CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 122
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
25X1C10b
25X6A
25X1X6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Note: -.Pages'.1-15 - - - Moscow's Sweet Life, The Soviet Elite's Daily Life
Approved For Re ease 1999109102 . CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Pages 15-25 *? L~Inti ite..des.J itres de L'U.R.S.S.
Pages 26-27 - - Conversation in Russia
DER SPIEGEL, 24 May 1971
Hamburg
(Excerpts)
Moscow's Sweet Life
CPYRGHT
The Soviet Elite's Daily Life, by ***
..Since Nikita Krushchev's abdication -- he appreciated contacts
ith the outside world and opened the Kremlin's gates to strollers --
he Soviet Union's top officials again keep themsell~es aloof from the
eople as they did in Stalin's time.
When the elite come to work in the morning or ride home at night,
hey never get out of their official cars. They live in residential
reas, their leisure time is spent in country estates and clubs,
ccording to strict protocol. When they make official trips they use
pedal trains and only planes that take off from special airports like
liDscow-Vnukovo II and land at special airports -- perhaps near Sochi.
People do not see them and hardly know them. On 1 May or on
November, the anniversary of the revolution, when the officials
tand on top of Lenin's tomb and review the parade, Red Square is
losed off. Only those marching by see their leaders, but they
ee them only as the leaders want to be seen: from afar and on high.
The: pfctizres.,.that are carried past and which decorate the fronts
f houses on holidays show the faces of the top officials like icons in
pose that has been established for years (and long outmoded). In
ewspaper photos and on TV the faces also appear with the same established,
sked expression, bare of emotion.
No Soviet reader learns anything about the private life of the
viet elite from his press. He was not told that Premier Kosygin
eceived the news of the death of his wife Klavdiya while reviewing
he L May 1967 parade (Kosygin remained on the tribune); he hears
othing about his rulers' children or illnesses. Yet probably the
remlin leaders live much further apart, are more isolated from the
eople and are much more old fashioned than Soviet citizens imagine.
Hardly any jokes are told about Brezhnev or Kosygin. When a
Soviet citizen talks about his government he. says: "They decided...,"
"They are doing.it" -- they up there.
In the morning between 9:00 and 10:00 those who are interested can
ee their rulers -- if they want to. That is when the Kremlin leadership
oes to work...
...Since Lieutenant Ilyin's attempt to fire a pistol at Brezhnev's
ar from behing the Borovitskiy gate on 22 January 1969, security precau-
ions have been strengthened. Police sentries along the customary
Ap ted ffiar" isiedsea.19 /BZs .C IA1 RDRff %-r1t*9"Q0 6W'k;7
approaches, all other traffic is immediately halted and the traffic light
 Ap~Pd *br Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
on the Borovitskiy gate is switched to red.
Politburo members' cars can be recognized by the blank plate they
carry on the front bumper. The four-place license number beginning
with 11, is carried only in the rear and is frequently changed in order
to make identification difficult....
....On Moscow's big through streets the convoys use a special
center lane---a system introduced by Stalin. It is for special vehicles
belonging to the police, the fire department, ambulances and -- a
rather unusual privilege in the modern world -- for-the elite.
Since 1967 the center lane has been widened a few centimeters at
each spring renovation....
The Moscow Telephone System Was Made.by Siemens
Perhaps it is their conservatism that makes the Kremlin politicians
prefer black limousines with curtained windows and the timeconsuming
land route. Even the car telephone as a means of communication is
not yet widespread in the Soviet Union's leadership circles.
Politburo members' official cars have them, and also the vehicles of the
top generals and State Security Police (KGB). But a department minister,
a division administrator or a regional party chief does not yet have
such equipment.
In the large antechamber of the Moscow chief mayor, Promyslov,
in the City Soviet House on Gorkiy street, there are two large tables.
On them stand over a dozen phones-(with dials). The Moscow telephone
system was made by the German Siemens company which was already in-
stalling long distance communications systems in the time of the czars
and whose Petersburg branch manager was Leonid Krasin, a well-known
Bolshevik. Later he ran the young Soviet state's foreign trade; he
died as ambassador to London in 1926.
The most modern technology however, is concealed between the
battlements of the Kremlin walls. 'IV cameras installed there survey
Red Square day and night.
This centrally controlled surveillance system cannot be seen from
outside. It serves to spot incipient rioting on the Square, unauthorized
demonstrations and even assassination attempts. In 1967 the security
organs were unable to prevent an old Lithuanian farmer from blowing
himself up with a home-made bomb in front.of Lenin's tomb.
He probably,wanted to protest the Soviet government's minority
policy. In Moscow they said the assassin wanted to destroy Lenin's
body but had been kept from doing so when a West German tourist group
approached; in order not to a endanger the visitors he had run outside
with the ticking bomb....
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
2 .
 CAWPI@M ffd For.., Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7
...On the first floor of the Kremlin are Brezhnev's and
Kosygin's private offices in addition to those of Politburo members
Masurov, Polyansky (both vice premiers), Podgorny. (chief of state)
and Suslov, (Central Committee Secretary). Even Anastas Mikoyan,
honorably discharged from the Politburo, still has an office in the
Kremlin as member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Parliament of
the USSR. During breaks in the sessions, Mikoyan takes a constitutional T
in the court next to St. George hall: 50 paces back and forth, for
ten minutes. His bodyguard marches in the opposite. direction.
During sessions of the Supreme Soviet the top officials can easily
be observed close at hand. About 100 of them sit on raised govern-
ment benches behind the speaker's rostrum. To.the right- of'Brezhnev,'
Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov have their seats. Behipd them sit the rest of
the Politburo members in the order of rank.
Almost all wear dark suits. Only chief ideologist Mikhail
Suslov sometimes appears in an elegantly tailored light gray flannel
suit; his choice of ties is in excellent taste.
While individual speakers are at the rostrum, the Politburo
members usually unabashedly converse together. Brezhnev -- with the
golden stars of Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Work and
Hero of the USSR on his chest -- likes to tell funny stories, which
make Kosygin and Podgorny break out into wide grins. Pelshe, the
72 year old Latvian, oldest member of the Politburo and chief of the
party court system, stares steadily ahead. He laughs only when the
others do.
Thick bundles of documents are considered status symbols of
industriousness. Kosygin's overwork and nervousness show through his
constantly moving fingers and his playing with a pencil.
t e ~artr.'L`eader Cart Cry ,When N tossa
Several rows behind Brezhnev sits his closest confidant, Central
Committee Secretary Katushev. He busily leafs through papers. When
he writes he looks like a diligent grammar school boy. He has a
habit of covering the paper in front of him with. his arm and hand as
if . he ,`tpre~titrying to prevent his neighbor , from,_ copying .. ; ... ,
Ukrainian party chief Petr Shelest, separated from-Brezhnev by,
an aisle, usually sits with his elbows spread wide apart on his
desk and broods., Besides Kosygin, Podgorny and,Suslov, Central
Committee Secretary Kirilenko is the only one who dares to address
Brezhnev, the chief. Politburo members Shelepin; Masurov and Polyansky
show definite restraint.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194AOOO3OOO6OOO1-7
 CPYRGHT,
prove or a ease 1999709702 : -
The fate of the Soviet Union is decided almost inci enta y -- pro
forma. In this pseudo-parliament, the Supreme Soviet, the defense
budget is passed something like this:
The chairman explains to the 1517 deputies: "We now come to
defense expenditures. Any remarks? No. All in favor of passing the
defense budget?" All deputies raise their hands. Without looking up
the president continues: "Opposed -- none. Abstentions -- none." Within
20 seconds the Supreme Soviet has approved the 20 billion ruble
budget (80 billion marks) for the USSR's military might.
Anyone who has an opportunity to observe party-chief Leonid I
Brezhnev more frequently in public gets the idea that he consciously
acts like a sovereign. His face seems bloated, his eyes swollen. At
public occasions in the early morning, Brezhnev looks as if he hadn't
had enough sleep,and suffers from hangovers. He often vainly combs
his hair. At the Bulgarian party congress in Sofia in the middle of
April, before beginning his speech of greeting he brushed his hair
back with both hands.
Brezhnev is a man who can cry at the right time. As in Bratislava
in 1968, when they played the "Internationale," and at the Kharkhov
tractor plant in the spring of 1970 when managers and workers cheered
him, there were tears in his eyes.
The widespread Russian and Ukrainian custom of kissing on meeting
and leaving is especially marked in Brezhnev. The secretary does
not confine himself to the traditional kiss on the cheek, but also tends
to kiss.heartily on the mouth. A-?comparison of the various Politburo
members' techniques shows that none can kiss like Brezhnev.
Brezhnev's mixture of a certain polish -- he wears well-cut,
single-breasted suits -- manly brutality and affability in his official
appearances, is usually quite effective with women. A woman observer
once said that Brezhnev had the charm of a St. Bernard.
Married to a plain woman, he has the reputation of not being
particularly fastidious. In Moscow they say that there is a liaison with
Lyudmila Sytsila, a popular, very stately, buxom, "merited singer of
the people." She is no longer young. She was already known during
the war for her work entertaining troops.
Brezhnev also likes to be surrounded by young girls, dancers,
but not from the Bolshoy Ballet -- from folk dance groups and operetta
cc anies.
His daughter Galina, in her early thirties, can be seen at the May
and November parades on the tribune for the elite in front of the
Kremlin walls in an expensive fur coat.- Ga.linaf?r ywears has had
a yen for the circus. j_S . was..f rst married_._to, anj nu l- trainer,--was_-
divorced, and then was friendly with a trick marks.
- -- - - -_
state with: a magician fr- a Moscow
fAt_ .present s h e e goes ar?jund
circus. The party leader is supposed to have told his daughter
several times that she should finally pick out and marry a decent man
AIPP&Wk o i ial circles or the military hierarchy.
4V f
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
Brezhnev's city apartment is in a house that was built right after
the war at number 24 Kutuzovskiy prospect. It is on the right side
of the prospect and looking from the Hotel Ukraina it is directly behind
the second traffic light. Trustworthy middle echelo# officials also live
in the same building, Brezhnev's apartment has five rooms on the
fifth floor. Below him, on the"fourth,floor, lives KGB Chief
Andropov, and on the sixth floor is Minister of the Interior Shchelokov.
Brezhnev Cooks for the Chief of the'Secret Police and is Enthusiastic
out Soccer
A limousine with watchful KGB agents is always in front of the
apartment house. In the courtyard are military guards and a telephone
in the sentry box. In addition security police keepwatch on the
ground floor of the stairwell. Unauthorized visitors have no chance to
pass through the'iron gate which is taller than a man.
Brezhnev often spends his spare time with Andropov and Shechelokov,
the holders of all police power. The three are considered as of one
heart and mind. Frequently there are also officials and friends whom
Brezhnev knows from his days as a party official in the ukrainian city
of Dnepropetrovsk. The group is spoken of as the "Dnepropetrovsk
Mafia."
Brezhnev keeps open house for these friends. He likes to cook
for guests. He stands in the kitchen in his shirtsleeves preparing
foods which he himself serves with either vodka or Armenian cognac.
Leonid Brezhnev is an enthusiastic soccer fan. He rarely misses
ne of the big soccer games in Moscow. His favorite team is the Moscow
r o. The party leader watches out of town games on TV. The world
hampionship between West Germany and Italy was carried live from
exico. This was at his personal request, since he did not want to
iss the game. World championship games in which the Soviet Union
's not involved are usually not sent direct.
Box seats are always reserved for Brezhnev and his guests in the
1enin Stadium. The starting whistle blows only after Brezhnev is
eated. He has been known to come as-much as 20 minutes late -- and the
ame then starts 20 minutes late!
Brezhnev loves to hunt as do his colleagues Podgorny and Kosygin.
e often drives into the forest area around Zavidovo, 120 kilometers
orth of Moscow, on the upper Volga, east of the Leningrad highway.
his area is closed to Russians and
.fougners..wittheexception,of
eing the vacation "base" for foreign diplomats and journalists. It
s a collection of carefully fenced in weekend houses with a restaurant.
guard opens the padlock on the fence only after the visitor has
hown a pass.
When Finnish Chief of State Kekkonen visits the Soviet Union,
rezhnev,.Kosygin and Podgorny usually go hunting with him in?the
vidovo forest.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
At these times Yuri Andropov, Met o the
Politburo candidate is not allowed to show his face. He earned
his fame with Kuusinen, the Finnish-Russian communist. During the
war Andropov was head of Komsomol, the party youth organization in
the Karelo-Finnish Soviet republic and Kuusinen was chief of state.
After Stalin's death Andropov, the Russian who knew how to get along'
with non-Russians, was ambassador to Hungary -- a post he also held
during the 1956 uprising.
Brezhnev's other friend, Minister of the Interior Lieutenant
General Nikolay Shchelokov, is head of the uniformed police (militia)
and of the criminal police. It is known that as a music lover he
likes to play the piano; he is an ardent admirer of Soviet cellist
Mstislav Rostropovich, with whqm he also has a persol)al friendship.
A Criminal Police Agent Helped in a Bank Holdup
On 12 November 1970, Rostropovich, 44, sent an open letter
defending author Alexandr Solzhenitsyn to the editors-in-chief of
Pravda and Izves~~tyya__ and to two other papers. In it he criticized
o icial Sovievie ultural policy. Solzhenitsyn is currently staying in
the dacha given the cellist by the state organs for his artistic services.
The dacha is in Shukovka, 20 kilometers west of Moscow. Sol-
zhenitsyn moved there after being expelled from the writers' union.
Rostropovich told him: "As long as I live and as long as I have this
dacha, you will be my guest."
Shchelokov.maintains friendly contacts with Rostropovich and
other artists and writers. He also has troubles with his son who
last year finished his studies at the Institute for lNvrld Economics _.
and International Relations. In 1969Shchelpkov,_Junior,_got friendly..
with a Russian woman who was about ten years his senior. She is not
of higher circles, had been married, and was divorced because of
the younger Shchelokov.
The interior minister's son was determined to marry his girl
friend against his parents' wishes. The father sent in the police
over which he was in charge.
The woman was several times ordered to break up her relationship
with the young man. Both were shadowed by the police. They continued
to meet in secret. Finally the woman was threatened with deportation
from Moscow and with "still other difficulties.'!
When even these threats proved to no avail, young Shchelokov was
t ken into the diplomatic service and after brief training, was sent to
the Soviet embassy in Australia. His boss now is Ambassador Yiesyatsev,
until recently chairman' of the Radio and Television Committee.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C64-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Ap
CPYRGHT
i
Interior Minister Shchelokov often criticized 6e Soviet police
in articles and speeches. At the Moscow writers club he explained last
year that when he took over the job he had had to fire some 500000
policemen for inefficiency. The militia's prestige needed improve-
ment. Special care must.now be given to the selection of police
recruits. In the future only the best of the working class will
be trained as police candidates. Especially, he said, "they must know
how to read and write."
Soviet papers never report big crimes. Thus, nothing was said
in November 1968, when burglars broke into world famous violinist
David Oistrakh's apartment while he was on tour abroad with his wife.
The burglars made off with works of.art, jewelry and cash worth
40,000 rubles (1,60,000'marks). Even West German Ambassador Allardt was
not immune from burglars in his apartment at 46 Vorovskiy street. The
thief was caught, although it is not know whether he was working on his
own or for the KGB.
As the year 1968 ended, a motorized gang held up a savings bank
branch in Moscow. In the ensuing fire-fight the bandits were captured;
one of them was a member of the Moscow criminal police.
Pretty young Russian girls are generally afraid of being attacked
in Moscow. Young ladies want to be escorted not just to the front
door, but right up to their apartments. They are afraid of being attacked
in the apartment house elevator.
People yearn for law and order. This however is not symbolized by
Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev. His reputation does not have a very
high rating. Rather it is Prime Minister Kosygin of whom many Russians
speak with a great deal of respect. Kosygin is considered the only
Politburo member seriously concerned about the people, especially
about improving their standard of living....
Kosygin Collects Jazz Records and ]discusses With Intellectuals
Kosygin regularly maintains a salon in his apartment. There are
lively discussions with intellectuals from the Soviet establishment.
This circle of regular visitors includes Jewish prima ballerina Playa
Plisetskaya and -- until he became seriously ill - Novy Mir editor-in-
chief Tvardovskiy, besides author Konstantin Simonov - who pleaded
for publication of Solzhenitsyn's latest novel August 1914 in
West Berlin in April and who also criticized Soviet censorship.
Kosygnr, so they say in Moscow, has a predeliction fo, jazz. He
has 'a large collection of Cool Jazz records. He is a well traveled
man -- not like Brezhnev who has never been to the west. Of all the
Politburo members he has the most contact with the outside world. His
son-in-law is Zherman Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the State Committee
for Science and Technology. The urbane Gvishiani, whose father was
a police general under Stalin, speaks fluent English and often travels
abroad. Always dressed in the latest western styles, he may be the
only man in the Soviet official elite to wear a blue button-down shirt.
4SrW PPIe6?96J62SaIRfRt'1'94A~d0801 sales
brad
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
manager in a minute."
Gvishiani says that the best way for him to rely is to sit behind
the wheel of a car. He maintains that he owns only One Volga. This
is surely an understatement. It is known that the parking place for the
elite has many foreign vehicles. Very much in keepY g with the
Lenin tradition, Leonid Brezhnev prefers a Rolls Royce "Silvercioud."
Recently he has been using this vehicle more frequently, even on
official occasions.
Until now the Moscow elite wanted to be seen oiofficial occasions
only in Soviet Vehicles. However, at the end of April Brezhnev appeared
at a state visit in Sofia in a Mercedes 600. Baybakov, head of the
are time.
in his s
l
I
p
a
mpa
Planning Committee, drives a Chevrolet
President Podgorny prefers a Mercedes 600 for his private trips. Two
such Mercedes limousines were Ueiivt L GU W L.,I~
years. However, Daimler-Benz service crews who go yearly to the
ct these vehicles...
i
d
nspe
to
West German embassy in Moscow are not allowe
Even Top Officials Have Only Hearsay Knowledge About the West
...Politburo members spend their hot summer vacations away from
The unconventional
ra
r Ga
hi
in S
g
.
o
oc
Moscow on the Black Sea
children of the elite travel to the Baltic countries where one can
watch Finnish TV...
...Most top officials have no idea of what life in the west is p,tl
matic
l
di
h
4;
o
p
e
like. They themselves never were there and members of t
Emissaries
h
ear.
service tailor their reports to what Tloscow wants CO
t information apparatus are often not believed; journalists
h
e secre
of t
who are occasionally sent out on important missions to take soundings 01
h
hi
{1
c
give distorted ideological interpretations. Public opinion, w
does not exist
li
sm,
could correct the official picture of capita
and could not even work, as long as Soviet citizens are not permitted
to travel in the west in greater ntmibers... .
"Kremlyovka Provides Servants and Dachas"
es are related to their jobs - and
il
i
'
eg
v
pr
...Top officials
carefully graduated. Servants, official residences, dachas, chauffeurs
le call
eo
h the
hi
1
p
p
c
and official cars are provided by a special agency w
the "Krel.yovka . "
v or Kos in do not have their daily
Brezhnev, Ifiriienko, Yg
f th
e
o
e o
needs taken ~_CLL
and the Central Committee there are special stores which the Russians
call "Spetsmagazin."
These are no ordinary stores. They are in buildings that from the
outside look like offices or residences. They also have no number.
Admission is only by special permission.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7
CPYRGHT
Special stores are divided into commissaries fox food supplies,
luxury goods, clothing, furniture and leather goods.'. They have every-
thing that can be found in western department stores:e
A privileged person pays an administrative fee of 50 rubles-on
the first of every month at his special food store. The payment of this
registration fee entitles him to draw all the food supplies he needs
for his household in any quantity and without cost.
It goes without saying that these stores are extremely well stocked,
and have all the goods that the people have to do w#hout. An order
of three kilograms of caviar, 10 bottles of French cognac, whiskey,
path de foie gras, lobster is no problem here.
The orders'are delivered free. Articles like English suit
material,, foreign perfume, records, books, tape recorders and Italian
ties are: available here to the elite without difficulty.
There are special stores in the Kremlin, near the Defense Ministry
on Frunse street, at the Kammeny bridge near the Estrada theater. There
are also closed off departments, branches of the special store, on
the top floor of the GUM department store. There is also a food supply
department here for diplomats and correspondents from the eastern
bloc states. This group of people, because they have no hard currency,
cannot buy in the hard-currency stores that have recently been set up
by the Soviet authorities for the colony of western foreigners.
The have-nots with soft currency also include diplomats from the
Arab countries. The special GUM section provides this group of people
with food and luxury items which, while they are not of as high quality
as that available in the foreign currency stores,._are considerably
better than that sold in the ordinary Soviet stores...
...Some personages in the Soviet Union's public life, like Heroes
f Socialist Labor, bearers of the. Order of Lenin, meritorious writers
d artists of the people, have one privilege in common with the
ighest officials. This puts them into the communist social order in
ich "everyone receives according to his needs" -- without money or proof
f accomplishment. These people have an "open account" in the State Bank.
o Films and Dior Styles Are Found Only at the "Club"
The holder of an "open account" has the right to withdraw any
unt of money he wants in rubles. The only condition: these amounts
are for personal use only: purchase of a car or dacha, etc.-
Those who have these privileges do not live as if they were in
he land of milk and honey. They are always afraid that if they abuse
he privilege, they will lose it. Thus in practice, the "open account"
rks like a checkbook (which is unknown in the USSR).
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7
9 irs
 CPYFACpPrboved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Besides the party elite, those who have these privileges are
mainly those citizens who bring hard currency into the state. Artists
like Rostropovich and Oistrakh, Bolshoy Ballet or folk dancers who
frequently play abroad, receive part of their pay in?hard currency or
more precisely in currency coupons. An administrative order by the
State Bank (Gosbank), with no legal regulation, makes 40 percent of
the box-office returns available to these people in foreign currency....
...Soviets who bring in foreign currency are allowed to spend a
part of the money abroad for such things as American refrigerators,
French clothes and German cars. Their currency coupons are also valid
in the Beryoska stroes, reserved for foreigners. These are located in
hotels and airports as well as in several special stores where they
offer luxury consumer goods.
The expensive furs worn for show by the wives of Soviet ambassadors
on social occasions, however, come from an entirely different source:
the "private distributor," a forwarding department for special purposes
that also supplies the Moscow partiarch with delicacies for his reception
of foreign guests.
This graduated system of privileges causes cynics in informed
circles on the Soviet capital to say there should be a large banner
spread across the Kremlin wall: "Kt u nas yesty, tozhe yest." -- He
who is with us also eats la pun on the word "yest" which means both
"to eat" and "to be"].
No Soviet official in Moscow who is particular about his appearance
would even think of eating in one of the usually miserable Moscow
restaurants. There, in public, is not the place for a Soviet official
to be. Celebrations are either private or in a club organized for the
various professional groups like the Writers.,Club, House of the
Architects, Doctors' Club, Officers' Club, or the House of the
Journalists (dom zhurnalistov).
There one is among one's equals. Western journalists are
admitted to the Journalists Club on Thursdays only. In the corporate
clubhouses the kitchen is terribly good and the waiter is friendly.
The best steak in Moscow is served at the Journalists' Club. And if
you want lobster, then you have to go to the`X om Kino, the moviemakers'
club on Brest street. Admittance to this club is restricted to members
and their guests. Foreigners are not allowed.
Dom Kino is where actors and artists, sons and daughters of
officials and ministers, the elegant young world of Moscow all meet.
Here: is where movies are regularly shown -- the newest films from the
west -- films that will never be shown in ordinary theaters. The
young Soviet elite had seen films like "Easy Rider" or "Blow Up" before
most of the diplomats of the western foreign community in Moscow.
Approved For Release 1999/0W02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
YRGHT
Western visitors to Moscow often ask if there are no elegant
women in this city of several millions. They can be found at Dom
Kino. Here is where you meet Stalin Prize Winner Roan Karmen,
director of documentaries on the Spanish War and World War II.
Although many young members of the establishment sniff at his last
work, Tovarich Berlin, this does not keep them from Admiring his young
wife and her pretty daughter by her first marriage, .n the Dior
dresses they bring back from Paris.
Here is where cosmonauts and Soviet junior diplomats meet when
they spend their home leave in the capital. The fine. people of Moscow
celebrate in. these clubs. At New Years' parties in; this "classless
society" the women wear extremely low necklines, here they unashamedly
show their jewelry and furs of excellent taste.
A Cooperative Apartment for Officials Costs 24,000 A1a.rks
Moscow's "dolce vita" exists only behind carefully closed doors;
because of official prudery it exists only in the elite's private
residences. Several tall buildings are reserved for middle echelon
officials in the inner city. These are cleanly finished, light
yellow cinderblock constructions with large picture windows and
balconies on Stanislavsky and Tolstoy streets. The lawns around these
buildings are carefully tended. The stairways are spotless and the
elevators work.
Chief mayor Promyslov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, lives
in the elite skyscraper on Stanislavsky street. His monthly salary
is 500.rubles. That is very little considering that this man is
responsible for the fate not just of this city, but that he is also
the head of all the housing construction companies, all department
stores, all barber shops, all gas stations -- all communal enterprises in the city. But no one who has privileges needs a large salary.
Promyslov lives with his wife on Stanislavsky street in a three-
room apartment with some 100 square meters (the standard living area
per Soviet citizen established by Lenin is 9 square meters). There
are two skyscrapers like this on Tolstoy street. This is where
Culture Minister Yekaterina Furtseva lives with her husband, Vice
Foreign Minister Firyubin who was third secretary of the Moscow city
party before his marriage.
Her daughter Svetlana was married to the son of the former Party
personnel chief, Frol Koslov. She was divorced and then worked at
the Novosti press agency where many of the elite's children worked:
Brezhnev's. and Kosygin's daughters, as well as Krushchev's'adonted
daughter Yulya.
The press always has a job for the offspring of a top official if
he does not have the ability or ambition to work in the economic adminis-
tration, science or even in a Party office. In this society, in which
connections mean everything, one's birth protects one from a -social
fall.
 CpApooVed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Since promotion is predicated on complete adaptation to the
rulers, the upper crust always associates with its equals. Seclusion
from those below and outside is a basic tenet of this system -- that
is why they see to it that the various classes live Closely together.
The middle echelon and lower officials in the ministries meet
not only at work but also live together. Thus, right by the Kutuzovskiy
prospect there is an apartment house -- not as-wefl-iiuilt as the above-
mentioned houses -- in which only membefs'of the Foreign Trade_Ministry
live. The same system holds for the other ministries and also for
the editors of Pravda and Izvestiya.
Many officials try to break out of these-areas by buying so-called
cooperative apartments -- small private apartments., These can be
bought for 6000 rubles (24,000 marks). Half of this amount -- over
20 months' salary -- must be paid in cash. The other half is paid over
a long period as monthly rent.
Anyone who is someone owns a wooden house in the country, a
dacha. If he is very special, he lives in a secluded dacha colony.
Some 30 kilometers west of Moscow, on the road to Uspenskoye, in a
tremendous wooded area, is a vacation area for the Kremlin elite,
surrounded by barrier areas that can be entered only with special
permits...
...On the access roads to the colonies are plaster figures of
stags and deer painted brown. Politburo members have individual dachas
in this tremendous area of woods and meadows. The area around each
dacha is enclosed by a wooden fence, usually green, which prevents anyone
from looking in. The entrance gates are guarded.
In recent years, party leader Brezhnev and his closest colleagues
have built themselves modern ranch houses with large picture windows
in the style of a California bungalow. These are surrounded by lawns
and private swimming pools. This 'kind of building is found nowhere
else in the Soviet Union. The construction work was done by soldiers
in the engineer corps...
...Several kilometers west of Uspenskoye is Object "Gorky 10."
Here is the guarded dacha settlement of the Council of Ministers, for
goverment officials who belong to the Politburo or the Central
Committee Secretariat. The individual houses were designed by a
French architect and furnished with imported Finnish furniture.
It goes without saying that Complex Gorky 10 has a swimming pool,
tennis courts, athletic fields, a clubhouse. with a restaurant and movie
theater, and a special store. Here too admission is by special permit
only. Guests must be announced. The family members of this group --
if they have no private car -- have a special bus shuttle service in the
morning, at noon and at night during the summer. The busses park along
the Kremlin wall near the Spasky gate.
Approved For Release 1999/0q/p2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
An Elevator on the Moscow River Bluff
The generals' dacha complex is in Gorky 6, right by Arkhangelskoye,
the Yussopov castle from which the Prussian minister ptto von Bismarck
sent letters to his wife. This 4s where Marshall Budenny lives at age
88. He drives a Zis made during Stalin's time. He has a colonel as .
his adjutant and his own chauffeur. Budenny, a former cavalry general,
as inspector general, attends to hourse breeding for the army at a
large stud farm near Uspenskoye (once visited by West=;German businessman
Neckermann). Until a short time ago Budenny had himself lifted onto
a horse every morning.
