among the various groups and parties, will be an important
guarantee for genuine democracy in the socialist society of the future."
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Unity in Diversity
It must be emphasized that the "coalition" (we have not found a
better word) is not to be understood in the parliamentary sense nor
is it a definitive "organizational" unity platform. The closest,
and even then not a very close analogy is perhaps the Vietnam
moratorium movement in Australia in which practically all of the left
(as well as many elements which in any other respect could hardly
be called leftist) participated. We have fought for the principle
that everyone can take part and that no one dominates (neither a
group nor a tendency). There are general goals: withdrawal of all
American, Australian, and other foreign troops from Vietnam;
cessation of all help for Saigon, and pppositionto the draft law.
We seek the kind of general form and action which has the greatest
effectiveness in the present situation. But neither the Communists
nor others set forth far-reaching anti-imperialistic goals (for
example support for NLF) nor volunteered for more radical forms of
action; everyone "does his thing," so to speak.
Related with this is the growing tendency to reject the rigid,
bureaucratic 'orders from above" organization which tends (and in
fact intends) to force everyone into one and the same schema.
Even if goals and actions are democratically decided, this procedure
is rejected by many who strive for "self-rule" and spontaneous self-
expression. This the Communists must take into consideration as much
in respect to their own organization as in respect to a broader move-
ment or "coalition," although we combat the idea that no organization
at all is necessary.
Beginning of a New Phase of Development
Since' the Party Congress wehave had the experience of the Vietnam
'moratorium in May when tens of thousands in all of Australia demonstrated
militantly and occupied the streets, when the growing fighting-spirit -
in the trade unions and in the movement for the rights of aborigines, gave
to all appearances, sufficient proof that the orientation of the Party
Congress was correct. This work is developing in a very promising way
as is our important-work in the theoretical field.
But it would be incorrect to overlook the difficulties. In addition
to apathy mid reactionary prejudices (for example racial prejudices)
.which are widespread in Australia, the fragmentation of the left is
cause for concern. (The split in the party sharpened this fragmentation
and is deplorable for this reason particularly.) The fragmentation
is not as serious as in the United States where a situation, promising
in itself, is so often depreciated by unnecessary conflicts, which are
fought out with unnecessary hardness or are carried out on a purely
factional basis without real communication or tolerance between the
combatants. Here is Australia, too, various groups of the "New Left,"
Trotskyists, Maoist, and others try to take over organizations
(especially the peace movements) and unite only from time to time on
an absolutely necessary action but also often (especially when the
situation is complicated) on the basis of a cheap anti-Communism.
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In many cases the Communist Party seems to represent the only visible
element of cohesion; but to play such a role without trying, in accordance
with a bad, old custom, to seize an avantgarde position (which so
often is a domineering position) is a complicated and demanding task.
It requires a clear position and a principled non-sectarian basis for
competition with others; it requires strengthened activity and a
greater knowledge on the part of the Communists, the development of
new forms of party organizations, and an open mind to the possibility
that new political formations will arise. The victory at the Party
Congress gives us a real possibility of succeeding in this task.
Conditions differ greatly from country to country. But it appears
that today, revolutionaries in the whole world are confronted with
the same theoretical and practical basic problems. We have just now
arrived at the beginning of a meaningful international diSpussion of
the new phase of development of Marxism. Journals like Wiener Tagebuch
have, in my opinion, an important role to play in the connection, and
I wish it great success in this teffort.
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WIENER TAGEBUCH, Vienna
October 1970
Der 22. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Australiens, der zu Ostern 1970 stattfand, bestatigte
die neue Orientierung, die sich in den sechziger Jahren, besonders in der zweiten Halfte des Jahr-
zehnts, herausgebildet hat. Das bedeutete einen entscheidenden Bruch mit vielen Praktiken, Metho-
den und Denkweisen der Vergangenheit, auf der anderen Seite jedoch die Ktintinuitat und Wieder-
belebung alter sozialistischer Ideale und Aspirationen. Ober diese neue Orientierung und ihre
Ursachen schrieb ftir uns Eric Aarons, Mitglied des Zentralkom4ees der KP Australiens und Chef-
redakteur der ?Left Review".
Die Neuorientierung der KP Australiens entspringt vielen
Ouellen; die wIchtigsten sind: die Probleme der soziallstischen
Entwicklung in den bestehenden sozialistischen Landern und
deren Beziehungen untereinander; die wissenschaftlich-tech-
nische Revolution und dI9 veranderte okonomische Entvvick-
lung in den modernen kaRitalistischen Staaten; der wechsel-
voile Verlauf des revolutioneren Kampfes In der Dritten Welt;
das Auftauchen neuer Berelche und Formen des politischen
Kampfes, namentlich der Studentenbewegung; und die fran-
zosischen Mai-Ereignisse 1968, die einen Beweis fur das revo-
lutionfire Potential In den entwickelten kapltallstischen Lendern
darsteliten. Jede sozialistische und kommunistische Part& muB
sich mit diesen Problemen auseinandersetzen; doch man kann
die Hailtung, die die KP Perstraliens dazu elnnimmt, nicht wilt.-
digen, ohne die Besonderhalten ihrer Lap zu kennen.
RUSSISCH, CHINESISCH, AUSTRALISCH?
.Das Jahr 1956 bewirkte in ;Australian, wie Oberall in der korn-
munistischen Bewegung, eine starke Erschtitterung. Trotzdem
anderte sich zunachst nicht viel, und zwar aus einer Reihe
von Griinden, von denen nether Meinung nach zwei besonders
wichtig sInd. Der erste wan die KOhnheit, mit der die schweren
Fehler zugegeben wurden, worm n man elnen Beweis Rir den
guten Willen der KPdSU-Fehrung sah, die Dingo in Ordnung zu
bringen, wenn man ihr nur Zeit lieBe und Verstandnis entgegen-
brachte. Eine solche Reaktion beruhte naterlich auf ungenti-
gender Einsicht in das eigentliche Wesen des ?Stalinismus".
Der melte wichtige (und damit zusammenhungende) Grund war
der EinfluB der Auffassungen der chinesischen KP '), die ver-'
nunftig und wohltiberiegt :schienen und um so bereitwilliger
angehiert wurde, als man fur die chinesIschen Kommunisten den
groBten Respekt hegte2).
? I) Zum Belspiel .Historlsche Erfahrungen der Diktatur dos Proletariats und
.Noch ?Innsl zu den historischen Erfahrungen der [Master des Proletariats'.
Ich selbst und Wale andere haben Ignore Zeit zu Studienzwecken In Chine
verbrecht. und die Beziehimgeof zwischen den belden Paragon waren setir ens.
