CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES 16 AUGUST 1971 SOVIET SETBACK IN THE SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 250
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 16, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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SLI+IAKY OF SOVIET BOOK, THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF AFRICA
A new books published in Moscow for alimited readership of Soviet
specialists., gives an unusually frank picture of Soviet attitudes to
political developments in Africa# The book The PolitLaa a ties ?L
Al ricao was passed by the censors last Oetobeftnawa been Issued
Lander the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute
f in an edition of only 3,700 copies,
Presumably because of the restricted readership, the dozen Soviet
African experts who collaborated on the book under the editorship
of V. G. Solodovnikov, the Africa Institute Director and a former
Soviet representative at the United Nations., have been particularly
outspoken both about conditions in Africa and previous Soviet
analyses cLf the. situation*
While African statesmen are criticised for "Utopian" views and other
heresies by the Soviet experts, they point out that some of their
own colleagues have taken an oversimplified view of African leadersio
The book contains biographies of several African leaders to stress
that there cannot be any automatic way of "defining political sympathies
on the basis of social origin....Like other continents, Africa knows
examples of political leaders who have refused to serve their class....
These examples testify to the incorrectness of identifying the
aristocratic stratum of chiefs with reactionaries, without any
qualifications..-.a view disseminated quite widely in (Soviet) Africanist
literatureo"
.The book names those "revolutionary-democratic" parties-in Guineas
',Algeria, the UAR, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Portuguese
Guinea and Mozambique.-which the authors believe-can become "reliable
.detachments of the African and international Communist and workerso
movement" "Revolutionary.-democratic" parties is the Soviet term
for the kind of "national Soci al.ist" parties with a mass membership
familiar in developing countries&
The authors describe how present nationalist parties of a mass nature
are to be "transformed" into Communist-type parties. Firstly, "the
establishment of a single party system of government is one of the
most important political successes of parties of the revolutionary-'
democratic type." But the book warns Soviet specialists not to commit
themselves to supporting present-day ruling parties of this types
since it was "impossible to exclude the possibility of a departure from-
-.a single party system":
"This system corresponds to the present-day state of social relations
in the progressive countries of Tropical Africa. But the social
structures of African countries are going through a period of stormy
changes, new social forces are emerging on to the historical arenas
in particular the political role of the working class is becoming
increasingly noticeable. Under these conditions any dogmatism in the
evaluation of the single-party system in the concrete historical
epoch of a given African country could entail serious miste. see
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Challefige Planned
The implication is that Marxist opposition groups may be formed and
that leaders now hailed by the Russians as "progressive" may be challenged
by them when the time is ripe. The book predicts that the tendency
towards onemman rule will inevitably Cede Qt r p "aalthoilgh it w
probably be a long time before this problera is fully resolved." There
are several references to the fact that opposition continues within and
outside the single ruling parties and that although it can be repressed
for a time,, "sooner or later the moment of serious upheavals arrives,,
as a result of which it becomes clear that the single-party system
cannot be regarded as a panacea,"
Sometimes these "upheavals" have already taken place,, producing a result
not favoured by the Soviet authorse They say of the military regimes
now existing in Africa: .
"The replacement of a regime of mercenary bureaucrats by often incompetent
officers does not decids anything itself..., It is clear that it is
impossible to implement even correct programmes by relying only on the
army and deliberately rejecting political, i.e* party,, forms of leading
the masses. The soil for the regrowth of new parties inevitably remains
in those countries where mi .itary regamea Groh down politig . W@ in
~~tl~rg~ ati
Returning to the more progressive "revolutionary-democratic" parties,,
the book says that they have entered a new phase: "These processes are
accompanied by a heightening of discussion around ideological questions,,
a growing interest towards the Marxist-Leninist teaching, The parties'
success in the new phase will greatly depend on the extent to which
these new trends will becou consolidated in practice and how quioklyP.
the new tendencies will be understood and become the parties# normsae?e
"Facts demonstrate that the transformation of the present-day mass
popular revolutionary-democratic parties into parties of a vanguard
(i.e. Communist) type is being placed on the agenda. One cannot consider
that. there is unanimity on this question in the political thinking
of revolutionary democrats. Although the process of transforming
present-day parties into Socialist vanguard parties has in practice
begun,, it is continuing in an extremely slow and contradictory manner,.,,
"In conditions whereby the influence of trade unions, the youth move
ment and peasant organisations remains strong within revolutionary-
democratic parties, the tendency towards their transformation into
vanguard parties begins to show increasingly clearly. This process in
general corresponds to the logic of the class ware The former antic.
colonial front slowly disintegrates and a dilemma arises before
revolutionary-democratic parties-to continue to be allied to the
bourgeoisie or to take the side firmly of workers and peasants,..,
The relative weakness of class contradictions in the towns and the
communal survivals (ioee traditional African village life) in the
countryside,.,favor the durability of illusions about the possibly
lengthy existence of parties common to whole peoplesof
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Class Struggle
Here the Soviet long-term opposition to mass nationalist parties is clears
even though it is conceded that in Africa the social basis for-the class
struggle which the Russians would welcome is not very promising. The
authors go on to indicate that., whatever the present situation,. they
expect the class struggle to emerges
"It remains an indisputable fact that class differentiation is taking
its normal course 1p Africa.... This process does not by-pass single-
party regimes eithep.... It may be that this struggle is being waged
within a formally single party ...but its class basis is undoubted*, Nor
can one forget the illegal, extra-parliamentary opposition under
conditions of single-party regimes#"
Despite the relative lack of class conflict in Africa, the book attacks
"revolutionary democrats" who deny that Communism can "have real roots
on the African continent,, One does not have to prove that these people
are willy-nilly in the same camp as the anti-:Communists and, as a
consequence, as the defenders of capitalism."
A sign that the Russians are cautious about forcing the pace, thereby
jeopardising their long-term plans., is the book's denunciation of "left.'
wing extremism." Nevertheless., the fact that a left-wing is emerging
in revolutionary-democratic parties such as those in Algeria and Egypt.
is welcomed. Discussing a 'number of Marxist.-Leninist parties on the
African continent, the book declares:
"The basic pxograrrsnatic theses of the revolutionary-democratic parties
often coincide with (those) of Marxist-Leninist parties or those
related to them. At the same tine, the views of Communists and
revolutionary democrats do not always coincide on many other questions
This is understandable. The revolutionary-democratic parties are not
consistent Marxists. Their basic membership consists of peasants who
have -inherited from many years of ao lonial overlordship political and
cultural backwardness and religious fanaticism.... However, representa-
tives of the African intelligentsia and the young working class, inspired
by scientific Socialist ideas... actively work in the central organs of
these parties-As well as in their middle and lower ranks."
Sudanese Example
The book cites the example of the Sudan, where following the takeover
in May, 1969, Communists joined the government. It claims: "Communists
do not strive for a political monopoly, ruled b3? some sort of egoistical
considerations..., This can be seen with particular clarity from the
example of the activities of Sudanese Communistsm?
But on February 12 President Nimeri attacked the Sudanese Communist
Party, claiming that it had been "perpetrating subversion against the
production machinery in various ways, including interference with trade
union work, ..,wrecking production and disseminating secret pamphlets,
disastrous rumours and harmful lies and spreading fear and diem" aapong
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He warned that the Sudanese revolution would not allow the creation of a
new party, secretly or overtly: "The revolution did not take place to
support one-group against another but to support the entire peopled"
Pointing out that difficult tasks lie before African Communists, the
book ends with interesting insights into recommended tactics. The maim
task is said to be for Communists to attract to them not only a reliable
and conscious minority, but the mass of the workers as well. Though
"extraordinarily 'difficult," the task could be accomplished-.."as the
positive experience of Sudanese Communists shows."
"The working-out of correct tactics by Communists with regard to ruling
revolutionary-democratic parties acquires particular importance.... In
entering the ranks of mass revolutionary.-democratic parties and carrying.
out daily work within them, Communists revolutionise these parties....
"But entry by CP members into a ruling party is likened by Communists
least of all to dissolution within it. On the. contrary,, they strive to
raise a mass revolutionary party to the level of a conscious Socialist
vanguard, to a close-knit union of genuinely like-ninckd peoples It is
natural that in doing this they have to rely mainly on the left.4dng.,
more revolutionary elements and overcome the resistance of right-wing.,
nationalist elements....
"The only way of putting an end to ideological pressure on the party by
elements hostile to the spirit of Socialism is...by means of periodically
purging its ranks of alien and casual elements."
The book raises two basic possibilities for Communist takeovers in
Africa: firstly, "revolutionising" ruling parties from within by
creating "close-knit union(s) of genuinely like-minded people" who
proceed to purge their opponents, and secondly, opposition from outside
the ruling party:
"Making use of the experience of more mature Communist and workers'
parties,, African Communists are striving to master different forms of
struggle for the basic interests of the workers--from peaceful and
parliamentary ones.to armed onesu.in order to be ready for any change
in the political situation"
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TIME
CPYR'bAfust 1971
The Sudan in midsummer is an Oven
of a land where ternpcraturea soar to
120? day after day and tempers tend
to get even hotter. Since he~ took pow-
er 26 months ago, Major general Jaa-
far Numeiry, 41, leader of the ruling
Revolutionary Command Council, has
faced eight attempted coups, most of
them during the summer months. Last
week members of the army elite that gov-
erns this equatorial nation of 15 mil-
lion staged the most confusing hot-
weather spectacular since it won in-
dependence from Britain 15 years ago.
Inthespaceof?a few, days, rebellious of-
ficcrs toppled the government, impris-
oned Numeiry, were top led themselves
and, as happened in Morocco only a
week earlier, were summarily executed.
The initial revolt was bloodless, but
the countercoup was a running battle
that littered the streets of Khartoum
with dead and crowded its hospitals
with wounded. Though the fighting was
confined to the capital and to Om-
durman across the Nile, the repercus-
sions rippled far beyond the Sudan.
The Soviets quickly supported the dis-
sidents and were noticeably distressed
by Numeiry's countercoup. Libyan
Leader Muammar Gaddafi, %the hotspur
of the Arab world, barged into the in-
ternal problems of another nation for
the second time in two weeks: He was
more effective than he had been in Mo-
rocco, however. By forcing down a Brit-
ish jet and kidnaping two rebel leaders,
he took much of the spunk out of the
anti-Numeiry, forces.
Mohammed and Marx. In Khartoum,
the principal leader of the coup was Ma-
jor Hashem al Atta, 35. Atta and two
other Communist sympathizers had been
booted off the ruling seven-officer Rev-
.olutionary Command. Council by Nu-
meiry last November, ostensibly for leak-
ing state secrets. Atta, supported by the
presidential guard and an armored diyi-
sion, skillfully directed the takeover of
Numeiry's hea4lquarters and Omdurman
radio, which proclaimed that "democrat-
ic Sudan has been established." Atta
named Lieut. Colonel Babakr al Nour,
37, to be president of a ,revolutionary
council, and himself vice president.
The rebels, he said, wanted lower liv-
ing costs, freedom for Communists and
trade unionists. and autonomy for the
iron-Moslem rebels of southern Sudan,
who have been in revolt ever since inde-
p nde idd (TtMtlt, Nitfth 1), Alta wee r o:
unforced not only by elements of the Su-
dan's 26,000-man army but also by the
nation's Communist Party. With 6,000
active members and the support of 200;
000 trade unionists, it is the biggest and
most vigorous in the Arab world, large-
ly by virtue of its skill at getting Marx
and Mohammed to coexist (verses from
the Koran are chanted in unison at
party meetings). Though he is a leftist,
Numeiry is an intense foe of the local
Communists-partly because they op-
pose his plan to link the Sudan in a fed-
eration with Libya, Egypt and Syria,
and partly because he is convinced that
they want to undermine him. Communist
Leader Abdel Khalek Mahgoub wisely
kept out of sight last week as sym-
pathetic army officers mounted their
coup. But there were reports that he mas-
terminded the coup from the Bulgarian
embassy in Khartoum.
Abdel Khalek's brother, Major Mo-
hammed Mahgoub Osman, however, was
quite visible. Along with Nour and Ma-
jor Farouk Osman Hamadallah, he was
in London when the coup was staged.
Alerted that it had succeeded, the three
officers and their aides boarded a BOAC
VC10 bound for Khartoum, Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam. Khartoum airport
was closed, but Atta announced that he
would open it for the VC 10.'
One for the Road. The plane was
moving into Libyan airspace and mon-
itoring Malta air control when the trou-
ble came. Captain Roy Bowyer heard
Benghazi break in and order: "You must
land at Benina Airport or we shall
shoot you down." Some passengers said
they saw a fighter buzzing the plane.
With 109 passengers aboard,. Bowyer
was not inclined to take any chances.
Nour agreed to give himself up. Ac-
cording to London Daily Telegraph Cor-
respondent Brian Silk, a fellow pas-
senger, Hamadallah summoned the first-
class steward and said: "Libya is a dry
country under Gaddafi. We'd better have
another whisky while we can."
When the plane landed in predawn
darkness at Benina, it was met by two se-
curity men and a soldier. After a ten-
minute conversation with his welcoming
committee, Nour told the pilot that he
was getting off. Asked Bowyer: "Are
you leaving of your own free will?"
"No," answered Nour. "We are being
forced." He disappeared along with Ma-
f1or Hamadatlah (for unknown reason ,
Mahgotab watt not removed from t
plane).
Shades of Indonesia. Soon thereafte
troops loyal to Numeiry moved out f
barracks, and rifle and cannon fire roar
through Khartoum and Omdurman. T
battle was short but intense; Numei
later announced that as the countercou
began, 30 of his officers and men we
captured and slaughtered by, rebel so -
diers. One U.S. Marine was wounds
at the American-interests section of t
Dutch embassy-the old American e -
bassy before the Sudan severed rel. -
tions following the 1967 Middle Ea ft
war. From an embassy window, a U-1.
diplomat saw the bodies of some 15 c -
vilians sprawled near the presidents I
palace. Before Atta's forces lost t
radio station, they broadcast a final me
sage: "Hold on to revolutionary gas
by the skin of your teeth." Then th
radio fell silent. When it returned t
the air, the first message was: "N
meiry is alive and well." Three hour;
later, a weeping Numeiry appeared o
TV and radio. Into the streets of Kha
toum for a celebration poured many
the people who earlier the same da
had taken to the same streets in a si
ilar demonstration for the rebels.
Numeiry moved swiftly once he ha
regained power. He telephoned Gadda
to thank him for his help, and a
nounced that "I am in complete co
trol." He sent a similar message t
Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, wh
was probably considerably relieved th
he would not have a Communist-or
ented regime on his southern flank.
Then Numeiry set about the husines
of revenge. "Arrest every Communist,
he told the Sudanese. "The Communist
are traitors." Whether that order woul
lead to an Indonesian-style slaiightc
was uncertain; in any case, the gov
ernment was taking care of its special en
envies. Numeiry established four tribu
nals for speedy justice. Atta and thre
other rebel officers were shot the flex
morning; other executions followed
Nour and Hamadallah, who were de
livered to Numeiry by Gaddafi's aides
may also die. Like Jordan's King Hus
sein (see following story), the Sudane
leader was using strong measures to con
soiidate his power. Like Hussein, h
May' be setting in motion forces the
could prove difficult to control.
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TIME
CPYF~C '}qust 1971
MIDDLE EAST
Revenge in the Sudan
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat felt
impelled to intervene. He telephoned Su-
dan's President. Major General Jaa'far
Numeiry, in Khartoum and offered, a
hit of advice: spare the life of Shaj'ie
Ahmed Sheikh, secretary-general of the
Sudan's federation of trade unions, win-
ncr of the Lenin Peace Prize and a lead-
er of the Arab world's strongest Com-
munist Party (6,000 active members).
Coolly, Numeiry said he would have
been delighted to comply with the Egyp-,
tian request except for one , thing
Sheikh had been hanged two hours'
before the telephone call.
Sheikh was one of three top-echelon
Communists and eleven Sudanese army
officers executed last week. Numeiry
was taking bloody revenge for the.iin-
successful revolt attempted the week be-
fore by Communist-oriented Sudanese
army officers (T;Mr., Au j. 2). In the `pro-
cess he was virtually declaring war on
the Communist Party.,
"There will, he no, more Sudanese
Communists wandering around," vowed
a loyalist government minister as rpass
arrests and summary trials were carried
out. At least 1,000 had been' arrested
by week's end. Among those executed
were two officers whp had been pulled
off a British ,airplane two weeks ago by
Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi and
handed over to Numeiry. Lieut. Col.;'
pncl Babakr al Nour, who had been fly-
ing, home to Khartoum front London,'
denied prior knowledge' of the plot
,against Numeiry. Then why had Nour
been named leader of'the new tebel gov
ernment? Numeiry asked. "Was it be-
cause of your beautiful brown eyes?"Unable to answer, Nour Wad led away
and shot at the Shajaia army camp out-
side Khartoum.
Shortly afterward, the ea o -
dan's Communist Party was also found
guilty of treason, Abdel Khalak Malh.
goub denied that he had advance knowl-
edge of the plot. Again Numeiry stepped
in to play prosecutor. He held up a
sheet of paper listing Cabinet choices
in a post-Numeiry government and
asked Mahgoub if the handwriting were
his. The Communist leader admitted
that it was. The military court quickly
found Mahgoub guilty of treason and
hanged him.
Russian Protest. The execrations had
international repercussions. The Soviets,
could scarcely ignore the attack on an
important Middle Eastern Communist
party, especially since Communism has
such an uncertain hold in the area (see
box). Moscow officially warned' Khar-
toum against what it called "the im-
permissibility of resorting' to ' extreme
measures"-a hint that the some '1,000
East bloc technicians working in the
SFrdan might be recalled. '
To counter the criticism, Numeiry!
convened a press conference in Khar=l
toum and described the' treatment he'
had received when he was held by the
rebels during the coup. "It was rep-'
rehensible," he said. "I went to the toi-
let only once in four days when I
absolutely insisted on it." Then Numeiry
put the onus for any breakdown in're-
lations on the Russians. "if they want
to choose that path, we will have no al-
ternative.", Numeiry said-which could
mean he may beat the Russians to the
punch by expelling the 'adv'isers before
the Kremlin could order them to re-
turn home.
Tripoli Summit. bqq the midst of, the
furor over events in''M Sudan, Libya's
Gaddafi decided once again to' project
himself into the Middle east spotIigbt?
He called , together an' h st#itt Arab~stuttt-
mit in Tripoli '*It@t a We, * ive guest
list. The ree Arab rngs-
Morocco. Feisal of Saudi Arabia and
Husnain of Jordan-were snubbed. Gad-
daft scorns them as too eonservat.ive;
moreover, his primary reason for the
summit was to discuss Hussein's hard at-
tacks on the Arab guerrillas who have
long used Jordan as a major base of op-
erations. Iraq, everybody's odd man out
and the only Arab government to sup-
port the Sudanese rebels, was also
ignored.
Only four of the nine leaders who
had been invited showed up. Hussein,
sarcastically thanked Gaddafi for "the
invitation which I never received" and
prayed facetiously that "God may di-
rect you on the right path."
Sisco in Israel. The disorganized Arab
situation was tailor-made for the Israeli
government, particularly since U.S. As-
sistant Secretary of State Joseph J.
Sisco arrived in Jerusalem last week
for further discussions on the moribund
Suez peace proposals. The Israelis ar-
gue that with the Arab world in tur-
moil. this is no, time to sign a peace
agreement with Egypt. Sadat reinforced
these arguments by delivering a mil-
itant speech promising to break the im-
passe before the end of this year with
"Political and military" steps and ex-
pressing his willingness to sacrifice
1,000,000 men in the effort.
If Sisco is not likely to get any-
where with his peace proposals, neither
are the Israelis with their request for
up to 50 more U.S.-built Phantom jets.
Washington; fears afresh arms delivery
would: wreck any, chance, of a Suez set-
tlement. As. one. U.S., official said ,last
week,.the Suez proposals are "the.one re-
maining diplomatic thread" in the Arab-
hruli conflic?.
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CPYRGHT '
'T
Arabs v. Communists:' Thanks gut'No Thanks
O"OAIRO is Moscow's foremost client
in the Middle East. Yet during the I
rief period, two weeks ago when it.
okcd as if the Sudan might fall un-
er the control of a pro-Communist re= .
ime, Egypt's leaders moved swiftly to.
revent that from happening. They air-
ifted some 2,000 Sudanese troops from
ositions along the Suez Canal to Khar-
oum to ensure the success of General
umeiry's countercoup, flying them
here in Soviet-supplied Antonov trans-
orts. According to a Cabinet Minister
rom neighboring Libya, both Egypt and
Libya were preparing to intervene if
he countercoup failed.
i
Thus, once again, a seemingly par-
doxical fact was underlined: although
the Soviet Union enjoys growing in-
fluence in the Arab world, there is strong
and sometimes savage resistance toward
local Communism. The Soviets have
supplied billions in aid to "revolution-
ary" Arab governments. They have re-
ceived lavish expressions of friendship
as well as vital military facilities in re-
turn. But they have never been able to in-
stall a pro-Communist regime in the
area. There are Baathist radicals in Syr-
ia and Iraq. and Socialists in Algeria.
Egypt, Libya and southern Yemen. But
Communists in power? Not a one.
That has been true from the first. In
the early 1920s, Moscow was on ex-
cellent terms with Turkey's Kemal Ata-
tiirk. But this did not prevent Atattirk
from killing off the leading Communists
in his country. Egypt's late Gamal Ab-
del Nasser accepted Soviet money, ad-
vice and, in some areas, decision-mak-
ing. But in 1959 he clapped hundreds
of Communists into prison. Throughout
the Middle East, the Communist Party
is legal only in Lebanon-and, ironically,
Israel. 'in Sudan, where it is technically
banned but has operated openly, its con-
tinued existence is now threatened.
Superficially, most Arab states look
like perfect targets for Marxist-Leninist
exploitation. They have been in a state
of constant upheaval for most of this
century. They are desperately poot. They"
are alienated from the West. Having
failed to wrest 'victory from Israel, they
have become alarmingly dependent on'
Soviet military help. ,Yet the region is
not sufficiently i~nd,rstrializer( to support
a classic, Russian-style proletarian up-
rising, and the illiterate, fatalistic, fel-
lahirrof the villages are too conservative,
too steeped in the concepts of familial
loyalty and the Islamic . faith to become
conscripts in a Maoist peasant revolt.
' "What is happening it} the Arab
world," former U.S. Ambassador to Cai-
ro Raymond Hare explains, "is not a rev-
olution but a revulsion." It is a re-
vulsion against foreign domination,
whether cultural, economic or political
-and even unsophisticated Arabs rec-
ognize that Communism is a foreign
import. Arabs still dream of the time,
twelve centuries ago, when their fore-
bears dominated a vast sweep of Eu-
rope, from the banks of the Indus to
the valley of the Loire. They might use
Communist help in hopes of restoring
that glorious past, but they are not like-
ly to accept Communist suzerainty.
0
In recent years. a seemingly endless
round of Arab military coups has pro-
duced major changes in the power struc-
ture at the top level of many countries.
But the social structure has remained vir-
tually intact. It is a conservative struc-
ture, rooted in the family and the tribe.
Nationhood is a more recent concept
and still an uncomfortable one; the Arab
had long been accustomed to thinking
smaller (the family) or larger (the Arab
world, a supranational notion).
Politically, the Arabs do not accept
even the concept of multiparty gov-
ernment. In most Middle East nations,
there is no room for a loyal oppo-
sition; the terms are mutually contra-
dictory in a society where "the enemy
of my enemy is my friend." The idea
of an opposition party committed to
Moscow rather than Cairo or Tripoli
or Khartoum is totally unacceptable.
So far, the type of government that
Arabs seem to feel most comfortable
with is an autocratic one, preferably mil-
itary. "Arab politics," comments Leb?
anese Political Scientist Elie Salem, "has
always ridden on horseback. Salve on
Is expected from the army." Ha ng
saved a country. . the army is loaf to
share power. Even if the rebellious of-
ficers had 'won in the Sudan two w s
' ago, outside observers believe, t ey
would soon have,turned on the C m-
munists who gave them support.
Looking at "the dysfunctioning of
Arab society," Beirut Social Psyc ol-
ogist Halim Barakat says: "Men alien-
ated from established orders have al-
ternatives." Barakat suggests three al-
ternatives-revolution, withdrawal nd
resignation-and notes that only the cc-
ond and third are acceptable in Arab ul-
ture. Revolution against a govern nt
is one thing: against the traditional st c-
ture of society, it is quite anot er.
Islam has much to do with such at-
titudes. Religion alone is not strong
enough to withstand Communism if th-
er conditions are right; Catholic C ba
and Confucianist China demonstr, ed
that. But Islam has a permeating is-
cipline in Arab culture that shapes ol-
itics and unites even dissident lea crs
like Libya's Gaddafi and Saudi Ara a's
King Feisal. Gaddafi subscribes to he
same simplistic explanation of the ew
order offered by Nasser before his de the
"The reason that Arab socialism is if-
fferent from Communism is because ur
socialism believes in God while C m-
munism is atheistic."
0
Every day 90 million Arabs intone
the word inshallah-God willing. I is
Allah who will reform society, no a
Brezhnev or a Mao, and the typ at
Arab has little enthusiasm for tinke ng
with changes himself. A famous Arab ex-
pression is "Bookrah flu mishrrri. i,"
which means that the apricots will be
blooming tomorrow; it indicates a ,a-
irana attitude rivaling that of even L tin
Americans. In such a culture, C m-
munism has slim chance of succeeding.
Understanding this, the Soviet Un on
up to now has been willing to sacri ce
one Arab Communist Party after p-
other in return for broader geopolitical
gains. It is a cynical trade-off, but iv-
en the attitudes of the Arab world, i is
the only deal available to Moscow.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
 Approved For ReaI a 9/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030007000'1-6
WASHINGTON POST
.25 July 1971
The Iris and Outs of Su rt
;' 't'he countercoup In audato,,returning to power' DO SO'ynar.otd ruler, Colonel Qadhefl, a paaaionat
o general who had been kicked out three days pan-Arabist whose hatred of communism rises dl
rifer, makes it hard to take Sudan very seriously rectly from the Koran, forced down a BOAC air
tf her as a country ready to tackle the misery of ' liner carrying two anti-Nimeri leaders back t
It own people or as one capable of bringing Influ, Khartoum from London, and kidnaped them. The
e ce to bear on the broader regional scene. Osten extent of Colonel Qadhafi's other services for his
sl ly, the' man who Is back In, General Nimeri,, Sudanese protege can only be guessed. 'As the late
le ned to Egypt and the officers' who are now out Gamal Nasser demonstrated, pan-Arabism provide
(a me were quickly executed) leaned to commu- good Ideological cover for suhh Intervention. A
ni m. But actually It seems gratuitous to ascribe any, rate, Libya's success in helping to engineer a
m ch importance to' any public positions taken in change of government In Sudan Is certain to raise
K artoum. j :.Its prestige In the 'Arab world, and to heighten its
olitics there consists of the maneuvers o a.few' leaders' arrogance,, too.
p pie, a good many of them evidently anipu-' Libya's Prestige in the Arab world, doubtless will
Wed from the outside. It Is the curse of m ny poor , be further raised by Its pulling of the British lion's
co ntrles suddenly overtaken by the pres ures, and tall in respect to the BOAC plane forced down at
an idles of the 20th century that they c nnot field Benina 'airport. Britain quickly protested the act
a cal "government" in the sense of a apparatus as. "outrageous" and "inexcusable." But Britain
' th it reaches throdghout the country and tries. to. follows France in its general policy of accommodat-
ge things done. Sudan, with 15 mi 'on disparate Ing the Arab states, where its oil and money are,
ci zens scattered over an immense million-square' and currently London Is trying to sell more arms
ml a territory, suffers from that urse more than ' to Libya. These considerations probably will prr,-
m st.
s-..tests
n __ a_
__
t it
ven
d
ven
s
from being
CPYRGHT
ibya's role in restoring Gen ral Nimeri to office seriously pressed. In any case, no satisfaction the
Is more Interesting than t restoration. Unlike British might now receive will alter the practical
Su an, Libya has a very s all population, Immense effect of Libya's strong-arm Intervention in Sudan,
oil reserves and revenue and a strategic location; where the Ins, who even outs for a day or so, are
th to differences expl why It cannot be ignored. his again-rand all the real problems remain.
NEV YORK TIMES
2 8 July 19 71
CPYRGHT
Esc j e Arab world to a group But the vehemence of General Nimeiry's reaction, an
0 visiting Americans last year as "a very large area close the strong support he has received from Cairo an
t our borders which cannot be controlled by any power." Tripoli, indicate the depth of anti-Communist feeling eve
Events of the last few days in the Sudan should bring . ' among Arab leaders who have been labeled as "progres
11 me the wisdom of that observation to policymakers sive" in Soviet terminology. Intimations of subversio
i the Kremlin who appear once more to have allowed in the Khartoum affair, following on the heels of th
eir Ideological ambitions corrupt their political judg- recent attempted takeover in Cairo by pro-Soviet ele
eat. General Nimeiry's harsh crackdown on local Corn- ments, should impel General Nimeiry, President Sada
unists suspected of masterminding, from the Bulgarian and other Arab leaders to re-examine the "fraternal con
E nbassy, last' week -'s military coup In Khartoum casts a tacts" with the Soviet Union which have inundated thei
s adow over Soviet ambitions not only in the Sudan countries with Soviet aid and advisers under the decep
b it throughout the Arab world. tive guise of anti-imperialist (Israel) solidarity.
The abrupt suspension of the public trial of Abdel The Russians in turn should recognize the limitation
K aliq Mahgoub yesterday after a prosecution witness that Islamic tradition and modem Arab nationalism plat
r (fused to confirm charges against the Communist party on any attempt to forge Soviet hegemony throughout th
c let may deprive the world of any clear evidence of Middle East In the fires of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
mmunist collusion in the Khartoum coup. It Is in fact legitimate Soviet Interest in the stability of this "ve
b rely possible that the Sudanese Communists and their large area close to our borders" would better be serve
'Viet friends were actually Innocent, though of course by policies romotin peace between th Arabs an
i ereste l1 eq I~ 4~H/A /~0@ : CIA- s7%? Eh"Qi a0QQ7A61&U Volution i
iitical u
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6:
CPYRGHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 July 1971:
Glum ms,m and the Arb world
Sudan's coup and countercoup and the
resulting anti-Communist witch-hunt
point up once agai the fact that commu-
nism has only a very limited ideological
base in the. Arab Muslim world.
Small Communist parties exist but most
of them have to operate clandestinely.
Some of the leading so-called Arab radi-
cal countries, such as Egypt and Algeria,
accept massive military and economic
aid from Communist Russia and the pres-
ence of hundreds-in Egypt's case thou-
sands-of. Soviet advisers, but they do
not want communism operating as a po-
litical force within their borders.
Hitherto. the Sudanese Communist
Party has been one of the strongest and
most active in the Arab world drawing
considerable support from intellectuals
and trade unions. Now the reinstated
President Nimeiry is rounding up both
Communists and suspected Communists
mercilessly in the aftermath of the short-
lived coup.
President Nimeiry's massive retribution
has brought forth an angry condemnation
from Soviet Russia, which has given
Sudan considerable aid, both military and
economic, with the usual accompaniment
of advisers and technicians:
Some observers believe the military offi-
cers who led the coup were prompted as
much, if not more, by strongly national-
istic and anti-Egyptian feelings as by left-
ist leanings. But they certainly had Com-
munist support and, had the coup suc-
ceeded, Sudan would have become the first.
Arab country to have a Communist-
oriented government.
This danger explains why Libya's young
revolutionary leader, the strongly anti-
Communist Colonel al-Qaddafi, intervened
directly in the Sudanese crisis and kid-
'napped two of the rebel leaders from a
British airliner.
President Nimeiry appears to enjoy con-
siderable popular support although he has
no broad political power base in Sudan.
Last year he crushed what was said to
have been an attempted coup by the An-
sar, one of the country's two great Muslim
sects - the Ansar's religious leader, imam
al-Hadi al-Mahdi, was killed in the fight-
ing. This action alienated a large section
of traditional, conservative opinion from
Nimeiry. The result has been that he has
had no effective counterweight on the
right to balance the leftist forces which
staged last week's putsch. And it helps to
explain why he has dealt so harshly with
the leftists now and why he has turned to
Egypt for support.
Hitherto Nimeiry has resisted pres-
sure on him to join the planned political
federation of Egypt, Libya and Syria, but
he may feel compelled to go into the club
now since both Egypt and Libya have
helped him over the crisis, even though
this would complicate still more his al-
ready tenuous relations with the non-
Arab southern Sudan.
In the current context the dilemma for
Soviet Russia is an acute one. To maintain
its present gains in the Middle East it
must continue to back Arab revolutionary
regimes which are essentially anti-Com-
munist. For interests of big power policy,
it thus finds itself obliged to stand by and
watch while loyal pro-Moscow Commu-
nists pay with their lives for their part in
the abortive Sudanese revolt.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
NEW YORK TII+ES
28 July 1971
CPYRGHT
By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON
Specter to The New York Times
CAIRO, July 27-A dream
of uniting the Arabs from the
Atlantic to the Persian Gulf
has long been a .guiding mys?
tique of Arab intellectuals,
yearning for the lost grandeur
,of Arable civilization a thou-
sand years ago.
Seldom, however, has the
mystique of Arab unity looked
so hollow, and
recent events in
'News the Arab world
Analysis have underscored
the impression
that absolute unity
of the 100 million Arabs isl
probably an unrealizable ob?4
jective.
For modern political leaders,)
such as the late Presidents
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.)
Arab unity' has been. viewed
largely as a weapon to regain)
Arab dignity and power after
long domination and division
by foreign conquerors.
Efforts toward such unity
may have been' renewed fol-
lowing last week's communist.
'
ra r
New Effort Toward
Goal Seen Since
Coup-In. Sudan
munist rebels In Khartoum.
Spearhead of Assault.
In a swift and well-executed
operation, aircraft of Libya
and Egypt flew Sudanese troops
froQm~ the Suez Canal front to
abase outside Khartoum. The
troops spearheaded an assault
that routed the rebels and re-
stored Premier Gaafar . al?
Nimeiry to power.
The success of this action
1cast a new light on the pro-
jected federation of Egypt,
Libya and Syria, in September,
which General Nimeiry has
vowed to join in January.
The federation's statutes
provide for Intervention against
disorders and uprisings in any
of the member countries, a
threat that can be expected to
`cool the ardor of dissidents to
seize power. The. swift execu-
tions of. the leaders of the
coup.i.M the Sudan have demon-I
strated the penalties of failure.
Unity of 'Arabs A o combat
Communism was, stressed' over
the weekend by the, Libyan
Minister of Interior. Maj. Ku-
weildi Hamidi.,
etat in the' "The Sudanese mutineers!
oriented coup d
Sudan, crushed within 72 are traitors and agents of
hours, in order to provide. Pgktng and Moscow, and. this
common defense against a new is the case of Communists all
Intruder in the region--Com- over the Arab world," he. said.
munist ideology. "Arabs must dedicate their
Last Friday, President Anwar sincerity and loyalty to the
el-Sadat of Egypt deplored the Arab nation and not import
l"co npleto disintegration" of Ideologies such' as, Commu?
Arab unity and underlined the nism."
complaint by accusing King 711is was perhaps one of the
Hussein of Jordan of deceit in few utterances by a member
starting a military offensive of the Libyan revolutionary re-
which deposed King
against Palestinian guerrillas gtme
,
while at the same time voicing Idris nearly two years ago, that
!assurances of abiding by agree- could be approvingly echoed bye
ments for a coexistence ore- King Faisal- ' of Saudi Arabia
the Jordanian h and other Arab . kings and
:tween ,ties and the guerrillas. sheiks.
But In the same speech, Mr. j The major pitfall for Comrru?
Sadat praised one of the rare 11 nists in the Arab world, is it
Instances of effective Arab
tion of Egyptians, Libyan and
Sudanese to oust the Com-
this at intervals in Egypt, Al- Outspoken acclaim by Liby
'
geria, Iraq, Syria and, most re-
cently, the Sudan.
Communists also stir hostility
and suspicion among Arabs by
their espousal of atheism. Be
yond that, Communism is
looked upon with dread byl
most middle-class Arabs, fear-
ful of seizures of land, villas
and shops.
The Arab-Soclallsm founded
by Mr. Nasser and adhered to
by Mr. Sadat, Col. Muammar el-
Qaddafi of Libya and Premier
!Nimeiry proclaims fealty to Is-
Ilam, condemns class warfare
and guarantees rights to per-
sonal property and a private
Isector in the economy.
True unity has proved Im-
possible to achieve among 14
Arab League countries with
extreme contrasts in wealth
and development and with
some, such as Saudi Arabia;
under virtually feudal monar-
chies and others, such as
Egypt and Libya, ruled by
revolutionaries proclaiming So-
cialism as their objective.
One Area of Agreement
The one area of agreement
among them has been hostility
to Israel. But some. are more
hostile than others and the
Arabs have been divided on
tactics and objectives- in the
struggle. Militant countries
such as Iraq still shout slogans
about destroying Israel, but'
Burin w hich the countryhas
others, including Eggyyppt and been gknown as . the United
Jordan, acknowledge that a re- Arab Republic.
covory of lands lost. to ; 2sraetl The gap between Arabs on
In the 1967 war and a settle- 'a political level was illustrated
Iment for Palestinian refugees by the shocked reaction of the
represent the only feasible ob- austere young Libyan leader,
jectives. Colonel Qaddafi, at a con-
The Egyptian-Israeli cease- 1fcrence of Arab leaders in Ra?
fire that took effect last Au- bat when he saw Moroccan
st, baiting Cairo's costa 'kgn generals and Cabinet ministers
gu g y 'kissing the- hand. of King
King
"war of attrition," appears to Hassan.
have weakened even the over. "Good God," he Was reported
44
strong nationalism and abhor-; 'all unity In spirit, allowing a Te-
rence of failing subservient to a sur once of old grievances and
Communist power. Arab Com- 'differences among Arabs.
munlsts have become victims of
s attempt
ans of an army group
on July 10 to overthrow
King Hassan-11 of Morocco led
to mutual recriminations and
an apparent break in relations.
The Baathist party regime inl
Iraq, shunned by most Arabs,
isolated itself even further bvl
withdrawing its embassy staff)
in Jordan and closing the
frontier, ostensibly In anger)
over King Hussein's drive'.
against the guerrillas.
A few days later, after Pre-1
mier . Nimeiry had regained!
power, the Sudan broke rela??
itions with Iraq and accused!
!the Iraqi leadership of com-
Iplicity in the coup. 1
Sunday. Syria also closed,
her border with Jordan, crcat-j
ing an uneasy situation for the
country by cutting off land ac-
cess to the Mediterranean.
In deploring the absence. of
Arab unity, President Sadat
warned last Friday, "If we do
not gather ourselves together,
we shall never be able to face
the ferocious drive by the
Zionists." He was addressing
the national congress of the
Arab Socialist Union, Lgypt'sl
only political organization.
Differences Are Deep
Arab unity, in fact, has been
increasin ly elusive since the,
late nineteen-fifties, and the
proud name of Egypt is being
to nave exclaimed, does such
a thing still exist in the Arab
world, .this* kissin of hands In
such humility and submission?"
Approved For Release 199910910? CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
,,,r.,? 'nn "+h41dVY717{IId1S'dlf3+ro? -, oA1V1kIl?Qd1'AM1i'(}lurh'~tr AlYMI1P11'PWIMIAd1111+iA
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i
i, 29 Jl '19
u71
a1..F!,.t3,J+L.1:.1.'I :~,t`+t
T.1,ul 01.. 11.1., ?,1 JS.:.~w~Ft ...~+..+:. i~',..1,,?!~+/- +' ..:,, ,. .~j
ti1?s .1,..11,1 111?t rl' u
33Y T1a.i`' S1.aran' . CI',b qhi-
'hi
~, Y.~~, were }t lagR tlt r;cvts parLy,..antt ? favoured ..lie lation'from the intelllttent,.}a.'-_
of ht~
tl Co it l~tl ~ soil !W 017C jp on poed o
Of' &;naftndl 11
va tratcd by titt d
1'byl sitflzc Con ntikrni
l ~' c`t~: ose a osiati
Ar f
nit
nto ct
~
ol
o
.
C
bde?' Mt
p ogres o
T ih T 9
ine 1
e rn, Cane and
f
t
tr K.