Right on the northwest shore of the Moscow River, close by
Uspenskoye, are several modern, whitewashed buildings: the sanatorium
of the Council of Ministers and, the Central Committee. A modern
swimming pool and gymnasium was finished last fall by army units. This
is where top officials, including retired ministers and party secretaries
and their wives meet for afternoon tea.
The complex is surrounded by a wonderful park with asphalted and
illuminated paths. At the Moscow River bluff there is an elevator tower
for those who find it difficult to walk. The elevator goes directly
down to the river shore. The entire installation is guarded by army
its.
Once when a western diplomat approached the vacation area he was
apprehended and asked to leave the area. Walking in this area was not
allowed, the officer explained. When asked what the buildings were
or, the officer smilingly answered, "Eto khosyaistvo" -- this is an
agricultural enterprise...
eat Hits and Bikinis for er Class Daughters
In the weekend settlements near the village of Peredelkino is an
rtists' colony. This is where Boris Pasternak lived, and that is where
e is buried. It is also the Moscow partiarch's summer residence.
The access to Peredelkino from the Moscow highway is barred. You
lblve to take a roundabout way to get there from Vnukovo. Journalist Victo
uis lives in Peredelkino with his wife Janet. Louis, who travels around
he western world on KGB assignments, has a wonderful collection of
cons, an imported oil heating system, and a swimming pool.
His dacha too is surrounded by a high wood fence. Proudly he shows
is guests the flood light installation, also imported from the west,
or his private tennis court. His neighbor is Valentin Felin, the Soviet
1 nion's new ambassador to Bonn. The Louis and Felin children play.
ogether.
The village of Uspenskoye lies in the middle of a beautiful mixed
rest. Here on the shore of the Moscow River is the so-called
' iplomats' pasture." This is a section of the shore which foreign
diplomats and correspondents may use as a bathing beach -- under polite
A rveil ce 1999/09/02 --R - - ----------
p
 The sumier houses in the village itself belong, privately, to
authors, artists, members of the Academy of Sciences, journalists,
departmental ministers and officials of the middle echelon and
ministerial bureaucracy... ,
...The tone in the village and at the beach is set by young
,people, the sons, daughters, nieces and nephews of the dacha owners.
They do not typify the younger generation of the Soviet Union. The
girls wear chic bikinis and tremendous sun glasses,.npt made in the
Soviet Union. Cassette tape recorders blast forth.-the' latest beat
hits from the west. Kent cigarettes are offered here, and American
chewing gum is used. Almost everyone knows everyone else.
These young, people are "with it.." They know what is going on in
the world. They understand English, French or German, they regularly
listen to BBC broadcasts, the Voice of America, or the Deutsche Welle.
They read Samizdat, the underground press, discuss Solzhenitsyn, have
read First ire and crack jokes about the habits of the anparatchiky--
the Sovie lea ers who are their fathers, grandfathers and uncles.
Fascinated they listen to a former classmate, now second or third
secretary at a Soviet embassy in Paris, London or Cairo. Their Prefer-
red topic of conversation is the west. In the last two years these
young people have unabashedly made contacts with the western foreigners
on the neighboring diplomatic meadow. Here they have developed
friendships.
On this beach the Soviet citizens openly read western papers and
magazines. The young ladies pounce on the latest editions of fashion
papers from France, Germany and Italy. The men leaf through news
magazines like Spiegel with interest. And on the other Moscow River
shore, Soviet generals gallop by on expensive horses from the Uspenskoye
army stud farm.
"I Would Like to Go to Rome or London Just Once"
The young people are not afraid to invite their foreign acquaintances
to their dacha gardens. On weekends they have happy parties there in
the late afternoon. The foreigners bring along iceboxes with whisky,
gin and tonic and the Russian hosts roast a shashlik on an open fire.
A comfortable atmosphere, overshadowed only by the watchfulness of
the state organs.
The KGB patrols and the militia have not failed to notice this form
of fraternization. But the young Russians with emphatic indifference
say: "Nichevo.11
'We are Soviet citizens and we can invite whom we want to our dachas."
They have coined the phrase "Starshiy Leytenant-Petrov" (First Lieutenant
Petrov) for the watchfu], police, But despite this apparent unconcern,
they listen carefully when they hear a motorcycle clatter by.'
Approved For Release 1999/92/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 r~vGe For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300060001-7
These young people no longer have illusions. Thry understand
communism differently from their fathers. They know about nuclear
physicist Sakharov's memorandum, demanding freedom of opinion and
a multiple party system. They know that the economic and cultur0.
development of their country, which they love, is stagnating. They
abhor the regime's ideological twists.
Many had set their hopes on the Czechoslovak experiment. They
cannot understand the bureaucratic imcompetence of cpntral planning.
They know that today's leadership cannot translate t4e wonderful accomplish
ments of Soviet scientists into economic efficiency,:'
They are most oppressed by the country's self-isolation. They
want to travel -- not to the Crimea or to the Baltic.' "I would like to
visit Rome or London just once," says a young girl engineer in a bikini,
whose father has, just brought l}er back from a scientific congress
abroad,in which he had---participated. And then she adds: "But those
are rosecolored dreams which can never come true. Here at home nothing
will ever change."
Another young man says he may be able to travel to Warsaw or
Budapest, in a group, of course. "But what kind of life is that. The
group leader counts off every two hours, one, two, three, four, five...
And then you sit in the bus and hear: 'On the right you see, on the
left you see.' No, thanks. I would rather stay in the glorious Soviet
Union. If I travel, I'd like to travel my own way."
This embitterment and resignation have caused the young people to
turn away from politics. Several of them have read no Soviet paper
for years: "Nothing but lies in these papers." One says: "I would
read a Soviet paper only to learn if war had broken out, but I would
probably find out first on the foreign radio./
PARIS MATCH, 7-14 June 1971
L'Intimite des nitres de L'U.R.S.S.
CPYRGHT
I )ans r/es.ghettos r!'bahit~rtirnl /i r /tu s, drs Brix rear rtvrs a lrur apes, do
i-ripitattx et des ecoles sprcialix, la,cactr dirigrawe Jr I'tJnio? .cfn wfirlrtc
faun Jr la vie tic guts privilt~gics 4o'% uec dit pruplr: Pour nnoderniscr
la stirirte sotWtigttc, fc'litc drzrail retneltre totalcnnr-/1 en gtneslio? Ic
rrronopok, dr la penscr ct tic la r/nrnination dit parti, rnais elk a pear de
le faire. Aussi, !c nraintieu de Ia soriete do classe existanl est-il drirnct zinc
ri\lc d't;7at. L'engtt& que nails pnthhons ci-dcssous a etc? realisrc pour
fJrchtlonradrrire alktnancl ? Der Spirgcl? par Uit ol'cervirtr/tr ti hlosrrrti.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
94
Approved For Reles '~999J09/~ ? Cl P, 117r~-Q 1 O00300060001
.., )epu~., le depart c e t tla ~- of he % c t i e t
ronlacts aver t'cxtcricur et fit aussi ouvrir Ics pontes (lit Krein-
titt pour qu' nl t puisse s'y promener), tes fonctionnnires -
conune nu temps de Staline --- se tiennent de nouveau it heart
(ttt penile.
Le nutlin, quand its vont to tetir bureau, to eoir. dtinnll It"
rentrent chez eux, its ulilisent Icon voilurc 'de servier. its
vivent (tans des c ghettos d'habitation *, passent le-ties mo-
ntenis do loisirs aver Tears senlbiahlcs' clans des maisons fie
cnntpagnc ct des clubs plus on moitis luxueux, scion le rang
qu'its occupent (lints la hierarchic. Elio voyage de ser~?icc, its
ulilisent des trains spcciaux el des avions spixiaux, dui (16-
col-lent d'aerodromes speciaux (leis clue Moscou - Viutkovo
11) et dui atierrissent stir des acroports spi:ciatts -- c?(mune
celtti qui esl situc it ltroximitc de Sotschi.
Le peuple ne les voil pas et tie les connait qu'a peine:ll,ors-
gtt'ils apparnissent Ions (Ito ler mai on de l'anniversaire de is
ite-volniion, le 7 novembre, perches not sontmet (lit ?lausolee
de Lettine, In Place liouge esl ferince. Seals crux qui defilcttt
.voient leers dirigeants, mats its les voient contnte ceux-ci veil-
. tent elrc vas it distance et grandis.,:
Les portraits qui soot presentes aux jours (lc fetes aux fron-
tons des mnisons montrent les visages des hauts.fonclionttaires
connate des icones, raidim clans une pose toujours semblahle
depais des annces et It visage insensible aux outrages (let; ans.
-Sur lea photos des journaux et it In television, le marque csl
le m@me, sans aucune manifestation d'individualite.
a presse est absoltiment mucttc stir la Vie privee des
dirigeants. Ont-its des enfants ? Sont-ils ntalades ? Nut
ne le sait. Lors de In parade (lit lei- ntai 1967, le Premier
ministre Kossyguine etait a la tribune lorsgn'on lei
apprit In. snort (le sa femme, Klavdija. II resin it In tri-
bune, figs. La presse ne souffla trot de cc tragigtte in-
cident. C'est le matin, entre tl et 10 heures, que les pon-
tes du Kremlin se reorient it leur bureau. Leurs voitures
pa:sent par les perspectives Kutusovski et Krlininski. Stir I'Ar-
bet,'devant le restaurant fc Prague a elies lournent - conlraire-
mest au code mais sans la direction de policiers - clans In rue
Frunze, passent devant to miniatcrc de in. Defense et s'engouf-
frent dens le Kremlin it (ravers Ito porte Boroviziki.
Mpais que, le 22 janvier 19CM, tin lieutenant de Leningrad
nontmct lljin a tents tie firer aft pistolet stir in voiture de ltrej-
n+ev, derriere In porte Doroviziki, les mesures de sccuritc
tint Ctc renforcees? Les poiieiers, an centre rte in Ville et lc
hmg tic I'itincraire itabituel, ont eti munis d'apparciis de ra-
dio :, quand tone voiture de haut fonctionnaire' -- - toujours
noire - approche, toot lc trafie est stoppc el les feux tic In
ptt`rte 1l3oroviziki, bloqucs not r(mge.
Approved For Release 1999/09162,: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
lei ~-
tjl~r
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
fin recommit les vnitures dies membres du bureau po)itignr
an fait quit l'avant In plaque mincratogique est vierge. l,e? nu-
mcro it quatrc ehiffres, conunentttnt ioujours par t L est it
1'arriere et continue?llentent change, pour tie pas perm e(tre
.d'idcntiflcallon. -
Stir les grandes arteres de degagement de Moscou, les yoittires
des pcrsonnalites utilisent the travice spcciale intermkdiaire,
gtte scuts ont le droit d'emprunter In police, les ptnnp!ers, les
ambulances et - privilege unique Bans le monde mo(Ierne -
ies personnalites. I)epuis 1967, lors des travaux de v4iries, a
chaque printemps, cettc travee est Margie de quelques centime-
tres. Les voitures des membres du bureau politigite sont monies
dI'un lclephonc, ainsi quo cellos des'gcneraux et des membres
importants du K.g.b. Mais les ministres specialises ou les chefs
de services do contite central tie disposent pas de ce !Woven
de communication. 11 v a la aussi, hierarchic.
Le 1. ~seau t616phonittue de Moscow est cquipc de Siemens,
firme allemande, qui deja du temps des tsars fit des
installations de ti lecommunicalion en Russie et dont le direc??
teur de filiale a Petersbourg, I'ingenieur Leonid Krassine, fut
itn bolcheviste connu. 11 dirigea plus tard le commerce exte-
rieur du jeune Etat sovictique et.tnourut, en 1926, ambassadeur
a Londres.
Mais les oohs du Kremlin recclent to tcehnique In plus mo-,
derne : des cameras de television y soot instnllces pour observer,
jour et nuit, In Place Rouge.
Cc systente de stirveillance, invisible de I'extnrienr, Bert it
dkcler tnute tentative de demonstration interditc, toute ten-
\tative d'attentnt : en 1967, lea orfanes de x6curit6, devant ~ le
Kremlin n'avaient pas rcussi it empecher tin vieux psysan
lithttanien de se faire sauter, it !'aide d'une bombe de sa fabri-
cation, levant le mausolee de Lcnine. Il vottlait protester contre
In politique du gouvernement sovictique.a l'egard des ntlno-
rites. Officiellenient, on annonce qu'il s'agissait d'un tnalade
mental qui avail essaye de pulvcriser In momic de Lcnine,
mais avail ctt derange par I'arrive a de touristes alletnands
et aWait enfui avec In bombe deja amorcce.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 ~plediFor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Pendant tine seance du Soviet supreme, les dignitnires se lais-
sent observer de pins prigs : tme centainc d'entre eux sont fassis
stir Ies banes surcievcs du gotivernetncnt, derriere le piupilre
tin itpenltcr. A droite de 13rejnev, Kommyguine, Podgorny Ot Sus-
lov. Derriere, les autres niembres du bureau politique pren-
nent place.
resque bus portent des costumes sombres. Seul l'id o-
logue en chef, Michael Suslov,- apparait parfois dans tin
costume fie flanelle gris clair, de coupe elegan.te : le
choix de ses cravates trahit in eerttiin gout. Pendant
qu'un orateur est it la tribune, les membres du bureau
politique continuent ode parler entre eux, sans preter
attention it ses propos. Brejirev, qui arbore stir sit poi-
trine i'etoile ?d'or des heros de I'Union soviclique, in
mcdaille de heros du travaill socialists et cello fie heros do
Tchecoslovaquie, raconte volontiers des histoires drnles qui
font - evideniment - sottrire Kossyguine et Podgorny. Le let-
ton Pelsche, 72 ans, le doyen du bureau politique et chef du
tribunal du parti se twit et garde le regard fixe levant lid. lI
tie rit que Jorsque les autres rient.
Les serviettes bourrces apparaissent coniuie symboles 5t'une
grande occupation. Le surmenage et In nervosite de Kossy-
guine s'exprinient dans I'agitation continue de ses doigis qui,
le plus souvent, jouent avec uti crayon.
Quelques range derriere Brejnev se tient son plus proche colla-
horateur, le seca?etaire du parli conimuniste Kattischcw ; it feuil-
lette activement lcs dossiers. Lorsqu'ii ccrit, it a l'hahittide fie
cacher la rcuille fie son bras rcplif : comme s'il vonlait eviler
qu'on puisse lire ce qu'iI note.
Pjotr Schelest, chef du parli ukrqinien, separe de lirejnev par
tine trnvice, s'appuie en general stir ses coudcs et mcdile. Outre
Kossyguine, Podgorny et Stislow, Kirilenko secretaire du P.c.
est le seal qui ose s'adresser de lui-mcnte it Brejnev, le chef.
Les metnbres du bureau politique tels qne Schelepin, Alasurow
et Poljanski gardent tine retenue certaine.
Geux qui out observe Leonid Brejncv en public asses convent,
ont pu constatcr qu'iI se contporte comme tin chef absolu el
ce, consciemment. Lorsqu'il tape stir 1'epaule do ses collabo-
ralcurs, ceux-ci s'epanouissent fl'etre dignes d'un tel honneur_
Son visage -W bouffi, lea yeux gonfles. Lors fie manifestations
qui out lieu le matin, id a fair de ne pas avoir assez dormi,
d'?avoir In 4 gueul? de boil P. Souvent, it sort tin peigne de tin'
puche et se recoiffe.
Approved For Release 1999/09/ : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved use 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300660001-7
rejnev est un ho-mnc qui snit et pent plenrer all bon
moment : ninsi, it Bratislava, en 1968, lorsque ? L'In-
ternationale * a relenti ; ainsi, a I'tisinc de trac`!enrs de
Charkow an prinlemps 1970 ; lorsque les foncjionnai-
res at le" nuvrierrt Pont acetante, fah larntes Jill ArItH
nlnntCes aux veux.
liha?bitude qu'ont leg' Busses et les Ukrainiens ie s'em-
brasser lorsqu'ils se' retrouvent est specialeM-. ent re-
nrarquable chez lui : it ne Sc contente pas. du baiser sur[ila joie,
orals pralique le cordial baiser stir ila bouche. Personhe n'eni-
brasse cotmne l3rejnev.
he nie.langc d'une certaine attention ii cc qui touche..Sa per-
sontic -- it porle des costumes bien coupes - et de brutalile
masculine et de cordialitc, tors des receptions officielles, ne
reste sottveni, pas sans effet stir lcs femmes. Une obset?vatrice
a (lit tine foss, tic lui qu'il avail le charme d'tin chien Saint-.
Bernarti. ?
Marie a tine femme gtii a Pair piut6t K popottc ?, it a In
reputation de ne pas @Ire ennenri des plaisirs. On (lit it Moscon
gti'il It tine liaison avcc l.jtidniila Syzila, title ? chaitlettse 61116-
rile (lit people s, (rem populaire et all baste imposanl. Elie
West plus jcunc : dcjit pendant In guerre, elle elait l'une des
vedettes du c Theatre aux arnices x.
Mais 'l3rejnev aime aussi s'entourer tie ,jeunes fides, de dan-
seuses - pas de In troupe du Bolchdi - mais appurtenant it
des troupes tie dances folkloriques ou d'opcreltes..
On volt sa fine Galina, 30 ans, fors des parades de mai et
octobre, a in tribune officielle, enveloppee de fourrures pre-
cieuses. Galina niontre depuis des annees tin goat special pour
to cirque. fate fut mcnie niariee it tin domplcur. divor4a et se
tin atlas aver tin champion tic fir.
four Ic moment. ells vil avec till preslidigiIII leur (III ci'rgttc
d'Iaal tie Moscou. Son pore lui tl dejit deuiatidc piusicurs foil
de vivre definitivenient avec tin hbmme < convenable ?, mem-
bre de la caste des fonctionnaires on officiers de I'arntce.
A 1lloscou, 13rcjnev habite dans un inttneuble construit apres
la guerre, stir In perspective Kutusowski, an numcro 21 qui,
vu de I'ltbtel ? Ukrainia ;o, est juste derriere le deuxieme feu
rouge, stir le cote droit de In perspective. Dans ce complexe
iabitent aussi des fonctionnaires dignes tie toile confiance.
.'appartenient de Brejnev occupe cinq pieces an cingitieme
'take. A 1'etage au-dessous, an quatrienie, lrabitc le clief (lit
K.g.b., Andropow ; au sixienie, le ministre de I'interieur,'
c li tschelokow.
3rejnev passe souvent ryes moments tie loisirs en compagnie
d'Andropow et tie Schtschelnknw. Les trois hrnnmes tint In re-
ptiiatitrn d'@tre excellents amis..Souvent, des fnnctinnnnires et
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
App
rl'autrrs Hillis viennent s'ajotilcr .i eux, dew Hillis du Irtnps n4i
llre iiev Mail fonctionnuire du t'arti (mans In ville ukrninientie
de 1)nepropelrowsk. On pane do Is a Mafia de Ul clu(-pr-
trowsk
Pour ses ninth, Brejiiev nhiue faire In eulslne, Mnnehcs de c1it+?
ihise relroussees, it s'HtfHire (tans In cuisine et prepare des plats
qu'il sett lui-mcme a ses invites. Les convives tic boil*ent (lie
de In vodka on (iu cognac arineitjen.
Leonid lircjnev est tin fanatique de football. Ii cat r.prc qu'il
rate tin important match a iiloscou. Son club favori eat Ic cltih
I)vnatno ?. Lorsque les matches oat lieu en dehors dt Moscow,
it les suit a in television. Lorsque, logs, de In Coupe d'(11 Monde,
le match entre In Bepuhligtie federate el l'italie fut rtilransmis
en direct, cola cut lien a In dcmtinde personnelle de Brcjnev
it ne vou'lait pas rater cc tnalch. Sans cola, picnic `pour is
Coupe (lit Monde, quand I'Union sovietique ne p-artieipe pas, les
matches tie sont, en role generate, pas retransmis en' direct.
Au Stade Lenine, des loges sont toujours reservecs pour I3re,j-
nev et ses accompagnateurs et le coup d'envoi n'est (tonn6
qu'unc fois qu'il eat installi. I] eat dcja arrive qu'il sit cu
vingt minutes de retard - le jeu n'a commence que vingt
minutes apres I'horaire prcvu.
Tout conune ses collegues Podgorny et Kossyguiite, Brejnev
adore la chasse. Souvent, it part Bans is region boiscc de
Sawido, a. 120 kin all nord de Moscow, stir le cours superieur
de la Volga. Cette region eat ferntce aux Busses coinnie flux
strangers, a 1'exception d'un lieu-dit ? La Base i, oil sont re4us
diplomates et journalisles.
L'autre ami intime de Brejnev, le gsnsral Nikolai Schtsche-
lokow, ministre de I'Intsrieur, eat le chef de In milice et do
]a police criminelle. On sail qu'en amateur de musique, ii
joue du piano et qu'il est'un admirateur fervent du violoncel-
liste Bostropovitch, auquel, d'aillgurs, it eat 116 par une amitls
personnelle.
Le 12 novembre.1970, Bostropovitch envoys title tettre ouverte
60001-7
^caa^c, !^ 1.t ^tlaiut[^t tax innniyuc ut-tutClte 7uiletluuruurisee tic ';5
'
I
Union sovictique. 11 abrite en cc moment I'ecrivain daps sit
'
datcha, qui a ets miss a sa disposition par lee orgi nes officiels. 4+114 f
en rscoinpeilse de ses msrites artistiques.
Cette datcha est sittise a Schkowka, it 20 kilt a l'onest do Alos- y{Ir~r+',
coo. Soljenitsyne s'y rsfugin spree qu'on Tent exclu de I'Union
SY.'
des scrivains. Bostropovitch a dil a Soljenilsyne e Tcintrytic je vivrai el taut ryue ceite datcha sera it nth disposition, to Cs tali
hills. s 1. !'~}l
Schtschelokow entretient des contacts nmicnux aver I4 violon-
(ciliate et d'autres artistes el ecrivains. Ii a quckines smiris
Approved For Release 1999/09!/172 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 ,;,,,,
 Approvve?'jgGRg1ease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194Aa00300060001-7
avre son his rtrri ;r Icrtrtitte. I'anni.e. drrnierr s;(-.s r,Iitdes :# 1'& Ins-
111111 pour I'rct-nontic'mnndiale ct les relations inl(rnatit rtalrs; a.
~~ hfsr h~ lnlcr-w jitttior?, (till a tine vinfrtainc ti'aiin es, s'ttst rpris
'rime topple (lc dix attnccs lotus itgcee quc ltti, (till nc fait puts
ltrirF{tr rStt a; wellIenr ntllfen al a divorrtl i~nur 1tt1,
11 ('Jai( bica (lccidt! it t'cpousc'i, malgrc le refits de ses' parents.
Lc pyre a alors mis en branle In police gu'il a sous se$ ordres.
1'lnsicurs fois, in jcunc fetnnie s'est vu intimer l'ordre de con-
per tonics relations aver lc jcunc'homme. its fttrent torts les
deux surveillis par In police. Its continucrcnt a Sc rencontrer
en secret. On finil par menacer In femme de deportaaion ainsi
quc a d'nttlres difficulles A.
Alois, cotnme les menaces reslaicnt vaines, le jeune homme fut
inilic promptement it in vie diplomatique et expedie en Aus-
tralie. 1, 1
Schlschclolcow, lres sonvent, adresse de violentes critiques it In
police sovielique. L'annee dernicre, it avoun quc depuis son
entree en fonctions, it avail ere oblige de licencier 50000 poli-
ciers pour incapacitc notoire. lit forme le desir qu'une attention
route spcciale soil accordce au recrutement. Avant loute chose,
it faudrait que les policiers sachent a lire et ecrire
a presse sovieligt& rte parle jamais des delits graves.
pourtant frequents. Ainsi, en 19G8, des cambrioleurs ont
pille l'appartemenl du violoniste mondialemcnt celebre,
David Oistrach, lorsqu'iI etait en tournee avec sa femme
it l'Ctranger. Its emporterent- des objets d'art, des bijoux
et de ]'argent liquide dune valour de 40 000 roubles
(vingt millions d'A'F). La residence de 1'amlrassadeur
allemand Allardt n'a pas ere epargnce non plus par
Teti cambrioleurs. Le coupable a ele arrete, mais on ne sail pas
ire's Bien s'il travaillait pour lui ou, pour le cotnpte du K.g.b.
Vet's la fin de l'annee 1968, une bande motorisee attaque une
Iarnie d'une caisse d'epargne. Poursuivie par la police, it y cut
i?;'htinte de coups de fen. On finit par arreter les bandits. L'un
rl'cntre eux faisnit panic de In police crimincl-le' tie Aloscon.
Lrs jeunes femmes russes redoulent les altaques dons In rue.
i;lles se font accompagner jusqu'a la porte mCme de lour appar-
Ivitlent. bans les blocs d'imtne'ubles,_ elles opt pour d'etre atta-
gtiees dans 1'ascenseur.
I:rtssyguine passe pour le soul membre `du Bureau politique A
s'intcresser serieusement an peuple, et surtout, a ]'amelioration
de son niveau de vie.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
21
 AJ'MPrl or Release 1999/09/09 ? CIA-RDP79-01194A000 000 0001-7
Xnssygtiinc retrofit a a jour fixe s dens son appartemcnt ; cc
cola Blurs des discussions tres anini6es nvec les intcilectuels de
`[Mnhliwh-nent sovietique. Main Plissetskaia, In grande dan-
" uta puive, fait partio du corelo don vinilcurs regulicr4 et --
lu'u sn grave maladic --- Ic =redactcur en chef de R 'Novy
r a, Twordowsky, I'ecrivain Konstantin? Sinionov - qui a
Aside en avril it Berlin-Quest pour In publication du ?dernier
wmnn de Soljenitsyne (ao{it 1914) et a critique hi censure
Srirtiquc. On dit it Moscou que Kossyguine a tine predilection
pottr In nttisique tic jazz ; it a unc collection tie distjties de
jazz-cool Cc grand voyageur - an contraire de 13rcjnev tlui
n'a encore jamnis ete en Occident - entretient les meilleurs
contacts avec le monde extcricur. Son gendre est Dscher-nen
Gwischinni, directeur adjoint du comile d'Etat pour la science
et la technique. Toujours moderne et habille a I'occidcntale, ii
doit @tre le seul homme de In. caste des fonctionnaires a porter
des chemises Buttondown. Berthold Beitz, manager de Krupp,
dit de lui. a Je.I'engagerais tout de suite comme directeur des
venter.
Il dit que sa plus grande detente est de.se trouver lui-mime au
volant d'une voiture. Ii affir ne posseder un?e Volga. Ll s'agit
la si reuient d'un understatement : on snit que ic part autotno-
bile des personnalites sovietiques comprend de plus en plus de
voitures etrangeres. Leonid Brejnev, lui, utilise tine Rolls Royce
? Silvercloud Y). II s'en Bert mime de plus en plus, mime lors
de manifestations officielles.
Jusqu'a maintenant, les hauts fonctionnaires se sont attaches It
ce que, Tors des manifestations officielles, seuls soient utilises
des vehicules de fabrication sovietique. Mais, fin avril, Brejnev
est apparu en Mercedes tom, tors de'sa visite officielle a Sofia.
I.e chef du comite du plan, Baibakow, conduit a titre prive tine
.,Chevrolet Impala. Le chef d'Etat Podgorny prefere une Mer-
cedes 600.
Les membres du Bureau politique passent leurs vacances d'ete
au bord de la mer Noire, a Sotschi ou Gagra ; les enfants des
personnalit6s de moindre importance vont dans des regions de
1a mer Ballique. Il est complttement inipensable qu'un membre
du Bureau politique puisse exprimer le souhait Waller passer
an vacances familiales a Saint-Tropez on aux Bahamas. On
le prendralt pour ton.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 /02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 1 V
Approve~F%gofase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
1 our lei; fonctionnaires rnoyens, les privilege$ sort
inoindres : ils se limit-,! :t to possihilite de pbuvoir
acheler des tissus provcnnnt des pays de l'Est (surtout
il.d.a.).
Alais nu ? Donn modeli x, ii ), a regulierement des de-
fileM de mode pour lea feimnes tie fonclionnni l4s qui
veulent se tenir an coi`irant de cc qui se fait de plus
nouveaut en Occident en mntiirc de hunts cont ire.
Anlre privilege : ?les comples c spcciatts m onverls it in I1nnque.
0111re les pcrsonnalites du parli, les priv;kgies soul ie,% cttovens
rani rapportcnt des devises it l'Etat : des artistes c.omme lios-
li opovitch el Oistrach on les danscurs stoiles des ballets-du 3o1-
clw. qui vont souvcnt en lournee a l'Ctrangcr cl recoivent tine
partic de icurs cachets en coupons do change. Sans reglcmcnt
ieg!il, siniplentcnt d'npres line ordonnance adminislralivc de la
1-atnriue d'i?tal (In (.:osbmtl( 3~) pour ccs licrsontncs-(a. I0 ';
tes_ sontnles gagnees sont disponibles en'cspi'ees 44r;tngeres.
