CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 189
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
MAY 1971
PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY: TRAINING IN THE "SCIENCE
OF REVOLUTION"
INSIDE THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SHOWCASE OF SOVIET COLONIALISM
THE SOVIET SECURITY CONFERENCE OFFENSIVE
EAST PAKISTAN: SINO-SOVIET BATTLEGROUND
POLLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION
DATES WORTH NOTING
SHORT SUBJECTS
SWEDEN SCORES RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM USSR
HOW THE KREMLIN TRAPS JOURNALISTS
CUBAN POET UNDER ARREST
BULGARIA: THE 16TH SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
KHRUSHCHEV MEMOIRS AUTHENTIC
25X1C3b1
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1971
THE PATRICE LUMUMBA PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY
OF MOSCOW
? Lumumba University, which even some Soviet officials
admit:was founded "to educate students from underdeveloped
countries so they can return to their homelands to
become the nucleus for pro-Soviet activities," is eleven
years,old. It was when former Soviet Premier Khrushchev
visited Indonesia in February 1960 that he made the first
public announcement of the Soviet Government's intention to
establish a "University for Friendship Among Peoples,"
as the institution was first called, in order to offer
training to the national intelligentsia cadres for Afro-
Asian and Latin American countries. Months, before,
however, word had been spread among students already study-
ing at Western universities about the impending announce-
ment.: Arab and Asian students in West Germany, for example,
not only knew that the university was coming into being,
they Oven knew details of its organization plan.
The Early Days
For the first academic year, according to Soviet sources,
some 43,500 applications for admission had been received by
31 July 1960, the final date set for submission. From these,
501 applicants from 63 countries were accepted including
193 from Africa, 142 from Southeast Asia, 120 from Latin
America, and 46 from the Near East. Also enrolled for the
first. year were some 50 Soviet students from the Central
Asian. and Caucasian republics. Some governments objected
to the way in which Moscow bypassed them in the selection
of students. Burma, for example, decided that the enrollment
list of Burmese students (of whom there were 35) sent direct
to Moscow via the Soviet embassy in Rangoon, constituted a
violation of Burmese regulations and refused to give the
students exit visas. India insisted on taking a hand in
the selection of students as did Indonesia and Nepal.
As a result of these interventions, student departures
were either canceled or delayed and the gates of the new
Friendship University swung open on 1 October 1960 with
only 300 students in attendance.
During the late 1950's the majority of students
entering the USSR from the developing countries were
drawn from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, but in the
early 1960's the emphasis switched to sub-Sahara Africa:,
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and the new entrants from Africa rdse sharply from about
400 in 1960 to about 2,000 in 1962. Africans have accounted
for fifty-five to sixty-five per cent of the total number of
new students from the developing countries every year since
1962. The largest number have come from Somalia, Kenya,
Ghana and Nigeria which, together, have sent more than 3500
students to the USSR since 1959. In their eagerness to
attract students from lower economic and social strata,
the Soviet officials were initially overly lax as far as
entrance requirements went and many students were accepted
without any or with very little secondary school education.
The Soviets soon discovered that the "poor students" for
whom Patrice Lumumba had been established were also poorly
qualified for academic studies. The dropout ratio was high
and by 1967 some 850 students had been sent home because of
academic failures. This inability to meet minimum academic
standards contributed to widespread dissatisfaction among the
students and was an important factor in the December 1963
demonstrations by African students. Subsequently the Soviets
gradually raised the standards for admission and imposed
stricter controls over the behavior of students in residence.
In fact, there have been widespread reports of near-segregation
of Asian and African students, who have resented and COM-
plained about the constant surveillance and restrictions
on their activities.
Student Recruitment
The Soviets use two approaches in recruiting students
for training at Patrice Lumumba: official, through bilateral
cultural agreements or under sponsorship of United Nations
agencies (i.e., with the approval of the students' home
governments) and unofficially, through Communist parties
or front organizations such as friendship societies and
trade union groups (i.e., illegally without the consent
of the students' home governments). For example, in February
1961, when the university was officially renamed in honor of
the deceased Patrice Lumumba, such groups as the Inter-
national Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic
Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Inter-
national Organization of Journalists all renamed their
scholarship funds which became part of the "International
Patrice Lumumba Scholarship Fund."
Many governments have now imposed stricter controls on
students leaving their countries and the illegal scholarships
are a smaller proportion of the total than they were up to
the mid-1960s. A factor in encouraging home governments
to exercise greater caution may well have been the exposure
in mid-1963 of Pavel Erzin, a prorector and recruiter for
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go abroad for higher studies. To crown all, there is a
statement that 'preference will be given to Indo-Soviet
Cultural Society workers." In February of this year,
according to a TASS dispatch, Prem Sagar Gupta, General
Secretary of the India-USSR Society, said that approximately
4,000 applications to the university will came from India
during this year.
The Academic Level
Only !about one third of the some 12,000 foreigners
studying in the USSR go to Patrice Lumumba University.
For the rest, those whose level of training will often
have a bearing on the ultimate success or failure of a
given Soviet economic or technical aid project, openings
are available at some 170 of the various polytechnical,
scientific,: agricultural or other specialized institutions
of higher education scattered throughout the country.
The role of Lumumba Friendship University, as Pravda noted
on the occasion of the institution's tenth ama'FFEgiry last
year, is to "strengthen the position of progressive forces"
in the world struggle. On the same occasion, the university's
rector, Sergei Rumyantsev, held a press conference at which
he said that 2,335 students had graduated-from'his univerSity
since it was founded. Rumyantsev also quite frankly alluded
to the university's political character saying it had originally
been founded because of appeals from "representatives of
progressive circles in a number of countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America." These "representatives"
talked of need for forming national cadres, but also
allegedly said such an institution would "render great
support to the liberation movement"
During Rumyantsev's press conference, held 28 January
last year, the rector fielded a number of questions posed
by both Soviet and Western journalists. The rector seemed,
to Western journalists at least, notably defensive in
answering:questions which probed Lumumba University's
academic standards, the qualifications of its applicants,
and problems related to the Lumumba graduate's return to
his home country. One correspondent asked how many students
drop out and why. Rumyantsev said that an average 150 drop
out annually, most are either first year students with
insufficient preparation or students who develop serious
illness or those who have "adjustment difficulties"
(unspecified). One correspondent commented: "As the final
trumpet blast fades away, one is struck with the notion
that even after ten years Lumumba University is still
striving to establish its reputation as a serious educational
institution."
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Patrice Lumumba University, as holding the rank of General
in the Soviet Union's secret police, the Committee for State
Security (KGB). Erzin, who stayed on with the university
until at least 1968, was identified as a KGB officer by a
fellow KGB operator, Yury Rastvorov, who defected to the
West in the early 1960's. A 17 April 1963 London Daily Tele-
graph article had described Erzin as on his way to Indonesia
from India where he reportedly recruited more than half of
the 50 Indian students he planned to have admitted to the
university during the next academic year.
Currently, Soviet extra-legal student recruitment
continues in countries that have no bilateral agreements
for student exchanges with the USSR, such as Iran and
many Latin American countries. The practice also prevails
in countries where the Soviet Union wants to attract more
students than are provided for under bilateral agreements
or where it wants to maintain good relations with the local
leftist organizations and to train their members, such as
with the. most recent cases in Mexico and Ceylon. In these
situations, scholarships are offered directly through trade
union, student and other front groups, as previously men-
tioned. Or, students may be recruited from among groups
already abroad and studying in the West. Since the students'
home governments are bypassed, many countries are unaware
that they even have nationals studying in the USSR. For
example, when the new ambassador from Cyprus arrived in
Moscow in 1963, he was surprised to learn that at least
50 Cypriot students were studying at Patrice Lumumba.
Any foreigner who has not been offered a scholarship
but who wants to attend Patrice Lumumba University can apply
directly to the university or can apply through the Soviet
embassy or consulate in his home country. Many countries,
aware of the threat of illegal recruitment, now forbid
direct applications to the university. In 1962, for example,
India established a selection board especially for students
applying: to Patrice Lumumba. Yet as late as March 1969, the
National Council of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society ran
an ad in the New Age weekly, inviting applications for
scholarships of five to six years', duration to Lumumba
University. Commenting on the ad, Current newspaper noted,
in its 19 April issue of that year, "Other countries
advertise through the Government of India, but this one
dispenses with that formality. Application forms for
scholarships of other countries are obtainable free of
charge, but this ad says, 'Applications on prescribed forms
only will be entertained. Forms available on payment
of Rs 5.' This should enable Quite a large sum to be
collected from thousands of frustrated students wanting to
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CPYKuri
NEW YORK TIMES
18 April 19/1
Soviet Union:
What They Do At Old turilumba U.
MOSCOW ? Lumumba
which die Soviet. Union
established to educate students
from non-Communist develop-
ing countries, celebrates its
11th anniversary this year. The
school, on Moscow's south side,:
has figured in the news recent;
ly in conjunction with reported
, revolutionary movements in
Mexico and Ceylon.
According to dispatches from,
Texico City last month, some
of the people arrested for revo-
lutionary activities there were
said to have attended Lumumba
University some time ago and
to have made:' North Korean
contacts while in Moscow. Simi-
larly, radical leftist insurgents
in Ceylon are also said to have
? a Lumurnba background, and
the Ceylonese were reported to
have expelled North Koreans in
connection with the present
civil strife.
The suggestion that students
at the university are being
_ trained for revoiutionarj/ activi-
ties against existing govern=
merits in their home lands can-
?
, not be documented here. Nor,
has there been any information
about North Koreans at
Lumumba, for students from
Communist countries are nor-
mally placed in other universi- ,
ties.
criteria that guide the selection `
of Oue.ct .,tudc...ts far Latmeteba
, University. However, observers
have noted' that they appear tcY
be somewhat ,older than ordi-'
'nary Soviet college entrants. ,
Although all formal political '
; activities are prohibited on the:
, campus, there is known to be
frequent controversy -- and
even strife -- among the for-
eign students. Soviet authorities
are said to be particularly con- ,
cerned over occasional evidence
; of Maoism and, adherents of the ,
militant guerrilla tactics of Che,
Guevara.
; Basically, however, . foreign -
students are expected to seek
. a professional education at the
Patrice Lumumba ? Peoples'*
; Friendship University, as the
institution is officially called. It t
was named 'for the Congolesd
: leader, who in 1961 was ,killed
under obscure circumstances in
the Katanga region.
' The annual freshman class.
consists of 225 Soviet citizens
and 600 foreigners; the latter
, are selected from applications
sent through the education sys-
! terns of their home countries'
I and ark an individual basis.
i Competition is strong, with as
many as 7,000 and 8,000 appli-
cants for the 600 foreign. open-
ings.
On arriving, the foreigners are
; put through a preparatory, one-
; year course. The course is de-
? signed to give them intensive
training in Russian so that they
-
4
preparatory program is also in
to fill any gaps in the
' academic backgrounds of the
new arrivals, and may be ex-
. tended to two years if the stti-
' dent is particularly poorly pre-,
:pared.
,3 Like ordinary Soviet univer-
sities, Lumumba does not offer
a general liberal arts program,
but assigns students immediate-
ly to any of six professional
schools., They are the Schools,
;
" The Soviet press has been
silent on any link between Lat-
in - American or Asian revolu-
tionaries and Lumumba. Pub-
lished commentaries on the can understand the lectures, all
'rest in Ceylon have described of which are in Russian. The
the insurgents as anarchists fi-
nanced by, Western intelligence
agencies. ,
However, there is little doubt
that, in the five or six years
of their studies foreign stu-
dents are exposed not only to '
the Soviet way of life ? "one.;
fourth of the 4,000-member stu-
dent body and the entire teach-
ing staff are Soviets?but also,
to tha political ?cross-currents'
that the Asian, African and Lat-
in - American newcomers brine or Faculties, of Economics and
Awith te=tElsorhiRlabkhasie,1999vratzximrop
leased on, the procednre. and Enaineerina.
CPYRGHT
In an attempt to make the
'courses as relevant as possible
to the particular needs of the
.% developing countries, Soviet ed-
,, ucators have added subjects not
normally taught at the Soviet
college level. They include trop-
ical forestry, crop cultivation,,
, animal husbandry, econom-
ics and- law in the neutralist
parts of the workk and architec-
' ture in tropical climates.
The largest single contingent
? last year ? 964 students ? was?
from Latin America, with as
many as 109 from Mexico
alone. Next came the African
, group of students, numbering
834, with the largest national,
representation consisting of 81
, Kenyans.
, As a general rule, Lumumba
, does not admit students from
. other Communist countries;
they are placed in regular So-
viet universities. Nor does it
admit Japanese, on the ground
that Japan is an advanced in-
dustrial nation that does not
fall within the concept for
which the university was in-
tended.
Like regular Soviet college
students, foreigners at Lumum-
ba get free dormitory space,
plus a 'monthly stipend of 80
.to 90 rubles ($88 to $99). This
,is substantially higher than the
7 30 rubles a month received by
Soviet students.
There have been about 2,500
graduates so far since the first
graduating class of IR in 1965.
A small percentage stays on lot
Post-graduate work, and the un.
i'Versity has conferred 20 doc.
torates to date.
.--THEODORE SHABAD
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SOVIET UNION #3
1970
A few words about the Patrice, Lumumbn University from its Rector SERGEI RUMYANTSEV:
hen we opened the doors of our country's first inter-
national institution of higher learning we knew that we
were embarking on e great experiment. There was
no doubt that our staff would be able to provide' the
necessary leaching for people who had chosen to
become mathematicians, physlelets, engineers; agronomists,
lawyms, Of dO61.911, ftlfW1 Iii(jhef AC11'01111 Ma
already proved its worth. The uncertainty lay elsewhere: wculd
it be possible to form a cohesive, friendly community of young
people from different countries, with varying views and social
backgrounds?
Some foreign specialists and journalists gave us "friendly"
warnings. The Russians, they said, have without knowing it,
taken on the impossible. They don't realise that these Afri-
cans, Indians and Latin Americans are simply not capable of
.analytic thinking. In short, they were telling us that this was
our own busi,ness, of course, but nothing would come of this
noble effort.
We did in fact encountered certain difficulties, but they
were by no rkjrns insurmountable.
, The entrance examinauxis disclosed some serious gaps
In the applicants' knowledge of the natural sciences; many of
those who held secondary school-leaving certificates actually
had insufficient educational qualifications for entrance to a
Soviet institution of higher learning. It was a question of In-
adequate preparation for material reasons rather than lack of
ability. And there is a big difference between the two.
To bring the students up to the requisite educational
level, we organised a special Preparatory Department, offer-
ing, among other subjects, a one-year course in Russian
which became the working language for all students.
The University has already sent off five batches of grad-
uates; 2,335 young men and women have already received
diplomas, and another 579 will receive them this year. The
University of Peoples' Friendship has fully justified its name.
This is not just my opinion, but also the opinion of many
observers abroad. Let me quote some foreign comment.
"I am very happy to pay a visit to this great Institution
where friendship in the international field Is nursed with
such devotion. Students drawn from all over the world find a
a rare opportunity of not only getting advanced training in
higher sciences and technology, but in the process emerge
as strong links for international waderstanding and friendship.
Great force for peace and friendship."
This statement was made by India's Minister for External
Affairs Swaran Singh.
And here are the words of the eminent British scientist
John Bernal:
It has been a great inspiration to me to visit the Lumum-
ba Friendship University. After travelling over much of the
world it is a pleasure to meet all together and working In har-
mony the young men and women, who are going out to build
a new world of peace."
The members of a parliamentary delegation from Costa
Rica had this to say:
We were able to assess the feeling of unity and the
scope of the work being done at the University for the ben-
efit of all the people on our planet. Comparing Friendship
University with other modern universities, we must say that
this was a discovery for us. This new university of culture and
friendship is developing successfully."
After ten years of work, we can justifiably say that we
have passed our major test. The University has become a
large centre for the training of highly skilled specialists for
the developing countries. Already working in various branches
of science, industry and agriculture in their native countries
are 593 of our graduates from Latin America, 451 from
Africa, 317 from the Arab East, and 518 from Asia.
There are 3,092 students from 84 different countries
currently enrolled in the six main departments (engineering;
physics, mathematics and natural sciences; medicine; agricul-
ture; history and philology; economics and law).
Since the developing countries need specialists with .a
broad training, we have made it our aim to prepare our stu-
dents to work in the most different branches of their chosen
fields. The medical faculty, for
example, not only provides train-
ing in therapeutics and surgery,
but also in the organisation of
?public health services and epide-
miology. The graduates of our ag-
ricultural faculty are not only high-
ly qualified agronomists, but have
a soundAbc
of -vetenIK
and farm mec
?
A good deal of attention Is also given to developing
teething skills In the students themselves; the skills they
need In order to train national specialists In their own coun-
tries. Many of our graduates have devoted themselves to
teaching. For example, Kante Kabine heads the Mathematics
Chalf et trio jdonakfi Folyt@ohnics1 Institute (Ouiriosh tiesiun
Odunuga Is head of the Russian Language Department at
lbadan University (Nigeria); Krishna Reddi is head of the
Mathematics Chair at the Colmbatore Institute of Technology
(India); and Sanchez Vargas is Dean of the Physics and
Mathematics Department of the University of Los Andes
(Colombia).
The srecific problems involved In training specialists
for Asia, Africa and Latin America required that we add
to the teaching syllabus a number of special courses and
provide special textbooks for these courses. Our University
chairs have published textbooks on such subjects as tropical
forestry, agriculture and livestock breeding; tropical infectious
and other diseases; the problems of economics and law In
developing countries; architecture for tropical countries; and
others. So far, in these first ten years of the University's exist-
ence, the academic staff of the University have published
1,427 different textbooks and other teaching materials. These
are now part of our well-stocked library (over 420,000 volumes),
which receives all newly published literature in the Universi-
ty's fields of interest and subscribes to over 1,000 Soviet and
foreign scientific periodicals.
The University conducts intensive research into problems
related to the development of Asian, African and Latin Amer-
ican countries. Here are just a few examples: the mining and
geology chairs study the geology, magmatic formations and
problems involved in mining processes in Africa and the Hin-
dostan Peninsula; the Humanities Department conducts re-
search Into the socio-economic problems of the developing
countries; and the law department concerns itself with problems
of the formation of national state and legal systems.
Research in these and other important fields is also done
by our post-graduate students. The University has already
produced 170 Candidates of Science in various fields. The
work done by first-degree students on terminal and final exam-
ination projects not only helps them to master the fundamen-
tals of their subject but also to make an individual contribu-
tion to it.
Through the joint efforts of the staff and the students, a
friendly and .hard-working community has grown up at the
University. Our decision to institute student self-government
turned out to be a good one. The students of each faculty
elect a student council for their respective faculty, and the
chairmen of these councils represent the students on our
highest governing body?the University Council.
There are also the student hostel councils, the women's
council, the journalists' club, the debating society, etc.
From the very beginning the University has had various
types of student organisations. These include the student
associations (zemiyachestvo) which are composed of students
from the same country. There are now 80 of these associations
In the University, each of which is run according to rules and
regulations drawn up by the students themselves, and has Its
own structure and elected administrative bodies.
These associations take part in discussing and deciding
basic questions relating to the University's activities. Occa-
sionally they invite representatives of the administrative and
academic staff to their meetings. The administration in its turn
holds meetings of the associations' representatives to pass on
Information and discuss iimportant questions concerning the
development of the University.
The student organisations are always represented at stu-
dent scientific conferences, meetings and sports competitions.
They recommend their members for taking part in the work
of various social organisations, set up national amateur art
groups and guide their activities.
In this way students take a most active part In all aspects
of University life.
Over Its ten years of existence the University has won
Itself a high reputation abroad. This can be seen botn from
the 7,000-8,000 applications
which arrive each year from young
people of 'different countries and
from the University's extensive
contacts with foreign universities,
government bodies and social or-
ganisations.