Der schwere Konflikt zwischen der KPCh und der KPdSU,
der Anfang der sechziger- Jahre offen ausbrach. Obertrug sich
auch auf unsere Partei: Sekretariatsmitglied E. F. Hill trait Mr'
die chinesischen Auffassungen ein und drohte mit einer Spaltung,
die seater WIrklichkeit wurde. Obwohl bei diesem Kampf
die bekannten internationalen Probleme Irn Vordergrund sten
-
den, waren Jene noch wichtiger, welche die innerparteiliche
Praxis und die Strategle der Parte! In Australlen betrafen. Urn
Oberleben zu konnen, muBten wir uns mit den Prnblemen von ,
Grund auf beschaftigen und sie auf unsere Weise zu lesen
suchen. Das war faktisch eine ?UnabhangIgkeitserklarung",
wurde aber von vielen (wie sich z>e, auch von der KPdSU) els
?Partelnahme fOr die Russen" angesehen. well wir die chine-
sischen Auffassungen zum GroBteil ablehnten. DaB wir nicht
?fOr die Russen Partei ergriffen", wurde allmahlich klar, nament-
lich als der ProzeB der ?Entstalinisierung" nach Chrusch-
tschows Sturz zum Stillstand kam und dann rOcklaufig wurde,
und wir nahmen uns kein Blatt vor den Mund. wenn es urn
prinzipielle Fragen ging (zum Beispiel urn die judische Frage,
die Form der Absetzung Chruschtschows, die Verletzung der
kOnstlerischen und intellektuellen Freiheit, und ilberhaupt urn
Probieme der sozialistischen Demokratie). Vielleicht 1st es an-
gebracht, daB ich eine personliche Erfahrung erwahne, die ich
Ende 1965 bel meiner Ruckkehr aus Chile und Kuba nach
Moskau hatte. Man drang mit eller Macht darauf, daB die
australlsche Partei einen ?groBen" Artikel veroffentliche, den
die KPdSU zur VerfOgung stellen wollte; .er sollte die Antwort
auf den jiingsten ElguB der KPCh (vom November 1965)
sein. Die Art und Weise, wie die Angelegenheit betrieben
wurde, machte es deutlich, daB auch vorher schon ?groBe"
Artikel auf dlese Weise placiert worden waren. In zunehmen-
dem MaB erkannten wir die Einmischung und die (oft Behr
plumpen) Versuche, Genossen gegen die Partelfuhrung aufzu-
hetzen, offenkundig in dem Bestreben, diese zu stOrzen und
durch eine fur die KPdSU akzeptable "zu ersetzen, wie as
schon In so vlelen Men gegenOber kommunlatischen Pension
ad der ganzen Welt praktIklert worden war.
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DIE UBERWINDUNG DES STAL1N-MY1HOS
So wichtig es war, in diesen organisatorischen und politischen
Dingen auf unserer Unabhangigkeit zu bestehen, war es noch
wichtiger und schwerer mit der Jenen Methoden zu-
grundellegenden ideologie zu brechen. Diese ideologle wurde
von Genossen Marek in seinem Artikel .Zur Struktur des
Stalln-Mythoe, der auch in Australien verbffentlicht worden ist,
sehr anschaulich beschrieben.
Es genOgte Jedoch nicht, dies? Ideologie abzulehnen, es war
notwendig, se u verstehen. Und noch notwendlger war es,
eine andere Anschauung zu entwickein, die auf dem Marxismus
als Ganzes, insbesondere ober auf seiner Methodologie basierte
und die Moglichkeit bot, einige der schwierigen Probleme zu
losen, die sich aus der eingangs erwahnten Entwicklung erga-
ben.
In einem kurzen Artikel ist es unmoglich, auf elle Aspekte der
Prozesse einzugehen. die sich auf der oben genannten Grund
sage entwickeit haben, oder auf alle Probleme, die as zu
Ibsen gilt. Aber die Frage der Demokratie war zweifellos emn
zentrales Problem, auf das wir bel jedem Schritt stieben. Wir
stieben darauf, wenn wir offen Ober prinzipielle Fragen in der
Weitbewegung sprachen und uns von keinen opportunistlschen
Erwagungen (*Was werden sie denken und tun, wenn wir das
sagenr) und von keinen pathetischen Appellen an den ?Kies-
senstandpunkt" und die .Parteitreue" abhalten lieben. Wir er-
kannten, dab es Obskurantismus bedeutet, wenn wir von vorn-
herein uneberschreitbare Grenzen setzen, dab manche geschlos-
senen Richer und erledigte Fragen neuerlich geOffnet und be-
handelt warden mubten, und dab Gedankenfrelhelt eine wesent-
lithe fur alles intellektuelle Streben 1st. Wir
stieben darauf auch In der innerpartellicben Diskussion, die
wirklich frei von alien Beschrankungen seln mate (nicht von
oben .geleitee und nur schelnbar fret). um 'zu elner Krung
der Vorstellungen und ? elner Herausarbeitung der Probleme zu
fOhren.
RUCK NACH ?RECHTS"?
Als die_ tschechoslowakische Krlse ausbrach und das Aktions-
programm zeigte, wie die Einschrankung der Demokratie unter
Novotny und den anderen, die Monopolisierung der Macht in
den Handen der Partelf0hrung, zu dieser Krise gefOhrt hatte,
bezogen wir eine v?llig eindeutige Stellung, von der wir uns
weder durch Drohungen noch durch Versprechungen der KPdSU
und ihror Anhanger abbringen lieben. Die Tschechoslowakei hat
In der KP Australiens gar nichts verandert; sie hat uns nur.
neyerlich die Bedeutung der Demokratie fiir die sozialistische
Gesellschaft und die Kommunistische Parte!, die Notwendigkeit
einer entschiossenen Verteidigung der Unabhangigkelt zum
Bewubtsein gebracht und den in Gang befindlichen Prozell des
Umdenkens und Neu-Erforschens beschleunigt.
Manche Leute ? wohlmeinende und andere ? waren der An-'
sicht, die Betonung von Freiheit und Demokratie set em n Ruck
nach .rechts". In die Rithtung des bOrberlichen Liberalismus;
und tatsachlich kann die Sorge um die Demokratie In diese
Richtung fOhren. Sb e kann aber auch in die Richtung &ler
noch revoiutionareren Kritik der bOrgerlichen Demokratie f?hren,
zu einer Neuformullerung der soziallstischen Ziele im Sinn von
Freiheit. Selbstverwaltung und Arbeiterkontrolle, wie Marx und
Lenin ale vor Augen hatten. Ste .kann zu militanterem Handeln
fahren, mit dem Ziel, die ?Konsenspolitik" zu durchbrechen,
die in der JOngsten Vergangenheit so oft bewirkt hat, deb die
Kommunisten Bich auf Aktionen beschrankten. die far die herr-
schende Ordnung akzeptabel waren. So versteht die KPA die
Betonung der Demokratie; und das erkennt auch die russisch
orientlerte Opposition, die, auch In innenpolltischen Fragen kon-
servativ bis an die Knochen, standig Ober ?Ilnkes Abenteurer-
turn" schreit. Die Kapitalisten, ihre Reglerungen und ihre Presse
haben es ebenfalls erkannt, wie aus vielen Artikeln und Reden
zu entnehmen ist. (Es ist auch kern Geheimnis, dab die Bour-
geoisie bewubt die Opposition gegen die neue Orientierung der.
Partel unterstOtzt sie weiB, dab diese Opposition .fOr ale
nicht gefahrlich ist und nur dazu dlenen kann. die Menachen von
den Kommunisten abzuschrecken.)
DIE URSACHEN DER SPALTUNG
Die Gewerkschaften sind der traditionelle Boden, auf dem die
australischen Kommunisten vor allem ihre Massenaktivitat und
ihren EInfluB entfalten. Es ist daher nicht verwunderlich, da(i
sie auch eln wichtiger Boden ftir clas Umdenken und dir Neu-
orientierung waren. Lange Zeit schon herrschte Unzufriediinheit
mit der Enge der Sicht (fast ausschlieB)iche Beschrankung auf
die traditionellen wirtschaftlichen Forderungen), mit der konser-
vativen Taktik (beruhend auf elner defensiven Einstellung, die
vor zwanzig Jahren elner v011ig anderen Situation entsprungen
war); mit der Unterordnung der Aktivitat unter das Bestreben,
offizielle Positionen zu halten, und mit dem allgemeinen Kon-
servatismus in Organisation und Einstellung, der die Jugend
abstieB sowie Ansehen und Schlagkraft der Gewerkschaften
schwachte. Das krasseste Beispiel vielleicht war der Wider
stand vieler kommunistischer Gewerkschaftsfunktionare gegen
den Aufruf des Zentraikomitees vom Februar 1969 gegen die
gewerkschaftsfeindlichen Gesetze. Dal) dieser Aufruf kein
Abenteurertum" war, zeigte sich drel Monate spater, els eine
Million Arbeiter In den Streik traten, well eln Gewerkschafts-
funktionar auf Grund dieser Gesetze eingesperrt worden war.