Approv
"Cc's citoyens sovicliques qui rapportent des devises it I'I:tnt oil
le droit d'en depenser tine panic a l'Ctrangeret, par exemple, de
faire entrer en U.r.s.s. des rcfrigcratcurs atnericains, des vete-
ments franc-ais on ties voitures allemanties. Avec'leurs coupons,
its peuvent faire Ieurs achats -dons Ies ? l.Zc.rjoska r, qui, clans
les hotels, les asroports, ainsi clue duns cerl:ains inagasins spe-
cialises, affront des hiens de consotiitnation do haul niveau.
11 y a aussi lest datchas a, ces villas parfois sinmpincuses oil
les nanth du regime pnssent lours vacances.
L'entree de Peredelkino, en venant par In route tic Moscow, est
ferntec. On arrive it l'endroit par \Vnukowo, en faisant tie longs
detours. Le journalists Victor Loitis v vii avec son epousc an-
glaise Janet. Louis, qui a voyage en Occident pour le compte tlu
K.g.b., a une merveilleuse collection d'icones un chaufrage cen-
tral an mazout tl'importation et tine piscine.
Sa datcha est egalement ferntec par une haute cloture en plaun-
ches. Tres fier, it montre nux visitcurs l'installntion de projec-
teurs destines a sclairer son court de tennis, egalement imports
d'Occident.
Le village Uspenskoje est situe an milieu d'une merveillcuse
forCl. Au bond 'de In Aloscova se 'trouve ce qu'on appelle lc
c Pre des diplonnates ?, une panic de in rive pie les diplomates
strangers et les correspondants peuvent -- sous in surveillance
de policicrs - utiliser pour se haigner.
A peu .pros a 30 km it l'ouest 'dc Moscou, apres Uspenskoje, se
trouve tin lieu de repos pour Ics pcrsonnalites enninentes du
Kremlin, en pleine fort-t, all ctrur dune region fermsc.
La route qui conduit a cet endroit est en nsphalte, toujours
parfaitenient entretenue et balayec de loute neige, inetne en
plein biver. C'est ? la piste de course i, de I'elile du Kremlin,
surtout pendant le week-end.
A tons des croisements importants se trouvent des policicrs. Fn
outre, des patrouilles en civil et en unifortiie circtileni. Presque.
toutes les deviations vers Uspenskoje wont interdites it in cir-
culation norniale. Un panneau rond it raie jaune empCche d'en-
trer. Sculs out droit tie passer les vchicules qui tie_rendent thins
une datcha biers precise ou porteurs tl'un Inisser-passer.
Des.patrouilles de securitc Cloignent tons les visitcurs. In mas-
se de is population n'a nucune idea de In mnnicre tout les
personnalitims du Kremlin vivent idi.
For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Ap99nt,Rr't'& Release 1999/09/07 ? C_IA-RDP7Q-01164A00030110-40601 -7
Les maisons organises en lotissetuenls pernlhltcnt anN 01'g-tnes
do securilc (I'ctrc conLinuelletnent infot?mes stir les stllces et .
venues (le chacun, sur les relations qui se noucnt. Fans res
conditions, t'sventnelle formation de groupes stlbvctsiIs est
impossible.
A quclqucs kilometres it i'onest tic t)rpenskoje se Irouvp * Gor-
ki 10 *. C'est lit clue soul billies les dntahas ties fonelimnn,iires
du gouvernement qui ne font pas partic (lit Bnrenn ljolilignr
on du sccrctarint (lit Comilc centrn.l, Les mnisons out t.le r4)11-
cues par till architecte francnis et soft amsnagses en nteubles
finnois -intpot?Ies.
11 va de soi qne le cmnpiexe c Gorki 10 , contprend. piscines,
terrains Kle sqirt; courts de tennis, club avec restaurant, cinema
cl magasin special.
I'a mtssi. on n'entre que muni d'un laisser-passer.
*,
he contplexe de datchas des gsnsrnux se Irottve a t (torlci 4
tout pros du chateau de russlipotiv, it Archangelskoje. ,
Sur le rivage nord-ouest de la Aloscova, tout Ares do Uspensko-
je, quelques bAtitnents modernes tout Manes : c'est In Innison
de repos (lit Conseil des minislres et du Comitc central. tine
piscine et des terrains de sport niodernes ont etc construits
I'annce dernicre par des unites de l'armec. C'est la que se ren-
contrent hauls fonctionnaires, miuistres R la retraite et secre-
taires du Parti, pour prendre le the avec leur spouse.
Sur Ic bord escarps de la Moscova, un ascenseur conduit direc-
tement au bord du fleuve. 11 est surveille par des unites de
l'arnttie.
Un diplomate occidental, s'stant un jour approchs de cette re-
gion, fu( rapidetnent rejoint par un officier (lc garde qui lid
intitna l'ordre de quitter ces lieux : it Unit interdit de se
promener.
Comore Rome et Paris, Moscou a aussi sac (Iolce vita *. Elle
se clsroule derriere deg pontes Men fermscs. La vie des fonc-
tionnaires ne t; etnle pas en public. On festoic en privy on Bans
des clubs qul wont rttscrvss flux spi:cinlisles : - Club (leg ccri-
~vnins, Alttison des arrhilecles, Club des nti:deciny, (:ful) deg offs-
siege, Alaison des journalistcs (c Don) Journalistow *),
Dens ecs slabs, 1a cuisine eel bonne et to mttitrc ('hi-tel aima-
ble. i.e. mcillcur steak (le Moscou est servi all Club des journa?
)isles. El alnand on a envic de holnnard, on doit alley all c Dom
Kino ,, club des professionnels du cinema, dens In rue de Brest.
Au c Dom Kino * se rencontrent Acs acteurs el deg artistes,
Ies fits et fines des fonctionnaires et (leg ministres, le jeunc
monde elegant de Moscou. Ici, on voit regulii'rentent des films
qui ne pascal. jemmy loos leg cinemas soviel.iques. .
Les visitcurs etrangcrs de Moscott (lemandent convent W it n'exi:t-
te pas daps cette ville snorme des jeunes femmes cleganles.
On Ins trouve au c Dom Kino *. On y rencontre aussi des cincas-
les co me Roman Karmen, laureal.du Prix Stalinc, metteur en
jsrene de fiIin documentalres cur In guerre d'Papagne el Is
Approved For Release 1999/09/02. CIA-RDP79-01194A0003Uuuouu01-7
24 (l1~,~1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AOOG300060001-7
CPYRGHT
Seconde Guerre tnondiale. I)e nombreux jeunes niembres do
I'1?stahtishntent font in moue tluand on lour pane du dernier
film de Karmen, ? 1'owaritsch Berlin *, mais vela ne lc, empc-
c.lie s d'adntirer sn jeunc femme ct ses filles Bans lairs robes
de t)ipaor.
Elf In jeunesse, que pease-t-clle do Celle vic close ? O1i1, tlu'eii
penlsenl ces his ct ces filles de a Brands x du regime ? Qucis
hunt nussi (curs espoirs ?
Dams les residences de week-end du village do Peredeiicinn, all
hoed (tes piseines, cc son( les enfants ties pcrsonnalLies qni
do anent Ic ton. Les filles portent d'clegants bikinis e(,,'(t'cnor-
mes lunettes 1de soleil americaines. Ici, on entend les (crnicrs
sttcccs des hit-parades occidentaux sortis de mini-came cs. lei.
on vows offre des Kent, la, on achete du chewing-gum antricain.
Cos jeunes Bens sont a in ?. Its parlent le francais, l'anglais on
Palfemnnd, ecoutent regulicrement ICs emission de In la
a Voix de I'Antcrique n oil des emissions allemandes, its lisenl
In ?presse tle l'underground (a Saniisdat s), its discutenl de
SoIjenitsyne, fl s ont in ses o uvres cl blaguent sur les habitudes
tits Alpparntschik, les chefs sovietiques, (fui son[ lour pore,
gr nd-pore et oncie. Its preferent parler de l'Occident. Ali
(Ours de ces deux dernicres annees, ces jeunes Bens ne se son(
pas genes pour prendre contact avec ICs Occidentaux fill q l'rc~
des diplomates ? voisin. La, des amilics se sort notices. Sur
ces plages des bords tie In Moscova, les citoycns soviclitfnes
privilcgics lisent sans vergogne des journnux. et des reviles
occidentalcs. Les jeunes femmes se jettcnt surtout stir les der-
niCres partitions de mode. vcnaut de France, d'llalic et d'Alle-
magne. Ces jeunes Wont plus d'illusions. Its entendent par coin-
ntunisnie autre chose (file lours Acres : if,, eonnaissent Ic memo-
randum de l'atontiste Sacharow, qui demandai( In lihcrtc d'ex-
pression et in systcme autorisant l'existence de plusicurs parlis.
Its savent que le developpemertt econoinique et culturel tie leer
panne stagne. Its reprouvent In soIerose ideologigtiic du regime.
Beaucoup d'entre eux avaient mis tours espe'rances drills l'expe.-
rie-nce tchecoslovaque. Pour eux, l'incapacite notoire 'btirenu-
crntique de In planification sociale est incomprehensible.
e qui leur peso de plus, c'est l'isoletttent de leer pays.
Its veulcnt voyager, et pas settlement en Crimcc on sur
In I3altirluc. r Je voudrais after it Rome ou it Londres,
ne serail-ce qu'une fois x (fit line jeune femme ingC-
nieur en bikini, cadeau de son pert qui avail participc
it nn congres scientifique it J'etranger. Ht elk ajoute:
e M-ais cc sont des roves Wells qui ne se rcaliseroni
jamais. lei, rien ne changera jamais., s
Celte resignation fait que les jeunes gees se dcsintcressenl de
a vie politique. Certains d'entre eux Wont pas iu de journanx
soviCtigties depuis des annees. x On lie fail que mentir (Inns
es journaux. s L'un d'entre eux m'a dit : a Jc nc lirais tin Jotir-
al novietique que s'il ni'apprennit qu'unc guerre a eclnle...
4oh, ga ne serait meme pas In pelne : j'aurais deji npprin in
ouvelle, longtemps avant, par In radio ctrangt re...
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
NEW STATESvIAN, 1 January 1971
bbscow
(Excerpts)
Conversations in Russia
CPYRGHT
By K.S. Karol
Beneath the flat surface of society In Russia, of view of justice, our country is more like failed to make the Russian masses articulate
as presents 1 by Trarda, a rich and complex yours: mostly it is the little men who catch because the experiments of Lenin's soviets
life abounds but it totally lacks any means of it, the unknown people who don't have pro- were quickly stifled ...
expres'ion or communication. We arc not a tectors, who don't even have the means to 'What has changed since your day,' he
one-dimensional' society. as Vt'cstcrncrs be-
; slip a bribe in the right quarter. People like continued, 'is that while society then seemed on d tncht
ri sey. . the Prevented contrary from we are a communicating with ' you or me or your intellectual friends, reta- to be unified by the Stalinist ideology, today atom emrh other, we have almost no common cri- tivelY well placed on the social ladder, always wit live's numerous lives, atom ere. Everyone will tell y u about his life.
teria. Everyone takes hold of a piece of the get oll.'..
experience and interprets - -The gulf between supply and demand in Don't be shocked by his ignorance or his
dail
hi
h f
'
y
s
rom
trut
t
It according to his own lights. The some words consumer goods is vast even in Moscow. petty bourgeois attitude, and above all don
that what he tells
have a different meaning for each social which, by general agreement, forms a more forget that what he tells you is only one tiny ny f
?.......... only One t
conditions we just can't make it serious analy- However, my first impressions about the and, at the most, a dozen of his trends. And
its of the real state of al prigsa we try improvement in the standard of dress is in when you write your articles don't cite any- '
tackle the problem in a pragmatic manner er P
contradicted by what follows. The one by name.
a
y
by studying what happens at the different no w
levels of this closed and, up till now, i eren- Russian enigma begins the minute one 'No longer,' he declared, smiling. 'doe s the
arallel' shops Stalinist terror knock in the 'night for both
f the
i
p
c o
cable society. probes the arithmet
ut these points to me is no in which most people buy their smart clothes. great and small. Nowadays from the poi t
an why
Th
rae
t to .e
l
s
t, w
i
mar
p
e m
~0
Pl
ec
#re
hough
opponent of the Soviet regime. He has. an How in fact can a seeretary
h
a
an who eerbovt rcgnla
important job in the party apparatus and roubles a 'month. buy
even second-hand, cost more than controlled.
'w
fter the war
hi
h
,
c
,
surprisin;. 2~ years a
frequently travels abroad, where we have w
at Sov
met many times. He has his own ideas but her monthly salary? he Amittedly rnts are low in Russia, as is and 13
breakth he offers try impose miht me:
m e public transport (an underground t cket costs in space. ism-
assess is'Econom y Num
me e me e a clue that might help
asly merely
e
aree not bread,
dear. ever. A by-product of scarcity and the ram-
to assess s my my second homeland after an ab-
o
b flo
h
d
>
-
p
ha
ka
tatoes
and
ur
sence of 25 years.
Since I left Russia after the war I have ITheoretically, a couple who earn 200 roubles pant inflation, it is built in to modern Soviet maintained friendly links with several Rus? a month between them should therefore be life. What is worse, the state distribution
sian who travel outside the Soviet Union. able to live economically, although only if system is just as ineffective today as it was ~f+
This party official is one of them, and we they are willing to spend a lot of their time in the past. So the individual takes advantage hop- of
the mo
cheap - to carry goods
on top were talking as we strolled along the im+ queuing tand he resist the Aempt.tion of smear of everythirngnised transport
posing and completely new ne gin mo on ping in parallel where , very
levard in Moscow. I had telicho all boxhim , ys halfcosts ayrouto 5 ble. Thosescoua kilo and a ples who areecon- h ose where e hey are in short supply. to the
my arrival, but from a pubh
ins frankly that I would understand per- tent with the basic necessities, who are wit- benefit of his own budgEt. A Georgian
for fand to amily rows that Leningrad her will earn tickmare more.
featly if he were unable to meet me, in view ling to wear foa r coat for
of their >oryears
of his official position, buy nothing
He laughed at my precautions, but took celebrations, appear to be very rare citizens: from several boxes of touters than he will the
record his own: we rendezvoused in the city for a Where then do they find the extra income mah is by smashing all the pros uction records
walk. We talked about everything, from the to eat and dress well and where do they tier we`ve became a nation of merchants: is +~
new buildings to the slow improvements in find commodities in short supply?
accommodation in Moscow where, happily, For someone who has lived a long time the current joke in Russia. are 'communal' flats are now rarely being put in Russia tha~ltanswer illtculall t toefindues th is itional'cver, thes of enotxploitionlyngtheseEconomy 'trail-
Y In metho
' reap ana-criai classes, feeling ;',
m
Th
m
d
h
2
e
on
e
b
.
up. But whatever topic we touc
y country
friend always came back to his central theme, cotwo economics have long existed Number
c?Ilften rf nomic ._
the difficulty of grasping Soviet reality. `our side by sides Eo omtstNumi~gidly confficial. trol breakethesecafe from ruleli Hama action
u?.--..- of rollecter- ~~.
and
and
--- - -
association, for organising communal re wear
gether, for getting to know each other m and ber bet 2, which functions according to its own goods taCE0171CS Null, throu taking decisions together, never really existed laws and aHowspeeople rdist nu eth mh wok I was told h at in certain provincial I'I
in Russia. the czar and the one money and consumer goods
there was nothing; equally, between n o one . selves according to their needs. This Econ- cities two kinds of goods meant for the f
state
illicit
The most a profitable tbusinesse is in f
t omy Nutnbtr 2
ce
e
hi
k
p
p
x
ng
et.
ar
m
the evllecl
moujik and another there was not
the case of
for essential personal relationships.. We were means, except in meat -which is in short supply everywhere
and we remain a huge body. colossal m' en' of that political. fabric on which the modern . and in fashionable women's clothes. As
ere uilt The Revolution
but shapeleass anJkftTV#U-RUfi Iffl~`e?bas`e T9V 1i : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
~777T ~{~'1~IY'd';bail'~tJ?;'~`IIf~S;'T*iP~Stiyil'A)C iS'd;1T'Y~IT~,{Ill1'4f[~Cd1~7L{hlf".YhIiF~S~lf7rflSN~try~TgYI yJ'tit4_Yit ~;iP1i ;;'rs~ f
 they put it in, Moscn*: 'In Russia we have any 'officials' or intellectuals - it was a rather
to tic cities. ' fn} 9iidd Fil r they etuaases4999Q9/0'2 :aGLA ~RD~t7t&41 At94lAd00needs, 0 000800Dt ,-71 on to oth planning four
h'ild'
avent captuate. No one denies the existence of Economy
Number 2. The official press is full of re-
ports of misappropriations and the crimes of
thieving citizens. The Central Committee
and all ntltar burls( Of the party t:onwtnntly
discuss. 'the problem of the struggle against
waste and embezzlement'. But these general-
ities reveal nothing of the mechanics of the
Soviet black market. To know them, one
must have lived there as a worker or student,
that is to say, to have been part of the
Russian rank and, file, as I once was. This
is something you can't learn second-hand in
the space of a couple of weeks.
However, I was able to meet more Rus-
sians than I had hoped possible when I set
off. Everyone I approached, party members
or podpi.rtrhiki intellectuals (those who have
signed different protests against government
policy) responded as eagerly as my high
oiiicial. They invited me to their homes or
clubs, to the Writers' House, the Press Club
or the Actors' Club. But all these people,
whatever their age, their situation or their
views, belong in fact to Economy Number
3, the only' one which allows a man to live
honestly in Russia without having too many
material worries. Their salaries or their
royalties are more than big enough to allow
them to buy anything they want in the
'closed shops' - from which ordinary mortals
are banned - or in the 'foreign currency
shops' where they can spend the dollars
they have saved during trips abroad. They
also have priority for new housing and are
able to get, mortgages for flats in the so-'
called 'cooperative' housing, or to rent
darhas.
The bulk of those with access to Econ-
omy Number 3 belong to the power Elite -
party and state officials, high-ranking officers
of police and army and the economic bosses,
But the 'creative intelligentsia', writers, film-
maker,;. university dons, also benefit to the
point of notoriety from the cornucopia of
the '11hirt 1:conomy. I met those who were
secretly outraged by the situation and spoke
indignantly about these volrhelbuave ,nnrag-
aziuy (magic shops) where you can find
anything, but only if you have dollars, after
producing a certificate showing where you
got them. 'What separates 911 per cent of
the Soviet population from communism,',
said one of them, 'is this damned certificate'
which presents them from shopping in these
luxury stores.' Another declared: 'Our coun-
try' humiliates itself by displaying in broad
daylight, in full view of foreigners; a whole
consumer-goods sector in which our own
national currency isn't valid.' But whether
the beneficiaries of Economy Number. 3
condone it or condemn it, the fact is that
its flagrant privileges contribute to the shut-
ting off and fragmentation of Soviet society.
I discussed the problem over dinner with
an economist known for his advocacy of
'liberal' reforms. We ate in a popular re-
staurant where we were unlikely to meet
'My mistake.' he said. 'was to believe too
long that our leaders supported reforms to
end Economy Number 2 and tackle the coun-
try's economic reality. I thought they under-
stood. from their experience, that repressive
moasttros would never nehiave rosin(( and
that they were therefore ready to employ
purely economic tools. Now I see there was
nothing in it. The state continues to regard
every citizen who earns less than 300 roubles
a month - 95 per cent of the population -
as a potential crook and is content simply to
put some obstacles in his way. This cat-and-
mouse game results in a totally deformed
manpower structure and a crazy organ-
isation of work. We force ou' shop assist-
ants and waiters to work ridiculous hours
so that a check can be carried out at the
end of each shift to see if anything has been
stolen. In fact, the "controllers" join in the
rackets and the whole-system simply increases
the number of thieves and lowers pro-
ductivitv.
`That's not all,' he continued. 'Our leaders
refuse any kind of economic rationalisation
which would hit the interests of the various
lobbies of privileged citizens. They deplore
the inflation but they refuse to introduce a
tax on high incomes: the state takes more
from the tax on alcohol (recently raised)
than from all taxes on income. We are
sadly short of manpower, to the point where
we aren't able to finish certain projects, and
yet we make millions of our young people
do three to five yt:arc of a military con-
scription which is completely irrelevant in
the atomic age.
,We still have 44 per cent of the pop-
ulation living in the countryside without
the freedom to-move about the country and
therefore prevented from taking jobs in in-
dustry; but all our plans for farm product-
ion are systematically undermined by fail-
,c learns any lessons. In
uses from which no on
my opinion the government accepts this sit-
uation because it prefers it to the risk of
change. To sum up: the government bene-
fits from this fragmentation of our society
because it forces the workers individually to
resolve their diflicult day-to-day problems
and distracts them from politics and from
anything touching on public affairs. True, it's
a paradox, but the stability of the regime
depends precisely on this paradox:
What astonished me in Russia was that
even the regime's opponents seemed to ac-
cept quite calmly a 'socialist' society which
is split up into classes and in which glaring
privileges and contrasting standards of life,
exist.
'Within the framework of our system,' he
replied. 'we can only attempt to influence
our, leaders by trying to sharpen their sen-
sitivity to certain economic and social prob-
lems. It's impossible to organise strikes or
tq engage in any great doctrinal debate on
the nature of our 'society. We have to tackle
the most immediate problems; how to lib
erate our workers from the degrading
necessity to resort to Economy Number 2;
errors etc. That in itself is quite a pro-
gotptmc.'
I objected that it is exactly the limited
character of this programme which makes
it unrealisahtc because leadership circles
riikcly yield to the simple advice of experts.
1'Id`evould only admit I was halt right: '1349n't
be, shocked because those students you met
the other night asked you about the price of
clothes in France and not about the revol-
utionary movement there. Don't misunder- -
stand these young people because they told
you that they had been inoculated against.,
th~' disease of politics. Until we can get
away from shortages our fellow citizcrts will
re in obsessed by the consumer goods they
cap t get. No one is going to risk the little
be has for an uncertain future by doing a
bon Quixote. They prefer to wait. The
government, for its part, ensures that it will
for a ease itputpiduid - ti';t
 25X1C10b
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY August 1971
THE REACH OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE
The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty received its name
at the hands of Western journalists from Brezhnev's speech at the
Fifth Polish Communist Party Congress on 12 November 1968, when he
declared in obvious reference to Czechoslovakia:
"It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has
done much for the real strengthening of the sovereignty
and independence of the socialist countries. However, it
is known, comrades, that there also are common laws governing
socialist contruction, a deviation from which might lead to
a deviation from socialism as such. And when the internal
and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the
development of any socialist country toward the restoration
of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of
socialism in that country, a 'threat to the security of the
socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer
only a problem of the people of that country, but also a
common problem, a concern for all socialist states.
"It goes without saying that such an action as military
aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the
socialist order is an extraordinary, emergency step; it can
be sparked only by direct actions creating a threat to the
common interests of the camp of socialism."
Brezhnev's enunciation of the doctrine was preceded by two
authoritative statements: The so-called Warsaw Letter of 15 July
1968 signed by the five Warsaw Pact powers who were to invade Czecho-
slovakia six weeks later, and by a full elaboration of the doctrine
in Pravda on 26 September 1968 by Sergei Kovalev (the full text of
ea is attached.). The Warsaw Letter was drafted at one of the
pre-invasion emergency meetings of the Warsaw Pact powers (except
Czechoslovakia and Romania) as a warning to the Dubcek leadership
to halt the liberalization of Czechoslovakia and abandon its
program for creating a new socialism, a "socialism with a human face,"
The Warsaw Letter is probably the frankest Soviet--endorsed statement
of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It includes the following passages:
"We did not have and have no intention of interfering
in such matters that are purely internal affairs of your
party and your state, of violating the principle of respect
for independence and equality in relations between communist
parties and socialist countries.... We cannot, however,
agree that enemy forces should divert your country from the
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060061-7 i
path of socialism and expose Czechoslovakia to the danger of
being torn from the socialist community. This is no longer
your affair alone. This is the affair of all communist and
workers' parties and all countries which are linked by
alliances, cooperation and friendship.... We shall never
be resigned to imperialism making a breach in the socialist
system, by peaceful or nonpeaceful means, from inside or
outside, and changing power relations in Europe to its own
advantage...
"In your country, a whole series of events in recent
months indicates that counterrevolutionary forces supported
by imperialist centers, have launched attacks on a broad
front against the socialist system.... We are convinced
that a situation has arisen which endangers the foundations
of socialism in Czechoslovakia and threatens the vital common
interests of the other socialist countries? The peoples of
our countries would never forgive us our indifference and
carelessness in the face of such danger. Our parties bear
the responsibility, not only before their own working class
and people but before the entire international working class
and the communist world movement, and cannot keep aloof from
that obligation. Therefore, we must maintain solidarity and
unity in defense of our achievement, our security, and the
international positions of the entire socialist community,.
"We believe,: therefore, that, in the face of the attacks
of the anti-communist forces, resolute resistance and determined
struggle for the maintenance of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia
is not only your task, but ours also." [Emphasis supplied.]
Kovalev produced the most comprehensive statement of what later
became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. The whole text repays study,
but the relevant passage for present purposes reads as follows:
"The peoples of the socialist countries and communist parties
certainly do have and should have freedom for dete Wing the
ways of advance of their respective countries. However, none
of their decisions should damage either socialism in their
country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries
and the whole working class movement, which is working for
socialism. This means that each cortm-unist party is responsible
not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist
countries, to the entire communist movement. .. The sovereignty
of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interest
of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement."
[Emphasis supplied.]
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Out of the final pre-invasion meeting between the Soviets and
the Dubcek leadership in Bratislava 3 August 1968 came a joint
communique which contained the most usually expressed version:
"Support, consolidation, and protection of [a socialist
country's] gains ... is a common international duty of all
socialist countries." [Emphasis supp ie .
This became Soviet leaders' and propagandists' most frequent way of
defining the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Soviet and Soviet-oriented leaders and writers have been
consistently careful to use only legalistic and "principled"
expressions when discussing the Brezhnev Doctrine and to avoid
more frank and bruta 1 statements of its real intent. They do not
even recognize the legitimacy of the term, and on the rare occasions
when they use it, they sarcastically refer to the "so-called Brezhnev
Doctrine."
The mild, invariably innocuous-sounding terms used by the Soviets
to describe the Brezhnev Doctrine are intended to veil the fact that
its practical application meant a 500,000-man invasion of Czechoslovakia
by Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and East German troops on
the night of 20 August 1968 and can mean a similar invasion anywhere
within the reach of Soviet power. Soviet claims that an internal and
external "counterrevolutionary" threat existed and that they had been
"invited" by "thousands" of Czechoslovak citizens are patently false.
The invasion made a mockery of continuing Soviet claims that they
respect "the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in the
internal affairs of a fraternal state, and of mutual equality and
respect between allies."
The fundamental reason for the Soviet invasion was that Czechoslovakia
had begun to establish an independent model of socialism that deviated
from the Soviet model. The Dubcek regime deviated from the "common laws
governing socialist construction" (as defined by the Soviets) in permitting
traditional democratic freedoms of speech, press, political organization,
etc. and in developing the potential for an independent foreign policy.
In a word, the 1968 Czechoslovak leaders sought to exercise the simple
right of national sovereignty, a sovereignty they discovered was limited
by the Brezhnev Doctrine. As Kovalev explained after the fact:
"The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed
to the interests of the world of socialism, the world revolutionary
movement."
Since the Soviets claim to lead and speak for the world socialist
movement, Kovalev's statement simply means that a socialist state can
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
be sovereign only so long as it does not act contrary to the wishes
and requirements of the Soviet Union.
The Brezhnev Doctrine has been at the heart of the tumultuous
dissension within the Communist world since the invasion. The battle
is between those who insist on the primacy of national sovereignty
(like Yugoslavia, Romania, and many free world Communist parties)
and those who find it necessary or expedient to support the Soviets
in their insistence on the primacy of world Communism. Attached
are some expressions of Communist opposition to the concepts of
the Brezhnev Doctrine, cast again in doctrinal terms, as are the
Soviet views cited earlier.
The example of Czechoslovakia raised the question, still tut
answered, as to what other deviant socialist states or allies might
fall under the purview of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Romania, as a
socialist state bordering the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, the
original deviant, felt (and still feel) justifiably threatened by
the doctrine. And the most prodigious deviant of all, Communist
China, was the subject of a threatening article (see attached)
by Victor Louis, notorious spokesman of the KGB, the vast Soviet
security organization charged with the responsibility for world-
wide Soviet espionage and subversion. The post-invasion period
is replete with examples of the Soviets' punishing and splitting
deviant and independent Communist parties of the free.-World, such
as those of Spain, Venezuela, Japan, and Australia, among others.