!'ne ar ' " q 'r
Cr 1111 ti tai, " 'awe he K its pnwMr th_''tibortitye t'? s. 1,. ?s till toda. a hoTenain1i. 4 9
ell lb~ 1h the Sucl.IS "at, Toast'
Eli fe tico Ljdinht2 t}liinnn?~ivlto m ethtli,~
c'ct
t-t 7 `i~itt'the- reeettt"thou livbll' T ei'ti?14dl ds `:edt"-tahet! Gen, :Al rity of
y titb e e s owe elle l9r,(; tile
' gY rutrhuliNt 'chnilellge, In, I the
N
co il+as'li~"iilst'ff~nt,ttiat t!{P ulnlneir?V dissnl,diMaior al!Atta, "ce'to Mr Khaliq: art wxtsjbahnrd and 11s i t t elect
-
3i Col. , n1u NUr ??id, bI rrrr~~ I L ,.1 I , : , , I ,t i ed members were expelled from
ca 1N'+ clbaltt' 'tb' Netting top `th'e' a11ah from tic Cabinet 19,;ttaNov Four ' ~'Qrrf5 , , ? Y;arlla neltt. . went , 1968 the S44tdaa
tYCtnthnlnariist Matc on African ! ember,' wind dr??-ubllfs1ed ?ebs5ttt''a C.,gvernnsent to the extcht of
11Lyn rulorx of tiny,.Cont;rl, dr~ien army of. ce3s ~V~tit
for. tlteIrl ro? 9UCl in' ncfucvsn~+ indepen= abofasltln~ t11e"graiiitate. lonetitn-
Lt ?,luiitl;;,~,rsn Itho, we,t coact 1of Communist lc,pingsr he didpnot dence tt,,18a6, tile pant, trained In etictes, tvh'cli' had, returned the
h1 ~':>,,, o l ,c tl thTm .rlve,7,. Kepi,-realize the e).:trit bt" 'Cbiiitnuhf t prestige P "Id
member hip, but still Ct n nett tlst ;. Mr Awadellah, then
~:i t, t{fl t icy hav ~ t1tF3,r inEllttvfiiott in he army. Exact fi- rentaired "bit u4toffielai part,, 'It the, Chief jtlviic~; .111Uccnnte the
0%, F4ih+{ of Crym*ndd(44tt tsd li.gures.are not aveilable,l.but it is 1had.t ciurinF;,-Ccntl~bbli Of a iotrsse- olt?hj of,thn Igtt,,et4 enk_; beaoent
an ?1t ,'i . tI rir' i'S` tin h`
Ct4ti v"
itiunsat said, that at. last ,2. D officers is iidgYnPnt which -vent
I'u tylidn culvtonce'these.) I tito$uc{ane.c Irnt are card-hp?tare rills from ly'j3 to 1964. against '"jParlinmentts encroach-
,'~11t'},fi4arl~t~s}SS'++ coU7 of JG1~ ?~ ing niethberi oZ slto part,, whi a In dpitel.or.many , hartlettlps, (1t4 ment on ;undajneni,ai, rights. Ile
in t4t1411' 4lict"nett Ic,st' lUtii;, liut'it auite"n' lbtb :1i u and abfdie'rs party contirtt>;ed to grow .asnonK rest ned twhcit {hb Gi4vernment
pt mrf11}?,nv~,h?li' , -doubt that the the 2}1,b00-n rn' army have often intellrc isal:;. trac~f urilbni t yttd .defied his rutlni He -vas ap-
C nrtsundtit 11Iturdl ?is Ia that t e ext~resaed their leyalty to ? the ev4 t fatntcrs.:At on time it: be- pointed Prime' ''M nister by Gen.
fr, `q i.ll fl'', trit' itryd, Iftwtoolc Marxi,tliderlogy. ;i camo'a iprhion ifOr ''intellectuals coup, -, lthot., hit, btay. 196y
tr, ? to be,?clubbed Coinr-unist
M 9. Thq coup ?lathough 1q did not stay
t i t"'t ll diremli tt l itta the- pro`SLrO11 LTnit;errlk
cc' } 1b~ tli " gprin, ghlice r -;ho Fef{ ~" lie cc, y ?' y IAf Khartoum bpearng 1ana,
c
1 r ilt Y;fhh'.111 fsrh11u e 1h9shof 4f} omr ~' ins In ed 'n0
m tv.1115kfAtis IiLMut ?sv 'mililuteg to r1'he Comc stlni,,t' Party of Sudan :ur3)s of lly' 1>i ?a' 1a lad 'b fit~l.: 'i(ZI't'' 1,,
n- htnc~ 1llrm.l!vholcF P^h,h to tha was born l: Ip15,.tv(ten ~~ir Iche: Cbtit+.kil!4tist1 < 3 f~Clitil! Gin. 'ill :ltinpirv also took six
t!r in lie ea!t
wl rlkt-is,,cottp. , , And this ~ a did- r a d j gte h r turned rt homed r c 'cr YPus. c?,,(order l tNtl~te c l o s u r a d o f f the c I n { V
ny }~' ~Athi;wd' A
Salesian ia-
f , ~ 4i ttt-0 i cl(=rrs, eel 1 r, ? t relr education In trafro. ?'icy niverssf.y' s i'lt' t}tis $tear because Ittduslrics >vlinit ter mid. Mfr I a~
f# !h 1 t~? (tl f +st ancl' Iv{a n ,. of the un?ohtrolladble !agitation by tong Abu. Isla asl Foreign, itnis-
1t1,';Y C1L4r,11Ji 11 rni~cl.tll ih; 'i+r~}ec trail Cn
In ih l
l f C cm'ofr the E vn the
Fait' y''ftdlil' ~itirillt;` Tlise! g Ggl*tinunb3ts.)
?coup till n.Copn,tynist?? Patty. InI the Four front gc ter,1 They nil ?.,UCjon ttitm 1.ct
fulld'nin [hut dayy'berdutae; pdr.Iearlier yye?srs, a great deal of - ~anL~aEEios ty. ( Ff
),as Ru11ta Cltmnlm!nist .witharrtl.dtl f}oodcd In'. Fedc a#io{s ou L,alaotl4 Tt?the ade I trray 'IIc' a roue sb at the e pohti Coedm three
ree
nr,t ?4s'h4I ss{{51Rcf~trite, , iprgcautton4. S Cojf,1sriI`I irilmuniSt tt, Fvvttt. literature 'p'ile party. the , .' tftc , Leants' Federatio s l -t Wfihesi;' Major allAtta and
An 6,
I i 1 flit ?tstih of m Uq } the Yduih?
? a , his two frtonci.s, Who,-as Commu-
an
Witt its headquarters in Khan- yp
An n-1 ti IQ t>~is
aircraft missiles at Port Sud n.
This has not deterred Mosc w
from protesting loudly agal st
General Nimeiry's crackdown n
the Communist party.
the Sudan's Ills underlay
though It was technically Illegal a' ' xne "1UinBLIUH v! PUVVLcy a
Y B -.-f.! -t G.l. i..-.
..9!-e,
d th
an
e
l
f s
e.,
o
bership Is generally estimated o
t
t
C f
tt
In the hang it ~iMd` PAM Release 1999/09/0? CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
 . Iln:I t , III' ' r:I, ? ? I.. ?.1?. : I
Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-0.1194A000300070001-6
LINK, New Delhi
25 July 1973
SUDAN
Communists Take over
T E successful coup: staged by
Major Hashim .31 Atta against the'
Go rnment of Gen Abdcl Numejri
will affect not only Sudan but also
the Arab world and Africa. It is the
-first attempt by a Communist' Party
in he region Id take direct control
of 3overnment with the help of a
sect on of the army. In Sudan, in
fact the party had its secret wing in
the armed forces. In his broadcast to
the nation, Atta promised radical social
and economic reforms and a battle
aga st the local and foreign capitalists
wh were trying to disrupt the eco-
no y. He accused Gen Numeiri of im-
pos ng? an autocratic rule on the
cots itry and deviating from the true
.pall i of the May 1969 revolution which
ov -threw the reactionary regime of
M lammed Ahmed Mahjoub.
he ween Atta and Numeiri came when
N meiri decided to join the proposed
co federation composed of Egypt, Lib-
ya and Syria. This he did at the
re suction of Nasser whom Numeiri,
ad ired as a great liberator and friend
of Sudan, Gen Numeiri was ..an able,
co rageous and nationalist officer but
he lacked political awareness and fail-I
ed to recognise the mood of his pco
pl , particularly the leftist elements]
wt weild enormous influence on the!
misses. The leftists had built him up
as a mass leader and persuaded him
to adopt socialist and radical measures
ant also to move closerto the socialist
Co entries. The Soviet Union is held in
gr at respect in Sudan because of its
c ,stant support to the Arab's fight
ag inst Zionist expansionism and its'
pt icy to help the. developing coun
Ir :s. Sudan's army has been rebuilt
wi IS the assistance of the Soviet Union
Major Atta was not in Khartoum
wh n Numeiri took over power two
years ago:, He was Sudan's Military.
att. chc in West Germany but Numeiri
ha no alternative but to include him
an three of his leftist colleagues in
the Government. He had in fact come
to power with the actiVe help of the,
C nmunist Party and his first Coun-
cil of Ministers included nearly eight
pr minent leftists.
'ONFEDERATION: But the breach
which has also trained a large number
of its officers in modern warfare. Nu
mciri did maintain excellent relatib'ns
with the socialist countries but 'he
tried to emulate Nasser in his domestic
policies which proved his undoiug?. He
thought his friendship with Cairo
and Moscow had proved his position
as a socialist, and :thus he was free
to curb the real leftist elements in
his country. The difference between
him arid Nasser was that while the
Egyptian revolution was entirely Nas-
ser's own, Numeiri owed a great deal
to the local Communist Party .
COMMUNIST PARTY:, Sudanese
Communist Party is the largest and
most well-organised leftist force "in
whole Africa and the Arab world. It
began functioning secretly in the early
forties when no other organised politi-
cal activity was allowed in the country
by the British. It first won over some:.
of the best intellectuals,, most of whom
were teachers, doctors and lawyers.
Then it spread among the students,
youth, workers and peasants. Khartoum
University, which was the only centre]
of higher education Until recently, bey,
came the centre obis_ activities where
the only, other organised force it faced l
was the Muslim Brotherhood. After
independence the party, though illegal,
claimed- a tightly knit organisations of
peasants, workers, students and youth.
For a number of years they have been
a power to reckon with.
DISCORD: Maj. Atta, Maj. Babikr
Noor and Maj. Gen. Farooq Hamdalla
who are now in power, were the main
link between the party and the army.
They had joined Numeiri's Govern-
ment when be came to power in May
1969. Atta was, then in West Ger-
many, flew to Khartoum a few days
after the 1969 coup. Gen. Numeiri,
who also included in his Council of
,Ministers seven well-known leftists, re
fused to be guided by the political
readership of the Communist Party.
This went against Mahjoub's original
thesis, in which despite the army's pre--
dominant position in the Government
the leadership had to be retained by
the PB and the Central CommitIee.
The three officers who now rule Sudan
remained true to Mahjoub's thesis.
Numeiri's efforts to create a split in
the party leadership by giving impor-
tant positions to some opportunist left-
ists also failed, and, he was alienatcd
from the party. The final breach
came when Numeiri insisted on joining,
the proposed confederation.
Mahjoub argued against Sudan's
'entry into a larger group of countries
whose political and economic policies
clashed with its own, and Where open
leftist activity is not only banned but
considered 'a crime. Mabjoub feared
that his party may lose its identity and
influence if Sudan became a unit of
the confederation. The three officers, at
his instance, opposed Numeiri in his
move and. in turn >lrere forced by him
to quit the Government. This brought
the Communist and 'non-leftist factions
of the army into an open clash. Nun-
meiri banned all leftist activities and
arrested a large number of Communists,
including Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub. He
declared that. he. would "crush and
destroy" them if they blocked Sudan
Joining the confederation. As Numeiri
lost his balance, Khartoum buzzled
with rumours about the- possibility cif
a Communist, take-over.
JAIL-BREAK: Two weeks before
Atta's coup, Mahjoub escaped from the
well-guarded Kobar jail on the bank
of the Blue Nile facing Khartoum. The
jailers and police officers detailed to
watch him also escaped. That showed
the party's influence on the police. Des-
pite a countrywide hunt by Numciri's
intelligence service, Mahjoub could not
be traced. He was only in Omdurman,
a few furlongs away from Numciri's
presidential palace. And Atta and
his colleague kept in touch with him.
Mahjoub, who is commonly referred to
as the Lenin of Sudan, has thus be.
come the architect of the first Com-
` muni:cf Government in Sudan.
Both Nool_pnd Atla, who form an
effective- team, have promised radical
transformation of the country's eco-
nomy and a more militant foreign pol-
icy. It is obvious that political
equations is inter-Arab politic will
updergo a change.
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15
 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 ?
WASHINGTON STAR
2 August 1971
Sudan has never taken too kind-
:y to conquerors and colonialists. The
E;Iyptians moved in in 1822 and hung on
f some 60 years until they and their
B itish partners in conquest were ousted
3 Muhammed Ahmed, the tabled
hdi. At the, turn of the century,
B itish-Egyptian rule was restored for 53
ears when by mutual aeree-
alter the coup. Both governments ave
been prompt and effusive In their on-
gratulations at his success in ousting the
conspirators. There is renewed spec ila-
tion that Sudan will join the rab
Federation with Egypt, Syria and
Libya-a federation that the Soviet n-
Ion has, until now, given strong sup art.
It appears likely that, in the end, the
easy y
nt Sudan was set free. have been what it got. Numairl, In an Soviets will swallow their anger nd
the Soviets took over, , interview with a correspondent o! the ! maintain their ties with Sudan. he
boring the 60s
,
,
n ~' with troops but with aid and influ-
e ce. Now the brief honeymoon is at an
e d and Khartoum has recalled its
bassador from Moscow. It's Mos-
e w's turn to learn how readily Khar-
t m will bite the foreign hand that
t eds it.
'Two weeks ago, everything seemed to
b 'going Moscow's way. A coup, headed
b Sudanese Communists, ousted the
p ime rI inister, Major General Jaafar
mairi: Some 72 hours later Numairf
the Sudanese Communists
k
b
.
;
ac
s
trials for treason were The scope of the Russian miscacula- ideal with the Sudanese, and a reailza on
th
il
d
r
e
,
e
e fa
td and the executions began. The so- lion extends well beyond the borders of 'that Moscow's hold on the Arab co n-
Ie , who had held their peace when Sudan. Egypt and Libya were prepared tries is not nearly secure to as-we or
Xpra Andat nut down an earlier ra-~ intervene in Nnmairf'a behalf Kremlin leaders believed it to be.
WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1971
CPYRGH
The Kremlin Comes a Cropper
The inner contradiction of Moscow's Mideast
policy-its effort to support "anti-imperialist" local
governments and, at the ? same' time, the local
Communists challenging those governments-has
ripened with a vengeance in Sudan. There the
Soviet Union had made an important investment In
General Nimeri, giving him not only arms and some
economic aid but advice if not direct support in
his campaign to suppress black rebels in the south.
But then the Sudanese Communist Party, reported-
ly in cahoots with Soviet operatives, in Khartoum,
essayed a coup against General Nimerl, and he
In suppressing the coup executed a number of
party leaders, including a- Lenin Prize winner. To
keep faith with the local. brothers, the Kremlin
protested. Understandably, the general took um?
brace. Official Soviet-Sudanese relations are Un-
raveling and-the future of the Soviet investment
is, at best,. clouded.
To be sure, for a great power Sudan is not what
you'd call a great prize. Its huge but poor and
the British, In arbitrarily wrapping its borders
around blacks as well as Arabs, built in an abscess
which has steadily drained away what potential for
development the country may have. Its "loss" by
Moscow, if it comes to that, would be small along-
side the Soviet "loss" of Indonesia in 1965. Still,
the Soviet-Sudanese affair cannot fall to rever-
berate throughout the Arab world. Already, to
Moscow's deep embarrassment, it has brought Into
bold relief the Communist aspect of Soviet policy
which Moscow has sought to keep subdued, as
opposed to the anti-American aspect on, which the
Soviet thrust for Influence In the region has been
Approved For Release 1999/09/e : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
Moscow revolt against him, let out a
bellow of diplomatic rage.
' The Sudanese leader, Moscow said,
was' involved in a "bloody reign of ter-
ror." Unless the anti-Communist activity
stopped, the Soviets warned, aid would be
cut off and diplomatic relations broken.
__ Whatever result Moscow anticipated
from Its angry warning, It could not
LondontObserver, expressed his belief In alternative is to place in extreme jeo ar-
Moscowr complicity in the abortive coup dy their influence throughout the id-
and rev ,eled that he had given the Rus- die East. The fruits of two decade of
sian ambassador an ultimatum. The energetic and successful diplomacy I too
"false and .unfounded" attacks on his l high a price for them to pay to extra t a
regime were to stop, he said, or he would suitable reprisal for the deaths o 14
take "necessary steps to restore the Sudanese Communists.
dignity and prestige" of Sudan and its . Whatever the Soviets do, it Is unl ke-
its people. And he meant it. Numairi ly that the West-and particularly the
has announced that his ambassadors United States-will inherit any imm dl-
to Russia and. Bulgaria are being, called' ate benefits. The most we can de ive
home and that top diplomats 3rom ;from Moscow's problem Is a sense o re-
' , lief that it is they, not we, who hav to
those two countries are to leave Sudan
 `based. One result is1 to give fresh currency to de-,
nunclatlons of communism which have emanated;
{ , from.. Libya,. these days the ' most ` determinedly
anti-Communist of Arab states. Another result Is
sons from local disaster that less well endowe
and less ambitious states are com(felled to dra
Therefore 1 to expect Moscow to Conclude th
radical' Arab regimes' are too' unstable and u
I to complicate , Soviet, flat tiirl,'`'ils' prineibal Arab ;. grateful to be worth supporting further Is to ignor
?,lw 1u1,
>#1111 v, iU
i,?Ctt?, It.
t, i:uiltt:
1:y tltlcl,,I
L-1I1ic 14)1
111lilt 1rt.~
:U l,;tt,l.
ji111t'
a
,
g
,,
11
Iteltt itllii
ni, .Cll., t ; ,:: lu lt:tt'11~t 1,, lli 1* IS:aICt lo, 1i, 1,t 1.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
CPYRGHT?, August: 1971
,,,p d'etat in May, 1969.
Lessons p and executions followed,-but, the party was
Lessons of , history To understand some of the difficulties of not liquidated.
By John K. Cooley
t9day's Sudan, it is useful to dip into recent In 1963 the Iraqi Baathists accused the
Arab histotty, which tends - to repeat itself, Bulgarian embassy of helping the om-
in short cycles. munist plotteri:'"Egyptian journalists fr' and-
Beirut, Lebanop Back in 1958, the late President Nasser l ly to General Nigteiryr made the s me
Sudan's newes't' arlti-Cordmilhitt' Mtge `fa of Egypt reluctantly accepted a fec~eFal charge against the Bulgarian emboss in
my the latestt pisodt in a 'kind of serialized'?n on with the anki?Communist 4rian Gov- Khartoum ii1 the Communist coup att mpt
an oi` this month. Just as the events of 1959 and
ernment. Rather than be involved' with'
hriller story-.'that - has. tfascinated, shocked e
nd sometimes,, bored ,the (Arab, world, for experimental he Ifeit was doorhedi to ' failutei 1963 strained, President Nasser's rela ions
Syrian ' Co'rhmunist leader Khalid- Bagdash with~,the 'Soviets, so are those ? in Sudan to-
early 15 years. ..1 o dislappeaYtd' frdil Damascus? He, turnedi up .day producing a, chorus of accusations 'om
This is the struggle between t o Sovi t?rin Peking whr 'he denounced.,~gth.$resi-,Mgscow..and prorMoscQw Communists.
asked, ortho&z mind?l kideaste{{''~ G~or i? dent Nasser, and the Soviet i t)n of the issue in S ,'ia, in 1958 or d in
unist parties 'and''thcir erietiiie's, th16 Arab` Vp Rp y4
. 1i,,; ,Ano1her,4rab federation 1s atls6 i i8c'ay.'Iraq ~n 959 and 63 is identica' with ore in
ationalista dan: the one-party state.
I This time- it is,. the projected one'"bi` it y~it, today Su
It is a tale lote iwith' surpris+ees And with 1 Libya, and Syt ia, General Nitn' iry11WIn`ttd'' 'ties a`l ' Niineii y no 'like' 1'r~ s' ent
Ad enemies saetnnobimes+turnung up as friends. 'Sudan tojoin h, 'the Sudatibae Cbrninunists'Nasser an'd General Katsem' tlhlen. warts a
Most of the Soviet-type Arab Comnittnistldid riot,' ;slat' tFieir Soviet fi'Iend's' cAr`efdlly,one-party systenh. The ICommunistr uld
artics are ,sma1ll,,,weak,,,iille,gal,,s,nd,,sup,?la,oidedtaking ''any public ;stand;,,an;the.haaive to: cease their own political exist ncc
ressed, ever y reg lines rec iviri a gengc?,lisSUe:' r,s a party.,.
us portion of S vret aid, like thos in; ypt s Lommunisis 'agreed to do this.
' , Ln 1959, ,,shortly after the, }ft;ght ?{I MF.
Egypt, Algei{ia etn Trtact.' For lie' moat aiy 1l3agdash from Syria, Iraqi; ~iftator Abdel Thhy' merged into Egypt's Arab So alist
Moscow has eh1 ie4'fectly content to sit' by Karim Kassem,;,who had been imprisoning Union 'its imperfect but- We legal arty,
and watch thli'ill?o!rgf;nred! Arabot>irades, Communists, suddenly chaiige'fl'tiactics'."He"though .some , reananed itt concentration
originally led,by, Europeans, ?be prosecuted released Communist, leade`r's' 61h& 11lbiy- ;camps just the same. I
or persecuted. Moscow's own state-to-state leashed" armed Communist militia against The Communists-of Iraq, Syria, and dan
relations 'with the Arab governments im? his other enemies, the Baath (Arab social. never agreed to efface themselves Ii the
proved as a result. . ist) party. In northern Iraq hundreds were -Egyptian ori6s. They have continued a woi'-'
The Sudanese Communist Party, now ob- killed in what came to be called the "Mosul ried and often underground existence.
.jest of a ruthless repression by Sudanese Massacre." Very probably, say the old Sud nese
General Jaafar al Nimeiry's forces, is differ- Oddly enough, the same Iraqi Baathists, hands, 'Abdel Khalek Mahgoub and his men
ent. It is strong and well organized. Its now in power in Baghdad, but isolated and, feared the imposition of a one party s stem
leader, Abdel Khalek Mahgoub, who was badly in need of friends in the outside Arab in Sudan. This would spell the end f the
executed July 28 for his alleged part in the world, have been supporting the, Sudanese Communist Party and all its many front
July 19 pro-Communist coup against General Communists against General Nimeiry , organizations for workers, students, w men.
Nimeiry, was known and respected in ortho? 'In the'' neat episode, in February 1963,; young people, and university graduate;.
dox Communist circles around theworld. the Baathists seized power in Iraq and Ignoring the lessons of history, both Gen.
What is more, Mr. Mahgoub's disciplined launched a drive to liquidate the strong eral Nimeiry and the Communists in don
legions of workers, schoolteachers, bureau-` Ira Si Communist Party, were rigid and uncompromising. Sot ' this
'crate, and intellectuals did much to help 'Three hurAred Cam"Untsts broke a oo: has been the undoing of the Communis , but
General Nimeiry overthrow Sudan's ailing 'detention at the Al Rashid military camp r the next episode may not be long In cing.
parliamentary A0PFobe FE'S?fitie1flse r19" 1 0 -!ad'10e ' -SMT94A000300070001-6
1?; iallyi' `Egypt, which Clot' only daltlted Gonoral Nih 'a long" ret:ora, American as well as avviCt, tiha
itterirs restoration I ,to power buE acttitk111~ ~ol ees , in, the opposite direction.' I ' J01104 goes.,
'Libya' 'in' provldink' plan'ea'to starry Sudanese 's9Y "I i I To expect "other Arab' stales tq'conclude tha
1i 1lierk' front Stfei to' Xhirto`u'rn to help out with the' 1 ' goviet support is too risky' ideologically" and
restoration. ? litica11y' to bd worth accepting ~s , equally, illusory,,
1 h a ,, ; Fort; heeds' and re son o their own, countries lik
Taal 'great power involve in, what ; it,regard; 44
t It aiid?5yiti'a feel competent to Fide :thf),1Co.
"a`Crucial tstir a for pgsi don across a. ~rhole?ref oQo,:t1 'Ihilt is 'fl .e 'The will hardly slter their view
y r~osirtgle setback in a p ace,as peripheral ,ts.Sudau.,;1;, a olI,yie ,~1 ?e` Genq,al,,Nimeri-fe)l; off the, tiger' can oe ,dlsabling,~ ?is gSeeab~e' as it mailel, One; t , j t i i : t t
anti three i days iin i its, belly! before-.h
i
te
s
a
k
c
; , ; , 1
t~
the hal,m
r
s of great powers' is a cap
bi
and
'3~g'y-psians Syrians will rib a
i+ceel, 1. ,1 I It 11,
t, Aso Mg bands, and day,in.the gamd."I'he remou u 1
=,b* ausi of tbtati
cre; them the tent u "
of such states 'n
the e
o
if not
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
28 July 1971
CPYRGHT
I RUSSIA'S SUDAN QUANDAIiI
R USSO-ARAB harmony has received its nastiest jolt
result of the short-lived coup in the Sudan, now bein
tamped out in an anti-Communist blood-bath and witch
hunt by the restored ruler, Col NUMEIitY. The allianc
between Soviet imperialism and Arab nationalism ha
lways been one of the most cynical expediency. On
eason is the basic contradiction between Communism an
Islam. Another is that the Arabs have been inveigled into
opening their gates to the onl
countr
in the w
ld th
t
y
y
or
a
.
Ms strategic designs against their lands--the neighbourin
Russian Super Power. Finally Russia, while prejudicing
the Arabs' natural oil market in the West, offers no
Comparable outlet in compensation.
i Hitherto Russia has taken extreme care not to give
offence by open interference in Arab affairs. Thus, although
In most Arab countries Communism is outlawed and its
supporters harshly repressed, the Russians have sedulously
kefrained from remonstrances. Now, suddenly, Tass has
some right out with a condemnatory statement speaking
Of "bloody terror ... hysterical anti-Communist campaign
ilitary tribunals making short work of patriots."
Col NuMEIRY's Government is warned of "the danger of
the path along which it pushes the country."
There was also more tangible Russian intervention.
ussian military advisers and technicians tried to stop
oyalist troops using tanks and aircraft against the rebels
nd some were locked up after encounters. All this will
o down badly In the Arab world, especially In Egypt and
ibya, where a rescue operation for Col NuMEtfY against
he Communist was being mounted. President SADAT' of
gyps, a strict Moslem, is even more suspicious of
ommunism- -than. was : Col,- ?NASSes, while Col GAfDArL
f Libya is fanatically intole~htnt-.to say nothing of the
rab kings., .But why is ,1ussia sticking her neck out : fi
e Sudanese ' Coillhmnists?.' , S.utei,4 not, in view of hek
wn record, because blood is being shed in the suppression
f a rebellion:. Chagrin because- coup by Africa s biggest
ommunist atij was prevented i i success, at this stage,
ould have been an embarrassment. The artswer is rdbably
at?'Russia,?,with Chiba Comp tlti for leddtt'shl riP"ttna
anmtinist world, could 'xotl,a8'brtjto reth& 'sfleA'
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 Approved For, Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
CPYRGHT
HINDUSTAN TITHES
29 July 1971
taidf&idii
has worse in store
From Madan M. Sauldie?
t1fndustan Times Correspondent
CPYRGHI-
Addis Ab a: Coups in Africa The result was the communist- hers of the ruling Revolutionary. the recent dtsturbnnces hi thl
have becom at tiny game. Inspired coup that ousted Gen. Council of Ministers-two of them; country.
o seize the Nimgiry on July 10. being Lt-Col. Babaktt Al-Noor ?
,One ne s my too
radio, the Irp rt and the Gov- Ne erthelcss, for Nimelry and Mal. Al Attah who, together Southern problem
__ ___a ... find the Ioh tR there was no alternative to a 1
with ued ?st lai
ey
mae y
16 -#-h- -4 4- .4 41- _#' in a difficult situation In the 4on-
sk _ -
r d
...... .. e. q.yv..- .
to ...... that ...e .a
vecu.
The htr?e m ss of the populn- worth taking. The Communist- the r ranks. text of its southern problem. It'
tlon merely nods as It azed inspired radical policies had The Ministers were accused of Is commonly th. that tho
spectator of th hectic toings-on. brow ht about ruination of the rebels In the South, mostly rise
It Is oft n he mill ark that leaking State secrets and main bans and pauana who sec sc es?
coon try's econorhq. Investments slop from the 1~rnb north, are
undertakes uc operation s but were dwindling. and foreign l tabling "contacts abroad, possi-
mnre often it ! the clvllinn poll espy was keeplnli Offs, .. t . , biy as the recent events showed: getting ? military assistance n
is??I that c muse the military to Iu7 witti the Aeathist party In Iraq Israel, and presumably Ort
act, oreover, theCr,tnmrnlsts had which detests Egyptian hegemon Uganda wherthousands of
, tie equcncy of cmrps become a stumbling, block in the of the.Arab world tied wantedi Southern Sudnnere are livini In;
Indeed way of the N'imefry Govern-
and now co nl r-coups'-!n Africa ment's gradual move into the I The real blow to the Communo seems to u do score the comple- Arab fold. And, It was the ists was struck In February it is- indeed a fight be cee'
mentary c ra ter of the equa- popular feeling thus aroused year when Gcn. Nimelry announct. Chribtians and Muslims Arabs on the'
lion hctwr civilians and the aganst Sudan's entry into an ed that his Government would one hand, and Arabs and fri-.
reds the. other to Arab Federation that kept Sudan "crush" and "destroy" the Coma cans on the other. '
away ~ from the rubscquent monists and p~urge yalI Commu- Wthln the Arab north too the,
in point Is the rregotiatrrns for the Federation fists from public life, He had traditional elemcnts? allearhe dcd'
;r a iarl;est country which comes into being on Sept. argued that it was the duty of his by the Anaars, have been upg
where Gov inn rots have changed 1. Government to y regard but not ellminnted. To'
hands betty en the pollticions and Impelled by such res.~ures of protest the ctrl, hose elements Gcn. Nime ry
military in to na s ce Its lode- the Cnmm hlste on public opi-. ed zenc by against the Communists. terrorism unleash,.! brnnd of soetallsm seems In m?,
~~rr
pendence 1 1 Sb pion, the Nlmefry regime cm- pntlble wlih the relative e0
nut all n flit ry regimen with- :bnrked on a collision course. Nevertheless, the Communists, v
ntikm of Islam. They still W8
we
out except) n, nve tendre~ to en- with the Communists. In October. continued their underground aetl- allegiance to Muslim Prot er?-
Nd.tropul g port and._partle!- IND. Gen. Nimelry dropped the ;vitics reicnttesr;l). Only last hood, a movement against w tch'
nc as civiiinn Gov- 53-year-old Marxist Abubakr month the Communist Party . Nasser fought throughout, in hit;
ration, as general secrets own country.
rnments av rested on the Awrriallnh from the post of hts successfully csen]],cdMa from hat
oyntty of t t le soldier. But reglni a first Prim Minister. irMnr with the help of a 'cornoral ion Gen. Nlmelry's dramatic c me+t
rpither the tvi fans nor the army in Awadallph was accused of in an address to students in duty However, while the Corm . back on July 22, therefore, ncel
n the coo ry could ever reps- East Berlin an that the Ctud tnis In monists within the country were: nt:nln brings him face to Ince Ith,
rent any c e+ o element.'. th ?~..r~,.-@ ,.r Its till v tar from "coughed;' , Gen) the problems of his country. But'
u
i
R
me
e a reg
?.L.., 'Communist countibd th
.res aroa thanan ever.
The regi a o. Gen. Al Nimelry, the ommunist party-Africa's! hie domestic Policies should no% vhich r
, automaUcaily affect the friendly-, The army Is critically dlv tc.
n o ower In Mny only one-refused to dissolve It-
pp C
li
a
ve elements will still,
c
1In
fnrth(r
e broad directive, cceneraall n. sNecretiya' Tiehad d of Ills country with onservn
the stand In the way of his "prolrrc
ry "Articular' In mi
d C
9
end,
to
n
om?r
dtwo
th
y
Mr 1Chalck Mate oub, 'O vas arrester.' muntst China and the . SovIC give rev rf.
e . R a. n on-Comm Ist It
on on. o mm e . It first tt i gaam m and 13 senior army officers with ~ Union with whom, he sal The southern problem wiU1, it
n- Communist leaningti were dig- :Sudan's relations have been re time to cause a heavy drppraerec inlt th m d ? the ca tN into rtunlatsho byveemrn?- arlswed, fruitful. the country's financial and b I ' Clo fa resrurcps, white the g meat end stn
an to denrollsb Gen. ]~limeiry tvCttt i step Str-I Buts more thengg all this fE wa~~state of Sudanrse et onomy r file. ' missed th eee 8 lasConmunIst~tndm--k Arab IlMltltlc& the., brv'ontlight eat onti late'aril-mWi' m.. r. , .,......
a
r a t Jul possa
dh
And thisition put Sud !n
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19
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
LE 14W EE, Paris
CPYRGHlJuly 1971
Mi(ts 1 DES tr r
Les ie ti s a dtre:~-ivr sc i e
Uno gravo crlse menace /as relations eritre Moscou of Khartoum
aprds los s6v6res mestlres do 'repression. anti-communists adoptees
par, !es dlrlgoents soudaneis. Notre envoyd `epectal eu Soudan, Eric
Routoeu, lndlquo quo Pon s'oftorcerait ?'de : part' et ?d'dutre d'dvllo,
uno rupture totafe.
0 A MOSCOU. oD to compagne do protestation- s'amplfllo, doux
'cents dtudlants orabes oat manifestd ce.loud! 29' lulllet devant ?Pam?
bossedo du Soudan eux cris de ? ftadhefl, to es un !Ache ?, ? Nometry
0 AU PROCHE-ORIENT, M. ' Joseph Slsco,. socrdtelro d'Etet
edlofnt emdr1ca1n, dteif ettendu leudt' A Jerusalem.-!! bereft portour
dun nouveau plat) emdrldoln presenld cbmme uno solution provisolro
reels qui pourralt Otte durable. ? slnon ddfinllly?.
r9otr' eH oye'`5p6clal ERIC ROULEAU
qubira to sort do Noury SaTd
Khartoum. I- PAalgrb leg d6nd(Ia? 96n4ral Nometry. L'entretien Be scroll Ios fourri latos occidenteux, no ten, i do four asstntance m1114olre et Oc o-
11 na otflclelles, 11 y e lout Ilev do dbroutd dons un otlmat eregeux. Le ent plus de War quo Moscou rd- mique. Vest atnel qua Pon expll us
c ol-o quo loo relations enlro to Sou- reorhneniant de Mosaou euralt 61evd prOOVO Is chassa IPvtdo at'x commu- let Is violence du ton adoptb Per
On at M.R.S.S. trovorllenl line uno viva proleatilton contra is ma- ntsles sovdanats. 11 cambia
Nouso ertse. Plows apprenone, en quo to faience Toss pour condemnor fee
r
rot, do bonne source, quo 9o' nr6rp dent sent tratds los conceit- ?disor6tlon observed tusqu'Ici ail' 6td persecutions anti-communtstos Cu
el,os, d.I 1 d lobo emt ills ou mnnnceolreI u ant leg lore at bxports eovtdtlques at euralt - diclbo. ontre suites raisons, per un Soudan. El West trOs probable ant
d I6- demandb des explications. No leg .sovel d'efflcaclt6. En oIfet, salon oe communlqu6 qul a suncltd Is
ibs depvis qu umilli jour. par lo616 g aysnt p a a obl^.nues, 11 auralt uno personnalit6 ? OFfictelte, to Chet dc~rleration, mercrodt colt, du pen rat olqueg tortfes eudannlses d'arrster touts "06 flans detours to question do es ? do I'Etat sovdanats auraft re0u do Nemolry d6noncant le campaign do
riHvlb of do raster, daps to ma? voir al is) gouvarnoment eoud anais M. Podgomy un message dons lequel prosso d6clench6o A I'6trengor c tro
' eovoConnall to Kromlln d'avolr !616- Is president dp pr6srdturn dt' Soviet to Soudan. Lo toxic, egn6 par to hot
a re du poes1ble. che>? eux co^+mamd6 ou soutonu to coup d'Etat supreme to priait. dune manl&re
Cartnins oat ddib cholsl do qullteP do I'Etat, ri comports P adres uno menac .,
l d'6pargne- Is vie du prlino volldo edress6o A i'U.R, A.
pays. Tows too experts ost-alts= precommuntdte dv 99 Julllet Le gd prossanle,
ends Tot is ieo ex sdaur qu9 Nometry 1.. aural! MpondlreAcho? 1 eecrdtnlre g6n6ral de to C.G.T., ptilsqu'rf rappolle quo lea rap its
vnrenr rte nnteetos do ministrre,d0 " i'"nquA? ^e 11111n, nn Chnfal El Cheikh. Le gdndral Nemolry Fntro tog Vale dolvent Ettre to des
I lntFri9ur on1 M6 mIe Al pled. Oe? Un e -e(etO la demands, r6pondant btu- antvuoment our too intt rots cam ns.
message de M. podgon1y i talamnnt quo Moscou pron&t alnsl exctunnt loute In bronce done log
till.) tundl. leg correspondant9 des IFlo duronao d'un ? erlmine/ de droll ; affalros Int6rloures
sys communl4les sent ~mpOchds ' Solon cart *Ines informations non commun ' ~ Les ? lnMctr6ls eomnluna a eux sum
cxorce? four molter ; its no sent plus cOnfirmbes, 1'nmbassadcur sovlgtlqua - LA pr6sldont do to R.A.U.. M, 1lnovet'`
crud! At 't,
pays sent loin d'dtre n6 it o ios
_ _ ._ ._ g g
ennktrnncns do emssn nt .
..-__
t
El
f
r? -??- -- -- pro
it vcvnvmlquo Ot mal[a nO a on
ext'rlcvr, fours !tines thitphontgves putschlstes, to commandant Nnchom former quo P dgorny tut exam ailfnneo avec I'U.S.9., cells dor?
1 do telex nynnt 616 covpflos. Oe El Att.. Plus grove encore euralt M6 demarM6 d'RStsrren t pour eauvnr to niOre pardralt dnorm6menl at log
title mC,Credr 25 1Wllot, ?W!) ICs In Min Inuit nnr tar! Ir nrnorla .AL A. n1..tM el V , It w I w ..h ? A.
101,o"Idontet r?~'?.~rl^3 ?^ melt GO 5Q' .VUC3 mIftaires svvtnuquea dens to dt~ro.- 1'Etot egypflan. preeteent nos Infer' s nnyn do I'_51 aul sent 11611 pro, lament du coup d'Etat A en orolro tnateure soudenats dovalt so position coupe. ced'un ntrals en at occ pant
)ntra l'o Atrtq o, h
Memont dishes - sent ?"ewes do log rumours qul circutent A Khartoum. ' formutb , ragv8 to on sot, Copondan4 nom tli lio ne ne pon 6
arn Iourn vnilsos diniomatlquos A Ile euralent notommont prove lib propro. On n la lose d'ettleuts voPonttaro to cr . L me r r of
disposilton dos wtoritds Gouda, q moondonde stabs. La prudence 6mo
es, fl so rdservenl to droll e'en 1 Immoblllsellon ? de chars apparte- entendre lot quo to gouvemern6M do M.P.S.S. on Egypto et. po lent. qui
n1r61n' Ie contend.Celto mod en Want A un r6glmont Ioyatiste. 8bynilon nnnrotrv+s au Prochc-Orlent depend done uno
II ost possible quo cos rumours
pdrovoqud ung vivo 6motlon dens no solent pas fondbos, mats 11 est fl^49-communlates prla?9 etD corfalne mosure de to solidi! do
milieux diptomatlques, oust blon' slgnlucatit qu'ellea dmanont da ml? $owen? eon implantation damn t'htnto lend
vx gb'orlenteux. .Ileux proehos do gowornement A " aunt gv'll?en colt. aprbs eat Opt- soudenats.
Tenets qvo so enleux & @ huts t'embassade aovl6fique, qu1 red- bode Moscou euralt. lug6 Inutile de Cost oourquof taros sent gas 0 set-
tee IQ proog du eecrOtaire g6nLra1 gamble de plus on plus A un camp Plalder Is brace pour to sect6telre velours A Khartoum qul crolent h la
u PA A , soudenats, Abdel Khalek ralranch6, it nest as possible d'ob? 96n6ra) du part! communists Atxlel probebtlltb d'tvto rupture sett foe
nhfovb. I'ambessadeur eovi6ttgve - tariff Is moindro Indication A co sulef. , Khatek PRahloub. Les Sovidttques daux pays. Lo detente du g6 Aral
pprenons-nave, 4gatement de eovrae Male leg tenetlonnalres. qut, pas aere a m an416 bro aveoldequeN Ios tlyd- gtr'Petry do t no pas A {~er llo too riots
Itn
dlene de tot - e ex198 6'btro ragu,do so p irais ~0.
d'urgence Per "Ap'p~0 Is (dpg ltAeR i 9J1" 6171P90"* de vre pas ten.
 CPYRGH-ikpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000300070001-6
r publiques tag meaure9 vexa '
1 tros prises ii 1'encontro do ses cos-
rtlesanis confirment I'Impresslon
uo log daux capttates espbrent en-
ore 6vltar rirrbparabe,
Copondnnl, las mllfevx' dtrlgennt
oudanals re eont pas unenlmoo. 4
ouhattor to mnintien do rolattonei
troltea avao Pu'A'S.0, La dreite du.
dgtmo - plus forto eprbe Is Itqul.
anon . physique des dirigoants do-
extr6mo gauche of dos progres.