Die Entscheidung in den langen innerpartellichen Kampfen fief
In den BetrIeben, wo die Mehrhelt der kommunistischen
Arbeiter ? zweifellos in Anbetracht Hirer eigenen Erfahrungen
sich der neuen Orientierung anschlob. obwohl die Halfte
der kommunistischen Gewerkschaftsfunktionare in der Oppo-
sition blieb.
In den Landes- und Bezirkskonferenzen vor dem Parteitag er;
litt die konservatIve Opposition eine entscheidende Niederlagel
Sie erhielt 1m Durchschnitt nur etwa eln Viertel der Delegier;
'ten und der StImmen. Auf dem Parteitag seibst schrumpfte sie'
zu einem Hauflein von wenlger els einem Zehntel der 150 Dele-
gierten zusammen; nicht ganz zu Unrecht beklagten sie
diese Zahl 'sel nicht .reprasentativ", aber sie 1st das Ergebnls
des von ihnen (wie auch In anderen Parteien) so glOhend ver-
teidigten .demokratischen Zentralismus", den wir fOr unbefrie-
dlgend ansehen und durch em n besseres Prinzip zu ersetzen
trachten. Am Parteitag haben viele Junge Nichtkommunisten els
Gaste teligenommen und die Beratungen mit lebhaftem und
kritischem interesse verfolgt.
Das Vorgehen der Konservativen nach dem Parteitag war so
wie erwartet. Sie haben eme Zeitung gegrundet, urn die ?Er-
rungenschaften der .sozIallstischen Welt zu popularisieren (das
heibt der Sowletunion und der Ihr ergebenen sozialistischen
Lander), sie zahlen keine Partelbeitrage und Widen de facto
elne eigene .Wenn sie diese noch nicht .de Jure" gebil-
det haben, so liegt das hauptsachlich an ihrer ROcksicht auf
die Taktik der Sowjetunion, die es wahrscheinlIch noch nicht
fur opportun.halt, eine Spalterpartei offen zu fordern.
Die Haltung der KPdSU .gegenOber der KPA war ebenfalls vor-
hersehbar, doch 1st sle insofern interessant, els sie die tat-
sachlIche eowletische EInstellung zur Weltbewegung demon-
striert. Die KPdSU hat sich? geweigert, zu den von tots doku-
menterisd1 belegten Fallen von Einmischung Stellung zu neh-
men oder mit uns. Ober Grundsatzfragen zu dIskutleren. Ste
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u-YKGHT
macht kaum ein Hehl claret's, daB sie das Recht habe, sich In
unsere Angeiegenheiten eingumischen und eine ihr ergebene
Opposition zu unterstutzen. Das kann nur zu einer weiteren
Spaltung und Schwtichung der bereits schmerzlich gespaltenen
und geschwechten Weltbewegung fiihren und ist von baser Vor-
bedeutung kir elle (wenn es solche noch gibt), die naiv genug
sInd, zu glauben, die Bezlehungen der KPdSU zu ihnen beruhten
auf sozialistischen Grundsatzen und nicht auf den vermeint-
litilien Eigeninteressen der ISowjetunion (die In sewjetischen
Augen allerdings mit den ' interessen des VVelteoziallamus
ideriiisch werden).
FUR EINE KOAUTION DER LINKEN
Was 1st heute. die Qrientierung der KPA und wie, kommt sie
in der Praxis soft dem. Parteitag zum Ausdruck? Hier verdient,
abgesehen von den bereits skIzzlerten wichtigen Aspekten,
das Hauptdokument des Parteitags Erwahnung. Es zerfallt In
vier Abschnitte: Kapitalismus. Die Gesellschaft der Zukunft.
Methocien der VerwirklIchung, Die Kommunistische Partei. Im
Abschnitt ,Kapitalismus- wird versucht, das Wesen der wis-
senschaftlich-technischen Revolution zu definieren, es werden
die Veranderungen in der Struktur der Klassen, der Imperialis-
mus und die nationale Befreiungsbewegung untersucht, des-
gieichen die Beeinflussung der Weitlage durch die Lander
,mit sozialistischer Basis' (das heiBt die Okonomisch soziali-
stischen, in anderer Hinsieht aber nicht entsprechend ent-
wickeiten Lander). Der Abschnitt _Die Gesellschaft der Zukunft"
enthalt eine Skizze unserer Hauptziele, mit dem Akzent auf
sozialistischer Demokratie und Selbstverwaltung. Im Abschnitt
-Methoden der Verwirklichung" wird die Kiassenstruktur ge-
nauer analysiert, die Rolle des Staates unter den heutigen
Bedingungen und die-,Bedeutung von ?HegeMonle" und ?Gegen-
hegemonie" untersucht. Her wird unsere Haltung zum Kampf
fOr Teilforderungen, zur Arbeiterkontrolle, zur Labour Party und
zu den Gewerkschaften definlert und der Haltung der ?Konser-
vativen" und der ?Anarchisten" oder _LInken" gegentiberge-
stellt, wobei in der gegenwartigen Lege der Akzent auf dem
Kampf gegen die erstgenannten liegt. Hier wird ouch die Kon-
zeption elner ?Koalition der Linken" erortert, Ober die I?
einige VVorte sagen mochte.
Der Gedanke einer ?Koalition der Linken" wurde zum erstenmal
auf dem Parteitag im Jahre 1967 formuliert. Er 1st natOrlich
nicht ohne Zusammenhang mit frOheren Vorstellungen und Er-
fahrungen der ?Einheitsfront" und ?Volksfront", geht aber iiber
diesen nehmen hinaus. Im Parteitagsdokument heiBt es dazu:
?Die komplexe Natur der modernen Gesellschaft, die Mannig-
faltigkeit der in Aktion tretenden sozialen Krafte, die Vielzahl
der sle bewegenden Probieme, das betrachtliche Mal) an
Spontaneitat und die Reaktionen auf negative Erfahrungen der
Vergangenheit, wie Uberzentraiisierung und ideologischen Kon-
formismus, haben es kiar gemacht, daB eine Organisation far
soziale Veranderung so bes,chaffen sein rnuB, daB sie den
heutigen Bedingungen entspricht. Die australischen Kommu-
nisten schlagen eine ,Koalition der Linken zur revolutionaren
Veranderung der Gesellschaft' vor. Dieser Vorschlag geht davon
3L1S, daB es heute ? und wahrscheinlich wird das auth In Zu-
(unit so seln ? eine Anzahl von Tendenzen glbt, die In Ihrer
31Igemeinen Orientierung auf eine sozialistische Umwandiung
ler gegenwartigen Gesellschaft iThereinstimmen, aber In wichti-
len Punkten der ideologie, des Programms und der Organi-
ration verschiedener Meinung sind. Dazu zohlen die Kommu-
listen, die wachsende Linkq. in der Labour Party, Gewerk-
ichaftsaktivisten, Studenten, Intellektuelle. Anarchlaten, Barger-
echtler us
Eine ,Konlition der Linken' implIziert die verschiedensten For-
mer, von gemeinsamen Aktionen und Zusammenarbeit all dieser
Gruppen, doch nicht nur dieser. Wahrend die bewuBten Revo-
lution? den Kern jeder Koalition zur radikaien Vertinderung
des Gesellschaftssystems bilden, sollen andere Krtlfte, die sich
Im aligemeinen auf bestimmte Probleme beschranken ? Viet-
nam, Btirgerfrelheiten, Reform der Sozlal- und Gesundheits?
ftirsorge, des Schulwesens und so welter ?, unterstatzt und
penebenenfellit in MO nufganommon worn. In.
nerhalb einer solchen ,Koalition' glbt es Im Zug der Zusam-
menarbeit und Aktion natal-Bch Diskussionen Ober theoretische,
programmatische und organisatorische Fragen; es gibt auch
omen Wettstreit der Melnungen. Nur auf dieser Grundlage
kann EinfluB ausgeibt und eine Rihrung gebildet werden.