Even non-Communist allies;Of the USSR like Egypt and Finland cannot
rest assured that the Soviet Union will not seek to impose its will
on their countries in the name and spirit of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Indeed, Finland on many occasions has undergone the experience of
the Soviets' placing limits on her sovereignty-
In the final analysis; Soviet implementation offthe Brezhnev
Doctrine is limited only by the practical matter of how far Soviet
power can reach.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
PRAVDA
18 July 1968
CPYRGHT
THE "WARSAW LETTER" ' TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK ' COM'IUNIST PARTY ' CENTRAL ' COMMITTEE
r comra cx
On behalf of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers'
Parties of J tnlgatia, Hungary, the C.J).L. Poland and the Soviet Union, we
send you this idter, which is dictated by sincere friendship based on the princi-
ples of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and by concern for
our common tasks and for strengthening the positions of socialism and the
security and socialist commonwealth of the peoples.
The developments in your country have aroused profound anxiety among
us. The reactionaries' offensive, supported by imperialism, against your party
and the foundations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's social system,
we are deeply convinced, threatens to push your country off the path of social-
ism and, consequently, imperils the interests of the entire socialist system.
We expressed these fears at a meeting in Dresden, during several bilateral
meetings and in the letters that our parties recently sent to the Presidium of
the Czechoslovak. Communist Party Central Committee.
A short time ago we proposed to the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Com-
mittee that a new joint meeting be held on July 14, 1968, to exchange informa-
tion and opinions on the situation in our countries, including developments in
Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Committee
did not take part in this meeting and did not take advantage of the opportunity
for a collective comradely discussion of the situation that has taken shape.
Therefore we deemed it necessary to set forth our common opinion to you in
this letter with all sincerity and candor. We want you to understand us well
and assess our intentions correctly.
We have not had and do not have any intention of interfering in affairs that
arc purely the internal affairs of your party and your state or of violating the
principles of respect, autonomy and equality in relations among Communist
Parties and socialist countries.
We do not appear before you as representatives of yesterday who would like
to hinder your rectification of errors and shortcomings, including the violations
of socialist legality that took place.
We do not interfere with the methods of planning and administration of
Czechoslovakia's socialist national economy or with your actions aimed at
perfecting the economic structure and developing socialist democracy.
We shall vrekome adjustment of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks
on the healthy foundations of fraternal cooperation within the framework of
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
At the same time, we cannot assent to hostile forces pushing your country
off the path of socialism and creating the threat that Czechoslovakia may break
away from the socialist commonwealth. This is no longer your affair alone.
It is the common affair of all Communist and Workers' Parties and states that
are united by alliance; cooperation and friendship. It is the common affair of
our countries, which have united in the Warsaw Pact to safeguard their inde-
pendence, peace, and security in Europe and to place an insurmountable barrier
in front of the schemes of imperialist forces, aggression and revanche.
At the cost of enormous sacrifices, the peoples of our countries achieved vic-
tory over Hitlerian fascism and won freedom and independence and the op-
portunity to advance along the path of progress and socialism. The frontiers
of the socialist world have shifted to the center of Europe, to the Elbe and the
Bohemian Forest. And never will we consent to allow these historic gains of
socialism and the independence and security of all our peoples to be jeopar-
dized. Never will we consent to allow imperialism, by peaceful or nonpeaceful
means, from within or without, to make a breach in the socialist system and
change the balance of power in Europe in its favor.
The might and solidity of our alliances depend on the internal strength of
the socialist system in each of our fraternal countries and on the Marxist-
Leninist policies of our parties, which perform a guiding role in the political
and social life of their peoples and states. Subversion of the Communist Parties'
guiding role leads to liquidation of socialist democracy and the socialist system.
This creates a threat to the foundations of our alliance and to the security of
our countries' commonwealth.
You know that the fraternal parties showed understanding for the decisions
of the C.C.P. Central Committee's January plenary session; they assumed that
your party, keeping a firm hold on the levers of power, would direct the whole
process in the interests of socialism without allowing anti-Communist reaction-
aries to exploit it for their own purposes. We were convinced that you would
defend the Leninist principle of democratic centralism as the apple of your eve.
Disregard for any aspect of this principle both of democracy and of centralism
inevitably leads to a weakening of the party and its guiding role and to trans-
formation of the party into either a bureaucratic organization or a discussion
club. We have repeatedly spoken about all these questions at our meetings,
and we received assurances from you that you were aware of all the dangers
and were fully resolved to repulse them.
Unfortunately, events moved along a different channel.
The forces of reaction, taking advantage of the weakening of party leader-
ship in the country and demagogically abusing the slogan of "democratiza-
-
 CPYRGHT
tion," unleashed a cam pai gn a %fe PTO q~ t r untry indicates that
cadres, with clear intention of u-idat g the part s g g PPo y ing role, der. h~ orce~s o'Fcoun4errrevloluttiioonn, sou rte v~doslist centers, have launched
the " Y
mining thi sftialist system and pitting Czechoslovakia against the other socialist a broad offensive against the socialist system without encountering the requisite
countries, opposition from the party or the people's role. There is no doubt that the
The political organizations and clubs that have cropped up lately outside
the framework of the National Front have in essence become headquarters for
the forces of reaction. The social democrats persistently seek to create their
own party, me organizing underground committees and are attempting to split
the workers' movement in Czechoslovakia and to secure leadership of the
country so as so restore the bourgeois system. Antisocialist and revisionist forces
have taken over the press, radio and television and have turned them into
platforms far attacking the Communist Party, for disorienting the working
class and all tie working people, for carrying out unchecked antisocialist dema-
goguery and for subverting the friendly relations between the C.S.R. and the
other socialist countries. A number of mass news organs are systematically con-
ducting gennim moral terrorism with respect to people who speak out against
the forces of reaction or express their anxiety over the course of events.
Despite the decisions of the May plenary sessions of the C.C.P. Central Com-
mittee, whisk pointed out the threat from rightist and anti-Communist forces
as the chief danger, the intensified attacks by the reactionaries have met no
rebuff. It was precisely this that enabled the reactionaries to appear publicly
before the wiole country and publish their political platform, entitled "The
2,000 Wordty" which contains an open appeal for struggle against the Com-
munist Party and against constitutional rule, an appeal for strikes and dis-
orders. This appeal constitutes a serious threat to the party, the National Front
and the soaalist state and is an attempt to implant anarchy. In essence, this
statement is an organizational-political platform of counterrevolution. Let no
one be deluded by its authors' assertions that they do not want to overthrow
the socialist system, that they do not want to act without Communists, that
they do not want to sever the alliances with the socialist countries. These are
empty phrasts whose aim is to legitimize the platform of counterrevolution
and lull the 'vigilance of the party, the working class and all the working people.
This platf ann, which was widely circulated in the crucial period prior to the
extraordinary congress of the C.C.P., not only was not rejected but even found
outright champions within the party and its leadership, champions who sup-
port the anrancialist appeals.
centers of international imperialist reaction, which are doing everything pos-
sible to inflame and complicate the situation by inspiring antisocialist forces to
take action in this direction, have taken a hand in these Czechoslovak develop-
ments. Under the guise of extolling the "democratization" and "liberalization"
in the C.S.R., the bourgeois press is conducting an incisive campaign against the
fraternal socialist countries. F.R.G. ruling circles, which seek to make use of the
events in Czechoslovakia to sow discord between the socialist countries. to
isolate the G.D.R, and to implement their revanchist schemes, have been espe-
cially active in this.
Is it possible, comrades, that you fail to see these dangers? Is it possiible,to
remain passive in this situation and to confine oneself merely to declarations
and assurances of fidelity to the cause of socialism and alliance commitments?
Is it possible that you fail to see that the counterrevolutionaries have taken
one position after another from you and that the party is losing control over
the course of events and is retreating more and more under the pressure of
anti-Communist forces?'
Was it not to sow distrust and hostility toward the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries that your country's press, radio and-television unleashed a
campaign over the stag exercises of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces? Matters
have reached the point where a joint exercise of our troops with the participa-
tion of several Soviet army units, something customary for military coopera-
tion, is being used for unfounded charges that the C.S.R: s sovereignty has been
violated. And this is happening in Czechoslovakia, whose people hold sacred
the memory of the Soviet soldiers who gave their lives for the freedom and
sovereignty of that country. At the same time, near your country's western
borders the military forces of the aggressive NATO bloc are conducting ma-
neuvers in which the army of revanchist West Germany is participating. But
not a word is said about this.
As is obvious, the inspirers of this invidious campaign want to confuse the
minds of the Czechoslovak people, disorient them and undermine the truism
that Czechoslovakia can preserve its independence and sovereignty only as a
socialist country, as a member of the socialist commonwealth. And only the
Antisocialieit and revisionist forces are defaming the entire activity of the enemies. of socialism could today exploit the slogan of "defending the sover-
Communist Party, waging a slander campaign against 'its cadres and discredit- ei y" of the C.S.R. against the socialist countries, against the countries with
ing honest Communists who are devoted to the party.! which alliance and fraternal cooperation create the most reliable groundwork
Thus, a siimation has arisen that is absolutely unacceptable for a socialist for the independence and free development of each of our peoples.
country. We are convinced that a situation has arisen in which the threat to the
In this at?spherc attacks are also being made on the C.S.R.'s socialist for- foundations of socialism in Czechoslovakia jeopardizes the common vital in-
eign policy, and the alliance and friendship with socialist countries: is being wrests of the rest of the socialist countries. The peoples of our countries would
assailed. Voices are heard demanding a revision of our common coordinated never forgive us for indifference and unconcern before such danger.
policy with erect to the F.R.G., despite the fact that the West German govern- We live in a time when peace and the security and freedom of peoples more
meat invarahly pursues a course hostile to the interests of our countries' than ever demand unity among the forces of socialism. International tension is
security. The attempts at flirtation by the F.R.G. authorities and the revanchists not waning. American imperialism has not renounced its policy of force and
have found a response in ruling circles of your country. open intervention against peoples fighting for their freedom. It continues a
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
wage a criminal war in Vietnam, support the Israeli aggressors in the Near
East and hampers a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The arms race has by
no z, cans slowed down. The Federal Republic of Germany, in which the
forces of neofasci n have swelled, attacks the status quo by demanding a revi-
sion of the borders, refuses to renounce its aspirations either to seize the
G.D.R. or to secure access to nuclear weapons and opposes disarmament pro-
posals. In Europe, where enormous means of mass destruction have been
stockpiled, peace and the security of peoples are maintained primarily thanks
to the strength, solidarity and peace-loving policies of the socialist states. We
all bear responsibility for this strength and unity of the socialist countries and
for the fate of peace.
Our countries are bound to one another by treaties and agreements. These
important mutual commitments of states and peoples are founded on a com-
mon desire to defend socialism and safeguard the collective security of the
socialist countries Our parties and peoples are entrusted with the historical
responsibility of seeing that the revolutionary gains achieved are not forfeited.
Each of our parties bears a responsibility not only to its own working class
and its own people but also to the international working class and the world
Communist movement and cannot evade the obligations deriving from this..
Therefore we roost have solidarity and unity in defense of the gains of social-
ism, our security and the international positions of the entire socialist com-
monwealth.
This is why we believe that it is not only your task but ours too to deal a
resolute rebuff to the anticommunist forces and to wage a resolute struggle for
the preservation of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia.
The cause of defending the rule of the working class and all the working
people and the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia requires:
a resolute and bold offensive against rightist and antisocialist forces and the
mobilization of all means of defense created by the socialist state;
a cessation of the activities of all political organizations that oppose socialism;
the party's assumption of control over the mass news media - the press,
radio, and television - and utilization of them in the interests of the working
class, all the working people and socialism:
solidarity in the ranks of the party itself on the fundamental basis of Marx-
ism-Leninism, saeadfast observance of the principles of democratic centralism
and struggle against those who through their activities assist hostile forces.
We know there are forces in Czechoslovakia that are capable of upholding the
socialist system and dealing a defeat to the antisocialist elements. The working
class, the laboring peasantry and the advanced intelligentsia -the overwhelm-
ing majority of the republic's working people - are prepared to do everything
necessary in the name of the further development of socialist society. The
tasks today are to give these healthy forces a clear perspective, rally them to
action and mobilize their energy for a struggle against the forces of counter-
revolution in order to preserve and strengthen socialism in Czechoslovakia.
In the face of the threat of counterrevolution, the voice of the working class
must resound with full strength to the call of. the Communist Party. The work-
ing class, together with the laboring peasantry, made enormous efforts in the
name of the triumph of the socialist revolution. It is precisely these forces that
most cherish the preservation of the gains of socialism.
We express the conviction that the Czechoslovak Communist Party, realizing
its responsibility, will take the necessary measures to block the path of reaction.
In this struggle you may count on the solidarity and comprehensive assistance
of the fraternal socialist countries.
[Signed:] On the instructions of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central
Committee: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the B.C.P. Central Committee
and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria;
Stanko Todorov, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee; Boris Velchev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central
Committee; Pencho Kubadinsky, member of the Politburo and Vice-Chairman
of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers.
On the instructions of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Com-
mittee: Janos Kadar, First Secretary of H.S.W.P. Central Committee; Jeno
Fock, member of the Politburo of the H.S.W.P. Central Committee and Chair-
man of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.
On the .instructions of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany: Walter Ulbricht. First Secretary of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee
and Chairman of the G.D.R. State Council; Willi Stoph, member of the
Politburo of the Central Committee and Chairman of the G.D.R. Council of
Ministers; Hermann Axen, candidate member of the Politburo and Secretary
of the Central Committee.
On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers'
Party: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the P.U.W.P. Central Coax
mittee; Marian Spychalski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee
and Chairman of the Polish People's Republic State Council; Josef Cyran-
kiewicz, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the P.P.R. Council of
Ministers; Zenon Kliszko, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee.
On the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the,
Soviet Union: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Com-
mittee; N. V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee
and Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet; A. N. Kosy-
gin, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Min-
isters; P. Ye. Shelest, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Com-
mittee and First Secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee;
K. F. Katushev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.
Warsaw, July rg, 1968.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
PRA.VDA
26 September 1968
CPYRGHT
"SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES."
by Sergei Kovalev
In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia the question of the relation-
ship and interconsoetion between the socialist countries' national interests and
their internationalist obligations has assumed particular urgency and sharpness.
The measures taken jointly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries
to defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of enormous sig-
nificance for strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is the main
achievement of the international working class.
At the same time it is impossible to ignore the allegations being heard in
some places that the actions of the five socialist countries contradict the
Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-
determination.
Such arguments arc untenable primarily because they are based on an ab-
stract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of na-
tions to self-determination.
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Commu-
nist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of
development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism
in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist coun-
tries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for
socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to
its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist
movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy in.t
'independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his
internationalist o'l gations.
The Marxist balectic opposes one-sidedness; it requires that every phe-
nomenon be examined in terms of both its specific nature and its overall con-
nection with other phenomena and processes. Just as, in V. I. Lends words,
someone living in a society cannot be free of that society, so a socialist state that
is in a system of ether states constituting a socialist commonwealth cannot be
free of the common interests of that commonwealth.
The sovercigm, of individual socialist countries cannot be countcrposed to
the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary Wit. V. I.
Lenin demanded that all Communists "struggle against petty national narrow-
ness, exclusivity and isolation, and for taking into account the whole, the overall
situation, for subordinating the interests of the particular to the interests of the
general" ("Complete Collected Works" [in Russian], Vol. XXX, p. 45).
Socialist states have respect for the democratic norms of international law.
More than once they have proved this in practice by resolutely opposing im-
perialism's attempts to trample the sovereignty and independence of peoples.
From this same standpoint they reject left-wing, adventurist notions of "ex-
porting revolution" and "bringing bliss" to other peoples. However, in the
Marxist conception the norms of law, including the norms governing relations
among socialist countries, cannot be interpreted in a narrowly formal way,
outside the general context of the class struggle in the present-day world.
Socialist countries resolutely oppose the export and import of counterrevolution.
Each Communist Party is free in applying the principles of Marxism-Lenin-
ism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from these principles
(if, of course, it remains a Communist Party). In concrete terms this means
primarily that every Communist Party cannot fail to take into account in its
activities such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between the two
antithetical social systems ---capitalism and socialism. This struggle is an ob-
jective fact that does not depend on the will of people and is conditioned by
the division of. the world into two antithetical social systems. "Every person,"
V. I. Lenin said, "must take either this, our, side or the other side. All attempts
to avoid taking sides end in failure and disgrace" (Vol. XLI, p. 4or).
It should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an "extra
bloc" position, it in fact retains its national independence thanks precisely to
the power of the socialist commonwealth - and primarily to its chief force, the
Soviet Union - and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link
in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries,
which cannot be indifferent to this. Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czecho.
slovakia were in essence using talk about the right to self-determination to
cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the CS.R. s withdrawal f vrn
the socialist commonwealth. But implementation of such "sdfdetermination,"
U, Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth, wild no
counter to Czechoslovakia's fundamental interests and would harm the other
socialist countries. Such "sdfActermination," as a result of which NATO
troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European
.4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-,RDP79-01194A000300060'001-7
 CPYRGHT
socialist countries would be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests
of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these
peoples to socialist self-determination. The Soviet Union and other socialist
states, in fulfilling their internationalist duty to the fraternal peoples of Czecho-
slovakia and defending their own socialist gains, had to act and did act in
resolute opposition to the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia.
Comrade W. Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Polish United Workers' Party, used a metaphor to illustrate this point: "To
those friends and comrades of ours from other countries who believe they are
defending the just cause of socialism and the sovereignty of peoples by de-
nouncing and protesting the introduction of our troops in Czechoslovakia, we
reply. If=_thc.anemy. plants dynamite under''our house, under the common-
wealth of sociiatist states, our patriotic, national and internationalist duty is to
prevent this by using any means that are necessary."
People who "disapprove" of the actions taken by the allied socialist coun-
tries ignose the decisive fact that these countries are defending the interests of
worldwide socialism and the worldwide revolutionary movement. The socialist
system exists in concrete form in individual countries that have their own
well-defined state boundaries and develops with regard for the specific attri-
butes of each such country. And no one interferes with concrete measures to
perfect the socialist system in various socialist countries. But matters change
radically when a danger to socialism itself arises in a country. World socialism
as a social sytgm is the common achievement of the working people of all
countries, it is indivisible, and its defense is-the common cause of all Com-
munists and all progressive people on earth, first and foremost the working
people of the socialist countries.
The Bratislava statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties on socialist
gains says that "it is the common internationalist duty of all socialist countries
to support, steengthen and defend these gains, which were achieved at the cost
of every people's heroic efforts and selfless labor."
What the sight-wing, antisocialist forces were seeking to achieve in Czecho-
slovakia in s+aent months was not a matter of developing socialism in an
original way or of applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism to specific
conditions in that country, but was an encroachment on the foundations of
socialism and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. This is the
"nuance" that is still incomprehensible to people who trusted in the hypo-
critical cant of the antisocialist and revisionist elements. Under the guise of
"democratization" these elements were shattering the socialist state step by
step; they sought to demoralize the Communist Party and dull the minds of
the masses; they were gradually preparing for a counterrevolutionary coup
and at the same time were not being properly rebuffed inside the country.
The Communists of the fraternal countries naturally could not allow the
socialist states to remain idle in the name of abstract sovereignty while the
country was endangered by antisocialist degeneration.
The five allied socialist countries' actions in Czechoslovakia are consonant
with the fundamental interests of the Czechoslovak people themselves. Ob-
viously it is precisely socialism that, by liberating a nation from the fetters of
an exploitative system, ensures the solution of fundamental problems of na-
tional development in any country that takes the socialist path. And by en-
croaching on the foundations of socialism, the counterrevolutionary elements
in Czechoslovakia were thereby undermining the basis of the country's inde-
pendence and sovereignty.
The formal observance of freedom of self-determination in the specific
situation that had taken shape in Czechoslovakia would signify freedom of
"self-determination" not for the people's masses and the working people, but
for their enemies. The antisocialist path, the "neutrality" to which the Czecho-
slovak people were being prodded, would lead the C.S.R. straight into the
jaws of the West German revanchists and would lead to the loss of its na-
tional independence. World imperialism, for its part, was trying to export
counterrevolution to Czechoslovakia by supporting the antisocialist forces there.
The assistance given to the working people of the C.S.R. by the other socialist
countries, which prevented the export of counterrevolution from the outside,
is in fact a struggle for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's sovereignty against
those who would like to deprive it of this sovereignty by delivering the country
to the imperialists.
Over a long period of time and with utmost restraint and patience, the fra-
ternal Communist Parties of the socialist countries took political measures to
help the Czechoslovak people to halt the antisocialist forces' offensive in
Czechoslovakia. And only after exhausting all such measures did they under-
take to bring in armed forces.
The allied socialist countries' soldiers who are in Czechoslovakia are proving
in deeds that they have no task other than to defend the socialist gains in that
country. They are not interfering in the country's internal affairs, and they arc
waging a struggle not in words but in deeds for the principles of self-determi-
nation of Czechoslovakia's peoples, for their inalienable right to decide their
destiny themselves after profound and careful consideration, without intimida-
tion by counterrevolutionaries, without revisionist and nationalist demagoguery.
Those who speak of 'the "illegality" of the allied socialist countries' actions
in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society there is and can be no such
thing as nonclass law. Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the
laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development. These laws-are
clearly formulated in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and
Workers' Parties.
The lass approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic
considerations. Whoever does so and forfeits the only correct, class-oriented
criterion for evaluating legal norms begins to measure events with the yard-
sticks of bourgeois law. Such an approach to the question of sovereignty
means, for example, that the world's progressive forces could not oppose the
revival of nco-Nazism in the F.R.G., the butcheries of Franco and Salazar or
the reactionary outrages of the "black colonels" in Greece, since these are the
"internal affairs" of "sovereign states." It is typical that both the Saigon pup.
pets and their American protectors concur completely in the notion that sovet6
Approved- .nrTlele_asP 1.9,9wtwr9/02 : RQP79-01 194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
eignty forbids supporting the struggle of the progressive forces. After all, they
shout from the housetops that the socialist states that are giving aid to the
Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence and freedom are violating
Vietnam's sovereignty. Genuine revolutionaries, as internationalists, cannot fail
to support progressive forces in all countries in their just struggle for national
and social liberation.
The interests of the socialist commonwealth and the entire revolutionary
movement and the interests of socialism in Czechoslovakia demand full expo-
sure and political isolation of the reactionary forces in that country, consolida-
SCINTEIA
22 August 1968
tion of the working people and consistent fulfillment of the Moscow agreement
between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders.
There is no doubt that the actions taken in Czechoslovakia by the five allied
socialist countries in Czechoslovakia, actions aimed at defending the furtda-
mental interests of the socialist commonwealth and primarily at defending
Czechoslovakia's independence and sovereignty as a socialist state, will be
increasingly supported by all who really value the interests of the present-day
revolutionary movement, the peace and security of peoples, democracy and
socialism.
Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania and Secretary General of the POmanian Cbnvm1nhst 'Par-ty
Dear comrades, citizens of Rumania. In this difficult moment for the situation
in Europe and for the fraternal Czechoslovak people, in the name of the
Central Committee, of the State Council, and of the government, I wish to
address myself so you and express myself to you and express our confidence in
our people, who are aspiring to ensure the peaceful construction of socialism.
We know, coatrades, that the entry of the forces of the five socialist countries
into Czechoshwakia is a great error and a serious danger to peace in Europe
and to the fate of socialism in the world. It is inconceivable in today's world,
when the peopks are rising to the struggle to defend their national inde-
pendence and for equality in rights, that a socialist state, that socialist states,
should violate the freedom and the independence of another state. There is no
justification whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a
moment the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist
state.
Our party-state delegation which last week visited Czechoslovakia convinced
itself that the Czechoslovak people, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and
the Czechoslovak workers' class, old people, women, and young people, unani-
mously support the party and state leadership in order to put right the negative
state of affairs in Czechoslovakia inherited from the past, in order to ensure
the triumph of socialism in Czechoslovakia.
The problem of choosing the ways of socialist construction is a problem of
each party, of each state, and of every people, and nobody can set himself up
as an adviser and guide for the way in which socialism must be built. It is the
affair of every people, and we deem that, in order to place the relations between
socialist countries and Communist es cry w put an end once and parties
of
for all to tinterference in the affairs
is neccessary p
is n
The measures which the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and
the State Council hade decided to adopt aim at submitting to the Grand
National Assembly a declaration in which we would set out clearly the rations we mean to build, our relations with the socialist countries and with all
the countries of the world, based on respect for independence and national
sovereignty, full equality in rights, and nonce in inttsrsal affairs, and
to base these relations on a truly Marxist-Leninist collaboration which would
contribute to the triumph of the ideas of Max, Engels, and Lenin, to the
triumph of communism, and to restoring the authority of and confidence in
Marxist-Leninist ideas.
We have today decided to set up armed patriotic guards made up of workers,
peasants, and intellectuals: defenders of the independence of our socialist
fatherland. We want our people to have their armed units in order to defend
their revolutionary achievements and in order to ensure their peaceful work
and the independence and the sovereignty of our socialist fatherland.
In our activity, we proceed from the responsibility we have toward the
people, toward all the working people regardless of nationality - Rumanians,
Hungarians, Germans, and other nationalities; we all -- Rumanians, Hun-
garians, Germans, people of other nationalities -have the same destiny and
the same aspiration: the forging of communism in our fatherland. We at
determined that in complete unity we shall ensure the attainment of our ideals.
It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was danger of counterrevolu-
tion; perhaps tomorrow they will say that our meeting has mirrored counter-
revolutionary tendencies. If so, we answer to all that all the Rumanian people
will not permit anybody to violate the territory of our fatherland. Lout coax
rades: Our whole Central Committee, the State Council, and the Government
are here. We are all determined to faithfully save the people in socialist enw
other states and ot, . . _Approv-eel For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
struction and in die defense of the revolutionary achievements and its inde-
pendence. Many of those who arc here are Communists and antifascists who
have faced prisons and death but have not betrayed the interests of the
workers' class and our people. Be sure, comrades, be sure, citizens of Rumania,
that we shall nevu betray our fatherland, that we shall not betray our people's
interests.
We are confident that the Communist and workers parties will know how
to find the way to put the speediest end to this shameful event in the history
of the revolutionary movements. We are convinced that no Communist can
be found who can accept this military action in Czechoslovakia, that all the
Communists would raise their voices to ensure the triumph of freedom, the
triumph :of the Marxist-Leninist principles, so that Czechoslovak people, so
that the peoples, may be able to build socialist society as they themselves want it.
We are determined to act with all our force and with all our responsibility
in order to contribute to the finding of ways for the speediest solution of this
situation created by the entry of foreign forces into Czechoslovakia, and so that
the Czechoslovak people can carry out their activity in tranquility. We are
firmly determined to act so that together with the other socialist countries
22 August 1968
and with the other Communist and workers' parties we shall contribute to the
elimination of the divergencies and to the strengthening of the unity of the
socialist countries and of the Communist parties because we are convinced
that only in this way are we serving the interests of the people and the interests
of socialism in the whole world.
We ask the citizens of our fatherland that, having complete confidence in
the leadership of the party and the state and in our Communist party, they
should give proof of complete unity and act calmly and firmly, with everyone
at his place of work, to increase his efforts to ensure the implementation of the
program for the development of our socialist society, and to be ready, com-
rades, at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania.
I thank you, all the citizens of the capital and all the citizens of our father-
land for your confidence, for this warm manifestation, and for the attention
with which you are watching our party's policy; and we wish you comrades
good health and success in your activity for the triumph of socialism in our
fatherland.
We request you, comrades, that you return to your work and have confidence
that we shall keep you informed regarding the unfolding of events. Good-bye.
OFFICIAL RU4ANIAN COMNIQUE ON THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 21 AUGUST 1968
CPYRGHT
On August at, i968, a joint session of the Rumanian Communist Party entra
Committee, of the State Council, and of the government of the Rumanian
Socialist Republic was held. In addition to the members of the Central Com-
mittee, the State Council, and the government-of the Rumanian Socialist Re-
public, the pleurisy session was attended by the leaders of the trade unions,
youth organizatiin, and other civic organizations, representatives of the press,
and activists wilt responsible state and party jobs.
Comrade Niorlae Ceausescu reported about the particularly grave situation
created as a consequence of the penetration of the armed forces of some
socialist countries into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and presented the
conclusions whier were reached by the Executive Committee of the party
Central Committee and by the Presidium of the Central Committee in this
connection.
The Central Committee, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers have
unanimously etgwessed their profound concern in connection with this act,
stressing that it represents a flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a
fraternal, socialat, free, and independent state, of the principles on which the
relations between socialist countries are based, of the unanimously recognized
norms of international law.
Nothing can lusts this arme action - the occupation ot zee os ov
by the troops of these countries. The interference in the internal affairs of the
Czechoslovak people and of their Communist party, the armed intervention
against Czechoslovakia, represents a grave blow for the interests of the unity
of the world socialist system, for the international Communist and workers'
movement, for the prestige of socialism throughout the world, and for the
cause of peace. The party and government, all our people, express their con-
viction that the only road for the liquidation of the grave consequences created
by the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia is the speedy withdrawal of the
troops of the five countries and the ensuring of conditions for the Czeclro-'
slovak people to solve for themselves their internal affairs without any outside
interference. The party and government, all our people, manifest on this occa-
sion, too, all their solidarity with the fraternal Czechoslovak people and with
their Communist party and express their conviction that the Czechoslovak
workers' class, the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, peasantry, the Communist
party, and its leadership elected by the party, the legal bodies of leadership of
the Czechoslovak state will successfully solve all the problems connected with
the march forward of socialist building in the fraternal Czechoslovak republic.