Isis - a'& force de convatncre Ie
bnbrai Nnmotry do Changer do cop
in potltiquo 6trengbro.
ntorrompte. to tache quit West IF109
'de Ilqutder tine foie ' pour touter
l'oxtrt!m gaucho dens . on
pays.
,Merctedt, Its arreelallons as pour-
Ieulvetent tandlo qu'une contalne de
? suspects . ilalent remts en llbert&
Dux personnatitds do premier plan
du mood- ayndtoal ont 6t6 eppf6-
hendoea : N.M. Hal ?Abdel Rahmen,
aect6talre gbn3ral edjotnt de to
C.G,T.. of Awadalleh Ibrahim. prgsl-
dens Is Grand-Khartoum. Is second
passatt pour btro Is colioborateur Is
plus proche d'Abdel Khatek Mah-
Joub. Leers portraits alnsl quo ceux
do deux suites mombres du comitd
central, MM. Jazoull Said of Soliman
Named. sont diffusbe our los dcrans
do to tltbvieton of darts In prasge.
Ile soratent, dit-on, pendus tous to$
qualre e'lis devalent titre arrbtds.
Tout membro de Is direction
r6pendus, mOme dens los mllloux nor
communistns, o0 I'on fail romarquoi
quo les Soudnnals r6prouvent, psi
nature. toule effusion do song,
Mme Abdol Khalok MahJoub, to
veuve du secrbtalro g6n&rai du P.C.,
It bt6 orrbtoo morcrodi malln.
Rn ontendanl A to radio is nouvelle
do I'ex6cutlon 'do son maH, else
e'btatt prdclpitdo dens Is ruo Dour
'Be nouvoiies arl?'estations
Pour i'Instant, toutafols, to principal'
cute du gbnbrai Namelry set de p-d.
ever on Image de marque do tee-.
lot a progressisto . sons pour eutent
Les deux hommos e'6talent rdfugl6s
dons Is ctandestlnit6. Au total. onvl-
ron une quarantalne do dirigeantta
du psrtl communleto est, an allot. sangulnalre - of leg ? assassins
consid6r6 comme petsonnollement,; Be bell" our, qui nous a recta ou
responsable du coup d'Etat du 19 lull. j soul, de Is malson. a dbclarb aux
let
I A Omdurman. rune des trols a lo?' ucCiuonraux presents t
on encore ectivement recherchbs,
on m6ratlons du Grand-Khartoum. of ? Rites Poplnlon mondlale quo to
particuller deux .membtes du peup/e eoudanata ON tier d'Abdat
bureau potitlque du pant comma- guarder populatre consid6t6 commo Khatek. K ,at Mort ft We haute, an
mate, MM. Tayeb El Tlganl et Moha- d uneot fief communlsie, lea fldatee d'Ab? -trftent pour ass t:onwctlons
mod Ibrahim Nugud. Le Premier titan Khaiek MahJoub plourent to loader
reeDeneabte de t'orgenisollon du part) dlaperu. L'Indignatton at r6ocoure- Orin(".' ROtsa tA1D.
msnt serelentles IAntlmantsta. plum
DAILY TELEGRAPH London
2 August 1971
CPYRGHT
RUSSIA 'AND THE ARABS
R SSIA'S SETBACK in the Middle East as a result of
e abortive Communist coup in the Sudan is easily the
rst.since the Six-Day War. Schaden.freude in the West
ust be. tempered by the memory that on that occasion
ssia. turned the defeat of her. Arab proteg6s into a
b illiant strategic and political success for her expansionist
editerranean and Middle East policy. She did this party
b more than making good, in: an incredibly short time and
r gardless of cost, the Arabs' enormous lo?es of military
@ uipment. In addition she got away-without. American
r
action-with h direct intervention in* the war on an
ceasing and by now highly significant ;scale.
To some extent Russia's troubles, as before, are
litany-although less dramatically so-and psychological.
T e, there has been no fresh Arab defeat. Rtst there
h s been no victory either, no regaining-of lost lands, nor
a y early prospect. The best that President SADAT Can
o er to keep up spirits is to proclaim 1971 as the year,
o decision, 1972 as the year of preparation, inc so on.
I this, the Arabs ask, all that the Russians can do for
t m, -after inciting them to war in 1067 and letting them
defeated? Under the strain Arab divisiveness has
ps uced an imbroglio of feuds and internal and external
ses unprecedented even in the' Middle East. In this
rought atmosphere ! ussia's part in the Sudan affair.
has set fire to some of the vast quantities of anti-Communist
tinder in the Moslem Arab world. ?
` An open break between' Moscow and Khartoum would
gravely damage Russia's position in Africa as well as the
Middle East. It is curious that Russia should have risked
her enormous investment in the Middle East by standing
up for the Sudanese Communists. Never hefm'e liar. the
tail of outside Communist opinion wagged the Russian
dog to this extent. There are more urgent rtuestlnns. Will
Russia try to correct the situation and maintain Arab
oyalty by upping the ante, as she did in 19137? She can
only, do this now by offering Egypt her full support in
war. Or might Russia think that her involvement in the
volatile Middle East has gone for enough?
America should warn Russia against military
adventures. The West as a whale should remind the Arabs
of the mutual identity of interest in every field, with
special reference to the expansion of oil production and
sales. The signing yesterday of the Egyptian pipeline
agreement was apposite. Mr Sisco, in Jerusaleln, has a
difficult task, Mrs Mr in even more so. She can argue
that Israel is winning the battle of nerves. But, at the right
moment, she must be, willing to take calculated risks for
peace. The parties must return to the Suez Canal discussions
With tl renewed determination to And a way,
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21 1
 CPYRGAHpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
2 August 1971
The :drab way with an y
Most developing nations have made the point
o the Great Powers at one time or another that
terference In their Internal affairs-real or?
agined-will not be tolerated. This has been
e burden of the message of the executions and.
umerous arrests of Communists in the Sudan,
(ter the unsuccessful: attempt to overthrow
President Numeirl. The Sudanese leader's reaction
Soviet and East European complaints about his
activities has been to Indicate that Soviet advisers
are about to leave and to warn the Soviet Union
to end its attacks on his regime. In doing so, he
is arguing, on his own terms, that a Soviet-
Sudanese relationship should be a two-way affair,'
and that It needs the efforts of both sides to keep'
It going. This will be seen as relevant to Arabi;
Soviet relations as a whole. .-. I
The Soviet Union must be disappointed In.,
what has happened. In giving total support to the
Arabs against Israel they should have, been on to
a winner. It has been no difficult task for them to
emerge In a better light for the Arabs beside the ;
United States, seen as the evil supplier of hostile
eryalpmont to an aggressive Israel. Tha mood of
self-proclaimed revolutionary, nociallst Arab gev
ernments should superficially have matched easily
with that of the Soviet Union. The anti-imperialist
line adopted by most Arab States should have
given It a head start. And In strategic terns,
Soviet naval deployment In the Mediterranean,
and access to air and naval bases in Arab countries
along the shore have been major gains since the.
war of June 197. Sudan has shown, however,
that the Soviet policies have their fratztie corners..
Sudan's decision to join the Federation of
Arab Republics (of Egypt, Libya, and Syria) gives
Its actions wider significance. Implicit Is the
approval they must have. They also confirm a
,recurrent tendency in the Arab -world to deal
severely with people suspected of communism
ono matter how woolly the definition of this term.
,The persecution of Communists In Sudan also
demonstrates that, wiper It. matters, outside
powers can have only marginal influence on
internal politics. In Egypt, the Soviet Union has
extensive control over the armed forces and
certain sectors of the economy; This nkturalty'
brings with It some general influence on policies..
But when President Sadat had his clean-out .in
May in the aftermath of Mr Ali Sabrt's challenge,
the Soviet Union. was waiting on the sidelines
with... the rest of the world to sec what was
happening.
could find its echoes. President Sadat's political.
reorganisations in Egypt suggest a shift towards'
the right, and towards emphasising Islam.
President Gadafy holds forth in pan'-Arab.. tones,
and. against Israel and Jordan with one hand
firmly on the Koran. President Assad of Syria has
tangled once before with the Soviet Union when
he suspected them of putting pressure. on Syria
Internally. Sudan has served notice that, however
sympathetic the Arab may be towards the Soviet
Union for its help in specific areas, they will react
with hostility--even to their own economic cost--
towards any suspicion of interference.
THE EVENING STAR, Washington
The Sudanese Communists
7 August 1971
As. the Russians are discovering in
den, it is sometimes caster to idcn-
ti y your enemies than your ideological
lends. And the Sudanese Communists
CPYRGHT
lire discovrrinr to their discomfiture..
't 1[L~, ' as has happened so mrlny other
'q rtes ,in so tnany other parts of the
*id, , the Russians always wily sacrifice
local Communist party when It Is nec-
sary to do so to preserve the I{rcmlin's ,
rnteglc objectives.
I- fits counter-coup, General Nu
;;!,' has executed at least 14 Commu
tsts and Communist sympathizers..
thers art being hunted divan and Ittt
'risoned, iettving the Sudanese Commt>t-" -
lit party, the `largest In Africa or the
@ y as
Egypt will continue to sulipre. it3 ow
Communists and to resist Comments
elsewhere In the Arab world. And the
Russians, as the abatement of their pro-
tests about Numairi's action.'; shows
have had to swallow this bitter pill
much as they did In the late 10508 When
President Nasser cracked down on th
Egyptian Reds.
r" While the Arab leaders still Intend
;milk the Soviet Union for as much milli
?? tart' and economic aid as possibld, th
prospects for Arab ComrnunistS in th
great are from the Pillars of Iierctiles
the, Fertile Crescent' seldom have ap
peered dimmer. That. is good news, an
It says aatttething about both the mall,
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
WASHINGTON POST
12 August 1971
dan ~, ts Soviet Im
NpeeIll to The Washington Post
-CAIRO, Aug. 11---Sudan's
Ministry of economy has an-
nounced that imports from the
Fhvlet Union have been sus?
pended after Moscow Mlcg?
bdly vininted n trade agree-
nient. Minister of State for;
}vnnnmy Mohamed Idris aiso+
Severely criticized S o v i e t ?rnde methods.
-'fiurlan's criticism of the So-'
i'Int Union and other socialist
countries was coupled with
.prniso fnr China and Yugosla-
?vva as countries that, respect
their agreements.
This is believed to be fur-
[her evidence of Sudan's dete<
iiorating relations with this'
lilviet Union after the unsuc?
ressful Communist-led coup
' igainst the government of
tresident Jastar iNimert lost .1
Vwnthb ~ r,
Arrording to the Sudanese
newspaper al Ayam, Idris ac-
cused the Soviet Union of
levying a 30-per-cent Increase
above International rates on
commodities it sold to Sudan
!under the bilateral trading
agreement. .
He also charged the Soviet
Union with having sold Su.
danese cotton at rebates of up
BALTIMORE SUN
13 August 1971
CPYRGHT
to 10 per cent in Sudan's.tradi. fated agreements to ensure{
tional markets: that discrepancies will not`,
Ali,, ., etbnomy ministry, occur in future," Idris said.
the Soviet Union bought ' al.
most 60 per cent of Sudan's
cotton and then sold it to
Iiidia and. other countries.
Moscow paid 25 per cent In
fiord currency for the cotton
and the rest in military equip.
ment, he said
I Idris spoke today of a "new
f policy' for Sudan's trade,
'under . ? which the pegple's
needs would be Imported from
all over, the .world.
"We will revise - all? the vto.
Sudan Reds Elect New Chief
Beirut, Lebanon tai--The hard.
pressed Communist party in the
Sudan has elected a new leader
and vowed to wage "ceaseless
underground struggle" to over-
throw the regime of Maj. Gen.
Gaafar al-Numairy, the official
newspaper of Middle Eastern
communism reported yesterday.'
The newspaper, Al Nida, of)
Beirut, said the party Centrai+
Committee unanimously chosen
Mohammed Ibrahim Nogod as'
secretary general. The paper
did not say where the commit.;
tee met. i
Mr. Nogod replaces Abdul
Khalek Mahnoub, who was
hanged in Khartoum recently
.on charges -of having planned
the July 19 coup which General
Ne alq vsW ned thw days
Meanwhile the Sudanese depu-
ty prime minister said today his
country does not wish to esca-
late late tensions with Moscow.
In a brief statement over Om-
durman Radio monitored in
Cairo, Babakr Awadalla said,
"We do not wish to escalate
the tensions between Sudan and,
the Soviet Union any' further.
We desire the normalization of
relations between the two coun-
tries.'?
Relations between Sudan and
the Soviet Union were strained
;almost to the breaking point
after the attempted coup and
the subsequent execution of 14
Communist leaders and sym-
pathizers.
General Numalry recalled his
ambassador from Moscow and
asked the Soviet counselor In
Khartota to leave. ' . * . j
The bilateral agreements with
socialist countries were a sen.,
salve Issue but oni: had to talks
frankly, he added. '
The minister praised Chinal
.and Yuaosiavla for respecting
their agreements to the letter;
and announced that Sudan
would import $3 million worth
of textiles from China.
It was earlier announced
that a Sudanese delegation led
by Defense Minister MaJ. Gen:
' Khaled Abbas will visit i;4
king shortly,
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 August 1971
CPYRGHT
Page from mmunis 'maser an
By Paul Wahl
Soviet setbacks in Egypt and Sudan seem
to have been inspired .by Moscow's action'
plan for conquest of political power in
Africa, Presidents Sadat of . Egypt and
The task of the Communists is to use
these forces in order to "transform the
democratic-revolutionary peoples's patties
into new parties of a vanguard (meaning
Communist) type.".'This can be, the' book,
warns, "an extremely slow and contradic-
tory process."
political chessboard.
the countries where: democratic-revolution
ary people's parties either are to power or
head a national liberation movement. Such
parties, says the book, can become "re-
liable detachments of the Communist and
workers' movement. But even when they
are in power or when they are able to seize,
power, other social forces are active on the
zama, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Portu- clews in Egypt's ruling party sought to do.
guess Guinea, and Mozambique. These are.- Only' President Sadat, who, may haw: had
their alliance with the bourgeoisie or of
siding firmly with the workers and 'peas.
"The elaboration by the Communists of
Entrance into the party in power should
not be considered by the Communists as winding up of their-own party. "On the con.
for Its political agents. The edition was kept trary, the Communists must try to over-
unusually small in the expectation that the come the 'resistance' of nationalist, ele?'
text would not fall into non-Communist.., inents on the right wing of the ruling
'hands. Parties and gain the support of the more
The Soviet action plan pays special 'at? revolutionary elements of the left wing."
tention to Guinea, Algeria, the U.A.R., Tan.-. . This is exactly what the Communist nu?
decoy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., entitled
The Political Parties of Africa." The book,
which was printed in only 3,700 copies, was
destined for Moscow's Africa specialists and
r
r
t
o u ons y prop'.. s pa tvs, c
book
published in October, 1970, under the munists turn these parties toward the revo?
auspices of the Africa Institute of the Aca- lution."
a Page from the Soviet leXtbgok and applied correct tactics for the democratic?rcvoIU?
It against its 'authors. tionary Parties is of Special importance. By
entering into the ranks of the democratic.
The Soviet action plan is contained in ?a - ..entering 1 t
m
n?
'
t th C
1
knowledge of the Soviet textbook, arrested
and did away with the members of the.
Communist nucleus inside his party just
in - time.
In Sudan, -where the Communists formed
a coalition party, they thought the moment
had come to seize full power. When Presi-
dent Nimeiry struck back, he carried out
what the Communist. textbook recom?
-mended, namely "to proceed to regular
purges of elements alien to the party."
What the Sudanese President did was to
purge the purgers who'had sought to purge
him.
Through their Pedantry and doctrinaire
insistence on giving their agents detailed
,
"Through their nuclei hnside the demo-, printed. Instructions while underpinning
cratic-revolutionary. people's parties the these insf etio'ns "theoretically," the Com-
Coenmunists must seek to place these ?' anitni:ts. ha' , been hoisted .by. their owes
parties before me alternati" of. continuing i petat
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
CPYRGHT
I SOVIET AND OTHER CCCMUNIST MEDIA COMMENT ON SUDANESE DEVELOPMENTS
CPYRGHT
Ap
TASS DEPLORES "REPRESSION" OF CCMIUNISTS AFTER COUNTERCOUP
statement on e
the "repression" of communists and other "patriots" and-the
"hysterical anticommunist campaign" in Sudan following the
22 July countercoup returning Revolution Command Council Chair-
man an-Numayri to power. Moscow had reported approvingly, and.
in some detail, the 19 July "corrective action coup" over-
throwing an-Numayri, TASS claiming that it. was cheered by
"thousands of elated people" in Khartoum. And a NEW TIMES
article reported by TASS on the 21st had called the coup an
"important event in the political life of the Arab world,"
while a LIFE ABROAD. article, signed to the press the same
day, approvingly enumerated the proclaimed policies of the
"new Sudan leadership."
The terse TASS reports. of developments in the wake of the
countercoup conveyed Moscow's unhappiness with the turn of
events and its dilemma in having to support an-Numayri, a
friend of the Egyptian and Libyan leaders, while he was
calling for "punishment" of.Sudanese communists. Initial
arrests and executions of leading coup figures were noted
only in brief dispatches, but with the 26 July arrest of
Sudanese CP Secretary General 'Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub and the
execution that day of Sudanese trade union leader ash-Shafi'
Ahmad ash-Shaykh, Moscow seemingly felt constrained to make
a public protest. Both East European media and West European
CPs had already been criticizing the "anticommunist campaign"
in Sudan.
Moscow has taken virtually no note of Arab reaction to the
Sudanese events--either pro- or anti-an-Numayri. TASS reported
an-Numayr:i's closure of the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum and the
Sudanese embassy in Baghdad "in view of the Iraqi Government's
hostile action." But there was no elaboration_ and apparently
only the LIFE ABROAD article, signed to press 21 July, acknow-
ledged Iraq's prompt recognition and support of the 19 July
coup. There was no mention of the Iraqi delegation sent to
convey congratulations, whose plane crashed in Saudi Arabia
on the day of the countercoup. Moscow has indicated UAR and
Libyan stands only by briefly reporting Libya's removal of two
19 July coup figures from a BOAC plane which landed in Benghazi'
.by order of the j,ibyan authorities, who subsequently "forwarded"
.the passengers-to an-Numayri, and by noting that an-Numayri had
had telephone contacts with as-Sadat and Qadhdhafi.
STATEMENTS BY The TASS statement refrains from condemnation
TASS, AUCCTU of Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri while deplor-
ing the arrests and.harsh sentences against
"absolutely innocent people," communists and other patriots,
charged with complicity in the 19 July movement. The statement
he
 CPYRGHT
~PyrRPHj ?
1 ?449Q03000700
1212 ve For 61A'ape
Sudanese l'eadership' is aware of, the danger of the road onto which
theS a're 'pu'shing' the dounts'y';" a Iditziatidn dahgerous "for the
vety''destidies of the Sudanese national: Ide4nbctatic?'revolution."
It als'o' hbpea''thab' the le'adershi'p "i*ril1~1find ,the 'strength" to
return to ' the' '154th ' bf cbnsolidati'ng 'th'e unity' 'of all 'national
pattrio't'io I fdtced and, baNguairditig' I sUdadss'.'in ~ the ett uggle , against,
iffipeAalis~t' and for' Buddzi I's 'soeiai. I prsgress?a "m,,, 1,.1 , ,,,,I
;TASS routinely points to approval by imperialism and reaction
of the "bloddj terror "arid 'fanning' of ' Aziticommunism" in Sudan.
It ptaisea `tyre Suddzl6se CP's role it atrdngthening ; the country's
nati'onal' "dependence Andl'so6ial'progress,'likewise hailing the
arrested Mahjub,and executed ash.-Shaykh as "heroib~ sons. of the
?u'darleae iiedple." I?,1 I,, , ]''it .::,, :,I.I..: ,., 1 .
Late do'the'26th- TABS' had -carrried ,a''statemezit,,by'theISoviet
A11-Union Central' Council' of 'Trade Uniohs (AUCCTU). voicing its
"wrathful"cbndei nation" bt the '''murder1!':bf'SiKdanese{ trade union
l'eade'r and W?TVI vice' president abh-Shaykh j holder' of a.Lenin
eace''priY.e: Hi:#' ekdcfitibn; thel'stittmefit' ~asherta i ,playsi into
he''hands''ttf those who' alwsya''sebught"to'?'strike, at the Sudanese,
trade"uftidz1is''ungermirie"the uz'nity,of":the' Siidenese' people,,.. and
w` eakb'fi `'the'ir' st=ruggle' for, the', country' b' progreeaive. and.
de~tocrati'c"@evelopmea4t ,1 1 ,: ??I,, I ,1,,1 iit7ing lied tibettii
govetptrl Egjfptr
..,.
allies? VVG have ?c^n them movie?
a! or?t in th;; stre::ts of :ruira where
they cr,l based, flyir ; the Ml-8'
F ii?opters ar 1 fi%rng ct us the'
-kits 2ri.t 3,,Am of thecc
h:!icoptors. We have hear!] the-,,
cc nvrtin i,,ating v.ih c::ch other in
their tanks'and in their phinzs. We
have heard the scretims of
Lass iria lri.lot We hav;
who p:: cciuli;;d with t5ii,i.r
helicot:_,x::~,
L:r nrxr t ,ul c'00:; not have tho
oil o< ?.r.; .: , t!; chronic cf
of
our r: , I rc ice arc; s. All w
of life is to L ai1iuwed to I.it:a it. We
do not ;c k fors :gin arms. ~: ",y ar
pith. A!I ire bc, f:. om the r.;,, of
Africa v0d EhN ; a.r!d is flu
recognition that we are li.ririnf
not animals, and the right,
to live as huriau beirit;a. Is this ~.r
unill', d_=ad?
Your Excellency, who is a
peaceful man, m::y question why
we do not surrcnrerour arms and
co-operate with the Sudanese
government. We have rich!, :cd to
do so many times. William D-11. 1"
illustrious schoh.r and
statesman .;hose ti;_, p Lh of c4
op.^ratio:i. Hi w,,is Cot d-:::1 by,:
Sudanesa i riy -'m ly afta~ his,
el_rrti in in'iooj i ntrr,l'.
ni,,s.a is but
one of scores of d e r lost talented
so1ct1 rners whcac Choice of cc-
operai:on resulted ian heir mu ,.J.. z
or in:carreration. Among the
ordinary people, many have triett. to
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 Ap
CPYRGHT
co=opp?ate. They have been repaid
by being slaughtered in their
honkies and in theirchurches ana
mosques:; One exatnple among
thousands, may be cited from a
rgcent book"Sundan,.An African
Tragedy," by a Norwegian
journalist. Discussing a
massacre of A -group of
dommunicants in a church, the:
guthor,dcscribed'vrhat he saw as,
"the burueil chap,1, thewoundect,
the burned banes and slculls of the
50 innocent Civilians; including
Children, mur.ered in cgldblood."
This int ident took place within the
last six months.
The Sudanese.ggvernment and
its army frequently announce so
called "amnesties" under which the
500,Q00 Southern Sudanese
refugeesir treighbouring states are
invited to return to the Sudan.
Those who have responded to these
amnesties have been massacred.
The Sudanese government and
its,Egyptianand Soviet masters
have triedto conceal the true
nature' of their genocidal war in the
Southern Sudan by saying that the
Southern problem is one of
religion. This is nonsense.
Muslimsr Christians of all
denominations and pagans are
working together against a single
problem: the genocide ofthO
Africans in the,.Sudan. Among the
foremost; guerilla generals in the
Southern Sudan are the Mgslem3,
Abdel Rahman Suli and Paul Ali
Gbatala.
For what crime then are,we
condemned to annihilatioiti?
Whatever, the crime it must be
heinous, beciuse we have paid the
fullmeasure, off v e hundred
thousand lives for this crime. Is it
becaue,`we were born black?
Because ae dp not wish to be
slave? Because we date to assert
'we are men!
Will Africa and the "world
forever lookaway'in the hope that
we will all die, out and relieve the
conscience'of those who pretend
we do4not'exist? Or even worse,
those, who recognise our existence,
4
butpreteridwe"do not suffer an
rie? Wilt no one socak out in oti
beh'atfI.
If.4gt one African leader or
ptateinan raised his voice for us,
surely others would follow. But no
one will be first. Therefore we must
Suffer in a backwash of human
misery, relegated to limbo of
.despair, until every African roan,
woman and child. in th.; Southend
Sudann,uo n?~ tter whit his tribe, or
religion, "i s dead. Dead froin the
.machines of war or the
concomitant ho:rers as starvation
anddisease. Is there no stareman
tq tell the story to the world? Not
4A000300070001-6
just one rdan?
Do not forsake us, excellency
Bring our case before the OAU
and the world. LET US BUT
'LIVE. In the naine of God
humanism, treat us like me'n.'FOO
+WIi ARE MEN
Respectfully
?Colonet,[oseph L agu
on behalf of the Anya IVya
AEGIS CQMMITFEE
-3ft
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 Appro d ffjDnvReWAWAR9 A9 i .CAWRQP7R701194A000300070001-6
Uganda's Ties With Neighbors Worsen as
East African Leaders Continue to Rebuff Amin
CPYRGHT
ipeolaX The New Yallo
JINJA, Uganda, April 25-
Relations between the. Govern-
ment of Gen. Idi Amin and sev-
eral neighboring countries have
been deteriorating rapidly.
Altlhough General Amin over-
threw President Milton A Obote
three months ago in a coup
d'etat that was widely support-
ed In Uganda, a number of East
African left-wing leaders have
refused to recognize the new
Government. Today the general
chanted that Somalia had"spear-
headed" discussions among
those. leaders of "joint armed
action" against Uganda.
The general, a towering, mus-
cular man who was once the
heavyweight boxing champion'
of the army, said at a large
rally in this southeastern town
on Lake Victoria that such dis-
cussions had been attended by
representatives of Tanzania,
Zambia, Rwanda and Burundi.
Mr. Obote, who during his pres-
idenc had announced policies
aimed at moving Uganda "to
the left," Is now in exile in
Tanzania.
President Amin announced
that he had asked the Organi-
zation of African Unity to con-
sider action to end the pro-
longer civil war in the Sudan
between the Arab-dominated
Government and a black mi-
nority: in the south.
This represented a significant
diplomatic shift for Uganda,
which is just south of the Su-
dan. In the past, th
e Ugandan
Government has sought to avoid
positions that would annoy the
Sudanese Government, even
though there is widespread
sympathy here for the black
rebels.
General Amin, wearing khaki
and a black beret, told the
crowd in a stadium that "our
brothers are being burned alive"
in the southern Sudan.
He said the Organization, of
African Unity, which embraces
all African states except those
governed by White minorities,
had "kept quiet" about military
repression by the Sudanese
Government.
However, General Amin
a so said that Uganda would
!continue to refuse to allow $u-
se refugees refugees to "engage in
hostile activity" against the Su-
dan from Uganda. Last week
Uganda accused the Sudan of
permitting Ugandan guerrjllas
who support Mr. Abate to train
to the Sudan and of helping1
launch guerrillas make a foray
Into Uganda.
He has also accused Tan-
Wia of allowing gueirilla ac-,
t#vity by Obote followers.
Also lastweek, General Amin,
attacked President Kenneth D.
Kaunda of .. Zambia as' "the
greatest two-faced double-deal-
er -of . our Continent." Prime
,Minister John Vorster of South
Africa had said that President
Katinda had engaged .in secret
diplomatic contacts' with South
Africa while publicly attacking
,the South African Government
for Its racial policies.. President
Kaunda denied any, secret, con-
tacts.
Repeating the charges today,
General Amin saidat -Presi-
dent Kaunda had encouraged
others to fight South Africa
while seeking secret negotia-
tions so that "when war comes
Zambia is safe and others will
be attacked."
Such charges seem to reflect
General Amin's anger over
President Kaunda's sympathy
for Mr.. Obote and attempts to
deny Uganda's Government it
seat in the Organization of Af-
rican Unity.
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 Approved For Release 1999/O9/q f sari 4laR9-O1194AOOO3OOO7OOO1-6
whit,, a. C., Apra 4 19T1
The Stubb~rn Struggle for
Black Power in Sudan
CPYRGHT
By DAVID ROBISON
Siseciai to- The Star
The night I arrived in Southern
Sudan, 80 black guerrilla soldiers
were grouped around their fires,
singing one of their popular songs:
"Three persons Anyanya, killed Ar-
abs with bows and .arrows; the rest
started running. In the beginning
we told you; What ;did we tell you,
oh Arabs? We said the birds would
eat you, The birds will fly over you,
Northern youth; Your country is
eaten by vultures."
After each song, the soldiers bel-
lowed the "Freedom"- cry of Ken-
ya's aged leader, Jomo Kenyatta,
used when the Mau-Mau were fight-
ing the British for independence:
"Harambee, Harambee."-
The group was led by Rolf Stei-
ner, an ex-Legionnaire and former
Biafra mercenary, who had entered
the bush 10 months'before to try to
upgrade the woefully inadequate
combat skills of the Anyanya (pro-
nounced An-YAHN-ya.) This time
he was fighting without pay, since
no country cared enough to pay
him. The war had entered its ninth
year, but the Anyanya-about 8,000
armed African soldiers fighting the
.Arab-led Sudan army of 35,000
men-had never been skilled and
disciplined enough to make their
guerrilla war a replica of Vietnam.
Now, with Israel supplying arms
to the Southern guerrillas and Rus-
sia providing its own army advis-
ers, pilots, helicopters and bombers
to the Sudan army,, the virtually
unknown Sudan war was taking on
a new character.
I went with this unit when it
attacked the Sudan1 army post at
Kajo Kaji, close to' the Nile near
the Sudan-Uganda border. Of the
three platoons Steiner had trained
for this, attack, one never even ar-
rived at the starting point because
its major went off to another head-
quarters. His men remained in
their base camp despite strict
marching orders.
The other two platoons marched
to within three miles of their oppo-
nents, and at midnight left to infil-
trate in pitch blackness to within 65
yards of the Arab barracks. I went
with the second platoon and Stei-
ner, crossing and r; e c r o s s i n g
streams and through elephant
UUW at Is am. we .ere u
ly lost. The guide, an elderly ser-
geant, had led reconnaissance pa-
trols perfectly in the past week. We
learned later that he had relatives
living among the civilians at the
post.
Three Die
It was too late to po4ition the
second platoon. Promptly at six,
the first platoon launched its at-
tack, succeeding with'bazookasin
burning down all but one of the
buildiwgs, but losing three killed
and much of their prbcious ammu-
nition.
Steiner aimed to. U7 s w?*k
later, but 19 of his 23 a muti-
nied, refusing to fight again so soon
and so close to the enemy. They
said they were.used to ambushing;
left unsaid was that the An anya's
uncoordinated ambushes have nev-
er hurt the Sudan army very badly.
Steiner began again, training a
younger group of officer cadets,
telling them: "Our time is still
coming."
But Steiner's time is apparently
up. His Anyanya had cooperated
with the Ugandan army under Gen.
Idi Amin, but when Steiner went
back into Uganda for rest, he was
seized by President-Mitton Obote's
special police and cast inte.Kampa-
la prison for three months, without
charges. Just before Gen. Amin
overthrew Obote in January, Stei-
ner was handed over secretly to the
Sudan, government, though no ex-
tradition treaty existed between the
two countries. Steiner, is expected
to go on trial for his life shortly in
Khartoum.
The unsuccessful attack and Stei-
ner's capture seemed typical for
the Anyanya. The Africans in
Southern Sudan seem never to have
had much luck. From 1820 to 1898,
they were victims of the slave
trade. An estimated 2 million Afri-
cans from Sudan were carried off
in chains during those years and
sold in the slave markets of Khar-
toum and Cairo.
Beginning in 1898, the Southern-
ers were sheltered by British rule.
The Arabs in the North were kept
out for the next 50 years, and Angli-
can and Italian Catholic mission
Schools "9 it education, Engiis
and Christianity to the South. B
1956, however, North and South Su
(Ian were merged, by Britain int
independent Sudan, despite a
armed Southern revolt in 1951,
against union with the North.
Civilian Suffering
During the last 15 years, report
of unrest, fighting and vast civilia
suffering in the South have failed
arouse outside interest.
Nineteen-seventy began as the
Southerners' good year. Israel be
gan airdropping arms to the Any
anya in September 1969 and has
continued with almost weekly drop
of arms .and medicine since then.
Southerners walked to training
camps in eastern Equatoria prov-
ince from all over the South, often
hundreds of miles through undulat-
ing savannah, bush and swamp-
lands.
Nearly, once a week, an un-
marked DC-3 circled low over the
camps in the night. Out parachuted
Russian and British arms, includ-
ing machine guns, World War II
rifles and bazookas, which Israel
captured from Egypt in the Six Day
War.
Besides fresh arms and rudimen-
tary training by four Israelis in the
bush, the Southerners were bol-
stered by alliances with non-Arab
blacks in the North. Sudan's 15 mil-
lion population is actually divided
into 6 million black Southerners, 3
million non-Arab Northern blacks,
and 6 million Northern Arabs. To-
gether, the blacks are a majority,
though a majority without power
because the Arabs dominate Su-
dan's government, army, economy
and social structure.
'The Northern blacks and the
Southerners joined in a black-power
alliance in 1970, demanding majori-
ty control of Sudan's institutions, a
demand which is anathema to the
Arabs. The blacks plotted under-
ground, having produced at least
half of the nine unsuccessful coup
attempts against the regime of
Gen. Gaafar Nimerir in the past 20
months. The Southerners hope that
their black-power strategy may
work, even if it requires many
years of continued guerrilla fight-
mg.
Approved or Release
 CPYRGHT
months, according to U.S. intelli-
gence sources in Washington, 100 to
200 Russian army advisers have
been directly planning and partici-
pating in the counterguerrilla war-
fare operations of the Sudan army
against the Southerners.
A larger group of Russians, 300
or more, have piloted and serviced
Russian helicopters and bombers
supporting combat operations in
the South, according to American
intelligence specialists. Up to 1,000
Russian military men are estimat-
ed to be supporting the Sudan
army, counting Soviet army advis-
ers, pilots, ground crew and missile
technicians.
In the North, at Port Sudan on
the Red Sea, the Soviets are build-
ing, A, naval base and installing
SAM-2 antiaircraft missiles to de-
fend the area. The missiles were
presumably detected by U.S. elec-
tronic surveillance, since Air Force
sources state that the presence of
the Russian missiles at Port Sudan
is a certainty.
The Soviet aim is believed by
Washington to be two-fold: first, to
establish a strongly-defended base
for Soviet naval power to be proj-
ected into the Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf, and second, to bottle
up the Israelis in the Red Sea area.
The Russians are thought to want to
influence Africa, continue to domi-
nate the Arab world and leapfrog
beyond the Mediterranean and the
NATO system. But first they must
secure their base in Sudan, accord-
ing to this analysis, by aiding the
Sudan army to crush the Southern
guerrillas.
German correspondent Rudolph
Chimelli flew in an MI-8 helicopter
gunship from Juba to Meridi in
South Sudan. He wrote in Sued-
deutsch Zeitung, Jan. 22:
"The helicopter crew consisted of
a. Sudanese air force officer as
nominal captain, a Soviet copilot in
blue' overalls who directed the
flight, a Soviet navigator, an Epyp-
tian navigator and two soldiers
armed with ` heavy automatic ri-
fles."
Chimelli reported that, "helicop-
ters flown by Russians played a
decisive role in a battle by a Su-
danese brigade that lasted 25
days." In Juba, the commanding
officer of this brigade described the
Soviet helicopters as "the only
means the army has for carrying
out, such an operation." He ac-
knowledged that the Sudan army
has become dependent on helicop-
ters because in all of the South's
350,000 square miles, there are only
a few dirt roads.
A c r d Fir F eleasea 999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-011S4A000300070001-6
l-Iow, for rs une ut v1 Oryf OSWfQ e t e most rate of any
base near the Uganda border. Ac
cording to eyewitnesses who reach'.
ed Uganda in December, the Rus-
sian helicopters were used repeat-
edly to rocket the Anyanya and to
bring soldiers and supplies to the
Sudanese army units. The bomb-
ings caused an estimated 1;000 cas-
ualties, mostly in surrounding vil-
lages.
About 35,000 Southerners were re-
portedly' made homeless by recent
fighting and bombing around Bor in
Upper Nile. A 45-bed government
hospital in the bush at Magwi, in
eastern Equatoria, was bombed
and destroyed on Jan. 25 : after
which a Sudan army patrolled
the medicines and hospital equ p-
ment.
U.S. defense analysts believe that
the Russians will not easily , with
draw from this war, They assert
that the Southern Sudan Is, too large
to be controlled effectively by the
Sudan army.. The Egyptians might
intervene with their 5,000. troops
now stationed around Khartoum to
protect the Nimeiri regime, but
without changing the balance.
The war is increasingly seen as
an extension of the Middle East
conflict. Barring an Arab-Israe'
settlement and an accommodation
between Sudan's Arabs and Afri-
cans, the Russians in Sudan are
expected to .' continue . being drawn
into fighting the Africans in the
South, as they have already done.
Though the scale of Russian ac-
tivity in Sudan is relatively small
compared to the preset"U.S. role
in Indochina, it is being compared
in -Washington to the beginnings of
the American intervention in sup-
port of South Vietnam in 1960-61.
Khartoum is as unstable as Sai-
gon used to be, with nine coup
attempts reportedly made by Gen.
Nimeiri's opponents since he as-
sumed power. The Anyanya guer-
rillas have shown themselves will-
ing to fight for another decade if
necessary.
On the other hand, the Africans
in the South have not become effec-
tive guerrilla fighters and they are
now facing modern helicopter oper-
ations backed by the Russians.
The price of the conflict is evi-
dent throughout the bush. In all the
villages I visited in Equatoria prov-
ince, the level of disease and star-
vation was clearly the highest in
Black Africa today. Foreign doc-
tors who deal with Southern refu-
gees estimate that one Southern
child in four reaches the age of 15,
other African region.
At night, the villages reverberat-
ed with hacking, wheezing, barking
coughs, evidence of the epidemics
of bronchitis, pneumonia and often
tuberculosis that afflict the South-
erners. No medicine or health care
has reached them for years. No,
relief-group dares to ship medicines
illegally across' Sudan's, borders.
As I left the bush, a 60-year-old
sergeant held up his tattered shirt.
He asked for $10, enough to send
his son to school in Uganda for a
year. Except for clandestine
schools run by the Anyanya, but
lacking paper, pencils, books and
desks, there was no education. He
said: "We are the land of nobody.
I remain nothing."
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 Approved FBOV gad 'ON : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
Sudan - en of ikansk tragedie
BORLAGT AV
K ASCHEHOOG & CO. (W. NYGAARD)
OSLO 1970
CPYRGHT
Den 3tte 3r gamic Beda fra Iandsbyen Banja vrir seg i smerte. I
g$r ble han operert av den amerikanske legen pa misjons-
stasjonen i Aba. En kule liar gAtt gjennom nederste del av ryg-
gen og har tatt med seg mesteparten av Fret pA veien ut. En
annen kule liar gAtt gjennom hodet. Den er fremdeles der
inne. Den satt for dypt inne i hjernen til at legen kunne fjerne
den. Beda er lam pi venstre side. Kanskje vil han overleve,
kanskje er han alt ded. Ett av ofrene.ved massakrene i Banja.
I den Lille sykestuen ligger hans mar. Hun liar fAtt ti kuler
gjennom begge bein, ti arabiske kuler da hun fortvilet provde
A flykte sammen med to barn. Den Lille datteren star hjelpelos
midt i rommet.
?Piva,? klynker Beda. Noen Keller vann fra en kaffekjele
inn i munnen bans. Hele rommet er fylt av hans klagende
ynk - og av stanken fra betente sAr.
Jeg stir ved enden av Bedas seng. Jeg prover 3 fange hans
blikk. Bare det ene oyet er synlig. Det andre er skjult av
bandasjene. Det feberfylte, slappe blikket Bier meg ingesting.
Men med ett forstAr jeg det meningslose i denne konflikten.
Jeg vil komme til Bedas landsby. Jeg vil fortelle verden om'
denne skjenselsgjerningen.
Bedas klagende stemme klinger ennA i orene mine da vi
tidlig om morgenen drar ut i jungelen. Sammen med Anya-
Nya-folk skal vi to oss fram til Banja og selv se om det er sant
det de overlevende liar fortalt.
De liar fortalt oss felgende:
Det er morgen i den Lille landsbyen Banja. Det er torsdag
26. juli 1970. Sola er forlengst oppe. , I dag har,.det ik6'.reg-
net. Alt er normalt, innbyggerne tar fgt. p3' dagens arbeid.
Det er noen gronnsaker som skal innhlsstes, noe kasava og
noen jordnotter. Det er ikke mye, men 'nok tA'at liv'et kan' g3
videre. Buskapen har Anya-Nya elier arabtrne tatt,, men follcet
i Banja mA eksistere videre trays 1 at dot egentlige liv'runn-
laget er tatt fra dem. De kryper tit av sine sm3, strAhyttet og
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 CPYRGHT
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t
h
-
y
gar i gang. Noen vasker kla?r, barna leker to elig runt
tene. Bare en liten gutt opplever en dag utenom det normale.