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CPYRGHT
JAPAN TIMES
2 April 1971
Lumumba U. in oscow Said
Producing evolutionaries
By ROGER LEDDINGTON
MOSCOW (AP) ? -The arrest
of 20 lettwing terrorists in
co recently revealed a clandes-
tine aspect of Soviet "coopera-
tion" with developing countries
? the production of young revo?
lutionaries at Moscow's Patrice
Lumumba Friendthip Univer-
sity.
With the announcement that,
. the arrested terrorists had stud-
ied at Lumumba, the sub-
sequent recall of Mexico's am-
bassador from Moscow and the
expulsion of five Soviet Embas-
sy offi cials from *Mexico City,
there seemed to be little doubt
the Mexican Government be-
lieved that the Kremlin had
plsi,ed a major role in the crea-
tion of the terrorist group, the
Revolutionary Action Movement
(MIR).,
Although North Korea alle-
gedly served as the guerrilla
warfare training ground for the
Mexican recruits, it was at Lu-
mumba, on the outskirts of
Moscow that the Mexicans got
their ideological education.
Created in 1960 as the Pec'
pies' Friendship University, the
institution was founded by the
Soviet, Gc ernment "in com-
pliance with the Leninist prin-
ciple of rendering disinterested
assistance to the peoples of the
liberated countries."
I n 19 62 the name was
changed to the Patrice Lu
mumba Friendship University
in, honor of the Congolese
Premier "who sacrificed his life
In the struggle for his country's
freedom and independence."
Last year, when the univer-
sity celebrated its 10th anni-
versary and revealed the latest
student statistics, 3,092 foreign
students were attending Lu-
rnumba, representing 84 count-
ries, 75 per cent of them were
under 26 years of age.
Latin America contributed
the largest number of students;
964. Africa llowed with 5
Arabs accounted for 770 and
Asians for 524.
Mexico was fourth on the in-
owlet al list with. 109 students,
outnu nbered only by India with
210, Chile with 186, and Syria
with 43.
Notably th a country that con-
stantl / espouses female equaf-
ity, t le Soviets permitted only
447 women ? out of the 3,092
studets ? to attend Lumumba.
In us first decade the univer-
sity as graduated 2,335 men
and women. Latin Americans
Jed Vie list of ordinary gradu-
ates with 593, but was at the
bottom of the post-graduate list
with mly. 15, indicating an ern-
phasi by Latin American stu-
dents on basic education and
trainhig. Soviet students,' who
make up a small minority of
the student body, led the post-
gradt ate list at 145.
No information was available
on the Latin Americans' par-
tibulAr study fields.
In many underdeveloped coun-
tries the students are selected
by the local Communist party or
the ocal branch of the Soviet
"frioidship society." Then the
Soviet Union takes over ? local
governments rarely provide
scho arships. The students are
brou ;ht to Moscow free of
char e, housed and educated
free, and returned home free.
While here they receive
mon hly stipends from the So-
viets ranging from about 80 to
100 rubles ($72 to $90). On that
they are expected to feed and
to chthe themselves and to pro-
vide whatever entertainment
they can find in the capital
city..
In a society where the aver-
age monthly per capita income
is 1: 1 rubles ($109) and where
both parents th a household
usually work, many students,
privAtely complain that they
find it difficult to adequately
live on their stipends.
TI,e university's hard-cover'
an
American or European college
catalogue with a few difference.
According to it, the university
offers instruction in seven dif-
ferent faculties or departments:
natural sciences and mathemat-
les, engineering, medicine, agri-
culture, preparatory . Russian
history-philology, and econom-
ics-law.
, All foreign students, unless
they speak Russian fluently,
spend their first year studying
' the language. All instruction
and books are in Russian.
In all but the that two facul-
ties, the ?course titles indicate
the students get basically the
'samd education as their West-
the students are offered a
course in ."the history of ?the
countries of Asia, Africa and -
Latin America."
That course requires 414 stu-
dy hours. The department's
Russian language studies re-
quires 434 hours.
The history faculty's course
catalogue is replete with studies
such as "the breakup of the co-
lonial system of imperialism,
development of the intert
national working-class ail
Communist movement, mover
ment for peace and friendship
between the peoples for peace-
ful co-existence and abolition of
a new world war."
Other than the compulsory
law ? courses the university's
prospectus. gives no hint of
guerrilla warfare training.
But as Mexican. officials and
diplomats revealed earlier,
practical application of the 20
Mexicans' Soviet education was
made in North Korea.
A pamphlet published by the
university last year concluded
with:
"The celebration of the tenth
anniversary, reaffirms the rec-
ognition of the university as a
center of training for first-class
experts for the liberated count-
ries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America."
em counterparts.
The ,difference ? and the uni-
versity's probable role in the:
recent events in Mexico ? be-- ,
!gin to appear in the economics-
law and history-philology; stud-1
les,
In the first, in addition to the
usual legal and economic in-
struction, there is an emphasis
on the "modern bourgeois polit-
ical economy."
From there the students pro-
ceed to courses such as inter-;
national law 19: "History of Po-
litical Thought" which stresses
the study of "revolutionary and'
national liberation movements."
Among the compulsory !I
courses in the law department
ls "problems of the general the-,
ory of state and law" which'.
covers "peaceful and nonpeace-,
ful ways of transition to social-
ism."
Under another compulsory
course,, law students , are edu-
cated in the "ways and meth-
ods of ? colonialism liquidation,"
the "legal character of armed
struggle against colonialism,";
and "liquidation of imperialist'
bases on the territory of devel-
oping nations."
In the history faculty, in addi-:
lion to stress on the methods of ?
teaching children and adults
("training of will, character
and conscientious disciplines"),
4.....01????????bilmfmlirrlo
4
CPYRGHT
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THE UNIVERSITY
IN FIGURES
? There are 3,092 students from
84 foreign countries currently en-
rolled in the University. These In-
clude 447 women students. In ad-
dition, 969 young Soviet men and
women also allefid the UnlVerSity,
? The University has 82 chairs
and 864 teachers representing 149
fields of knowledge.
O The teaching staff includes
84 professors with doctoral de-
grees and 388 assistant profes-
sors with Candidate of Science de-
grees.
? 150 teachers of Russian are
taking special courses offered by
the Advanced Training Depart-
ment, and 25 engineers , from
Asia, Africa, Latin America and
the Arab East are raising their
qualifications in the UN Courses
at the University.
O The University has Ii2 special
study rooms and 151 laboratories
and workshops.
? The students receive practical
training at 210 industrial and ag-
ricultural enterprises, research In-
stitutes, clinics and museums, lo-?
cated in 35 Soviet cities.
? The academic staff of the Uni-
versity has written and published
60 monographs and textbooks and
over 2,300 articles which have
appeared. in Soviet and foreign
periodicals. The University has
demeleted 160 reseireh lifejeits
tor various enterprises and organ.
isations.
? At present, 225 young scien-
tists (145 Soviet and 80 foreign)
are doing post-graduate work at
the University.
O The University has signed
agreements on co-operation with
many institutions of higher learn-
ing in the developing countries,
'including the Technical University
In Oruro and the Tomas Fries
University in Potosi (Bolivia), the
Gorakhpur University (India), the
Central University of Las Villas In
Santa Clara (Cuba), and the Uni-
versity of Khartoum (Sudan).
? In 1965, the Patrice lumum-
ba University was accepted as3
member of the International Af-
sociation of Universities.
? Nearly 1,200 students, post-
graduates and teachers are active
members of the University's
Sports Club, through which they
engage in a total of 20 different
kinds of sport.
WASHINGTON POST
12 March 1970
Lumumba University
Rounds Out a Decade
By Donald Armour
RNiIrrs
MOSCOW ? Patrice NI-
I a I. i
CPYRGHT
proominz Asian. African and
Latin American students for a
niece In the "third world." hng
produced 2.335 et-nth:ales in its
first decade, just ended.
The univer,ily. which ac-
quired ilg present name a year
4.tey R was founded, following
the death of the first Congo-
lew leader. Patrire Lumumba,
k geared In specific require-
ttlf.P19 or developing countries.
be six (acuities ? Of engi-
neering. sciences. medicine,
urimilltere, history snd
reannmics snd law ? re.
fleet a. marked emphasis nn1
reienceicalhr thaiards.
! The *VM,Inlak AG's' Rel
ivtith geology and mining ern-
ptiastze xperiat prospecting
problems In India and Africa,
while the medical faculty con-
ducts research Into tropical
idsrases.
The largest contingent of ,
ti university's roll of 3,092
fsrelen students comes from;
at in A mcrica, numberinal
PIK followed by Africa with;
F-14, arab countries with 77(1
rand Asia with 524.
Individual rountries with
I te lei vest representation
elude Chile (111M, India (awl
;nil Syria (1431. MOOT than 751
ler rent of the students are
nrIer 26 years of age. Women I
umber only 447.
or five years hi the elISP nri
medicine, and nil studies nrel
preceded hy al least one year's:
training In Russian ? tite
teaching Intuoinge,
11.entrilkin Is then.
reikelly not a compulsory sub-
Pict as II Is it Waxer soviet
universities. und In Out stu-
dents From other coternunist
Countries, tnetwitroa Cuba anal
Chios. are not 4dirnItte4 toy OM
Patrice Lumembe taniversit/..
Nor are Japanese. student s,1
since .1apan Is tainsidered
Industrialired 5181C and not ii
de:eloping country.
The universtly has not been
free from internal strife.
someittnes involving pro-
The university collaborates! Chinese elements among the
with the United Naliona Edii-1 students. The government
rational. Seientific and Cull newspaper lzvestla reported
Tensions between Africans,
and some Russian citizens led'
In serious trouble six years!
ago.
On Dee. 18. 1901 hundreds:
of African students fieleht
their way to hlosrow's lied,
Square over pollee barricades.
demanding an inquiry into the
death of a Ghanaian student.
whom the Soviet authorities
said had died from exposure
tO cold while he was drunk.
The Africans said Russians
had beaten him to death for
timing out With a white girl.
ImpernougzigpciAA Lftftikrik990300100001-2
I anon ovno). after e an o er str hu e
pamphlets received from the
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ties decided to immortalize the name of our Prime Minister, we
wern delightedr-all of us, not just the Congolese, but the people
.of the other young nations that used to be oppressed. There is
no doubt that the hope of the third-world countries was that
this place would serve as a sanctuary for the development of
lofty thought, and not as a den for weaving the most deceitfy.
kind 'of plots.
On the eve of the 24th Congress of the Soviet CP,. we should
hope that the Soviet authorities will give some consideration to
this question and cast some light on the real role assigned the
Lumumba University. The fact is that it is becoming increasingly
clear that an evil campaign is being run from the place named
for our national hero, and that he is sometimes alleged to have
held philosophical concepts he never endorsed in his life. Of
course, it would not be inappropriate right now to reMind the
world that the first Congolese prime minister never in all his
political life opted for any of the ideologies that divide the
world today.
Citizen Christophe Ngbenye, a former rebellion leader,
testified to Iumumba's nationalism, when he stated redently at
Kampala that General Mobutu had made the Congo what Lumumba had
wanteNi it to be. On its side, the great French daily Le Monde,
in a Special issue devoted to General Mobutu's imminenT?Vigir-to
France, points up the similarities between the political think-
ing of our head of state and those of the Congo's national hero.
These are two. important voices which we cannot ignore unless we
want to give currency to the unhealthy factions that threaten
to blacken the,,reputation of Patrice Emery Lumumba.
From now on, the great institution set up in the name of
Lumumba in the Soviet capital, if it is to be worthy of its high
inspiration and Serve the countries of the third world, must
teach our future cadres the concepts of nationalism as he under-
stood them, instead of orienting them toward goals that might
well bring shame upon the noble heritage of the hei.o Of our
once-oppressed countries. The nationalism of young nations, al-
though each of us has its own special kind, finds its common de-
nominator in our quest for our intrinsic, primordial values.
This is nothing more or-less than a return to our own authentic
sources, and General Mobutu is the champion in that quest today.
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LE PRiDgES, Kinshasa
24 March 1971
LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY; HOTBED OF SUBVERSION?
Last March 15th, the Attorney General of MW.co, Sanchez
Vergae, announced that the Mexican police had uncoyered a commun-i..
.ist plot and arrested 19 terrorists who had holed up in their
'den, andithat the police were hunting the other suspects listed
as fugitives. The Attorney General also announced that the ?
group had come back . via East Germany and the USSR after a train.
ing course in terrorist sabotage and guerrilla tactics in North.
Korea.
According to the Mexican Attorney General's office, some.,
of the terrorists apparently had been given scholarships at the,:
Patrice Lumumba University under Soviet-Mexican cultural ex- 4
change programs. 'TheY` admitted that they had not Only received,
training in politics, but that the purpose of this training'
could have been to teach them to commit other crimes.
It was against this' background that they stole money.es-
timated at the equivalent of more than 40,000 zaire from a Mex-
ican bank. They allegedly admitted that they intended to go on
stealing from banks and financial institutions 'in Mexico City ?
and elsewhere throughout the country. The government also claims
:to have captured large quantities of weapons and other propaganda
materials.
On 17 March 1971, the Mexican government recalled its am-
bassador from Moscow for consultations. Apparently the plot
was organized with the collaboration of some Soviet pitizens.
In this connection, the official French radio and TV announced
in its news broadcasts last week-that five members of the Soviet
embassy staff in Mexico?had been asked to leave Mexico. It was
also pointed out that recently a great many Mexicans, Latin Amer-
icana, and Africans have been going to the USSR. .Unwilling to
head the list of countries that harbor terrorist movements, this
great power allegedly uses North Korea as a cover for training
revolutionaries to operate in non-communist countries.
The Mexican daily El Sol has directly accused the USSR of
'involvement in the plot, charging that scholarship students at
Iumumba University are indeed engaged in revolutionary activi-
ties, and that it is an established fact that scholarships grant-
ed under this cultural exchange program are used for Other pur-
poses. This is no secret to anybody.
As for reaction in Congo, the obvious point is that peo-
ple here are very much offended at this ignoble use of the name
of their national hero. Back in 1961, when the Soviet authori- ?
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EL MERCURIC, chile
2 September 1970
KUNAKOV FILE (VI): LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW
. A visWto the Soviet Union, and 'enrollment in Lumumba
jrniversity in Moscow, which was especially oreated for the. youth,
.of underdeveloped 'countries, constitute two of the greatest in-
centives devised by the EmbaSsy and the Communist Party to at.
.15.raot adherenti and future oollaborators in their intelligence
services.
According to the Kunakov File, there are, in the Soviet
,Embassy, detailed lists of all. Chileans who have received grants:
to study in Moscow since 1960, including their names, addresses 7!
and other items. According to the' File, the following grants
.were .awarded for the years in question: six in 1960; 12 in 1961;
'12'in 1962; eight in 1963; 42 in 1964; 47 in 1965; 49 in 1966;
31 in 1967; 32!in 1968; and 25 in 1969. About the middle of
last year,,Kunakov drew up a list of 25 graduates of Lumumba;
and, on the basis of this tabulation, of the total number invol-
ved, three graduated in philology; five in engineering; four in
111edioine; four: in physics; three in chemistry; three in econom-
ics; two in agronomy; one in international law; and one in his-
tory. 'A good Many of them are working at the University of Chi-
1.e4, some with the INDAP /Thstituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario;
;Agriculture-Livestock Development Institute 7, two on the Cen-
tral Committeei of the Communist Party 7 one at the Soviet-Chilean
Institute, and another at. the State Technical University.
On the iiiitiative'oethe Soviet-Chilean Institute, a
'Center for Former S.pudents, and one ofTarents and Guardians of
students now in Moscow were formed. The parents are involved
in collecting funds and favora_for the youths, and the gradu-
ates are urged tO remain united in association with the InSti-
tute. This does not always happen, and the File notes (in July
1969) that " a delegation of former graduates appeared at the
Embassy a few days ago, expressing criticism for the Soviet-
.chnean Institute's failure to do anything to help them 'Faliriata,
their.lomotessionAl.degrees. Kazakov, who spoke to them, _quated
'them f - as. salting that in view of the Institute's:
-
attitude, they were holding their meetings at the East German-. .
Chilean Cultural Institute. This provoked Kazakov's indigna-
tion, and he requested that they return again to the Institute.
Candidates for Lumumba are selected by the Institute and
ut the Embassy, apparently on the basis of merit, but in reali-
'ty aocording to the status of their sponsors in the Communist
-Party, or their influence at the Embassy. Acoording to an
.evaluation made by Kazakov (File, 23 September 1968)0 "the
,chief danger at the Institute is the interference of 'alien'
individuals in the selectiop of candidates for:Lumumba Univer-.
- sity; if this should happen, the political intervention of the..
U.S.S.R. in Lapin America). Would be. seriously jeopardized.", .
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LE PROGRES, Kinshasa
24 March 1971
Univers
Lumurnhal
-.foyer de
suiliVeysica ?
CPYRGHT
Le 15 mars clernicr, k pro-
enreur general de Mexique,
Sanchez Verge% a annonee
que in pollee tie Mexico avail
ilejoite un cemplot communiste
et arritte.19 terroristes qui s'e-
talent retires dans leur repaire
et qu'elle recherche les mitres
suspects pories ? disparns. Le
procureur general a d'autre
part precise flue le groupt
CtaiI revenu par in RDA et
11.111SS nitres un entrainement
tie sabotage terroriste et de
taetique de guerilla en Corea
du Nord.
Scion les informations re-
eueillies =titres du procureur
general 1nm:1e:tin, il seeable
tine queiques-uns tic es ter-
roristes auraient men des
b.urses a Vijniversite Patrice
Lumumba, d'apr'es le program-
me d'echanges culture's sovie-
to-mexicains. us ont, en fait,
avant qu'ils n'ont pas mule-
meat !Ten l'entrainement.tlans
le cadre politique, mais que lc
but de cet entrainment pou-
vait leur permettre do perpe-
trer d'autres melaits.
C'est dans cc cadre qu'ils
out vole uric cornme evaluee.
plus de 40.000 mires d'une
banque mexicaine. us auraient
precise a cet effet que leur but
etait de continuer a valer dans
des hanques et societes finan-
clams, tant a Mexico .que dans
(Ventres villes du pays. D'au-
f,re part, le gouvernement aU-
rail beancoup d'armes
et autres materiels do propa-
gande.
Le 17 mars courant, le Gou-
vernement mexicain a rappole
son ambassadenr k Moseou
pour consultation. U Kimble
que lo complot ekait organist
avec la collaboration de cer-
tains Sovietiques. A cc propos,
dans ses emissions de la se-
maine derniere, POICiee de la
radio television francaisc an-
noncait que cinq mcmbres de
Pambassade sovietique a Me-
xico ont ite invites a quitter le
territoire mexicain. On fait
renharquer par ailleurs que
derniereinent beaucoup de
Metticains, de Latitio-Ameri-
caihs, voire des Africains se
sorli rendus en DRSS. Par
erninte de se rnontrer en tete
d'azffiebo des pays qui entre-
tiehnent des mouvements ter-
rol'istes, eette grande puissan-
ce se couvre de la presence de
la Corie du Nord pour Pen-
trainement des revointionnai?
res destines a jotter lcur role
dans des pays non communis-
ten.
Le journal rnexicain, El Sot
a accuse PlURSS en affirmanf
que les activites eevolutionnal?
res sent menees par des hour.
siers de l'Universite Lurnurnbro
et qu'il est bien etabli que cep
bourses donnees dans le cadre
de programme d'echanges cul-
ture's sont utilisees a d'autres
fins. Ce West un secret pour
personne.
Pour cc qui est de Popinion
congolaise, on no peut man-
quer de souligner qu'elle est
offusque'e par un empini si
abusif du nom de son hems
national. En effet, en 1961
(mend les autorites sovietiques
deciderent d'eterniser le TIM
de notre Premier ministre, ee-
a faisait la joie, non mule-
irtent du peuple eon golais.
nsis milnia dos kitties Nations
sitfrofoir opprhutes, 11 10 fail
awns+ dottle que respoir dee
pays flu (ler, monde hail qu.,
cc Neu serve de aunettutire flu
developpement do haute pen.
see et non d'un rephire oh t dol.