The party Central Committee, the State Council, and the government of the
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
ApVX, y,,neoq lTp ~~et t-~ ~~4i 02 : C RPRr?9p9XJ JAq0930006Q~OOmit7 to ensure the peaceful
pCU u.. S-:roust Republic hay a i s1~r
Presidium and of the Executive Committee of the party Central Committee creative work of the Rumanian people, builders of socialism, the independence,
directed toward the promotion of the principles of independence, sovereignty, and sovereignty of our fatherland, were also approved unanimously.
noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual respect, the strengthening on It has been decided to convoke for tomorrow, 22 August, the Grand National
this basis of the unity of the socialist countries, of the Communist and workers Assembly of the Rumanian Socialist Republic in extraordinary session,
parties, and of all anti-imperialist forces. I
BORBA
26 August 1968
IRPT FROM THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 1HE CENTRAL 0ONMITTEE OF THE LEAGEJE OF- CONKNISTS OF Yt VIA-, 23AUQJSf 1968
CPYRGHT
The Communists and other citizens of Yugoslavia have in recent days over-
whelmingly expressed their. deep indignation and protest against the occupa-
tion of CzechWovakia. They have given full support to the people of
Czechoslovakia who under'difficult conditions of occupation rallied around
their party and state leadership, so unanimously and courageously fighting for
the independence and free socialist development of their country.
In endorsing the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY),
our people have once again declared themselves ready to defend uncompromis-
ingly their independence, their right to determine their own way of internal
socialist develo s ent and to act freely in international relations. They have
taken this stand in line with their internationalist responsibility and in solidarity
with socialist and all anti-imperialist and democratic forces in the world, in the
interests of peace, independence, and the equality of peoples in the interests of
socialism. In the stand taken by our people, the LCY sees an inexhaustible
source of strength and encouragement for further efforts in the struggle for
the development of socialist, democratic, and humane relations among people
and for the resolute support to all the forces fighting for the liberation of
man and nations from all forms of repression and hegemony.
Together with all the people of socialist Yugoslavia, the Central Committee
(CC) of the ICY has once again expressed its protest against a violent action,
the method and aims of which are directly opposed to the essence and interests
of socialism.
The CC condemns the policy which attempts to shirk responsibility to the
working class and peoples of the whole world, to the interests of _peaa,
progress and socialism. No matter what arguments are used to justify the
occupation of Czechoslovakia, the fact remains that the governments of the
five Warsaw Treaty countries, by applying brute force, have perpetrated an
attack against the independence of a socialist country in order to hinder its
independent socialist development and to subject it to their will.
The peoples of our country, led by the LCY, once again raise their voce in
protest, as they have been doing in the matters of American aggression in
Vietnam, threats to the independence and independent internal development
of Cuba, Israeli aggression against Arab countries, or imperialist violence and
intervention in various countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Viewed
historically, the action against Czechoslovakia is all the more grave and far-
reaching in its harmful effect on progress, peace, and freedom for having been
undertaken by socialist countries ostensibly to protect socialism.
Striking at the working class and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
(KSC), the forces which alone can ensure the progress of socialism, the inter-
vention against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) can in no way
be described as protection of socialism nor as directed against counterrevolu-
tion. Neither can the intervention be justified by any strategic interests; of the
struggle against imperialism because, by weakening the position of the socialist
countries and socialism, it is, on the contrary, strengthening the positions of
the imperialist forces. Finally, this action can least of all be justified by
ideological reasons and arguments drawn from the theory of Marxism-Lenin-
ism, because it is flagrantly at odds with the ideas of Marx, Engels, and L enin-
499 09300060004-T-
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
')A A?mutt iQ6R
CPYRGHT
FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH ON CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION; 23 AUGUST ly0~
EXC EWIS FROM
considered Czechoslov
of all I wish to state that we to be head-
. . . First ritiorrtoward capitalism, and into the
ing toward a ~errevohr2
arms of imperialism. position toward the action
Thus, this is the operative concept in our first Poswe consider that it was
carried out by a pup of socialist countries. That is,
revcut it from happening at any cost, in one way or another.
necessary to p bemuse we propose to analyze this in line with
Let us not become impatient,
our ideas The essential
Discussing the farm is not really the most fundamental thing.
or not, is whether or not the socialist bloc could
thing, whether vwe accept it political situation which would lead to the
permit the development of 'a
socialist country and its fall into the arms of imperialism
issible, and the sociat loc has the right'
breakdown asocial
From our vie ewpoint, it is not Penn We Est wish to begin by establishing what
to prevent it in one way or another,
our opinion is aboac this essential fact' that Czechoslovakia was heading
d to
Now, it is not enough to accept simply d it is . n and that it
b toward a counte i 1ude t imply that the only a ornative was to prevpn it and
causes and determine the factors which
not enough to coal
drastic, and painful remedy?
nothing more. We must analyze the d
oviola-
made possible and necessary such a dramatic,
Those arc the facaxs which required
international s standards, which have a a often lion of legal pimciples and regarded in
served as shields for peoples against injustices and are highly
the world. that in the case of Czechoslovakia the
What is not appropriate here is to say
not violated That would be fiction
sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was
and a lie. The vitiation was flagrant. ideas
our r ideas s of legal
is
And this is what we will co ce lerevieon' wpointei~rannat be
political principles. From legal
quite clear. In air judgment, the decision on Czechoslovakia can
plained only from the political viewpoint ofd not from a legal viewpoint.
alega.
Frankly, it has anmlutely not o Ape
revolution
What are the [kcumn a difficult situaPcrr the entire world this
remedy which places traumatic situation for an
ch
movement, a remedy which con stitutes a really
e ogle - in Czechoslovakia -- s remedy
as is the present case
implies that an entire nation has to pass through the most unp
stances of seeing the country occupied by armies of other countries, although
they are armies of the social' socialist countries- How did a situation come about
which millions of citizens have to see
hee over today circumstances rand
stances of choosing either to be passive
previous episodes - or to struggle
this event - which so much brings to mind comradeship with the
in comradeship with pro-Yankee agents and spies, in of W enemies of socialism, in comradeship thwith at thetagents
heat of theseG u umsa s
all that fascist and reactionary rabble
will ions of the sovereignty, patriotism, and
try to present themselves as champ
freedom of Czechoslovakia? act Logically for the Czechoslovak
,Therefore, sit is no~noughtsimply t"
tute a bitter and tragic and even, if you wish, as an
elude that it has arisen as an inexorable necessity a
and events
uestionable obligation of the socialist countries to p heefa ctsuch
the
ca
h
e
unq
e rs of communism in
from happening. [One must inquire] what are t
circumstances that made iiopos of1c rsone who t roes do not even apps
the
Czechoslovakia -that a g p Pe her
ist anywhere would have request ent the triumph of th~o In rrc ?1uu king
Czechoslovakia a and the triumph of the Cuc~e~ vakia frconspiracies of tlu ern' and
Czechoslovakia to send their P the
commuBiq
Aerialist countries interested in tearing hhooss governments of till
of socialist countries. the decision of the g?
The statement by TASS explaining "The brother nations firmly and
Warsaw Pact says in its final paragraph: any threat from abroad,
resolutely oppose their unbreakable solidarity against an thle link of the so-a
away
h
even They will never permit
We ask-Does this is at m statement include Vietnam? Does this
cialist community."
socialist ~pDoes it consider
thes cannot be
statement nt include Korea? Doestli~ks tement include
Vietnam, Korea, and Cuba as ns ere sent to snatched away by the imperialists or not? also if
tf
On the basis of this declaration3 Warsaw
sent to V C
Warsaw Pact Pdiv be act o visio
Slovakia. And w ask, Will Wagainst that country and the pe P
the imperialists increase their aggression aof Vietnam ask for this aid? Will Warsaw Pact
div attack that tome
Korean Democratic Republic if the Yankee imperialists
c& .n
Approved Fr.Release 1999/09/02 : C A-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack
our country, or simply if, in the face of the threat of an attack by the Yankee
imperialists, our country requests it?
We accept the bitter necessity which demanded the sending of troops to
22 -August 196.8.
Th 1UNIf OF THE POLITE` OF T MMUST -P ry OF ITALY 2 -AUGt T"1 '
Czechoslovakia. We do not condemn the socialist countries that adopted this
decision; but we, as revolutionaries, and on the basis of principles, have the
right to demand that a consistent policy will be adopted in all the other ques-
tions that affect the revolutionary movement in the world... .
CPYRGHT
The Politburo of the PCI met this morning with the participation of the
members of the Directorate present in Rome, to discuss the grave situation
that has unexpectedly arisen as a result of the intervention of Soviet troops
and of troops from other Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia.
The Z`iernd--nad Tisou and Bratislava discussions and agreements were
greeted by the leading PCI organs with great satisfaction, as they were con-
sidered to be fully consistent with their demands for a political solution of
the problems that had arisen in Czechoslovakia and with regard to the r+ coons
between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries --- a cola-tion that was
to be realized with all due respect for the autonomy of every party and ocean-
try, following the line of development of socialist democracy in the spirit
of solidarity with the revival process taking place in Ciechoslovakia and in a
manner that would effectively strengthen the unity of the rational Com-
munist and worloers' movement.
In these conditions and given the facts, it is hard to understand how a deci-
sion for military intervention could have been taken.
The PCI Politburo therefore considers this decision to be unjustified and
inconspatible with the. principles of the autonomy and independence of every
Communist party and socialist state and with the need to defend the unity
of the international Communist and workers' movement. In the firmest and
most convinced spirit of proletarian internationalism and reaffirming once
again the profound, fraternal, and genuine relations that unite the Italian
Communists. with the Soviet Union and the CPSU, the PCI Politburo con.
siders it to be its duty to immediately express its strong dissent and to re.
serve the. party directorate's right to make a more profound evaluation of the
rtttt . awwl its further devckTment=, to make i self the spout of the
rsitu and deepest c -cern felt by the workers' movrtt at this memetit;
and to reaffirm. its solidarity with the action of renovation undertaken by the
Czechoslovak Communist Party.
The PCI Politburo expresses its hope that all Italian demara,atie brew
will be We to assume a responsible position and to steer clear of emotionalism;
it also commits all Communist organizations to hold to the positions of the
party's leading organs and to be firmly vigilant against all anti.Communist
speculation and provocation.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
L' UNITA
8 September 1968
VIEW GRANI`ED BY LUIGI LONGO SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ITALIAN* COr'NIUNIST J?AIrIY, TO L'AST'R0~4BI0
EXCERPT FROM AN IhTER~
CPYRGHT
"DEVELOPMENTS IN
LESSONS - LEAPNED ' FROM ' CZECEi 'CRISIS?
It is equally true that in that period the CCP was deeply divided, with its
the disagree-
foreign activity almost halted, by the divergencies of the past and it
ments over domestic organizational and leadership problems. But was to
unite again on these matters and rally around the new leaders including
Dub&k, especially after the encounters at Cierna and Bratislava. It therefore
had broad opportunities to defeat rightist and antisocialist forces.no facts to
It is my opinion that, following those encounters, were
indicate that the counterrevolution posed an imminent and inevitable threat
and that socialist power was about to disintegrate. I therefore do not believe
that military intervention to ward off a hypothetical catastrophe was warranted.
And even less do I believe that the situation in Czechoslovakia was such that
it warranted that "painful necessity" with which the intervention in Hungary
in 1956 had been justified.
Because of this, we immediately expressed our disagreement and disap-
proval as soon as we heard about the military intervention in Czechoslovakia
by the five socialist states, which had sent jointly the so-called July "Warsaw
letter." And we expressed our disagreement and disapproval not only for the
aforesaid reasons of fact but also for the more general reasons of principle.
In fact, we consider the following reasons of principle to be inviolable:
the autonomy, independence, and national sovereignty of every state and the
autonomy and sovereignty of every Communist party. We hold that the fate
and future of socialism in a country are of interest not only to Communists,
democrats, and people of the given country but also to the Communists, demo-
crats, and peoples of all countries. However, this principle, in our view, cannot
be understood in any way as the right of intervening militarily in the internal
life of another Communist party and another country.
Moreover, this principle was solemnly stated by the government of the Soviet
Union itself in a resolution of October 1956 following the Hungarian events.
This resolution affirmed clearly that "the countries of the great commonwealth
of socialist nations can establish their relations only on positions of complete
equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence, and sovereignty,
and noninterference in the affairs of others." The resolution also mentioned
L'Asrrolabio: Following the disagreements between tie L'ommuntst Parties
of the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and
Bulgaria on the one hand and the Communist party of Czechoslovakia on the
other over the "new course" undertaken in Czechoslovakia, there was in May
an understood tnme with Kosygin's trip to Karlovy Vary; this was followed
by the formal accords reached at Ciern6 and Bratislava. Then came the un-
expected military intervention. Why? What do you think of the arguments
presented to justify this intervention?
Longo: I do not believe, as I have repeatedly stated in recent months, that
the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) was in danger, with the "new
if it had
the counterrevolution even socialist
course ovakia could have been overturned the
sl tried to attack.
In my opinion, twenty-three years of existence and construction of socialism
in Czechoslovakia had already sent down, despite shortcomings and errors, such
solid roots throughout Czechoslovak economic, social and political life that
the country was in the position of facing with security and tranquility any
destructive attacks by rightist domestic forces and imperialist and counter-
revolutionary foreign forces.
On the other hand, the "new course" adopted by the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party proposed precisely to consolidate socialism in Czechoslovakia
by overcoming the errors and delays of the past, activating democratic life
within the party and the country, and adapting relations between party and
state and their relations with the working classes, the popular masses, and
public opinion to new requirements.
Moreover, the decisions adopted by the Central Committee in January and
April, decisions that inaugurated the "new course, were also welcomed by
the responsible organs of the CPSU. It is true that the new CCP leadership
was subsequently accused of having inadequately reacted to the social-demo-
cratic and counterrevolutionary attacks that were directed against the Commu-
nist party itself, the socialist foundations, and the international position
Czechoslovakia.
11
Approved F.gLReJease 1999/09/02 : E+ r=R 79=01'1V4A0 0 0~ 0 001
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
that "the Twentieth CPSU Congress has condemned with maximum resolu-
tion violations and errors and has posed the task of consistent application
by the Soviet Union in its relations with the other socialist countries, of the
Leninist principles of equality among peoples."
The same resolution specified in a very concrete way how the Leninist
principles of equality among, peoples were to be consistently applied. "The
deployment of troops of this or that signatory state of the Warsaw Pact on the
territory of another signatory country of the Warsaw Pact is effected in agree.
ment with all the signatory states and only with the concurrent: of that State
on whose territory, through its request, these military units are deployed or
are to be deploycd."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Radio commentary by Milika Sundic over Zagreb (Yugoslavia radio
on 31 anuary
For over a year and a halffithe Soviet press has been accusing
Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist
and workers movement of having invented the doctrine of the limited
sovereignty of socialist countries and, as the organ of the office
of the CPSU Central Committee in the RSFSR, Soviet Russia, maintains,
of attributing it to the Soviet Union. The acts, jwever, say exactly
the opposite.
The doctrine of limited sovereignty or socialist community was
not invented either by Western propaganda or the so-called revisionists,
but by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries
whose troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The
article we mentioned in Soviet Russia clearly confirms this. It
says, among other things, thatt the sovereignty of a state not only
is a concept of international law but it also has'a class character.
This reference to class character actually represents the arrogation
by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every socialist
country which, by their criteria., is building socialism in accordance
with its own specific condition and not on the basis of foreign models.
The article in the army paper Red Star which, like Soviet Russia,
is dealing with the same problems, s - a so characteristic. Ac oong
to that paper, varing models of socialism are not acceptable and deserve
only to be condemned because the Soviet experience has allegedly
shown that there is only one road to socialism.
These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous,
and the LCY rejects them as dangerous for the unity of socialist
countries and the communist and workers movement. It is all the same
to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country is part
of the doctrine of limited sovereignty or whatever other name this
doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but
the essence of the policy. References to the Czechoslovak case,
for instance, do not enhance the validity of assertions that Western
propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers
movement have fabricated the doctrine of limited sovereignty and the
socialist community. On the contrary, the very fact that the sovereignty
of a state is being questioned or the aspect of sovereignty according
to international law not recognized refutes the words of the camp
press that the doctrine of limited sovereignty was invented by
revisionists and' imperialists.
This does not, of course, mean that Western imperialism is less
dangerous and, even less, that is should appear as some kind of
guardian of the independence of small countries.. To dispute the
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
13
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
concept of the sovereignty of a country under international law or
to make this sovereignty conditional upon the class character of the
state represents, in our view, nothing but a modified doctrine of
limited sovereignty, the authorghip of which is now being denied
by the countries of the camp, but so far only by words and not by
deeds.
Anyway, what does the assertion'that.proletarian internationalism
has been transformed into socialist internationalism mean? Does it
.not mean insistence on unity in inequality or on unity of the privileged
and the unblemished and of those who are predestined: to sin and who
have, therefore, to be taught a lesson? The League of Yugoslav
Communists does not recognize such internationalism, which demands
the renunciation, of national sovereignty, because this is not
internationalism. Such concepts are no less dangerous when they
appear inside a country embracing several nations as, for instance,
the Soviet Union or, let us say, our country.
With regard to the repeated insistence that the intervention in
Czechoslovakia represented the fulfillment of internationalist duty,
it should be noted that this insistence in present circumstances is
something other than an expression of a need to repeatedly criticize
those who were not in agreement with the intervention. The case of
Czechoslovakia, in our view, is being revived as a continuous threat
to others, because, otherwise, why should it be talked about in such-
a manner, when even those who are doing this know full well that this
is not at all popular?
British Communist Party
"If the right to break this principle [the '?soverei.- ty of
'Socialist' States] is conceded, who is to decide whhenthe
duty to intervene exists? Whd decides whether the situation
in a country is endangering Socialism? Has any party or
Socialist government the right to intervene in the affairs of
another if, in its own opinion, there is such a danger? If
such a so-called principle was to be accepted, then it would
have universal validity and could be acted upon by any-Communist
Party and any Socialist government. This is an impossible
proposition and one that could never be accepted by the
international Communist movement since it could provide a
theoretical basis for war between Socialist States. If on
the other hand, it is argued that such a right to intervene belongs
only to some parties and some Socialist States, then this is
equally unacceptable andc+ampletely alien to every established
principle of the Communist movement". (nt,:?5..tlctober 1968.)
Approved For Release 1999/09/0&: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Suess Communist Party
"The intervention in Czechoslovakia which is qualified as
preventative and is claimed to be necessary woul be an
exception' to these principles [of Communist Party
'autonomy' and independence]. But the problem i., then to
know who has the sovereign right to decide on such as
'exception' so laden with consequences?" (Voix Ouvriere, 4
November 1968.)
Japanese Communist Party
"If this method [i.e. Soviet intervention] could be approved
within the Socialist camp, any Socialist country could carry
out any kind of armed intervention in another Socialist
country by unilaterally deciding that there was a 'danger of
counter-revolution' in it. If so, the Socialist 'principle
of completely equal rights, respect for territorial integrity
and national independence, and roan-intervention in each
others' domestic affairs' as clearly stated in the Declaration
and the Statement [adopted by international Communist con-
ferences in 1957 and 19601, would be an empty statement. As
a result, the Socialist camp would lose its raison d'etre".
(Akahata, 21 September 1968.)
Australian Communist Party
"We join with others in the international Communist movement
who ask: if it is permissible to over-ride the agreed
principles of self-determination of nations and of relations
between Socialist States, on the ground of duty to prevent
counter-revolution, who is to decide when the call of such duty
has come?" (Tribune, 18 September 1968,)
Italian Corranunist Party 0
"4Vho will decide the application of this duty to intervene?
Who establishes that there is a counter-revolutionary plot
and who takes responsibility for the consequences? Pravda
does not say". (L', 3 September 1968.)
French Communist Party
"one cannot invoke proletarian internationalism in order to
interfere unduly in the affairs of other parties".
(L'Hunahite, 23 October 1968.)
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 ]:S CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7
 25X1C10b
L 25X6A Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
NEW YORK TIMES
2 July 1971
CPYRGHT
Indonesia, Five Years Out
of Deep Instability, Is Finding a New oasis for Hope
CPYRGHT
JAKAKIA, n , Junu
26-"1 wouldn't have believed
it," said an Indonesian student
who returned to his country,
this month after six years of
study in Europe. "I got back
here, and for the first time X
thought to myself that maybe
we can make it."
He noted that most children
now wore clothes instead' of
rags, that the roads were less
,bumpy, that steel-reinforced
concrete bridges stood over rivo
ers where wooden ones had
washed out annually. Boys
carry transistor radios. Air-
lines run on schedule. Beggars
are less noticeable. Some of the
new businesses give out free
books of matches.
There are still many pessi-
mists in Indonesia-maiy peo-
pie who see this nation of is-
lands - the fifth largest na-
tion in the world in area and
population - destined to be
a crippled, hungry and angry
world dependent. Many of the
long-range projections are
bleak, and one can still find
many families in Jakarta l
in sewer pipes. Per capita in-
come is still less than $80 a
year.
Yet five years after an era
of seemingly chronic economib
and political instability, long-
time observers see more hope
now than at any other time
since the leaders of Indonesia
declared their independence
,from their Dutch colonial rulers
in 1945.. Travelers returning
after a long absence use word9
like "miraculous" and "spec=tacular" ? In describing the
'changes they see, although
many of the changes are admit.
tedly superficial.
The progress has occurred
under the leadership of Pres-
dent Suharto and the group of
generals who assumed power
after crushing an attempted
Communist take-over in 1965:
By force -- some say by severe
.repression - they tightened
mii~l ry control and pushed po-
litical processes into dormanty
-in an attempt to create a cliff
,
.a ate for development In place'. defense. .42
WLXffrAW 6.
rof
ideological 41-0
.
By JAMES P. STERBA
.,-4r?m,,-V~ v trgrime.
Leaning on the West
This year President Suharto
loosened the reins ever so
slightly. Under careful stage-
managing and an overlay of
force, about 57 million Indo-
nesians are to vote on July 3
in the first national election for
representatives since 1955. Gov-
ernment officials contend that
the election is the first step'
toward popular democracy and
the gradual end of military rule.
Although Indonesia's foreign
policy involves active nonalign-
ment and she' is seeking re-
newed friendships with Com-
munist countries, she is also
'leaning heavily toward the
West.
When Richard M. Nixon be-'
came the first American Pres-?
ident to set foot on Indonesian'
soil two years ago, he ? was
pinning on the country his
hopes for a resurgent non-Com-
munist Asia. Nothing since
then appears to have diluted
those hopes if anything, eco-
nomic progress, under capitalist
tutelage, has undoubtedly raised
them.
Sukarno Spent Heavily
From a period four years ago,
when inflation peaked at an
astronomical level, Indonesia
has settled Into ' economic
sobriety. The rupiah inflated
last year by less than 8 per.
cent, a better performance,
than that of the United States'
dollar.
In the nineteen-sixties Pres-,
ident Suharto's predecessor,
Sukarno, spent vast amounts of;
borrowed money on facades of
world leadership like military
hardware and giant monu-
ments while roads and irriga--
tion systems disintegrated. Now
Indonesia is spending her;
money on rehabilitating roads
and communications networks.
Into the third year of its
first Five-Year Plan, the Gov-
:ernment is spending more than
a third of its budget on de
'.velopment projects and less
,than 3 per cent on defense
and this in a nation run by
the military. In 1963 Mr.
87 per cent on
[Sukarno spent
s
by a general- Its candidate
who fly to rallies on aircraft
volatility, have been pouring'
in for three years in a quest
for vast untapped resources of
oil, minerals and timber. Indo-
nesians who once sent their
earnings out as soon as pos-
sible are putting them into
banks here in record amounts.
The gross national product, it
is estimated, jumped 7 to 8 per
cent last year.
Rice Output Rises
Rice production increased to
some 12 million tons last year,
surpassing expectations, and
Indonesia is looking forward
to being self-sufficient in rice
by the mid-nineteen-seventies.
Timber production has
doubled, and experts say oil
production will It a million
barrels a day this year. In
the next two' years, export
earnings from minerals are ex-
pected to shoot up after sev-
erNl years' of exploration and
construction.
Though the economic gains
are evident, they do not pre-
vent vocal dissatisfaction in the
political arena, where critics1
of the Government assert that,
the election is little more than'
a public-relations stunt to le-
gitimize the military's continued-
rUle in the guise of democracy.
,' As a Western diplomat com-
mented, "This election is in thej
great democratic tradition of
Taiwan and South Vietnam."
But a ranking government of-
ficial said: "This is an expert=
ment-a small first step. You
can't expect us to go from
military rule to pure democ-
racy overnight."
'Blatant Propaganda'
Regardless of motives, the
Government makes little pre-
tense of staging a "fair" cam-
paign or election. Its banner is
being carried by a collection of,
"functional groups" of laborers,I
veterans, heathers, civil ser-
vants and the like that one
critic terms "hollow, organza-
tions without significant fbl-
lowings-mostly the products
of imagination, wishful think-
ing and the blatant propaganda
of their leaders."
The collection is called the
Joint Secretariet of Functional
Groups. Its chairman is a lieu-
a private airline run by a co -
lection of generals, receive no-
lice motorcycle escorts and sol-
dier guards.
Members of the nine opposi-
tion parties maintain that 'the
Government has used excessive
force and intimidation, ranging
from threats to remove village:
chiefs who do not turn in
enough votes to beatings to ru-
mors that the Government has
devised a way to tell how each
villager votes and will be
checking up afterward.
Nervousness Apparent
Despite the heavy-handed-
ness, nervousness was apparent
among officials as campaigning
came to a close yesterday. Pres-
ident Suharto has warned that
if instability threatens, he will
quickly tighten controls.
Military dominance stretches
from Jakarta to the remotest
islands. While only 6 of 22 Cab-
inet ministers are generals, the
President's key decision-makers'
wear uniforms, and 17 of the
26 provincial governors are
military men.
Military commanders run
dozens of businesses from air-
lines to nightclubs and movie
houses, in many cases with the
entrepreneurial talent of ethnic
Chinese, who have dominated
commerce since. they were in
vited in by the Dutch 'to serve
as a buffer between them and
the Indonesians.
The military men say that
with the Government provid-
ing less than half the funds
needed to run a battalion, they
have no alternative but to look
elsewhere for funds.
but this is still a country with
President Suharto, who long
ago traded his uniform for a
business suit, has pledged to
reduce the size of the military.
Last year he put more than 60
generals on the retirement list,
but this is still a ctounry with
a state of mind that regards a
uniform as a status symbol and
requires Adam Malik, Indo-
nesia's most prominent civilian,
to salute before shaking hands
with local officials.
Yet officials irysist that a shot
has not been fired in anger in
years. "It's just tradition," a
Oy ,gj Ierrnarked.
 CPYRGHT
p v For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
The military APe9 Sukarno ran up like a house- (With teachers generally earn- their lot steadily Improves they
hey are the only group with wife gone berserk on Fifth log less than $10 a month-not will form the grist for a Com-
e talent and organizational Avenue with a fistful of credit enough to live on-the qu lity munist resurgence.
kills to run the country andj cards. More than $1-billion is or education is dismally sow. The Indonesian Communist
ush development. owed to the Soviet Union, most The Department of Education 'party was crushed in 1965 and
"I for one would be morel of it for warplanes, ships and estimates that there are ~ no subsequently banned. Hundreds
an happy to Sol back CO just other har1waro that now nit laces for more than hig Vdl? of thousand or rorninunista ant
sing a soldier,' said Lieut. Idle for lack of spare parts. lion children aged 7 to 15. Innocents, It Is estimated, vJre
en. Kemal Idris, military com slaughtered in the nightmare
which the Russians have re- Health care is in about the
under for Sulawesi, ..but: fused to supply except on a same state. In Jakarta, that followed the attemptdd
here are the organizations' the
cash-and carry basis. most advanced city in Igdo- take-over. it is believed, how-
nd the qualified civilians to Giant Doses of Foreign Aid nesia, with a population of ever, that hundreds of thot}
e over our Jobs?" He threw The country is also being kep five million, there is one os sands of sympathizers escaped
p his hands. afloat by massive and increas- pital bed for every 1, 00 death of arrest.