I dag er ban syk. S'a syk at moren mener presten bor be for
ham. Ja, hun inviterer alle i landsbyen til en bonnestund i
kirken eller kapellet, Ysuona Lueto. Langsomt samles de, en
handful! mennesker for A sende en bonn opp til Den Allmek-
tige Gud. Misjonaerene har fortalt at Han kan gjore gutten
frisk igjen. Kateketen leser fra Bibelen, og innbyggerne er sam-
let i bonn. Kirken er ikke stor, den kan vel romme en 80 men-
nesker under det lave strltaket.
Britt stopper bonneropene i kirken. Det blir sI stille der
inne. Utenfor borer de ukjente lyder. Araberne er der! Ara-
berne er kommet til Banja. Alle vet hva det betyr. Patruljen
bestir av i alt 41 mann med automatviIpen. De stormer inn i
kirken, binder kateketen med hendene pi ryggen til en skrope-
lig stol. En annen gruppe raser rundt fra hytte tit hytte. De
bruker ikke geva:r, kniven gjor samme nytten nit mllet bare
er I drepe for fote, dessuten sparer man da ammunisjon.
Innbyggerne, de som fremdeles lever, blir fort inn i kapellet.
Langsomt blir de bundet til stolen med et to-tre centimeters
tykt tau. Noen skriker, noen grlter, andre ber. Det er for det
meste kvinner og barn, men ogsl noen eldre menn som i kir-
ken Ysuona Lueto venter pg en skrekkelig dod.
En offiser gir ordrer. Det siste han sier for ban gir ut av
den lave doren, er: NI skyter vi dere i deres gudshus, la nd
deres Gud komme og redde dere! Han sier det med et hatsk,
ironisk smil.
Og sI: patruljen bar tatt oppstilling p3 den ene siden
av kirken. Hundrevis av kuler spruter ut av automatvlpnene.
De tommer et magasin eller to hver. Kvelende top i smerte lyder
der inne fra. Ikke alle er dode. Sett fyr pi! lyder ordren. Etter
fI sekunder stir kirken i lys lue. Man kan nesten ikke se flam-
men, for sollyset overtoner alt. Bare en svak, grll royk stiger
opp og blir fort bort i den svale brisen inn over det hoye gres-
set i jungelen. Snart lyder ingen stemmer mer innenfra. De
alle dude. Det vat femti i alt.
: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
YRGHT
tit
4, 4"In. De prover nI I flykte. Araberne sender salve etter s lye
e ter dem til de forsvinner i gressct. Noen forblor der ut og
it aldri funnet, noen - i alt 14 - greier A to seg ne til
en Aba til sykehuset. De fortalte oss om Banja.
Araberne er ferdige. De kan trekke seg tilbake til forleg in-
n. Anya-Nya er pi vei til Banja: trommene bar spilt le-
f nens rolle igjen. De kommer for sent. Etter endt did sla per
41 araberne av i forlegningen, trygt beskyttet av panserb ler.
e drikker of og brennevin, de royker og er i godt hu r.
I dag fikk vi da has pA en bunt slaver! En ung pike so er
rlovet med en av soldatene, flykter. Hun holder det ikk ut.
un bar fortalt om festen.
I
ja
aptein Michael bar tatt pi seg oppdraget I fore os til
anja. ?Dere skal selv fA se, sl kan ikke araberne karakter sere
et som ondsinnet Anya-Nya-propaganda. Ta binder, vis k pel-
t, vis de slrede, vis de oppbrente knoklene og hjerneska ene
1 uskyldige sivilister. Dette er folkemord. Det bar vi h det
nge, men verden bar ikke trodd oss. Dere skal selv se, ere
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 CPYRGHT
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Han er ung. Han matte slutte pa realskolen da han var 16.
Siden gikk han inn i AnyaNya. Na krysser han grgnsen fra
tid til annen. Han har fatt billharzia der inne i jungelen. Han
har lyst a fortsette skolegangen og kanskje studere ved uni-
versitetet. Jeg ser ingen muligheter for den unge, begavete
mannen fra Wau i Bar el Ghazal. Nicholas deler skjebne med
tusetivis av andre landsmenn. De bar fatt odelagt sitt liv,
denne generasjonen kommer aldri til a fa oppleve et modern
Sor-Sudan. Noen' faller i krigen, noen dor av suit, andre
bukker under av alvorlige sykdommer. Likevel star Nicholas
der med et spent, optimistisk srhil foran oss:
?Jeg hater arabeme, jeg ville aldri kunne sti ansikt til an-
sikt med en araber.?
Dette hatet hos Nicholas er representativt for negrene i s r.
Det er vanskelig I si hva som ma til for at hatet skal f -
svinne.
?Jeg cr villig til a kjcmpe til jeg dor, og jeg kommer til a
gjore det,? Bier Nicholas. Jeg tror han er etterretningsoffis r
i Anya-Nya, met] han roper ikke sin funksjon de 14 dage e
vi er sammcn. De liar lam, enda sa unge de Cr. I filler gar e
til fronten som er ovcralt. Dct cr (lager da de ikkc liar ma
de kjcmper i dcspcrasjon og hat for en rettfcrdig sak.
roper Nicholas. < Vi trenger hjelp o
det fort. Hvorfor snakker dere alltid om Ser-Afrika? Tenk he
ler pa oss! Araberne driver folkemord, det er ingen tvil lenge
Men bare vent: vi skal nok fa hjelp fra visse utenlandske mak
ter. Den dagen er araberne ferdige. Kanskje set du meg aid
igjen, om noen dager ratner jeg kanskje opp der inne, > ha
nikker i retning av bush-en. ?Jeg faller for en god sak, m
aller heist ville jeg studere og bli noe nyttigere b >
Clement er 16 at gammel. For et par ar siden gikk han p
skolen i Torit. Etter middagspausen tar elevene plass i d
primitive skolestua. Plutselig er araberne der. De skyter vilt in
i klasserommet. Instinktivt kaster Clement seg mot glassruten
Han redder livet, kameratene dor. Na roper han mot bush-en.
En eldre mann kommanderer ham til a dra i retning Uganda.
Det er flere dagers marsj. Clement vii gjerne tilbake til foreld-
rene og 6 sosken, men mannen sier at det betyr den visse ded.
Clements lange vandring tar til.
(I dag gar jeg pa skole i Uganda. Men jeg lengter tilbake
til Torit. Hvor er det blitt av foreldrene mine? Hvor er mine
sostre og brodre? Jeg vet ikke, kanskje lever de, kanskje er de
for alltid borte. Jeg har mistet ett oye, med det andre skal jeg
en dag se igjen mitt land! Hvis konflikten er over om et par
ar, vil jeg bli politiker, hvis ikke, tar jeg ogsl geweret i hind.
Da skal jeg kjempe. Jeg hater araberne.)>
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
S1JaA T -- AN AF CAN TRAGEDY
By Per oyv:i.nd He.radstveit
(From: Sudan -- en Afri_kansk Traedie, Aschehout Publj shinT Co.,
Oslo, 1970, pp 13-1 , 92-93
CPYRGHT
_saona Lueto
Eight-year-old Beds from the village of Banja writhes in pain. Yesterday he
was operated on by the American doctor at the mission station in Aba. A bullet
went through the lowest part of his back and took most of his thigh off when it
re-emerged. Another bullet went through his head. Tt is still in there. It was
too deeply imbedded in the brain for the doctor to remove it. Beda fs paralyzed
on hj_s left side. Perhaps he will survive, perhaps he is Just about dead. One
of the victims of the massacres in Banja.
His mother lies in the little ward. She .,rot ten bullets through both legs,
ten Arabian bullets when she desperately tried to flee with two children. Her
little daughter stands helplessly in the middle of the room.
"Piva," cries Beda. Someone pours water from a coffeepot into his mouth.
The whole room is filled with his cries -- and the smell of infected wounds.
T stand at the end of Veda's bed, trying to catch his eye. Only one eye can
see. The other is hidden by bandages. The feverish, apathetic glance tells me
nothing. But suddenly T see how meaningless this conflict is. T will go to Beda s
villare. T will tell the world of this infamous deed.
Beda's plaintive voice is still ringing in mvr ears when we go out into the
j,.r.gle early in the morning. We will go to Banja with the Anya-Nya people and se
for ourselves if what the survivors have told is is true.
This is what they told us.
It is morning in the little villaI'Union Nationale du Soudan Afrionin
(L4 ) s'6tablit b d'6?ranger at depuis, ells
a { pour so cause per des appels of des
p6 s ns aux organisations, internationales.
q~
ivite des politiciens soudanais 6 I'
6t er, ajoute Die Presse, a cause one rs-
uerent brOl6s at ?pilles, et 4eurs habitants
hommes, femmes et enfants - assassin6s.
Ces horreurs eurent pour consequence la
fondation d'un mouvement appel6 Anya'nya,
en 1963. Ce nom est celui d'un poison mortel
qu'on obtierrt on reduisant en poussibre la
tgte s6ch6e d'un cobra.
Anya'nya tronsforma da guerilla, qui existait
depuis 1955, en one force de combat plus
efficace.
En 1964, le regime du general Abboud
tombo, at le secrbtaire general de I'UNSA,
William Deng, qui fut ossassine Van dernier
a Khartoum, retourna dons a gouvernemen
ovec d'autres politicians exiles.
Ceci morquo de debut de profondes diver-
gences dons les mangs de roppositaon africoine.
En 1965, Joseph Oduho *init los groupes
rivoux des ' poll-fieiens du Soudon du Sud sous
1 egde du Front de Liberation de I'Anya'nya.
(FLA). Mais, en 1967, on soi-d-isant ?gouverne-
ment provisoire? fut fond-6 dons le Soudan du
Sud sorts d'aide du FLA, et, en 1968, ?il com-
menra b s'oppeler a ?Gouvernement'Provisoire
du Nil*. Oduha s'opposa violemment 6, ce
mouvement. Avec 4'aide de Joseph Logu, chef
du FLA dons do province equatoriale, its rrsu-
nirent one force disciplin6e qu'"9!'s appele rent
l'Organisation Nationale de 4'Anyo'nya (ONA).
Depuis dons, les mouvements voulant cr6er
on Etat africain dons lle Sud du Soudan se
sont divises en deux groupes principaux: le
Gouvernement Provisoire du Nil at d'ONA.
Un troisieme groupe, le Front Uni de Lib6ra-
tion du Soudan Africain fut cre6 en mars 1970
au Congo-Kinshasa. Son but est de realiser
on Soudan gouverne par les Africains of no
subissant plus 4'influence orabe.
Le pr6sident du Gouvernement Provisoire
du Nil est Gordon Mayen, ancien mi?nistre d.u
Travail 6 Khartoum. Ce gouvennement a d6clar6
I'independance des trail provinces du Sud du
Soudan et 'les a oppel6es la ((Republique du
Nile. Son aparlement) siege dons one butte
de terre, en pleine for6t. Jusqu'ici, iI n'a pas
6te decouvert par 'les Arabes: Le parlement le
plus secret au monde, cela a I'vir d'une tragi-
comedie, mais ?les acteurs sont terribtement
s6rieux, dit I'artiele de Presse. Les Forces
Arm6es Nationades de d'Anya-nya representent
l'orgonisation m?ilitaire du Gouvernement du
Nil.
L'outre groupe principal, d'ONA, n'a pas
d'organisation civile. II est purement militaire
at se -montre tres critique envers les membres
du Gouvernement du Nil.
Le territoire du Soudan du Sud 6quivaut a
deux fois celui de la Republique Federale
Allemande. Cest on pays de for6ts humides,
infests par la malaria, et dons lequel les
serpents at Iles animaux sauvages abondent.
Les petites villes du Sud, fortifi6es contra
les attaques de I'Anya'nya ne sont habitees
maintenant'que par des Arabes, les Africains
cyant fui par crainte des persecutions. Dons
lo brousse, to ?loi de I'Anya'nya prevaut. Cette
region est trop peu maniable et trop grande
pour que les troupes arabes puissent to
contr8ler entierement. De leer c8t6, les Af-
ricains sont trop foibles, trop .mel nourris et
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trop ma equip es an ormes pour u er
ovec succss b eux souls contre Khartoum. Leurs
efforts ont eu relativement peu d'effets sur
des forces gouvernementales en nombre
superieure..
Mais, or leur tactique de guerilla, its
reussissent a harasser une arm$e profession-
nelle de plus de 10.000 hommes. Celo com-
prend ;la destruction de ponts et de routes, 1'
attaque de convois routiers at de bateaux sur
le Nil, to coupure des voles de chemin de for
reliant Khartoum b d'autres centres.
Bien sOr, 4ts ovtoritbs de Khartoum ripostent.
.IIs (les Arobes) orrivent gbn@ralement b la
tombee de lo nuit, entourent un village of
jettent des tisons sur les toits de choumes, dit
Joseph Oduha. .Affoie s, hes habitants s en-
fuient de cot enter br0kmt at tombent entre
r r, niialns t Arobes qui ie; ortwent, )as
violent at lee assassinent - da plupart du
Sernps, cc sort des femmes, des enfa-rts, et
des nlGicds
Les hornrnes ?vivan ha .itue!iument clans to
brousse, com?ba;tont ou s'entrcincnt au cc roat.
lie Iclssent a t4u'r, fommes e, G lours vniant?
'to sots do ovlt!vrsr le you cte le~,res qui pe?ut
,encore 4'etre. Chaque foie que les Arabes
trouvcnt des traces de cc.rnpement cfricoin, its
rEduisent tout a nouvecu en cendres, dit I'
orr'clo de Die Presse. C'est pourquoi un grand
nombre de Sou:iana'is du Sud oat fui leur?
pays. Plus encore sort morts de fa.im.
It n'y a IEgadement pas de discrimination
rcciale au Soudan. Cependant, sedon le journal
outrichien, des Arabes qui ant ate la classe
dominants pendant des generations at qu.i ont,
dons, [a-passe, considers les Afr ica'ins cornme
c!es`;csclaves, jugent encore la population afri
coine du Sud comma une race de seconde
c1csse, ul?Is ont transfonme ? le Soudan ' an un
Etat o?robcH, dit avec ,amertume Joseph
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through the complete disruption of norm prof
onomic life in the swamps, forests, a
grassy plains of the three southern -
inces.
Refugees helped
In neighboring countries United Natio s
organizations, the World ~ Council f
Churches, the Swedish Red Cross, Rom
Catholic Mission Relief, and the Briti
Catholic Womens League among others ha
been helping refugees.
In 1968 the UN estimated 63,000 southe
Suda,,i-se refugees in Uganda and 40,000
Congo (Kinshasa) alone. In 1955, the la
year of British rule, the southern, Britis
trained Equatoria Army mutinied unsucces
fully against Arab officers and civil servant
sent from Khartoum to "integrate" the no
Muslim south,
A series of politicians and parties, som
legal and some underground, have sine
campaigned for southern self-rule.
Measures untaken
General Nimeri after his take-over
1969 promised more measures to help th
non-Muslim sough to self-government, bu
refugee sources say these never got off th
ground.
Two main rival southern groups now exist
One is the "Nile provisional government" o
exiled southern politicians in Kampala
Uganda, last known to be headed by Gordo
Mayen. It advocates total independence fo
a "republic of the Nile."
More active is the Azania Liberatio
Front. The Anyanya -is its military arm
and it is attempting to organize schools an
some basic administrative and economi
activity in "liberated"; regions where Ara
government has either: been driven out o
never really existed.
Government troops hold the main south
ern towns, such as Juba in Equatoria, Wa
in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Shambe in Upper
Nile. But they are evidently unable to se
cure roads and other communication line
or hold villages in bush areas.
In a preface to a recent book "The Su-
dan, a Southern Viewpoint" by southern
exile leader Oliver Albino, published by the
Institute of Race Relations in London,
British historian Arnold J. Toynbee writes:
"British rule [from 1899 to 1956] differ-
entiated the northern and the southern Su
danese from each other without separating
them from each other politically.
"This made it virtually inevitable that, i
and when the British abdicated, the north
erners, being by far the stronger of the tw
sections of the Sudanese people, shoul
attempt as they have done to assimilat
the southerners by force. This in turn, ha
made it inevitable that there should be
southern resistanep mnvement."
THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.)
Monday, January 10, 1971
CPYRGHT
rHE ROY WILKINS COLUMN:
Su&ds Racism Traps Blacks
WASHINGTON Hardly ># is' killed oft by government, then se
ek goes by without revealing Io a valid charge,
t at the pit propaganda phrases The petition, however, exposed e
o many of the sloganeering black than the genocide fantasy of Ame
ilitants are so much holuam. A black militants. All the for left Neu w
ority of black thinkers believes the big name black leaders eIn Ile
talon(( plea , are
i 'in those it now has a chance to stampede eAlgerialsewhere or hi AfricAfrica,have been n prey
log
t eir own race into a suicidal emo- the vilest anti-Semitism,
ti nalism under the sweeping black They have promised Egypt that bl ek
I el. American volunteer soldiers would help he
Sudanese Genocide Arabs against Israel. It is true that e
Two black Sudanese have outlived the have been changes in the mood of b ck
p secution of black people by the Arabs America, but no one has yet recorded
in Northern Sudan and thus have forced rush of blacks to fight alongside( ha
th pro-Arab black operators here toward Arabs.
M ment of truth. Curious Silence
ese have becu harping on the charge Speechmakers, interviewees d
of genocide. They , want the world to analysts of .the black revolution it ep
-w.~o, .a,w. Ll, CAlC1 WWg4Wa ;WO government, Tile U.N. petition filed by he
N population Southern Sudan Liberation Front docla es
` obody among the dark wailers has that Egyptian and Libyan troops are be ng
s Ja policy, the total 'Negro population Soviet-built aircraft. are bombarding he
er than that o( whites, The life ex, Black militants beat the tom-tom for
ancy of Negro men and women IT black, blank, black. They sound often like
- ei
et
p
hate . rums
..
he Isindsi of ?;dlnsurance, policies now Every, Negro American who does t
av liable to Negroes testify in un-' embrace 14 unquestioning fashion no
son imental statistics to the Improvement goodness of blackness is denounced as a
in ealth and in the diversification in "traitor, to big race." He merely may e
occ ations. Granted that ghetto life is saying that two plus two equals four, at
ding and hard, that malnutrition takes if the black spellbinders say the total,
its toll, that" Negroes arrested for an "black experience" is We, them he is
al ed infraction of the law are' more' condemned.
like than whites to be convicted and that The disciples of blackism and th it
nar otics have' made searing inroads, it white sycophants are now called upon o
is s ill not accurate to call the Negro death become something they have never bee i:
r "genocide." consistent. Are they for the liberation fro it
petition, filed with. the United id black Sudan as they declare themselves
Nat s by two black Sudanese puts to be for the liberation front in Vietnam?
gen ide in its proper place. They charge Do they oppose the Arab-led gover -
that 250,000 black Sudanese have been shot meet in Khartoum, or do they contin e
to d th and 250,000 have.died of hunger. to urge Negro Americans to help the Ara la
e half-million dead, they assert, were exterminate Israel?
the exult of official policy which the Arab- It is long past. time for someone
led Khartoum government is enforcing say something besides "black." L
aga it four, million blacks. in southern "humanity," for instance.
Sud n. If one-eighth of the black population (The Register and Tribune Syndicate)
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January 22, 1971
Sudsudan: Aufstand als Uberblkibsel des Kolonialismus
as ?Cai~uC(~ G;'"
a 119?
(I Da
CPYRGHT
Die Regierung macht die Gewahrung der Autonomie von
,der Auflosung der Rebellenbewegung abhangig
Von unserem Korrespond.ente:n Rudolph Chimelli
Khartum, im Januar
Der Rotor des Hubschraubers treibt rotliche
Staubwolken in den dunstigen afrikanischen
Sommerhimmel. Gerauschvoll hebt sich die ton-
nenschwere sowjetische Mi 8 vom Flugplatz von
Juba, der Hauptstadt der siidsudanesischen Pro-
vinz Aquatoria. Das Ziel: 240 Kilometer welter
westlich die Distriktstadt Meridi, die auf
dem Landweg nur nosh zweimal monatlich
im_ bewaffneten Konvoi erreichbar ist. Die
Fracht: eine kleine Gruppe Informationsbeamte
und Journalisten, ein paar Regierungsfunktio-
nare,, ein Eisenkoffer mit 150 000 Pfund in bar
von der Nationalbank. Die Besatzung: ein suda-
nesischer Fliegeroffizier als Kommandant, im
blauen Overall ein sowjetischer Kopilot, der je-
doch tatsachlich den Flug dirigiert, ein sowjeti-
scher Navigator, ein agyptischer Navigator, der
auger beim Start und bei der Landung den drit-
ten Sitz in der Kanzel ubernimmt, und zwei Sol-
daten, die rechts und links mit schweren Ma-
schinengewehren, Relikten einstiger deutscher
Militarhilfe an den Sudan, aus geoffneten Bull-
augen nach Rebellen spahen.
Das wellige Land, das einige schroffe Felsbar-
rieren von Nord nach Siid durchziehen, erscheint
aus 2500 Meter Flughohe fast menschenleer. Me-
terhohes Steppengras, einzelne Baume, die sich
manchmal zum Gebiisch verdichten, die Win-
dungen eines algenverwachsenen Flusses, drei
oder vier Dorfer aus runden Grash{ tten, sonst
wahrend einer Sturide und zehn Minuten nichts.
Der ganze Sudsudan, bestehend aus den Provin-
zen Aquatoria, Ober-Nil und 'Bahr-el-Ghasal
(Gazellenflufi), mit semen 650 000 Quadratkilo-
metern so grog wie die Bundesrepublik, Oster-
reich, die Schweiz und Italien zusammen, hat
hochstens vier Millionen Einwohner. Von Khar-
tum nach Juba ist es so weft wie von Munchen
nach Tunis, von der ostlichen Ecke der Siidpro-
vinzen am Rudolfsee bis an die Grenze der Zen-
tralafrikanischen Republik so weit wie von Paris
nach Sofia. Im ganzen Suden gibt es keine
AsphaltstraBe, sondern nur Erdwege, von denen
die meisten wahrend der sechs Monate wahren-
den Regenzeit nicht benutzbar sind, eine Eisen-
bahn von Khartum nach Wau, der Hauptstadt
von Bahr-el-Ghasal, und als einzigen zuverlassi=
gen, aber langsamen Verkehrsweg den Weil3en
Nil, der zwischen Juba und Malakal ein 400 Kilo-
meter langes und 300 Kilometer breites Sumpf-
gebiet bewassert.
Seit Jahrzehnten abgeriegelt.
DaB dieses riesige Land heute zum Sudan ge-
hort, ist eine Folge britischer Kolonialpolitik im
19. Jahrhundert; daS es wahrend zweier Men-
schenalter nicht an den arabischen Nordent assi-
miliert wurde, ebenfalls. Rigoros sperrten die
Briten den Suden gegen Siedler und islamische
Missionare aus dem nordlichen Landesteil, ge-
gen kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Durchdrin-
gung aus dem hoher entwickelten arabischen
Sudan ab. Der Suden blieb Schwarzes Afrika,
der Suden blieb zuruck. Als der Sudan am 1. Ja-
nuar 1956 in die Unabhangigkeit entlassen wur-
de, gab es in den drei Siidprovinzen nur sechs
Personen mit Universitatsbildung, nur eine ein-
zige Mittelschule, kaum Ansatze zu einer kom-
merziell betriebenen Landwirtschaft, so gut wie
kein einheimisches Handwerk, praktiscl} keine
Industrie. Vielleicht 20 000 bis 25 000 der schwar-
zen Stammesleute waren zum Islam bekehrt, et-
wa 200 000 waren von weil3en Missionaren fur
den Katholizismus gewonnen, 25 000 bis 30 000
waren Protestanten. Die ubrigen, mehr als 90
Prozent, hangen bis heute Naturreligionen an,
bauen wie eh und je Negerhirse zum eigenen
Verbrauch, leben als Jager und Sammler oder
,nomadisieren mit ihren Rinderherden.
Obgleich der Suden als selbstandiges Gemein-
wesen kaum vorstellbar war, wehrte sich die
kleine- afrikanische Elite, die hierin ihren Ruck-
halt beim Volk hatte, von Anfang an dagegen,
daB mit der Unabhangigkeit des Sudan die
Macht von britischen in arabische Hande Uber-
gehen sollte. Schon 1955, im letzten Jahr der
Hcrrschaft Londons, meuterten die sudlichen
Garnisonen. Da der Suden mit seinen Forderun-
gen auf Autonomie und Federation niemals
durchdrang, befindet er sich seither mit Unter-
brechungen im Aufstand gegen Khartum.
In Meridi, das der Gouverneur von Aquatoria
am Tag zuvor als ,ruhigsten und sichersten
Platz in der Provinz" geschildert hat, sind die
Spuren der Rebellion fast uberall zu sehen. Am
sudlichen Stadtrand, von wo es zu den blauen
Hugeln des Kongo nur 25 Kilometer sind, kon-
nen neue Anpflanzungen von Hirse und Kaffee
nur besichtigt werden, wenn vorher ein Land-
Rover mit aufmontiertem Maschinengewehr am
Rand der Felder in Richtung auf den Busch in
Stellung gegangen ist. Schwerbewaffnete Solda-
ten umringen jeden Schritt der Journalisten.
Auf dem von einem Schutzenpanzer und Ma-
schinengewehrlochern gesicherten Damm, der
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 CPYRGHT
fragt der Begleitoffizier freundlich besorg : ?Sie
wollen doch nicht auf die andere Seite gehen?"
. Wie um alle Stadte des Sudens hat sich um
Meridi ein Ring von Grashtittendorfern gebildet,
utter deren Bewohnern zu wenig Manner sind.
Der stellvertretende Kommandeur des siidlichen
Armeebereichs,Oberst Omar el Tayeb, gibt of-
fen zu, daB die Zwangsdeportation einer der
?Eckpfeiler der Befriedungspolitik 1st. ?Wir wol-
len die Leute urnsiedeln. Wir sammeln sie in den
Waldern und im offenen Land ein und siedeln
sie in. der Mahe;: der Stddte neu an." Der Zweck
sel, den Rebellewdie,Mogliehkeit zu nehmen, in
der Bevolkerung unterzu(auchen. und sich zu
versorgen. ,Und wenn die Leute nicht mit Ihren
Soldaten kommen und; ein Friedensdorf' bauen
wwollen?"
Mit dem selbstzufriedenen Lacheln eines Man-
nes, der ein gutes Werk geleistet hat, schatzt der
Oberst, dalI uber die Halfte der friiher im Busch
lebenden Einwohner Aquatorias und der am
meisten gefahrdeten Gebiete der beiden anderen
Siidprovinzen eingesammelt worden ist. ?Wir
mussen einfach etwas fur die Leute tun. Es 1st
der Gang der Geschichte. Jetzt gefallt es ihnen
nicht, aber spater werden sie uns verstehen."
. Es gefallt ihnen tatsachlich nicht. Bei der Um-
siedlung verschwinden haufig die Manner im
Busclh, um zy den Rebellen oder uber die Grenze,
vorw'iegend nach Athiopien, Uganda und in den
Kongo zu gehen. In den Grashuttenslums um die
Stadtre herrscht Armut. Juba ist von 1963 his rum
verga;ngenen Jahr von 18 000 auf 65 000 Einwoh-
ner gewachsen; Meridi von 4000.auf 15 000. Fur
so vi(ele Menschen fehlt es an Arbeit, an sanita-
ren IEinrichturgen, an allem. Demoralisierung,
MuBi;ggang, Kriminalitat, Prostitution sind die
Domi~nanten im Leben der meisten Umsiedler.
Soweit die Bevolkerung des Sudens auf dem
Land geblieben ist, gebietet die ' Regierun;, im
Biirge;rkrieg den Stammesfehden weniger als
fruheir Einhalt. Ohnehin stehen die Dorfer zwi-
schen zwei Feuern: Arbeiten sie mit den Rebel-
len zusammen, trifft sie eine Strafexpedition der
Armee; bleiben sie loyal, was auch vorkommt,
rachem sich an ihnen rilcksichtslos die Aufstan-
dische!n. Es gibt Stamme, die von diesen N:iihl-
steinem buchstablich zerrieben worden sind.
Vom Volk der Lapit, das einst 30 000 zahlte, ve-
getiereen heute nur nosh wenige Hundert am
Rand won Juba.
,Auf einem Hugel fiber Meridis besser gesi-
chertex Nordseite steht zwischen Palmen, Man-
gobauimen und i1ppig wuchernden Bliitensi.rau-
chern die protestantische Kirche: strohgedecktes
englis(ches Backste~n-Tudor. Ein Frauenchor
singt zur Begieitung von Rasseln und Hand-
tromnneln eine melancholisch-rhthmische
Hymnce. Meridis Kirchen waren nie zerstort. In
Malak;al, der Hauptstadt von Obernil, ist Monsi-
gnore ?Yukwan sogar dabei, mit der Finanzhilfe
Roms eine nepe Kirche zu bauen. Er bereugt,
daB er- keine Behinderung seiner Arbeit un 1 daB
seine Gemeinde. keine Verfolgung kennt.
Aus der elektrizitatslosen Nacht der Grashiit-
ten driingen dem Fremden andere Stimmen ent-
gegen. Sie sprechen mit dem festen Glauben und
dem einfachen Vokabular der 1VLissionsschu e.
,,Wir haben noch immer Vertrauen zu i13t n.
Gott hat uns these Priifung aufgegeben, da it
wir Zeugnis ablegen, und ihr, unsere Braid r,
mul3t es auch tun", sagt ein.schwarzer anglika i-
scher Pfarrer, der keine Gemeinde mehr h t.
Seine Kirche hat in den Wirren der Jahre 1965 6
im gesamten Suden 38 Gotteshauser and V -
sammlungsgebaude verloren. Sie wurden v en
den Regierungstruppen zerstort, nicht well ie
christlich, sondern well sie die Zentren der -
senden, schreibenden, organisiert handelnd n
Minderheit waren, die den Widerstand gegen ie
Eingliederung in den Norden leitete. Da es r
britischen Zeit im Suden nur Missionsschul n
gab, konnten die Fi hrer der Autonomiebe -
gung nur Christen sein. Die heidnisch geblie -
ne Manderheit, die ihre politischen Wiins e
nicht verstandlich machen kann, empfindet -
doch nicht anders als sie.
,,Wir machen keine Fortschritte mehr, wir f 1-
len zuriick" klagt ein katholfscher Priester. i-
ne Kirche hat weniger Gebaude eingebullt u d
ist organisatorisch besser intakt geblieben, a
seit der Ausweisung s:imtlicher 33 wr"iCen d sionare, welche die sudanesische Ec., :c, ;
verfugte, ist die Last auf den SchcaiLer crr
nigen einheimischen Pfarrer zu sci;w..r. S.:
Priestern aus afrikanischcn und arabischen L` -
dern, die im Sudsudan aushelfen konnten, g bt
Khartum nur selten ein Visum. Am scharfs n
urteilt ein presbyterianischer Kirchenma n:
,,Wenn ein weiles Regime mit uns t5te, as
Khartum mit uns macht, wi rde sich die ga ze
Welt darilber aufregen. Was im Sudsudan a-..
schieht, ist zehnmal schlimmer als das, was n-
sere Braider in Stidafrika und Rhodesien aus
halten haben." Wie praktisch alle jiingeren e-
sprachspartner, wenn sie von Regierungsau an
unbeobachtet sind, bekennt er sich zur ?An
Nya", der Bewegung der Rebellen und zu de an
Ziel, zur Sezession.
Die Anya-Nya (zu deutsch: giftiges Gras) at.
im Juni letzten Jahres die vier anderen Sepa a-
tisten-Organisationen (Anzania Liberation L a-
gue, Suer Republic, Anidi Government, Nile 1 e
public) unter ihre Fittiche genommen, die m i
sten der friiheren zivilen Foderationspoliti er
mattgesetzt und ein einheitliches Militarko -
mando errichtet. Ihr Fi1hrer ist der ehemal e
Leutnant Joseph Lago, ein Katholik. An zw i-
ter Stelle steht Samuel Abu John, Ex-Hau t-
mann und Protestant, an dritter Stelae Freder k
Brian William Maggot, gleichfalls Protest nt
und ehemaliger Major. Joseph Lago werden v m
sudanesischen Geheimdienst enge Verbind -
gen nach Israel nachgesagt. Er sei selber d rt
gewesen und babe andere Anya-Nya-Krieger
Ausbildung hingeschickt.
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 CPYRGHT
Lips)
Obgleich die Kampfkraft der schwarzen Re-
bellen von unabhangigen Beobachtern, die auf
der anderen Seite waren, gering eingeschatzt
wird, hat die Anya-Nya dieses Ziel sehr weitge-
hend erreicht: Ein erheblicher Teil der sudanesi-
schen Armee steht heute im Siiden. Ein grol3er
Teil der StraBen ist durch Minen and Gefahr von
Uberfallen aus dem Hinterhalt unpassierbar. Im
Dezember attackierte eine Anya-Nya-Gruppe
unter Fii.hrung von vier weifen Soldnern die Po-
lizeistation von Bor am Nil, 300 Kilometer von
der Grenze Athiopiens oder Ugandas entfernt,
tdtete einen mit den BehSrden kollaborierenden
Schilluk-Hauptling and fur Polizisten and ver-
schwand. Die sechs Gefallenen, welche die
Anya-Nya zuriicklied, waren gut ausgeriistet
and gekleidet. ,Wenn wir ein Jahr vorher einen
Rebellen fingen, hatte er nur ein oder zwei Pa-
tronen. Jetzt haben sie Bazookas and 5-Zentime-
ter-Motser", klagte ein Offizier.
Zeitweise gelingt es den Rebellen, kleinere
Gebiete unter ihre Kontrolle zu nehmen. Das
wichtigste davon, genannt ,Moroto" (der groBe
Versammlungsplatz), das in einem schwer zu-
ganglichen, bergigen Areal im Grenzgebiet mit
Uganda siidlich von Yei lag, konnte eine sudane-
sische Brigade im Herbst nach 25t5gigen Kamp-
fen ersturmen. Die von Russen geflogenen Hub-
schrauber spielten dabei die entscheidende Rol-
le. ?Das einzige Mittel fur die Armee, diese Ope-
ration auszufilhren", nennt sie der Komman-
dant. ,Ohne Helikopter batten die Soldaten nie-,
mals an diese unwegsamen Platze gelangen kSn-
nen." Gefangene wurden kaum gemacht. Dif.
meisten Aufstandischen entkemen, so such der
Mann, der den Anya-Nya als Chefausbilder ur,d
Khartum als Beweis fur imperialistische Anstif-
tung der Rebellion dient: der deutsche Ex-
Fremdenlegionar Rolf Steiner, der spater in
Uganda festgenommen and jetzt an den Sudan
ausgeliefert wurde. Die Behauptung, israelische,
amerikanische and westdeutsche Drahtzieher
stiinden hinter der verstarkten Aktivitat der
Anya-Nya ist zum Kleingeld national-arabi-
scher Propaganda von Khartum bis Beirut, von
Kairo bis Bagdad geworden. Details zur angebli-
chen Verwicklung der Bundesrepublik kann in-
dessen niemand liefern, nicht die Verwaltung im
Suden, nicht die Armee, nicht die Polizei, nicht
300070001-6
das Informationsministerium in Khartum, nicht
das Amt des Prasidenten. Das Ministerium fur
Angelegenheiten des Sudens wartet mit einer
Liste auf, in der in pauschaler Form Personen
and Organisationen (,,die Caritas die Freunde
Afrikas") genannt werden, die propagandistisch
oder a Geldsammler fur die Siidsudanesen ta-
tig sii1d. Ein Sender, ?Die Stimme Afrikas", soil
von Kdln aus den Rebellen den Riicken steifen.
Bestimmter wird erst der Minister, Joseph Ga-
rang, selbst Sudlander and Kommunist: ?Es
kann kein Zufall sein, das diese Organisationen
immer dann aktiv werden, wenn im Sudan ein
linkes Regime erscheint." Die Schaffung von
Garangs Ministerium and seine Berufung in das
Ressort fur den Silden sind einige der wenigen
Taten, die auf Numeiris Proklamation des Prin-
zips der Regionalautonomie am 9. Juni 1969 folg-
ten. Als die 'Revolutionsregierung damals ver-
kiindete, dag sie ?die historischen and kulturel-
len Unterschiede zwischen Nord and Sii.d aner-
kennt and fest daran glaubt, dag die Einheit un
seres Landes auf diese objektiven Tatsachen ge-
grundet werden mug", hatte sie zunachst Kredit
im Suden. Der Aufstand schlief ein. Nahezu ein
halbes Jahr lahg herrschte vollige Ruhe.
Doch es geschah nichts, auger dag Projekte
zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der drei Pro-
vinzen entworfen wurden. Arabisch blieb die al-
leinige Sprache der Verwaltung and der Schu-
len, uberwiegend arabisch blieben Regicrung,
Armee and Beamtenschaft. Im Revolutionsrat
gibt es keinen Sudlander, im Kabinett nur zwei;
nur einer von noun Provinzgouverneuren
stammt aus dem Suden, drei Obersteri sind die
ranghochsten Offiziere, welche der Sddsudan
hervorgebracht hat; an der Universitiit Khartum
studieren nur 220 Studenten aus den Siidprovin-
zen; eine gemeinsame Regionalverwaltung fur
Aquatoria, Ober-Nil and Bahr-el-Ghasal, be-
setzt and dirigiert von Si dlandern, gibt es nicht.
Die Chance, den Wilnschen des Sudens im Frie-
den entgegenzukommen, damit das Feuer des
Aufstands dauernd geloscht werde, wurde ver-
paBt, der Circulus vitiosus 1st wieder geschlos-
sen: So lange die Rebellion andauert, kann'.ceine
wirkliche Autonomic gewahrt werden; so tango
keine Autonon'-ie gewahrt wird, daucrt die Re-
bellion an.
CPYRGHT
Khartoum, January
By Rudolph Chimelli
The helicopter rotor drives reddish clouds of dust into the hazy African
s er sky. Noisily, the Soviet Mi 8, weighing tons, rises from the landing fiel
Juba, capital of the Sudanese province of Equatoria. Our destination is the
strict city of Meridi, 21L0 Kilometers toward the west, now reachable by land
],y twice a month by armed convoy. The passengers are a small group of inform
on officials and journalists and a couple of government functionaries. An iro
est containing cash from the National Bank to the value of 150,000 pounds is
rried as freight. The crew consists of a Sudanese air force officer as capt
Soviet copilot in blue overalls who in fact directs the flight., a Soviet navi
tor, an Egyptian navigator who, except during take-off aid landing, occupies
ird seat in the cockpit and two soldiers armed with heavy automatic rifles,
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 CPYRGHT
through open portholes.
The rolling country, traversed from north to south by a few rough mountain
ranges, seems from the altitude of 2500 meters almost empty of human beings. For
an hour and ten minutes nothing is to be seen except yard-high steppe grass,
scattered trees, sometimes condensing into bush, the windings of a river overgrown
with algae, three or four villages of round grass huts. The whole of South Sudan.,
consisting of the provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-el-Ghazal (Gazelle
River), with an area of 650,000 square kilometers, as large as the Federal Republic,
Austria, Switzerland, and Italy put together, has a population of at most four
mai.lli?on. The distance from Khartoum to Juba is as great as from Munich to Tunis,
and from the eastern corner of the southern provinces on Lake Rudolph the border
with the Central African Republic is as far as from Paris to Sofia. In the entire
South there is no asphalted road, only dirt roads, most of vich are not passable
during the six-month long rainy season. The only railroad nuns from Khartoum to
Wau, capital of Bahr-el-Chazal, and the only reliable, but slow, traffic route is
the White Nile, which waters a 400 kilometer long swamp region between Juba and
Malakal.
Cut Off for Decades
That this huge country today belongs to Sudan is a result of British colonial
policy during the 19th century, as is the fact that for two generations it has not
been assimilated by the Arab North. Rigorously, the British cut off the South from
settlers and Islamic missionaries from the northern sections of the country,
as against cultural and economic penetration from the more highly developed Arabic
Sudan. The South remained Black Africa, the South remained backward. When the Sud
gained its independence in January, 1956, there were in the southern provinces only
six persons with university educations, only one middle school, hardly the beginnin
of commercial agriculture, practically no native handicrafts, and practically no
industry. Perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 of the black tribesmen were converts to Islam,
about 200,000 had been won over to Catholicism by white missionaries, 25,000 to
30,000 were protestants. The rest, over 90 percent,tiave up to the present time h
on to their native religions, grow millet for their own consumption, and live as
hunters and food gatherers or as nomads with their herds of cattle.
Although !the South was hardly conceivable as an independent commonwealth, the
small African elite, which in this had the support of the people, from the beginnin
of independence resisted the turning over of British power to the Arabs. As early
as in 1955 the last year of British domination, the southern garrisons mutinied.