!vent se trainer le desseins les
iplus sournois.
1 A la veille du XXIVme con-
gres du_PC sovietique, nous
-souhaltertons que les enteritis
sovietiques se penchent sue
cette question afin de firer an
clair le role imparti I l'univer-
site Lumumba. En effet, II
s'avere de plus en plus qu'une
mauvalse campagne est menee
l'endroit de notre biros na-
tional I qui on attribue parfois
des conceptions phiiosophiques
no nourrissait pas de son
'vivant. Certes, 11 ne serait pas
mal venu tie souligner aetuel.
lenient aux yettx du monde
que le premier Premier minis-
tre congolais tie s'etalt Jamais
prononee dans an vie politique
pour les ideologies qui divisent
aujourd'hui le monde.
Le citoyen Christophe Ngbe-
nye, ancien leader de la rebel-
lion a temoigne du national's-
me de Lumumba, en declarant
dernierement I Kampala que
le general Mobutu a fait du
Congo ce que Lumumba von-
lait qu'll soil. De son elite, le
grand journal franca's, k
if Monde a. dans le numero
special consacre a la prochal-
ne visite du general Mobutu.
en France rappelle les simili-
tudes de la pens& politique
de noire chef de l'Etat avec
celles du hems national cows
golais. Ce sant la deux 0111011
gnages itnportants quo nous no
pouvons negliger en faisant
valoir par mitre des inten.
titym malsaines qui risqUent tit
noireir la reputation de Patridt
ea Emery Lumumba.
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"The second request was from 'a candidate who indicated
in his autobiography that he had 'twice failed in, his attempt
,to enroll in the University of Chile.
"The third, from still another candidate; contained a
'certificate of secondary studies,containing two incompletes,
entered in red, indicating that this individual had suceeeded
in passing his ecaminations 'wthan average mark.
?
"Whereupon Silva Cimma told Mrs. Millas that all those
pre-selected were 'either,/ Communist Party militants, or spon-
sored by 'benefactors.' When he asked me who .was in charge of
bolding the meetings'of the board of 'directors,I,told "him:
'You, Mr. Chairman.' He ordered the secretary to call the
'board for a meeting on Monday, the 14th, at 1700 hours, and
asked her if she would mind if he took the,documents. Me,later -
-took off with"all the 'documents, Aeclaring,the,pre-selection
invalid, and requested that the documentation on all the other
-candidates be 'sent to 'his residence. .
"i view of these events, Adriana Millas: called the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party, asking to speak with Os-
car Diaz Iturrieta, the national head of the Institutes. He
replied that he was on leave, and she then asked 'Mrs. Virginia,
who is Diaz ?Iturrieta's secretary, to come to the Institute.
1Ithe latter vehemently refused to do so suggesting that Mrs.
lianas solve the problem he_rtelfjThis involved locating
Segovia (the Communist Partes charge at the Institute) by tel-
ephone in Arica, and she subsequently succeeded in dontacting
Fernando Garcia, the acting Secretary General; who was at the
Astor Theater., Garcia authorized the transmittal of the docu-
mntation to Silva Cimma, and the convocation of the meeting on
Monday."
' The preceding account offers a very good example, of the
decisive role played by the Communist Party in the granting of
.scholarships, and in the administration of the Institute. Some
;other instances of political intervention, i among many, are the
following: '
Carmen Marsellesa Pereira Pena refused the grantSbe had
obtained to enroll_ly the School of Medicine at Lumumba Univer-
sity. To replaseh_erj the Chilean Communist Party, in a letter'.
dated 5 August 1969, sent through the Institute, suggested a
Communist Youth organization-militant, Alicia Mujica Romero.
The note was submitted to the Soviet Ambassador on the date in-
dicated, -
There is a notation in-'the Kunakov File as follows:
"On Friday, the 7th (of March 1969), Baltra telephoned the In-
stitute and asked me why 'his candidates', that is, the indiv-
iduals he had recommended, were not even premsolected. ,He com-
plained of the fact that even the applicant that he had 'submit-
, 'bed, a relative of Soriaior Hugo Miranda, had not been pre-.eleotede/ told Baltra that the seleotion bad been made by a
_?_?. _
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:I
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?0,!.
The Kunakov File recounts an interesting episode in the -i
process of prp-selecting candidates for Lumumba:
"At about 1730 hours on Friday (11 April 1969), Enrique
:Silva Cimma called me to ask whether the meeting called by the
Seoretar7 Gonoral for the proviouo 447 had boon hold; thin was
la meeting at which he was going to approve the pre-selection
of scholarship candidates. I told him .that this meeting had,
! in fact, taken place; to which he replied that he had been given0
La message on Wednesday afternoon which, on account of a previ-
ous commitment, made it impossible for him to attend the meet-
ing. I'informed him that, at that very moment, the Secretary -
General was about to send off a letter;ainZzIKWnk. 1for the
length of time this pre-selection had taken, and containing,
as an enclosure, a list of those who had been pre-selected. TheI
-meting had been held, on Thursday, the 10th, because the
matic pouch had to go out on Monday or Tuesday, and the docu-
-t
mentation on the pre-selected individuals had to be sent. Other-1
wise, they would have to go in the May pouch, which would pu
Chile's candidate's beyond the deadline for application (1 May. '
-1969).
,"Silva Cimma asked me about 'his participation in the
matter of the grants,' saying that he was supposed to be fam-
:iliar with the background of the candidates. I told him that
even I.bad been surprised at the haste in which the meeting
had been held, which had forced me to rush in preparing a
on the activities; and that, in any event, the 'recut-qt.
.of the pre-seletted individualm.yere at the Institute awaiting
withdrawal, some.time or otherilthe Embassy. At this, he
,informed me that he would be-at the Institute in 30 minutes,
'to look at the documents.
tl
? ,
"Shortly thereafter, V. Kazakov arrived in search of the
".folder containing the documentation on the pre-selected Indivi-
duals. I told him what the situation was, and he Suggested that,
. as soon as Silva Cimma arrived at the Institute, I tell him that
'1 had been left out of the pre-Selection process, and that the
one responsible for the documents right now was the wife of
'Deputy Orlando Millas,, who was a'secretary at the Institute.
Silva Cimma arrived at 1930 hours, and I promptly followed Ka-.
'zakov's advice. At this, he summoned Mrs. Millas, and demanded
. the documents of her.
"The first autobiography that he read was a request sub-
mitted by a militant from the Communist Youth Organization of
1., the North, who introduced his application as follows: have-
;. been informed by Tay comrades in the Tarty that you are reppon
sible for the distribution' of. the scholarships to Lumumba Uni
versity..1" .
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EL MERCURIO, Chile
2 September 1970
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
? rchivo Kunakov'(Vi)
'f r
? Investlgacien y Mato di 3
. Xaj Demi? K. .
. f Un viaje a la Union Sovletic
wy el Ingres? a Is Urriversida ,
Lumumba do Monti,. creada e I
',jlecialmento pars jemmies d
,los paises subdesarrollados
iconstituyen dos do los.. may.
lres incentives esgrimidos por I
;Embajada y el PC para atrae
? ta los mucbachos y captai adhe
irentes y futures colaboradore
ren sult,servielos do informacien
Segun el Archive de Kunako
n la Embajada sovittica exit
Lien Ilstas detalladas de todo
ilos ?ehilerros 'becados en Mose'
tslesde ' 1960, incluyendo . nom
throe, dilveciones y okras refe
{rendes. De acuerdo al Archive
'en .los ones respectivos se con
1cedieron las siguientes becas:
. ,en 1960; 12 en 1961; 12 en 1962
.0 en ,1063; 42 en '1964; 47 e
4965; 49 en '1966; 31 ere 1967; 3
en 1968 y 25 en 1969. A media.
;dos del alio pasado Kunakov
Cenfecciono una lista de 25,
jegresados de la Lumumba; se-.
igun ella, de este total habia 3
egresados en filologia, 5 en in
4enierfa, 4 en niedicina, 4 e
,fisica, 3 en'quimica, 3 err econo-
1
'Inia, dos en agronomia; uno?
?
en derecho internacional A
uno '. en historia. Entre' elks,
una buena parte trabajan
ten la ..Universidad de Chile, va-
rios en INDAP, dos en el Coml.
te Central del PC; uno en dr
4,Instituto Chileno - Sovidtice y
Aotro en la Universidad Tetrads
Pdel Estado.,
Por idicriativa del Institute'
sChileno ? Sovietieo se constitu.'
1 syo un Centro do Ex Alumnos 9
un Centro de Padres r Apode-
rados de los estudiantes actual.
snente en Mosctl.' Los padres so
preoCupan de recolecter fondos
!y obsequies para los inuchachos.
lry los egresados son estimulados
a marrtenerse unidos en terms
atil Institute. Este no siempro
/se ]ogre, y el Archive seilala
[(en Julio de 1969/ quo "una de.
riegaciOn de antiguos ,egresados'
'se present6 hace algnnos dies.
:en is Embajada y formuld ed..-
fleas contra el Instituto ChilenoA,
,Sovietico, quo no ha hecho na-
;
Ida pare ayudarlos a validar sus
"titulos 'profesionales. Kazakov,
. qua habld con cites, manifesto
1..#que le habiair informed? quo eti
1
vista de le actitud del Institute
testaban reuniendose en el local'
del Institute Cultural - ChiIemi
Au
'RDA (Alemanla Comunista). EV,
,to provoca indignacion ,en Ka4
Itakov, quien lea solleit6 que set
' .aeorearan nuevazuante, aj#,tt1
11.
1,tuto".:.' .. , :Y, ?T ,,,, .. ...:,T,..
Loa teildatoi, ii".I.Um ni
441"
bkikaoualioialoaaltoiK4ce ?
rsicla
k3sc
WEI?negarie i insirtuio
ver los documentos
Poco rato despuds 3iegO V./?.
1,Kazakey a buscar ?el paquetq
Iests4 ,con los documentos de los pre-1 ;
Lltuur y an Is zmtialada, eu ,soleccionados; le infertile de lei
?.aparienclas per merites, pero? situacion y me recomend6 quei .
en realidad segiin la calidad do ?apenas Silva Cimma Ilegara all
los padrinos que tengan en el
PC o las influencias quo se
mueven en la Embajada. Sc'
logim tars apreciacien de Kaza3
ikov (Archive 23-IX-68) "el pail ?
ler? principal en el Instituto ee
lla intervencien do personas "ex-..! .
Itrabas" en la seleccidn de pos.,
tuiantes a la Univorsidad Lu
rriumba? si -este sucediera, sal
ondria en sodas dificultades;;
? intromision politica de law ??,;:' documentos,
URSS grz America latirra". ,??;, ? rimera autobiografia qua
!Institute le ?dijera que se me
Rabin excluide de Is realizacion
6 la preselecciOn y quo ia res.;
? ponsable do los documentoI
? /en este memento era la esposa
del diputado Orlando MIlla
l
? im secretaria del Instituto. Silva
Chu liege a las 19.30 y de'
1,Kazakey; ante esto liam6 .a la
,inmediato sego( et consejo del
- tsetiora Millas y ? le exigi6 loss '
t En ,e1 Archive Kunakov se
rrelate un interesante episodio
(id proceso; .de preseleccidn'
,de candidates a la Lumumba: ?
t? "El viernes 11 taint 1969)
?alrededer de las 17,30 bores'
l; me liam6 Enrique Silva Cimma
1#,
ipara consulter si se habla rea-
klizado la reunion convocada
ipor el secreted? general para.
el,dia anterior, en la coal so
iba a aprobar la preseleccion de
:los postulantes a becas. Le in.
:forme que efectivamente se
liable realizado esta reunion,
in
In que er replic6 que se le ?
Prabia dojado un mensale erLs
Ila tarde del mlercoles, in quo!
iimpldiO, por rezones de corn- .
si?omisos antedores, coneurrie?
a este reunion. Le infornie que,
el secretario gen,erai le estaba?
(lespachando en ese mismo 1
1:momento una carte con excu-:,
ass por is premura del tiempo .
con que se habia realizado este. 1 ? militantes del partido comunis-./
preseleccidn y en la?cual se lei. ' ta o favorecidos por "coma-,
adjuntaba una lista de los pre." ., i tdres", Me pregunte quo quient
?.: .? eyo fuc de una solicitud pre,.
? -.. 4sentada-p.or una militante de las:
../JCC del Norte, que encabeza-,
:besu presentacion de is si-'
tguidnte manera: "Me he infer-
;made per intermedio ' de Ins
tcompafieros del Partido que us-'
itedes tienen a su cargo la.dis-
aribucien de las becas a la
7Universidad Lurnumba.. SI
i.. La segunda solicitu 'era
de un postulante que en so au-
toblografia indicaba nue en dos
oportunidades habia fracasado
en sus intentos para ingresarl
a la Universidad de Chile.? ,
'La tereera, de otro postulan-s
e, contenia un certificado de)
.estudios secondaries ? con dosl
1 Slotas insuficientes seiialadasi
ton rojo e indicando quo esa i
:persona habia logrado aprobar
sus examenes por promeclio r
Ante este._ Silva Cimma le di-.
Jo a la senora Mlles quo to-
dos los preseleccionados eran 0
seieccionados,. La reunion se;
habia realizado el jueves 10,'
i
debido a que el lunes o mar-.
tes scale la vallja diplomatica..
3' debIan enviers? los documen-.,
Ites de los preseleccionados, ca-
se contrario irfan en la vallje
siel met de roam 10 quo "sigotes ?
ficaba quo las solicitudes del
Chile quedaban fuera de plazo
1do entrega (l.o de mayo 1969).
? Silva Cimma me consuIt6 quell
"coal era 'su participaciiin en
el asunto de las becas". y 000
61 debie conocer lors.anteceden-
tee de los postulantes. Le dije.,
lode incluse a mi .ree hehiarij
Tsorprendido con la nremura deti
'hacer la reunion, ka que ? me,t1
'oblig6 a preparar .acelerada- Y '
mente un Informe sobre -las
actividades; quo en' todo ea,:
So las solicitudes de. 145 pre-'
fieleceionados estaban en: cit
Institute esperandow:que de un?
Memento. antro- las, rettraran
la.Embajada..Anto tato me
1. 1041,PitaittelaRami
_ . . .
disponfa la realizacion de re.
?uniones de directorio, le dlia
:"usted, senor presidente". Le
ordend a la secretaria eller at
;;.Directorio pare el tunes 14 ai
:las 17 horas y le pregunto si)
flenia Malin inconveniente pars.)
'que el se llevare los doeumeni
,les, Posteriormente se Ileve? tos
f dos los documentos. declaranda .
;tando ,el envie a su domicili
,nula la preseleccidn Y solic.1:1
lade los documentos ' de,' irides,
Hos otros postulantes. ? ' 1 i
pc; Ante estos hechos, Adriana; '
/-*Millas llama al Comite Can.; ;
s?t tral del PC, sollcitando hablae .
*con Oscar. Diaz Iturrieta, encar. .
. Ciacio nacional de 10S. institutors;
rte contes.t6 ? quo' cstaba do
1A"wvacaciones; soliclt6 entoncer it '
ti "sellora Virginia", 'clue ,et
:secretaria ' de ,', Diaz Iturrieta)
'quo ?viniera reinstitute. Eats'
illtInie so ;negd -retundadient0.
..#reconiendfindole a la senora Mi.;
9, a
IN
.11
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team consisting of Segovia, Ubeda and Gardia; and that their
'choices had later been protested by the President, Mr. Silva ,
:Cimma. 'Baltra gave me his private telephone number, so that '
Segovia could call him that very day and give him a full ex-
planation. He also remarked that 'an overly legalistic cri-
terion' had evidently been applied in the pre-seleotion. Later
Segovia tried to have Fernando T explain to Baltra that
the one who had been responsib a or the failure of his.candi.
dates to be pre-selected was 'his friend and protector, Silva
Cimma.'"
The following entry on this topic appears subsequently
in the File: "When Segovia inquired of Air France the number
of passengers arriving from Moscow, he was told that there were
27, instead;Of 26. Later investigations proved that the 27th
ticket belonged to Manuel Bachelet Pizarro, the brother-in-law
.of Radical Senator Hugo Miranda. Baohelet, who resided at 2093
Los Araucanos, in Santiago, had not been pre-selected, and,
when the pre-selections were announcedr withdrew his application.,;
Senator Baltra requested information from the Institute, point-
ing out the feasibility of a grant for Bachelet Pizarro, in view;c
of his status as Senator Miranda's brother-in-law. The negotia-
tions to Secure this grant were carried out by Senator Baltra -
.with the Soviet Ambassador in Santiago."
T:On 17 June 1969, Lumumba University-in Moscow sent the''
Ilist of those selected to Santiago. According to the File:
"Of the 26 names sent by Lumumba, 24 were those of individuals
who had been pre-selected by the Institute, and, two for grants..
offered by the Soviet Embassy. The latter scholarships went
to Gilberto Cepeda Contreras and Luis Monardes Jogo; the former
iapparently received his grant as a result of the intercession
,of former Senator Baltazar Cafftro."
At Moscow, the academic achievement of the Chileails has
been less than satisfactory. At a meeting with Kunakov? on 22
January 1969, at the Soviet Embassy, First Secretary Dimitriy
Pastujov cited this matter in detail. The File reports: "A
report was received by the Embassy on the unfortunate performance
of the Chilean scholarship holders at Lumumba. Among other
things, Santiago had been officially informed of the
of Nelson ()lave, in February 1968, 'on account ofdrunkunness.!
The individual in question had postponed hisLireturn to Chile
several times, but, since this-situation had gone on too long,
and ?lave's behavior was bad, it was 'decided to expel him. The
Embassy was notified of this decision. Pastujov officially
reported to the Institute that the number of scholarships to
Lumumba University for 1969 had been out to 20, owing to the -
poor performanoe of the Chilean students. He added that, at ,,
the present time, over 200 Chileans were taking courses. there,::
and that, of this number, about 120 were academically unfit.
-
In the University's classification of academia
Ithe Chileans,were in next-to-last. pl.aoe.11 -
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66bierienfenti?1.
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they traveled individually to East Ber-
lin, where they exchanged their Mex-
ican passports for false North Korean-
passports. They regrouped in Moscow,
where they visited for ten days before fly-
ing to Pyongyang on a Soviet Aeroflot '
'plane. Next came six months of train-
ing in guerrilla tactics, radiotelegraphy,
Judo and use of weapons. Retracing
-their steps through Moscow and East
Berlin, the youthful firebrands returned
to Mexico and, during the next year,
with another $16,000 supplied by North
Korea, recruited 40 more like-minded
revolutionaries to make similar trips to
Pyongyang.
The movement, which only really got
off the ground last August, turned out
to be short-lived. On Dec. 19, six MAR
members allegedly assaulted a bank mes-
senger and snatched a strongbox con- i
taining $84,000 in U.S. currency, The '
raid put the police on their tracks. The
break in the case finally came when a
MAR member named Francisco Parades
Ruiz was arrested on a vagrancy eharge
'March 1 and police found a phony pass-
port on him. Under interrogation, Pa-
rades Ruiz reportedly informed on the
others in exchange for immunity. With
his information, police soon arrested
19 more MAR members on a wide va-
riety of charges.
Soviet Involvement. The youths read-
ily admitted that they had received guer-
rilla training in North Korea. "No easy
coup d' lint was planned," said Go-
mez, "but a long struggle, guerrilla war-
?
fare and armed confrontation." At first,
the Mexican government cautiously
avoided implicating the Soviet Union
and put full blame on the North Ko-
reans with whom Mexico has no dip-
lomatic relations. But when it came to
light that no less than 50 Mexicans
had crisscrossed the Soviet Union on
-North Korean passports, the Mexican
government reacted angrily, expelling
five top-ranking Russian diplomats and
recalling its own ambassador from Mos-
cow. Western intelligence said that the
diplomats had been directly involved
with MAR'S activities. As police stepped
up the search for 28 other members of
the ill-fated movement, the Soviet em-
bassy issued a statement proclaiming
its "strict observance of the principle
of nonintervention in the acts of each
country." But few Mexicans could ac-
cept that profession of innocence.