Wir orientieren uns daher darauf, daB eine solche ,Koalition der
Linken' sich entwickeit und vertindert auf Grund der Erfahrun-
gen und der Entwickiung der Lags bis zur Revolution und
auch In dieser selbst.
Eine solche ,Koalition', die gegenseitige Achtung. Toleranz und
Offenheit zwischen den verschiedenen Gruppen und Parteien
voraussetzt. wird eine wichtige Garantie fOr echte Demokratie
In der sozialistischen Gesellschaft der Zukunft
EINHEIT IN DER VIELFALT
Es muB hervorgehoben werden, daB die ?Koalition. (wir haben
bisher kein besseres Wort gefunden) nicht im pariamentari-
schen Sinn zu verstehen und auch keine definitive .organisa-
torische" Einheitsplattform 1st. Die ntichste (wenn auch immer
noch nicht sehr nahe) Analogle 1st vielleicht die Vietnam-
Moratoriums-Bewegung In Australien, an der praktisch elle
Linken (und auch manche, die in anderer Hinsicht kaum links zu
nennen sind) tellnehmen. Wir haben fur das Prinzip gekampft,
daB jeder mittun kann und niemand dominiert (weder eine
Gruppe noch eine Tendenz). Es gibt allgemelne Hauptziele:
Abzug eller amerikanischen, australischen und sonstigen aus:-
landischen Truppen aus Vietnam; Einstellung jeder Hilfe f?r
Saigon und Opposition gegen das Wehrdienstgesetz. Man sucht
nach jener allgemeinen Form und Aktion, die in der gegen-
wartigen Situation die grOBte Wirksamkelt hat. Aber weder
die Kommunisten noch andere stellen weiterreichende anti-
imperiallstische Ziele auf (zum Beispiel Unterstatzung der
NLF) oder treten f?r radikalere Aktionsformen em; jeder-
mann _tut das Seine', sozusagen.
Verwandt damit 1st die wachsende Tendenz, die starre. Niro-
kratisch ?von oben nach unten" wirkende Organisation abzu-
lehnen, die dazu tendiert (und darauf abzielt), .alle in em n und
dasselbe Schema zu pressen. Auch wenn Ziele und Aktionen
demokratisch beschlossen werden, wird diese Prozedur von
vielen, die nach ?Selbstverwaltung" und spontanem Selbst-
ausdruck streben, abgelehnt. Das mOssen die Kommunisten
berticksichtigen, sowohl hinsichtlich Hirer eigenen Organisation
els auch hinsichtlich einer breiteren Bewegung oder -Kean-
tion", obwohl wir die Auffassung bekampfen, wonach Ober-
haupt keine Organisation erforderlich sel.
REGINN EINER NEUEN ENirWICKLUNGSPHASE
Selt dem Parteitag haben uns die Erfahrungen des Vietnam-
Moratoriums im Mai, els Zehntausende In ganz Australlen an
Kampfdemonstrationen und StraBenbesetzungen tellnahmen, so-
wn: der zunehmende a .f.: l? er schaften und
. ? Is -ssl
19
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CPYRGHT
schein nach gentigend Beweise daftir geliefert, daB die Orientle-
rung des ParteRages richtlg war, und diese Arbeit entwickeit
sich vielversprechend. wie auch unsere so notwendige Arbeit
auf theoretischem Gebiet.
Aber es wore falsch, die Schwierigkeiten zu Obersehen. AuBer
der Apathie und den reaktiontiren (zum Be!spiel rassistischen)
VtiturtO1len1 did In AustriaHeti wait verIteitet Bind; let die Zer-
splitterung der Linken besorgnIserregend. (Die Spaltung der
"Partei verscharft die Zersplitterung, und vor allem deshalb 1st
sie bekiagenswert.) Die Zersplitterung 1st nicht so stark wie in
den Vereinigten Staaten, wo eine an sich vielversprechende
Situation so oft entwertet wird durch unnotige Konflikte, die
mit unnotiger Harte ausgekampft oder auf rein fraktioneller
Grundiage ohne wirkliche Kommunikatlon und Toieranz zwischen
den Streitenden ausgetragen werden. Auch hier iP Australian
versuchen verschiedene Gruppen der ?Neuen Linken", Trotzkl-
sten, Maolsten xAd andere, Organisationen (besonders die
Friedensbewegung) zu erobern und einigen sich nur von Zeit zu
Zeit auf eine unbedingt notwendlge Aktion, aber manchmal
(namentlIch wenn die Lege komplIzlert 1st) such auf der Grund
-
lege eines bIlligen AntlkommunIsmus. In vlelen Fallen schelnt
die Kommunistische Partel das einzig sichtbare Element der
Kohasion darzustellen; doch eine solche Rolle zu spieien, ohne
snach schiechter alter Sitte eine Avantgarde-Position (die so :-,Ft
eine domlnierende Position 1st) anzustreben, ist eine kompil-
zierte und anspruchsvolle Aufgabe. Sie erfordert eine klare
Haltung und eine prinzipielle, nicht-sektiererische Grundlage fOr
den Wettstreit mit anderen, eine verstarkte Aktivitat und gra-
item Malan Dolton dor Kommuniston, dio nwliun nom
Formen der Parteiorganisation, und eine vorurtellslose Einstel-
lung zur Moglichkeit des Auftauchens neuer politischer Forma-
tionen. Der Slag auf dem Parteitag gibt uns eine reale Wog-
lichkeit. diese Aufgabe erfolgreich zu bewaltigen.
Die Bedingungen sind von Land zu Land sehr verschieden.
Aber es hat den Anschein, daB haute die Revolution? auf
der ganzen Welt im wesentlichen vor den gleichen theoreti-
schen und praktischen Grundfragen stehen. Wir sind erst ganz
am Anfang einer sinnvollen internationalen Diskussion Ober
die neue Entwicklungsphase des Marxismus.
Zeltschriften wie das .Wiener Tagebuch- haben. wie Ich glaube.
In diesem Zusammenhang eine wichtige Rolle zu splelen, und
Ich wansche dem WTB dabel vie! grfolg.
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25X1 C1 Ob
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correspondent for the prestigious leftist London
weekly, New Statesman, and is now in charge of
all that part of the magazine that deals with
25X1C10EP
mmunist affairs."
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4Ii)fl IIUJWfl0UJW UDhlI 01FL April 1971
CUBA: THE SOVIET "MODEL" OF SOCIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
"In Cuba, as in Eastern Europe, low
productivity is not simply a remnant from
the past; it persists because the relation-
ship between man and society remains defective,
not to say bad. No amount of ultra-revolution-
ary slogans or socialist enclaves can disguise
this fact; indeed, they merely serve to under-
line the striking contrast between hopes and
reality."
This is the essence of post-revolutionary Cuban failures,
according to a comprehensive and sympathetic review of Cuba's
revolution by K. S. Karol in his recent. book; Guerrillas in
Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution.* This failure,
in turn, stems from Castro 's 1968 decision -- out of "harsh
necessity" -- to embrace Moscow again after a brief but
disastrous flirtation with "independent socialism" and Chinese
Communism. His embrace meant acceptance of Soviet political,
economic, and technical guidance -- in a word, his adoption
of the Soviet "model." The decision led Cuba to the same
economic stagnancy, bureaucratic inefficiency, and political
oppression that has been experienced by all the countries of
the Soviet Bloc and most spectacularly, by the Soviet Union
at present. The combination of the ignorance and inefficiency
of Soviet Bloc advisors and their blindly doctrinaire application
of Soviet methods in trade and aid and in the administration of
an economy proved disastrous. This is the important conclusion
Karol draws from his close personal acquaintance of many
years with Cuba and its leaders, so that he is forced to the
bitter conclusion: "The chief enemy of Socialism is not
U.S. imperialism, but the USSR."