Since the SouthIs demands for autonomy and federation were never successful, it has
since that time, with interruptions, been in a state of rebellion against Khartoum.
In Meridi, which the governor of uquatoria had the day before described as
"the quietest: and safest place in the province," the traces of the rebellion are
seen almost everywhere. At the southern edge of the city, only 25 kilometers from
the blue hills of the Congo, new plantings of millet and coffee can be inspected
only when in advance a Landrover has been positioned at the edge of the field with
its machine gun pointing toward the bush. Heavily armed soldiers surround every
step taken by the journalists. On a dam, protected by armor plate and machine gun
pits above the small reservoir formed by the Meridi RLver, the escorting officer
asks with f riendly solicitude: "You ll not wish to go to the other side?"
As around all of the cities of the South, a ring of grass hut villages has
grown up around Meridi, among the people of which there are too few men. The depu
commanding officer of the Southern Army Region, Colonel Omar el Tayeb, frankly
admits that forced deportation is one of the cornerstones of the pacification
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 pen oounWepcY~s'el~near theciesl $~1-0~1A?Of~~(3A1#fte
ebels of the opportunity to disappear is to deprive the
ppear among the people and to support themselves.
And when the people refuse to come with the soldiers to build a 'peace village l?"
With the self-satisfied smile of a man rh o has done a good job, the colonel
stimates that over one half of the inhabitants of Equatoria who formerly lived
n the bush and those who lived in the most endangered areas of the other two
outhern provinces have been collected, "We must simply do something for the
ople. It is the course of history. They are not happy with it now, but later
hey will understand us*"
It does not please them, as a matter of fact. In the course of the resettle-
ent, the men often disappear into the bush, to join the rebels or to go over the
1 order, mostly to Ethiopia, Uganda, and the Congo. In the grass hut slums around
he cities poverty predominates. From 1963 to 1970, the population of Juba in-
eased from 18,000 to 65,000, and that of Merida from 1,000 to 15,000. For that
any people there is shortage of work, sanitary facilities, everything. Demoraliza-
an, idleness, crime, and prostitution prevail among most of those resettled. To
e extent the people of the South have stayed on the land, the government during
e civil war restrains tribal feuds less than before. Nevertheless, the villagers
e between two fires: If they cooperate with the rebels, they meet with an army
Live expedition, if they remain loyal, which also happens, the rebels ruthlessly
t
revenge on them. There are tribes that have literally been crushed between
ese two millstones. Of the Lapit people, who once numbered 30,000, only a few
h dreds now vegetate at the edge of Juba.
.
On a hill above Meridi's better secured north side, between palms, mango trees,
d luxuriantly blooming shrubbery, stands the protestant church, a thatch-roofed
gush brick Tudor structure. A female choir sings a hynm in melancholy rhythm
t tie accompaniment of rattles and hand drums. Meridi,'s churches have not been
erupted. In Malakal, capital of Upper Nile Province, Monsignor Yukwan is even
b ilding a church with the financial aid of Rome. He declares that there has been
n interference with his work and that his parish experiences no persecution.
In the night, other voices meet the strangers from the grass huts that are
ck,void of electric light. They speak with the firm faith and simple vocabulary
the mission school. "We must still have confidence. God has given us this trial
s that we may bear witness, and you, our brothers, must also do so, n says a black
glican minister, who no longer has a congregation. In the chaos of the years
1 S-66 his church lost a total of 38 churches and meeting houses in the South.
y were destroyed by government troops not because they were Christian, but be-
cawe they were centers for the literate, organized minority which led the resis-
t ice to assimilation by the North. Since during the British time there were only
mi sion schools in the South, the leaders of the autononr movement can only be
Ch 'stanns. However, the majority that has remained heathen experience nothing
th Lbis different.
"We no longer make progress, we fall behind.." complains a Catholic priest.
Iii church has lost fewer buildings and has remained more intact organizationally,
bu since the expulsion of the 33 white missionaries at the disposal of the Sudanese
go rrunent in 1962 the load an the shoulders of the few native clergymen is too
he vy. Khartoum only seldom grants visas to priests from African and Arab countries
wh could help out in South Sudan. A Presbyterian church man expresses his opinion
in the sharpest terms: "If what is being done to us by Khartoum were done by a
rah to regime, the whole world would be stirred up. What is happening in South Sudan
is ten times as bad as what our brothers in South Africa and Rhodesia have to bear."
Lie practically all the young people with whom we talked when unobserved by govern-
t eyes, he admits to belonging to the Anya-Nya, the rebel movement, and to approve
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In June of last year the Anya-Nya (Poison Grass) took the four other separatist
organizations (Anzania Liberation League, Suer Republic,, Anidi Government, and
Nile Republic) under its wing, checkmated most of the former Federation politicians,
and established a unified military command. Its leader is former Lieutenant Joseph
Lagu, a Catholic. Second in command is Samuel Abu John, ex-captain and Protestant,
and third in command Frederick Brian William Maggot, former major and also a
Protestant. Joseph Lague is said by the Sudanese secret service to have close con-
tacts with Israel. He is said to have been there himself and to have sent other
Anya Ilya fighters there for training.
Victory by Means of Soviet Helicopters
Although the fighting strength of the black rebels is estimated as slight by
independent observers on the other side, the Anya-Nya has very largely attained
one of its goals: A considerable part of the Sudanese army is today in the South.
A large proportion of the roads is impassable because of mines and the danger of
attacks from ambush. In December, an Anya-Nya group led by four white mercenaries
attacked the police station at Bor on the Nile, 300 kilometers from the borders of
Ethiopia and Uganda, killed-a Shilluk chief who was collaborating with the authori-
ties and four policemen and disappeared. The six rebels killed, left behind by
the Anya-Nya, were well equipped and clothed. "When a year ago we caught a rebel,
he had only one or two cartridges. Today they have bazookas and five-centimeter
mortars," complained an officer.
From time to time, the rebels succeed in bringing smaller areas under their
control. The most important of these, the Moroto (The Great Gathering Place),
located in an inaccessible mountainous area on the border with Uganda south of
Tei, was in the fall stormed a Sudanese brigade after a battle lasting for 25
days. Helicopters, flown by "ussians, played a decisive role. The commanding
officer describes helicopters as "the only means the army has of carrying out such
an operation. Without helicopters the soldiers would never have been able to reach
this inaccessible place." Prisoners were rarely taken. Most of the rebels escaped,
as did the man who serves the Anya-Nya as chief trainer ad Khartoum as proof of
imperialist instigation of the rebellion, the German ex- oreign Legionnaire Rolf
Steiner. Steiner was subsequently apprehended in Uganda and handed over to the
Sudan. The contention that American and West Germans are pulling the strings
behind the increased Anya-Nya activity has become small change in national Arab
propaganda from Khartoum to Beirut, from Cairo to Baghdad. In the meantime, nobody
can furnish details on the supposed materialization of the federated republic,
not the administration in the South, not the army, not the police, not the informa-
tion ministry in Khartoum, and the President's office. The P6 nistry for Southern
Affairs serves up a list, in which are lumped together persons and organizations
(Caritas of the; Friends of Africa) who are active as propagandists or collectors
of funds for the South Sudanese. A broadcasting station in Cologne is said to be
stiffening the backs of the rebels.
Minister Joseph Garang, himself a Southlander and Communist, is more positive:
"It cannot be a coincidence that these organizations become more active when a
Left regime appears in the Sudan." The oration of Garang's ministry and his
appointment to the administration for the South was one of the few actions that
followed upon Numeiri's proclamation of the principles of regional autonomy of 9
June, 1969. When the revolutionary government at that time announced that it
"recognized the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South
and firmly believed that the unity of our country must be founded upon these ob-
jective f acts," it was at first believed in the South. The rebellion died away.
c''omplete calm prevailed for almost six months.
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 CPYRGHT
,,~, ~o CPYRGHT
P -Y6ff INXf th
;e-e- W E~ r2r~ef e`W V e
o '1'angu01Pen3stra
tion and in the schools; the government, the army, and the civil service remained
preponderantly Arabic.. There is no southerner in the Revolutionary Council, only
two in the cabinet; oly one of nine provincial governors is from the South, and
only three officers of ranks as high as colonel; at Khartoum University there are
only 220 students from the southern provinces; there is no joint regional adminis-
tration for the provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-el-Ghazal, staffed and
directed by southerners. The chance of meeting the desires of the South in peace,
so that the fires of rebellion could be permanently extinguished, has been passed
up. The vicious circle has once more been closed: As long as the rebellion lasts,
no real autonomy can be assured, and as long as autonomy is not assured, the
rebellion will last.
MORCENBLADET, Oslo
January 23, 1971
Lars Korvald an Syd-Sud.an og FN :
C aien"
NoreborvOge a s(~
YRG
Jeg gje a se o so
internasjonale menneskerettigheter, ved at vi spilte en mer aktiv' rolle f, eks. i
FN - og at vi ikke matte vike unna for to opp konkrete saker i internasjonale
fora nar medmenneskers, liv, sikkehet og frihet er i fare.
Det er formann i Kristelig Folkeparti, lagtingspresident Lars K o r v a I d som
sier dette till Morgenbladet i en kommentar til den treghet som hersker nar det
gjelder A` fa
Av GUNNAR MOE
borgerkrigen i Syd- Sudan I FN.
Under utenriksdebatten i Stor-
tinget i november ifjor, fremmet
Korvald et forslag om at den nor-
ske regjering matte to et initia-
tiv I denne saken I FN, og kreve
at en granskningskommisjon ble
sendt til omrAdet der borgerkri-
gen pAgAr, for sA senere a frem-
legge konkrete forslag to en los-
ning av den blodige konflikten.
-Er det ekjedd noe med denne
saken siden De tok den opp I
Stortinget?
- Nei, sier Lars E orvald, det
vanlige er jo at slike forslag blir
Rsamlet opp> av Regjeringen, som
sA - vanligvis en gang pr. Ar -
sender ut en melding eller et doku-
ment om hva den bar foretatt seg
I disse sakene. Hvis en storttngs-
representant osker saken gjort til
glenstand for en realitetsvotering
i Stortinget, da mA ban be om
slik votering med en gang. Ellers
er vanlig praksis at forslagene.blir
vedlagt protokollen og oversendt
Regjeringen.
Hva tror De er den egentlige
Arsak til at ikke bare Norge, men
de fleste land, vises sA liten vilje
til A to den opp I FN saker som
gjelder brudd ph menneskerettig-
hetene?
-- Det virker meat som om det
er formaliteter og en slags inne?
bygget treghetsmekanisme i uten-
rikstjenesten, mener Korvald. -
I smrdeleshet gjelder dette over-
for FN. Man unnskylder seg med
formelle vanskeligheter: ?det er
ikke det rette tidspunkta, ?vi vil
ikke fa stotte fra andre staters,
osv.
- Men yeg tror imidlertid at
Norge en gang ibiant kunne koste
ph seg A stA alene om en sak der
vi vtrkelig mener at noe br r gjo-
res, og hvor vi tror at FN kunne
utrette noe positivt. Tar vi en slik
fast holdning, vil vi som regel og-
,sA efterhvert f A folge av andre.
Norge er, efter min mening, I en
sick posisjon at ingen vii kunne
. mistenke oss for A to skjeve, smr-
politiske hensyn om vt sa klart
ifra i :like raker.
- Ligger det kanekje politiske
hensyn bak vAr forsiktighet? Er
vi redde for A komme Litt pA' kant
med stormaktene?
- Net,. det vil jeg nouig tro, sier
lagtingspresidenten bestemt. -
Men det er mitt inntrykk at det
ofres altfor. lite oppmerksomhet
ph krenkelser av tnenneskerettig-
hetene, selv om det, er gledelig A
registrere at bide folkeopinionen
og politikerne i sin almindelighet,
t stigende utstrekning gjores be-
visste om at en mer aktiv linje
er nodvendig for A beskytte disse
rettigheter.
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 MOR.GINBLADET Oslo
@3 r:Releasb?$ / W:1dIA qM '#4 0Y 9b *
CPYR@KRGHT
e orway p ay a ea g ro-re Men tt MUMS
fending international human rights, by being more active -- in the
ited Nations, for example -- and by bringing up concrete issues in
tie international forum when human life, security, and liberty are
i danger."
These words were spoken by Lars Korvald, president of the lower
chamber of Parliament and chairman of the Christian People's Party,
i an interview with this paper, commenting on the slow progress mad
i getting the civil war in southern Sudan discussed by the United
N tions.
During the foreign policy debate in Parliament last November,
K rvald proposed that the Norwegian government take the initiative
i this matter at the UN, request that a committee of investigation
b sent to the area affected by the civil war and later present cone to
p oposals for ending the bloody conflict.
We asked if anything had happened since he took the matter up i
P liament.
"No," said Lars Korvald. "Usually such proposals are 'picked up'
b the government which then -- usually once a year -- issues a state
m nt or a document on what it has done about them. If a parliamentary
r presentative wants the matter brought up for a vote in Parliament,
h must request such 'a vote at once. Otherwise, the customary
p ocedure,is to include the proposal in the minutes which are submitted
t the government."
We asked what he thought was the reason why not just Nors y but
m st countries seem so unwilling to discuss in the UN matters pertai
i g to breaches of human rights.
"Apparently formalities and a kind of built-in mechanism of sl
g shness ih foreign affairs offices," Korvald said. "This is especi ly
t e with regard to the UN. Formal difficulties are used as excuses
This is not the right time,' or 'Other countries will not support o
p sition,:'. and so forth.
"But it seems to me that once in a while Norway could take it u n
i self to stand alone on an issue on which we really think action sh d
b taken,: when we feel that the UN could really do something positive.
I we took such a firm stand, others would usually join us after a
w ile. In my opinion Norway has such status that no one would suspect
of twisted political motives if we spoke out on such matters."
We asked if our caution might not be due to political motives.
W ).s Norway afraid to step out of line with the great powers?
"No,, that I would not believe," said the president of the lower
h )use emphatically. "But it is my impression that too little attention
i paid to encroachments on human rights, although I am happy to not
that popular opinion and politicians In general are becoming more an
m )re convinced that we must take a more active line in order to protect
t ese rights."
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 NEW YORK (moved For Release 1999/09
January 23, 1971
CPYRGHT
Africa's Hidden Wars
For a year the guns have been Silent in Nigeria. ine
civil war that gripped the world's attention is ended; the
Ibos who powered the Biafran secession are resigned
most of them-to working back their passage within
united Nigeria. But the first anniversary of Biafra's sur-
render serves as a reminder that three other blood
civil wars have been grinding on almost unnoticed i
Africa.
These wars are humiliating for leaders of the ne
Africa and for the 41-nation Organization of Africa
Unity, especially at a time when they are imploring th
world to help end white minority rule in South Africa
Rhodesia and three Portuguese colonies. For all thre
wars involve ethnic and religious clashes comparabl
to those that helped provoke Nigeria's agony, comparabl
even to those behind the black-white confrontatio
farther south.
In the Sudan a Government dominated by the Arab
Moslem majority of the north has fought for fifteen year
to suppress a struggle fo
autonomy by the blac
pagan and Christian mi
nority in the south. Tw
representatives of a blac
Sudanese liberation mov
ment, in, New York r
cently to petition th
United Nations for heir,
charged the Khartoum Government with a policy
"genocide against the four million blacks of the souther! i
MORG NBLADET, Oslo CPYRGHT
January 26, 1971
troops, President Tombalbaye's black and largely Chris-
tian Government has been unable to crush an insurrec-
tion of Arabic and largely Moslem northerners. Faced
with France's decision to pull all its troops out of Chad
during 1971, Mr. Tombalbaye has signed an agreement
with several dissident leaders and is negotiating with
others; but there is no indication to date of any peace
moves involving the major rebel fighting force.
East of the Sudan, the Moslem-led Eritrean Liberation
Front, which has struggled for nine years for independ-
ence from Ethiopia, recently charged Emperor Haile
Selassie's Christian Government with attempting "mass
annihilation of Eritreans."
With their fixation on the white regimes farther south,
African governments have made no serious effort to halt
these wars. The Organization of African Unity has not
even set up a consultative committee as it did in a fruit-
less peace effort in Nigeria.
African leaders can say with justice that much respon-
sibility for these cleavages in Africa rests with the
colonial powers that drew state boundaries to suit their
own convenience rather than for ethnic, religious and
regional viability. They are less persuasive when they
blame the steady exacerbation of old African feuds on
"neo-colonialists" or "imperialists"-or on unnamed "out-
side nations and groups," as Emperor Haile Selassie did
with regard to the Eritrean conflict this week.
In forming the Organization of African Unity the
African governments agreed to live with those colonial
boundaries and to strive to surmount them in a collective
effort to build peace, prosperity and solidarity. Their
effectiveness in extending majority rule to the rest of
Africa will depend heavily on their ability to put their
racial house in order north of the Zambesi and their'
success in halting the killing of African by African.
Sudanesisk prest til tysk avis:
?Ti ganger verve cnn i Syd-Atrika
cHvis et hvitt regime
hadde behandlet oss slik
Khartoum nu gjor, da
Mille utvilsomt hele verden
,rast og skreket Opp. Men
det som skjer i Syd-Sudan
er ti ganger verre enn de
tilstander som vane brpdre
Det er en syd-sudanesisk,
presbytarlansk prest som
sier dette til Siiddeutsche
Zeitungs utsendte medar-
beider Rudolph C h I m e I-
1 i, i en rapport datert ja-
nuar 1971 (SZ 22. ds.)
i Syd-Afrika og Rhodesia Og som praktlsk tact alle
de yngre personer denne Jo-
CPYRGHT
ev t h
med, bekjente ogsh denne
presten seg til opprprsbeve-
gelsen Anya-nya og dens po-
Iitiske mal: LOsrlvelse.
- Vi gjer ikke lenger noe
fremkritt, vi bare faller til-
bake klaget en katolsk prest
seg ti] Chimelli Det kirke-
saintunnet nan tilhorer har
klart a flilcke pa, endel kirker,
og liar organisatorisk sett
klart a hedre sine vilkdr en-
Men efterat samtlige 33 a
denne kirkens hvite misjonee
rer ble utvist av den sudane
siske regiering 1 1962, er by
den pt` de f'a tnnfodte pre
sters skuldre blitt for tun E.
Selv prester Ira andre arab
eke ag afrikanske land
som kunne hjelpe syd-sud
neserne - biir jjelden innvi
get vlsum fra Khartoum-r
gj eringen
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T V ANGS-
DEPORTASJON
Chimelli beretter om en he-
likoptertur han var med p.a
fra Juba (hovedstaden i pro-
vinsen Ekvatorta) til di-
striktsbyen Merida, 240 krn
lenger vest. Helikopteret, en
russisk MI-8, be flrbyet av en
sudanesisk pilot og med et
mannskap som sellers bestod
av bade russere og egyptere,
hadde ogsa meth seg soldater
som holdt kontinuerlig utkikk
efter mulige gerilja-soldater
pa bakken.
I. Meridi ble de mgtt av
stedfortredende kommandant
for den sydlige armegruppe.
oberst Omar el T a y e b, som
kunne fortelle de ankomne
pressefolk at etvangsdeporta-
sjon var en av hjprnestenene
i. regjeringens frigjdringspoll-
tikk> .
- Vi vil finite andre bo-
plasser for folket. Derfor sam-
ter vi dem inn I skogene og
pa det apne lendet og far
dem til a bosette seg I neer-
heten av byene. MAlet er a
hindre at oppr?rerne skal
kunne blande seg med folket
og bli forsprget av den lokale
befolkning.
-Og hvis folket ikke vii
bli med Deres soldater for a
bygge slike efredsbyerx -
hva da? spurte journalistene
obersten.
- Vi ma ganske enkelt
gjpre noe for dem. Det er hi-
storlen gang. De innser ikke
dette ennu, men senere vii de
komme til a forst& det.
Med et selvtilfreds smil
kunne han fortelle at over
halvparten av dem om var
butt innfanget, av troppene
hadde butt med til byene.
Hva som skjedde med den
andre halvparten sa han in-
tot om, if?lge Chimelli.
det stor armod. Som eksempel
nevner han at Juba siden
1963 har hatt en befolknings-
eksplosjon rra 18 000 til 63 000
innbyggere; Merida fra 4000
til 15 000 1 samme tidsrom.
For sa mange. mennesker
mangler man b&dP arbelde,
saniteeranlegg og sA godt som
alt annet.
Resultatet er demokratise-
ring, kriminalitet, lediggang,
prostitus j on.
H.EREN BINDES
I SYD
Selv om Anya-nyas militee-
re styrke regnes for a va;re
ganske beskjeden, har den 1
hvert fall klart a oppna at
mesteparten av den sudanesi-
ske beer ma sta I Syd-Sudan.
Og en stor del av velene har
Anya-nya klart a gj0re ne-
sten ufremkommellge, ved 1.
plassere miner og ph grunn
av den stadige truselen om
overfall og gerilja-angrep.
-Nar vi for bare ett 6,r
siden klarte a fange en opp-
rerer, sa hadde an vanllgvis
bare to eller tre patroner pa
seg. Men i dag har de bade
bazookas og 2-tommers botn-
bekastere.. uttalte en bekym-
ret offiser 1 regjerings-styrke-
ne til Rudolph Chimelli.
Pa regjeringshold fikk han
ogsa h?re at uten de sovjet-
iske helikopterne ville ikke
regjerings-styrkene ha store
muligheter for A gripe inn
mot Anya-nyas avdelinger. De
ferdes ofte I s>l ulendt og
vanskelig terreng, at det ville
vaere det rene selvmord a
forf?lge dem. I disse omrade-
ne har opprorerne ofte den
reelle kontroll, skriver
Siiddeutsche Zeitung.
SLUM
Det er imidlertid tydelig at
negrene I Syd-Sudar slett
Ikke forstar at' regjerings-sol-
datene vii ?gjyre noe' for
dem. Festeparten av menne-
ne, som blir samlet inn som
kveg pa markehe, rummer fra
Kfredsbyenea. De slutter seg
til Anya-nya ute I bushen, el-
ter de flykter over grensen tit
Etiopia, Congo eller Uganda.
skriver Siiddeutsche Zeitungs
medarbelder. dg i gresshytte-
slummen rundt byene hersker
ME.7,LOM BARKEN
OG VEDEN
Sk langt befolkningen I syd
er butt tilbake ute pa lands-
bygden, betyr borgerkrigen at
stammefeldene er b11tt langt
sjeldnere og svakere. Men al-
likevel star landsbyene mel-
lom barken og veden:" Hvis de
samarbeider med oppr(rerne.
rammes de av regjerings-
styrkenes straffe-ekspedisjo-
ner. Hvis de er lokale mot re-
gimet i Khartoum - noe som
ogsa forekommer - utsettes
de for hensynslpse gjengjel-
delsesaksjoner fra opprorernes
side.
Det finnes stammer som
bokstavelig talt er butt revet
t stykker i dette dilemma. Av
Lapi-folket, som en gang
tellet 30 000 mennesker, gjen-
star der I dog kun noon fa
hundre som vegeterer I ut-
kanten av Juba, beretter Chi-
melli som et eksempel pa hva
denne hensynslose borgerkri-
gen har fort til
Anya-nya (som rett over-
satt betyr cgiftig gress*) tok
i junt for den 4amlede sepa-
ratistbevegelse under ' sine
vinger (Anzanta Liberation
League, Suer Republic, Antdl
Government, Nile Republic).
Lederen for denne fronten
er en katolikk og tidligere
loytnant, Joseph L a g o. Hans
nestkommanderende heter
Samuel Abu J o h n og er
protestant og tidligere kap-
tein I haeren. Som nr. 2 kom-
mer en tidligere major, prote-
stanten Frederick Brian Wil-
liam Maggot.
Det sudaneiske hemmelige
politi hevder at Lago star 1
naer kontakt med Israel, at
han selv har veert i det lan-
det og at ban sender andre
Anya-nya-krigere dit for. ml-
liteer utdannelse.
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C PYRC TDITIONS IN SUDAN TEN TIMES WORSE THAN IN SOUTH
"If a white government treated us the way Khartoum does, the
hole world would have risen up in protest. But what is going on in
he southern Sudan is ten times worse than the conditions being en-
dured by our brothers in South Africa and Rhodesia."
This statement was made by a southern Sudanese Presbyterian
inister to Rudolph Chimelli, foreign correspondent for Suddeutsche
eitung, in an interview dated January 1971 and appearing in that paper
n 22 January.
Like almost all the younger people with whom the journalist
ame into contact, this minister believed in the rebel movement, the
ya-Nya, and in its political goal -- emancipation.
"We are no longer making any progress, we're just going back-
ard," a Catholic priest complained to Chimelli. The religious society
o which he belongs needs to repair some of its churches and must
mprove its organizational conditions.
But since 33 of the white missionaries of this church were
rdered to leave the country in 1962 by the Sudanese government, the
urden has fallen much too heavily on the shoulders of the few native
riests. Even priests from other Arabian and African countries -- who
ould be able to help the South Sudanese -- are seldom granted visas
y the Khartoum government.
Teport at i on
Chimelli told of a helicopter trip he took from Juba (capital
f Equatoria province) to the town of Meridi, 24+0 kilometers to the
est. The helicopter, a Russian Mi-8, was flown by a Sudanese pilot
d manned by a crew of Russians and Egyptians. It also carried sol-
ders who kept a constant watch on the ground for guerillas.
In Meridi, they were met by the deputy commandant of the south-
rn army forces, Colonel Omar el Tayeb, who told the arriving press
epresentatives that "forced deportation was one of the cornerstones
f the government's liberation policy."
"We will find other places for these people to live. That is
y we are rounding them up in the jungle and from the open country
d making them settle near the cities. Our goal is to prevent the
1 bels from mixing in with the people and from being supported by the
cal population.
The journalists asked the colonel what happened if the people
d not want to join his soldiers in building these "peace villages."
"We simply have to do something for them. It is the course of
U story. They don't understand that yet, but they will understand it
1 ter on."
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CPYRGHT
wit.-h 9. self -satisfied smile, he said that over half of those
ho had been caught by the troops had come along
aid nothing about what had happened to the other half, according to
himelli.
However, it is very obvious that the Negroes of southern Sudan
do not understand that the government soldiers want to "do something"
for them. Most of the people who were rounded up like cattle from the
fields run away from the "peace villages." They join the Anya-Nya out
in the bush or cross the border to Ethiopia, the Congo, or Uganda, ac-
cording to the correspondent for Suddeutsche Zeitung. And there is
great poverty in the grass hut slums surrounding the cities. As an
example, he mentioned that since 1963, Juba had suffered a population
explosion from 18,000 to 63,000 inhabitants. Meridi's population had
swelled from 4,000 to 15,000 in the same period. There is not enough
employment, sanitary facilities, or anything else for that many people.
The result has been demoralization, criminality, unemployment,
and prostitution.
Dilemma of Tribes
As long as the population in the south remains out in the
country, the civil war serves to reduce the frequency and intensity
of tribal feuds. Even so, the villages are faced with a dilemma --
if they cooperate with the rebels, they become targets for the govern-
ment forces' punitive expeditions. If they are loyal to the govern-
ment in Khartoum -- which does happen -- they are exposed to severe
retaliatory actions by the rebels.
There are tribes that have literally been torn apart by this
dilemma. Of the Lapi people, who used to number 30,000, there remain
today only a few hundred who vegetate in the outskirts of Juba.
Chimelli cites this as an example of what this ruthless civil war
leads to.
The Anya-Nya (the proper translation of which would be "poison
grass") took the entire separatist movement under its wing last June
(Anzania Liberation League, Suer Republic, Anidi Government, Nile
Republic).
The leader of this front is a Catholic and former lieutenant,
Joseph Lagu. His second in command, Samuel Abu John, is a Protestant
and former captain in the army. Next in line is a former major, a
Protestant, Frederick Brian William Maggot.
The Sudanese secret police claim that Lagu is in close touch with
Israel, that he has been to that country himself, and that he sends
other Anya-Nya warriors there for military training.
Army Must Stay in South
Even if the military forces of the Anya-Nya are estimated to be
quite limited, they have been able to make sure that the greater part
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 CPYRGHT
1-6
of the Sudanese army has to remain in southern Sudan. And the
Anya-Nya have been able to render a large number of roads
impassable because of mines and because of the constant threat
of ambush and guerilla attack.
" Just a year ago, if we managed to capture a rebel, he
usually had only two or three cartridges with him. But today
they have bazookas and 2-inch grenade launchers," a worried
officer in the government forces told Rudloph Chimelli.
Government sources also said that without the Russian helico
ters, government forces would have little opportunity to attack
Anya-Nya squads. They often operate over such rugged and diffic
terrain that it would be sheer suicide to try to pursue them. In
such areas, the rebels are often actually in control, according
to Suddeutsche Zeitung.
AFRICA DTARI
January 29 - February I3, 1971
CPYRGHT,
Genocide' In South A dlenod
Two representatives of a black Sudanese movement have
claimed that the Arab-led Governmeilt of Sudan is using
Egyptian and .Libyan troops and Russian aircraft irl the
I6-year-old conflict between the Christian and pagan blacks
of the south and the Muslims of the north. In whit they
described as an overt appeal to world public opinion, the two
men described the policies carried out by the national
Government in Khartoum "as genocide against the 4,000,000
blacks of southern Sudan".
"We call upon the nations of the free, world to express
their indignation at what is happening and to bring pressure
to bear on the nations that supply armaments to Khartoum",
Mr. Laurence Wol Vol said in New York recently. He is a
Sorbonne graduate who, as a member of the Southern Sudan
Liberation Front, has presented a petition to the United
Nations calling for the observer teams to investigate his
charges of genocide.
The other spokesman, Mr, Frederick Maggotti, who identified himself
es a co;oncl of Anyanya, the guerrilla army of the south, said that 25
Russian built aircraft were being used to bombard (ho southern provinces
and that Libyans and Egyptians were among the 25,000 troops fighting
the rebels in the south, He said that in the past eight years some 250,000
black Sudanese tied been shot and 250,000 had died of hunger. For its
part, the Khartoum Government has accused outside forces of stirring up
rebellion and secession, "They stirred up civil wars in the Congo and
Nigeria and they are trying to play the same evil game in Sudan," Mr.
a1.Nimeiry, the Sudan Prime Minister, sold in a recent interview In
Khartoum.
(Tirne..r, London)
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January 28, 1971
THE THRE.
HE germ of seces-
sion is growing
ain in Africa. Just
r cently, several areas
i northern province
Ethiopia were
aced under state of
ergeney. Reason?
ecause of banditry
d subversion.
An Ethiopian Go-
ernment statement
blished in the offi-
ial gazette, alleged
t at "foreign spon-
red bandits, trained
d armed with mo-
ern weapons, were
ttempting to under
Inc Ethiopia's sove-
ignty and integrity."
The emergency
rder affected areas in
ritrea enclosing a
ix-mile belt along the
ea coast and Sudanese
order. In this area,
group of Eritreans,
perating under the
mbrella of Eritrean
iberation Front. have
emanded indepen-
ence for the territory.
Su-
And in Southern Su-
an, a group of unpa-
iotiC citizens known
s "Anya Nya South
udan Freedom Figh-
ers", are reported to
ave intensified their
l fir the suc-
ession of Southern
uda;l from the rest of
etcountry and have
aken up arms against
e Government.
Serious concern
The situation in
Ethiopia and Sudan
should cause alarm
and ? serious concern
to fall patriotic Afri-
cans who abhor the
concept of secession
as a means of settling
political differences.
AFRICA
The question here is
not about the merits and
demerits of Eritean libe-
ration Front that is Pham-
pioning the cause of in-
dependence of the Eritean
people. The question is
whether Africans can ?
again afford to kill one
another on the instiga'ion
of foreigners, no matter
the reason.
. In this wise, It becomes
imperative for the Ethio-
pian Government to en-
by'
JAMES. U MOH
Ten years ago, It was
Congo. We had thought
that Africans would learn
a lesson from that blood
bath. Then it happened
in Nigeria. Must we allow
it to happen in Ethiopia,
Sudan or any other Afri-
can country? And if' we
must not allow it to hap-
pen, is it not proper that
we kill this dangerous
germ of secession before
it grows too big to cause
a menace?
It is not yet known
which of the foreign Go-
vernments are actually
behind the rebellion in
Ethiopia. But the fact
that the Ethiopian Go-
vernment has officially
alleged that foreign Go-
vernments sponsored,
trained and armed the re-
bels with modern wea-
pons, is enough to keep
every patriotic African
standing on the alert.
lighten the people of Afri-
ca with the real situation.
At the moment, very little
seems to be known. Those
foreigners sponsoring the
Ethiopian rebellion, should
be named openly.
All available . facts
should be placed before
the Organisation of Afri-
can Unity to enable the
OAU intervene with a
view to seeking peaceful
ways of settling the con-
flict.
A once and for n11
lasting but peaceful settle-
ment should be effected
as urgently as possible.
This can be possible if
the OAU is involved 'now
that the dispute has n_ot
got out of control.
Reactionary farce
the very reactionary fo ce
which propped up d
sustained the rebellion in
Nigeria are solidly:. behi d
the Sudanese rebels.
Ironically, the is e
forces, that backed Ni, e -
to .~ ~ry are a o
ri said to l~ * pporting e
Sudanese Government.
Sudan. which is e
main link between Afr a
and the Arab world -- as
the two races inhabit t e
Country - is religion ly ,
divided between the M s-
lem north and the Ch s-
tian south. It is this t at
the rebels are exploiti g
to sustain their igno le
cause.
Recently, the So th
Sudanese Freedom Fig t-
ers appealed to the P e
for aid, charging the u-
danese Governfent w th
committing genoci e
against the people of
Southern Sudan.
In their appeal, t ey
described themselves as
the "Southern Sudan e
Catholics along w th
other Christian breth n
living under extreme e-
pression in our homela d
or as refugees in frien 'y
African countries un er
the foot of the Sudan se
Arabs."
The rebels further a e-
ged that. "Russians soldi rs
were directing the Su a-
nese Arab soldiers in
their war to stamp cut
Christianity from cur
In the case of Southern
Sudan, it is clear that
country and to exter i-
nate our African civili a-
tion...... killing and ma'
ing our defenceless o-
ple."
We in Nigeria, are v ry
familiar with this type of
allegation. It was the e
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 CPYRGHT
lu u powe KeieAsenq0
to obtain massive a from 1 on t e allegation the unit
f the conflict
f th
.
y o
e country, o
the world Roman Catho- that Sudan was "threate- an attempt was made on No matter how progres-
li
th
h
h
ed
i
i
h
n
cs
roug
t
e notor
ous n
w
t
dege
eration, his life when he visited
CARITAS under the pre- instability and chaos." Southern Sudan. Several
text of protecting the The Southern Sudan rebels were killed in
Christian East from "on- problem began to 'plague clashes with Government
slaught" of the Moslem the regime of Aboud in troops. Presently, 'a cam-
North. It is not likely that 1963 leading from one paign to eliminate the
the same can happen in crisis to another up to rebels is said to be going
Sudan? And must we allow October 1964 when 17 an in Sudan.
it to happen? people were killed as While it is recognised
It is not necessary now they marched to the pa. that there is 'a southern
to recall the full back- lace where Aboud lived to Sudan problem, it must
ground of the crisis. It is protest against the earlier also be recognised that
a known fact that for a killing of a student of the solution to this con-
long time, there has al- Khartoum University in flict cannot be found in
ways been the conflict previous revolt. secession.
between the Arab north
and African south of Su-
dan. This often centred
around the accusation by
Solution to cenfiict
MiIitt3ry campaign
General Numeiry may be,
its success depends on
all Sudanese hands being
on deck. It is a vital fact
the Sudanese Government
cannot afford to overlook.
Besides, it will be to the
eternal credit of General
Numeiry, if he succeeds
in forging a happy multi-
racial society.
the Africans that the It was the same South- The Sudanese Arabs
Arabs were wielding po- ern Sudan problem which and Africans, with a pro-
litical and economic po- forced Aboud to resign per understanding and
wer to their disadvantage on November 15, 1964 co-operation can and
and were trying to subju- after ruling for six years. should live together hap-
gate christianity to Islam. The demand for seces- pily. While the 'military
It was only in the last sion became more pro- campaign goes on per-
decade that the conflict nounced with the eme.gen- haps unannounced to
was intensified with gra- ce of left wing regime smash the rebels, the Su-
dual demands for seces- of General Numeiry in danese Government should
sion particularly during May last year. Shortly take urgent but positive
the era of General Ibra- after he had taken over steps to seek a much
him Aboud who seized
TEEMPO, Montevideo
January 29, 1971
CPYRGHT
Santisimo Padre: 25 de mayo de IM
Nosotros, ca'diicos del Suddn meridional en con-
junto con otros hermanos cristianos y eompatriotas
musuimanes que vivimos suletos a ex'rema represi6n
en nuestra Patria o refugiados en paises africanos
amigos, de nuevo suplicamos a Su Santidad que tome
cuenta de nuestra triste condicibre y haga oir su voz
bendvola en bien de nosotroe.
El ado pasado inten'amos poner en conocfmiento
de Su Santidad la situaeibn de nuestro pueblo bafo
la bota de los drabes sudaneses. No se nos oeurria
entonces que en espacto de un solo mes el Gobierno
en Jartum sufriria in cambio que acarrearia aun
mayores represiones, esta vez bajo el infiufo de una
potencia extranfera -la Uni6n de Repdblicas Socia-
listas Sovidticas.
Precisamente mientras escribimos a Su.Santidad
los tanques sovidticos retumban por las canes y ice
reac'ores sovidticos MIG-21 sobrevuelan el desfile en
conmemoracidn del Dia de la Revohici6n Afrieana.
Ayer esos mismos tanques y aviones actuaban en el
Suddn meridional, matando y mutilando a nuestra
rmeblo indefennen. 11 Manaus voloerds a continuer an
misibn de muerte if estrdgos. Desde el eambio de
bie no en mayo nuestro pueblo se ha habi'uado at es
pectdculo de scldados rusos at =and* de soldaft
drabes sudaneses en su guerra por aplastar el Cristia
nismo en nuestro pass y exterminar nuestra, civili
zaci6n africana.
Esta guerra de los drabes contra el Cris'ianism
no as Cosa nueva en el Suddn, donde reins Cat6H
cos Ortodexox comp Makuria V Aiwa fueron destrui
dos par inmigrantes drabes de Arabia en el siglo XI
de la Era Cristiana.
Hacia la segunda mitad del siglo %I% el Sierv
del Senor, monsenor Comboni, penetr6 en el Suddn
Is cabeza de in pufiado de gallardos y devotos mt
sioneros y de nuevo enarbol6 la Bandera de la Sal
vaci6n. A la desesperaci6n reemplaz6 la esperanza
Cuando germinaba la simiente del Ct4stianismo un
segunda tragedia azot6 a la naciente Iglesia, la cua
fue tronchada por la revuelta mahdista.