The episode may mean a considerable
setback for Soviet foreign policy in
Latin America. In the last two decades,
Moscow has established diplomatic re-
lations with every. South American
country except Paraguay, and assidu-
ously cultivated a Via Pacifica policy
emphasizing cultural exchange programs
and trade agreements as a means to
'peaceful expansion and influence. The
first repercussions came from Costa
Rica, which postponed negotiations for
a Soviet embassy in San Jos?It would
have been the first for the Russians in
Central America.
14
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CPYRGHT
"Vte I It
, NW OR tio,ar ai
segovia tencareado (lel. PC en
f,e1 Institut()) por talefono e
Arica, y limp) se.consiguid ubt-
sear a Fernando Garda, secre-,
;tario general Interino, quien Se
Cencoritraba en el Teatro Astor,,l
i,Garcia autorizo el env16 de la%
elocumentacion a 'Silva Clmmat
tY la realizacidn de la teunlOk
el lanes". .
f'! La relaelda precedent* ilua.'?
muy Wen el paPel dechavell
"que juega et PC en el otorga.f
trelento de becas Y en ?Ia. c11.1
Yrecclen del Institute., Otros ca-1
sos de Intervencion, politica, ell
etre. muchos, son los siguientes:
!,1' ?Carmen Marsellesa Pere1-1
t%)'a Perla ranunc16 a la beca?
iobtenida para ingresar a la?
f Facultad de Medicina de la U.
!ALuburnba. Eh su reemplazo
4P CCH. en comunicacion dr.4.
;5-VIII.69 prOpuso por interme>
ti.dlo del I:litituto a la mi1itan4
te de le Juventud Comunistai
Ai Alicia Mullett Romero, La no.
pta fun entregada Ethbajadort
asovietleo en la fecha indicada;
q'? ?En el Archive Kunakov sil
anota: "El viernce 7 (marz
0.069) Nitre llama por telefol
al Institute y me consultd
Otabre los motives de. que anti
eandldatos, o sea, las persol
nas recomendadas por el, ni si
iuiera fueron preseleccionadas4
,1rotest6 por el hecho de. quei
Incluso ei candidato presental
cdo por el, pariente del senador.
?Hugo Miranda, no fug prese.;
Occcionado. Le Informe a Bat,:
,,,,tra quo la selecciOn la liable
i?realliado un equipo integradd;
'por Segovia, Ubeda y Garcia%
quo posterlprmente este' seleol
chin fue ;ntojetada par e1 pre'
dente senor Silva Chnmei
tBilitra tni? din ati telefoon part
".ticular *con el objeto de qua
iiSegovia In Ilamara ese mismo
Ildfa? y le dlera ampliai explica4
kelones; expres6 edemas que el
rparecer se liable adoptado
tsoeritero demasiado legallste
Zen la preseleceldn". Posterior)
?.)nente Segovia estaba tratanddi
lbgrar quo Fernando Garcia t
? re milkers a Molten que el;
It ?
Cusavapaniable de la no preselee.,
elan do sus recornendados era!
min amigo' y compadre. Slice
j:Cimma".
t.,11 Sobre este problema, en ell
,I1Archivo aparece post erio
temente la siguiente note: "Sego)
Vvia al ?solicitar a Mr France!
ntimero de pasajes Togadoe
Monti, se inform6 que
'dn vez de 26 /easajes, habfa 274 .
rEn averlguaciones posterioree
confirm6 due el pasaje nti-!
1. mete 27 correspondfa a. Eduar.:
do Manuel .Bachelet Ptzarro,
?"cunadO del senador radical Hu...,
1?,
titgo Miranda. Bachelet, con do:,/
nnicillo en Santiago, to Arau-
P.;oanos 2093. no habfa aid? pre.
eleccionado y luego de publl-
earso la preselecclon retire, Bur
kdOcumentos. EI senador Baltra
Informaciones al ? Ins.
;.tituto' inanIfestando. la ? donve.
nIenclitie una. beca para. Ba.1
ihehelat .Plzarra, por' flu entitled)
pickC miliaria- delna* . se Miran,*
f La igestldn .Para Obtene
r "silts beta fun.. /*allude pore;
oefuldot : Baltresote...01: Embv
iador sovietIco en Santiago".
I. ?El 17 de junto de 1969 Ia.
(UniversIdad Lumumba de Mos-
etilenvie? a Santiago la lista de
as selecclonados, Segiln eL
latrehivo "de los 26 nombres en4-
jvlados pox. 1 Lumumba, .24 co:
tresoonden a eireaelerrInnadna
or 'el Instituto y dos do ellos
hecas otorgadas por la Ent.'
'bajada sovietica. Etas bccate,
reorrospondon a Gilberto Cepo.,',
,11a,, Contreras y Luis Monardes
Wage; al parecer el primer() re-)
lolbid..la beca por ? gestiones4
trealizadas par el ex ' senadoti
Illaylazar Castro"t ?
Mosta el renchmiento aca
datieo'tie' lea ehilartos es me.li!
qtle discrota, En um;
Wilton "con Kunakov, el 22 de
[endro de '1969 en la Embajade.
oyietica.? el ?Primer Secretarial
pirnitri Pastujov se refirld de-1
talladamente a este ,problema.4,:
.Ex'presa el Archivo:. "En' lak
'Embajade se recibl6 un infor-;
Ina' sabre 'el triste papel clue;
eaten hacienda los becadas
ienoe en la Lumumba, Entre,.
?otras COUS se informd oficia1.1
intente a Santiago sabre la exii
fpillslan ."por ebriedad" 'de Nei.
on Olave, en febrero de 1968.%
T1: afectado ? !labia, postergadoT
fyiriaa veces su retorno a Chl-.1,
-per? como esta situacidnj
prolong6 demasiado, y Olavo ;
-tenfa male conducta, se resol.
.,.
.v16 sti expulsion.. La decisiOnl
juo comunicada 'a la Embajada.:!
?Pastujov informo oficialmento
;el' Institute elle el nilinere de;
..tbekas a la U. Lumumba pare'
i1969.fue rebajada a 20 por
iaJ rendimiento de los estu-1
idlantes chilenos. Agreg6 Altie7
t'eta la actualidad m?de 2004,,
rilenos siguen eursos alit, del
ok cuales alretiedor AO 120 son.:
'dadeMicos Ineapeces;'Los.
atm Ilguran en' .0l. pentillbno-
NdiV,en la elialtleacion'..de,liv,
lvtirsIdad...soloy.; tendizzitentol
.;.r v
TIME
19 April 1971
MEXICO
Troubles on the Via Pacifica
CPYRGHT
Political one-upmanship in Mexico
frequently comes in the guise of a com-
ic. hook. All factions can and do com-
pete to produce the cleverest and most
convincing interpretation of national
events. Last week a new comic hit the
stands. On the cover was Miss Liberty
in all her Grecian-gowned glory, about
to be done in by sinister men armed
with rifles and long Turkish knives. Were
those the Russian and North Korean
flags over their heads? They most cer-
tainly were. This unabashedly patriotic
comic, the handiwork of a wealthy, mid-
dle-aged illustrator named Jos?. Cruz,
spins out in cartoons, photographs and
cryptic c!.:alogue what many Mexicans
are talking about these da/s: the arrest
2.0 YeAprOrtriWaDdrailtRifitilifiS
who traveled to North Korea for guer-
rilla training and returned home to cause
the severest strain in Mexican-Soviet re-
lations since Leon Trotsky sought asy-
lum in Mexico in 1937.
2 de Ocfubre. Even without the com-
ic embellishments, which probably ex-
aggerate the Soviet role in the affair,
the story is a remarkable account of in-
ternational intrigue. As pieced together
by TIME correspondents from various
sources, it all began in the dormitory
of Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship
University in Moscow. The time was Oc-
tober 1968. Upset by the bloody uni-
versity riots in Mexico City that month,
which claimed at least 34 lives, six Mex-
ici
eget?113 yingattavil
?s Pal
gether and decided to form a clan-
destine organization. They named it
Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria
(MAR) and called the guerrilla unit the
2 de Octubre, the date of the massacre.
Fabricio Gomez Souza, one of the stu-
dents, made contact with the North Ko-
rean embassy in Moscow and arranged
to visit Pyongyang. There he received
the North Koreans' assurance that they
would give the Mexican students polit-
ical and military training. Back in Mos-
cow, he was handed $10,000 by the
North Korean embassy to finance the
students' travels.
Gomez then returned to Mexico,
where he recruited several more as-
avoid sus-
sPrItitittft - t nte agencies,
? ?
17
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CPYRGHT
BALTIMORE SUN
28 March 1971
Suspicioas' Raised By Soviet-Bolivia Cultural Exchange
By Boni= A. EttILANDSON
Sun Staff Correspondent
La Paz, Bolivia?A purportel
long-range Soviet plot to intro.
duce North Korean-tra ned Me) -
lean guerrillas into Mexico ap.
parently is being repeated her
in Bolivia.
Some sources are convince
that Moscow had guerrilla trait -
trig in mind when it signed
recent cultural exchange agree
ment to offer scholarsh ps
,eight Bolivian students yearly i
undergraduate and postrgaduat
Work at Moscow's Patrice Lt
mumba University, in additio
to other scholarships at othe ?
Soviet irstitutions and an e.
change of professorships.
t According to reports here, th2
Russ ans selected 10 leftist Me)
ion students to attend the urn.
versity in 1963 on four-yea
Scholarships. After graudatio
teh reports said, they were sert
by way of East Germany t
North Korea, on North Korean
passports, for an intensive sin-
month course in guerrilla war,
fare.
Subsequently, the reports con-
tinted, another 10 students f0-
loWiid the SAMS route and Pined
their colleagues in establ shing
, t, 01Ang and recruiting
centers in the Mexican hinter-
lands.
When the Mexican govern-
ment discover xi the plot earlier
this month, it expelled five
Soviet d pIonts, includng the
man who reportedly recruited
the first students.
The Russir ns have been
carrying on a cultural and com-
? mercial offer sive throughout
Latin Ameriza for several
years, sendh4 delegations and
top entertainn ent attractions to
convince the various govern-
ments of the sincerity of the r
purposes in a ding underdevel-
oped nations.
Prelude Co Election
Ths was pa licularly evident
in Chile last year as a prelude to
the Septembe election which
saw a Marx i it,, Salvador Al-
lende, emerge a president. ?
? Bolivia, 1 le other Latin
American courtries catight up in
thi current ware of nationalism,
appears to be turning to Rossi'
and East European countries in
deliberate effort to Rd itself of
any taint of United athttql dorni
nat on. This has certainly been
the case with Chile and Peru.
There has been no official re-
action here yet to the Mexican
affair. But it must be assumed
that all Latin American govern-
ments, especially those which
already have guerrilla prob-
lems, will take second looks e
any agreements they might
have with Russia. It may well
set back the Soy et efforts in
Latin America for several '
years.
Five Agreements
The Bolivian program in
eludes five agreements, three
commercial accords, one for sci-
entific co-operation and the lat-
est, signed February 25 in Mos-
cow and reaffirmed here two
weeks ago, the cultural ex-
change agreement.
Under the cultural accord,
university degrees w 11 be mu-
tually recognized in the two
countries and the Soviet Union
will extend scholarships to Bo-
livian. students for unlimited
technical and scientific stud es
in Russia in areas needed for
Bolivian development.
It also provides for full cultur
al exchange on an academic ley-,
el, with exchange visits between
Bolivian and Russian profes,
sors. The Bol vian academic
community is markedly leftist,
and the student organizations I
are led by Havana-Peking ori-
ented students.
All the agreements with Boli-
de contain provision for mutual
recognition of sovereignty, inde-
pendence and non- ntervention
in domestic affairs. So, presupil
ably, did the one with Mexico.
THE CURRENT WEEKLY, India
10 April 1971
S VIET PLOT
A ai st 2 Govts.
A 'CURRENT' Special
N March 15, it was announced that the r011ee had
-0
smashed a plot against the Mexican Government and
arrested 19 terrorists at "Guerilla , Academies" and
various secret hideouts. On March 16 the. Government of
Ceylon declared a state of emergency as tt precautionary
measure against a coup by the People's Liberation Front.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 March 1971
CPYRGHT
Guerrilla slot in exico linL e
to Soviet cultural institute
By Conrad Manley.
Special to The Christina &tome Mon
Mexico City 0 The Soviet Embassy's control of the cul-
tural center is exercised by its cultural
attach?Boris N. Voskoboinikov, who was
in Santiago, Chile,, as a student for six'
months in 1965 and who has been active
here among members of the Mexican Corn-
munist. Youth.
He is assisted by Konstantin N. Verzhbit-
, sky, assistant. cultural and sports attache,
who devotes Much time to youth and uni-
versity groups here and in Veracruz,
Guadalajara, Morelia, and other provincial
cities of MexitO.
With the arrest and arraignment of IL
Mexican urban guerrillas reportedly trained
:In the Soviet Union and North Korea, the
'spotlight here is on the Mexican-Russian 1'
'Institute for ? Cultural .Exchange which
:anted them scholarships in Moscow.
The Institute, which functions, with thel
rfinancial assistance and under the direction
of the Soviet Embassy, recruited 50 Mexi-4
can students between 1968 and 1970 to study
at the Patrice Lumumba University iri'Mos-
Equipment seized
? From Mosca:-, through arrangements
with the North Korean Embasy, they alleg-
,..edly went in three groups to Pyongyang
Am political indoctrination, training in the
'Ilse of ? weapons and explosives, and strate-
gy and tactics of urban and rural guerrillas ,
in courses of six months to one year.
The 19 guerrillas weretaptured with mill.
tary weapons, uniforms, short-wave radios,
quantities of Communist propaganda, and
other materials and were charged with
"planning to impose an Mexico a Marxist-
Leninist regime." Others members of the
guerrilla teams are still being sought by ,
Mexican authorities.
Attorney General Julia Sanchez Vargas I
reported that confessions by members of
the band not only confirmed their travels
and training abroad but also implicated
.:hem in an'484,000 robbery of a bank mes-
senger here last December and in the acci-
dental killing of one of their fellow guer-
rillas during target practice in the state of,
Michoacan.
Scholarships arranged
The Mexican-Russian Institute, headed
by Adelina Zendejas Gomez, had, as of last
fall, arranged scholarships for 150 Mexican
students who now are at the Patrice Lu-
rnumba University. ?
The institute also functions here as both a
language training school and a cultural cen-
ter in which Russian books and periodicals
are available and events such as film show-
liTerved it* tReikVVITM19/02
na. ts, and t e hke are nei regui .
Membership is estimated at 2,300 members
IIJi, dic of ly 80 ecntl
Expulsions recalled
The present minister counselor of the Rus-
dan Embassy in Mexico, Dmitri A. Diako-
iov, who previously served as its press
attache, was expelled from Argentina in
.958 and from Brazil in 1963 for allegedly
_ntervening, as an agent of the Soviet secret
"once, the KGB, in internal affairs of both
:ountries.
Although a cultural agreement between
Vlexico and/the Soviet Union, signed in Oc-
tober, 1968, calls for a mutual exchange of,
Midents, the trafc has all been one way.:
rhis situation was blamed by Mr. Vosko-
Joiniltov in September on the Mexican Gov-
!rnment, which, he said, "will not award
my scholarships" for Russians to study in
Nlexico.
Tour of Europe
A group affiliated with the institute, the
Latin American Institute of Cultural Stu-
dent and Teacher Interchange (ILICEM
from its initials in Spanish), organized in
1970, has sponsored for Mexican partici-
pants a 52-day tour of Europe, including
the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Denmark, Swe-
len, Finland, and ,Austria for the bargain
price of $1,360.
Mexicans and resident foreigners here
are intensely interested as to whether, in
its trials of the Marxist-Leninist urban ?
guerrillas, the Mexican Government will
implicate even More the Mexican-Russian
Institute for Cultural Exchange.
, If it is demonstrated that the binational
: CIA-RDP MVP NOVO 41iiiafi,
Aminging for
dos-
ing of the institute and expulsion of the
Soviet diplomats might be the minimal re.
25X1 C1 Ob
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1971
THE SOVIET SECURITY CONFERENCE OFFENSIVE
Two international conferences scheduled for May and June
will include as major discussion topics on their agendas,
variants of the concept of European security and the matter
of a conference on European security (CES). They are the
World Peace Assembly, meeting 13-16 May in Budapest and the
25th Congress of the Socialist International, meeting 25-27 May
in Helsinki. The Soviets can be expected to take every
possible propaganda advantage they can from these two meetings.
One they will run from behind-the-scenes and the other they
will try to manipulate.
Soviet Propaganda Offensive
The Soviet campaign to bring about, as soon as possible,
a conference on European security is going ahead at two
levels.-- governmental and public. At both levels, the
Soviet propaganda offensive is calculated to divide the
U.S. and its European allies by nurturing European suspicions
about U.S. commitments in Western Europe and convincing
West Europeans that America is the only stumbling block
to the: convening of a. CES. At the same time, the USSR
seeks to induce the people of Western Europe to pressure
their governments into acceding to the Soviet request for a
CES.
On the government level, Leonid Brezhnev told the recent
24th Party Congress that the majority of European countries
had come out in favor of a CES and that preparations for it
were moving along. However, this is far from true. While
the majority of European countries express agreement in
principle, several are also adamant in their insistence on
a satisfactory Berlin solution and on an informal and
flexible exploratory phase as preconditions to any preparations
for a conference dealing with European security. Finland,
too, is successfully resisting Warsaw Pact pressure to speed
up preparations for a CES. Faced with these obstacles, the
Soviets have now shifted their main focus of effort to the
unofficial level while they continue to try to apply diplomatic
pressure and to vocalize at the government level.
At the unofficial level, the Soviets are operating on
the theory that if the electorate is swayed, so will be the
parliament. At this level, Soviet propaganda is designed
to sway public opinion through the tactic of getting various
professional, youth, labor, or peace organizations to go on
record in favor of a CES thereby bringing pressure to bear
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on West European governments to show some fdrward movement.
Their aim, of course, is to ultimately make it appear that
the initiative for a CES --- whatever form it takes ---
comes as much from the people of Western Europe as from Moscow.
World Peace Assembly
At the end of last year, the International Institute
for Peace held a conference in Vienna which was billed by
Pravda as an attempt "to mobilize public opinion in the
direction of a European security conference". The actual
sponsor of the conference was the World Peace Council
(WPC) and its chief organizer was Maurice Lambilliote,
chairman of the Belgian Council of Peace (affiliate of
the WPC) and the Belgian-Soviet Friendship Society. It was
at this conference that plans were laid for a "Congress of
the European Peoples on Security and Cooperation".
Some 65 delegates attended the Vienna conference; the
majority represented the WPC and other Communist-front
organizations. A series of reports was delivered on the
subject of European commercial, technical, and scientific
exchanges and on the main political aspects of European
security. These papers are now being incorporated by the
secretariat of the WPC into a "Charter of European Security"
which will be the basic working document for the plenary
congress that the WPC hopes to convene sometime during.
1971 or 1972.
This month, the WPC is holding a World Peace Assembly
in Budapest to which all member organizations have been
invited along with various groups of sympathizers and
representatives from large numbers of Communist-front
organizations. A special committee will be concerned
with European security and the plenary congress project.
In the Warsaw Pact countries and in some West European
countries, national committees are already at work preparing
for the congress. Additional committees will be set up
during the assembly.
The Belgian national committee, headed by Lambilliotte,
is to play the key role in organizing a "committee of
distinguished personalities in public life" to sponsor
the congress, so as to give it the appearance of being
held in response to the demands of West Europeans of
varied political persuasions and from all sectors of
society. Participants will be drawn from trade unions,
women, youth, and professional organizations.