Mountain of Debts ing doses of foreign aid, the people. The status of arrested s
While the critics charge that bulk of it going into develop- Those are symptoms of the pects remains a sensitive iss
r. Suharto's Government is ment. major problem - overpopala- at home and a source of inter=
pressive and that some of The United States, the major tion. Although experts warn national embarrassment, ' and
is aides in uniform are cor- contributor, granted $232.7-mil- that it can overcome the rrlost officials remain hesitant to talk
t, it has received good re- lion last ear, of which nears 'successful development effots,
-upy y about it. It is conservatively
sews for its performance In $102-million was for food. birth-control programs are not estimated that at least 70,000
icking up the pieces of a shat- As the, aid continues to flow, a major priority and have just suspects remain in about 350
red nation and slowly point- corruption and. Inefficiency re'- ;gotten under way. prisons and detention camps
g It down the road of de- main as major problems, but on Population Over 115 Million with little hope of a trial.
elaPment under the watchful small measure of Ph rogress' is Estimates of the population
The Government has released
idance and advice of inter- that officials are less hesitant range from 115 million to 123 about 30,000 minor suspects,
rational economic specialists to talk about them. million, although the outer but at least that many are
Tmhe or anizations such as the Gross misallocations of re- islands lack people - about
ro
g 1.000 of the 13,967 are poau- believed to remain in confine-
d eBank. sources lan ample, the are dozens of evident.
of charming For r ing lated-some 73 million people ment.
Th relative economic moue -' ample, Indonesia earnestly wants to
ty has been built on a own-~ old steam locomotives that puff are compressed onto the island take a place among the im-
in of I O.U.'s. The Indone- along the Javanese countryside of Java, which has an area of g
fans owe other countries about use teak, a rare and expensive just under 49,000 square miles, portant nations of the world,
4-billion in loans and inter- hardwoodof which Indonesia about the size of New York a place many of her young
be-
st. Until last year they con- has a large marketable supply State. cause leaders of argue size is and population
warranted ntrated on holding off the for fuel. A third of the annum The stability and the eco
editors; this year they are harvest is burned in the loco- nomic growth have had little alone. Whether she can do so
scheduled to make their first motives and for cooking fires. impact on the daily lives of Is unclear. She is out of the,
repayments. Schools in Poor Shane most Indonesians. Observers. hospital bed and looking at the
The largest debt is about The educational system is who say they are better clothed sun, and her progress has made
$2.5-billiothat the late Mr. In extremely poor condition. and appear more hopeful about her doctors jubilant, but they
the future, fear that unless worry about a relapse.
JAPAN TIMES
CPYRG -V " 1371
'Indonesian Elections
The election held Saturday in Indonesia, the second sines The appointed representatives are to insure a strong voice
the nation won its independence in 1949, is well calculated to by President Soeharto and his military government in the legis-
produce no surprises. The continuance of President Soeharto's latures. But the cautious President has also taken out another
:firm control over the government and the nation's destiny Is insurance policy to insure political stability. He organized the
:assured. ,.Sekber Golkar, Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, whose
' No one Is even pretending that the elections will convert .members are recruited. from almost every level of society and
Indonesia instantly into a civilian-led democracy. But they do from major 'government and nongovernment organizations. It
,represent a first step toward parliamentary " government. , includes fishermen and students as well as Christian and Mos-
Whether there are further steps in. the future will depend 'on ;lem organizations among many others. But most important, all
'the performance of the legislatures to be established and the :civil servants are required to join Sekber. Golkar or resign
progress the country is capable of, both economically and poll ' ,their jobs.
'tically. With strong financial backing, the nonpartisan Sekber Golkar
Between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m., an estimated 90 per cent of the Is competing against the nine political parties in the election. It
nation's 57 million registered voters have filed through polling ' has been accused by its opponents of steamroller tactics in
places and cast ballots for three offices in the lower and upper ,bringing in members.- However, many people have flocked to
regional legislatures and in the new House of Representatives. i S`ekber Golkar because they see a sure winner. Everyone from
Once the lengthy and complicated vote counting is completed, diplomats to opposition party leaders concede that it will prob-
t e 460-seat national parliament will convene October 28. These P :,ably sweep the elections. In fact, there is now concern that
members will have the added duty of becoming part of the fthe popularity of the Sekber ..Golkar may deter the hopes that
People's Consultative -Assembly which will elect a president , multiparty or a two-party system would emerge from the
and vice president late next year or In 1973.. elections, despite Government assurances that it had no inten-
The voters were not casting ballots for individuals. They tion of establishing a one-party country.
Reports from Indonesia say there are virtually no'hational
-oted for party or organization slates. According to the per--
*entage of votes won, the representatives will lle'selected from Issues in the campaign: The only possible one would be the na-
'approved .'lists, for the three levels of government. In addition; ' Lion's economy. However, President Soeharto and his military
Approximately one fifth of the legislators will be appointed by, and nonmilitary supporters are convinced that their record in
he, government and of these the majority will be military rebuilding the economy from the ruins left -by the Sukarno.
ffi ra. Approved For Release 1999109/Q 9 1)Vgl? 14ft ftG 001-7 :..
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
Although unemployment and under employment 19 still a
serious problem, inflation is now under control, the budget is
balanced, export earnings are climbing and the inflow of
foreign capital continues. There is optimism over the economy
in iridonomia. 'ha lncianeolani: Al'o boginnina to predict that
heir country will become the "Japan" of Southeast Asia. The
nation always had potential but in the past very little luck.
One interesting question that may or rr not be answered
In the election is how the underground Coi.munists, still con-
sidered a danger, will vote.
But most other questions have been answered already. The
outsider-but certainly not the Indonesian-might. ask why
hould elections be called at this time. However, pressure has
en mounting within Indonesia for parliamentary government,
nd President Soeharto has felt, it wise to give In to the wishes
f his people. His obvious concern, however, is that a parlia-
mentary government might set back, if not destroy, the pro=
gress made so far through Is policies. After. all, political r,, aos
was the result of the only other election in Indonesian ini5tory.
In considering the present Indonesian election, it s hard
not to recall the late President Sukarno's description of the
form of government he 00 ON: "Guided Democracy." unfor-
tunately under Mr. Sukar, there was plenty of guiding but
no democracy.
Considering the conditions and situation in Indonesia, w&,
are inclined to accept President Soeharto's gesture toward par-
liamentary government in good faith. We hope it truly is the
,beginning of representatives government which will contributet
greatly toward stability and progress in Indonesia and South-
east Asia. The, decision to `Mold elections does reflect President
Soeharto's confidence in the progress of his nation. It is to bd
hoped'he will not be disappointed.
WASHINGTON POST
5 July 1971
to
hidonesia Seektay to Slow
_C7 .
Population Boom
CPYRGHT
DJAKARTA -- A bur.
eoning population, scarcely
dented by a fledgling birth
control. program, threatens
to undermine the ambitious
roject to develop Indone.
sia's economy grid ease the
widespread poverty.
Much of the Increasing
output of food, clothing and
other, goods will be swal-
lowed up by the 3 million
persons added to the popula-'
tion each year, leaving little
to raise living standards for
the country's 120 million In-
abitants.
At the present growth rate
of nearly 2.8 per cent a yeas'
he population. will double
n a little over 25 years, and,',
the country's economic de-
velopment program will
have to run hard lust to
keep up in providing schools,
Jobs and food.
An organized family plali
Bing program Is just getting?
under way. Planners hope to
havr d million women prat:
By Donald Bremner
Los Angeles TTmss
tieing birth control by the,
end of 1975, about 22 per
cent of all wives in the
child-bearing ages.
Putting the brakes on pop*
ulation growth is especially
important for Indonesia,
with its combination of low
average income, dense popu
lation and insufficient rice
to feed its people.
High birthrates mean a',
high proportion 'of children'
to be supported by those in
the productive ages. Each,
100 Indonesians In the work-y
Ing ages of 15 to 64 years
must support 100 children
and elderly..
In contrast, each 100
working-age Americans sup-.
port 64 children' and elderly,
and in Japan, which has an
effective birth control pro-
gram, each 100 in the work-
Ing ages. 'support only 45
children' and elderly. This
high dependency burden in
Indonesia is a major drag on
development. and improved
diving standards.-
Indonesia's population -
the sixth largest in the.
world after China, India, the
Soviet . Union, the United
States and Pakistan -
might not be such a problem'
,if it were more evenly dis-
tributed. But nearly 65 per
cent of Indonesians live on
the central Island of Java,
which has less than 7 per
cent of the country's, area.
The result is gone of the
most densely. populated land
in -the world - 1,500 persons..
' per square mile on Java -
an average of about 10 per-
sons trying to grow food and
live on the equivalent of a
city block of mountainous
and nonarable land.
Little was done about In=
donesia's swelling popula-
tion until recently. The na-
tional family planning Insti-
tute was established in 1968,
and government spending
for birth control, which was
'only $80,000 in 1968, has
climbed to $4 million for
this year. Foreign aid adds
another 82 million.
Beginning with 125,000
Is to have 6 million women
:practicing birth control'
within five years. Nearly
,15,000 field workers and
3,000 clinics will be needed
-to carry out the program,
the aim of y*hich is to re-.
.duce the population's
growth rate from Its present
level of 2.8 per cent a year
to 2.2 per cent.
The tradition of large
families - four or more
-children is the wish of the
typical Indonesian couple -
and the belief that the Lord s
will provide for them are
major obstacles to slowing
population growth.
"People here say that
'when a child is born, its'
livelihood is assured, or else
it wouldn't have been born-
"It's the will of Allah,' " said
one Indonesian. "That atti
tude will have to change if
'family planning Is to suc-
ceed."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
THE WASHINGTCE POST
7 July 19 71 ,
CPYRGHT
HONG KONG, July 6 - In-
donesian voters, overwhelm-
ingly endorsing the Suharto
government and Its economic
development program in last
week's election, have set the
stage for a basic reshaping of
the country's system of poiiti?i
cal problems. .
The result is almost certain
to be a party system focused
less on communal and reli-
gious questions, and more on
the issues of building Indone-
sia's economy, educating her
people and solving pressing
social problems,
Foreign Minister Adam
Malik said only four parties
will be left of the 10 political
groups which ran in the elec.-
tion Saturday. The others will
have to merge with the big
parties.
Dominating the scene will i
be Golkar, the government-
sponsored organization which
,swept more than 50 per cent
3f the votes In preliminary re-
Indonesian Vote to
Reshape. .Parties
By Donald Bremner
Los Angeles Times
turns. The 200 or more seats
Golkar won, added to the 100
to be filled by appointment of
President Suharto, assure it
powerful pro-government bloc
of nearly two-thirds in the
new 460-seat parliament.
Golkar, the joint secretariat
of functional groups, went
into the election as a hastily
rejuvenated alliance of more
than 200 mass organizations
and a nationwide network of
government civil servants.
Three other parties emerged
from the election as-counter-
weights weights to Golkar: The main
two were Moslem parties, the
Moslem Scholars Party. (Nah-
datul Ulama) and 'the ihdone-
sian Moslem Party (Parmusi).
The third, sharply reduced
from its previous strength,
was the Indonesian Nationalist
Party (PNI) founded by for-.
mer President Sukarno.
Parties surviving the
merger will be under Heavy
pressure to unite or at least
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 July 1971
Top~ ular vote backs licies
CPYRGHT
i ter or a governor, if he does a;
good job," said one well-edu-
cased Hindu woman on the is-
land of Bali. "There is so
much work to do."
Corruption in government,
particularly among some army
leaders, an issue that brought
students into the streets last
year, was largely ignored as
the election neared. Editors
who had pressed the issue ear-
lier found It expedient to soft-
pedal it, partly to avoid giving
ammunition to Golkar oppo-
nents.
The election results may
cause a wrench for some of
the traditional elements of so-
ciety. A prominent Jakarta
journalist commented on the
eve of the voting:
"We're in a period of funda-
mental change, and it's pain-
ful for everybody. But if we
can develop Indonesia, we can
lift our own people and be of
some help to the whole south=
east Asian region."
Malik, S.uh~rto big' gainers
By Henry. S. Hayward
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
CPYRGHT Jakarta, Indonesia
TWO men likely to come out of the Indo?
nesian election with enhanced stature are
President Suharto and, Foreign Minister
Adam Malik,
nificant opposition to Golkar.
The election, the first since
1955, gave Indonesian voters
their first chance to express
opinions on national issues
with ballots since the trau-
matic attempted coup of 1965
and the subsequent decline of
the flamboyant Sukarno.
There were heavy pressures
to vote for Golkar. But basi-
cally, the Indonesian voter
was endorsing the sense of sta.
bility created by the Suharto
government, which first
curbed rampant inflation and
then set about rehabilitating
the country's . stagnant, bro-
ken-down economy.
Misgivings In some quarters
,at military influence in gov-
ernment were outweighed by
the general belief that Indone?
sia needs a strong government
to maintain stability and carry
through the development pyo-
gram.
'q have no objection to a'
soldier as a government minis-,
in Indoijesia-
st,kP in tea a1an4.inn~ m1,in1~ u,oe ~nr nn~ 4innel
I
and provincial legislatures.
But the fact that the government-spon-
sored Sekber Golkar group is conceded to
have won a sweeping victory nevertheless
709/02: CIA-RbF11F9X61fA00 3G0 fitq
himself.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
Compared with his flamboyant predeces-
sor, the late President Sukarno, President
Suharto sometimes is described as lacking
charisma as far as the Indonesian public
is concerned.
Quiet but firm control
But the election outcome demonstrated
to the nation at large that General Suharto
retains a quiet but firm grasp on the coun-
try's affairs,
For fastmoving, versatile Adam Malik,
his performance as Golkar's star campaign-
er demonstrated to ordinary Indonesians
and the topmost rulers of the nation that he
has impressive political qualifications as
well as post experience in leftism, revolu-
tion, and foreign affairs.
.'His performance may well earn him the
vice-presidency as a reward, according to
informants here,
Especially in his home territory of Su-
matra and the outer islands, Mr. MONO
proved to be Golkar's foremost speaker dur-
ing campaign swings. He seemed to have
had the right touch for every occasion, shift-
ing his stance easily in different racial or
religious areas.
Tireless performer
Golkar sent out 17 troops or "safaris" to
cover. the. provinces. In addition to big Ja-
karta government or military personalities,
the entourages included dancers, singers,
and cultural performers. Among those in-
.eluded was "Bing" Slamet, a popular In
,donesian entertainer and Golkar candidate
for the Jakarta assembly.
The performances proved very popular in
'small villages and towns where amusement
Is not easy to find and the election commo-
tion was welcome.
The tireless Malik, meanwhile, often out-
'ran his younger colleagues while hopping
around the country, He was the ranking,
civilian in the Golkar organization, yet he
managed not to alienate the military
machine which was solidly behind Golkar.
"Once the generals tended to mistrust
Malik," a Jakarta source said, "but his
campaign performance was so effective
;there are no generals gunning for him at
4preaent."
,UN presidency likely
The conoensus here is that Mr, Malik has
the presidency of the United Nations Gen.
oral Assembly next fall Just about wrapped
up, This will provide him with further ins.
ternational exposur i. as well as prestige at
home, The assumption is that he can either
continue to run the Foreign Ministry by
remote control, or temporarily turn over
the reins to a deputy.
On the domestic side, the Malik cam-
,paign speeches often included scathing de?
nunciations of the present nine political
parties for their parochial interests, He did
much to mobilize intellectuals behind Golkar
as an organization that would deal with na-
tional policies and programs, rather than
represent political or racial groups only.
Those who feel the military has too much
influence on Indonesian life would look to
Mr, Malik in the vice-presidential post to
dilute or deflect the military influence when
necessary. But they concede this would re-
quire all the Foreign Minister's tact and,
persuasiveness.
When Mr. Malik emerged from a post.
election luncheon In a Jakarta hotel, an ad-
miring Indonesian whispered to me, "I
come from the same place as he does-west
Sumatra." Then he bowed as the Foreign
' Minister, looking small in a white western
suit, smiled in return.
The next day (Wednesday) he was off to
Romania to renegotiate Indonesian debts.
One felt the election must be well and truly
For President Suharto, the Golkar victory
practically ensures his own reelection in
1973.,He was appointed to a five-year term in
1968. Few expect the Golkar machine to lose
its impetus in the next two years after its
impressive trial run.
Popular endorsement.
? The victory also indicates that the basio
philosophy of the Suharto government is en..
dorsed by the people. That means resisting
pressure to make Indonesia Into an Islamic
state, remaining nonsecular as the Army
prefers, and continuing the dedication to na-
tional economic development.
It also ensures the election of cooperative
national and provincial legislatures capable
bf producing legislation desired by the gov-
ernment. This means, especially, financial
support for government programs.
Finally, the election should enhance the
vested legitimacy of the Suharto govern.
meat, providing it with a better international
image and encouraging those to whom In.
donesia owes money.
At home and abroad, it showed the demo.
oratic process is gradually being reinstated
in this country, although stilt with careful
controls,
over if Adam Malik was away again.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Cl -RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 July 1971
Economy improves
Oil finds brighten
Indonesia's outlook
By Henry S. Hayward
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
CPYRGHT Jakarta, Indonesia
CPYRGHT
ctal u pa i .
An earlier discovery by Stanvac in South an in vi
Sumatra now has started productioh. Pertamina has accumulated assets of
economic progress. here have encountered a number o ogis i- gar a here as an example of what good
New oil discoveries, just confirmed by the cal and housekeeping problems, such as management can achieve. General Wutowo
mining minister, make it likely Indonesia shortages of office space, of homes for is credited with steering Pertamina to its
chieve its target of 1.4 million barrels families, and of schools for children. Weld- present eminence, although some of his
ill
w
a
per day by the end of 1972 and 1.5 million in ers, drillers, and other trained workers are methods are considered unorthodox.
1973, in short supply. In addition to oil, other aspects of the
The rate of oil production now is 900,000 But prospects for the future are bright; Indonesian economy are showing improve-
barrels per day, a sharp increase over the enough so that oil company complaints are ment. Exports are increasing. The price
700,000 produced in 1970. kept to a minimum. At a recent luncheon, a
index of essential commodities such as
At a sale price of $2.30 (U.S.) per barren, large group of Americdn businessmen, in-,
oil income will go a long way toward help. eluding American and other oilmen, raised kerosene, rice, and textiles is going down.
ing Indonesia pay off past indebtedness and no questions when Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, head Imports of consumer goods still are rising
build for the future. of Pertamina, informed'them his company but not as rapidly as last year, the govern-
Foreign oil companies operating on a cost- now is prepared to provide such services as ment says.
plus basis for exploration and production, transportation and communications, and to
and sharing profits with the government, help with immigration, exports, and even Timber shows potential
also stand to make handsome returns in labor relations-all of which the oil com- Gross national product is increasing at
this' area. panies hitherto have been handling on an over 7 percent this year. Population increase
individual basis. is believed to be a manageable 2 to 2.5 per-
Oil wells itemized One central Indonesian organization to cent, although recent statistics are scarce.
The latest oil discovery to be publicized handle such problems, General Sutowo Timber meanwhile is shaping up as al-
is an onshore strike by Caltex at Riau. said, would be "cheaper and better." He most as rich a potential resource as oil. Half
Other new discoveries this year and last. pointed out that Pertamina.has acquired a the timber of Southeast Asia is in Indonesia,
as itemized by the mining minister, were: number of planes and helicopters available with 2 million hectares of teak in Java
1. A Pertamina (Indonesian Government to charter not only to oil companies but to alone: East Kalimantan and Sumatra have
oil company) field which will start produc- other businesses too. huge reserves of hardwood such as meranti
tion by the end of 1972. The general expectation was that the and teak.
2. An offshore well by Iapco in South Pertamina services would indeed be utilized.
Sulawesi scheduled to start producing next The value of timber sales in 1970 was
October. Assets pile up $100 million, up from,$60 million in 1969. The
3. An offshore well by Atlantic Richfield ; figure is expected to reach $1 billion in the
north of Jakarta, also scheduled to 'start Some found it interesting that Pertamina mid-1970 s.
production in October. should invest some of its oil profits in air- The Japanese, hungry for wood for build-
4. - An offshore well by Yapex Union Oil .craft, spare parts, communications, etc., ing and paper supplies, take 80 percent of
in the. Strait of Makasar, expected to be in Others pointed out Pertamina actually it, Indonesian production. Japan is the biggest
aperation by the end of 1911. In a position to provide such -services better timber consumer in a timber-short world.
Approved For Release 1999/09/026 CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 July 1971
CPYRGHT
Indonesia moves ahead
Nothing could be more different than
the style of Indonesia's present ruler,
General Suharto, and that of his predeces-
sor, the flamboyant President Sukarno.
The one depended on excitement. He
could not settle down under a placid sit-
uation. He saw his mission as nation-
building and resorted to foreign adven-
tures with accompanying bombasts while
uniting the people of the vast Indonesian
archipelago politically. And he sadly ne-
-glected the country's economic needs.
By the time of the abortive Communist
coup in 1965 and the subsequent downfall
.of Sukarno, Indonesia had had enough of
excitement. And General Suharto, strong
,but quiet, unemotional, even prosaic com-
pared with his predecessor, was the man
of the moment - the man needed to re-
store the country to a more ? rational
sense of values and priorities.
General Suharto's first priority was to,
concentrate on economic recovery, and in
this he has succeeded to a remarkable
extent. Galloping inflation has been
brought under control. A sound develop-
ment program is under way. Foreign in-
vestment has responded to the new sta-
bility.
Now he has reinforced his success on
.,the economic front with a political victory
:in the first general elections to be held:,
in Indonesia for 16 years. Full results of,
the elections will not be known until'
,August, but it is already clear that Got-,
' kar, the broadly based political movement
backing the government, has won a
sweeping victory over the old, traditional
political parties still in existence. (The
Communist Party was eliminated after
the 1965 coup and the intellectually elite
Socialist Party was banned by Sukarno.)
Golkar's emergence as a new political
force is one of the most significant devel-
opments on the Indonesian domestic scene.
It is not a political party in the usual
sense, but a rather loose federation of
"functional" groups from all levels of
society. Although it has the support of
the military, it is entirely managed by
civilians. It was formed to carry the gov-
ernment's' program to the people, and in
this it has met a need for better commu-
nication with the people.
Much credit for Golkar's success must
go to the astute and intelligent Foreign
Minister, Adam Malik, who has played a
major role in negotiating foreign aid for
Indonesia's. economic recovery and in
helping rebuild the country's image on
the international scene. It is said he may
well be rewarded for his part in the elec-
tion victory by being given the vice-
presidency.
The elections represent a first step to-
ward the restoration of democracy in
Indonesia. There is still a long way to go
before the military step down and hand
over power to a civilian government. But
:under General Suharto Indonesia is set-
tling down, and has made significant pro-
gress toward meeting the twin requisites
of economic and political stability.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C119-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
U E ECONOMIST
10 July 1971
One cheer for Suharto's d epmocracy
The Indonesian election wasn't exactly clean, but that's nothing new in
CPYRGHT Asia, and at least the government was prepared to take :a risk
The preliminary results of the elections in Indonesia last
Saturday show a clear victory for President Suharto, but
they do not justify putting out more flags for democracy
in Asia. The government's electoral machine, the Sekber
Golkar; may have pulled in as many as 66 per cent of
the votes, overshooting the sunniest forecasts of its own
leaders. Since ` i oo seats in parliament are reserved for
official appointees, that would mean that the govern-
ment can count on the backing of more than 300 of
the 460 members ' of the ' new legislature. It ' would also
mean that, when parliament is called upon to - vote for
a new president in-103, the generals will not need
their tanks to make sure that their man gets elected.
But General 'Suharto's victory had its price., The
Golkar machine is said to have spent more than $50 mil-
lion 'on its caravanserai of charter planes And 'loud-
speaker vans, its pork-barrel ' politicking and' its 'roving
bands of troubadours: Part of: that was supplied by the
affluent Chinese' businessmen whb 'coughed up $5oo a
head for places at'American-style' fond-raising banquets.
But Go1ka'r's' success 'depended-, on more than: lavish
campaigning. The new electoral i Iaws prevented 'the
opposition parties from doing most ' of the- things that
an opposition is normally supposed to do. For example,
they were not allowed to express criticism of.government
actions or. to discuss " the religious question." And,
especially in the villages,, officials eager to produce sup-
port` for the government resorted to strong-arm tactics.
There is evidence that some civil servants were threatened
with losing their jobs 'unless they joined Golkar, ' that
some, opposition rallies were forcibly: dispersed' and that.
peasant voters m the tackblocks were herded to the
ballot-boxes by military police.: Mr Subchan' the leader
of the Moslem Scholars' party (one of the ' ' largest of
the nine authorised opposition groups), claimed this week
that- on most, of the island of Sulawesi- there was no
pretence' of a secret ballot. There will be more corn-
plaints. ` The irony - is that` the' elections were partly
designed to " win the approval of the outside ' world as
a step towards civilian rule.
But what happened ' on Saturday" riiust be Out into
perspective. ' After ' all, it is 'easy enough 'for, westerners
(and above all for Ariglo-Saicons) to forget', that the
deiinocratic system is 'a t'arIty; 'and perhaps'even a luxury.
The c6j ies of WestmihsteV' that the"Btitish bequeathed
tb` Ala.' atld Afriea have had ,oh1 a precarious' existence ;
nib* ~f1f teeth -hat given' Way' td` personal'`d1stat6rships,
vt =pa ty`l'tit t(triilrtary }uiitas. Thei'lddoi#esiahs' only
Approved For Release 1999/09/02
previous experience of a free election came in, 1955,
and was soon followe4 by the chaotic personal autocracy
of Sukarno-one of that breed of third-world leaders
that a French observer has called " demigods." Sukarno
substituted the cult of personality for rational planning
and an attack on Malaysia for any attempt to come
to grips with the country's economic crisis.
The men who succeeded him are the survivors of the
pogrom unleashed against the army high command by
the Indonesian communist party on the night of Septem-
ber 3o, 1965. That night has rightly been seen as one
of the turning-points in recent south-east Asian history.
The fact that General Nasution escaped his would-be
assassins and was able to rally the armed forces deter-
mined that Indonesia would be ruled today by soldiers
rather than the communists. That also had its price. It
has been claimed that more than 500,000 people died
between 1965 and x967 as the soldiers took their
revenge. It will not be easy to bury the enmities of those
years, and the men in General Suharto's government
who insist that only a new generation will be able to
restore the country to full civilian rule may have a point.
And who could govern the country now if the generals
and Golkar failed ? Their main opposition lies
in three places : in the suppressed communist party,
which 9611 has tenacious grassroots support in eastern and
tentral Java, where land famine and overpopulation
are most acute ; in the Nationalist party, which seems
to be held together only by regional chieftains like those
in Bali and by a diffuse sense if nostalgia for its golden
days of affluence under Sukarno ; and in religious groups
like the Scholars' party, and others, whose main appeal .
is to Moslem chauvinism or Catholic and Protestant
fears of Moslem dominance.
General Suharto's real claim to power is that he,
represents a coalition of interests (the army, the civil
servants, the urban professional men) that may be
capable, if anybody is, of threading the country's
thousands of islands together and getting the economy
back on the rails by rational management and by attract-
ing foreign investors. And he has not done badly. The
rate of inflation has been pushed down to under to per
cent, compared with 85 per cent in 1967 and 650 per
cent in Sukarno's worst year. The government has
coaxed new concessions out of foreign, creditors,
including the Russians and the east Europeans, and
some $640 million is to be poured in as foreign aid this
year. Figures like these mask the problems that remain.
CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
There is a gaping trade deficit, and much of the $ i I bil-
lion that was invested icy private companies between
t 9 7 ttttd WO went into the extractive industries, which
do not give jobs to many people. There Is an urgent
need to accelerate internal migration away from land--
hungry Java towards the; roomier islands and to create
new jobs to soak up the unemployed. If the government
did some arm-twisting to get its majority on Saturday,
that was partly because there has not been time for
the considerable economic progress it has brought about
to seep down to the man in the paddyfield.
That is why some sympathetic outsiders have sug-
gested that General Suharto might have done better to
put off the election for a year or two until he
could count on more genuine public support. But
Indonesia will remain a " supervised democracy "-as
the official jargon puts it-for a long time to come.
General Suharto has at least managed to widen his
political base through Galkar. He has shown that power
does not rest solely in the barracks by promoting Mr
Adam Malik, the civilian foreign minister, as the main
government tub-thumper in the electoral campaign.
Small changes, perhaps, but Indonesia was unlikely
to sprout a stable party system overnight. One forecast
of the country's political future is that General Suharto
will be replaced by a retired general who will in turn
be replaced by a civilian who, enjoys the confidence of
the high command. This will not happen overnight, but
one of the hopeful things is that General Suharto does
not look to be the kind of 'man who becomes, addicted
to office.
Before passing judgment on the Indonesians, it is
worthwhile looking around the region.- The two-party
-system in the Philippines has failed to provide an outlet
for some of the explosive, social frustrations that
undoubtedly exist there. Malaysian democracy is tine i
you happen to be born a Malay, but less satisfactory i
you arc Chinese or Indian. The armed forces rind th
local oligarchy run Thailand, as they have done for mud
of its- history ; and neighbouring Burma is under th
slackening thumb of an introverted autocrat who ha
fallen prey to a morbid fear of assassination. In Sout
Vietnam the politicking for the presidential electio
scheduled for October 3rd is going on as intensely
ever, despite the war, but then South Vietnam is a ver
'special place because the Americans obliged its leader,
to submit themselves to the voters in order to justif,
their own presence there. No one really believes that i
is possible to hold an entirely clean election in time o
internal war. But the paradox of South Vietnam'
election is that it really is-possible for the opposition t
overturn the government, however much shady busine
goes on beside some hamlet polling-booths, whereas the
leadership in Hanoi would never contemplate exposing
itself to the same risk.