La mefor descripci6n de la revuel'a mahdisti
que cast destruyd la obra de la Igtesia hace 70 atio
es is del R. P. Joseph Ohrwalder en su libro "Die
silos de cautiverio". En el deeia: "El adetanto de 5
ados fue arruinado par la revuelta mahdista. El Su
ddn volvio a caer en las tinfeblas de las cuales
Approved -6
 fi o~b~~LY deralfd '`-RDP ~ r t `Is r iLs"!/' =rfl e.tSu s nttidaadd
como esclavos y la band-era de la tirania onde6 sobre deberd tambidu derivar valor de ells.
las ruins humeantes de Darfur at Mar Rojo y de Esta nueva voluntad a resistirnos a la is1amiza-
Repaf a la segunda catarata. Partidas de /andticos cion y arabizacidn de nuestro pueblo por la fuerza ha
has barrido pot sobre la fat de la lierra, destruyendo traido una nueva ola de sufrimiento a nuestra tierra
Lode swto ertstiano. M sudan Pace coterie en su
~ y d~uda? y nuestro pueblo. La espada isiamica shore se en-
La Paz inc restablecida por los ingleses durance cubre tras Los tangoes sovibtlcos y Los fandticos mu-
La del none den muerte sWematicamente a
sus 50 ands de gobierno. A Los misioneros cristianos nttestro pueblo con cohetes y bombas incendiaries
lee Inc de nuevo autorizado el proselttismo en el Su- fabricados en la URSS. Tengo que repetir los hechos
ddn meridional Durante la tutela ingiesa los misio- de nuevo Para en/atizar nuestra situaci6n. Ya mds de
nerds laboraron sin cesar predicando la Palabra de 500 mil hombres, mujeres y nigos han perecido ba-
Dios al bum pueblo del Suddn meridional. Vartos ie s., QugMOW vivos en no. choza s o muertos de
centenares de miles abrazaron at Cristianismo,,,y des- aid. Otros tdntos ltan tenido Qiee
purls de 62 anon de dura labor el Cristianismn alcan- hambre escaper y de e/suerme Patric en busts de refugio en Los vee
I a la carters generaei6n en algunas families. cinos estados de Uganda, Kenta, Etiopia y la Repti?-
Los buenos misioneros tambidn fundaron escuelas y Mica Centroafricana. BE resto de la poblaci6n en el
ezsenaron tEcnicas moderns. Los centros crs'ianos Sudan es una poblact6n de refugiados que se ocultan
r del aqui saber se multiplicaron.. Nos enorgullece menc?ra en Las selves y los mon'es. Su gituacibn es en verdad
egresado de que Ios todo centros sudanbs cris meridional instruido era penosa. Viven en constante temor y siempre en fuga
Los os sa- desoiada. Heridos de muerte par las bolas sovleticas,
cerdotes catOlicos naturales del l Su Su . ddn meridionidional Inc.- otros miles perecen de enfermedad y de hambre. Casi
r andan ae at iNg Dtem. IQs buenos Padraa de secs de calla diet recidn nacidos mueren de malaria y
Verona han estado pacienemente preparande elate de una multitud de endemias tropicales. Miles de ni-
loeal - cures, religios y religiosos-. BE Progreso fm not mueren cads ago de desnutrici6n par falta de
rdpido y el futuro del l Crlstianismo estuvo cast ale- - alimentact6n vitaminica. Miles mueren pot exposition
gurado en e1 Sudan meridional. a la intemperie. PiIotos drabes. en aviones MIG ru-
Suplicamos a Su Santidad sec Indulgente con nos- sos han destruido totalmente Las viviendas y el ga-
otros mien ras repasamos esta pequega historic ya ndo vacuno, cabrio i lanar en muchas pares del
que pone de relieve la calamidad que ha sobreventdo Pais. Hospitales y escueLas han sido destruidos, clau-
ahera a la Iglesia v que amenaza La destrucclOn to- surados o convertidos en cuarteles militares. La go-
tel de Los cristianos sudaneses. EI and pasado Ia ame- blacion estd moribunda V su situation inspire Idsti-
naza provenia tie Los nuevos s de los inmigran- ma. Carece de refugio permanente v se guarece bajo
tee drabes que dos veces destruyerruyeron el Cristlanismo drboles infestados de mosquitos y en cuevas. Si el
en nuestra parted de Africa. Hoy esa cruel fuerza dra- mundo permanece indiferente a la agonia del Suddn
be es azsiera a y enormemente reforzada por la URSS. meridional, no quedard vivo en 61 ning'un cristiano
que quisiera roar, destruida la Iglesia en el Sudan me- en unos cuantos altos.
ridionai, ya que el Cristianismo es anatema Para el Era de esperarse 4ue los otros estados africanos
drito de Los nglatios erra cedi s edib cos La . independencia a Ios se irguieran,en nuestra defensa contra esta conjure
Cuando Inglat
drabe Para come'er el genocidio en toda una nation
sudaneses, los del none : enian Vera alto. Disponlan a/ricana, Pero no to han hecho. No nos queda otra
del poder canto politico como economleo. Esos drabes, esperanza en la humanidad ni en Los Consejos Mun-
obsesados per ci anhelo de subyugar at Mediodia cris- diales de Paz, salvo en la Iglesia de la cual es jefe
nano, elaboraron political dirigidas a la total isla- Su Santidad. De nuevo suplicamos a Su Santidad que
mizaclbn is arabizacidn del pueblo sudanbs rn?eridional. otorgue at pueblo sudanbs meridional su bendici6n
Nuestra volumed de rechazar is resuos a esta paternal y pontifical Para que podamos mantenernos
/orzosa isiamizacibn y arabizacibn de nuestrestra culture firmes en nuestra resolution de defender nuestra Fe
cristlana'p afrteana crab inevitablemente la actual Lu- y echar de nuestra Patria a las tropas extranjeras.
cha armada antra Mediodia y Seplensta' . padre Santo, nosotros sus hijos e hijas en Je-
Respaldados par el mundo comunista sdvibtlco r sucristo comprometemos nuestra lealtad a la Iglesia
Pudien arabe, Los drabes sudaneses, no cio ddblega de Dios, asegurdndole que acep?aremos el genocidio
el espIritu del pueblo sudanbs meridionadionaI, estdn die- antes que permitir que par tercera yes se destruva et
hate. tierra erra futuro e es s mientr Cristianismo en nuestra tierra.
puesto el mus a ndo e entero teroarnos de observe y la fez nada de la
et mu d n ri .
ei n'eL' hJoseph ? SU~a-pu
, a l degdcii6n C d to V s
realmente sombrio y Para tenebroso pare nosotros soda- La
vases meridionales y Para el el Cristianismo. o u Sag
Cuando el ago pasado vimos a Su Santidad du- Combatlentes de Libertad del 3uddn Meridional.
rante in peregrination a Uganda nos nutrimos de
TIEMPO,, Montevideo
January 29, 1971
25 May 1970
We Southern Sudanese Catholics along with other Christian
brethren and Muslim countrymen living under extreme repression in our
homeland or as refugees in friendly African countries appeal once more to
Your Holiness to take stock of our plight and raise your benevolent voice
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_(,5-
 CPYRGHT
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o then that in only one month's time the Government in Khartoum would
undergo a change which would bring about even greater repressions, this
time under the influence of a foreign power - the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
Even as we write to you, Soviet tanks are rumbling through the
streets and Soviet MIG-21 jets are flying overhead in a parade to com-
memorate African Revolution Day. Yesterday these same tanks and planes
were in action in Southern Sudan, killing and maiming our defenceless
people, and tomorrow they will return to continue their mission of death
and havoc. Since the change of government in May of last year our people
have grown accustomed to the sight of Russian soldiers directing the Suda-
nese Arab soldiers in their war to stamp out Christianity from our country
and to exterminate our African Civilisation,
This war of the Arabs against Christianity is not new in the
Sudan, where Orthodox Catholic Kingdoms such as Makuria and Alwa
were destroyed by Arab immigrants from Arabia in the 12th Century Anno
Domini.
"Towards the second half of the 19th Century the Servant of
the Lord, Mgr. Comboni, led a handful of gallant and dedicated Mission-
aries into the Sudan and once more raised aloft the Flag of Salvation. Des-
pair was replaced by hope. As the new seeds. of Christianity took root, the
second tragedy struck the infant Church which was nipped in the bud by
the Mahdist revolt.
The Mahdiss revolt which almost destroyed the work of the
Church 70 years ago is best described by the Rev. Fr. Joseph Ohrwalder
in his book "Ten Years in Captivity". In it he said: "The progress of 50
years was ruined by the Mahdist revolt. The Sudan fell back into the
darkness from which philanthropy had rescued it. Civilisation was swamped
in the flood of fanaticism. The sign of.Salvation was blotted out, the bearers
of it chained as slaves and the flag of tyranny waved over smoking ruins
from Darfur to the Red Sea and from Regaf to the second cataract. Bands
of fanatics have swept over the face of the land, destroying every Christian
sign. The Sudan lies open in its desolation and nakedness."
Peace was restored by the British during their 56 years of rule.
Christian Missionaries were again permitted to proselytize in Southern
Sudan. During British tutelage the Missionaries worked relentlessly preach-
ing the word of God to the good people of Southern Sudan. Several hundred
thousands embraced Christianity and, after 62 years of hard work some
Christianity reached into the third generation in some families. The good
Missionaries also opened schools and taught modern skills. Christian in-
stitutions of learning became widespread. We are proud to mention here
that every single educated Southern Sudanese graduated from Christian
institutions. The first Southern Sudanese Catholic priests got ordained in
1944. Since then the good Verona Fathers had been patiently producing-
local clergy - priests, sisters and brothers. Progress was rapid and the
 CPYRPH,T j)f-Chrj,s, 1aj itvwa
We beg Your Holiness to bear with its in our reviewing this little
history as it heightens the calamity which has now befallen the Church and
which threatens the total destruction of the Sudanese Christians. A year ago
the threat came from the new offspring of the Arab immigrants that twice
destroyed Christianity in our part of Africa. Today this cruel Arab force
is urged oil. and mightily reinforced by USSR which would like to sec the
destruction of the Church in Southern Sudan, as Christianity is anathema
to the success of Soviet designs.
When Britain handed independence to the Sudanese, the north-
erners had the upper hand. They wielded both political and economic
power. These Arabs, obsessed by the desire to subjugate the Christian
South, made policies aimed at the total Islamisation and Arabicisation of
the Southern Sudanese people.
Our will to reject and resist this forced (slamisation and Arabici-
sation of our Christian and African culture inevitably created the present
armed struggle between South and North.
Supported by the entire Soviet Communist and Arab world,
the Sudanese Arabs, unable to break the spirit of the Southern Sudanese
people, are determined to eradicate 'is from the face of the earth while
the whole world looks on and does nothing. The future is indeed bleak
and gloomy for us in Southern Sudan and for Christianity.
When we saw your Holiness last year during your pilgrimage
to Uganda we drew great moral strength and courage from the experience
and we found a renewed spiritual impetus for our struggle to defend
our Homeland and our Faith. Your Holiness should also draw courage
from that.
This new will to resist the lslamisation and Arabicisation of our
people by force has naturally brought a new wave of misery to our land
and people. The Islamic sword now takes cover behind Soviet tanks and
the Moslem fanatics of the North are systematically killing our people
with rockets and fire bombs made in USSR. I must repeat the facts once
more in order to emphasize our plight. Already more, than 300,000 men,
women and children have perished either shot dead, burnt alive in their
huts or died from famine and disease. A similar number have been forced
to flee their Homeland as refugees in neighbouring states of Uganda,
Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia and Central African Republic. The rest of the
population inside the Sudan is a refugee population hiding inside jungles
and mountains. Their plight is indeed pitiful. They live permanently in
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fear and are always on the run. Besides being killed by Soviet bullets
daily, thousands die from disease and famine. Nearly six newly born
babies out of ten die from malaria and a host of other tropical diseases.
Thousands of children die each year from malnutrition as a result of
shortages in vitamin giving foods. Thousands perish from exposure to bad
weather. Arab pilots in Russian M1Gs have destroyed every single home,
cattle, goats and sheep in many parts of the country. Hospitals and schools
have been either destroyed, closed or turned into military barracks. The
entire population is a dying one, their. conditions are pathetic. They have
no permanent shelter, but hide under mosquito-infested trees and in caves.
If the world remains indifferent to the agony of the Southern Sudan there
will not be a Christian life left there in a few years to come.
We would hope that other African states would rise to our de-
defence against this Soviet Arab conspiracy to perform genocide on an entire
African nation but they have not. We have no hope left in humanity nor
in the World Councils of peace except in the Church of which you are
head. Once more we beg Your Holiness to give the Southern Sudanese
people your Paternal and Pontifical blessing so that we shall -remain firm
in our determination to defend our Faith and to drive the foreign troops
from our homeland.
Your Holiness, we your sons and daughters in Christ do pledge
to you once more our loyalty to the Church of God assuring you that we
will accept genocide rather than allow Christianity to be destroyed in our
country for the third time.
with filial devotion
Col. Joseph Lagu
on behalf of The Anya Nya
His Holiness Paul VI South Sudan Freedom Fighters
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Jariua; ~
AC8 OX rnH LEVI BANK
.ARABS. USE SOVIET ARMSTO
MASSACRE NEGROES CPYRGHT
While the whole world is in an uproar over Britain
selling arms to South Africa which might be us-
ed :against Africans, not a whimper of protest
is heard about the Soviet arms that are not only be-
ing used to kill the Sudanese, but have been used
against them for several years past.
South African apartheid is a OPEN GENOCIDE
b1 t on civilisation which no de- As for the war in Sudan, which
c it man will uphold, but it is for the past few years has been
a alling that those who condeinn coming close to outright genocide,
ite racism suddenly go blind, this is not hypothetical butchery
de ' if and dumb when dealing with in some distant future, but some-
ot er versions of the say-Pe thing that is taking place right
di ease. now, with non-aligned nations
If it is criminal for South Afri- conveniently looking the other
ca Whites to turn guns on South way because it suits their ipter-
Af lean Blacks, it is equally ab- gists.
ho ent for the Arab minority in That the murder of Negroes in
th Sudan to turn its guns on the the Sudan has been ignored does
Af. can majority that inhabits the not make it any the less dreadful.
so thern regions of that country. The details of this one-sided con-
e arms that Britain plans to flirt have been recorded in' all
pr vide South Africa -in return for their gory detail on several op-
la 'ties at the. Simonstown base casions, but the same "liberals"
ar being given for, purely strate- whose tearduc's are so sorely af-
gi reasons that Britain considers fected by Vietnam don't seem to
ess tial to its security. The Third give a damn.
W rld, used to looking at One particulraly vivid pictorial
ev thing with blinkers on, re- account of this one-sided conflict
fus s to see the necessity for the was given over Norwegian televf-
W tern nations to have a base sion. An equally harrowing We
in he Indian Ocean at all but is told in "Sudan - An African
do not mind in the least if Rus- Tragedy" by Per Yvind Heradst-
sia vessels virtually take over veit. The authors of these ac-
the area. counts bluntly called. what was
.hlr Swaran Singh at Singapore, going on in the Sudan "murder
when faced point blank with evi- of a nation," but the Norwegian,
de a of Soviet naval base all foreign Ministry, with customary
roe d the Indian Ocean perimeter, diplomatic' down-playing, put on
fle in the face of facts by claim- its rose-tinted spectacles and ac-
ing there were no bases at all. nounced that these. accounts were
exaggerated and that the situation
He went on i:e argue that there in South Sudan was " improving.
wa a vast difference between.
,"facilities" given to the Soviets In order to clear up who was
an the communication base that right and who was wrong, the re-
Brit tin and America intend to puted journal Aftenposten decid-
est lish in Diego Garcia. '60 to. check. Heradstveit's findings
hen specifically confronted and to quiz him in an., interview.
wit the naval base of Socotra, The following are extracts from
rec try given to the. Soviets by the article by Afteinposten's Au~gn
the Republic of Yemen, Swaran Tjomsland :
Sin h retorted that no such base he controversy over television
exis ed _ because the Soviets. had reporter Per Yvind Heradst-
den d it and South Yemen had veit'~s claims about the war
repl ed to his queries in the nega- in the Sudan will undoubtedly
S aran Singh must be singe- about the Sudan is published in
lay] naive to take such assertions the near future.
at face value. Nei country is 'going H
ere he repeats claims denied ...-.,,.,.,..,.. =au vouba FU
to blazon such deals to the worj i. by the Norwegian Ministry 4 Norwegian TV team at the actual I am not willing to back k d n
site. an inch."
Foreign Affairs and, among other The world found out abo t it
things, uses the phrase "murder because two reporters accide ally
of a nation". Regardless of who arrived on the scene just ter-
comes closest to the truth, wards. No one knows low arty
Heradstveit has done a great deal similar events have taken ace,
to bring this "forgotten war" into Heradstveit says.
the light. Since Heradstveit and Sta run
Heradstveit made a trip last (his TV colleague) entered p evi-
summer that lasted for about a ously closed areas in South S an,
month, travelling both in North in June 1970, new reports the
and South Sudan. Arabs' oppression of the Net roid
INESCAPABLE REALITY population in the South have eeu
made.
In his TV programmes Heradst- Among others, Bishop fno
veit drew. a number of farereach- Tiboi; in a letter to the two efe-
ing conclusions. Among other vision reporters from Aba in the
things he used the expression Congo, 'has written that With
"murder of a nation" to describe soldiers a attacked a village and ill-
the Arab rulers' actions against ed at least five people, while the
the Negro population in the rest of the inhabitants fled nto
South., the forests.
When this conclusion was re- In the London Times there is a
lected by Foreign Minister Svenn report of another occasion en
Stray, the TV reporter said i "I six people were killed.
do not want this to be a conflict NORWEGIAN FEELING
over words.' The essential factor
is that we must open our eyes to What does the Norwegian ov-
what is happenfng 'in the Sudan, ernment feel?
whatever we choose to call it.$) .'Ve ' do not : deny that the
Genocide is usually defined as situation is serious, we do not
the killing of members of a group. doubt that there are acts of op-
of people with the aim of com- pression by both sides, and we
pletely .or partially annihilating do not, of course, doubt the TV
national, ethnic, racial or relteam's pictures at all," says De-
Otis groups . and this is the partment Head Tim Greve, of the
word ("folkemord" in Norwegian) Foreign Ministry, to Aftenpo en.
that Heradstveit used. But we have made our ,fnv sti-
Heradstveit in his book has put gat ions during the course a
year prior to Heradstveit s d
aside his professional mask of neu- Stabrun's coming to the Su an
trality and objectivity. And Fie ,
and we believe we -:are able to
does not try to conceal this fact. prove our statements that the on-
After having been led to the re- clusions ? are exaggerated."
mains of a church in the country
town of Banja, where 28 people However, he cannot re eal
w e r e murdered, Heradstveit what sources the Foreign Mi is-
wrote : - try bases its claims on.
"T heard about Arab massacres On the opposite side, Hera st-
in the Sudan. I had taken these veil claims : "I cannot say reports with a grain of salt. Nqw thing besides the fact that we
T saw it for myself." have been in South Sudan, h ve
It has later been confirmed by seen the charred remains of _ b es
other sources that the massacre and smelled the corpses, and hive
in Banja took place under , condi be} n ^with .people who have b en
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He also adds that the informa- The law of amnesty would be captured our r
tion he was given in Khartoum expanded. Southern Sudan would landing strips for . aircraft, which
agreed completely with what his be developed socially and cultu- the rebels used to move in arms,
critics said but which, according rally, with emphasis on economic medicine and food. Large quanti-
to him, does not present the true progress. A Minister for Southern ties of military equipment, anti-
picture at all. affairs would be appointed. Edu- aircraft guns, mines, mortar and
Heradstveit quotes a captain cation of the Southern Sudanese automatic rifles were also seized,
named "Michael" from the Anya- for various sectors within the ad- said Abbas.
Nya (the South Sudan ` rebel ministration would be started. Reports bout this were carried
movement) on the situation. "They Heradstveit says in his book in, among others, the French
(the Arabs) do not want us Neg- that Nimeiri's Government has newspaper Le Monde. The British
roes in the Sudan", Michael says. shown a willingness to improve Evening Standard also reported
"They want to wipe us out They the situation. But he concludes by that "about 60 Soviet-equipped
want the land, the fields, the saying that not much has been and to a great extent also Soviet-
nastures. They want to control the done. The people are no longer manned MiG-21 jet aircraft now
Nile. They do not want us in a satisfied with words. They want are stationed at the town of
united Sudan. They will wipe us to see action, and there has been Juba", the capital of the south-
out. no action., ern province, Equatoria.
"At this moment hundreds of Norwegian television's findings The Sudanese Minister for South
people are dying of undernourish- are fully corroborated by Oslo's Sudan, Joseph Garang, recently
ment in the bush. They have never leading daily Morg+enbladet. On confirmed that a constant escala-
seen a doctor, they have. never December 3, it carried an article tion of the war is taking place in
had enough to eat. if this is not by Gunnar Moe, not only indicat- the three southern provinces and
murder of a people, I cannot un- ing genocide against South Suda- recommended that greater military
derstand what you can call it." : nese, but charging the Russians pressure must be exerted from
the world keeps quiet and accepts the Arab ^ overnment in Khartoum
XT-_ The active presence of the
As a summary or inc ractw;, lowing is taken from Moe's report for themselves a solid military
behind the conflict, Heradstveit in. Morgenbiadet
olitical foothold in the coun-
p
"Racial conflicts there have al-
ways been between the Arabs in
the North and the Negroes . in the
South. As an -overshadowing, do-
minant fact is the Arabs' feeling
that the people in the South are
like helpless children at another
phase of historical development,
and that they are not `mature'
enough to rule themselves or to
have any influence on the central
government.
This should not be in the least
surprising. In Stalin's day hole
nations were removed from their
ancestral land and sent to erish
in exile.
Small races like the Chi hen-
Ingush were totally wiped out.
Larger ethnic groups lik the
Crimean Tatars were ban bed,
but not allowed back even after
they had been rehabilitated the
charges against them being rov-
ed to be totally false.
There is something int nsely
odious about nations with lood,
on their hands trying to each
peace to the world - and at is
exactly what Russia is doi .
r,VUALLZ nAt.x~i Russian bombers in great sweeps As is known, the matter was
"In many. ways we recognise systematically bomb the jungle taken up in the last debate on
the pattern from the thought-pro- where rebels are hiding. They use foreign affairs in the Norwegian
cesses among the Whites in Rho- both napalm and ordinary 'bombs. Parliament, but Foreign Minister
desia and South Africa. It is tra- After that, Arabs come with tanks, Stray answered that it "would not
gic that the African people in infantry, parachute troops and be correct to deliberately portray
many ways are not better than helicopters. The jungle is " tho_ the situation as bein worse tai n
the worst of the White racists. roughly combed". Behind all this, it is according to the factual in-
And the most tragic fact of all, the Russian military advisers then formation which is obtained from
perhaps, is that the Arabs them- follow. a number of sources."
selves are not conscious of this
condition." Aircraft used are Russian MiG- We ask again : What are the
According to Heradstveit this 21 and Antonov bombers, as well sources of. the Foreign Ministry?
as MI-8 helicopters. The Daily Where have they been in order to
Is, that hhassbeen discussed very title Telegraph reported on 17 Octo- obtain "factual information?" It
and which has been described as ber, 1970 that an additional 27 is important to know this now -
"the forgotten war." Russian bombers had arrived at since a long line of internationally
Khartoum airport for delivery to recognised press organs, journal-
The new regime which came the Sudanese Air Force.. For two ists and news bureaus claim the
into power during the summer of and a half months, the offensive exact opposite of that which the
1969 has recognised the relation- went on, while the world is little Norwegian Foreign Ministry sour-
ship with the population in the informed about the blood bath. ces maintain.
South as Sudan's greatest problem Khartoum no longer attempts to From this article one can see
and has formally giv the south- conceal that a battle is being that the Soviets while they keep
ern provinces region n nal self-gov- waged in the south. On 9 Novem- prodding their client states to
ernment. her, 1970, Defence Minister Gene- raise a howl against the supposed
The new President, the GaafAr fol rat Khaled Hassan Abbas held a militarism of the West, and who
lowing Nimeiri, has declared that thhe fol. keef South African racialism to
lowing four measures will be put press conference in which he said the forefront, quietly - P
try. iii to. asily u u.. ?-.~; - r
I government in
is entering a new and more ported the ocentra ~
serious phase. The, Khartoum Nigeria during the conflict with
Government has begun an inten- Biafra, they now have no scruples
sive offensive with bombers, beli- about helping Prime Minister
copters, napalm and motorised in- Nimeiry in Sudan to crush the
fantry to crush "once and for all" Negro rebels in the ,outh.
the rebel organisation Anya-Nya`. The problem is only to get
This great offensive, which is "the job done as discreetly as
directed by Soviet "advisers", possible". The publicity which
was begun in the middle of Sep- now begins to follow in the tracks
tember last year according to of the civil war, does not particu-
several sources. larly please Khartoum.
M
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February 1971
THE ~'v~AMEM 0 F W SEC0,10 0IAFRA
CPYRGHT
Race and religion split the Sudan
From THE SUNDAY TIMES, London
rising
re-
sistance from the black tribes of the South to rule by the Arab North.
Even a coup by the leftist military junta of Gafaar al Nimeiry has failed
to settle the vexing question of autonomy. The Times of London has a
worried report from Anthony Nutting, after a trip to the Sudan saying
that racial and religious overtones and the combination of hysteria on
the rebels' side and confusion in Khartoum threaten a new Biafra.
Joining the fray are an observer who takes the rebels' part in a letter
to The Times and a mercenary whose last main engagement before
the Sudan was in Biafra. He is interviewed in Hamburg's Die Welt.
N THE HEART of Central Af- sit round a table and negotiate
rica an almost forgotten war is with the rebels, they made it clear
being waged which has all the equally that the only basis on
makings of a second Biafra. For which the Anyanya would ne-
most of the last 14 years, since gotiate was absolute independ-
the Sudan gained its independ- ence for the South, which no one
ence from British rule, the three in Khartoum could accept.
southern provinces have been They refused even to consider
conducting a running battle for the present government's propo-
secession against successive gov- sals which would give the South
ernments in Khartoum. regional autonomy within a
Periodically a lull in the fight- united Sudan and insisted that,
ing enables the local Sudanese as Africans, they wanted no
administration to establish a few truck with an Arab regime which
more "peace villages," where life wanted to Arabize and Islamize
can return to normal under the them as all previous Khartoum
protection of the army or the regimes had done.
police. But, as happened just be- Today no less than in the past,
fore my visit in October, the reb- North and South are divided by
els-or Anyanya, as they call a "grass curtain" with the differ-
themselves from the local word ence between the sides as stark
for the viper venom which is as the contrast of the rich red
their emblem-soon resume their soil and tropical abundance of
harassing tactics. Roads are Equatoria with the and desert
mined, army convoys are am- wastes of Nubia, Kardofan and
bushed and the peace villages be- Darfur.
come once again isolated clear- I am convinced from my talks
ings in a hostile' jungle. with Nimeiry and his ministers
I did not gain much cheer in Khartoum that they genuinely
from talking to the Anyanya believe their policy of regional
leaders in Uganda, whose atti- autonomy is the best way to bring
tude showed a militancy which peace to the South and keep it
would have done justice to Bi- within a united Sudan. Certainly
afra's Colonel Ojukwu in his it is a considerable advance on
most perverse moments. While anything offered by their prede-
protesting that, if the Sudanese cessors.
government genuinely wanted a But in an area without as yet
settlement, they should offer to a common language among the
major tribes, without modern
roads or railways and where the
tribesmen are at roughly the
same stage of civilization as Brit-
ain before the Roman conquest,
it is hard to see how regional au-
tonomy can be much more than
a paper project for many years
to come. And the danger is that,
if the Anyanya keep up their
harassments for another two to
three years, the Nimeiry govern-
ment will be forced to maintain
martial law and will be unable to
show any progress with its
"southernization" programs. Dis-
illusionment in the South could
then spread like wildfire and an-
other Biafra become inevitable.
As I learned from the display
of captured rebel arms at army
headquarters in Juba and from
information given by Anyanya
deserters and prisoners, Israeli
officers, helped by West German
"mercenaries," veterans of Biafra,
are training and supplying the
rebels with equipment ranging
from American medical kits to
Russian and Chinese weapons
captured from the Egyptians and
Palestinians.
But if, over the South, the
Nimeiry government has been the
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 CPYRGHT
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victim of the mistakes and ma-
chinations of others since it
seized power in 1969, it is not
making the problem any easier to
solve by pursuing an economic
policy which involves national-
izing and confiscating foreign
and Sudanese private enterprise
with a socialist insouciance that
takes too little account of the
country's real economic needs..
No doubt previous governments
had allowed some cobwebs of cor-
ruption to spread through Su-
danese business and commerce.
But Nimeiry's new broom has not
only swept away the cobwebs, it
has also removed much of the
essential furniture.
The Sudanese pound's value on
the free market has fallen to a
half of the official exchange
rate. With the cotton crop mort-
gaged to Russia for the next three
years, trade is being steadily di-
verted towards the Soviet bloc,
and the Sudan's balance of trade
ATLAS
February 1971
with Britain and the West
plunges ever deeper into the red.
Not that Nimeiry and his
Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil are unaware of the risks they
are running. The disinclination
they showed to discuss economic
problems when I called on them
seemed to suggest that they
were more bewildered than com-
placent. Nimeiry struck me as a
sincere and dedicated patriot.
His minister of planning told
me that the government intended
to introduce measures to promote
security for foreign investment.
But if Nimeiry decides to slow
down the nationalization pro-
gram, as the recent sacking of
three hard-line Leftist ministers
suggests he may, he will still have
to reckon with a strong reaction
from the Communists.
No doubt it was in an effort to
find a way out of this labyrin-
thine confusion that the Sudan
agreed so readily to join the re-
cently established tripartite
union with Egypt and Libya. D(-
spite the differences which d -
vide the Sudanese and Egyptian
peoples, President Nasser' 3
death was probably felt mo
acutely in Khartoum than in an
other Arab capital outside Cair .
Over the last year of Nasser
life, the Sudan enjoyed som -
thing of a special relationshi
with Egypt.
At such a crucial moment,
marriage with the oil wealth
Libya and the relatively superi
technical and political know-ho
of Egypt can hardly come ami
and, so long as it lasts, may pr -
vide a much needed blood tran -
fusion for the Sudan.
PYRGHT IS NIIIEIRY THE VILLAIN?
Anthony Nutting's article on the Sudan contained several errors of
fact. Firstly, the Southern Sudan rebels, known as the Anyanya, are
not "separatists." They are fighting to create conditions whereby the
civilian population can have a chance of democratic self-determina-
tion. Many of the freedom fighters would welcome the chance to
achieve real (not mythical) autonomy for the South.
Secondly, the Anyanya have frequently offered to meet the Khar-
toum government at a peace conference to be held outside the
Sudan. Nimeiry has refused. It is, therefore, inaccurate to draw a
close parallel with Biafra.
Nutting's impression that the Khartoum government is making
an all-out effort to achieve peace and progress is belied by the
actions of their own army, the bombing of civilian villages, the
burning of crops and the massacre of Christians at worship (all of
which are amply documented). These acts of barbarity are rapidly
alienating even further a large proportion of the Southern popula-
tion and destroying hopes of eventual peace.
Surely the solution (if Khartoum is genuine in its peaceful in-
tentions) is to withdraw the army from the garrisons in the South,
to cease to train or employ Egyptians and Libyans and to get down
to the conference table with Southern leaders. Failing this, the. only
recourse left open to Southerners is to strengthen their forces until
i
i
i
i
6 i
.
s
qe1k
l
f
-
Letter from B.H.D. McDermot, chairman of the Southern Sudan Association
in THE SUNDAY TIMES, London
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT I By shin Burman,
rvive the sixth coup att pt-
si
h
i
nce t
e
r seizure of p wer
months no, have accuse 0-
nited States. Israel and esti
erinanxy of ? a plot to tur the
The three countries, of cc rse7,
e `Anya Nya' (the rebel n. n
ter the scorpion's tfr~i znn r.:
Pe donee, the Sudan. the far s4
an culturally the most var erdl,
co ntry in Africa, was ruled by
an Anglo-Egyption Condominit In,
Br ain shared sovereignty o cr.
Su an with Egypt. Now Sudan is
I rul d by a (Revolutionary Cou cil
est bibbed by a group of yoo g
I ar y officers after the May 1 6
i sd the VAR, with whom It forusiaai
ro of the secessionists while haa.
ur an arras, are isecurely held by
th government forces. Howe erg
wi h A he gradual escalation of
fig Ling the situation in ti :;e
ar too is rapidly changing iss,
fa ur of the rebels.
lie war in the southern S cia-
n c provinces till recently ied
d n the bulk of the count -y'as
30 000 strong, partially So et-
e ipped armed forces. The n.`
da, developed tropical region; ' th
a area of 300,000 square in e:s
is largely populated by 'thre to"
fo r million' Christian and pa an
bi eks, who often fall pre to
s% eping attacks of disease, fa,
m e and northern raiding par lea.
7b ~ rural areas, allure more t
an
5?i per cent of the native pop Ia.
P rtuguese Angola. Within a pan
o eight months more than 7 000
f .itives from the three vast
s there provinces of Sudan ave
b en resettled in Uganda, 5. 000
I Burundi, 24 000 in the'
he C ego
a rd 14,000 in ii'anzania, in a ? di?
ti n, there are thought t be
ht ndreds of thousands of unr 'hi-
to ?ed !refugees.
n w oeconte the largest a a ;le
s rte of refugees after war, u,.n
aI as"'.cadly,. Sudan cornprisrera
"Yearly 000 tribal groups. The 14
rr,ii.?,ion people are all Islamic by
faith a and tradition save those izt,
'the south. Khartown, the capital,
or long derived its wealth from
the Me. But today, with an an-
nual Paz" capita income of X40
only,, Sudan survives virtually on
a single crop, cotton, and has
limited foreign exchange resources.
It is, finding it hard to finance tlasa
war in the south.
The violence in the south Is due
! to the same racial conflict which
caused the civil wars in Chad?
Ethiopia and Biafra. In Sudan its
has been aggravated also by the
grave inconsistencies in Britain'a
own policies prior to the country a.
independence.
To aradicate slave raiding a*
well as the economic and cultural
a xploi.tation of the black tribes
by the northerners. the British.
cordoned off the southern region,
from the rest of the countr-y
creating in effect a huge sane...
tuary shielding its inhabitants.
from development. Education wan:
neglected and left completely in.
the hands of Christian mission-
aries.
After. World War 1.1 Britain,
confronted with increasing na-.
tionalisrza and pressure from the
north, abruptly lifted the protec-
tive ban on south Sudan and ali.,
cci independence talks at which,
the black minority was absent.
The Arabs demanded a complete-.
.
iv centralised type of administra-
tion and ultimately secured it.
After Independence, Sudanisatlosu
led to the appointment of Arab*
rather than Africans, in the civil
services even In the south. The
south also faced a tremendous
now of traders and soldier` from-
the north.
A mutiny finally broke out is;,
:Eaiuatursra and Bul'ar-el^4:ai`aa.rsl Ply
Atha southern army men.. in 1956.
Thou;'' it was quelled, open re.
sist.arce to the northerners, con-
tinued and -gradually developed
into an, organised guerilla'-tlhe
`Anya I'vya.'
Political leaders who demanded
a federal constitution were either
imprisoned ' or forced: to seek
as rlum in foreign countries, Siinul-
taneouxsly all missionaries were
expelled. Large-scale civilian
violence grey. '
It is now clear that without the
co-operation of :the "Anya Nya",
there can be no effective a.daitiia-
istration in the rural areas of the
south. General Tafeng, a 430-ye.tr-
old former officer of the Ecsua-
toria Corps who leaf the . 1325`
mutiny, is - the rebel .iesder.. 'The
i uerilla force- was or? gniscd III
1963. Today. it equipped with
modern automatic weapons, inid
receives foreign military aid.
Torit, Juba and' Nimule are places
where heavy fighting has., been
reported.
Significantly. it is the Nasserite
Sudanese leaders who seek a fe-
deral-type set up under' which' the
three Southern provinces would
get an autonomous status.
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NANA IX
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February 33, 1971
Sudan
South comes first
CPYRGHT
The Sudanese army has recently
scored some successes in its apparently
endless war against the southern
separatist rebels, the Anyanya. These
successes were due partly to a new
supply of Russian weapons, in par-
ticular troop-carrying helicopters, and
partly to the changed attitude of the
former Ugandan government. One of
the more publicised incidents was the
handing over by the Ugandan authori-
ties of Rolf Steiner, a German
mercenary who had fought in the
Congo and Biafra before he came to
Sudan. He escaped into Uganda after
his camp near the frontier was over-
.run two two months ago ; the Ugandans
-Landed him back to the Sudanese.
These military operations are one
part of a two-pronged attempt by the
radical army officers and left-wing
intellectuals who now run Sudan to
find a solution to the southern prob-
lern. The other part is represented by
the declaration of regional autonomy
announced by President Numeiry after
he seized power in May, 1969. This
Was not just a fine-sounding phrase ;
the government, particularly its
marxist members, are looking for ways
of implementing the liberal measures
envisaged in the declaration.
The regime's concern with internal
affairs far- outstrips its interest in the
still shadowy plans for inter-Arab unity.
President Numeiry went to Cairo last
month for the meeting of heads of
state of the proposed Egyptian-
Libyan-Sudanese-Syrian federation in
order to show willing and to avoid
giving the Libyans an excuse for saying
the Sudanese were dragging their feet.
But the Sudanese have made it per-
fectly plain that they, like the
Egyptians, will not be party to any
hasty, ill-prepared union which would
only humiliate the Arabs by its
inevitable failure.
The Libyans recently published in
their army newspaper details of the
discussions which led to the declaration
of tripartite federation (Syria was a
late, and not altogether welcome,
fourth) ; this provoked e u
into publishing their version of the
talks. The Sudanese report claims that
the Libyans were proposing the imme-
diate unification of the three countries'
foreign ministries and political organi-
sations (though Egypt, at present, is
the only one of the three to have a
political organisation) and the estab-
lishment of a fixed timetable for full
constitutional unity. All this, the
Sudanese argue, is impossible because
of the wholly different circumstances
of the three countries.
The ardent, puritanical Islamic
Arab nationalists in Libya are
impatient with Sudan's concern with
its southern conflict and censorious of
the continuing presence of marxists in
the Sudanese government. But Sudan's
leaders need the support of both right
and left. Although the revolution of
May 25, 1969, was carried out on a
wave of popular enthusiasm for the
idea that Sudan should shed its old
ways and decisively join the "Progres-
sive" Arab camp, much of this
enthusiasm has waned and the regime
lacks a solid popular base.
So it is trying to win allies where it
can. The recent release of 125 of the
16o men accused of being involved in
the fighting at Aba Island last March
(when the Imam Hadi a1,Mahdi was
killed) was aimed at disarming right-
wing opposition. The Sudanese com-
munist party is split but the weightier
half, led by the attractive, if irrepres-
sibly bourgeois, Abdul Khalik Mahjoub,
is now opposed to the regime. Mr
Mahjoub himself is in detention and
two of his supporters were eased out of
the government in November (the third
minister dismissed at this time, Major
Farouk Hamdallah, is not a com-
,munist). Marxists who remain in the
government include the minister of
labour, Muawiya Ibrahim, and the
minister of industry and mining,
Ahmed Sulaiman. Their presence does
not satisfy Sudanese communists but
they help to protect the regime from
an all-out onslaught from the left.
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'February 16, 1971
CPYRGHT
Norsk initiativ for
Syd-Sudan i FN?
Appell til Menneskerettighetskommisjonen
og regjering om bidrag til a lose konflikten
C
PYRGHT
og menn har i en henvendelse
tii Regjeringen anmodet om at
det tas et norsk initiativ med
sikte pi en losning av situa-
s jonen i Syd-Sudan.,
I henvendelsen heter dot bl. a.:
*Undertegnedo ber Regjeringen
om A medvirke til at konflikten i
Sudan blir tatt opp til behandling I
den sesjon FN's Menneskerettig-
hctskonmisjon skal ha i Geneve
den 22/2-26/3 1971 slik syd-suda-
nesiske politikere ber om. Vi har
tillatt oss a sende en henvendelse
om sakgn direkte tit Menneskeret-
tighetsko.mmisjonen og logger ved
en kopi.
Vt mener at en behandling i
kommisjonen sikkert vii kaste nytt
lys over situasjonen og at det er et
rimelig krav at represen'anter for
Syd-Sudan far legge from sin sak
for verdensopinionen.>
I henvvendelsen t11 Monneskeret-
tighetskommisjonen heter dot bl. a.:
?Til tross for motstridende in-
meldinger pA at sivilbefolkningen i
Syd-Sudan er rammet av suit og
sykdom og utsatt for overgrep fra
do stridende parters side. Det er
derfor grunn til A frykte for at sto-
re dolor av befolkningen ikke or
sikret selv de most elementaere
menneskerettigheter. Det er et
sterkt behov for tiltak sow kan gjo-
re en snarlig slutt ph de indre mot-
setninger mellow Nord- og Syd-Su-
dan.
Vi or kjent med den rcformvilje
den sudanske regjering har uttrykt,
I pakt med denne mA dot vaere rik-
tig at begge parter Mr anledning til
A legge sin sak from for verdens-
opinionen. PA denne bakgrunn vii
undertegnede sterkt oppfordre
Menneskerettighetskommisjonen til
A to det sudanske problem opp til
undersokelse og vurdering pA sin
sesjon i Geneve den 22/2-26/3
1971.>)
Bak henvendelsen star en rekke
personer fra det politiske og hu-
manitmre, kulturelle og kirkelige
virkefelt, bl. a. syv stortingsrepre-
sentanter, ni biskoper, Oslo-univer-
AFTENPOTEN., Oslo
February 16, 1971
CPYRGHT
NORWEGIANS SUBMIT REQUEST FOR DISCUSSION SOUTH SUDAN PROBLEM IN UN
Appeal to I-krnian Rights Commission and the goverment about contributing
to the resolution of the conflict.
In a communication to the government, forty prominent women and men requested
that it take up a Norwegian initiative aimed at a solution of the situation in Sout4
Sudan.
The communication says, among other things:
"The undersigned ask the goverment to cooperate in having the conflict in
Sudan taken up for discussion in the session which the Human Rights Commission of
the UN will hold in Geneva from 22. February to 26 March 1971 as the South Sudanese
politicians request. We have taken the liberty to send a communication about the
matter to the Human Rights Commission and enclose a copy of it.
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"We believe that consideration in the commission certainly will throw new
light on'the situation and that it is a reasonable demand that the representatives
for South Sudan should submit their case for world opinion."
The communication to the Human Rights Commission says, among other things:
"In spite of conflicting information about the conditions, reports indicate
that the civilian population in South Sudan is stricken with hunger and sickness
and exposed to attack from the disputing parties. Thus there is reason to fear
that most of the population is not assured even the most elementary human rights.
There is a great need for an effort which can put a speedier end to the internal
conflicts between North and South Sudan.
"We are familiar with the desire for reform which the Sudanese government
having reason to present their case for world opinion. On this background, the
undersigned strongly wish to urge the Human Rights Commission to take up the
Sudanese problem for study and evaluation in its session in Geneva from 22 February
to 26 March 1971."
A number of persons from the political and humanitarian, cultural and church
fields, among others, seven members of parliament, nine bishops, and a rector from
the University of Oslo, are behind the communication.