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Out of the plenary congress is to come a Charter of
European Security and Cooperation. Congress participants
will form standing committees throughout Europe dedicated
to influencing public opinion to bring pressure on West
European governments to accede to Moscow's call for an
imminent conference on European security. The aim, of
course, is to make it appear that the initiative for a
CES comes from the West as well as from Moscow.
Socialist Opinion on CES
In January this year, Britain's "shadow Defense Minister",
George Thomson, told a meeting of the Bureau of the
Socialist International in London that if the Soviet Union
was "acting in good faith in demanding a European security
conference leading to progress and detente, then Berlin is
a reasonable test of that good faith." Mr. Thomson felt
that a major breakthrough or a major setback in East-West
relations could be imminent and that Berlin was the crucial
litmus test. (A reprint of the text of Mr. Thomson's
address published in Socialist Affairs is attached.)
Finland Resists Moscow's Pressuring
The government of Finland has quite clearly committed
itself to being the cautious broker in the eventual
convening of a conference on European security. In all
proposals made since May 1969 when Finland formally offered
to sponsor an East-West security conference, up to the
most recent offer to host a "multilateral gathering of
ambassadors" preparatory to a CES, Finland has been careful
to maintain its neutrality and not to Side with either East
or West.
The Finnish government is, however, being almost
crudely pressured by the Warsaw Pact to hurry matters along
to the extent Of calling immediately for an ambassadorial
gathering with or without America and some of her West
European allies. Finland has been firm in resisting this
pressure. The only exception came after the issuance of
the December 1970 NATO communique in which that body
deferred on the Finnish proposal for a multilateral gathering
pending additional progress at the bilateral level and on
Berlin. To the embarrassment of his government, Foreign
Minister Leskinen then told a meeting of the Social
Democratic Parliamentary Group that NATO was "escalating
the conditions stipulated by the West" and suggested that
preparations for a CES should begin even if some countries
were unable to accept the Finnish invitation. Prime
Minister Karjalainen almost immediately slapped Leskinen's
wrist by telling a television audience that Finland most
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certainly would not host a "rump" conference on European
security.
Official Warsaw Pact pressuring began with a visit to
Helsinki in late January by Hungarian Prime Minister Fock who
told a press conference that Finland should issue invitations
for ambassadorial level talks on CES even though the U.S.
and some West Europeans might not attend. Three days later,
Prime Minister Karjalainen again publicly rejected the
idea of beginning such discussions before they were
acceptable to all the states involved. By March, Foreign
Minister Leskinen, too was publicly rejecting any speed-up
in CES preparations. While on a three day visit to Austria,
Leskinen told a press conference that to attempt to speed
up preparations for a CES "would be like hitting one's
head against the wall" and said that bilateral talks should
be continued.
A hint that Finland will be subjected to further Warsaw
Pact pressures has just came from Poland. Jozef Ozga-
Michalski, who is both vice president of the Polish
Peasant Party and chairman of foreign relations in the Polish
parliament, has publicly criticized the U.S. for its "braking
role" in CES preparatory work. Speaking at a 17 March press
conference in Warsaw, Ozga-Michalski said that the sponsors
of CES wanted a universal gathering, but that if one country
consistently vetoed conference preparations, then the possi-
bility of proceeding with an empty chair at the meeting
table should be considered. Just the week before, Warsaw
government leaders had been visited by Soviet ambassador-
at-large and specialist at "peacekeeping", Lev Isaakovich
Mendelevich. It is therefore speculated that this newest
"empty chair" concept was born in Moscow and that Mendelevich
brought orders for its public appearance with him to
Warsaw.
4
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SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, London
February 1971?
SOCIALISTS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Progress on Berlin is the Key
GEORGE.' THOMSON
Britain's Shadow Defence Minister sets out the attitude of the
British Labour Party to the proposal for a conference on European
security. He feels that a major breakthrough or a major setback
in East-West relations could be imminent, and specifies the Berlin
issue as the crucial litmus test.'
P., British Labour Party regards the
key to world peace as still lying in the
heart 4f Europe. There are, of course,
important north - south ' problems.
There are also urgent international
dangers in the Middle East. Never-
theless, the danger of international
conflict from either north-south prob-
lems or Middle East tensions is the
danger of conflict by accident.' The
heart of the balance of power on
which the peaCe of the world depends
today is still in Europe and is the
balance between the Atlantic Alliance
on the one side and the Warsaw Pact
Alliance on the other. It is against
that background that we in the British
Labour Party approach these problems.
My view is that we are probably at
the beginning of a very critical period
in the relationship between Eastern
and Western Europe. In one way I
believe that we could be on the verge
of a major breakthrough in East-West
relations. On the other hand, if the
breakthrough is not achieved; then I
think we must face the fact that we
will probably find ourselves conscious
of a very sharp setback. The pros-
pects of a European Security Confer-
ence have been considerably increased
over the last few months. By this I
mean the prospects of a European
security conference which has been
properly prepared, which has the right
sort of attendance and which has an
agenda that will enable it to do serious
business. This kind of European
security conference, which is, I believe,
now a possibility, is of course a long
way from the original proposal of
the Soviet Bloc, which was much more
a propaganda manoeuvre than a pro-
posal for making a real and construc-
tive contribution to Eurppean d?nte.
d For Rcicc
Why has this change come about?., the leader of a coalition government
Why are, there these possibilities either _ with an extremely narrow majority.
of breakthrough or of setback? The
' major new event in the European field
has been the Ostpolitik pursued by the
German Chancellor, Willy Brandt,
and by the Government led by the
German Social Democratic Party. We
in Britain have watched with both
anxiety and admiration the progress
199?10?? 102 ? CIA' RDP79 011? 4A000300100 01
Because of this background, it is
important to record that Willy Brandt
now needs and deserves some positive
sign of response from the Soviet
Union and from the Eastern Bloc. It
is in this sense that I believe that on
the one hand there is the possibility
of a major breakthrough. Yet on the
that Willy' Brandt has made in his other hand, if the breakthrough does
negotiations with the Soviet Union, not come, the very fact that Brandt
with Poland and indeed with other has gone as far as he has and that
Eastern European countries. He has hopes have been raised in the way
signed treaties with the Soviet Union that they have, could lead to quite a
and Poland, subject to ratification, and significant and sad setback. Certainly
this has of course transformed the my own impression of the German
possibilities in East-West relations in political scene is that Willy Brandt
Europe. is under very substantial pressure at
This is because the heart of the the moment in his own country.
European problem remains the Ger- The position that Willy Brandt has
man problem. No one needs to be taken, which the British Labour Party
reminded of the very deep suspicion has very strongly supported, is that
which has existed through the whole we have now come to a stage where
post-war period in Poland and the progress in relation to the problem of
Soviet Union of German motives and Berlin is a reasonable and necessary
German policies. Often these suspi- pre-requisite to making progress in
dons have been deliberately fanned the direction of a European security
and exaggerated by the communists conference.
for political purposes. Nevertheless it Perhaps I could explain why we
remains a fact that underneath the attach such vital importance to pro-
political provocation there was a very gress on Berlin at the present, time.
real hard core of fear and suspicion. First of all, it is important in human
It is the eroding of that fear and terms that the people of Berlin should
suspicion which is the remarkable have much freer movement and that
achievement of Willy Brandt and of there should be altogether much easier
the present Federal German Govern- access. All the, parties of the Inter-
ment, national should be conscious of the
We must be conscious also, as general duty that the socialist move-
socialists, not only of the constructive ment has to preserve human liberty
nature of the work that Brandt and inside Berlin. Secondly, I believe it is
his Government have undertaken in perfectly proper to say that if the
the field of East-West relations, but Soviet Union is really acting in good
also of the great political risk that he faith in demanding a European security
has taken in so doing. He is, after all, conference leadind to irogress and
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d?nte, then Berlin is a reasonable
test of that good faith.
Finally, from the point of view of
Britain and the other West Berlin
powers (to say nothing of the point of
view of the Soviet Union), if there is
to be progress towards East-West
d?nte it is very important indeed
that the four-power responsibilities in
relation to Berlin are reasserted and
safeguarded. In the first place, it is
i. aportant to Britain, as a Western
power guaranteeing liberty in Berlin,
that the progress of the Ostpolitik is
not of such a nature that Britain,
France and the United States end up
with continued responsibilities in West
Berlin but with their rights to fulfil
these responsibilities undermined by
whatever agreement might be reached.
Equally,, there is a good deal of
evidence that the Soviet Union is not
anxious for its share of the Four
Power responsibility for Berlin to
be undermined in favour of East
Germany.
I would now like to consider the
question of a European security con-
ference itself?what it ought to seek
to achieve and what would be the
problems facing it. First of all, I
would emphasise the very noticeable
improvement which has taken place in
regard to the communist conditions
for a European security conference.
Eighteen months ago it was ,,by no
means clear that the communists
would not once again seek to use a
European security conference to try
to drive a wedge between the Euro-
pean allies within NATO and the
United States and Canada. Now it has
been, I believe, established beyond
doubt that Canada and the United
States would be members of inch a
conference without question from the
beginning.
Secondly, there was a very great
reluctance on the part of the Eastern
Bloc even to consider the question of
mutual force reductions being a part
of he agenda of a European security
conference. Although the communist
position is not as clear on this as it
is on the membership of the confer-
ence. I think there are some signs of
movement on the Eastern side.
And finally, there has been the idea
of the conference leading to the estab-
lishment of some kind of permanent
machinery. To begin with, this idea
was greeted with great scepticism by
the communist side. Once again there
have been signs of movement here.
? *
As the British Labour Party sees it,
the purposes of a European security
conference would be three-fold. First
of all, taking the easiest aspect, which
the communist side has always empha-
sized, it would no doubt be useful to
discuss at a general European con-
ference the means of improving the
momentum of exchanges in the techni-
cal, social and economic fields. These
go on at the moment; they can always
benefit from an extra impetus. But
this part of the conference would be
largely declaratory. Real progress in
East-West exchanges in the technical
and social fields is bound to be
achieved on a bi-lateral basis rather
than multi-laterally. Indeed, if one
tried to set up multi-lateral machinery
for this purpose I think you would
retard the pace of progress rather than
speed it up.
Secondly, there is the question of
the conference leading to some con-
tinuing machinery. This is something
in which we in the British Labour
Party have been very interested for a
considerable time. Indeed, it was
Michael Stewart, as our Foreign
Secretary, who can claim to have
taken a leading part in trying to pro-
mote this idea within the Atlantic
Alliance. What we envisage is the
emergence of permanent East-West
machinery on the political plane that
would match the European Economic
Commission (which is an East-West
forum in Geneva) on the economic
plane. We would not think of this as
any dramatic breakthrough. Neverthe-
less, the establishment of continuing
machinery would make a constructive
contribution, and would help to enable
those countries in Eastern Europe who
have a different emphasis on various
problems from that of the Soviet
Union to be given the maximum
opportunity to develop that difference
of emphasis and to enable Europe
generally to talk about its problems
with a greater sense of continuity.
Finally, there is the main question
of promoting security; that is, the
problem of producing some kind of
reduction of armaments inside Europe.
The NATO countries have been put-
ting forward proposals for balanced
force reductions for a considerable
time now, with until very recently a
totally negative response from the
communist side. We ought not to
conceal the very substantial difficulties
involved in making a reality of mutual -
force reductions. The Warsaw Pact
countries have an overwhelming pre-
ponderance of conventional forces as
against those deployed by the NATO
countries. And therefore the key
formula in terms of mutual force
reductions which we must always keep
in mind is the concept of what I would
call equality of security. By this I
mean that it is not enough to take
arithmetically the same number of
forces from each side. You have to
take forces from each side in a way
which at any stage in the process
leaves security in as good a state as it
was before the process began. And
, this may very well mean an asymetri-
cal reduction in forces ? a different
volume of force reduction on the
1Warsaw Pact side as compared with
reductions on the NATO side. Simply
to put it that way underlines the very
considerable difficulties involved in
making progress.
The final question is whether, in
fact, the Soviet Union and its allies
are now really serious in wanting to
make progress or whether they still
simply see a European security con-
ference as a method of making people
forget as quickly as possible the 1968
events in Czechoslovakia and of help-
ing to legitimise the status quo in
Europe. I believe myself that there
are cautious grounds for believing that
the Soviet Bloc may mean some kind
of business in this field. First of all,
the Soviet Union itself obviously has
an interest in arrangements on its
Western flank that safeguard whatever
might develop on its Eastern flank,
where it has the longest and most
disputed frontier in the world with
China.
Secondly, I would guess from what
contacts I have these days with the
communist side that probably there is
an increasing awareness of the poli-
tical risks that Brandt has taken in
Germany and of the risk that the
Ostpolitik might go under if it is not
given some concessions which demon-
strate its success to public opinion
inside Germany. Thirdly, there are
the differences within the Eastern Bloc
to which I have referred. These pro-
bably encourage progress rather than
discourage it. Finally, there is the fact
that the Soviet Union is engaged in
the SALT talks with the United States.
Although these talks have now gone
on for some time?without visible pro-
gress, what is significant is that they
have continued despite a number of
events in various parts of the world
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CPYRGHT
which might easily have led either side
in the talks to have broken them off.
There have been crises between the
Soviet Union and the US over the
Middle East; the SALT talks have
gone on. There has been the fact that
the Soviet Union appeared to behave
provocatively near the shores of Cuba;
the SALT talk have gone on, One
can draw from this the conclusion
that both sides in the SALT talks are
talking seriously. This fact has large
implications both for the future of
Western Europe and for the prospects
of a European security conference.
FRANKFURTER AILGEMEINE ZEITUNG Frankfurt
12, February 1971
* This article, exclusive to SOCIALIST
_AFFAIRS, is based on an address which
George Thomson gave to the January
19 meeting of he Bureau of the Socialist
International in London.
VARIED REACTION IN SCANDINAVIA TO IDEA OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
The attitude of the Scandinavian countries to the plan of A European
security conference is varied, 'however it is basically Pervadingly positive.
Finland has shown the strongest commitment. In May of 1969, building on the
stimulus of the Budapest Meeting of the Warsaw Pact, Finland had declared in
a memorandum to the states of Europe, including both parts of Germany, and to
the United States and Canada, that Helsinki was prepared for the role of host
to such a security conference.
There followed thorough international soundings by Finnish special
ambassador Encke11,. Last July President Kekkonen? who travels at least once
a year to the Soviet Union, went together with his then new Prime Minister
Karjalainen and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Leskinen to Moscow, and im-
mediately thereafter to the United States.
The topic of the discussions with the Soviet Leadership and then, on
the basis of this experience, with President Nixon, was the security con-
fe.vence. The Social-Democratic Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Leskinen,
who in recent years has had especially good relations with Moscow Party Chief
Brezhnev, made extremely optimistic temporary prognoses on the basis of the
Washington discussions as to the beginning of a preliminary conference.
However, he had to revise these prognoses several times before they became
outdated anyway by succeeding events.
The second Finnish memorandum, addressed to the same international
circle as before, followed at the end of November, and contained an invitation
to consultations of diverse embassies in Helsinki with the Finnish Foreign
Ministry. However, these consultations were not yet to mean a commitment
of the participating countries to the security conference.
The caution of the NATO states with respect to the hardening of the
Soviet position in Berlin and the generally observed cooling-off of relations
between the Big Powers caused Finland to become cautious in the last few weeks.
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During the whole time since the first Finnish initiative, Helsinki was
careful not to be labeled a mere servant of Soviet interests, for that very
thing would be most damaging to Finland's goal of giving Helsinki the neutral
position of Geneva, and thereby giving the country universal security, through
a great international conference or a series of successful meetings.
In December Deeltinen hinted that a preparatory oonferenoe Gould also
be called without full attendance of the participating countries. That Soviet
wishes aimed in this direction have foundered on Helsinki in spite of Leskinen's
indulgence, was recently made clear by Prime Minister Karjalainen when he
stated that the conference could only succeed on the basis of the consent
of all appropriate countries, and Finland would make no reductions in the
circle of participants.
The conference is too important for Finland's neutrality for Helsinki
toibe a party to a one-sided propaganda event. Finland continues to hope for
the occurrence of a comprehensive conference, but is already showing.: a certain
amount of skepticism, at least as far as the date is concerned.
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's ears probably tingled from Karjalaineds
speech; he was in Finland right on the heels of the Hungarian government head
Pock; before that, in the beginning of December, Grechko was in Sweden. The
Soviet Union is continually attempting to encourage the neutral countries into
undertaking initiatives for the conference.
But although Sweden is by all means in favor of the conference, and has
frequently expressed its agreement -- Stockholm also declared itself "of course"
immediately ready for the ambassador-level consultations in Helsinki -- it
does not like to be pushed to the forefront by the Soviet Union.
Stockholm's attitude is, as usual, cautiously pragmatic. The Swedes
praised the plan last March during the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Smirnov in Stockholm, in June during the trip of Prime Minister Palme to
Moscow, and now again to Grechko; but at the same time they point to the
decidedly affected countries, and among these especially to the Big Powers,
on whom finally depends the realization of the security conference, they said.
The NATO country Denmark is even more cautious. Copenhagen itself
traditionally follows a policy of reduced tensions with Eastern Europe, as
does neutral Stockholm. After the war, Denmark was for a long time the only
NATO country which had intensive relations with Poland, especially during the
governing period of the Social-Democrat Krag. At that time Copenhagen ren-
dered good service to Bonn in Warsaw, which had lasting effects.
Baunsgaard's government welcomes the plan of the conference, but does
not thereby forsake the common ground of NATO agreements. Denmark, which
sees itself as especially vulnerable to Eastern wooing, was on its guard
against hurrying forward in its answer to the second Finnish memorandum: The
result of the memorandum, they said, would "naturally depend on the reaction
in. the many countries which are mutually responsible for the solution of the
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fundamental European security problems." Copenhagen itself has a "funda-
mentally positive" attitude, it was vaguely stated.
For a long time all the Scandinavian countries have made the partici-
pation of America and detailed Preparation conditions of the conference.
Likewise, all Scandinavian countries are agreed that the German Ost?Politik
with the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw has furthered a reduction in tensions
and has improved the preconditions for the conference.
It is the logical consequence of this evaluation, that the necessity
of a countermove by the other side becomes clearer and clearer to the Scandi-
navian politicians. Norway, like Denmark a NATO member, has recently out-
-lined its stand unambiguously.
The Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz was told in Oslo that
thdre was a clear connection between Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw,
the Berlin question, and the security conference. For the improvement of
the East-West relationship a Berlin settlement is mandatory, they said.
Progress in the Berlin negotiations is accordingly a precondition for the
security conference.
A visit to Norway and Sweden by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Manescui in Winiewicz's footsteps, and which undoubtedly would have had the
same purpose, was cancelled, possibly because of a Ramanian ambassadors'
meeting taking place in Bucharest. Perhaps a discussion on this point was
not agreeable at the moment to Manescu, who is Open to realistic differen-
tiations.
The strategic situation of Norway, the weak neighbor of a Big Power
which at any time could turn one of its extensive maneuvers into something
serious, forces Oslo to be keen-of-vision. The Norwegians test the changes
of international conetellations for possible effects on their security.
Norway is also dependent on NATO, leans on it, and would by no means like
to see it perceptibly weakened or disappear without a functional defense.
Oslo carries out a policy of reducing tensions by trying to realize
and expand collaboration in practical realms, as in economics or with tech-
nical Oooperation. But Oslo considers as illusionary the view that the
security conference would automatically lead to the concrete practical col-
laboration which Norway wishes to have with every country. Norway regards
the conference Iplan with an open mind, but skeptically.
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CPYRGHT
FRANICEURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971
Unterschiedliche Beurteilung in Skandinavien
Finnland am stiirksten interessiert / Von Clans Gennrich, Stockholm
Die lialtung der skanclinavlschen
Liiiidee Wtt Men @hie? oi-iroppii@ri
Nitherheitskonferenz ist unterschiedlich,
jedoch im Grundzug durchgehend positiv.