Polish-born Karol Was afervent patticipant in Soviet
Communism until he experienced it first-hand during seven
years in the USSR. Still no friend of capitalism (see biographic
*Published by Hill & Wang, New York, 1970, 624 pp.,
$12.50. It appeared earlier, in the spring of 1970, in French
as Les guerrilleros au pouvoir: l'itineraire olitique de la
revolution cubaine, Robert Laffont, 6, placeSaint-Sulpice,
6, Paris Vle.
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data in the attached NOWYOtk'TiMes book review) and severely
critical of the Uniteor8tates' role in Cuba, particularly in
earlier years up to the heavy Soviet involvement in the 60's,
Karol, after several trips to Cuba and interviews with all the
top leaders, came to admire their courage but realized, as
they did not, that their tangled experiments, following the
collapse of Castro's idealistic dream of 1960, would lead
to the reality of Soviet client statehood a short ten years
later.
A fascinating, impressive, and vastly detailed account
of the Cuban experiment, the book itself should be of
interest to specialists and historians. Of wider interest
would be the account of its recent past and current situation.
Thus, the extensive extracts selected for inclusion herewith
relate primarily to the evolution of Cuba's relations with
the Soviet Union as an object lesson to those, particularly
in newly developing nations, who still regard close politico-
economic relations with the Soviet Union as a solution to
their economic problems.
2
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UPYRUHT
THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
24 January 1971
Guerrillas in Power
The Course of the Cuban Revolution.
By K. S. Kara
Transiotcd front the French by Arnold Pornerans.
624 pp. New York: Hill & Wang. $12.50..
AC/or:net friend of Fidel
halvtiet Cub; ricwvie
By LEE Locicwoori
On April- -22, 1970, Fidel Castro.
nriterrupted an oration in Havana .
,marking the centenary cif the birth ,
Lenin and delivered a scathing at-
-ntaelt on certain leftist European in-
-tellectual critics of Cuba. "These days,
es you know,- there are- gaper-A:vole.-
tionarY theoreticians,. saper-leftists,':
':real 'supermen' you might Say, who
.are capable of crushing 'imperialism,
un two second& with their tongues."?
'These "super-rtablutionaides," Castro
went on, "construct imaginary, hypo-
, Cultic:al worlds from Paris and Rome,'!
:while they themselves live in comfort
eand "haven't the slighteat notion of.:
reality '.or. the problems and difficul-
ilea of' &revolution. they worete
? even forgive the Soviet 'Union for
"existing ? and this from positions on
the left!"
Although Castro mentioned no
names, it was imir.ediately. under-
- stood, in Paris, Rome and Havana
alike that the principal object oi his
_tongue-lashing was K. S. 'Karol, the
noted French journalist. Karol, an
intimate of Fidel, had been laboring
for three years on a ? monumental
. book about Cuba. The first excerpts
had just appenred in French leftist
'journals, and they were not favor?
? able ? to gay ahe least.
Castro's vituperative Ohne -attack -
not ooly assured the book's literary
. success in Europe, bufetransformed
Its publication (in France in April,
1970) into a political event of violent
. controversy. Among Parisian -.rite.-
' lectuals, whether one Condemned or
? adefended Karol quickly became the
? chief eriterion of onc'S "solidarity"
with the Cuban ReVOlpti011. Impor-
4tant ? Spanish publisherS sympathetic
to Cuba (notably Siglo :XXI) angrily
' refused to give it a Spanish edition.
And in Havana, writers, bureaucrats
and political cadres struggled over
smuggled copies of the French edi-
tion spud jwsgech their aarnerican
fr le itdOM Riavt*IEFA ChUi ag Ise
ettnn tit la stiqukared.
Who is K. S. Karol? American
readers may know another of his
books, "Chinin The Other Commu-
n" a serious journalistic account
published here in 1967, a book that.
marked him as a clear, if not un-
critical, ideological partisan of Mao
Tse-Tang. But other aspects of Karol's
biography are also interesting. Born
in 1924 , in Poland, he was deported
to the Soviet Union under the 1939
Partition at the age of 16, studied at
the University of Leningrad, and:,
was conscripted into the Red Army ,
during 'World War U. By his own
testimony, he began his sojourn in ,
Russia "enraptured" by the Soviet ?
Communist Party and all it stood for.,l
Seven years later, disillusioned by ;.
the "misery and terror" that charae-
terized Stalinist rule and by his own
experiences in Soviet jails, he went
first to newly socialist Poland and ,
then, finding Soviet control there no
less pervasive and dispiriting, moved
on to settle in Paris in 1948. Based
in Paris, he has since. 1954 been a
correspondent for the prestigious.
leftist London weekly, New States- ,
man, and is now in charge of "all that
part of the magazine that deals with
Communist affairs."
Although the Cuban Revolution is
.unquestionably one of the most in-
teeestine politieal phenomenons of
modern tirnes, engennering a, colorful,
-literature?. there1)a'st to be pah::
lista,d A serioias .stoy' of li:.:that is ,
satiafaetory both in' corriplexity and
nrolundity. Karol, a brilliaist scholar ,
with a critical Marxist perspective
and wide experience with 'socialism,'
would ncern to be most qualified to,
:fill that gap. Moreover, he has had
the opportunity to come to know
Cuba well at fiesthaect ?
Two preliminary visits in 1961 (the
first shortly after the Bay of Pigs
invasion, during which he had a long
VaPSrlieirt'hOlterbj
1007, when ha mot 2nst 1..41 Peng
enssions with Fidel Castro, and again
in 1968. Castro was enthusiastic
Omit Karol's project, briefed him
personally, arranged similar inter-
views with other membees of the
Cuban leadership and opened tip the
archives of the Revolution to KaroLa
unlimited scrutiny. No other writer,
foreigner or Cuban, has enjoyed such
.-..ncomplete. access. to the confidential
fiIc-0,e the Govetrimewt..
? -? ."Guerrillaa -- in - Power?: is a Artily
inonumental- Sven*. Some 600. pages!
? -long a - curious but artful amal-
gam/ I
' of historical narrative, journal-
, istie reportage, political and economic
atialysis, personal reminiscence, anec-
dote, rumor and ideological theo-
rizing. Its sheer breadth of scholar-
ship is breathtaking: there seems
ecarcely a book or newspaper or
article or document pertaining to the
history .of the revolution that Karol
-1as not read and analyzed. The
voluminous footnotes alone, some-
times running on for pages; con-
stitute a verittible treasure-trove of
bibliographical and historical infor-
mation about Cuba that has been as-
sembled nowhere else in one book.
'Moreover, it is admirably written.
, Such disparate elements as descrip-
tions of trips with Fidel, recapitula-
tions of Soviet economic policy and
critiques of revolutionary ideology
are held together by Karol's lucid
style which is itself the expression of
a rigorous, Cartesian intellect.
As its length implies, the book is
encyclopedic in scope. One can hard-
ly think of an aspect of the life and
!imes of the Cuban Revolution that is
not dealt with ? and, what is more
remarkable, placed within a theoreti-
cal context. That this context is deep-
ly flawed by the overwhelming
ideological bias of its author is the
hook's major ? and I believe fatal
.sitorteorning. , Nevertheless, because
"Guerrillas in Power" unquestionably
94Aq003040111GIGQ1e4lous attempt
yet made by any scholar to locate
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and define the complex Cuba phe-
. eon-tenon in historical time and politi-
cal space, it deserves to have its
virtues ? which are many ? clis-
eussed before its defects.