MOR(fl1BLADET, Oslo
February 17, 1971
CPYRGHT
SUDAN -
EN PROVE
EN GRUPPE nordmenn? -
med bl. A. 9 biskoper, 7
stortingsmenn, flere professo-
rer og rektor ved Universitetet
I Oslo, samt forretningsmenn,
pressefolk og talsmenn for en
rekke humaniteere organlsasjo-
ner - har rettet en henven-
delse til FN's Menneskerettig-
hetskommisjon og anmodet om
at konflikten i Syd-Sudan mA
bli dreftet I dette forum. Grup-
pen har ogsA henvendt seg til
Den norske regjering og bedt
regjeringen stette initlativet.
Tiltaket indikerer i sin And
noe mer enn. bare det syd-
sudanesiske sporsmAl. Det in-
nebeerer i realiteten ogsA en
generell og ekende misneye
med den behandling som de
internasjonale menneskerettig-
hater blir til del, nettopp i de
organer som har pAtatt seg
A vokte over enkeltindividets
Integritet, sikkerhet og frihet.
Det har I flere Ar vokset
frem en stigende grad av for-
bauselse og skuffelse over den
eftergivende holdning som har
preget regjerlngene I de demo
kratiske land, nAr det gjelder
aktivt A arbeide for slike sa-
ker I FN og lignende interna-
ejonale sammenslutninger.
Man vil ikke lenger aksep-
tere adet stille diplomatic, som
vokter seg vel for ikke A stete
stormaktene pA mansjettene i
full offentlighet.
DET NORSKE initiativ over-
for Menneskerettighets-
kommisjonen bmrerl bud om
at opinionen nu forventer en
mer aktiv og Open hoidning fra
den domokratiske del av ver-
den.
Sudan er den aktuelle prove-
sten - men med at langt vi-
dare nersnektir.
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February 17, 1971
NORWEGIANS URGE UN DISCUSSION OF SUDAN PROBLEM
CPYRGHT
ament
A group o orw
several professors and a rector of the University of Oslo, as well as business men,
pressmen and spokesmen for a number of humanitarian organizations, have sent a
communication to the Human Rights Commission of the UN and requested that the
conflict in South Sudan be discussed in this forum. The group also has turned to
the Norwegian government and requested that the government support the initiative.
The effort indicates something more in its spirit than only the South Sudanese
question. In reality, it also signifies a general and increasing dissatisfaction w'
the treatment of which the international human rights is a part, precisely in the
organs which have undertaken to watch over the single individgal's integrity,.secur'
and freedom.
For several years, an increasing degree of amazement and disappointment has
arisen over the acc.omodationg attitude which has characterized the governments in
the democratic: countries when it is a question of actively working for such matters
in the UN or similar international organizations.
The "quiet diplomacy" which is careful not to hurt the feelings of the big
powers in full public is no longer accepted.
t1 Human Ri hts Commission carries the message
ty
The Norwegian initiative to ie g
that [world] opinion now expects a more active and open attitude from the democrati
part of the world.
Sudan is the current acid test - but with a much wider perspective.
AREEI DE RBL ADET, Oslo a f / 0
February 17, 1971 ; ,OR,
I 7;
0
7
J
CPYRGHT
/.' 0
r l./ v
-17
rr
0
Pet vii by ph praktiskc problerner t f'a hrakt opp situanjonen
j ?r- udan i FiNs mennes ere a ornmisjon, oru se r
er ncinli at Sudan sely gir sift samtykke til dette. Op I
annen Vi'-sarnznen lieng er det vanglcelig A fA offisiell he-
handling av saken.
Ekspedisjonssje: Tian Greve i uten-
riksdepartementet sier, pA bak
grunn av brevet fra en rekke per-
soner fra ulike virkefelt i Norge
til Regjeringen om S to et initia-
tiv, at de norske myndigheter er
fullt oppmerksom pd lidelser folk
i Sor-Sudan ni 1 gjennomgi, og? er
opptatt av dette.
- w;en sporsm:11et el- om man
kan gj0re n,oc gjennom menneske-
rettighetskommisjonen hvor Norge
for ovri'g ikke er med. Komrni-
sjonen har scly satt opp visse
,-1., tnr hphanrllineen av klager.
eller opprette en ad hoc-komite
for A gjcre dette, kan det bare
giores med samtykke av den Stat-
en saken gjelder. Forutsetningen
er at unders?kelsen skal skje i
nzert og varig samarbeid med den
ne part og pa de vilkar ? denne
fastsetter. Dette gji r at de formel-
le inuligheter for A arbeide via
kom.misjonen er sterkt begrcnset.
Og ennA er vi ikke kommet s',
langt at FNs mcnneskerettighets-
konvensjon er bindende.
Men nar dette er sagt, er det
dart at en appell fra en bredt
ral=k vi-r'kning. Den vil i h0y g-a
henlede opi.nionc:ns oppmer?ksomh t
pa prohlemet.
- Kan ikke saken tas opp
annen mate i FN?
- Situasjonen er den at den
saken er tatt opp underhfinde .
Men orn Norge skulle 0nske A
bringe den inn for FN, vil m.
ikke fd stotte fra de afrikans e
land. Dermed er sjansen for t
den skal komme opp liten.
Fra S?r-Sudan er det komm It
on henvendelse om at FN a
gripe inn, silk at organisasion n
er kjent mcd situasionen.
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 ARBECDERBLADET, Oslo
February l7,A oved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
CPYRGHT SUDAN SITUATION DIFFICULT TO PRESENT
It would present practical problems to have the situation in South Sudan
brought up in the UN's Human Rights Commission. The assumption is that Sudan
itself will give its approval for it. Also in another UN connection, it is difficult
to get official handling of the matter.
Tim Greve, a department head in the Foreign Department, said, regarding the
letter from a number of persons from different fields in Norway to the government
about taking an initiative, that the Norwegian authorities are fully aware of the
suffering that the people in South Sudan must experience and are preoccupied with it
"But the question is whether one can do anything through the Human Rights
Commission in which Norway is not a member. The commission itself has set up
certain rules for handling complaints. If it should undertake investigations
itself or establish an ad hoc committee to do it, it can only be done with the
approval of the state concerned with the matter. The assumption being that the
investigation occurs in close and lasting cooperation with this state and under the
conditions which it stipulates. This has the effect that technical possibilities
to work through the commission are very limited. And yet we have not gone so far
that the human rights convention of the UN is binding.
"But when this is said, it is clear that an appeal from a broadly made-up
roup will have a moral effect. It will draw a great deal of the attention of
[world] opinion to the problem."
"Can the matter not be taken up in another way in the UN?"
"The situation is that this matter was taken up privately. But if Norway
hould desire to bring it before the UN, it will not get support from the African
our*ries. So the chance that this shall occur is small.
"A communication came from South Sudan that the UN must intervene, so that
he organization is familiar with the situation."
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CPYRGHT
FS-F UTESJA7VGDE
BE,-Fl?1E~LSEFRONT
S .da s afrikaner tigs ihjal
^ Inga "olalnpliga" befrielserorelser tillats delta
i den konferens oln Afrikas befrielserorelse, som
pagiir i I)ipoli i Otniis. -Motets yard, Finlands Stu-
rlentkarers. Forbund (FSF) liar vinkat used kalla
handen at Dominic A. Mohamed, representant for
sodra Sudans befriclsefront Anya Nya. Orsak: Den
liar befrielsefronten ar "rote tillrackligt kand".
o FSF har dock ;haft c. 15 ar
pa sig, att Infdrskaffa informa-
tion o utvecklingen I sodra
Sudan, Mir hundratusentals in-
vanare odats urdcr de senaste
15 are
[:] Enli t uppgifter fran Foren-
ta rata nernas flyktingkommis-
sarie, u pgick antalet flyktingar
till gr nlanderna Iran sodra
Sudan or tva ar; sedan till
125000.
I lag an siffran c. 300 000,
sager minis Mohamed.
o Han has varit kontakt med
FSF, f? att fa delta i konfe-
rensen tminstone ; som observa-
tor. Hari var villig alt endast
lyssna, me talc.
Cf Me nej. FSF uppger pa
Hbl:s "rfragan, att konferen-
sen int kunde u(vidgas till att
omfatt ocksa problem I Sudan.
Det a trots att man vid
forhan informationen fore
konfer sen uttryckligen pape-
kade al t "Afrikas hPfrielserorel-
se" sk ll tolkas sum en enda
heihet, alt det inte an fraga om
de en ilda befiielsefronterna,
utan a samordnad kamp mot
koloni ism, imperialism, rasism
och to tryck overhuvudtaget.
o Pa tisdagen krop det dock
tram a t befrielserorelserna skall
vary g dkanda av den afrikans-
ka enhctsorganisationen OAU,
for att vary salongsfahiga pa
Dipoli.
o FSF:s dorrvakter ser till att
obehoriga jute tar sig In 1 mo-
teslokalen, berattar utrikessek-
reterare Martti Laajava vid FSF
for Hbl.
'plan viii jute hora Dominic
Mohamed beratta om hur 1 mil-
jon manniskor, afrikaner, i sodra
Sudan her dodats av regerings-
trupperna. araber.
(Uppgitterna om antalet doda
ar okiart, andra kallor havdar
alt det ror sig om c. 100 000
nagra hundra tusen etc. Kiart
ar I. alla fall att forlusterna i
manniskoliv ar enorma.)
FSF-konferensen vill jute hel
ler hora talas om de hundra-
tusentals flyktingar, som lever
under obeskrivliga forhallanden
i Sudans grannlander.
- Vi hjalper ju dem ocksa,
sager viceordf. Martti Mellais,
FSF. Var organisation star ju
bl.a. bakom Finlands Flykting-
hjalp rf.
Pa FSF-motet ges ingen infor-
mation om uppgifterna, corn
havdar att M000 soldater fran
Libyen och Egypten hjalper. Su-
dans militbrregering i stravande-
na att "arabisera" sodra Sudan.
Konferensdeltagarna skulle
bland annat ha haft mojlighet
att titta pa biller, som vicar
hur napalmbomber, som enligt
hr Mohamed tagits I bruk under
de senaste fyra manadernna, har
farit Pram med eivilbefolk-
ningen.
Yen eftersom man "saknade
information" om befrielserbrel
sen Anya Nya, sa hade bildern
ingen plats I debatten om de
afrikanska befrielserorelsen
stort.
Detta trots att ocksa de
andra sidan hade haft utmdrkt
mojligheter att ge sin syn p
saken. FSF:s medarrangbr, In
ternational Union of Student;
(IUS med hbgkvarter i Prag
ordforande ar namligen hemm
hbrande i norra Sudan'
Viceordf. Martti Mellais berg
tar att FSF varit i kontakt me
denne. och att man efter de
diskussionen definitvt beslut
ate Anya Nya inte far delta
motet.
FSF anscr som sagt alt ma
jute har tillrickliga informati
nor om organisationen. For ti
manader sedan tillstalldes doe
FSF en promemoria om rore
sen? doss syften, aktivitete ,
problem. on:.koinal M.M.
Anya Nya har ocksa beror
1 flera brett upplagda artikla
I varldspressen, och ocksa i de.
finlandska pressen. "Folkmord
tysthet", "'Ett nytt Biafra", "De
burtglomda tragedin i Sudan'
har man kaliat afrikanerna
kamp mot de harskande arabe
na.
FSF sager: -- Vi kan irate p
nagot satt notera Anya Nya, d
kunde Sara nagon annan.
Hbl: Vem?
FSF: - Nagon som anser a
sodra Sudans befrielsefront int
har nagonting att gora bland d
andra befrielsefronterna pa dett
mote.
Det ar vart all notera att kon
ferenstemat I och med delta at
talande har andrats. Det ar alit
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 CPYRGHT
av ~ ; t ,~ ' rf` IVase 1999/09MI exploaterats. G IAi4 9-011$A~4-A013AS1~7000 a 6 5
e
l
ii
re
s
r
Sydafrika, Rhodesia,
Namibia, Mogambique, Angola
och Guinea Bissau).
Inte om "Afrikas befrielse".
Dominic Mohamed ar en av
de fa Fran sodra Sudan, soot
beffolkningen lever kvar i
stenaidern.
I dag lever . afrikanerna i
Sudan undangoinda i bushen, pa
flykt undan regeringstruppernas
soldater,
lyckats skaffa sig utbildning. Regeringschefens, general-
Han studerar for narvarande vid major Jaafar al-Nimeiri, erbju-
hIinnesotauniversitetet i USA. danden om partiell autonomi
Han berattar for Hbl att be- vagar man late lita pa. Inte
fricisei'Orelsen kompar for reli- elter de massakrer sour for-
gionsfrihet och for afrikanernas anstaitats mot afrikaner, och
ekonon:iska och kulturella obe- inte sedan man under de senaste
roende. wren sett sina skolor och sjukhus
For invanarna i sodra Sudan
framstar araberna corn kolonia-
lister, sour med vald foroker
omvanda afrikanerna till Islam
(den forharskande religionen
bland afrikanerna ar kriytendo-
men. men manga naturreligioner
har ocksa anhangare).
bombas till ruinhogar.
Och alldeles apeciellt irate
sedan ryskbyggda illigplan och
helikoptrar borjade kretsa over
sad'-a Sudan. samtidigt som
egyptirka och libyska trupper pa
regeringens beg5ran kom till
landet.
i > Sudan's own civil war appears-to be warming up again.
The Khartoum Government, dominated by the Moslem majority in Northern
Sudan, has never been able to pacify the Southern area of the country. That
part of Sudan is inhabited by some 4 million blacks, most of them Christians.
The Anya Nya, a military force of black guerrillas who want independence
for the Southern Sudan, has kept war going for eight years. In this war to date
at least 500,000, probably many more, have died. Most of those killed were
blacks with ties to the peoples of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo.
> > Israel, says the Sudanese Government, is getting into Sudan's war. Through
Israeli military missions in Ethiopia, Uganda and the Congo, say officials in
Khartoum, Israel is supplying arms to Southern rebels.
Soviet_made antiaircraft guns lost by Egypt to Israel in the June War of
1967 now are used by rebels against Sudan's Soviet-supplied helicopters.
Ask Israelis, and you get official denials that their arms go to Sudan's
rebels. You also get an unofficial reminder: "Sudan is at Israel's back door."
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 TIME, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
March 1, 1971
Africa: Rumblings on a'Fault Line
Across the midsection of Africa, at roughly the point where the savanna
meets the tropical forest, a kind of human fault line separates the Arab
world from Black Africa. This zone of instability, from Chad to the Horn,
is a battleground where Arab guerrillas are pitted against black gov-
ernments, and African rebels against Arab regimes. In a sense, two of the stub-
bornest rebellions-the civil war in the southern Sudan and the Eritrean
uprising in northern Ethiopia-are extensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict to
the north. The situation in the Sudan has been further complicated by the So-
viet Union's powerful thrust toward the Indian Ocean.
5UUAN
he Soviet Viet Nam
Like their neighbors in Egypt, the
Len who run the Sudan have found for-
ign Communists a good deal easier to
et along with than the domestic va-
ety. Two weeks ago, Major General
afar Numeiry, 41, the Sudan's leftist
I ader, vowed that he would "crush
nd destroy" the country's 6,000-mem-
er Communist Party. The local Com-
unists, he said, were guilty of ev-
ything from sabotage to poking fun
the Sudanese armed forces.
Nonetheless, Numeiry's revolutionary
gime is becoming more and more de-
endent on the military support of the
viet Union, which has some 500 ad-
'sers in the Sudan. Farther down the
orn of Africa in Somalia (see map),
t ere are an estimated 325 Russian ad-
sers. Last year the Russians began to
nstruct a naval base at Port Sudan
the Red Sea, an installation that
ill be useful, once the Suez Canal is re-
ened, in the further expansion of So-
et naval activity in the Indian Ocean.
ow the Russians are installing SA-2 an-
t aircraft missiles to defend the base.
t ven more startling is the fact that
ut 100 of the Sudan's Soviet ad-
rs are directly helping the Khartoum
ernment to prosecute its civil war
inst 6,000,000 black southerners.
e north contains 6,000,000 Arabs
3,000,000 blacks.) The southerners
and autonomy within a federation,
guing that under the existing system
t ey will never be given any real au-
t ority by the Arabs of the north; at in-
pendence in 1956, for example, the
rtherners grabbed off 796 of the 800
ailable government posts. There is,
oreover, a long history of hatred be-
t teen the two regions: in the 19th cen-
t ry, Arab slave traders from Khartoum
d Cairo carried off 2,000,000 blacks
i chains from southern Sudan.
Drums Sounding. Since last Sep-
amber the Russians have engaged in
ound operations in all three southern
ovinces. Last month they accompanied
idanese army units in a raid on the
ain guerrilla camp, Owing-ki-bul (an
choli war cry that means "Hear the
drums sounding"), attacking the south-
erners by surprise while many were bath-
ing in a river. The rebel Anyanya
(who took their name from the poi-
son of a cobra or scorpion) lost o
dozen men and considerable equipment.
A bombing raid against a rebel base'
at Morta near the Uganda border
caused nearly 1,000 civilian casualties.
Russians have almost certainly flown
helicopters into combat against southern
rebels. They, as well as Egyptian pilots,
may also have conducted bombing mis-
sions with AN-12 transports and two
squadrons of TU-16 medium bombers.
The Russians, in addition, are known
to have carried out MIG training mis-
sions in the north, but whether they
have flown MIGs into combat in the
south is uncertain.
In any case, the Soviets have al-
ready set two unwelcome precedents
for themselves: never before have they
participated so actively in a Third World
counterinsurgency effort, and never have
they fought against Black Africans and
helped bomb their villages. The situ-
ation prompted an Oslo newspaper, Mor-
genbladet, to headline a Sudan story a
bit hyperbolically: THE SOVIETS HAVE
THEIR VIET NAM.
Soldier of Fortune. The southerners
have received some modest foreign sup-
port of their own. In September 1969
-about three months after Numeiry
seized power in Khartoum and aligned
the Sudan more closely with Egypt
-the Israelis began parachuting arms
and supplies from an unmarked DC-3
to Owing-ki-bul. The DC-3 apparently
flies in from either southwestern Ethi-
opia or northern Uganda; Israel pro-
vides extensive aid to both countries.
Because the Khartoum government has
allowed Ethiopia's Eritrean rebels to
cross the Sudan while returning to their
own country from overseas, Emperor
Haile Selassie has permitted the south-
ern Sudanese to take refuge in Ethi-
opia from time to time.
Until recently, the southerners were
also aided by one of Africa's more no-
torious soldiers of fortune, German-born
CPYRGHT
Mercenary Rolf Steiner. A veteran of
losing battles in Indochina, Algeria and
Biafra, Steiner spent some 13 months
trying to train the rebels to fight the rul-
ing Arabs. "They fight very well against
each other," he once said. "But against
the Arabs they feel inferior."
Late last year Steiner was captured
by Uganda police while spending a few
days of unofficial rest and recuperation
outside the war zone. After three months
in a Uganda jail, Steiner was secretly
turned over to Sudanese authorities.
He is now in prison in Khartoum, where
his fate will be settled by still another
group of foreign Communists. The case
against him is being prepared by some
of the 50 East Germans who advise
the Sudanese Interior Ministry on se-
curity techniques.
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CPYRGHT
Cairo, Cairo Radio, March 1, 1971
Tiere is a to 'c which newspapers have paid prominence to, namely the statement issued
y sterday evening by the general command o the u anese a forces Tn reply CO
tie allegation made in TIME magazine. The following is the text of the statement
b the General Comand of the Sudanese Armed Forces:
Aldis Ababa Radio broadcast on Friday evening, February 19, 1971, a report attribut d
t the American TIM magazine which stated that Soviet experts are helping the Sud
t ,D the rebellion movement in the south by building a naval base and missile
s tes on Sudan's Ibd Sea coast and that a number of Soviet experts took part with
tie Sudanese Armed Forces in raiding Sudanese rebel camps last month. The Sudanese
Armed Forces statement added that the armed forces general command denies this report
c mpletely and :presents the following facts connected with this question:
.-The alleged.base or missile sites do not exist and Britain, Indian, and other s.ps
which arrive at Port Sudan from all parts of the world confirm this fact.
-The armed forces have carried out internal security operations in southern Sudan
f. or the past 16 years, and continue to do so, and are scoring successes day after
c V. Our turning to the great Soviet Union did not take place until after the vic-
torious May revolution two years ago.
!_-We know that the purpose of this mad campaign is to cast doubt on the skill of
the Sudanese fighter and belittle the splendid results he achieved recently, by
elling world public opinion that foreign interference existed and was the main cause
or those victories.
P --The U.S. and Western press spare no of forts to harm the firm relations which h a e
own between our republic and the great Soviet Union, and that we are proud of this
riendship and: assistance, particularly in the field of scperience and equipment.
--These mad campaigns are the beginning of a foreign intervention through false
egations that the Soviet Union is building bases in the Sudan and is fighting I de
side with the Sudanese soldiers in the internal security operations.
CPYRGHT
SUDAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DENIAL
Cairo, Cairo Radio, March 20, 1971
'e Sii nogg F^, ,i s Mini try has denied a report by the U.S. Time magazine that the
Soviet Union is building a naval base in Port Sudan harbor. It has also denied the
rnacrarine's allegation that Soviet experts have participated with Sudanese forces in
rime magazine's editor in chief refuting the lies contained in the riarcn issue. m e
:Letter was published by the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo today.
The Foreign Ministry has accused the U.S. magazine of giving a false picture of
interests and on respect for Sudan's independence and sovereignty. The rd.ni.stry als
affirmed that Sudan is proud of the ties of f riendship which bind it and the Soviet
'Union together, particularly in the field of technical cooperation.
Replying to the magazine's allegations, the Ministry said that ships calling at Po
Sudan from all: parts of the world can ascertain that the Soviet Union is not buildix
a naval base in the harbor.
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 CPYRGHT
40 7C Q 1a i7r29;Q00?7z9s
he Sudan e s @~ ire , e
orrespondent should have known and noticed that the Sudanese forces alone successfully
arried out their operations in the South, which he reported to his magazine. He should
ave known also that these forces can frustrate any plot aimed at jeopardizing Sudan's
erritorial safety."
he Ministry charged the magazine with trying t o cast doubt on the Sudanese forces'
ombat ability. It said the magazine has overlooked the reason why the Northern
udanese had assumed key government posts after independence; that is, the British
eft Southern Sudan in a state of economic and educational backwardness which,
aturally, left the Southern Sudanese unable to participate in governing the country.
ommenting on the part of the magazine's arlti.cle on Israel's support for the insur-
ts in Southern Sudan, the Ministry said srael's role in the South--which is also
art of a large-scale imperialist conspiracy to overthrow Sudan's progressive regime-
s aimed at checking Sudan's growing activity in connection with the Arab cause and
eventing progress from reaching Southern Sudan.
NEW T11?S, No. 12, USSR
March 24, 1971
Letter to the Editors
C
ly to
ill
6 If
"
1
Magazine
CPYRGHT
T me magazine in its March 1, 1971,
issu published an article under the
tit! "Africa Rumbling on the Faultline."
The author had chosen Sudan to be the
sub ect of his imaginative article. Under
the subtitle "Soviet Vietnam," the
aut or, in addition to a number of ab-
sur 'ties and misleading information
ab if the Sudan, stated that "about 100
of udan's Soviet advisers are directly
hel ing the Khartoum government to
pro acute its civil war against 6,000,000
bla k southerners."
T begin with, the figure given for
the total number of Sudanese living in
the southern part of the country is a
pur invention. According to known
rec rds, the total population of the
thr a southern provinces is much less
than 3 million, of which more than two
mil on are from largo Nilotic tribes
wh are committed against the Steiner
followers and rebel activity and pol-
ici as a whole.
nofher invention is the alleged
par icipation of Soviet military experts
in ostilities in southern Sudan. Under
i the arresting subtitle "Drums Sound-
ing " the author states: "Since last Seppp-
to r the R ue s't~rtgF !r~
g P dRgrati I s in all three southern
rovincos.... The Soviets hove their
Vietnam." The mysterious author expects
is readers to believe that "100 Rus-
ions" are engaged in ground opera-
ions against a mythical 6,000,000 blacks
tattered over an area larger than Spain
and France put together.
In the same article the author sup-
plies Time readers with more sensa-
tional news, such as Russian pilots
lying combat missions against a "Hear
the Drum Sounding" rebel camp it -the
jungle.
Another fabrication relates to Port
Sudan. In spite of the fact that Port
Sudan is an open commercial port
where ships belonging to India, Britain
and various other countries , put in
daily, the author, to give Time readers
another thrill, discloses to the ap-
parently blind crews of those ships that
the port is actually being turned into
a Soviet naval base.
No doubt the author of the article
was prompted and inspired by the
recently published news that a contin-
without any essistonco from Ike air, an
unaccompanied by any "Russian,"
captured those camps. By alleging that
the Russians did it, the author sought
to question the ability of the Sudaneso
Army unit to do it alone. Such an at-
titude is only natural, for the Zionists
and racists of all kinds do not believe
that Africans alone are capable of do-
ing anything without a Steiner or a
European of some sort to lead them.
But whether the Zionists like it or not,
the Sudanese Army did capture the
mercenaries' bases and is able to deal
effectively with any intruder in the
southern part of the Sudan.
However, it is no secret that the
Soviet Union does offer assistance to
the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.
The $udanese people after more than
15 years of independence found the
Soviet Union and the Soviet people to
be their true friends. The Sudanese-
Soviet friendship is also no secret to
be hidden from any quarter. On the
contrary, the Sudanese and the Soviet
completely liquidated the rebel camps
on the Sudan-Uganda boundary. These
camps, as admitted by the author of the
Time article, were used by Israel to
rain European and
this friendship is mentioned.
Whether the author is a Zionist or a
hired hack in Israel's pay is beside the
point, but the publication of such an
who infiltrated into Sudanese
territory. Time magazine readers. The editors of
he success of the Sudanese Army unit
in crushing these boundary pockets of
mercenaries is not expected to be good
news for the employers of the Steiners
and other interventionist enemies of
the Sudanese and African people.
Time, in their blind support of Israel
and the Zionist strategy of aggression
and intervention in African affairs, have
indeed paid a high price in terms of
the integrity of Time magazine by al-
lowing such an article to be published.
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., 197
Anya Ny
I. bull
rebels'
ing
in South Su
CPYRGHT
eorge we
expected Africa to be the
-fighting ground of the two
Great World Powers the
scene of continuous:
warfare. We still
have 13 years to go and at the
moment there is fighting in
five African territories.
In Chad, Angola, Mozam-
bique, and In the small-scale
guerrilla activity of Rhodesia
the conflict looks back to the
fight to end colonialism. The
warfare In the. South Sudan is
the exception - each month
edges the 14-year-old civil
war towards greater involve-
ment In the grand strategy of
Russia in the Mediterranean
and North-east Africa
For many years the.
struggle of the South
Sudanese Anya Nya rebels to
,preserve some degree of inde-
pendence, frdin successive
Sudanese Governments was
virtually a private fight,
ignored by everyone except
the refugee organisations.
Demoted
This has changed since the
seizure of power by General
Ndmt;iri's revolutionary
Socialist Government in May,
1969. Now Sudan is linked
with the Arabs of Egypt and
Libya. Egyptian, Libyan, and
Russian soldiers, airmen and
advisers have been moved
ditto the Sudan and brought
into the fight against the
'Anya Nya,. The Russian front
has quietly moved south.
. No wonder Uganda's Head
of State, General Amin, has,
demoted the threat to Africa
of Britain selling arms to
South Africa to second place
to the threat from Sudan. No
wonder the Israelis are
providing support for the
Anya Nya. No wonder the
*.Foreign Ministries of Britain
and several other countries,
and, an assortment of intellig-
ence services have recently
intensified their watch on the
South Sudan.
an
be ignored. Any hopes that
the situation would l be
resolved by a military defeat
of the rebels or by a defus-
ing of the conflict by the
Khartum Government's
declared policy of recognis-
ing the South's claims to a
large degree of autonomy are
fast disappearing.
The relbels have shown
they have the weapons and
the will to keep the fight
going : the Khartum Govern-
ment, however genuine its
declarations, has failed to
make its political solution
viable.
The South Sudan has been
called "Russia's Vietnam "
and "a second Biafra." Both
descriptions are at present
highly exaggerated. Russian
mi-litary involvement is still
very limited and although
about 250,000 refugees have
fled from the region, they
have been able to find refuge
in surrounding countries
instead of being surrounded
and starved.
But on a lower scale the
South Sudan becomes a point
of conflict between Arab and
Black Africa, between the
Arabs and Israel, and so.
between Russia and the
United States. Just in the
wings to the south are the
large British economic
interests in Uganda and
Kenya.
The Khartum Govern
rnent's military drive against
the rebels has been inten-
sified in recent months
increasing the' flow of
refugees into Uganda, Kenya,
the Congo, Ethiopia, and the
Central African Republic.
Khartum's claim that large
numbers of ' refugees have
been voluntarily returning to
Sudan are rejected by
refugee organisations.
Evidence
Thirty MiG-17s and Rus-
3lan-built bombers and heli.
copters are being used
pilots are flying combat mis-
sions. The Khartum govern-
ment administration in the
South has been reinforced by?
Russian advisers. A few Rus-'
sians have been killed in
attacks on Anya Nya camps.
Grisly confirmation that they
were Russians was supplied
by dental evidence. The Anya
Nya, knowing that the
identity would be challenged.
cut off the dead men's heads
and had the dentistry estab
lished as Russian by dental
experts.
A collection of eye-witness
accounts prove that bombing
raids on rebel camps and
villages thought to contain
rebels are a regular event.'
The scale of rebel resistance .
is shown by a recent attack
on Pacholi, The rebels
attacked 300 troops and 150
armed police and claim to
have killed over a hundred
men and to have captured
some 80 automatic weapons
and 26,000 rounds Of ammuni-
tion.
Rebel equipment raw
includes mortars, bazookas,'
mines, and some light anti-
aircraft guns. Some heli-
copters used in attacks on a
rebel airstrip were shot
down. That strip is still held
'by Government troops but they
rebels have another availabld'
'in Equatoria Province.
With tfii'ir supvrior frees
the Government holds the
towns and roads and pre-
vents any concentratio of
Anya Nya forces. But arti-
cularly in the thick jingle
area of Equatorla Pro nee.
roughly the size of F nee,
they cannot break the r bels'
hold on the countryside.
The' Anya Nya are now
setting up their own civil
administration in all thr a of
the subprovinces, Equa ria,
Upper Nile and Bah el
Ghazal, and have started tun-
dreds of bush schools.
1 cu les
terever they are ge ing
their arms from - an I
have no evidence-to sup ori
the allegation that Is ell
arms are being air drop ed
the rebels remain an e ec-
tive fighting force. It is iffi
cult to see how they coul be
'so without the backing of he
local people.
And if the civilian pop Ia-
tion supports the rebels he
increased military acti ty,
with the inevitability of r el
'soldiers melting away w He
the civilians remain to be
shot up, is likely to lessen he
chances of the Khar m
Administration be ng
accepted.
Complete military vict ry
being ruled out, th re
remains a negotiated set le.
ment at some time in he
future. The rebels do of
believe Khartum's talk of
autonomy 'for the So h.
Khartum will not agree to he
,rebels' proposals for Peace,
talks in a neutral Afri an'
country.
Meanwhile the Arab- s-
slan build-up continues th
its threat to the stability of
both the Middle East d
'Africa.
John Fairhalll
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March 7, 1971
THIS question which every
T "es person must ask them-
selves now that war has become
to devastating and terrible. The
terrible nature of modern agar
draws one's attention to a problem
that always existed.
Bss it ever been right and proper
for men to kill each other under
due process of law. There are two
ways in which men can kill each
other under due process of law.
One is by war and the other Is by
execu.tion. By execution I do not
ran necessarily with an axe or
the lopping off of your head.
I mean that you are tried, found
guilty of some crime, the punish-
ment-for which is the taking of
your . life, and legally drlle to
death by some official person
usually called an, executioner.
This -is called capital_ punishtrcnt. It
is worthy of note that capital
punishment is increasingly un-
popular among civilised nations. In
most Scandinavian countries it has
been abolished. In the USA It Is
legal In some states, while in others
it -hay been abolished. In the states
where it is legal, it is usually Lorne
time since the last execution took
place.
In Britain it is quite a while since
the last execution took place and
very shortly Britain will probably
join those countries who have
abolished capital punishment.
6o much for capital punishment but
what about war? More people can
die in a week of war than in seve-
ral years of capital punishment.
The question that arises Is this. Is
the individual entitled to decide-
off his own bat, that all killing,
of man by man is unmoral or
against the law of God if he be-
lieves in such-a ditty and refuse
to fight for his, country, when
called upon to do so.
The question remains an open one
in most countries. In most coun?
tries the conscientious objector is
now tolerated and allowed to get
AM among those who believe
that man is still among the
most fierce of animals and
will continue to be a fighter,-
even unto death, for several
hundreds of years yet.-Clinton
*way-, with his . refusal to fight
ta.ndpr any circumstances whatso-
ever, But no nation as a whole. has
outlawed, war.
Our own civil war was fought en-
tirely by voluntary recruits. if in
tinother war in which we felt our
very survival was involved we saw
fit to - Introduce conscription:
would we let the conscientious ob-
jector get away with It?
To get the majority of amen of any one
nation to agree that-they will not
fight under any circumstances
whatsoever see ns an almost lmpos-
sihle task.
But supposing you did succeed In
convincing tbdt one nation, would
It survive among a majority of na-
tions who believe that some things
are worth going to war and fight-
ing for?
And supposing it failed to survive,
which seems to me most likely ins
all the circumstances would the(
moral effort have had any effect
upon humanity as a whole.
In other words would its going
down in a sea of blood have been
worth while.
Personally, I more than doubt it. I
do not feel that the disappearance
of one nation as a result. of such a
moral decision would have such an
effect upon world history as to Jus-
pl[y it. couple years It would be forgotten among
the warring nations.
am among those who believe that
man is still among the most fierce
.of animals and will continue to b+-
, fighter even unto death, for seve-
ra hundreds of years.yet.
Civilisation has decided that the con-
scientious objector must be allowed
to do his stuff. I don't see that it
lets anybody anywhere. It's just for
consicence sake. If you feel like
that, you're entitled to be taken
seriously. But If you think you're
going to convert the world you're
in for a big disappointment.
Men realise that it's rather wicked to
destroy one another for ideological
reasons and rather more wicked to
destroy one another for non-Ideo-
logical reasons.
It used to be the fashion to fight be-
cause you belonged to one religion
and I to another and both our re-
ligions said that the unbeliever
should be destroyed. Now it's more
fashionable to fight about racial
or economic Issues.
There are two racial wars going on
at-the moment or rather one Is
going on and the other is pending,
with a view, to settlement, because
the whole world is interested.
Both sides feel that the big powers
will ensure that actual fighting
does not break out again I'm
Speaking of course of the Israeli-
The other war I have in miAu is the
civil war In the Sudan, between the
dominant. Arabs of the North and
the black Afrinans' of the South.
We are not allowed to interfere
beef use of the OAU, to which the
Arai' and African riations also
belong.
My sympathies are with the black
Africans who are being exterminated.
by Arab armies. Could the policy
of the OAU be In error? I think
we have at least to consider the
possibility.
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 OBa vbd or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
March 7, 1971
CPYRGHT
WAR ON
THE NILE
months with the rebels to compile this
bloody war is Growing in intensity. On one side are
the Arab rulers of the Sudan ; on the other the Negro
rebels, who demand secession for the country's far
south. The heavily-camouflaged rebel guerrillas were
trained by ex-Foreign Legionnaire Rolf Steiner
(above) until he was caright in neighbouring Uganwr
and handed over to the Sudan Government. The
war receives scant publicity - few outsiders can get
in to see it - but the stakes are high. Its outcome- is
crucial to the Sudan, Africa's biggest country, but
~Jlso Egypt and Israel realise its significance for
the Middle last conflict. In the wings stand Russi,
and America. DAVID ROBISON has spent several
F iftecn hundred miles from the
centre of the 3liddle East
cmi-flict, a lone unmarked
1)C-3 circles over its drop-
zone and picks up a guiding
signal from it small radio
beacon. The pilot is Israeli; so is
the operator of the signal beacon.
The drop-zone is in the forests of
the southern Sudan.
About twice a month through-
out the past year, the 1)C-3 has
appeared in the night sky and
parachuted arms to waiting
guerrillas. The supplies include
heavy machineguns. bazookas,
hand-grenades, .303 World War
II rifles and old land mines of
Russian and British origin. Almost
all were captured by the Israelis,
from the Egyptians during the
Six 1)av War.
The recipients are groups of ill-
trained fighters who call them-
selves Anya-1ya. The name
derives from the fatal poison of
the Gahon viper: the poison was
at one time spread on spears to
dispatch tribal enemies with a
long and lingering death.
The Anya-Nva say they are
striiggling on behalf of nearly
seven million Africans spread
throughout 350.(44) square miles
ref)Ort.
of the Sudan's southern pr -
vinces, an area five times that of
the British Isles. The rebels swe r
they will never accept the units v
Sudan State created in 1956 1 v
Britain.
Since 1963 the war has com-
bined with disease and tl e
shrivelling of trade, social se.-
vices and medical care in ti e
south to kill between 51)0.0(4) ai d
a million people. Civilian deatl s
are now higher than in Vietnam
The Arab-dominated Goverrnnei t
far away in the north, in Kha -
toum, admits that fighting It, steadily grown more fierce.
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 CPYRGHT
The ernotApprtwed>IfdrsRelealseil9 9IO91 2s- CIARDP794i 94A O OQO1-6
emote but bloody trial of
strength is the southerners' feeling
of being a racially abject group.
I'll c southerners allege land-
obhery by Arab settlers, forced
projects
The figures are certainly re-
vealing. Of SIN) Government posts
Siulanised' at independence in
1956, only four went to souther-
ners. Twenty-one southerners, as
gainst 190 northerners, were
dmitted to the Sudan police
allege between 1950 and 1964.
my 241 out of 559 army officers'
commissioned between 1954 and
1965 were from the south.
By 1965 the 3,900 students at
Khartoum University included
only about 100 southerners. While
the number of Governnumt
secondary schools it, the north
iuereased from four at independ-
ence to 22 in 1965, the south was
left with the two schools - both
of which are now closed anyway
for security reasons. 1-et souther-
ners make up about 10 per cent
of the Sudan's 15 million popula-
tion.
Complementing the Arab-Negro
conflict is religious hostility. The
south is almost entirely Christian
or pagan while the north is
equally IIuslim, The northerner
sometimes still uses the word rrbcl-
or -slave', to refer to southerners -
a reminder that for hl) years,
until IS95. several million
southerners
slaves.
were carried off as
Southern soldiers first mutinied
in 1955 against the prospect of
union with the north. Britain
helped to crush that revolt. The
dissident soldiers then developed
into guerrillas in 1963. using
spears and bows and arrows.
Later they acuuired nun,, from
the Congo, where disorder iuade
weapons easily available.
The first planeload of arms
from Israel reached the south in
September 11)69. But Israel was
the last of the four outside Powers
involved in the Middle East to
intervene in tit(, Sudan - after
Egypt, Russia and the CS.
The eight-year-old war has now
a volatile mixture of participants.
These include Eg*-ptinn troops
army 'advisers' with tanks and
armoured helicopters, East Ger-
man security urea. Libyan
soldiers, Israeli advisers. and
American agents. Finally there
was a merceuar% element.
Outside intervcution followed
from the Sudanese army (.41111) of
25 May 1963), when Colonel
Jaafar )llrhilllimacl el-,\imeiry
overthrew the civilian Govern-
ment in Khartoum. I nuuediately
after the coup all the old-line
parties except the Conununists
were suppressed. Since the" the
army has continually been purged
of any conservative elements and
Nimeiry has even split the
munists by frequent reshuffiliug
of his Caliinet and arresting the
Communist Party secretary-
general. Except for segments of
the army, Nimeiry's support comes
from his powerful foreign backers.
Egypt's late President Nasser
acted quickly to sustain the
Nimeiry regime; a UAR-Libya-
Sudan defence alliance was soon
born. The Sudan then announced
it had become a `confrontation
State' against Israel and an
Egyptian army college moved to
Jebel Aulia, south of Khartoum,
to become the Sudan General
Staff School. To protect the
regime, 5,000 Egyptian troops
were deployed into the Sudan
and concentrated around Khar-
toum.
Up to 100 Egyptian combat
aircraft, including a squadron of
MiG 17s and MiG 21s, stand under
a desert sun at Wadi Seidna air-
base, just north of Khartoum and
safely out of the range of Israeli
Phantom jets. For five days at
the end of March last year, they
were used within the Sudan to
bomb the headquarters of the
Ansar Muslim, a sect of two
million conservative Arabs.
The bombing raids followed an
unsuccessful attempt by Ansar
civilians to assassinate Nimeiry
with spears and clubs when he
visited the town of Kosti, near
the Ansar stronghold. The
Egyptian MiG attacks left. 3,000
dead on the Ansar island of
Aba on the White Nile. The Ansar
religious leader, the Imam el-
Mahdi, was killed as he fled
Russians have followed the
Egyptians into the Sudan, as they
did in the Yemen, Aden and
Libya. A Western teacher in
Omdurman last summer has told
me of his surprise at hearing
Soviet army instructors giving
orders to Sudan troops - in
Russian.