Am starksten hat sich Finnland daftir
engagiert. Im Mai 1969, aufbauend auf
die Anregung der Budapester Tagung
des Warschauer Paktes, hatte Finnland
in einem Memorandum an die Staten
Europas einschlief3lich bolder Teile
Deutschlands sowie an die Vereinigten
Staaten und Kaneda erklart, Helsinki
sei zur Rolle des Gastgebers einer Si-
cherheitskonferenz bercit.
- Es folgten eingehende internationale
Sondierungen des finnischen Sander-
botschafters Enckell. Im vergangenen
Juli reiste President Kekkonen, der sich
alljahrlich mindestens einmal in die So-
wjetunion begibt, zusammen mit set-
nem darnels neuen Ministerprasidenten
Karjalainen und AuBenminister Les-
kinen nach Moskau und unmittelbar an-'schliBend in die Vereinigten Staaten.
Das Thema der Besprechungen mit
der sowjetischen letihrung und auf die-
ser Erfahrungsgrundlage dann mit Pre-
sident Nixon war die Sicherheitskonfe-
renz. Der sozialdemokratische finnische
AuBenminister Leskinen, der in den
letzten -Jahren besonders gute Bezie-
hungen zum Moskauer Parteichef Bre-
schnew unterhalt, machte an Hand der
Washingtoner Besprechungen auBer-
ordentlich optimististhe zeitlichee Pro-
gnosen Ober den Beginn einer Vorkon-
ferenz, die er allerdings mehrfach revi-
dieren muBte, ehe sie durch die Wirk-
lichkeit ohnehin ilberholt wurden.
Ende November folgte das zweite
finnische Memorandum an den gleichen
internationalen Adressatenkreis mit der
Aufforderung zu Konsultationen der
diversen Botschaften in Helsinki mit
dem finnischen AuBenministerium.
Diese Konsultationen sollten allerdings
r ec.h keine Festlegung der beteiligten
Lander auf die Sicherheitskonferenz be-
deuten.
Die Vorsicht der Nato-Staaten im Zu-
sammenhang mit der Verhartung der
sowjetischen Position in Berlin und der
allgemein zu beobachtenden Abktihlung
des Verhaltnisses zwischen den Gra-
machten veranlafite Finnland in den
letzten Wochen zur Zuriickhaltung.
Wahrend der ganzen Zeit seit der ersten
finnischen Initiative athtet Helsinki
sorgsam darauf, nicht als Handlanger
sowjetischer Interessen abgestempelt
zu werden, well gerade das Finnlands
Ziel am meisten schaden milfite, oeurch
the in diese Richtung mien( en blJV 1 I J
tieelieh Welled-if) trot g LeAkiimi Nfieh-
giebigkeit an Helsinki scheitern, machte
Ministerprasident Karjalainen dieser
Tage klar, als er sagte, die Konferenz
Menne nur auf der Grundlage des Ein-
vernehmens eller zustandigen Lander
glecken, und Finnland mache vom Tell-
nehmerkreis keine Abstriche.
Ftir Finnlands Neutralitat ist die Kon-
ferenz zu wichtig, als daB Helsinki sich
zu einer einseitigen Propaganda-
veranstaltung hergeben k6nnte. Finn-
land hofft wetter auf das Zustande- ?'
kommen einer umfassenden Konferenz,
.eeigt aber bereits, zumindest was den
Zeitpunkt betrifft, eine gewisse Skepsis.
Dern sowjetischen Verteidigungsmini-
ster Gretsthkow dtirften von Karjalai-
nens Rede die Ohren geklungen haben;
auf den Fersen des ungarischen Regie-
rungschefs Fock war er gerade in Finn-
land; davor, Anfang Dezember, war
Gretsthkow in Schweden. Die Sowjet-
union sucht die neutralen Lender standig
zu Initiativen fur die Konferenz zu er-
muntern.
Doch obwohl Schweden dem Konfe-
renzplan durchaus geneigt ist und seine
Zustimmung hating geauBert hat ? auch
zu den Botschafterkonsultationen in
Helsinki hat Stockholm sich ?selbstver-
standlich" sofort bereit erklart?,1? es.
sich nicht gem von der Sowjetunion vor-
schicken.
Stockholms Haltung ist, wie meistens,
vorsichtig pragmatisch. Die Schweden
lobten im letzten Man beim Besuch des
stelivertretenden sowjetischen Auflen-
ministers Smirnow in Stockholm, im
Juni wahrend der Reise des Minister-
prasidenten Palme nach Moskau und
jetzt wieder Gretschkow gegenilber das
Vorhaben; doch sie verwiesen gleich-
zeitig auf die entscheidend betroffenen
d dbi besonders auf die
Lander un da be
GroBmachte, von denen das Zustande- genehm.
kothmen der Sicherheitskonferenz Die strategische Lage Norwegens, de i
schliefilich abhange. schwachen Nachbarn einer' GroBmacht,
Noch vorsichtiger ist das Nato-Land die jederzeit aus einem ihrer umfassen ?
Danemark. Kopenhagen fiihrt selbst, den Manover ernst machen Montt,
ebenso wie das neutrale Stockholm, tra- zwingt Oslo zur Scharfsichtigkeit. Di ?,
ditionell eine Politik der Entspannung Norvveger preifen Verenderungcn in ?
gegentiber Osteuropa. Nach dem Krieg ternationaler. Konstellationen atif meg -
war Danemark lenge das einzige Nato-, lithe Folgen hirer Sicherheit. Norwegen
Land, das intensiven Umgang mit Polen ist eta die Nato angewiesen, stlitzt sleet
hatte, besonders wahrend der Regie- auf sie und mochte sie keinesfalls spier-
rungszeit des Sozialdemokraten Krag; bar getheveche oder ohne funktionsfae
darnels leistete Kopenhagen Bonn gute. higen Einsatz schwinden sehen.
Dienste in Warschau, die nachgewirkt Oslo betreibt Entspannungspolitik, in-
haben. dem es Zusammenarbeit auf praktische e
Die Regicrung Baunsgaard begrefit den Gebieten wie in der, Wirtschaft oder
eizie groBe Internationale Konferenz Plan zur Konferenz, verlent aber dabel bei technischer Kooperation zu ver-
oder durch eine Serie erfolgreicher Zu- nicht den gemeinsamen Boden der Nato- wirklichen und zu vertiefen sucht. Dore
sammenictinfte Helsinki den neutralen rbereinktinfte. Danemark, das sich be- hell Oslo die Ansicht filr eine Illusion,
Rang von Genf und damit dem Land sonderem ostlichen Liebeswerben aus- daB die Sicherheitskonferenz autoina-
eine allseitige Sicherung zu geben. gesetzt sieht, hat sich bei der Antwort tisch zu konkreter praktischer Zusarr-
Leskinen . lice im Dezember durch- auf das zweite finnische Memorandum menarbeit f?hren werde, die Norwegen
blicken, ciaB eine Vorbereitungskonferenz vor dem Vorpreschen gehtitet: Das Er- mit idem Land wilnscht. Norwegen be-
Landern abnangen, cue r e sung
der finielementAlen europ5igichen
heitsprobleme mitverantwortlich sind". .?
Kopenhagen selbst verhalte sich, hien es -
vage, ?grundsatzlich positiv".
Alle skandinavischen. Lander stellen
sett langem die Bedingungen der Teil-
nahme Amerikas und einer detaillier-
ten Vorbereitung. Ebenso sind sich alle
slcandinavischen Lander darin einig, dal)
die deutsche Ost-Politik mit den Ver-
t en von Moskau und Warschau die
Entspannung gefordert und die Voraus-
setzungen fiir die Konferenz verbessert
habe.
Es liegt in der Folgerichtigkeit dieser
Bewertung, clan den skandinavischen
Politikern jetzt die Notwendigkeit , des
Gegenzuges der anderen Seite imrner
deutlicher wird. Das wie Danemark der
Nato angehorende Norwegen hat seine
Haltung dieser Tage unzweideutig pro-
filiert.
Der stellvertretende polnische Auelen-
minister Winiewicz bekam in Oslo zu
hOren, es bestehe em n klarer Zusammen-
hang zwischen den Vertragen Bonns mit
Moskau und Warschau, der Berlin-Fra-
ge und der Sicherheitskonferenz. Ftir die
Besserung des Ost-West-Verhaltnisses
sei nun eine Berlin-Regelung unerlaB-
lich. Fortschritte in den Berlin-Verhand-
lungen seien demgemaB eine Voraus-
setzung fiir die Sicherheitskonferenz.
Ein an Winiewicz ankniipfender Be-
such des rumenischen AuBenminister:
Manescu in Norwegen und Schweden
der ohne Zweifel dem gleichen Theme
gegolten hette, fiel aus, moglicherweise
wegen eines in Bukarest stattfindender
.rumanischen Botschaftertreffens; viel-
,leicht war Manescu, der realistischen
IDifferenzierungen gegentiber aufge?
schlossen ist, eine Unterhaltung Ube-
diesen Punkt im Augenblick nicht an ?
lender einber f n werden ,konneen0 q31 Po
au ch ohne vApprovedrFr as
azokxviromuctimboomaufgeschio-
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FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971
YUGOSLAVIA HOPES TO BENEFIT FROM EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
From the beginning Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet project of a
European security conferences although it did not deceive itself about the
underlying intentions. It certainly played a role here that Tito did not
1..ant to take a stand against the Eastern Bloc on such a plan, especially
since several Western countries were not verbally in favor of the idea.
However, it is more important that an all-European security conference fit
into the conception of Yugoslavian foreign policy, of course only under
certain preconditions.
Belgrade is not interested in a security conference which leads a
sleepy life in the fog of nonbinding chatter or which only serves as a podium
ford Soviet propaganda. The diplomatic euphemism for this is that one should
not remain on the declaratory field. Yugoslavia much rather intends concrete
tasks for a security conference: It should further the military reduction
of tensions in Europe.
By this Belgrade has in mind above all that the Big Powers reduce
their military presence on the continent as well as put an end to military
demonstrations of power in and around Europe, and that meneuvers, especially
those in border territories and in notoriously crisis-prone regions, become
rarer. The increased military security gained by this benefits the inde-
pendence of all European countries according to the view here.
In Yugoslavia's opinion, the security conference must give each Euro-
pean state new guarentees for the inviolability of its borders, and reject
bloc doctrines of all sorts which attempt to pass over sovereignty. Even if
not exclusively so, Belgrade here has primarily the Brezhnev doctrine in mind.
This is connected with the fact that Yugoslavia does not want the security
, conference to be a round of discussions by the Big Powers or by both blocs,
whereby the small states would only be the trimmings.
The result of the conference, or of a series of conferences, should
not solidify the bloc structures, but should loosen them up. The bloc
members should receive more political elbow room. It is sure that Belgrade
is thinking of its bloc-weary neighbors Romania and Italy here, even if it
does not openly say so. For the European countries which do not belong to
any bloc, especially for itself, Yugoslavia hopes for greater influence in
Europe from the conference.
The Yugoslavian diplomats are not considering preconditions for the
security conference. But they are clear about the fact that there is no
chance for the conference before a Berlin settlement. In this sense Belgrade
speaks of "context" or "parallelism," and avoids the word "condition."
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CPYRGHT
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971
Jugoslawien wiinscht Ergebnisse
Von JOHANN GEORG REISSMOLLER, Belgrad
Jugoslawien hat dem sowjetischen
Projekt einer europaischen Sicherheits-
konferenz voms Beginn an zugestirnmt,
obwohl es sich iiber die dahinterste-
henden Absichten nicht tauscht. Ilabei
spielt gewil3 eine Rolle, daB sich Tito
nicht gerade aber em n solches Vorhaben
mit "deaf Ostblock anlegen wollte, zu-
mai auch mehrere westliche Lander sich
'nicht verbal far die Idee erwarmten.
Wichtiger aber 1st, daB eine gesamt-
europaische Sicherheitskonferenz ins
Konzept der jugoslawischen AuBen-
politik pat, allerdings nur unter be-
stimmten Voraussetzungen.
Belgraddst nicht an einer Sicherheits-
konferenz interessiert, die in Nebel-
schwaden unverbindlichen Geredes da-
hindammert, oder nur der sowjeti-
schen Propaganda als Tribune client.
? Man darfe nicht auf dem deklaratori-
? schen Feld bleiben, heiBt die diploma-
tische Umschreibung dafiir. Vielmehr
denkt Jugoslawien einer Sicherheits-
konferenz konkrete Aufgaben zu: Sie
soil die militarische Entspannung in
Europa voranbringen.
Dazu gehort nach Ansicht Belgrads
vor allem, daa die GroBmachte ihre
militarische Prasenz auf dem Kontinent.
vermindern sowie militarische Macht-'
demonstrationen in und urn Europa
unterlassen und daB Manover, beson-
ders solche Th Grenzgebieten und in
notorischen Krisenregionen, seltener
werden. Die daraus gewonnene ver-
mehrte militarische Sicherheit kommt
nach hiesiger Auffassung der: Unablaan-,
gigkeit aller europaischen Lander zu-
g ute.
Aus jugoslawischer Sicht muB die
Sicherheitskonferenz jedem europa-
ischen Staat neue Garantien far. die
Unverletzbarkeit seiner Grenzen geben
und Blockdoktrinen aller Art, welche
die Souveranitat zu ilberspielen suchen,
verwerfen. Dabei hat Belgrad vor al-
lem, wenn auch nicht ausschlieBlich, die
Breschnew-Doktrin im Auge. Damit
hangt zusammen: Jugoslawien wiinscht
sich eine Sicherheitskonterenz nicht ald
GesPrachsrunde der Grof3machte oder
der beiden Blocke, wobei dann die
kleineren Staaten nur Verzierungen ab-
Oben.
Das Ergebnis der Konferenz oder
einer Serie von Konferenzen soil die
Blockstrukturen nicht verfestigen, son-
dern aufweichen. Die Blockmitglieder
sollen mehr politischen Spielraum be-
kommen. Es 1st sicher, daB Belgrad da-
bei besonders an seine blockmiiden
Nachbarn Rumanien und Italien denkt,
wenn es auch nicht often davon spricht.
Far die keinem Block zugehorenden eu-
ropaischen Lander, vor allem far sich'
selbst, erhofft sich Jugoslawien von der
Konferenz graBeren Einflui3 in Europa.
' Vorbedingungen far die Sicherheits-
- konferenz laBt die jugoslaWische Diplo-
matie nicht gelten. Sedoch ist sie sich
dartiber im klaren, daB vor einer Berlin-
Regelung das Konferenzprojekt keine
Chancen hat. In diesern Sinn spricht
Belgrad, das Wort ?Bedingung" ver-
meidend, von ?Zusammenhang" oder
?Parallelismus".,
FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971 '
ENGLAND SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS REGARDING EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
As a topic of British foreign policy, the European security conference
and the calling of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, whose
permanent chairmanship is shared by the British and Soviet Ministers of For-
eign Affairs, have had already for years in common that they give the oppor-
tunity for ritualistic affirmations.
Since in both cases it is, or should be, a question of striving for
peace, the reaction is always positive, at least in principle, and is only
dependent to a minor extent on the party color of the British government in
power at the time. Between the view of the present Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Sir Alec Doug1as-Home9 and that of his socialist prede-
cessor, Stewart, no difference on the issue of a European security confer-
ence can be discovered, even with a magnifier.
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When one strips the official answer of its rhetorical flourishes and
formulas and reduces it to its pragmatic essence, the precondition of British
assent is the guarantee,-if not absolute then at least convincingly tested,
that Moscow cannot use such a conference purely for propagandist purposes.
The exclusion of the United States from a European security conference,
originally hoped for by MoSw but ia the meantime dropped, was not only un-
datable for London, but a certain sign for how much skepticism and caution
the Soviet plan was to be treated.with.
There was complete agreement in the London conversations between
the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel and Sir Alec Douglas-Home
that a European security conference can only become a topic for serious pre-
liminary deliberations when Moscow has presented proof of the validity of its
intentions on the Berlin question.
CPYRGHT
FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1071
England skeptisch und vorsichtig
Von HEINZ HOPFL, London
Als Thema der britischen Autienpoli-
tik hat die europtlische Sicherheitskon-
ferenz mit der Einberufung der Genfer
Konferenz ilber Vietnam, Laos und
Kambodscha, in deren permanenten
Vorsitz sich der britische und der so-
wjetische AuBenminister teilen, nun
schon seit Jahren gemeinsam, daB sie
Gelegenheit zu rituellen Beteuerungen
geben.
Die Reaktion 1st, da es sich in beiden
Fallen. urn Friedensbemilhungen han-
delt oder handeln soil, immer positiv,
zumindest im Prinzip, und nur in ge-
ringftigigern,Mafie von der Parteifarbe
der jeweiligen britischen Regierung ab-
hangig. Zwikhen der Auffassung des
jetzigen AuBenministers, Sir Alec Dou-
glas-Home, und der seines sozialisti-
schen Vorgangers, Stewart; laBt sich
auch mit der Lupe kein tinterschied in
der Frage einer europaischen Sicher-
heitskonferenz entdecken.
Wenn man die offizielle Antwort ih-
rer rhctorischen ,Floskeln und Formeln
entkleidet und auf ihren pragmati-
schen Kern reduziert, 1st die Vorbedin-
gung einer britischen Zusage die wenn
nicht absolute, so doch aberzeugend ge-
prafte Gewahr. daB Moskau eine solche
Konferenz nicht zu blofien Propaganda-
zwecken mil3brauchen kann.
Der urspriinglich von Moskau erhoff-
te, inzwischen fallengelassene Ausschlufl
der Vereinigten Staaten von einer eu-
ropfiischen Sicherheitskonferenz war
fur London nicht nur undiskutabel, son-
dern. em n sicheres Zeichen dafar, mit
welcher Skepsis und Vorsicht der so-
wjetische Plan zu behandeln war.
In den Londoner Gesprachen hat es
zwischen BundesauBenminister Scheel
und Sir Alec Douglas-Home voile tber-
elnstimmung dartiber gegeben, dafi eine
europaische Sicherheitskonferenz erst
dann aberhaupt Gegenstand von ernst-
haften Vortiberlegungen werden kann,
wenn Moskau in der Berlin-Frage den
Beweis der Echtheif seiner Absichten
geliefert hat.
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FRANKFURTER. ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Rankfurt
12 February 1971
ITALY FAVORS EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AFTER BERLIN ShilLEMENT
Italy adheres to the standpoint of the NATO declaration of 4 December
1970 on the question of the European security conference. Rome makes the
solution of the Berlin question and a reduction of tensions in the Mediter-
ranean a precondition or tha aonferena4. To bo sum the Mediterranean oc-
curs in the NATO declaration only in subsidiary clauses. But Italian Minister
of Foreign Affairs Moro expressed himself clearly in front of the NATO Council.
To be sure it is freely admitted also in Italian circles that the
concept "reduction of tensions in the Mediterranean" allows for various inter-
pretations. For example, is the removal of the Soviet Russian fleet from this
sea involved here? No one will expect that. Basically therefore, also for
Italy, everything depends on the Berlin question as a precondition of the
conference. If there should be an,agreement on Berlin, the Italians would
alsb agree to a security conference. As long as this does not occur, the
Italians are not ready for multilateral discussions on preparations for the
European security conference. They recently stated this to Finnish President
Kekkonen, who advocated such conversations.
As in so many other points, Italy seems to be very close to the German
Federal Government on this issue also. But there is one difference. Rome is
more anxious for a conference than Bonn is; the reason for this lies in Italian
domestic politics.
At times this conference-eager attitude threatened to bring Rome in con-
flict with the three big Western allies, especially the United States and
France. The Italian concept of the conference was first developed in 1969 by
the then Italian Mimister of Foreign Affairs, Nenni, the leader of the social-
ists.
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971
Ap
, Italien denkt an das Mittelmeer
Von JOSEF SCHMITZ VAN VORST, Rom
CPYRGHT
In der Frage der europaischen Sicher-
heitskonferenz halt Italien an dem
Standpunkt der Nato-Erklarung vom 4.