"Guerrillas in Power" is tlie best
:Ind most complete political :history
al the. Cuban revolutionary process
vet published. At Karol notes in his
preface, that revolution has under-
naine a confusing series of "oscilla-
: ions" (the American edition untie.
auntably translates this as "vacilla-
n)ns") during its action-packed 12
oars. Karol combs out these histori-
ea1 snarls with impressive patience
.:ted vigor. The resulting chronicle is
a testimonial to the resilience of
t:astro's revolution which survived,
during it first half-decade in power,
succession of potential disasters.
These included its own chaos and im-
nrovidence in 1959-60; the cancella-
tion of the american sugar quota in
late 1960, cubit's' principal and al-
toast sole source of income (1Chrush-
chey picked up most of the deficit,
end Cuba became from that moment
aa a ruble-zone economy); the Bay
of Pigs invasion of 1961; the head-
long plunge into socialism and
eomantic ildoIntry of the Soviet
whote
two direst consequences were
a crash program of industriali-
zation, Soviet style, that ended
in failure and waste, and a
wracking sectarian power strug-
gle between, Cuba's old guard
Communist party (P.S.P.) and
the 26th of July Movement,
that nearly tore the political
fabric of Cuba apart; and final-
ly, the Missile Crisis of October,
19n2, and its . direct conse-
quences,
By 1064, as Karol tells us.
Castro stood in the enviable
position of being, for the first
time, his own master. He had
emerged from the nearly disas-
trous Missile Cris:is with his dig-
nity intact, his internal support
unified, his ideological appeal
to LatIn-American revolution-
:Idea sharpened, and hs secu-
rity assured, for in return for
Soviet withdrawal of the mis-
eiles the United States had
promised not to invade Cuba. -
? Moreover Khrushohev bad had
to pay his own "price" to
Castro for having negotiated di-
rectly with Kennedy over his.
? head. In material terms this
- meant underwriting Cuba's.
economy for the next six years
(primarily through steadily In-
creased -sugar imports ata_sub-
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, sicly level three times the then
current world market price)
.? and unlimited donations of mili-
tary hardware and material. Po-
litically, it meant ideological
"hands-off" Cuba while she at-
' tempted to develop her own
variant of Marxism-Leninism.
Having survived both the
: frontal attack of United States
invasion and the back-door sub.
version of Soviet hegemony,
Castro met but turning the,
temporary equilibrium wrought
: by the impasse between the two
super-powers into n ; state of
permanent independence. In the
economic sphere, this meant a
return to agriculture: sugar in
the short run, in incremental
steps up to 10 million tons in
1970, but diversification in the
longer run. Politically, it meant
the institutionalization of the
revolution through the forma-
tion of a new Cuban Communist
party, and the extension of the
ievolutionary movement to con-
tinental South America, led by
Che Guevara (planning for
which was already under way
by early 1965).
Ideologipelly, it meant the
doctrine of "armed struggle"
'abroad and the "simultaneous.
construction of socialism and
Commimism" at home by eradi-
eating the remaining vestiges
of capitalism in Cuban society,
the shifting from "material" to
"moral" incentives for workers,
and, in more general terms, the
"transformation of conscious-
ness" throughout Cuban society,
to culminate, ultimately, in the
'building of the, new man,'"
free of egotism and greed and
motivacT1 to work and Sacrifice
for the collective we.. in the.,
true spirit of Marx. It is these
two departures from post-Len-
Mist Soviet dogma which Karol.a..::
lumps - together under the
phrase, "the Cuban heresy." :
Americans are probably' at
least dimly aware ?that every 't
one of these hopes, which Karol
found still glowingly alive dur-
ing his long Cuban stay in
had either faded or disappeared
by 1970. ' Castro's sugar pro-
gram has been a disaster; the
10-million tod harvest of 1970,
upon which be staked The hon-
or of the Revolution," not only
fell far short but threw the rest
of the Cuban economy so- far
out of whack that financial sta-
bility now seems light-years..
away. The dream of "two, :
three, many Vietnams" ended
1 gttiggiar! CPA-REYP17-9-01
death in 1967 and the program
of armed struggle lies aban:a
cloned, at least for the fore-
-- seeable future.
The new Communist party,
whose formation in 1965 Castro
hailed as the beginning of tate
popular democracy in Cuba, has
yet to hold its first congress
and thus has canfaieci, despite ;
the best intentions sn'amost of :.
Its hard-working, me.rnbers, into
another seelalloot bureaucraCy
not 'unlike its predecessors. As
for the creation of the "new
man," the sad truth is that, to
the growing list of unkept
promises, the lengthening ra-
tion lines for ever-scarcer
gocds, the steady decline in
essential services, and the un-
rneriorated pattern of economic
disorganization and misman-
agement,the rank-and-file Cu-
ban, though he has struggled
honorably, has begun to re-
spond with lower prcductivity,
rising absenteeism and growing
immunity to official exhorta-
tions to greater sacrifice.
Karol labors diligently to pro-
vide an understanding of the
process that has 'led to this dis-
mal state of affairs. Cuba's eco-
nomic woes may be ascribed in
part to inherited neocolonialist
attitudes toward work, to the
legacy of Soviet:style central-
ized planning introduced into
Cuba in 1960, as well as to the
mercantile straitjacket imposed
on Cuba by virtue of having the
Soviet Union as her principal
trading partner. But in Karol's
view, both low worker produc-
tivity at the base and the ten-
dency to vainly overambiticms
planning at the top stem from
a common source: Castro's fail-
ure to provide popular institu-
tional forms for the direct parti-
cipation of the masses in mak-
ing the essential decisions .that
affect their own lives,
Karol put this thesis to Castro
personally in a conversation in
.1968 and was told that true
participatory, institutions would
not work well until the masses
had reached a sufficient level of
"revolutionary consciousness."
In Cuba, which never had a
strong, class-conscious proletar-
iat, this consciousness must be
fostered by the leadership, the
.lrevolutionary vanguard, through
"noninstitutional dialogue"
with the people, Castro told
Karol.:' Karol finds Castro's
faith ? in the role of the van- '
guard dlitiat and aristocratic,'
ltritipa3010611,00101 set-
1 pm Aenim larpr tint! ?
2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0003001f0WAHT
, email, dleruptive of the very
sort of political consciousness
that Fidel wishes :to ? foster.
Though well-intentioned, Fidel
.is the "victim, not the master"
of a process whereby the revo-
lutionary enthusiasin by the .
, masses bee slipped from his
grasp.
-. While I find the: last judg-
- enent Overdrawn, Karol's gener-
al this seems to me correct:
CJihe construction cif eoclalism, if
at is at all possible,: must build.
upwards from the base, and the
It is now time to say that
"Guerrillas in Povaer" is not one
: book but two and that only one
?of them is about Cuba. If Cuba
is the subject of Karol's analy-
sis, the object of his passion is
the Soviet Union?and the pas-
ion is hatred. Fpr Karol, the
history of Castro'S revolution is
a cautionary tale for all would-
be socialist revolutions, the
. moral of which is-that the chief
. enemy of socialisrn is not United
States imperialiern but the
U.S.S.R. The Soviet threat comes
e in two forms: ecOnoinic exploi-
tation and pond:cal manipula-
tion of other revdlutions by the
inept, power-hungry clique in
the Kremlin; and the 'Soviet
brand of Communism,' a revi-
sionist doctrine which is foisted
upon gullible neophyte socialist
,
leaders like Fidel Castro to
Karol devotes long digressions
to the vagaries of ?the -Sino- -
Soviet schism, invariably taking
Peking's side.. But China is in-
cidental to Karol's theme,
whieh, introduced unobtrusively ?
in the first. chapter by a 1961 .
quotation frOill Che ("Listen,
every revolution, like it or not,..
has its share of Stalinism") -
- growe in shrillness as the book
? unfolds and ? becomes the dome.:
? !tient leitmotif at the end.