Singapore remains an island, in a political as well
as a geographic sense, and even here there has been
mounting criticism of Mr Lee Kuan Yew's tough treat-
ment of his critics, and especially the press. Singapore
has become a de facto one-party state without any illegal
seizure of power ; which means that despite its booming
economic growth it runs the risk of failing to reflect the
divisions of opinion in its society. Against this back-
ground, it is possible to see the Indonesian generals for
what they are : men who are loosening their grip
little in search of some kind of political legitimacy.
Rousseau believed that democracy could exist only i
small republics, like his ideal version of Geneva o
Corsica. He had, a narrow view of democracy, but also
a necessary - sense of the relativity of political ideals.
E. M. Forster thought that democracy was worth two
cheers ; perhaps the Indonesian generals deserve one.
NEW YORK TIMES
:18 July 1971
Indonesia:
CPYRGH
 CPYRGHT
decide whlchqWYes F o rd Rte JNgq J? qA(1 O2
to be on the up-slope these munist general in charge of
days. It is Indonesia, which is
still tabulating the results of
a national election held the
week'before last.
The election made few
headlines, and .Indeed this
necklace of equatorial islands
virtually slipped from the
headlines altogether a few
years ago, possibly. because
no American troops were sta-
tioned here. But among the
persons known to be watch-
ing this fifth largest country
in the world with more than
passing interest is Richard
M. Nixon. If there Is a class-
room Nixon Doctrine
country, it must be Indon-
esia. which "beat Commun-
ism" without American ad-1
visers or American lives.
In 1965, Indonesia took
.what was believed to have
been the third largest Com-
munist party in the world and
demolished it - singlehand-
edly and?brutally, but-quick-
'ly and cleanly enough so that
-few. people now discuss the
,fact that one of the - worst
blood baths, In , history oc-
,curred here. When President
"Nixon visited Indonesia two,
years ago - he was the first
American President to do so
?- he was reported to, have,
put his arm around Press-
this transformation, and said,
in effect, "You're our boy."
Because It has a foreign
policy of "active nonalign-
ment," the Indonesian Gov-
ernment does not like to con-
sider itself in anyone's pock-
et. But the fact Is that In-
donesia has moved ever clos-
er to the non-Communist.
world.
The ' major foreign In-
vestors In Indonesia are the
United States and Japan.
Some Eastern European
countries are reportedly in-
terested in Investing, too,
but thus far they have
sent only feelers. .
Virtually all of Indonesla's
-enormous aid requirementsi
are met by the West. A con-
sortium of aid-granting,: na
Lions decides how much to
give each year; In 1970, it
was about $60-million,' and
the United States and Japan
were the chief contributors.
In'1966, Presided Suharto
turned a bankrupt economy,
over to a group of Harvard-
and Berkeley-educated Indo-
nesian economists and West1
ern advisers who, appraisers
Ift to say, performed mir-
aates. They attracted capital
by paying astronomical Inter-
est rates (as. much as 6 per
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 July 1971
: QJ A 7&Ot;14914W0Q, Q620{ a -Mouse of
Indonesian rupiah, infl4ting
at more than 600 per cent
In 1966, into a respectable
Asian currency.,.
-- Foreign investors, who
-were scared off in the V' am,
by the tnetabli#ty of boil rho
,country and the late Presi-
dent Sukarno, were lured in-
to exploiting one of the larg-
'est natural stores of oil, min-
rerals and timber in the world.
':timid at first, they are, now
coming lp faster than Iihdon-
' esia's archaic and inefficient
administrative apparatup can
absorb' them. By this May.
companies from two dozen
countries had pledged 1$1.4-
billion for investment in In-
donesia. and $20-million more
a month was being offered.
Compared to where Indo-'
nesia was six years ago, the
progress in fundamental de-'
velopment has been, enor-
mous, so much so, that the
Government set out this year,
to tackle other,, more tick-
lish ills: to reform the poiiti-i
cal system, to minimize Ide??
ological and religious dis. got to get out of politics. If.
putes and to to begin an ev- we don't start on it now,';
olution toward, Modern demo ;We'll be just like Pakistan.
cratic rule. and just'when we get going-'
On July 3,' "some 57 million .mod a? -few politfcans who
ndoneslan voters went to don't know what they are,
the polls (in the first nation- -talking about will ruin it all -
al election in 16 yeas) to JAMES P. STERSA
elect local councils and SW
Indonesian film industry
shows signs of growth
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
CPYRGHT
Indonesia's infant film industry is showing.
lusty signs of growth. After a period of com- '
plete standstill under Sukarno, production
has risen from three feature films in 1968 to
11 in 1969 to.25 in 1970 and a scheduled 40 in
the current year..
But growth has not been without its prob-
lems. Indonesian film producers have sue-'
ceeded in making money and beating foreign
competition by the standard formula of sex'
and violence.
In this predominantly Muslim country, the'
reaction from the. mosque and the press has,
been predictably critical with much corn-'
'ment against the adoption of Western per,:
missiveness and its effect on the. Indonesian
Representatives. The Govern-
ment-backed party -- "Sek-
her Goikar," a purportedly
nonpolitical assemblage of
nonpolitical, development-
?minded professional and la-
bor groups --- bulldozed Its
way through the countryside
with as much force, its
spokesmen say privately, as
was needed to win a large
majority. That apparently
happened.
It was not a "fair" elec-
tion. That word has little
meaning here. It was por-
trayed as a controlled hat.
step in which the Govern
ment hopes to apply to poli-
tics the formula that brought
economic stability. Critics
charged that It was merely
a public relations stunt,
to preserve military rule.
"We must begin it now,
because it is going to take at
least 12' years," says one of
the'Government's chief stra.
tegLsts. "The military has got.
to be put gradually In its'
place. The civil service has-,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
10
 25X1C10b
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 ? i T
PYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
LE MONDE, Paris
12 May 1971
CUBAN REVOLUTION FOLLOWS 'SOVIET WAY'
by Charles Bittelheim
is Dean of Studies, at 1'Ecol.e pratigVe des
hautes etudes. Upon Che Guevara's request, and
starting in 1961, he has sojourned in?Cuba on
several occasions as an economic development
expert.
Why did the Cuban government, as we have seen, so publi-
cize the Padilla affair and thereby damage its prestige and
international authority? Why, was that government led to stage
such a sinister affair in which a man -- after more than a
month's confinement in Cuban jails -- levels charges as con-
temptible as.they are ridiculous,'against Rene Dumont and
K. S. Karol? Charges drafted in a "style" that makes it obvious
that they were not written by Padilla but entirely by the police
authorities? We cannot help asking ourselves these questions.
To seek an explanation for this scheme in the Cuban
leadership's sensitivity to criticism, does not lead very far.
It is true that these leaders do more and more expect to receive.
only praise and flattering comments from those who know Cuba's
situation. Hence they were rankled by the analyses presented
in the Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol books on Cuba. Yet this
rancor could not be the sole reason for this worldwide campaign
of libel. The importance giv-en the Padilla affair, its large-
scale dissemination by the Cuban Press Agency, all clearly
demonstrate that apolitical decision was involved, and thus a
political explanation is indicated.
That politi4'cal, explanation. unfortunately lies in the
course taken by the Cuban revolution. After having for several
years plotted' ' an ascending curve -- which filled supporters
of socialism with.?libpe. -- that' revolution gradually entered a
degenerative phase., 'The efforts of those early days with their,
promise of a rad'i'cal transformation in. social relationships,
the development'of a new type of' democracy, and.the..end to
dependence upon fo're'ign markets'?due to.a one-crop economy based-
on sugar, all-progressively gave 'way to quite different prac-
tices. The Cuban government increasingly assigned priority to
"productivist": go'als';. It sought to strengthen sugar's role in
the economy, even :to the extent of putting off production
activities capable of covering the needs of the Cuban people.
In so doing, it increased Cuba's,de facto dependence upon its
principal customer and supplier, the Soviet Union.
These changes multiplied the difficulties besetting the
country. These difficulties are not due to the "inexperience"
of the Cuban leaders, as-,the latter 'so readily claim. Their
p9% FprJJeljWsg VMQV/QQt61 fSI I4 4itf I 0 oge7olution'
 CPYRGHT
sociaiAp b%'4FFcprSRg}ps 1Ja%W~Q4nPs#eRsDiF79tR11MR09 g%gg001-7
Movement's ideology which actually-is still the'dominant ideology.
The influence of these factors could have been diminished bit by
bit, but the contrary happened because Soviet policy made this'
influence even stronger. That policy favored anti-democratic
tendencies and Also a course 6f action which.cldsed the door to
economic independence for Cuba., .The consequencgs of the course
thus taken by the Cuban revolution are-' now bocoMing clearer and
clearer: despite the heroic and enthusiastic efforts of the
Cuban people, despite years of relentless work and considerable
investments, the country has seen its 1970 "zafrn" (sugar harvest),
fail -- a harvest proclaimed as the revolution's number one goal.
This course has also resulted in a profoundly deteriorated
economic situation, daily difficulties in obtaining food and
supplies, and the growing alignment of Cuban foreign policy with
Soviet policy, as evidenced, for example, by the official posi-
tion taken by Cuba on the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russian
t1roops.
Vis a vis this situation, the Cuban people. are asking
themselves how they ever got into this fix. How can it be that
so many years of effort have not produced other results, that
so many promises have not been kept?
The Cuban leaders have given no answers to these questions.
They have not even explained how they plan to get the country
out of its present difficulties. Only a few indications have
been given on this second point, but they are contradictory.
On the one hand, in several speeches made last summer,
Fidel Castro stressed the need to develop more democratic
relations within the country. In fact there was some start
made in implementing this new policy line, notably by estab-
lishing "production assemblies" at which workers were induced
to submit their criticisms and suggestions.
On the other hand,. the Cuban leaders were led, not to
penly reexamine their policy line and question the one-sided
mphasis placed on production, but, on the contrary, to
trengthen their "productivist" tendencies, to condemn the
'laziness" of those individuals who do not take a sufficiently
ctive part in`praduction efforts -- none of which show evidence
f being correctly.oiiented -- and to proclaim-the "virtues" of
aylorism, the aystem of standards and controls imposed upon
he workers, etc.
All ind'3catsions today point to a sudden change in demo-
ratization efforts.. In the absence of a radical change in
olicy line,.''sbch, a'ddvelopment was inevitable. Democratization
oes in fact, open':the door to 'criticisms that could be accepted
my by a government following an intensely revolutionary policy
ine
Allowing +t~he Srank and fil4 'to question leadership
ethods, the arbitrary character:bf decisions, and the increas-
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
2
 For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0003b0060001-7
ing social inequalities; cannot be tolerated by a political
leadership determined to make no.changes in these fields.
Today, Cuban leaders rely`lupon an administrative apparatus
superimposed over the ordinary workers. For years this apparatus
has'not been accountable to the workers and has been granted
minor and major privileges.. Challenging such a!situation --
which is what development of a real democratiza ion would have
led to--- would have upset. one of the regime's ocial bases,
and neither the Cuban leadership n'or,'its Soviet "friends" were
ready for that kind of upheaval.
Under these circumstancEs, all that now remains of last
summer's bright prospects are "productivism," Taylorism, and
discipline imposed from above. These remains are the police
line supported by the Soviet "riends" al.on'g with their friends,.
namely the officials of the fo-emer people's socialist party
(Communist). In this connects n,-the new political upsurge of
this party -- including some of its least popular members, such
as Laura Rene for instance -.is highly significant,
Thus it is this procosc n? de ;enoration currently
affecting the Cuban revolutioi:, that explains the absurd and
disgraceful accusations made :-.1,rainst Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol
whose books are being circular ed sub rosa in Cuba and being read
With interest, especially by ,he revolutionary and student youth
wio are worried about their c-untry's serious difficulties.
What Cuban readers loo for in these books, are not
political slogans or keynote., but those facts and data upon
which their national press rk.rains silent, facts which they
need to know to prepare anda"r;wer to the questions raised by the
country's situation and the ;evolution's retrogression. And so.
we can, therefore, understarll the eagerness of the Cuban govern-
ment to discredit such book; in the eyes of revolutionaries and
young students. Hence that iilly?charge leveld against Karol
and Dumont, claiming that tl ey are "CIA agents." Hence also
the stress placed on Rene D":.nont's "age"; this angle is
directed to the young studei:s. As a matter of fact, it is clear
that among the youth a new 3,.volutionary generation is reaching
maturity, a generation that is now reappraising the past history
of the revolution, the mistf Ies made, and the reasons behind the
appearance of new privileged individuals, notably that
"Alfacracy"*' whose existence symbolizes the "Soviet way" taken
by the Cuban revolution.
*For several.years ac;ually, the Cuban government has
been importing Alfa Romeos fjr its most "deserving" upper level
and-medium level officials."
fficials. These imports, made at a time when
the country lacksrforei-gn currencies' and its public means of
transportation a:eb s,eriousl:,, deficient, 'signal the appearance
of a now privi'},eged class'.
Approvea or a ease
3
 Approved For'Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
LE MONDE, Paris
12 May 1971
41,
CPYRGH A C
O U R O U O 1 is gouvcrnomeht
cubain a-t-11 donn6 la pubticit6
qua Yon salt a 1'affairo Padilla,,
portant ainsi prejudice b son prestige
at a son a u t o r i t 6. Internationale 7
Pourquol 'ce gouvernement a-t-11 06
conduit a la miss on scene sinistre
qui consists A faire porter par . un
hommo, pr6alablomont ddtonu pendant
plus d'un mots dans sea prisons, des
.a c c u s a t l o n s aussi ignobles quo
jr i d i c u 10 s confre Rene Dumont of
K.S. Karol ? Des accusations formu-
lees dens un - style ? qui no dolt
visiblement rien A Padilla at qui doit
tout. a In plumo des ? pottciers ? On
ne petit manquer de se Perot cos
.yGC Zlions.
Expflqucr tiro fella bn.l:cptit~ p r
in susceptibilitd des dlrigeants bubalna
dev'ant toute critique ? no mdne pas
biett 'loin. If est vral quo, do plus an
plus, ides dlrigeants n'attendent do coux qui connalssent to situation de
ieu, pays. quo dos 6loges tit dos pro-
,poa flattoura. Los analyses quo Ron6
C ELLE-Ct so trouvo malheureuse-
ment? dans Is tours. stltvl -par
to revolution c u b a 'f n o. Celts
rilvoiution. aprrrs avoir trac4 pendant
'{ tti+~.., ~'iit:, t ?t;i bt'tatii? nr ,.1:
dantj - qui remplissult d',=potr ice
partisans du soclalisme, -- eat entree
progressivemsnt dons uno ? phase do
d6p6n6rescbnce. Aux efforts du debut?
qu laissalent entrevoir une transfor-
motion radicals des rapports sociaux,
to d6veloppemcntd'uno dtimocr;_tle de
,type nouveau ot,ia fin do Is subordi
nation aux marches cxtdricurs, due A
la monoproduction sucribro, se sent
progressivemsnt, oubsUtu6es des pra-
tiques tout autres. ' Le' gouvernement
cubain a de plus an plus donne to
-priorit6 a des obleetifs - producti-
vistes -, If a chorch6 ? a renforcer to
poles du socieur suctler. act point de
fairo recuter leS producflons suacep-
tibloa do 'couvrir`res beaoins du peu-
pie cubain ; on agissant do to sorte,
if a? accru. to d6pendanoe 'Cs fait do
Cuba A regard do son principal Ache-
'teur-at fournisseur : f'Uniot sovidttque.
Ces changements ont''muttip116? tea
difficult6s : auxquepas to pays a eu
A. faire face. Cos' difficuft6s no sent
pas dues *I' ? inexpbrionce a des dirk
Hi `itlt rtJtsv~liist r^niiiir~@3 f3eirtlete
Pafilrment volontiors, Etas ont lour
Approved Fo
CPYRGHT...
Par
e a
/ f (
{
CPYRGHT
CHARLES BETTELHEIM ('*)
dens Ieurs tlvrea sur Cuba.les ont
done ulc6rds ; coca no saurait, copon-
-dant titre is souse raison de colts
cnuvre do dilfamation mondiale. L'am-
pleur donnee a 1'affairo Padilla, . so
diffusion a grande dchelto par i'Agonco
cubatne do prosse, montrent blen qu'il
s'agtt d'uno d6cislon poftttque, qui
eppello donc.uno explication politiquo.?'
origino' dens un?-iirno politiquo qui
s'enracino on partle dans les bases
sociates do to revolution at dons fes
1aiWesson do .t'iddotcgle du Mouve-
ment. du 28 puitlot, qui -recto, on fait,
I'Id6otogto dominanto. L'Inftuenco de
cos factours, qui aurait pu pcu a peu
titre rdduiie, s'est lrouvee au contratre
renforceo par to politiquo sovietique.
Celle-ci a favoris6 lea tendances anti-
dr mocratlques ainsi qu'une potttlque
qui ferma'? A Cuba to vote de son
inddpendance dconomique. Les cons6-
quences du tours Sinai sulA per In
revolution cubatns sent aujourd'hul
de plus en plus clatres : on d6pit des
efforts hdroiques at, enthouslaste9 du
peupte cubain. d'anndes de travail
attharnd at d'investissements'considd-
rabies. Is pays a connu 1'6chec de Is
.? zaire - (rdcolte sucriere) do 1970.
proclam6e objectif numdro un de Is
revolution, une situation economique
profonddment ddgradde, ? des ditfi-
cuitds quotidlennes de ravitaillement,
I'atignement croissant de to politique
extdrteure cubain sur is politiquo
eo"ittique, comme I's montr6, par
exempla, to prise de position do Cuba
tore de I'invaston de Is Tchdcoslova-
qule par [as troupes fusses.
-["% ACE A cette'situation, to peuple
.6U cubain ' se demands : comment
an est-on arAv6 la ? Comment,
se fait-11 qua tent d'ann4es d'effort
Wont pas ports d'aulres fruits, quo
'tent de promesses n'ont pas 6l6
tenues 7
A ces questions, les. dlrigeants
cubatns n'or' apport6 aucune r6ponse.
tie Wont memo pas pr6c1a6 comment
Its comptalent fairs sortir,le pays des
difftcull6a qu'ft connalt actuattement.
'. Seules quetques Indications ont 6%
Rel 79
dopnees sur ce deuxibmn point. mats
cokes-cl sont contradietoires.
Dune part, dons plusieurs discours
prononc6s I'6t6 dernier. Fidel Castro
j a instate sur to ndcessit6 de d6ve-
Ioppor des rapports plus d6mocra-
tiques dens to pays. Celle orientation
nouvelle a efreclIvement donne lieu
a un debut de r6alisation, nolamment
.sous la forme d' - assembldes do
,production ? ou cours desqueltes lea
?. iravailleurs ont 6te amends At formuler
des critiques at des suggestions.
D'autre part, lea dlrigeants cubatns
ont std conduits, non pas A rdexa-
miner ouvertement leur Ilgne politique
at A mettre an cause 1'accent place
unilatdralement sur to production,
mais, au contralre, a renforcer lours
tendances ? productivistes -. a d6non-
cer Is , paresse - de ceux qui no
participant pas assez activement A des
efforts do production dont rien no
ddmontre qu'Ils Solent correctement
orlenlds at h proclamer lea - vertus -
du taylorisme. do systeme des nor-
mes. den contr8les exercds sur les
travailleurs, etc.
TOUT Indique aujourd'hui quo fes
efforts do d6mocratisation tour-'
vent court. En ('absence d'un
changement radical de ligne, 11 dtait
Inevitable qu'il an soft ainsi. La demo-
s cratisation ouvre an effet Is Porte A
des critiques que soul un gouverne-
ment suivant nne l i g n e politique-
'profonddment revoiutionnafre pourrait
accepter. La miss an question par Is
base des m6thodes de direction, do
I'arbltralre dons lea decisions at des
Inegalites acetates crolssantes ne peut
etre tol6r6e par une direction poll-
tique dectdlie A ne rien modifier dens
.ides domatnes.
Aujourd'hul, lea dlrigeants cubatns
s'eppulent our un appareii adminietra-
tit ptac6 eu-dessus des simples tra-
vallieurs, qui pendant des enn6ea We
pas so do comptes a leur rendre at
qui b6n4ticle d'une sorts do petits at
de Brands privileges. La remise on
cause dune tells Situation -- ce A
pool aurait conduit to d6vetoppement
dune d6mocrattsatlon veritable
aurait boulevers6 tine de:; bases
aoolal08 du rdpime : nt to direction
oubatne nl ses - amlo ? sov16tlquss;
W6talent prilte A parelt bouleversement, '
 . CPIYRGHT
Dans ces conditions, des perspec-
tives ouvertes late dernier 11 ne rests
plus qua Is - productivisme ', Is - tay-
lorismo -, to discipline imposes d'on-
haul. C'est' IA i'orlentnlion quo sou
tiennont [as ? amts - eovi*tiques at lea
nails de too dorlliera I lie cadres de
I"a n c I e n parts soclaliste populalre
(communists). to remont6e de ceux-ci
our Is scone politiquo ?- y compris
des moms populalros, comma Lazaro
Pena, par example est A cat dgard
houtement significative.
C C 'EST done he proem do d6g6nd-
rescence on tours de Is r6vo-
lution cubains qul expfique too
accusations a b s u r d a a at Ignoml-
nlouses portees condo Rend Dumont
at K.S. Karol, dont lea iivres circulent
sous to menteau A Cuba at sent 'lus
' avec Intdrdt, notammert par Is Jeu-
nosso rdvolutionnaire at etudlante,
inqulAle des graves diffieultds do
son pays.
MIAMI HERALD
14 February 1971
Ce quo Jos lecteurs cubains cher-
client dana ccs iivres, co no sont pas
des mots d'ordre pofitiques, macs des
faits et des donnoes our lesquals In
presse nationals est muette, at quits
ant besoin de connaitre pour formuter
Una r0on114 atix questions pestles per
In situation du pays at to roflux de
la revolution. Des lors, on comprend
I'acharnement mis par to gouverne-
ment cubain h d6consid6rer do tels
ouvrages aux yeux dos revolution-
nacres at do In jeunesse 6ludlante :
d'ou l'accusntion inople porteo contra
Kardt et Dumont d'Oiro des .. agonls
do In C.I.A. d'oir suss] - A I'adresso
do Is jeunesse etudianto -- I'Insistance
' , miss our I' - age . de Ren6 Dumont.
11 est ctaie, en eliet, quo c'est au soln.
do In jeunesse quo mOrit une nouvelle
gAn6rAtion rdvolutlonnatre. uno gdnA-
ratloh qui s'intetroge aver paosion
stir t'hlstolte passto do to revolution,
sur lea erreurs commisos at our los
ratsonel'pour tesqualtes sont epparu$
de nouveaux privil6gl6s, notamment
CPYRGHT?
? ~ ub-n 's in Dire ~ ~' .~"c~no~n Trouble,
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
By FRANK SOLER ? AGRICULTURAL out- t arts
Twelve Years Into the Cas-
forged ahead as a result
con-
tro regime, Cuba Is beset by
its gravest economic crisis In
history.
. The dismal picture of the
Cuban economy is drawn by
veteran Cuba watchers, re- !
cent visitors to the Island,
economic experts and arriv-
ing refugees and Is reflected
In the statements of the Cas-
t- vernment itself.
ere is no relief In sight.
By most estimates' the situa-
tion will continue to deterio-
rate for at least one year and
perhaps t--o despite massive'
doses of Soviet aid.
Consider.
? INDUSTRIAL produc-
tion has been sharply, per-
haps Irreparably, disrupted;
by the government's all-out:
emphasis on agriculture.
,
tinues to crawl at a snail's
pace.
? THE 1971 SUGAR
HARVEST, mainstay of
Cuba's fragile economy, is
not likely to reach 5.5 million
tons, the casualty of last!
year's Intensive but unsuc-
cessful effort to harvest 10
million tons.
? WORKER ABSENTEE-
ISM and deliberate produc.
tion slowdown by disgrun-
tled workers Is widespread,,
so much so that the govern-
Merit recently decreed an
"anti-vagrancy law" in an ef-
fort to deal with the problem.'
The law provides penalties.
which include prison terms
for troublesome workers.
? INDICATIONS of he-
creasing student discontent.'
as demonstrated recently n
Oriente, Cuba's easternmost
province, where a group or
students is reliably reported
to have engaged in. an angry,
debate with Castro.
Specific Incidents -
involv-ing rebellious youth have not.
been acknowledged by the
government, but the serious-
ness of the situation has. 1
Government sycophant,
Guido Garcia Inclan said In a
radio commentary last Sep-.j
tember.
"Dissension, failure to get
to work on time, difficulties
raised by them (the youths)
when they are of military agej
.... doing things they should
loot be doing during class
hours. Youths always have a
derisive joke to make against
our revolution .. ,"
In a later commentary.
Garcia Inclan said: "The
youth refer to our Central
Park as Miami. Why? Be-
cause they want to be in
Miami. That is their environ-
ment, so let them go there. It
Is time we cleaned house!"
Only In limited sectors has
the economy made some
progress.
The fishing industry con-
tinues to grow as does the
Cuban merchant marine.
Nickel production report.
edly increased during the
,past year, bringing some
badly needed relief In the
form of hard currency
through exports abroad.
The production of rice she
increased and Its ' rationing
Celts a{illacrailo ,. (1) dont I'oxlstence
syrr,bgJit:o Is , vo:n .^..nv., tlqun - pri e
oar Ia( revolution cubs&".
tt t puck piusteurs an n 6 e s, -n
' atrtit, tlativaI1it"Ifla i dtihain irfl-
patttt es Alia-rtomeo destinr~e?, sax
cadres a it p 0 r l n u r a of aux cadres
moyeris lea plus a mOritante s. Ces
lmport$tlons, que ont lieu alors que
le P&W.1.1manque de devises et qua lee
mobcns ? de transport publics sont
ggrnvcment dCftctcnte sont le signs de
1'npparl'tlon dune n o u v e 11 c classe
privlldgloo.
.(-)'directeur d'd t u d e s A 1'Ecole
prptlgpo des Mutes Etudes. A effect'
tub A partlr de 1961, at 1 1s demabde
do * (fhe o Guevara, pliialcurs e8jours
A Gills cornnre expert des probuirnes
de atvnloppement Oconotntque.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 was relaxed Yed For RWe> 109r9/QWA2 :.UA# ?F67 Oi a~9 00 0 0~,~r are few
> - Q Q
But the plc u as ea very seriously was prompted Cuban. , bedsheets to he found.
elsewhere. primarily by Cuba's failure to' Virtually all consuniir A growing amount of med-
White the situation is re- harvest 10 million tons of goods have been rationed for Icinal prescriptions go un-
garded as "critical It is not
sugar from the 1970 c
years
and wh
t
'
,
,
op,
a
wasn
t soopj
yet believed critical enough Castro had staked "the disappeared from the shelve
to ignite it popular Internet, honor of the Ilavolutlon" a The economic Setbacks of r -
revolt. achieving the record 10-mil1 cent months have mode tl?
Instead, Cuba is seen as lion-ton crop. Cuba still pro. shortages more acute.
becoming even more depen- duced a record 8.5 milliol Long lines of early rising,
dent upon the Soviet Union tons, but the massive diver consumers waiting their turn - which already. Is pumping slon of workers and equip to purchase soap, tooth-'.
more than $1 million a day- moot for the task caused tht brushes, eggs, medicines and;
Into, the Island - during crippling disruption of most even toilet paper became
1971. other sectors of the economy longer.
Castro's personal Interven- Subsequently, several toy, . Recently arrived refugees,
tion in the administration of Ministers warp anmm*rily ra~ say the ration list Includes
resources will probably dl- placed by younger;Castroieer these principal items:
minish this year, as-more col- many of them military of- ? Six pounds of rice Veit
lective decisions are made firers. month per person.
under Soviet pressures. Meat supply, already limit. ? One and one quarter:
Responsibility for pumping ed In Cuba, dropped even ounces of coffee per person,..
new life into the wobbly
likel
will
i
t
...~
y
sans
n
o milk, beer and even tobacco,
experienced hands, such as once the prime Ingredient of
those of minister without Cuba's renown d :..-. ,..A...
y.+..'_' ' a-aatarD K%atact IRUU-
riguez, an economist and Old>
Guard Cuban Communist.
Regarded as the shrewdest
official in the Cuban govern-
ment today. Rodriguez has
'perceptibly gained In status
over the past several months.
The availability of shoes
and clothes continues to de-
dine.
. Quotas for consumer prod-
ucts and raw materials for
the island's industries are not
being met.