Dezember 1970 fest. Rom macht die Lo-
sung der Berlin-Frage und die Ent-
spannung Mittelmeer zur Vorbedin-
gung der Konferenz. Das Mittelmeer
kommt zwar in der Nato-Erklarung
nur verklausuliert vor. Der italienische
AuBenminister Moro hat sich jedoch
vor dem Nato-Rat deutlich geauf3ert.
Auch in italienischen Kreisen wird
freilich zugegeben, daB der Begriff
?Entspannung im Mittelmeer" verschie-
dene Auslegungen zulasse. Gehort bei-
spielsweise die Entfernung der sowjet-
russischen Flotte aus diesem Meer dazu?
Das wird niemand erwarten. Im Grunde
laufe daher auch filr Italien alles auf
die Berlin-Frage als Vorbedingung der
Konferenz hinaus. Kommt es ilber Ber-
i:Attaintarneivagth tiss . ?
k ? ? r.
C51.111.r
stimmen. Solange sie ausbleibt, sind
die Italiener nicht zu multilateralen
Gesprachen zur Vorbereitung der euro-
paischen Sicherheitskonferenz bereit.
Dies haben sie noch vor kurzem dem
finnischen Staatsprasidenten Kekkonen
erklart, der solche Gesprache anregte.
Wie in so vielen anderen scheint
Italien damit auch in dieser Frage dem
Standpunkt der deutschen Bundesregie-
rung sehr nahe zu stehen. Es gibt aber '
einen Unterschied. Rom ist konferenz-
freudiger als Bonn; der Grund dafiir
liegt in der italienischen Innenpolitik.
Zeitweise erohte diese konferenz-
freundliche Haltung Rom in Gegensatz .
zu den drei groBen westlichen Verbiln-
deten, insbesondere zu den Vereinigten
Staaten und Frankreich, zu bringen.
Das italienische Konferenzkonzept ist
1969 zuerst vOn dem damaligen italic-
OV
nigithernister, cle_m_aozialisten-
pa$IS4A00.03001
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FRANKFURTER ALLGINBINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971
FOR FRANCE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE A WAY TO STRENGTHEN ITS OWN POSITION
France favors an all-European security conferences After long initial
hesitatiOn, Paris regards it as a means to strengthen ita own role in Eastern
politics. Since his trip to the Soviet Union, President Pompidou has re-
peatedly declared that the "multilateral preparation of a European security
conference" could now "move into an active phase."
Pompidou rejects a legal package deal linking the conference to a
prior Berlin settlement. Just as France does not want to give up its role
as-occupation power in Berlin and thus wants to keep the last lever of a
right to participate in discussions on all-German issues, thus the German
question -remains the central issue in considerations regarding a security
conference.
Pompidou would like to continue de ?mullets Eastern policies. They
involve the establishment of bilateral contacts with the 'Soviet Union and
the East European states, with the goal of dissolving the-"bloce'in favor
of a reduction of tensions in Europe. In domestic affairs Pampidou thus '
obligates the French Communist Party to. support his foreign policy.
In the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is neither any haste
nor any special enthusiasm for the idea of a conference, so urgently demand-
ed above all by Moscow. A mammoth meeting for the sole purpose of presenting
the Soviet Union with a contractual sealing of the status quo in Europe is
considered senseless.
The minimal demand would have to be the free traffic of people between
both parts of Europe, the possibility "of cultural and intellectual penetra-
tion."
But Pompidou has also declared -- most recently in his press conference
of 21 January -- that the conference would make little sense without progress
in Berlin and withOut successes in Chancellor Brandt's*Ostpolitik."In the
preparatory work the French have so far proceeded from the idea of a meeting
of ambassadors from both sides in Helsinki. But recently one notices a def-
inite reduction in Soviet pressure.
In Paris one thinks it is possible to exclude the United States and
Canada from participation. European security would be guaranteed by the
atomic parity of both world powers, it is thought. In spite of their rejec-
tion of bloc politics, French experts admit that a reduction of troops for
the sole benefit of the Soviet Union would mean a threat to European security.
It is however significant that Brandt's"Ostpolitik"overshadows all
planning. Should the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties occur
after a prior settlement of the Berlin question, it is said in Paris, then the
all-European security conference would have no objective. Meanwhile, one is
...-Jilent about the connection ofthis whole complex to the fact that the suc-
cm,of Bratuitli'Ostpolitik-h630-11.in is dependent on the will of the Big
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pew.
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FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
12 February 1971
Fiir Paris em n Mittel
zur Starkung der eigenen Politik
Von JAN REIFENBERG, Paris
CPYRGHT
Frankreich beftirwortet eine gesamt-
europaische Sicherheitskonferenz. Nach
langem anfanglichem Zogern betrachtet ,
Paris sie als Mittel zur Verstarkung
der eigenen Rolle in der Ostpolitik.
Staatsprasident Pompidou hat seit "sei-
ner Reise in die Sowjetunion wieder-
holt erklart, die ?multilaterale Vorbe-_
reitung einer europaischen Sicherheits-
konferenz" kiinne jetzt ,,in eine aktive
Phase tibergehen".
Pompidou lehnt em n juristisches Junk- '
tim zwischen der Konferenz und einer
vorherigen Berlin-Regelung ab. Wie ,
Frankreich in Beilin einmal sdihe Rolle
als Besatzungimacht nicht aufgeben
und damit den letzten Hebei des Mit-
spracherechts in gesamtdeutschen Fra-
gen behalten will, so bleibt such bei
den Erwagungen beztiglich einer Sicher-,
heitskonferenz die deutsche Frage der
Mittelpunkt.
Pompidou mochte die Ostpolitik de
Gaulles fortsetzen. Sie beinhaltet die
Herstellung bilateraler Kontakte zur
Sowjetunion und den osteuropaischen "
Staaten mit dem Ziel, die ?Blacke" zu-
gunsten europaischer Entspannung auf-
zuldsen. Innenpolitisch verpflichtet
Pompidou auf diese Weise such die
KPF ftir seine Atthenpolitik.
Im franzosischen Auf3enministerium ?
herrscht weder Elle noch sonderliche
Begeisterung gegentiber dem zunachst
von Moskau dringend geforderten Kon-'
ferenzvorhaben. Eine Riesenzusammen-
kunft zum alleinigen Zweck, der So- '
wjetunion die vertragliche Besiegelung
des Status quo in Europa zu liefern,
gilt als sinnlos.
Mindestforderung mtiBte der freie
Verkehr von Menschen zwischen beiden
Teilen Europas, die Moglichkeit ?der
kulturellen und ideellen Durchdrin-
gung" bleiben.
Aber auch Pompidou hat ? zuletzt in
seiner Pressekonferenz vom 21. Januar
erklart, ohne Fortschritte in Berlin
und ohne Erfolge der Ostpolitik Bun-
deskanzler Brandts habe die Konferenz
wenig Sinn. In den Vorbereitungsar-
beiten 1st von franzosischer Seite bisher
von einem Botschaftertreff en beider
Seiten in Helsinki ausgegangen worden.
Aber in letzter Zeit stellt man merk-
liches Nachlassen des sowjetischen
Drangens fest.
In Paris halt man es filr moglich, die
Vereinigten Staaten und Kaneda von
der Teilnahme auszuschliefien. Die Si-
cherheit Europas werde durch das
Atomgleichgewicht der beiden Welt-
machte garantiert. Trotz der Ablehnung
von Blockpolitik geben franzOsische
Fachleute zu, daB eine Truppenvermin-
derung zu einseitigen Gunsten der So-
wjetunion Gefahrdung europaischer
Sicherheit bedeutet.
Entscheidend 1st jedoch, daB die Ost-
politik Brandts alle Planungen tiber-
schattet. Solite es zur Ratifizierung des
Moskauer und Warschauer Vertrages
nach vorheriger Regelung der Berlin-
Frage kommen, heiBt es in Paris, so
werde die gesamteuroPaische Sieber-
heitskonferenz gegenstandslos. Man
schweigt sich indessen tiber den Zu-
sammenhang dieses Komplexes mit del
Tatsache aus, daB der Erfolg von
Brandts Ostpolitik tiber Berlin vom
Willen der vier Mtiehte abhangt.
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CPYRGHT
LE MONDE WEEKLY Paris
9 December 1970
110
dttenle,
CPYRGHT
a two-way street
Cluunpagne and ehandeliers were laid on in '
Warsaw title week for the eignine by Wein Amman '
I Chancellor %lily Brandt and Polish Premier
1 Jozef Cyrankietvicz of a treaty intended to olpen, i
the way for nennalizatIon of the two countries':' ,
relations. But ;Berlin remained the central issue .
' in the question of how far and how fast East- '
West d?nte in Europe can progress.
The future of Berlin was also a major issue at
the conference of the Warsaw Pact powers' which
'ended last Wednesday and of the meeting of the.
' Nato Council in Brussels on Thursday and Friday.
..... The Nato ministers made It clear that they
regarded the "satisfactory conclusion" of the Big
/ Four talks and the favourable progress of "other
The whole future course or
detente in Europe may depend on
the d cisions taken b the War ae
Pact leaders. The ball is de-
cidedly in their court. for West
German Chancellor Willy Brandt
has- for his part done everything
-possible to create improved rela-
tions with Eastern Europe.
He signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty which In ef-
fect condemns his country to the
status of a second-class military
power. He made the pilgrimage
to Erfurt to meet the prime min-
ister of a state whose existence
until then Bonn had assiduously
Ignored. And he went to Moscow.
and has just gone to *Warsaw, to
sign treaties that sanction bound-
aries which previous West Ger-
man governments had refused to
recognize?except in exchange for
the East's acceptance of German
reunification.
There are several reasons for
thinking that Mr. Brandt may not
have paid as high a price as ap-
pears at first glance, He suc-
ceeded in avoiding the de jure
recognition sought by East Leer-
many that would make the separa-
tion of Germany definitive, and
his recognition of the Oder-Neisse
line was made in the name of the
Federal Republic, not that of an
eventually reunified Germany. In
addition, East Germany continues
to be kept out of the various
bodies of the United Nations and
these treaties have thrown wide
the door to trade with Eastern
Europe.
Despite all this, it remains true
Ain't so far it has been Bonn that
has been making 1111 the conces-
sions, and now it is up to Moscow
- and its' allies' to decide' how far
they twee/Ming to g0 in exchange.
. I..t
Package deal
APpooved IFISM6Pagen?
minister Walter otlaa
'ottgoing talks" as a necessary prolintitiary to
: Western gammen* to a novapean seeurite MM.`
ference.
A communique issued after the Warsaw Pact
meeting, in East Berlin itself, made it clear that
.Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had im-
posed his policy on the recalcitrant East German
leader, Walter Ulbricht. It failed to support Mr.
-Ulbricht's long-standing demand for de jure
recognition of his government by Bonn and re-
iterated Mr. Brezhnev's recent reference to a
Berlin settlement which would correspond to the
"eequiremerits of the population of West Berlin." e,
But it added that thereevas "no reason" to delay the i
convening of a conference on European security.!
By ANDRE FONTAINE
-felling apart.
The presence of American, Brit-
.sh and French forces in West
Berlin is based on the very gen-
eral terms of the 1944-1045 agree-
' ments which have since been
iisputed be the Soviets. What is
needed, therefore, IS a binding set-
tlement which would prevent the
East Germans from closing road
traffic and the Russians from dis-
rupting air traffic on the pretext1
A military manoeuvres.
To the extent that the declared
aim of Soviet policy is to make
the status quo definitive, Moscow
:annot deny that West ,Berlin's
ettachment to the Western system
Is an integral part of that status,
quo. Official Soviet recognition of
this fact is little enough to ex-
pect in exchange for agreementl
on frontiers and the division of
Germany. I
Too often in the past twenty/
years the Russians have tried to
rid themselves of this Western;
outpost by resorting to blockade
or even the threat of a world ware
It would be a fatal mistake for
the West not to insist on such a
settlement.
After all, the West succeeded in
holding on to Berlin even under
' the worst stresses of the Cold War
and there is no reason why it
should run the risk of losing it in
a time of detente.
. General. de Gaulle understood
this better than any one else. It'
Is clear ,from his memoirs that, to
, the end of his life, he was con-
vinced that he was right to have
;toed firm against Nikita Khrush-
I hey's blusterings. Prime Min-
ester Jacques Chaban-Delmas and
-Foreign Minister Maurice Schu-
Mann ? have made it abundantly
Meer that they are following the
path that De Gaulle set out., e
Thi East GerManis, however
0040400104400-11300**2?
hat these various agreement
he? Non - Proliferation Treaty,
'normalization" treaties w th
Moscow and Warsaw and eventtall-
bt Prague, the modus vivendi to
be negotiated with East Germany,
and the Big Four settlement?vill
not be submitted separately, to
.1Ihe Bundestag for ratification:
On the contrary, they intend to
present them as a package deal,
evhich means that if any one claese
Ii not accepted the whole of Mr.
lirandt's Ostpolitik will be jet p-
erdized,
The Socialist-Liberal coalitien
has yet to define the lim ts
'beyond which it would have to
selmit that its policy had failed.
Since this is a question of inter-
pretation, the government may `te
t enpted to accept a pro forma ar-
rangement on Berlin rather thin
a imit a failure which could teed
I,* its downfall.
This was certainly Moscow's
h )pe. And it has undoubted y
been the fear in Washington and
o her Western capitals. But recent
d !elarations by official West Ge '-
nem spokesmen have unequivoca
ly stated that a Berlin settlemer t
Is the sine qua non for any
implementation of their Ostpolitik.
But why Berlin? As last week s
slowdown on West Berlin access
roods or recent disruptions of a*
tr tine once again revealed, the s
Soviets and their East German '
at les have used access to WeA
Berlin as a Means of exertine
pressure on the Western *alliet..
Atheugh these tactics may have
been a good source of foreign cute ?
reney, they have backfired' polite ,
kelle by making'Derliri a symb0.
of the Cold War and by Testotlhe
Viet...seem solidarity at the ver
96946ifia:CaniRal?'
13
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?cherished dream' of making a
reunified Berlin their capital.
This means that they will do their
best to keep Soviet concessions
to a niinimuni. History shows.
however, that when It comes to
the crunch the Soviets usually
manage to resign themselves to
the necessary compromise, es-
pecially when It can be made at
the expense of one of. their allies.
Assurances in order
- The Western allies, on the other
hand, could well afford to give
certain assurances in exchange,
especially since the West Germans
have ehown themselves to be
rather high-handed with the
statutes of West Berlin by holding
Bundestag sessions or electing
their president there.
?
What matters is that they are
uncompromising on the question
of free access and Soviet respon-
sibility for guaranteeing it. It
would be too easy for the Rus-
sians. once sovereignty over access
routes had been given to 1 East
Germany. to merely wash their
hands of the whole affair, when-
ever a new incident cropped up.
Mr. Brezhnev, meanwhile, held
out some hope for an improve-
ment In the Berlin situation In ,
his speech delivered ten days ago ?
? in Armenia. According to him,
that is needed is a show of
1 goodwill by all interested parties,
, and that they work out solutions
, which satisfy the needs of West
% Berlin% inhabitants while at the
same time respecting the rightful
1 :Interests anti sovereignty of $1ast
'Germany.
It would take an inveterate
' ? optimiet to conclude from this
? that the Soviets are ready to pay
the price of detente. If Mr.
Brezhnev is serious about respect-
?' ing the hopes of the West Ber-
liners, he has only to consult their
?'voting record over the past twenty
,years. The candidates of the
East German Communist Party,
who are authorized in West Ber-
lin... have nevers obtained more
? Om a handful of votes., while the
vest majority have always gone
to the. parties firmly, attached ,to
?Western democracy. ? ? , .;. ? :,i.,t?
? R'wOuld bolo? nructt t,o hope,-
'two Years after the Ltivasion 'of
. Otechoslovakia, that Mr. Elreshnet
tear' clovin , the Infamous
Berlin Wilt;
But the , West can at least
demand of, the man who has
'raised the qvision'of.the world to
an absolute principle that he
carry his reasoning to its logiewl
conclusion, that is, that he accept
certain facts unfavourable to
Mmcow,
Sonn, London, Parte And Wa.ohu
ington must 'Imake it clear to him
that, unless 'he does so, the dip-
. flomatio triutilph of last summer's
Bonn-Moscow treaty, which he
' prides himself on, may well prove
to be illusory.
?Detente can never be a one-way ?
'street./ 'Otherwise. instead of
"slowly brealdbg down the barriers
Ithat'separato' the two Europety it,
. ',Could: tempt the temporary victor'
'to 'exploit' his advantage and the,
yaser :prepare hie revenge.
qodi
otbu Imo ti?i ANDRE FONTAINE
a ik41.1./.1r4r1P, .11.ser sr oil
LE MONDE WEEKLY Paris
9 Deceriber 1970
LA itiENTE ET LE VERE1
ORIN
IS
I.
Le e a long:
one. Individual Bulgar ans are
stil so closely watcl-td that
few dare enter the reading
rooms of Western embassies.
Instead, crowds of Belgarians
stand outside the a merican
library to stare at pictures of
Trioia Nixon and he fiance
and of United States: auto-
mobile racing drivers --nd their
cars.
A Western corre: pondent
,trying to reach a private Bul-
garian citizen, whose n une had
been obtained from mutual
friends, was annonym msly but
firmly advised nut t ) pursue,
his efforts.
Visitor Is gushed ,
Even more striking was the
experience of a Greek- kmerican
who spent some time recently
with relatives, who were for-
cibly moved to Bulgaria 25:
years ago during the Greek civil!
war. Visiting them ir a small
'village, he found flat they
refused to believe that Amer-
icans had telephones and tele-
vision, much less color tele-
vision and a choice ol channels
to watch.
He was also hastily hushed
by his brother when he began
to criticize Bulgaria. The wife
of another brother, he was told,
was a police agent charged
with spying on tin former
Greeks.
?journalists with foreign-lan-
guage ability, sports figures and
specialists in foreign trade.
rciceign commerce is becoming
a popular field of study for
young Bulgarians who want to
travel outside their own coon-'
try and know they can only go
to the West if they have official
business there.
One young man who has
made foreign trade a career
agreed, speaking figuratively,,
that Austria, for example
"smells better" than his own
country. But he added: "It is
unfair to compare our situa-
tion with that of the advanced
nations. A better measure of
our progress is to put us where
we belong historically and geo-
graphically, next to Greece,
Turkey or Yugoslavia."
. 2d Fastest Growth Rate
, Using that rating, Bulgaria
?with the fastest rate of econ-
mile growth in the world after
Japan ? looks rather good.
But party leaders, putting. a
new stress on consumer wel-
fare for the coming five-year.
plan, forecast food imports to
a nation that is traditionally,
an agricultural exporter. .
The progress achieved is
partly the product of hard work
?arliarie-but is also ?the result
of extensive Soviet aid, esti-
mated at more than 12-billion'
in the last quarter century.
. Bulgaria, which says sho sold
Russia 200 million bottles of
wine last year, is planning to
maintain that profitable rela-
tionship. Some 82 per cent of
her trade over the next five
years is to stay inside the Com-
munist him and 58 per cent
tr 124 treittMase eit9ipm2vfM79-91,POVC166"13601
pr
22
2
r,1,0.41M, rrtivr?
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AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo
.6 March 1971
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S MEMOIRS GENUINE ENOUGH
Byer Egil Hegge
In this article, Per Egil Hegge, the Ate n estencorrespondent recently sent
home from Mbscow, examines the much-diss boo , rushchev's Memoirs, which
will be available on the Norwegian market very soon. The doubts be had earlier
disappeared when Pravda printed Khrushchev's own denial -- a confirmation in
itself! It is not quiteclear how the memoirs came into the hands of the
American Time-Life concern, but Hegge names here one of the men who could probably
tell the whole story -- Time correspondent Jerold Schecter, who left Moscow
last September.