? The villainy of Nikita Klirush-:.
chev, Castro's patron (whoi*t
, Karol regards as even more .tnee
. principled than Stalin), . is' the:agent of this deforrnat?ion\. Thus,:
ewhen Kitrushchey threatened
th-
? _e United States with retalia-
tion (mm Soviet rockets if they
intervened in Cuba, says Karolr,
it wae all a hoax designed to
distract attention from "the
magnitude of his defeat" in his
anti-Maoist campaign. Two
years later, Karol asserts,
Xhrushchev provoked the Mis-
sile Criss for the sole purpose
of forcing the United States to
accept his policy of "peaceful
coexistence." In order to gain
Castro's unwitting complicity,
he "lied" to Fidel, telling Wm
that the Yanquis 'were. planning
another invasion, and "foisted"
the missiles on Cuba. (Here he
misquotes an interview with
Castro by Claude Julien to sup-
port his point.) In reality, Karol
concludes, "no United States
'invasion was being planned and
? sKlirushchev had not the least
intention of supporting social
uprisings in the Third World."
Perhaps it is academie at this
late date to quarrel over who
first suggested the installation
of nuclear miseiles in Cuba. But
? Castro, though somewhat am-
biguous at first, has long since
laid the question to clarified
Test. For example, he stated to
this reviewer in 1965: "Natural-
_ ly the missiles would not have
been sent in the first place if
the Soviet Union had not been.
? prepared to send them. But...
we made the decision at a
moment when we thought that
concrete measures were neces-
sary to paralyze the aggressive-
ness of the United States, and
we posed this necessity to the
? Soviet Union,"
Moreover, Castro in the same
, i
nterview went on to say that
still convinced of it in 1965. (He
had every reason to" be; just
after tr;p Bay of Pigs, J.F.K. had
public! prom sedthe exiled
"revolutionary council" their
defeat would be avenged, and
the council was still very 'much
in existence in October, 1952.)
Finally, Khrushchev's "lie,"
as doe-time:need "ey a Xerol foot-
note, tUrns out to be no lie at
all but rather a graphic quota-
tion ftom a ?-conversation be-
tween;Adzhuhel and Kennedy
(a repOrt of which was sent to
Castro). In it Kennedy made
'thinly veiled threats reg,artlin:P,
Cuba that were cleerly strong
enough to provoke the anxiety
of another invasion, whether or
not one was actually being
planned.
? Space does not permit a f1111
exposition of the countim
ic ;s
ways in wh...% Naroi hammers
home hik hysterical thesis that
the Soviets deceived, manipu-
lated and thwarted Cuba and,
ultimately, through the power-
ful influence of their ideology,
subverted Castro's revolutionary
principles. While this reviewer
does not wish to appear a de-
fender of the Soviet Union
Aced many of Karol's criti-
c. ,
visms of Moscow's Cuba policy,
are, in themselves, valid ones),
what I must take issue with is
the unmitigated parochialism of
his vision of Cuban history,
which leads him to distortion
and, ultimately, to falsification.
In his concluding chapter
"The Reckoning," Karol see:
Fidel Castro as having paid foi
? his heresies of 1965-67 witt '
total submission to the Soviei
_yoke. This period begins wit"
;
Castro's support of the Sovie.
? invasion of Czechoslovakia li
?1966. Karol asserts that Fidel
really wanted to denounce thr,
"socialist imperialism" of tha
. U.S.S.R. but lacked the courage:
to do so because of his reli-
ance on Moscow's aid. Further-
more, Castro's "greatest fear
I was that too violent upheaval;
Chi the Socialist bloc] might
paralyze his allies, and leav e
Cuba to the mercy of Ole
United States." By 1969, Karr 1
gees on. Castro had embarke:
on an economic program thre
"bore a suspicious resemblanai
to the doctrine of the Sovi
t
Union at the time of forced in
their ultimate undoing. he had been convinced ,in 1962 dustrialization and collectivizt
Miff tiOtt? ite tion." In a word: Stalinism. Fut
illtist in de.Faraggia 19O
ninaagOknfauti21194A800000f400011-1
? 3
wasaeat.de nennniny :Ind his
CPYRGHT
Annrnirl Fnr Rplpacp lcicicanci/f19 ? CIA-R111D7A-fIl1cutAnnnnnni1nnn1 -1
abandoned moral incentives
and his ether ideological here-
sies in favor of "primitive so-
cialist accumulation."
At this point, the levet of dis-
tortion is so high as to ,beggar
discussion, Castro's ? painful
speech on Czechoslovakia. '
whatever its shortcomings, was..
primarily an indictment r of the
Soviet Union's policies and use-
less to Moscow rts on Ideologi-
cal weapon. "Militarization"
Implies forced conscription,
and "Stalinism" implies purges,
assaiisinations, and totalitarian.
control of society. None of
these are remotely realities in
Cuba today. If Castro has tem-
porarily dc-emphasized other
ambitions to give priority
to righting Cuba's desperately
faltering economy, that is
hardly proof that he has sac-
rificed his principles?or lost
his courage, indood, if ono puts
aside Karol's tendencious in-
terpretations and analyzes only
hic hi cl-nrirai cs.ifience ono
must conclude that the two
qualities which give continuity
to Castro's revolution and mark
him as unique among political
leaders have been his adherence
to his ideals and his unfalter-
ing courage in defending them
through 12 years of adversity.
If the problems of the Cuban
Revolution still exist in 1971,
so do its virtues, a tact which
Karol both fully documents and
ultimately ignores, 111 ?
Mr. Lockwood is the author of
"Castro's Cuba: Cuba's kidel."
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CPYRG.m1-15proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001'(RGHT
TIME
8 February 1971
CUBA
The Mortgaged Island
raucisun/ iui wei. summont.a pro-
vincial representatives from all parts of
Cuba to an ieconomic accounting in Ha-
vana. The Ale md.rimo had bad news
for them. Unless the pace of the 1971
zalra, or sugar harvest, is stepped up,
he warned, considerable amounts of cane
will go unprocessed. Said Fidel: "We
cannot alloW ourselves the luxury of
leaving one pound of sugar unexportcd."
Lately, Cuba's bearded leader seems
to be deliviring nothing but stern ex-
hortations. Two weeks ago, he wrote to
Regis Debray, the French intellectual
who was captured shortly before Bo-
livian soldiers killed Che Guevara in
1967 and was recently released from
prison. "We.are working hard and fac-
ing great difficulties," Castro confessed.
"The march is truly long, Dcbray, be-
cause it is When power has been taken
?
that we revolutionaries understand that
we are barely starting."
Castro's longtime critics atgree that
the regime's economy is in serious trou-
ble. Pointing to a severe labor short-
age. excessive absenteeism, low pro-
ductivity and a woeful lack of modern
machinery, a U.S. Government analyst
said last week: "Something is radically
wrong?wrong priorities, wrong em-
phasis, wrong, administration?in short,
chaos." Castro admits as much in his
speeches. East year, for example, he
told the nation: "Our enemies say that
we have problems, and in reality they
arc right. They say there are irritations,
and they arc right.'