According to a British aircraft
mechanic who worked in the
Sudan, Soviet military pilots ferry
military supplies in from Egypt
in Antonov transports almost
daily. At least five of the largest
Antonovs, the AN-24s, have been
converted into bombers, he said.
These have joined with two
squadrons, each of six giant
TU-16s, that carried out raids
on the south in the last three
months of 1970.
Diplomatic and intelligence
sources in two neighbouring
African countries - and in Wash-
ington - say that the Russians
have also given the Sudan MI-8
civilian helicopters converted with
armour-plating and rocket-
launchers, more than 100 T-55
heavy tanks, as well as howitzers,
artillery and ground rockets.
More important is the presence
of Red Army advisers - now
almost 1,000-strong - Soviet heli-
copter and jet pilots, and ground
crews. More than 100 Russian
officers are reported serving with
Sudanese combat units in the
south and a Russian general is
said to command troops at
Juba, southernmost provincial
capital.
Egyptian pilots are believed to
have carried out recent bombing
raids on the south - raids that
were beyond the present com-
petence of Sudanese crews.
The mystery is why the
Russians have apparently com-
mitted their own men to combat.
A Washington specialist on the
Sudan argued to me as follows:
`I guess the Russians wanted to
control the Sudan army, so they
had to move into the field with
the Sudanese to show how to use
Soviet equipment. But now the
Soviets cannot afford to let the
southern Sudanese will, because
Russian equipment, officers and
prestige are involved. I suppose
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 CPYRGHT
;1999
lllV0J`6w ,q,' Ol s ft ibo le
For the same reason, the Nor-
wegian newspaper Morgenbladet
carried this headline over a
Sudan story last December:
SOVIETS HAVE THEIR VIETNAM.
If the Russians build missile
sites for Sam-2s and Sanl-3s in
the Sudan, they will duplicate
almost exactly their commitment
in Egypt, though; on a smaller
scale. There are unconfirmed re-
ports that missile sites are being
prepared.
There are also sonic East Ger-
mans running the Sudan 'Ministry
of the Interior. Their main
activity is internal security and
surveillance.
Opposition to: Nimeiry is
divided. The guerrillas of the
Sudanese National Liberation
Front do not trust Khartoum's
conservative Arabs, and vice
versa. The Arabs have received
money from Saudi Arabia, whose
conservative sheikhs fear Russo-
Sudanese subversion from across
the Red Sea.
Neighbouring Ethiopia has be-
come a sanctuary; for Sudanese
exiles. The obsession of Ethiopian
foreign policy - 'Arab encircle-
ment' by the Muslim countries on
its borders. Sudan and Libya are
known to be sending lu?nls and
money to the separatist Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF) in
Ethiopia. But the Emperor is
unwilling to aid the anti-Nimeiry
groups openly in the Sudan
because of his symbolic role as
father of the Organisation of
African Unity, where Arab-
African conflicts are never
mentioned.
The southern Negroes still hope
for aid from America on the basis
of `cold war' competition in
Africa. In 1965 they received
parachuted arms near the Congo
border. An American Negro,
named only as Louis, mysteriously
joined the Anya-Nya and guided
in airdrops with his radio.
But that was at a time when
the Khartoum Government was
pro-Russian. When Sadiq el-
Mahdi became Prime Minister
and the Government turned cool
towards Moscow. Louis dis-
appeared and the American aid
dAflf~'Fjfl'r1Vtt`19fl~P~l4" ground, logs
'06
1'f~~
.
~
`iiff t e Americans c?an w
out Nimeiry by using his Arab
opposition, they won't give us a
dime.' The mysterious Louis
would receive a warm welcome
if he reappeared, however.
In 1968, the Anya-Nya leader
Joseph. Lagu went to Israel to
appeal for aid. It took Israel a
year to decide, after consulting
Ethiopia, Uganda and the Congo.
Today, 30 Anya-Nya second
lieutenants, fresh from three-
months' training in Israel, instruct
the guerrillas in fielderaft and
marksmanship. They are super-
vised by three Israeli officers.
One guerrilla described for me
his personal quest for Israeli
arms and training. 'We crossed
the Nil- in rubber boats, at night,
and walked 10 days to reach
one of Lagu's camps. There were
four Israelis there - a Colonel
John and a captain, who were
checking our military training,
a radio operator and it doctor. All
four spoke English and the radio-
man and doctor spoke Arabic,
too. We had 31) Anya-Nya training
us. They went to Israel in groups
and, after three months there.
came back as second-lieutenants.
'I shot a ?303 rifle, a sten and a
Bren machinegun. But for
economy we fired only 2(1 bullets.
We had plenty of fieldcraft: how
to advance to the enemy. how to
ambush, how to find cover and
how to walk at night. Then, after
one month, the Arabs attacked
one of Lagu's posts near our camp.
We had a store of arms there.
`The Arabs came at five in the
morning, without warning. Lagu
sent a reinforcement which never
reached there. The Anya-Nya in
the post ran away, leaving about
40 arms in the store. We heard the
firing in camp and my platoon
went to reinforce and got lost.
`The Arabs were mortaring in
the bush. We fired at them. Then
both sides waited while it rained.
We forced the Arabs to go away;
they buried seven men by the
stream and we had two dead.'
In one area of the south, I
visited a clandestine bush school
run by teachers loyal to the
Anya-Nya. There were three long
soldier as guard. Black youngsters
danced in a circle, clad only in
shorts or in green leaves. Older
boys marched in military drill.
while six- to eight-vear-oids
practised abort-faces ;knd march-
ing in single file.
A teacher whistled and classes
began again. The youngest sat on
the ground, used wooden sticks or
their fingers to draw tablets in the
sand and practise writing words
in Kakwa, the local dialect, with
symbols remarkably like Hebrew.
Ten-year-olds sat on the logs
nearby, singing Christian mission-
ary hymns. The school itself had
no paper, pencils, desks or books.
Inside one open-sided hut, about
60 boys of grade four, aged 13 to
24, practised writing sentences.
They had pencils and paper paid
for by farming and bought across
the Uganda border. I questioned
them: What would they do after
grade four?
About one-third of them finally
said they would join the guerrillas.
Why? One after another they told
stories of seeing schoolmates
rounded up at. school by Sudan
army patrols. `When I talk about
it, I have a burning feeling,' one
said.
The Anya-Nya fighters cone
from several different tribes. After
several months of training, many
of the men will have run away
with their arms, preferring to
soldier in their own tribal areas
under local self-appointed colonels.
I went with one Anya-Nya unit
while it made an attack on the
Sudan Army post at Kajo Kaji,
close to the Nile near the Sudan.
Uganda border. The night I
arrived, the Anya-Nya were
grouped around their fires, singing
one of their popular songs: `Three
persons Anya-Nya/Killed Arabs
with bows and arrows/The rest
started running./In the beginning
we told you;/What did we tell you,
oh Arabs?/We said the birds
would eat you,/The birds will fly
over you, Northern youth/Your
country is eaten by vultures.'
The Anya-Nya group was led
by Colonel Rolf Steiner, the
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 CPYRGHT
assembled with their weapons -
British Bren.guns, a Russian
heavy inachinegun and Russian
bazookas and British -303x. Re-
German-born ex-French Foreign
Legionnaire who commanded
Biafra's 4th Brigade in the
Nigerian civil war. Steiner asserted
that, unlike the dozen other
whites who fought in Biafra, he
was not a mercenary.
The Anya-Nya said that he
lived in the Sudan as poorly as
they do and had not received
money from abroad, even to
augment his obviously meagre
food supply. `I am an extremist,'
Steiner told me. 'The Africans
need my help and I'm prepared to
spend five years here.'
Of the three platoons he had
trained for the Kajo Kaji attack,
one never even arrived at the
starting-point: their major simply
went off to another headquarters.
His men remained in their base
camp despite strict marching
orders. This behaviour, it appears,
is not unusual among the Anya-
Nya.
The other two platoons
NIGERIAN OBSERVER
March 12, 1971
CPYRGH
connaissance patrols to
northern Sudanese army
showed that the `Arabs'
Anya-Nya name for all
the
post
(the
nor-
therners) were not expecting an
attack. They were busy playing
football on the parade-ground in
the late afternoon.
At midnight, one Anya-Nya
platoon left for its assigned
position in bushes only 65 yards
from the Arab barracks. An hour
later, the second platoon set out.
Its guide was an elderly sergeant
who lived in the area and had
guided reconnaissance patrols
perfectly. But by five a.m. the
second platoon was utterly lost;
at sunrise it was a mile from the
post.. There was no time left to get
in position undetected. Steiner
could only hope that the first
platoon would realise its isolation
~tracu~0
MANY right thm ng r cans, no ma er
_Vvew
leanings, must have viewed with utter dismay, Press
report emanating from no less a personage thanl the
bulky and controversial Ugandan army ruler, General
Idi Amin Dada, that there is a "South Africa in South-
ern Sudan where Catholic and Protestants are not
allowed to go to church".
Although the Kampala
regime is as yet too
effeminate to pursue its
cherished objectives
through the proper dip-
lomatic channels, the
present state of war in
Soulthern Sudan cannot
be allowed to go on In-
definitely while all Afri-
ca looks on.
Indeed General Amin
and withdraw in time. Promptly
at six, the first platoon was
discovered. It launched its attack
with bazooka fire against four
barracks and succeeded in burning
down all but one of the buildings
in the post. Three Anya-Nya were
killed as the platoon retreated.
The redeeming feature of the
attack, for Steiner, was that the
Anya-Nya had never fought so
well before. However, although he
planned a second attack, most of
the Anya-Nya officers mutinied five
days later. They said the orders
were too strict. They preferred to
go back to their usual style of
fighting. This involves occasional
ambushes - which are poorly-
prepared and mainly use fire
directed from a long distance.
Despite the mutiny, Steiner did
not show himself too discouraged.
`Patience,' he told me. 'Our time
is still coming.' In fact, he never
had a chance to see it, come.to
sounds one use!-1 note
when he mentions that
the OAU cannot confine
itself to double-talks and
endless but ineffective
resolutions over South
Asks
Abraham Omoyi
Africa and Rhodesia
when right at our own
nose, the all-Arab Khar-
toum government oppres-
ses and persecutes the
black Sudanese majority.
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her of the OAU. country. base
e
,
Much of the Arab- In the Sudanese cas
black bitterness is older power in the hands of
than those now organi' Britain not only left
sing or fighting' the war the minority, Arab Su-
Itself. ' danese but made sure
that this was firmly en-
In the nineteenth cen- trenched in the law
tury, Arab slave raiders books before they bow-
and ivory traders were ed out.
said to have removed No safeguards were
two million blacks from given for the more po-
this region alone, in pulous but less advan-
chains through the de- ced blacks should they
sert, and at a huge cost in the future, come face
of black African lives: to face with civilization.
monopoly
Moreover, when the
British came late? last
century, the ancient ca-
pital of Khartoum re-
mained their centre of
adfninistration and to-
gether with this was thg
grooming of local Arabs
for leadership just in
case the Englishman had
to go.
It is therefore not sur-
prising that in 1956 and
ever since, Arath have
monopolised virtually
every office of govern-
ment and have held just
to the economic life of
the state.
When the British left
in 1956, Arabs who con-
stituted only six million
of Sudan's fifteen mil-
lion people grabbed 790
out of the 800 vacant
posts in government de-
partments.
Fifteen years of in-
dependence, however,
helped a lot to heal the
serious wounds inflicted
on the Sudanese blacks
by neglect, ignorance
and illiteracy.
As the years wore on,
after. 1,956, blacks started
making demands for
equality with their nor-
thern neighbours.
It is, of course, a
constant if not an inten-
tional deformity in Bri-
tish t'ramed constitutions
that, somehow, a bone
of contention must be
left in thg political
soup-pots of colonies as-
piring to independence
so that, a4 , soon as the
Union Jack: is lowered,
violence would errupt to
engulf a once proud.
The end result so far
is that while no Arab
is prepared to give any
concession to the blacks,
the Southern Sudanese
are firmly demanding
autonomy.
resistance
Throughout the 1960s
spirited efforts have been
made by black Su-
danese nationalists to
assert their rights
through violence as it
became increasingly evi-
dent to them that Arabs
of the North would ne-
ver really part with
their positions of autho-
dity under the existing
system.
Although the Southern
"rebels" have kept up
their resistance ? at a
purely guerrilla level,
the Arab chiefs at Khar-
toum have frowned bit-
terly at this subtle at-
tempt by the blacks to
truncate their authority.
They replied by thrus-
ting the all-Arab Suda-
nese army, into suspec-
ted rebel hideouts flush-
ing them out in their
tens and hundreds.
But in resillience, the
black Sudanese are
much a ? match for the
Arab soldiers from the
north, `and what had
started years ago - as
primitive bush fights has
now developed, sadly
enough, into a sideshow
of the sophisticated Mid-
dle East confrontation.
To break the will o1
the southerners, the
Khartoum regime hasp in
recent months, approved
air raids into densely
populated southerp towns
and villages.
1Clteilar b' ",h-
)0~0100,91l6
Mml'ar, near,
the Ugandan border,
caused nearly 1,000 civi-
lian casualties.
International obser-
vers who flew into the
scene of incident to as-
sess equipmet used by
the Khartoum gover-
ment forces said they
were of Russian origin.
Khartoum, df course,
has never made secret
of its "friendship" with
the Soviets in recent
months.
Despite General Nu-
meiry's vow to wipe out
local communists who
number only 6,000, the
Sudanese leader still to-
lerates about 100 Russian
"advisers" among whom
are the only pilots who
help him in prosecuting
his war of "smash and
rule" In Southern S'
dan.
arms
The Southern "rebels"
themselves are not com-
pletely starved of ex-
ternal support.
Since Numiery started
moving Sudan closely
to Egypt and Russia,
Israel began parachut-
ing arms and supplies
from an unmarked D.C.3
to Owing-ki-bul, 'a major
guerrilla camp.
The Israel plane, ob-
viously flies in from ei-
ther Uganda or Ethiopia;
Israel provides substan-
tial mi?,tary aid to both
countries.
Khartoum and Addis-
Ababa are particularly
not on speaking terms
since Sudan started of-
fei1ing access routes to
Ethiopia's Eritrean rebels
returning to their coun-
try from overseas.
Meanwhile, South
Sudanese refugees are
received with. open arms
in Ethiopia' from lime
to time.
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011610/001IL tell
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE STUBBORN WAR IN SUDAN
Moscow keeps busy in Africa
CPYRGHT
Translated from RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Cologne
Two months ago, ATLAS published a British view of the 16-year-old
war that is raging between the Arab rulers of northern Sudan and the
black (Christian) Africans of the South. As our February report sug-
gested, the hopes raised by the takeover of General Gafaar al-Nimeiry,
a "democratic socialist", have largely come to naught as reports of
further killing continue to come in to the U.N. This follow-up report
by Siegmar Schelling, the foreign editor of Cologne's respected con-
servative weekly Rheinischer Merkur, contradicts positive reports from
ther sources. Schelling blames the Soviet Union for keeping - the
udan in a state of turmoil to provide a staging ground for rebel
orces in surrounding nations.
ESTERN journalists trying to
visit the Sudan today are
Greened most carefully. If an ap-
licant's record shows that he
as studied the South Sudan and
s problems, he may be sure of
of getting a visa. And even if he
oes succeed in going to Khar-
um, he will definitely not reach
e South Sudan. One million
eaths are too much for the pub-
I c to take. A million dead do not
t into the -TV screen. Better
leave them alone-else a new
iafra might be evoked.
In the Sudan, as in many lands
o the underbelly of the Sahara,
t e struggle between Arabs and
b ack Africans is raging. Like its
p edecessors, the Nimeiry gov-
e nment is trying to gain control
o the situation. But the fact re-
sins that animosities between
b cks and Arabs are nowhere
re virulent or tenacious than
i the Sudan.
Tribal conflicts in the Sudan
were held in check by British
colonial rule until 1963-the
year of independence. With the
ouster of England came the end
of tolerance: the Sudan 'split
apart. All that still bound North
and South together was the bit-
ter heritage of slavery. For a cen-
tury the Arab tribes had sent
their caravans across the Nile
swamps to get slaves; for a cen-
tury, the southern tribes were the
servants and bootblacks of the
Arab North. The British were only
too glad to leave the job of civiliz-
ing the South to the missionaries:
church-sponsored schools were
no burden on Great Britain's bud-
get. In the civil war that marked
the English retreat, Moslem army
and police forces began to get
control of the country; mission-
aries in the South were dpven
over into the Congo or Chad.-Aid
the resistance movement in the
South developed a momentum
which all the napalm, phosphorus
bombs and torture used by Khir-
toum could not stamp out.
It was only natural that the
Khartoum government, faced by
this conflict and by growing eco-
nomic troubles, turned to the first
power that offered help-the
Soviet Union. And that it sought
to internationalize its problems
by aiming for a quadruple alli-
ance with Libya, Egypt and Syria.
Today the Soviet position in the
Sudan is an accomplished fact.
Still, the Soviets, like the
British before them, need a mid-
dleman. That role is played by
Egypt. Egyptian "advisers" were
already in the Sudan before the
Nimeiry coup of May 25, 1969;
today there are about a thousand
in the country. The military
school in Khartoum, indirectly
controlled by the Soviets, is one
of the best in the country. Over
200 MIG-19's and MIG-21's are
stationed In the Sudan. These air-
craft are not only an element of
support for the Arab cause: they
are used to keep the Nimeiry
regime in power.
Nimeiry, who tried to set up a
Nasser-type "Arab socialist" re-
gime, has outlived ten putsch at-
tempts. His survival would not
have been possible without Soviet
assistance. Yet it is typical of this
country, in area the largest of the
~1i~e~~tertur
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CPYRGHT
African states, that Nimeiry
speaks only for Khartoum and
not for the rest of the territory;
numerous guerrilla organizations
have :set up shop here. One such
group is FROLINA, the Islamic
liberation organization operatin
in the Chad. The Sudan also pro-
vides, a rear grouping area for the
Eritreans who at the moment are
trying to overthrow the Haile
Selassie regime in Ethiopia. The
proposed federation of Sudan,
Egypt, Libya and Syria should
give ! new impetus to these sub-
versive activities.
Both the U.S.S.R. and Red
China have tried to secure a foot-
hold; in Africa. So it is a natural
reaction for the Western powers,
particularly the U.S. and Israel,
to intensify their own activities
in the area. It remains to be seen
how; successful they will be. In
the African game, the Sudan oc-
cupies a key position. Thus far
the Soviets have been able to play
the'British cards in the old way.
How long Nimeiry can hold on,
however, depends on whether his
government can work out an ar-
rangement with the South.
That looks unlil-21y. The hatred
between the two halves of the
Sudan runs deep. In Khartoum
one notices little: of this, but as
soon as one crosses the border
into the Sudan from the Congo
or Chad, one comes upon burned-
out villages, abandoned settle-
ments, "scorched earth" on the
Vietnamese
dren's drawings on walls of
houses or schools-drawings that
reveal all that the children know :
violence, In the South Sudan,
only one child out of four reaches
adulthood ; there is no medicine,
there is not enough to eat, there.
are no schools left since the mis-
sionaries were driven out.
Meanwhile a million people
have been killed in the Sudan.
The world has taken no notice
because journalists get no visas,
journalists get only as far as
Khartoum. There are no foreign
"interests" to defend here, either
economic or political. The only
world power to have "discovered"
the Sudan to date is, the Soviet
Union. The Soviets are using it
as a pawn in their strategic game
to build their own influence in
the grab world as well as to com-
bat the inroads of Communist
China into black Africa.
With England, the Western
world withdrew from Egypt and
the Sudan. Through its protege
Nimeiry, Moscow has established
Itself in the breach. For the-mo-
ment it appears to be out of the
question to hope for recovery of
influence in the area, not to men-
tion establishment of a democrat-
ic regime. For. the time being the
surrounding states must resign
themselves to the fact that, while
the Sudan has its own rebellion,
it also provides a staging area for
insurgent movements in nearby
countries-Uganda, Ethiopia and
Chad. 40
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December., 1970
SOU~AIRIE
Reserves
a I'egard de ('unite arabe
CPYRGHT
Associ6 a la Libye et it la Repu-
blique Arabe Unie dans le , Front
Revolutionnaire ? fonds en de-
cembre 1969 par Gamal Abdel
Nasser, le Soudan se felicite des
avantages que comports pour lui
cette formule : appui politique or-
ganique du Caire, coordination
croissante des echanges dans la
moyenne et basse vallee du Nil,
perspectives d'investissements Ii-
byens dans une industrie encore
embryonnaire et dans une agri-
culture placee devant de lourdes
tdches de modernisation. Et le
general Gaafar al Nimeiri a sou-
tenu ('action politique du Rais
jusqu'au jour mime de la mort
de celul-ci : durant la crise jor-
dano-palestinienne de septembre,
it a ete charge, en particulier,
Waller faire le point a Amman
en vue de preparer Ia mediation
interarabe. Un colonel soudanais
dirige d'ailleurs encore le groups
d'officlers arabes qui contrOle,
sur le terrain, ('application de
('accord intervenu entre le gou-
vernement royal d'Amman et le
Comit6 Central de la Resistance
Palestinienne.
Ce n'est donc pas une opposi-
tion de principe que le Soudan
a exprimee, debut novembre, aux
projets egyptiens de renforcement
du ? Front o. Mais le general
Gaafar al Nimeiri, lors de ce
petit ? sommet ,, a cependant
formule des objections a I'encon-
tre tant de la formule egyptienne
de ? direction politique unique
que des veeux libyens d'unifica-
tion immediate des services diplo-
matiques, de creation d'une Orga-
nisation populaire unique et de
fixation d'un delai maximum de
trois ans pour la realisation d'une
unite complete entre Ies trois
Etats.
Le contre-projet soudanais, envi-
sageant un acheminement gra-
duel et prudent vers le but uni-
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taire, preconisait que ('evolution
se fit, !dans chaque Etat et pour
('ensemble en gestation, par eta-
pes. II; suggerait que, dans un
premier temps, fut realisee la
totale o liberation - politique et
aconorrique de ces pays, et qu'il
y fOt institue des gouvernements
stables, garantissant la liberte, la
democratie, I'independance eco-
nomique et la levee d'une solide
armee. Puis devalent interve-
nir, au cours d'une seconde
phase, des essais d'echanges
techniques et culturels soumis
ensuite a un examen critique, et
une cdordination des economies
operee grace a I'action d'un
Conseil de Planification commun.
Conformement aux vues souda-
naises, ce n'est donc pas une
formula; de ? federation ?, c'est
un ? plan d'action , unitaire que
les trois chefs d'Etat ont adopts
le 8 novembre. Et le general
Gaafar at Nimefri a pu souligner.
dans un message radio-diffuse le
16 novembre, que les mesures
d'unification envisagees seraient
lentes et progressives. II ne s'agit
pas seulement, pour le gouverne-
ment de Khartoum, de manager
un sentiment ombrageux de I'in-
dependance nationale, qui de-
meurevif dans tous les milieux
qu'a touches ('influence nistorique
du mahdisme. Mals it convient
aussi, et surtout, de progresser
d'abord: dans Ia solution de cer-
tains problemes particuliers au
Soudan,: de maniere a pleinement
assurer. I'homogenaite du pays
avant d'engager a fond celul-ci
dans un ensemble plus vaste.
Le retablissement d'une situation
normale dans les provinces meri-
dionales du pays a constitue, on
s'en souvient, le souci primordial
du gouvernement revolutionnaire
soudanais, des ('accession de
celui-ci au pouvoir, au printemps
1969. L'autonomle Interne a Atd
promise a cette region, un plan
special de developpement a ate
elabore a son profit, et le minis-
tere des Affaires du Sud, confie
a une personnalite politique lo-
cale, M. Joseph Garang, s'est mis
en devoir de rassurer la popula-
tion par diverses mesures admi-
nistratives ; une amnistie generale
etait accordee, les refugies etaient
invites a regagner leurs foyers,
et les autorites de Khartoum se
declaraient disposees a entrer en
conversations avec ceux qui
s'etaient rebelles contre les abus
du passe.
Certains resultats ont pu, de la
sorte, etre obtenus dans les villes
et les principales bourgades du
Sud, qu'ont regagnees plusieurs
milliers de fugitifs : les ecoles et
un certain nombre d'eglises ont
ate rouvertes, les ateliers d'arti-
sans et les petites industries loca-
les ont repris vie, le commerce
local a retrouve une partie de son
activite. Mais les Soudanais du
Sud refugies a I'exterieur, soumis
d'ailleurs a diverses propagandes
independantistes parfois inspirees
de I'etranger, hesitent encore a
rentrer. Les dirigeants separatis-
tes qui animent, dans le ? ma-
quis ,, ('insurrection armee de
I'Anya-Nya (? Front de Liberation
de I'Anzanie') et les chefs de la
plupart des a gouvernements en
exit ,, dont I'articulation est d'ail-
leurs confuse, se refusent a tran-
siger et visent it la creation d'un
Etat nigro-africain du Haut Nil ;
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CPYRGHT
soul l'un d'entre eux, M. Gordon
Mayer, au nom du , gouvernement
provisoire du Nil,,, c'est dit prdt
A negocier, mals apparemment
sans rien rabattre de ses exi-
gences.
Les forces soudanaises conti-
nuent donc d'opsrer contre les
groupes de rebelles armes qui
tIennent, ou parcourent, une
grande partie des provinces me-
ridionales ; elles trouvent peu de
concours aupres de la plupart
des populations tribales qui furent
naguere ('objet de la repression
brutale de Ia dictature militaire,
restent sensibles it ('influence des
? maquis ? et Ignorent les inten-
tions du nouveau gouvernement
ou les m6connaissent d'instinct.
Comme it est malheureusement
presque inevitable dans ce genre
d'operations, de fr6quentes con-
fusions sont commises, et it ar-
rive que des rassemblements
paisibles sont trait6s comme des
formations rebelles : Ia presse
internationale a signal6, cet 6te,
plusieurs cas de ce genre, en
particulier I'attaque d'un groupe
de fid6les d'une secte christo-
africalne r6unis dans une eglise
A Bansa, localite des confins du
Congo-Kinshasa abritant des r6-
fugies sud-soudanais, et le meur-
tre de six chefs et notables de
la tribu Dinka, A la lisiere du
Kordofan. La bonne foi des auto-
rites centrales de Khartoum n'est
pas mise en cause par ces regret-
tables excss, dont la responsa-
bilit6 incombe h des chefs de
d6tachement inducts en erreur ou
persistent dans les pratiques de
la periode ant6rieure.
presse (voir en particulier f El
Moudlahid N, Alger, 10 novembre
1970), la rebellion bendficie d'ap-
puls strangers, et en particulier
israeliens, mobilisant A son profit
des mercenaires europeens et
vlsant A 00nhtituer trole -fronts
de combat ? : A I'est A partir de
la frontiere ethiopienne, au sud
sur le Haut-Nil, au sud-ouest dans
le Bahr al Ghazal. Le 17 octobre
a Ate arrdt6 en Ouganda un an-
cien sous-officier ouest-allemand,
que les autorit6s locales soup-
connent d'avoir fait partie des
? maquis m sud-soudanais avant
d'dtre entr6 clandestinement dans
lour pays (? El Moudjahid u, 25
octobre). Le 8 novembre, le gene-
ral Hassan Abbas Khaled, ministre
soudanais de la Defense, a de-
clare, au cours d'une conference
de presse, que les forces souda-
naises avalent rsussi A d6truire,
dans I'Equatoria, les quatre bases
rebelles de Morto, Edo, Lorango
et Bramba, et A arrster le ? chef
des mercenaires Rudolf Steiner,
ancien sous-officier ouest-alle-
mand de la Legion Etrangere et
naguere ? colonel , des troupes
biafraises, alors qu'il tentait de
s'enfuir vers I'Ouganda. A cette
occasion, le ministre soudanais a
formellement impute A Israel et
aux Etats-Unis ('envoi aux rebel-
les d'auxiliaires mercenaires et
d'armement lourd, en vue de pa-
ralyser le gouvernement souda-
nais au sein de la coalition arabe
et de I'empdcher de jouer un r6le
dans le conflit de Palestine.
Les provinces du Sud continuent,
de la sorte, do constituer le prin-
cipal souci du gouvernement sou-
danais dans le domaine de la
securit6. II est cependant oblige
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aussi de veiller, daps ('ensemble
du pays, a ne se laisser deborder
ni' sur sa droite par leg elements
islamo-integristes ou mahdistes
qu'il regards comme ayant des
I'origine complote contre lui, ni
sur sa gauche par leg sympathi-
sants progressistes et commu-
nistes qu'il avait, en revanche,
associes a sa politique socialiste,
mais dont it redoute, de plus en
plus, qu'ils ne veuillent mener en
dehors de Iui, voire contre lul,
une action de surench6re pou-
vant alter jusqu'a Ia subversion.
En vue de faire face aux menses
venant de Is a droite', leg insur-
ges mahdistes de I'ile d'Eba sont
severement poursuivis. Une Hau-
te Cour militaire, constituee le
10 octobre, a entrepris une se-
maine plus tard Is proces de 160
d'entre eux. D'autre part, le mi-
nistLre de I'Interieur a annonce le
19 novembre I'arrestation de plu-
sleurs membres des anciens
partis reactionnaires ? et de
('association c I a n d e s tine des
? Freres Musulmans,,, qua seraient
impliques dans des activites con-
tre-revolutionnaires.
Entre-temps, it a fallu aussi faire
face aux intrigues decelees a
gauche, et, le 16 novembre, le ge-
neral Gaafar at Nimeirl a annon-
ce a la radio que trois ministres,
membres du Conseil de la Revo-
lution, avaient ete revoques de
leurs fonctions et dechus de leurs
grades militaires, on raison des
contacts qu'ils avalent pris avec
des -elements subversifs * dont
leg activites s'etendaient It I'inte-
rieur mOme du Conseil des forces
armees et des syndicats. II s'agit
du colonel Babaker al Nour, vice
premier Ministre, charge de I'Eco-
nomie et de Is Planification ; du
commandant Farouq Osman Ha-
madallah, ministre de I'Interieur,
et du commandant Hachem al
Atta, vice-premier Ministre charge
de I'Agriculture et des Ressour-
ces animales. Quelques jours
plus tard, Is nouveau ministre de
I'Interieur, Is commandant Aboul-
gacem Ibrahim, exposait aux re-
presentants des ? etudiants pro-
gressistes u de I'Universite de
Khartoum que ces m e s u r e s
n'avaient aucun rapport avec le
plan d'action ? tripartite adopts
au Caire et pour lequel Is chef du
gouvernement soudanais avast re-
cueilli ('approbation unanime des
membres de celul-ci.
Les trois ministres revoques, et
en particulier le commandant Fa-
rouq Osman Hamadallah, avaient
joue un role important dans Is
mouvement revolutionnaire du 25
mai 1969 ; depuis lors, Is com-
mandant Hamadallah detenait Is
portefeuille de I'Interieur ; leg
deux autres officiers, en revan-
che, no s'etalent vus confier de
fonctions ministdrielles qu'a Is
suite d'un remaniement partial, on
juin dernier. Tous trois etaient
connus pour lours opinions so-
ciales avancees et pour leurs
sympathies a regard de I'ancien
Parts Communists soudanais ; ce-
pendant, Its no preconisalent pas,
du moans ouvertement, Is recons-
titution de celui-ci.
Le portefeuille de I'Economie et
de Is Planification a ete confie,
par Is Conseil de Is Revolution,
au general Gaafar al Nimeiri.
D'autre part, Is jour m6me de Is
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6
CPYRGHT
revocation des trois ministres,
onze officiers superieurs et deux
officiers subalternes ont ete mis
e la retraite d'office, probable-
ment pour d'analogues motifs
ideologiques.
Enfin, le lendemain 17 novembre,
etait annoncee I'arrestation de
M. Abdelkhaleq Mahgoub, secre-
taire general de I'ancien Parti
Communiste soudanais, auquel
etait de longue date reproche de
poursuivre la reconstitution de ce-
Iui-ci et d'envisager son action
sous la forme d'une force inde-
pendante. Au printemps dernier,
le gouvernement avait dejA ecarte
dii pays, pour quelque temps,
M. Abdelkhaleq Mahgoub, puis
I'avait autorise A rentrer at sem-
blait lul avoir de nouveau temoi-
gne une certaine confiance. II
semble probable que M. Mahgoub
ait profite de I'ouverture A gau-
che que manifestait le remanie-
ment ministeriei du moss de juin
pour accroTtre ses contacts dans
les milieux gouvernementaux, et
qu'il ait de la sorte profite de cer-
taines Indiscretions. On pout
donc presumer, en depit de
I'absence de toute indication offi-
clelle A cat egard, que I'arresta-
tion de I'ancien secretaire gene-
ral du Parti Communiste souda-
nais n'est pas sans rapports avec
la revocation des trois ministres
auxquels ont ete reprochees des
Imprudences macs que, jusqu'A
present, on raison sans doute de
leurs services au profit du mou-
vement revolutionnaire, le Conseil
semble se borner A vouloir ecar-
ter des affaires publiques.
Le gouvernement de Khartoum
parait donc, A I'heure actuelle,
devoir concentrer beaucoup de
son attention sur des problemes
d'edification interieure, et iI est
aise de comprendre qu'il en-
tende assurer d'abord la parfaite
solidite du pays et de ses insti-
tutions avant d'associer I'Etat A
une construction unitaire arabe
plus structuree. Cette attitude a
d'ailleurs ete comprise par les
dirigeants egyptiens et libyens, et
le ? plan d'action n arrete en
c o m m o n en tient largement
compte. Dans ces conditions, on
pout presumer que le Soudan
s'associera sincerement A une
oeuvre progressive d'unification,
menee sans We excessive et
evec suffisamment de prudence.
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IF
March 15, 1971
CPYRGHT A F R I K A
t es Parallelen zwi-
schen Stidsudan and Stu os as en. So
siedeln auch die Behorden im Su Su-
dan die mit den Aufstandischen s m-
pathisierende Bev6lkerune In b fe-
stigten Dorfern an, um die Rebelle zu
isolieren. Wie in Saigon scheint uch
das Regime in Khartum alles an ere
er-
N
In in knapp aft
zwei JahrenHerrs
lebte b
nicht weniger als neun Umsturz er-
suche.
Anders aber als der hervorra end
organisierte, dlszlpllnierte Viet ong
sind die sudsudanesischen Aufst' di-
schen durch Stammes- and Fti.h gs-
rivalitaten zerstritten. Der in a em
Khartumer Gefangnis auf seine er-
urteilung wartende deutsche R bel-
len-Helfer Rolf Steiner: ?Am b sten
kampfen sie untereinander."
Experten beurteilen denn auc die
Erfolgsaussichten der Sudsuda esen
- anders als die des Vietcong su-
f3erst skeptisch. Ein Washingtone Mi-
litarspezialist: ,Jetzt, nachdem So-
wjet-Offiziere and Prestige verw kelt
sind, kbnnen die Russen keine iege
der Aufstandischen mehr zulasse
1
den Vereinigten Staaten" ausgeweitet A army
tisch-;igvpi lsrhe pz ,i;,?nz im Sudan ist
~~
schwarzen Sudsudanesen interessiert, ten NuI,wl,. Mig
die sich von der arabischen Fuhrungs- clan-Luftwaffe 1st colt -Uber-
schicht in Khartum majorisiert and schalljagern, An-12-Transporters, Tu-
16-Bombers and Mi-8-Hubschraubern,
unterdruckt fiihlen. den , fliegenden Lastkranen" der So-
Seft abet der 1969 in Khartum an wjet.-Luftmucht, ausgerustet.
die Macht gekommene Generalmajor i~el port Sudan baucn die Sowjets
Numeiri seines 15-le Mallioantiwenwoh- cities Flatten- and Samie Socten-Staat Lager fij ins radi h d antiwestliche Stiltzpunkt. Auf dem Flugplatz Wadi
Lager fiihrte, hat t zWis c Bhen iir degem rk ara- rieg rieg Seidna, 24 Kilometer nordlich von
b einem nd dem zwi Khartum - aul3erhalb der Retchwei-
zwis h and deco schwsr Afrika, to von Israels Jets -, stehen 100 agyp-
cen Arabern unit Israel l and da- e Mips.
rrdt zwischen der Sowjet-Union and tisch
, '-render nher ais die sowje-
SUDAN
Hort die Trommeln
l comer wenn u
schen Busch eine DC-3 ohne Ho-
heitszeichen auftaucht, stilrzen
schwarze Rebellen freudig gestikulie-
rend aus ihren Verstecic..n; denn das
Flugzeug bringt begehrte Gi ter: Waf-
fen and Munition, Let}ensmittel and
Medikamente. Am Steuer der aus
Athiopien oder Uganda kommenden
Maschine sitzen Welf3e - Israelis.
Sohald aber Mi-B-Orol3hubschrau-
ber ',der An-12-Flugzeuge iiher die
Wipfel knattern, gehen die Guerillas
entsetzt in Deckung; denn die Ma-
schiner. bringen Tod and Verderben:
MG-Feuer, Bombes, Soldaten der
Sudan-Armee. Auch am Steuer dieser
im Sudan gestarteten 'Maschinen sit-
zen Weif3e - Russen.
Der Bus'hkrieg im Sudan, Afrikas
flachengroiitcm Land, fist In cis neues
Stadium getreten. Mehl' als zehn Jahre
lang hatten sich nur humanitare Or-
ganisationen fiir den scheinbar aus-
Denn well der revolutfonare Sozia-
lilst Numeiri mehr and mehr Russen
and Agypter ins Land holt.e and damit
das Gleichgewicht. dc+r Krafte im i st-
lichen Afrika verinderte, wurden auf
der anderen Seite westliche Mi chte
aktiv - vor allem die Israelis.
Verglichen mit dem ost.lichen Enga-
gement fiir Numeiri nimmt sich die
westliche Unterstutzung fur die nach
einem Schlangengift benannten Anya-
Nya-Aufstandischen allerdings be-
scheiden aus: Die Israelis instruierten
In Israel einige Anya-Nya-Fiihrer -
so den Chef der ?Southern Sudan Li-
beration Front", Joseph Lago -, sie
leisten Materialhilfe'aus der Luft and
schickten 26 Agenten zur Beratung
der Rebellen in den Busch.
Bescheidene Hill',e leisten auch
Athiopien and Uganda. Haile Selassies
Kaiserreich, sift der linken Macht-
ubernahme in Somalia in die Zange
geraten, gewahrt deh Rebellen Unter-
schlupf. Der Negus? racht sich damit
zugleich bet Numeiti fur dessen Un-
terstutzung der Eritrea-Separatisten,
die Athiopiens reiche Kustenprovinz
aus dem Kaiserreich losen wollen.
(so der britische ?Guardian").
zu beiden Seiten der Grenze leben,
steht erst seit dem Sturz des Linken
Milton Obote am 25. Januar Pest an der
Seite der Sudsudanesen. Idi Amin,
Ugandas neuer Fuhrer, verglich Nu-
meiris Behandlung der schwarzen Su-
danesen mit Sudafrikas Apartheid-
Politik. Daraufhin drohte Numeiris
Minister Abu Issa: ,Wir werden ange-
sichts der Einmischung im revolutio-
naren Sudan nicht die Hande im
Schof3 gefaltet lassen."
Seine militarische Starke verdankt
der revolutioniire Sudan der Sowjet-
Union, die such an dem Mitte Februar
ausgesprochenen KP-Verbot keinen
Anstofi nimmt. Das Gastebuch im Ho-
tel der stidsudanesischen Provinz-
hauptstadt Juba ist volt von russischen
Namen. In die Spalte ?Firma" haben
fast alle ?Air Force" geschrieben.
500 his 1000 russische Expcrten dril-
die Verwicklung der sozialistischen
Freunde in den Biirgerkrieg, denn sett
sechs Monaten beteiligen sie sich aktiv
an den Aktionen gegen (lie Rebellen in
den drel Sildprovinzen:
So brachten im Oktober von Rus-
sen 'geflogene Hubschrauber eine su-
danesische
Lager Morta, unweit deraUganda-
Grenze. Die Hubschrauber griffen
in die Kampfe ein, angeblich fielen
fast tausend Zivilisten. Und im Januar
unterstiitzten Hubschrauber einen An-
griff auf ?Owing-ki-bul" (HOrt die
Trommeln), das Hauptlager der Auf-
standischen.
Von Sowjets gesteuerte Hubschrau-
ber, Migs and Antonows flogen
aul3erdem von den Basen Juba and
Malakal aus Bombenangriffe gegen
vier weitere Orte.
,,Niemals zuvor haben die Sowjets so
aktiv an der Unterdruckung eines
Aufstands in der Dritten Welt teilge-
nommen, nie zuvor haben sic gegen
schwarze Afrikaner gekampft and bet
der Bombardierung ihrer DBrfer ge-
holfen", entriistete sich das US-Maga-
zin ?Time". Uberschrift: ?Das sowjeti-
sche Vietnam."
Approvea or a ease