* * *
The origin of the Khrushchev Memoirs was one of the topics I was working
on when my work Was so rudely interrupted five weeks ago. Much of the information
I obtained cannot be published for fear of placing some people in a difficult
situation. Both this information and the circumstances I will relate in this
article tend without exception to substantiate Time-Life's claim that the memoiis
are authentic, that is to say they came, for the most .part, from the retired
Mr. Khrushchev. How much is based on records from Khrushchev's_neriod df_glorY
will .remain 4 secret, because the people directly involved in this affair are
obliged by contract to keep quiet about it.
A Soviet acquaintance told me in May 1970 that Khrushchev was writing his
memoirs. I did not have much faith in this information. It was reasonable that
rumours would circulate that a retired man with Khrushchev's level of activity
and need to talk would 'tirritse something down. Nor did I have any reason to believe
that my confidant had any special knowledge of what Khrushchev was doing behind
his guarded fence -- it was only later that I understood clearly the level of
,his contact with the Khrushchev family. I thought too that this was material
neither I nor any other western journalist would ever get to see and that,
therefore, the information was uninteresting from a news angle.
Even after the report that the memoirs would be published, I remained
skeptical, reasoning like many other people that even if Khrushchev had
his own ideas about the policies of the present leaders, particularly the
Stalin question, he was still a loyal communist who would not send critical
material out of the country. For that reason I assumed that the memoirs were
a forgery.
I changed my mind when Khrushchev's so-called disclaimer was published
on 16 November. .This must be regarded as one of the most affirmative disclaimers
the world has ever seen, since it said between the lines that material for
reminiscenses did exist. What Khrushchev did deny was that he had personally
delivered such material to anyone -- which no one had claimed he had.
In his denial, Khrushchev described the memoirs with a word commonly
translated as forgery. But the word has a more limited, precise meaning than
that. If, for example, the memoirs were edited without the cooperation of the
autlir
ppiiivkr AV/60ga qWgioifb/PtalAlkbPPS-IYMitatTOSIEN1581 -2
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.010000
philologically be regarded as "falchivka" and still be genuine. Thus xnrusncn
le1?
is telling the truth -- and so are the publishers.
The denial was dated 10 November, but was sent out by the Tass bureau on
16 November. Several days later I heard from a source I considered and still
consider very credible and reliable the story of how Khrushchev had been summoned
to Arvid Pelshe, member of the Politbureau and chairman of the supervisory
commission of the party. There he was ordered to sign a denial that had already
been drawn up. During his conversation with Pelshe, Khrushchev claimed that he
had no idea how his memoirs had ended up outside the country, a statement that
might be correct, although I and most of the Russians I knew doubted it. Khrushchev
yielded to pressure and signed the disclaimer aftermaking certain changes -- which
I do not know. The excitement was hard on the 76-year-old pensioner and he
entered the hospital immediately afterward.
An experienced colleague of mine in Moscow warned me against sending this
story. They'll expel you for it, he told me. I did not follow his advice and
it appeared in Aftenposten on 27 November. The story also appeared in other
newspapers and led people in Washington to think that my source must be Khrushchev's
son-in-law, former editor-in-chief of Izvestia, Alexei Adzhubei. Thus Stewart
Alsop wrote in Newsweek at the beginning of January that Adzhubei granted an
interview with western Journalists in Moscow at the end of November. He gives
that as an established fact.- It .s1 pure fabrication. And it. is regrettable that
it was taken seriouslyargi-Iceepsturning up -- for example in Professor John '
Sanness' otherwise excellent introductionto the Norwegian edition that will 'be
out soon -- tut in a very diluted form.
This is the background of the Memoirs. In the fall of 1969 or just after New
Year's Day 1970, Khrushchev got a tape recorder and was very pleased with it.
Every time he had someone to listen to him, the old popular speaker awoke in him,
and it was mainly his many grandchildren who heard grandfather talk while the
tape recorder operated': Without an audience, hothing would have come of it.
I do not know who turned the tape recorder off and on or who removed the tapes.
But I doubt that it could have happened without Khrushchev having some idea
what was going on.
Henry Shapiro, UPI correspondent in Moscow for many years, also investigated
these matters and came-to the conclusion that it was Lev Petrov, Khrushchev's
fatally ill son-in-law; who saw to it that the reminiscences got into the hands of
a foreigner. For all I know, this could be true. Petrov suffered from incurable
cancer and had only a few months left last spring. He died last fall before the
news of the memoirs became known.
Right after Christmas, Moscow journalist Victor Louis was a steady visitor
in the home of the Khrushchev family. His name was immediately mentioned in
connection with memoirs in the West. The only reason for it at that time was
that people knew he had been engaged in similar affairs in the past. Louis is
a Soviet citizen, a Moscow correspondent for the London Evening News, a KGB agent,
and a frequent traveler abroad. The suspicion that he had something to do with
the matter was strengthened when his stay in Copenhagen on 24 August became known.
In Copenhagen he met one of the top men in the Time-Life concern, MUrray Garth,
and Jerrold Schecter, at that time Moscow correspondent for Time.
One theory is that the manuscript -- or the tapes -- was handed over then
and there. That can't be true -- according to my information, all the material
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was out of the Soviet Union and almost completely translated by that time.
Louis' name has been cited as proof that it was the KGB that was behind the
export of the memoirs. Nothing I know excludes the possibility that the KGB had
quite a bit to do with it. But Victor Louis engages in a multi-faceted activity,
the object of which in the main is simply to earn money -- and only that. I
would not offhand exclude the possibility that this was the idea this time too.
The man who could tell the whole story is undoubtedly Jerrold Schecter.
This very likeable, capable, and most active correspondent left. Moscow last
September, despite the fact this left the Time office empty, as it has remained
ever since -- a void that a news magazine like7 Time shuns like the plague and
must have had very good reasons for considering-7:-to say nothing of accepting.
It should surprise no one that Schecter is one of those obligated by contract to
keep quiet, an obligation he has honored. (I for one would give a lot to hear his
comments about the theory of the British expert on Soviet affaris, Victor Zorza,
that the material was delivered to Time by CIA agents who claimed to be Russians!)
Inimy opinion, the strongest confirmation of the authenticity of the memoirs
lies in the treatment afforded them by the Soviet press. Aside from the "denial,"
printed 17 November, and some dark allusions to 'memoirs of all kinds" there has
been total silence. It is also revealing that the Soviet press has not printed
summaries of the articles in western newspapers seeking to prove that the memoirs
were forged.
But most revealing is the following detail I hear from a Soviet acquaintance
in a position to know -- at the last minute three or four critical portions dealing
with the memoirs were deleted from the manuscript of an article printed in the
party organ, Pravda, last 17 December. This article was signed I. Alexandrov,
a pseudonym used under particularly authoritative statements. "Alexandrov's"
articles are written by a group of leading writers for Pravda on orders of the
party s-cretariat.
This article dealt with ideological warfare waged by the imperialists and
a few remarks about the Khrushchev memoirs would have fitted in very well in
this connection if, they were forged. my informant had only one comment -- "The
memoirs are genuine and they know it. Otherwise Pravda would have used them then."
It is every bit as' interesting to speculate on the purpose of the memoirs
if they were smuggled out with knowledge of the authorities. That is another --
and very long -- story.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2
Khrushchev Memoirs Authentic
Of the hundreds of news accounts dealing with the origins
and authenticity of the Khrushchev memoirs, the attached
article "Nikita Khrushchev's Memoirs Are Genuine Enough," appearing
in the Norwegian daily Afternposten of 6 March 1971 and written
by Norwegian journalist Per Egli Ilegge, formerly posted in
Moscow, is by far the most convincing. flegge came into some
exclusive and closely held information (the source of which
journalistic ethics precludes his revealing) and otherwise
reasons very cogently from indirect evidence to make a strong
case for the authenticity of the memoirs, which was published
by Little, Brown and Co. in book form last year under the title
Khrushchev Remembers and is available in many languages.
In the course of his article, he refutes many'Of the
arguments -EdianCedby .those who wish to consider the memoirs
- fraudulent. It deserves dissemination to a wider audience
than Hegge's own, the Norwegian public.
Approved For Release 1999/09/026 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2
AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo CPYRGHT
6 March 1971
A
? . ?
ikita rusyts3ovs
t
?
inner er e n
Ay Per-Egil Hegge
? Per Egil Ilegge, Aftenpostens medarbeider som nylig ble
' utvist fra Moskva, tar i denne artikkelen for seg den meget ?
orntalte boken eKrusjtsjov minnes? som kommer pa det norske
0. marked, om kort tid. Hegge tviler ikke pa at memoarene er ekte.
? Den tvil han hadde pa et tidlig tidspunkt forsvant da Pravda ,
bragte Krusjtsjovs eget dementi ? som i seg selv var en bekref-
telse! IIvordan memoarene kom det amerikanske TimeLife-
konsernet i hende er ikke belt klarlagt, men' Ilegge trekker. her
f rem en av de menn som sannsylligvis kan fortelle hele histo-
rien: Time-korrespondenten Jerold Schecter som forlot Moskva ? ?
september ifjor.
Historien om Krusitsjov-me-
? moarenes opprinnelse var ett av
de emner jeg holdt p med da
jeg flick et kjedelig avbrekk 1
arbeldet for fem uker siden. En
del av de opplysninger leg kens
frem til, kan jeg ikke offentlig- ,
eJere av hensyn til personer som
da vine hilvne I en vanskelig
, situasjon. Bade disse opplysnin-
ger, og forhold jeg skal nevne
denne artikkel, bidrar uten unn-
tagelse til underbygge, Time-
Life's pastand om at merarene
er autentiske; dvs, at de I hoved-
sak stammer Ifr& pensjonis-
t e n Krusjtsjov. Hvor stor del av
dem som bygger pa arkivinateri;
ale Ira -Knajtsjovs glansdager,
vii forbli en hemmelighet, siden
de personer som har wed
direkte kontekt med offteren, er
kontraktforpliktet UI holde
munn.
En sovjetisk bekjent fortalte
meg 1 mai 1970 at Krusjtsjov var
gang med sine memoarer. Jeg ?
festet ikke noen sterns lit til
donne opplysning. Det var rime-
lig nok at det skulle oppsta rykter
MI at en pensjonist ....4
heller ingen grunn til Itro at
min hjennitelsmann skulle ha
sverlig grele p& bye Krusjtajov
, foretok Beg bat sitt bevoktede
gjerde bans ? kontaktflate
? med Krusisjov4amillen flick jeg?
? fOrst senere klart for meg. ? Jeg
regnet og. med at dette var &toff'
som hverken jeg eller noen annen'
vestlit Journalist noen gang vine
fa se, og at opplysningen derfor
var uinteressant som nyhet
betraktet.
Selv etter meldlngen om at
memoarene vile bli utgitt var jeg
skeptisk og resonnerte som sa
mange andre: Selv om Krusjtsjov
nok kan ha sine tanker om de
riuvserende lederes politikk, sezr-
lig 1 Stalin-sponanalet, er ban
' like fullt en lejal lt ommunist som
.ikke vine sende kritisk stoff
.utenlands. Jeg gikk derfor uten
'Mere ut fra at memoarene var
et falskrieri.
? Jeg skiftet melting da Krusjt- ,
sjovs skate dement!. ble offent-
liggjo'rt dew 16. november. Dette.
dementi ma were et t RV de mest
bekreitende. dementler verden
noen- gang her sett, siden de'
ein s
,han persenlig skulle he, over-
!evert slikt materiale til noen
og det var det Jo heller ingen
nom haade Ostia.
Krusjtsjov omtaler dementiet
?memoarene som f Isj iv k a, et
ord som vanligvis oversettes med
falskneri. Men det bar en mer ?
begrenset, eitsakt betydning enn
som si: hvis memoarene f. eks.
er redigert uten forfatterens
.medvirkning, silk oversetteren,
Strobe Talbott, sier de Cr. 'kan
de rent fllologisk sett betegnes
som falsjiv k a, og ends were
ekte. Krusjtsjov hat dermed sine.,
ord behold ? utgiverne likes&
Dementiet var datert 10. no-
vember, men ble sendt ut
Toss' tjeneste 16. november. Noen,
dager senere fikk jeg fra en
kilde jeg ansa og anser som
meget troverdig og palitelig, here '
historien om hvordan Krusjisjov
var Witt innkalt tit Arvid Pelsje,
medlem av politbyriket og
mann 1 partiets kontrollkomml-,
sjon. Her fikk han ordre om
undertegne et dement! som She-
redo la ferdig. ICruissisjov hevdet
under samtitlen med Pelsje at
Krusjtsjovs hictivitetsnivi or ta- mllo linjetie to at det eksi-
han ikke ante at hens erindrin-
,
tfnVgtteYigtNtt44,gca:g99/09ga? et-A1VVW?insterlide. Det ger yar havnet I utlandet, en
pp
jiAiviRdWM.0 41g 1a4A006030011960104a2viere mug..
_
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selv om jeg or de fleste russere
. jeg kjente. tviler pk det. Krusit-,
sjov bOyde seg for preset Og
?undertegnet dementiet efter a ha .
Toretatt enkelte enciringer
hvilke vet jeg ikke. Opphisselsen
' tok sterkt p den 76 kr 'gentle
pensionisten, og han ble
timid-
de1bar efterpk irmlagt p syke-
. hus.
? Denne historien ble jeg av en
? erfaren kollega I Moskva advert
. mot a sende. De komrner tEl k
- utvise deg for den, sa ban. Jeg
fulgte ikke hens rad, og 'den to
Aftenposten 27. november ifjor..
Historien gikk ogse. 1 andre
aviser, og forte I Washington til
at man trodde det var Krusjt-
sjoys svigersonn, Izvestijas
tid-
ligere sjefredaktor Aleksej Adsju-
bej, som var kilden for den.
Stewart Alsop skrev sAledes
Newsweek I begynnelsen ay ?
Januar at Adsjubej go. et Inter-
. vjU til vestlige journallster
Moskva i slutten av november.
? Dette slir han fast som et fak-
. turn. Det er blankt oppspinn. Og
det er beklagellg at det ble tett
alvorlig og stadig spoker Isom:
f.eks. 1 professor John Sanness'
ellers utmerkede forord til. den
norske utgaven som konimer pk,
markedet om kort tid ? men der
1 sterkt fortynnet form.
Memoarene ble til pA fOlgende
mkte: Krusjtsjov fikk hosten
1969 eller like efter nyttar 1970
fatt I en lydbandopptager og ble
meget begeistret for den. Hver
gang han hadde tilhOrere, vaknet
den gamle folketaler i ham, og
det var fortrinnsvis hens mange
barnebarn som fikk hoe beste-
far fortelle mens bandopptageren,
gikk. Uten publikum flick han
aldri noe til. Jeg vet ikke hvem?
som skrudde. bandopptageren av
og p og hvem som fjernet
bandene. Men jeg tviler pit at
det kan ha foregAtt uten at
Krusjtsjov hadde en anelse om
det.
UPI's korrespondent I Moskva
gjcnnom mange Ar, Henry
Shapiro, forsket ogsa, en :lel 1
denne materie og kom tit den
konldusjon at det var Krusjtsjovs
dOdssyke svigersOnn, Lev Petrov,
som stirget for at erindringene
kom en utlencling.1 hende. Det
kan were riktig for alt jeg vet.
PetrovAPpliOnfilkdeEdatr
og hadde bare mkneder igjen
leve IfjOr ? VA.r. Han, dOde .ifjor
hest, fOr nyheten Om menlOarene'
We, kjint. .
? , . ?
?
Ut over efterjulsvinteren var.
? Moskva-journalisten Viktor Louis'
fen fast gjest I 1CrtisitsjoV-fam11W.
ens hjem. Louis navn ble
iresten meeerf gang lett I for.
mon Dirm9attinth Grunn-;?.'
laget var det tidspunkt ikke'
annet enn at man visste at han'
? tidligere hadde syslet med ? lign-.
' ende, ting. Louis er tovjetisk
..borger, korrespondeht 1 MoskSti,'
for London-avisen Evening News,'.
KCIBfligent og en .hyppig gjest;
I utiandet. Mistanken om at ham'.
hadde ' med Bitten a gjore,
styrket da. ? hens ?oppheld
Kobenhavn 24. august ble kjent:'
I Kobenhavn traff han en sv
:Time-Life-konsernets Overate sjeil;
fer, Murray Garth; og Tirne
dawerenCle kortespondent?
?Mosktra,. Jerrold Schecter.
-
En. teori gAr ut' pet at manu-!'.,
skriptet, ? eller lydbandene
ble overlevert der og da. Det kan.
ikke were riktig ? alt miteriale
? var ifOlge mine opplysninger We'
av Sovjet og praktisk talt fertile,
oversatt ?pet det tidspunkt.
Louis' newt er blitt nevni son4
: bevis for at det var KGB sent 4'
forget for eksporteri av memoate-.?
ne. Jeg vet ;Ikke om floe sow
'utelukker. a ICOB kan ha hatt.
en ? viktig ' finger Med 1 spinet.;
Men Viktor Leads driver en
Itnangesicllg virksomhet hvor for-
?millet 1 swert mange tilfelle
ganske enkeit er k ? tjene penger
og bare det. Jeg vil ikke uten
Atter? utelukke at det kan ha
wert hensikten ogsk dcnne gang..
Den mann som kan rotten?
hele historien, er utvllsomt Jer-
, rold Schecter. Denne ytterst sym-
:patiske, dyktige og meget aktive
korrespondent reiste fra Moskva
, 1 september ifjor, til tross for at
Times kontor da, blo stfiende
ubesatt og har stAtt ubesatt
siden ???? en tornhet som et.
nyhetsinagasin ay Times typo
skyr verre enn pesten og ink, ha
hatt meget gode grunner for Ai
overvele enn 51 akseptere. Det
btu. ikke . overraske noen . at .
Schecter er blunt dem aom et'
kontraktforpliktet tit A, holde
munn, en forpliktelso han har
ease 4,999/09/02!Velf/PRIDP79-01194A000300100001 -2
mye for a hOre hens kommentar
til den britlske Sovjet-eksperten
Victor Zorzats teori om at mate-
rialet ble overlevert Time av
CIA-agenter son utga seg for
russere!)
Den sterkeste bekreftelse pi at
ftiernoarene er autentiske, ligger
efter min mening 1 den behand.
ling sovietnk Pre,SSO har Cita
dem, Bortsett fra edementlets,
som ble trykt den 17. november,
og bortsett fra enkelte dunkle
hentydninger ? tit ememoarer av
Mt mulig slags har det vsert born
stille. Det er ogsk avslorende at
sovjetisk presse ikke har trykt
utdrag av de artikler I vestlige,
aViser hvor man har sOkt
bevise at menioarene skulle vtere
et falsknerl.
Men mest avslOrende er fOlgez.-
de detalj, som' jeg har fra en .
sovjetisk bekjent som sitter' slik
til at han nik vite det: Tie-fire
fordommende avsnitt om memo-
arene ble I siste liten tatt ut eV
manuskriptet til en artikkel soni.
sto I partiorganet Pravda den 17:
desember ifjor. Denne artikkel
var undertegnet L Aleksanclrov,
et psevdonym som biukes under
spesielt autoritative erkheringer.'
*Aleksandrovss artikler skrives av
et kollegiuw ledende medarbeide-?
re i Pravda pk partiselcretariatete
ordre.
Mime artikkel omhandlet ideo-
logisk krigforing fra imperialist-
enes side, og det Wile ha passet
bra med noen betraktninger om
Krusjtsjov-memoarene 1 denne
sammenheng hvis de hadde vcert.
et falbknerl. Min hjenunelsmann
hadde bare en kommentar:
eMemoarene er ekte, og de vet
net. Elers hadde Pravda tatt seg
? av dem den dagen.)
? Minstl like..interessant. er det
spekUlere ,1:ok hensikten med
memoarene, dersom de ble
let nt med'MyndIghetenes viten?
de.. Det er en annett lig en'
mega lane .4.-k hinkried ' . '
7g