Surprisingly. some of the sharpest
criticism of Castro is coming from Eu-
ropean leftists who have frequently vis-
ited Cuba. talked with him and sup-
ported his goals. Polish-born Journalist
K.S. Karol, who writes out of Paris
for Le Monde, Le Nouvel Oh-
.servateur and Britain's New
Statesman, is one. His Guerrillas
in Power: The Course of the
Cuban Revohttion has become
required reading for U.S. in-
telligence and Latin American
speci;ilists. French Agronomist
Renc-Dumoot also faults Castro
in his Cuba: h. It Socialist?
Prolonged Sacrifices. Both
authors contend that one of Cas-
tro's earliest mistakes was setting
up incorrect goals and improper
procedures. "An encircled coun-
try like Cuba could not permit
herself the luxury of gradual proi-
ApptoVeden-Retleftelf1499/09/02 : CIA-RDP
5
that have been (tool prolonged
have become unbearable for the
people today," says Dumont.
Karol found el Cahallo?"the
HorSe." as the peasants alTection-
'tidy refer to Castro--personally
vibrant. "Pldel finds It diMcult to
sit still while he speaks. He moves
about all the time, gets up, takes
a few steps, sits down. stalks back
and forth as if every argument
were a kind of hand-to-hand
struggle with a wily opponent."
Castro has spent altogether too
much time serving as a national
ombudsman. Karol complains.
forever touring the country and
leaving the government to bu-
reaucrats. "The new proletarian class,"
reports Karol acidly, "is quite unable to
control and use the bureaucracy for its
own ends as the bourgeois used to do."
Costly Crop. Both observers agree
that Castro's greatest error in judgment
has been what Karol calls his "sugar ob-
session." To pay for Russian oil and
aid, which is now running at the rate
of $E5 million a day. Castro called on
Cubans to harvest an unheard-of 10 mil-
lion tons of sugar. The whole island
was mobilized for the harvest. Christmas
69 and New Year's Day '70 were post-
poned until it was finished.
But there was one monstrous mis-
calculation: Years before, that old har-
vester Nikita Khrushchev had ordered
his experts to design a cane cutter, and
1,000 of the machines were shipped to
Cuba. But while the cutters worked ad-
equately when tested in the Ukraine.
they failed completely in Cuba. Karol
blames it on hilly ground: others main-
tain that the Russian machinery over-
heated in tropical weather. Faced with
a 1970 avalanelic or sugar cane, some
400,000 mostly inexperienced Cubans
had to bring in the record crop by
hand. Castro himself cut cane instead
of administering. Visitors ranging from
Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grech-
ko to the "Venceremos" (We shall over-
come) brigade of radical American stu-
dents went into the canefields. Eventually
an estimated 8,500,000 tons were har-
vested, a commendable record but short
of Castro's goal.
Such a harvest, Karol maintains, was
more harmful than helpful. Fully 7.000.-
000 tons of sugar went merely to settle
Cuba's accounts with the Soviet Union
and other Communist providers. Writes
Karol. who was educated at Rostov Uni-
versity. served in the Red Army (and
Stalinist prisons) and is virulently anti-
910isitSCAIMP3MMUO Oil has
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
CPYRGHT
no moral right to insist on her con-
tractual rights and on the superhuman
sacrifices these entail for Cuba." Castro
commented angrily to Karol: "They give
us nothing for nothing and then act as
if they were showering us with gold."
Tobacco Ration. Since other work
had been abandoned or cut back to
bring in the harvest, the 1969-70 zatra
damaged the rest of the economy. Pow-
er is now so short that there are con-
tinual brownouts. "Click patrols" of
small children have been mobilized to
go about turning off unnecessary lights.
Cubans routinely face long queues and
shortages. In a laud famed for its to-
bacco. Castro warns that smoking is un-
healthy and rations his people to two
packs of cigarettes and two cigars ev-
ery week. Rents are cheap. prices are
low and, with little available to buy,
money is plentiful. Th t balsa negra. or
black market, flourishes as a result. Rum
costs 90 pesos a bottle and cigarettes 5
pesos a pack (black-market pesos are
seven to the dollar), but there arc plen-
ty of buyers. Other Cubans line up out-
side such Havana restaurants as Mon-
seigneur La Torre and Floridita to spend
40 pesos on dinner for two.
The Loafer. Castro has apparently
read his critics. He has referred to them
as "these little leftist writers" and as peo-
ple who "build hypothetical,
imaginary worlds." At the same
time, however, he has been car-
rying out some of the changes
they suggested. One was to al-
low workers more power of de-
cision. Cuba has held a series
of widely publicized trade-union
CPYRGHT
"elections." in which 2.000.000
workers approved 148,000 union
representatives. Supposedly,
these representatives will he the
channel through which the work-
ers can voice their complaints or
make suggestions.
Meanwhile, the government is
clamping down on slackers. This
year has been designated "the
Year of Productivity." New reg-
ulations have been introduced
against el raga, the loafer. Cu-
ban men from 17 to 60 who
arc chronically absent from work
face up to two years on state
farms. Women, however, arc ex-
empt. "Our people would not un-
derstand if we treated men and
women alike," explains Labor
Minister Jorge Risque!. Mean-
while Castro is weeding his Cab-
inet of those who, as he puts it,
"have worn themselves out" in
the revolution. Ominously, each
change seems to bring more army
officers into civilian Ministries.
Of 20 Ministries, eleven are
now run by captains and majors.
No one suggests that Castro will soon
be overthrown. Most of those who might
have opposed him have left Cuba or
hope to do so aboard one of the tcn-a-
week Varadero-to-Miami flights. Though
no new exit permits have been issued
since 1966, some 130.000 people who
were granted permits before that time
are still waiting to join the 600,000 Cu-
bans who have departed for what Cas-
tro scornfully calls "the (lake vita and
the consumer society." What the critics
do suggest is that socialist Cuba is in
dire trouble. They argue that Castro's
charisma has worn thin and that his re-
liance on Russian aid will not solve his
problems. "One wonders," says Karol
flatly, "if he has not mortgaged the entire
future of the revolution."
Approved For Release 1999/0%02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
EXTRACTS FROM
Guenringes
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New York
Russians visiting the island at this point were only too happv
to endorse Mayakovsky's view that Cuba was "A country of the
happiest prospect," and this time they did not say so tongue in
cheek. The poor in Cuba had not yet vanished from t-he land-
scape; but they were the first to declare their confidence in the
future. The existence of a whole range of light industries seemed
to guarantee?with even more certainty than in the U.S.S.R.?
a rapid improvement in the standard of living. The richness of
the Cuban soil greatly impressed many Soviet visitors: "Here
one has only to spit on the ground for something green to pop
up," said Timur Gaidar enviously, no doubt thinking of the
recalcitrance of his native soil. Havana, with its shops full of
the latest gadgets, its streets lined with American cars, its air-
-conditioned restaurants, and its swimming pools, beaches, and
parks, showed the whole world that socialism could go hand in
hand with gaiety and still prosper.
To be sure, Cubans intended to modernize their country,
Heavy industry would put an end to unemployment and to de-.
pendence on imports for basic industrial equipment. Their am-
bition seemed neither exaggerated nor unrealistic, even though
they had virtually no native sources of energy (reserves of pe-
troleum were far too small to meet the country's needs) . There
was iron in Cuba, as well as nonferrous metals, particularly
nickel. Less favored countries such as Japan had become big ex-
porters of finished steel, even though they had to import most
of the raw materials. Cuba lacked technicians, but Russia could
easily repair this deficiency. After all, the Soviet Union had
built gigantic steelworks in India, a country much poorer than
Cuba.
A few months after the great nationalization wave of October
1960, things began to take a turn for the worse, and supplies
became rather unpredictable. This was clearly the result of the
American blockade, but the Castroists, anxious to deny the ef- 1/4
fectiveness of this "criminal enterprise," preferred to attribute
it to cuts in production from the end of 1960 up to the Playa
Gir6n invasion; during all of which time the country had been
1
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300110001-1
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