Havana and -Other cities
EVEN CASTRO admits
Cuba's economic woes. In a
nationwide speech last July,
-Castro not only acknowl-
edged his regime's economic
failures but also placed the
blame on himself and others
within the government. '
"It would be better to tell
.throughout the island have
become increasingly dark at
night, as the government:
shuts off electric power to,
preserve the little it has. Ha-
vana also has several electric :
blackouts during , daylight
hours.
There is also an acute
the people to look for some- water shortage,
body else," Castro said. 'The While the Island's econom-.
people can replace us when Ic picture becomes progress,
ever they wish. Right now N sively worse, so does that of.
they wish."
+ ? Five pounds of sugar Refusing to give her name,
per person each month. she said doctors had told her
? One half-pound of lard before leaving the island that
per person each' month. but' she was physically In good.,
availability is Irregular. health. But she disagrees.
i Two to three eggs per, 'q am destroyed," she
person a week, when they says.
are available.
? One quarter pound of Many Cubans from small
meat towns in the interior of the
per person a week, island used to supplement
when available. their rigid diet by picking
? Two small boxes of fruits from fields outside the
match
es per family each towns, says Mario Rodriguez,
week. 47, a storekeeper from a tiny
T
?
wo packets of cigarets
per person each fifteen days.
g
s 1
po s -
ble Soldiers have been post
? One. bar of soap for
d .
e
aM Posts washing clothes and one bar aklrts poi tsetownse ?u,
of bathroom soap a month. they confiscate any are distribut- ben y food
ed when available, as V it brought IN,- he said.
toothpaste. Clothes are dls- rigves arrived with his
trlbuted every six months, Fite and Son in Miami last
but' underwear 1s extremely week
EL,SIGLO, Bogota
8 March 1971
CASTRO'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES INCREASE AMID WORLDWIDE CRITICISM
CPYRGHT
In Havana last week, Fidel Castro brought together representatives
of all the provinces of Cuba in order to report to them on the economy.
The chief executive had bad news for them. He warned that unless there
is a speed-up in 1971 sugar harvest operations, substantial quantities
of cane will go unprocessed. "We cannot," Fidel said, "allot ourselves
the luxury of failing to export a single pound of sugar."
filled because there are few
medicines at drug stores.
Deer and alcoholic bever-
ages are also rationed. West.
em visitors tell of seeing
long lines at restaurants
where these beverages are
served and where meals are
composed of items other than
rice and beans -- which most
Cubans eat today.
"I've lost 22 pounds within
the past few weeks," says 'a
sixtyish-looking housewife'
'from Camaguey Provinep
who arrived in Miami aboard
the t w I c e-daily Freedom
,Flights last week. The
"That is no lon
er
Apprnveri F"r Release 1999100107 ? r_In-Rr1P79-0I194A000300060001-7
 AARMR(O For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Recently, the bearded Cuban leader has been engagi.ng;in stern
exhortations. Two weeks ago he wrote to Regis Debray, thq.,French
intellectual who had been captured shortly before the Bolivian troops
killed the Guevara in 1967 and who was released recently.,; "We are
working hard and facing great difficulties," Castro admitted. "It's
long road ahead, Debray," he said, "for it is only when we revolu-
tionaries have come to power that we realize we are really only just
beginning."
The various criticisms that have been made of 'Castro for some time
now are in agreement that. the economy of his regime is in serious diffi-
culty. They point to the serious labor shortage, the excessive absentee-
ism, the low productivity, and the calamitous shortage of modern
machinery. A United States government analyst said last week: "Something
is going completely wrong: wrong priorities,.emphasis on the wrong
things, bad administration. In short: chaos."
Castro admits as much in his speeches. Last year, for example,
he told the nation: "Our enemies say that we have problems, and the
truth is that they are right." Surprisingly enough, the sharpest
criticism of Castro comes from European leftists who have visited
Cuba frequently, talked.with the Cuban leader, and supported his
plans.
One of their number is the Polish journalist K.S. Karol, who
writes for Le Monde and Le Nouvel Observateur of Paris and the New
Statesman of reat Britain. His books Las Guerrillas en el Poder:
el Curso de la Revolucion Cubana (The errs as in Power: the Course
of the Cu. an Revolution) Lpl ura. sic] have been favorite reading among
U.S. and Latin American experts.
The French agricultural scientist Rene Dumont also criticizes
Castro, in his book Cuba es socialista? (Is Cuba Socialist?).
Both authors contend-that one of Caatro's biggest mistakes was
to have developed, plans' that were incorrect and implemented than with
unsuitable procedures. "A country that is surrounded in the way Cuba
is cannot allow herself the luxury of gradual progress," Karol
acknowledged.:-`M6 sacrifices have gone on (too) long and are becoming
unbearable for the people," Dumont commented.
Karol found'The Horse (as the farmers affectionately refer to
Castro) to be personally sensitive. "Fidel is very restless when he
speaks. He is almost-constantly in motion. He gets up, takes a few
steps, sits down. His heels tapping, he moves back and forth as if
acli and every one of his arguments were in the-nature of a hand-to-nand
combat with an astute adversary."
Much. of Castro's time is spent playing the role of national polit-
ical leader -- Karol complai.rh:3 -- constantly touriiig the country and
Leaving the business of governing to the bureaucrats.' "The new
roletarian class," Karol reports, [has found it] somewhat difficult
o control and to use bureaucracy for its own ends in the way that the
urgeoisie used to do."
pproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
Approved or Release - -
Both observers agree that Castro's worst error iii judgment was
what Karol calls "his obsession with sugar" as a means o' paying for
the petroleum and Russian aid that is currently arriving;to the tune
of 1.5 million dollars every day.
Castro called on Cubans to harvest the unpreced.ente. quantity of
10 million tons of sugar. The entire nation was mobilized for the
harvest. The Christmas holiday period in 1969 -- and the New Year's
in 1970 -- were postponed until the end of the harvester,
y
There was a monumental error in calculation, howevr. Years before,
that veteran harvester Nikita Khrushchev had. ordered hi.- experts to
design a cane cutter.. A total of 1,000 of these machines were shipped
to Cuba. Whexgas the cutters had worked satisfactorily-when they were
tested in the.Ukraine, however, they were a complete failure in. Cuba.
Karol blames the hilly terrain, while others contend that the Russian.
machinery overheated in the tropical climate. To cope with the avalanche
of sugarcane in 1970, approximately 400,000 Cubans had to cut the cane
manually to achieve the maximum harvest -- and the majority of them
were inexperienced. Castro himself cut cane, instead of governing.
The visitors of the Venceremos Student Brigade, composed. of radical
American students [one or more lines dropped in Spanish text] of the
Soviet defense minister, Andrey Grechko, also went to the cane fields.
A total of 8.5 million tons were eventually harvested.. It was an
acceptable figure but did not fulfill Castro's plans.
It is Karol's contention that this harvest did more harm than. good.
Seven million tens of sugar were delivered as part payment en account
to the Soviet Union and other communist suppliers. Karol, who was
educated. at the University of Rostov, served in the Red Army (and served
time im Stalinist prisons), and is intensely. anti-Russian, writes:
"The USSR does not really have the moral right to insist on its con-
tractual rights and on the superhuman sacrifices that this entails
for Cuba." Castro remarked angrily to-Karol that "they do not give us
anything for nothing, and then they act as if they were showering us
with gold."
Because other labors were abandoned in ordero concentrate on
the J.0.69-1970 carte harvest, the rest of the economy was damaged.
Electric power is now in such short supply that blackouts are
continually occurring.
"Security patrols composed of small children, " [Karol writes ] ,
"have been organized to turn off unnecessary lights.,. "Cubans are still
having to endure the customary long lines and shortages. In a country
that is renowned for its tobacco, Castro warns that smokirng is dangerous
to health and limits his people to a ration of two packs of cigarettes
and t cigars per week. Rents are low, prices are low, and since there
is nothing ;o- buy,' there is more' and more rroney.' The black market
prospers, as a result: in costs'90 pesos per bottle, and cigareetes
5 dollars a pack. In the black-market the exchange rate is 7 pesos
for a dollar. Consequently, there are many buyers. Other Cubans.
stand in line to get into Havana restaurants such as the Wnseigneur,
La Torre, and Floridita in order to pay 40 pesos for a goal for two.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 &INPtd1For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300060001-7
Castro has apparently read his critics. He has referred to them
as "these little leftist writers" and as people who "h~--pothet.i.cally
construct imiaginary worlds." At the same time, however, he has been
making some of the suggested changes. One of these ch nges was to
allow the workers more power to make decisions. Cuba has carried out
a number of "elections" in labor unions in which a total of 2 million
workers elected 148,000 union representatives. These representatives
will supposedly be the channel through which workers will be able to
transmit their complaints cr to hake suggestions.
In the meanstime, the government is putting pressure on the lazy.
This year has been called the Year of Productivity. New regulations
to control vagrants have been introduced. Cuban men between 17 and
60 years of age who chronically absent themselves from work will have
.to spend 2 years on State farms.. Women are exempt, however. "Our
people would not understand if we.treated women and men alike,"
explains Minister of Labor Jorge Risquet. Meanwhile, Castro is purging
his cabinet of all those who -- as he states -- "have exhausted them-
selves in the revolution."
Ominously, every change seems to bring more army officers into
,civilian ministries. Of the 20 ministries, 11 are now headed by
captains and majors.
No one is suggesting that Castro will soon be overthrown. Most
of those who might have opposed him have either left Cuba or hope to
on one of the flights that are made 10 times a. week from Varadero to
Miami. Even though no exit permits have been granted since 1966,
some 130,000 perspns.who obtained their visa before that date are
.still hoping to join the 600,000 Cubans who left for what Castro
scornfully calls "easy living and a consumer society." These critics
are in agreement that socialist Cuba is in deplorable danger. They
argue that Castro's charisma has lessened and.that Russian aid will
not solve the problems. "One wonders," says Karol openly, "if he
has not perhaps mortgaged the entire,future.of the revolution."
EL SIGLO, Bogota
8 March 1971
~ r
Ci&bt; ,.GY i;l~' td
CPYRGHT
Fidel Castro rnuni6 on La I?Ia
bana Ia semana pasada a los re'
prescptantes do todas las pro
vinclas do Cuba para prescator
ios un balance ceonOmieo. El
Jofe mdxlmo .les tonfa male,'
otictas: a menos quo el ritmo
a to zafra do 1971, o Ia cose
ha' do auicar aumante, advit
16, quodardn sin procesar?con
!do,'ables cantidadcs do cans
iJo Fidel, "Nosotros no pole`
os permltirnos of tuio do dojar
In exportar una sofa fibre de
P OF. Cfirlos . i~ue?r~.aa,x!;;~ 0r
Ultimamente, of barbudo If
der cubano so he ontregado at
soveras exhortaciones : Hace '2
semanas oserlbi6 a Regis Do
bray, of Intelectual francbs cap
turado P000 antes de? quo los
soidados boilvianos mataran al'
."Cho" Guevara on 1067 y re
clentemento le concedieron 11
bertad. "Estamos trabajando du;
ro y hiclendo frrnto a grendos
rdiflcultados", confesb Castro
"La marcha as vordaderamonte.
nosotros ; Ios rovglucionarios}
-dijo Ia ^emana paaad,: "ciao`
anda? conipretamonte m,11 --ma-
las prioridades, maloa 6nfasis
male administracion- on rosu?
Men, coos"
Castro admito un tanto on
sus discurnos. Par ojemplo, el,
ar o pasado manifest6 a la no.
'oibn:11Nuestros 'enemigoa dicen
igtAb ;tertomos probiomae .y en.
d
tamOs comunzando".
Las critical quo dosdn haco.
ittempo so vienen haclendo a'
Castro estfin do'acuerdo on quo
Ia econornfa del rigimcn 'esta
on series diflcultades. Senalan
do In gravo esranoz do mono
do obra. el oxccoivo ausenti9
mo is baJa productividad y Ia'
calamitosa escasez do maquina'
zacer. blarno ?do Ios'Estodos o odes entices a Castro
A se #ta Unidos. 9 provlo?
A ________ __ J r-__ Re ease rJJJrv~29s~x 9 TI A A'0003000C0001 -1
reailda
tienen -razin. Dicen quo
hay irritaciones y trer en razon"
Sorprand ontemento. Ins m1 s a
 non do curopoos izgtiicrd(stao
quo ban Vi4ftadp fy
cuentenieiltL hQopto Convti
~e
der cubanb y apoyiido sus pla-
nes.
Uno do altos (is ol'periodis?
to polaco K. S. Karol. g0fen es,.
tribe Para Le Mondo y Lo Nou
vol Obearvtitour do Perle Y,
News Statesman de Oran A?re
toria. Sus libros: Las Guerrilla`s
on of Podnr:?ei Curso do ta'Ro
.volucidn Cubans, lien side let
lure favorite, do lore espccia?4
listas nortrsarnerlcanob y Latino
anlericonos.
El agrdnomo Irancds flenti Du
mont tombien Gulps a Castro
on su obra: LCuba ? as socia
tista?
Ambos autoros sostionen quo
tmo do los principalos orrurss'
Ale Castro fuo haber flJado pia-
nos incorrectos Con Impropios
procodinilontos "tin pale rodas
do corno Cuba no so deborta
perinitir of iujo do progresos
graduates", admits Karol. "Los
sacrifictos qua lion side We.
'masiado) pi;plongados so ostfin
haciondo insoportabtes para of
pueblo", comenta Dumont.
Karol nncontr3 al CahaIIc.
--como los campesinos se ro,?.
fieren afe.ctuosamonto a Cas-
tro--- personalmente vibrante'
"Midel so rnuestra muy inqutetc
cuando habia. So mueve oast to
do of ttempo. so levanta. do
unos Pecos pesos "3e :;lento, ta,
coney para atras j, adetanta ca
mo si cads argumarttu lucre u
na espocto do lathe marts 0
mano con un astuto opononte".
ci potrdlco y Ia ;;rude rush t;ul, rUhQ,s. ctiitr. u?tlc^ y ~ ' IU.t
F ip t, 6EPsten9'999y~W02 r#3FF i~1^AR+E5 e i Ab0( Ofl66001 7+ c nai a
e mti on y mudlu i0 ov tua cato acarroo Para Cuba" Motto travii &A
+I:ii C ti GC)ai8%
tiiarlOS. ; ;cornentti . noJarlanlente K1, do+c5 ...+,uli ir,+l5ivit;r ,{t:0
Castro Ilenid a ills cub:.no- pt rot. "olloa not dcin nrd pot` )as e ii-,cra sIJC;Crvr,cias.
no CoGechar Is tie) rnv da c i ri tda It luego oculars will Sf riicriti?uo t,L,tO, o;
tided do 10 nlil(ctir;s do forioia? ostuvleran OnG:illtiinc oirno Con' cst y
da3 ce azucar. T da i9 i$fa or. Old". ii:,to rni,i l1." SiG,7
movllix r ra In aftndllo, taut Como' pnr docllcnrna of orIrte e171'ru~lil rrrlr "Eli 1010 do Is raft
.fiestas do nuvidad did 1669 y do calla 19G9.19"0, so ,~Lr-ndciru r tciiviric.ri Sr.. Ilan i ttrnc:
orio nuevo do 1970 se aptaza ron otros trahalos, so pnr'Judicd Jo nuc?r?+s rec;,rl r,;nnr. J contra
ron hasty quo se turmiflara, at resto de Ia ecnnomf;s. La e, lo-3 wages. Lc : lino;:iris cub:;nos
Poro hubo tin trOnlondo erro- riergia as shots tail ht+Ja 'ql:n da 17 haitL oU silos quo crOl;lca
do c5irflio: clues antest f:so vic hay continuos apagO'iCS. PION 0 ac i.u::e+iton dct trails,c
jo cosechador - I1ikito Khrusli' "Patrullas do seguridad do pe tondi?iill quc it durant:+) o03 a.ln.l
rj -; nc( I :;t.:do, Sia
Sra
chev noble ordenrdo a sus fix a tas quenos niilos Sc hen rnoviltxa
or?tos, disn,lar un,i cortadcrt do pars apagar iucos inn;;i:osa- rrocni'rto {a3 Iraij.: cstya oxen
do calla, 1.000 do nata0.wd(jui Has. Los cubanos contin0fin s,ii 03. "fii11Xdo Irr;,tlo lo. corn
nas so oinbarcaroti a Cuba. PO? pror deria -I trar,irr,mo a lea
poi'iaitrtil 105 ~iiti?t~rrli+;; lat'tf.,:
to mtsntras Its cortadt3ras Ira irdll,?ros y a to.-, ilonlot?e3 p0r
baiaban :ldecuadamento r?Unrtclo E rims y' IN a,jhsp . t? it till i ~t 1gtrji",., cxplico c n+'r.intro de
J farnosrr itur su tabsco. fit,tc;
ce ensayartm an ticrania. fella t?fibr,,u Jor~7;5 Fisq;tet. hlttraa
roll cor,plaianletitu an Cuba. M, advlbrta quo t;l fumar ab ;iur tauto C i.,,tro 0.i1 s3ncan :11
trot culpa at suelo ntcnt:a6r3o, judicial para to wind y ,raato gauii*et s (10 riqu:lios quc. co
mientras otros sostictlcit gtto Is ha q au parrbi cC-n disr.. par.;uii file 1St io seii:lla, "oe Ilan arota
maqulnaria ruse se-rentlctitab i too de l:igarr,{la3 y +Jos et,tn do en la revotuciuri'. J
troy .cedar :omens. Los arr,10
is. evalancha do tail, de an:-
car do In7O. ,uviei-on qua tartar
Ca113 a t11n;1n llliaS '+)O.bt:?g rU - pros Do Zu minks:rtes. +) ostan ..?
dingo. Conte rrtaultacio.
pens lc ac;tar:J ;fjf nfrrio ;ii'xtrx. peta ci niorcr+do ncciro. E{ , he oreisrjgido3 per capttsnca y:
cuesta a ,000 Is botolfa, Y
,t:osocha, El miam i Castro Gov ciszrripos S fi.00 n! paqucte (i:n
to calla en voz do iirnlinis.;rnr, j'lada suciicr`o quo Cc?tro s:.a
l
t3
?
Los viaital!toa;)ruct:d~rtb3 60 !a of marcado ncyro so an s
, pronto ocri?ocacio. Cn In riayuria
I3rigada do -C.tu(fianto.; radios pesos par un ddlQt) for nsa aqueiloa quo so pudleron ilabaz
ins nnitrk rhos "Vcrir;!-rrtiiv..' Iray niuchos conlpradores. t]tf,+14 opttosto a ci. Ilan dejado?a Cu
I t`
del ministrn bo',idtiril de deice;
as. Andrei Grecliko tanlbi4n flit,
i
l
d
C car
.,ran a lug campc
s
a' . re y Irlorldita a gastar S 40 GO
Eventuallllentp: fuoroll coso nor i,rs rnmida nary dos nar?
CC ~., 7or ,en eua e . , w o
a Miami. Aunciuo no so Ilan con
Cedido permioos do Salida des
... .?.. ?11+" do 1SGti. alcunas 130.000' per
tas Psis tones tdaa, ctFra acr'p?
,tablo porn run ztu llogb a Jos' Castro ap.irentomcnto t1?? Irt 01 aS quo ubtuvicron vi,a On?'
planes dg" Gttt3trtt. do i' Iritiras, so ha icfr,rli;f) tts do eso tielilpo, Orin osn:>
Tat cPSsr hFi, 13tS94iono Korth critorosn zgii dru sa3titr~ydiya nI,cn o3 quossaiieron 600.00C
a ocquo
t116' illSl pe i da qua ftrnrfi too ~it'ntc quc "crinstruye Iltpa Castro' dccdonasamontr, Ilan)
Gros. State m1il ill fer do tonola, tcticaiilr nto niunr,oa blritlfna "La duke vida y is oricdcd
des do :hitter Euston en ties": No oostante, tin. osted+t
des a Buena rutt-ta a Is 01,16111 otsnsurilidora". Las crfticas, con"
Soiri6ttea y atrak pftsvcCritrles ofoctunndo of misino tigrilpn :.i ? cucrdzn an clfo In :nor ialinzi Cu
comunist is: aoribe Karol, t;ulpn 4Junos do Jos carnl,ios sugcrt' ba cstd on dej)lorabls pcligrb',.
No educado on Ia Univt:rsidad oo. lino de elios file permttrr i+ ; tiiulic+ttati ti,.. ri.1
CIO Rostov. aattivn on el icJ. r a los trai,suladores olds podor f,''si;ii,i sn/ 'W1 +hi ll, , l+,
do doctsidn. Cuba ha reaiiiadc ac uridad Cri is ryil;n rasa tilt
Ciao A610 (Y an lat-" prlsionss series do "elecciongs" do unto 'o ''Uno a
i, rti5lv.,r5 proUlutitao.
stalinls s Yon vFflitbttttitlnen -
"Le U. A. S. 9 nca do' trabajadoros on 13d` protluittu", dtre Ki;rol oblertz
to anti Svc ~
cuaies dos mittonos de C'i? 1 morlt'i ",^,t :1st sQ ,:t on hril i eil
'no tiono tcalnrlatir bl dsrecho tins aprobaron 140.000 rep o? htpotoc:,do todo of futuro do
moral Oars in.~I101r an 'sus der Ociitontes do los sthdfcatos.-11 to r,ivoluctdn".
Castro ha' pasado ttemrwo. sir
,vlcndo comp Ildor national. 80
cuoja Karol: stomplc de glras!
per. at pats, y dejandn at goblet,,
no ,a Los burdcratas, "La,nttova.
:lase prolotarla", teporte Karol'
"es on pogo dif fell do eontro=
tar y usar.Ia buracrecia pare,;
sus proplas fines climb antcrtor
mOnte is Il:t.:j t fit r;iri t?rlti~fil,
Amboy observudores co,?icuor +
dan on quo at mss' grando u-
rror an of juiclo do Castro. futi'
to quo Karol lisma "su obse-
sl6n del nzOcar" para pager pot
CPYRGHT
+111r
d misfiles son haste:, In;s ra'. ; Cnri,)05f;nlCnt0, C::da a mbi:i
eu0311Qrf MUM coo Vol" . .
restauranfes de to Habana ?'a: bo v ri.ip:raiil haccrto ci; Unb ~o
Ir.s Cairo Alonr,eignetn, La To- toe vualos qu l so toa,izan is
V 1 d If? d ro
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
10
 puSgAr RelleaRse 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300060001-7
26 April 1971
CPYRGH-Ey Jude Wanniski
or a few hours last week, Fidel Cas- a es, even To normalize relations with t e loo tro was in his for a afn. It ?dewas l the while "that monstrous war" in Vietnam United States, which would open ec
10th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, and continues. noniic opportunities for Cuba througho t
the Cuban premier, who never tires of It seems reasonable to. speculate, as' the, hemisphere, Castro would sirup y
recounting how the nation's heroes specialists in the State Department have, have to renounce the export of revol -?
squashed the Yanqui mercenaries, told that Mr. Nixon's comments this month tion. But for him, a compulsive revol
the whale blow-by-blow story again in caused Casro additional distress. ,Certain- tionary, this ? would mean admission f
a three-hour radio address. ly he reacted furiously. humiliating defeat. He said last wee
As usual, it was a fascinating, color- Mr. Nixon, asked In a radio Interview "such a gesture, Mr. Nixon-and we sE Y'
ful account that could not have failed if he Is thinking of normalizing rela- this with all the honesty which characte -
fu
macount, fly stir the tions with Cuba, as he Is In the long Izes this, revolution and Its statement
pride' and pas- term" with China, replied that Castro has will never be made."
sloe of the 8,500,000 Cubans, at least drawn the line. "He's exporting revolu- Castro also had some unequivocal r -
those who bothered to turn on their tion all over the hemisphere. . . As 'marks about the Organization of Amer
radios. Yet these remembered vlorina
aVVUY raw tit new t;ciualllo,can offer. __.____ .... w!!. Ejv!!llYlV, . a? U4[l4GJ tv:a~~, wnlcn cvlnciaenLau
people these days. The decade has anti-American line, we are certainly not met in San Jose, Costa Rica, last week.
not been kind to Cuba or Castro. While going to normalize our relations with 1962, and in 1964 after Castro stirred u
he remains a folk hero, his charisma Castro. As soon as he changes his line Insurgency In Venezuela. the OAS passe
tarnished but intact, his back is getting .'toward us, we might consider It. But it's resolutions excluding Cuba from its a
closer to the wa1}.., his move.- tivi.ties. Almost all of the 23 membe 'states 'brok trade The Cuban economy is in disarray Given the fresh currents of coexistence with Castroe But now and ~Iastro is soi weae
barely held from collapse by ever-in- around the globe, It seems likely the
creasing infections of Soviet aid. And the people of Cuba are not repelled by the ened domestically that his revolutionar
notion of normalization. In fact, they exports are almost limited to rhetoric
Russians, more and more, are elbowing probably yearn for It. It would be tuff}- and several of the Latin governments, le
their way into the direction of econom cult to exaggerate the current economic by Chile, seem prepared to take Castr
le planning, understandably appalled at, plight. Castro himself admitted last year' back. But that, too, would be. a humillat
ow easily the Havana .government has In the most despondent message he has yet' Ing admission of defeat for Castro, as I
managed to waste the $5 billion in Sov- delivered, that the OAS was taking et aid already supplied. privation would remain roke
until at least 1975. down Cuban revolution onHee reactn
Spotlight on Chile berceiy:
n
s
ns
he spiritual leader of the Latin Amer}- Not that there is any starvation. There 1 'the OAS .
p is a basic ration of beans and rice, and us into the : How are they going to silo
an left has been rapidly declining. Since
OAS when we say we are o
he Guevara's death In Bolivia in 1967, per persthree-quarters of a on per week. But. there s no fresh
the side of the revolutionary govern-
he Russians have been restraining Cas- milk for persons over 7 years of age 'and meats? How, when we say the OAS is a
ro's more impetuous revolutionary Im- fresh vegetables are rare. And there is filthy, rotten bilge with no honor? How,
wises. Now, with Castro-style comma- almost a total absence of consumer goods, when we, say that the OAS causes fits of
sm hardly a himself Latin revolution- including' ciothing~ Except for l 500 Alfa vomiting In our country--the name of the'
ries, Castro himself seems to be be- Romeos bought by Castro for his senior OAS, that is."
owing an embarrassment to the move- government officials, the only automobiles
eat. The spotlight belongs to Chile's in Cuba are those Imported before the Russia Grows Weary
ewly elected Marxist president, Salva- 1b59 revolution. One visitor reported that If that wasn't clear enough, Castro
or Allende, who not only has shown the a pack of American chewing hum was be- went further than he has for years, since
ay to peaceful revolution, via the ballot Ing sold on the black market for $5, a Moscow put a leash on him, in pledging
ox, but who also pledges that.-his goo- pair of nylon stockings' for $150. Cuban direct support of armed revolution. "At'
rnment of not Interfere in thy` internal rum is almost impossible to buy In Cuba the hour and moment that the other broth-'
ffairs of its Latin neighbors: Chile will at any price. er revolutionary countries request techni-
ot became the Sierra Maestro of the cal assistance, such as technicians or soj
ndes," he .declares, the Sierra Maedtras Housing, medical services, education, diers, as soldiers and combatants, as our
eing the hills from which Castro con- and utilities are free, or almost free, but most sacred duty we shall furnish them."
ucted his C. ')an revolution In 1957-1959. this only completes the cycle of Castro's
economic problem. Because what -is not Chances are Moscow was irked by
Then, too, Castro finds himself being free Is rationed, or unavailable, money these' remarks. in pursuit of their own
erwhelmed by the pace of globaj events. as little value and there is no incentive national interests, the Russians have been
At a time of severe economic privation o work. Productivity Plummets. The re-, conducting a gentlemanly diplomacy
f r Cuba, all he has left to hold the Cuban gime
throughout together is the hatred of Richard produces fewer goods with which; ghout Latin America --- hobnobbing
xon and Yanqui the hatlism. Yet here' to earn foreign exchange, hence less ca- gvet- with those - rightist governments,
I 'his friend, Allende, still along ;parity to buy consumer goods. The Rus- such . as Brazil's and Argentina's, that'
getting islans,, locked Into their political commit- have been going to extrenies to stamp'
a fashion with Washington. And here e went, now take up the slack at the rate out radical leftists. Further, the
i the People's Republic of China playing of $i, er ~In~t~s}~ 1q~ ,, prevail-
A roved For Re lease ?~ /~&8 : di-RD P79_01'k> i~ Ei` ~ Late Depart-
pp I of are ~gr~tting'
Allende Steals His Thunder
T or Cuba's Castro: Memories; Si! Successes,
Ivyfons, $150 a Pair "We feel better outside tha
a
i
id
 CPYRGHT
Approve d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
weary of pumping money n o a osini in recent months, Castro has been taken to condemning specific "counter-
proposition like Cuba,. and would, prefei
to see Castro get along at least with his
atin neighbors.
Certainly the Kremlin enjoys having
Cuba as a pressure-point In its big-power,
rolntionehil) with the United Motto, Every,
time It sends a nuclear submarine into
Cuban waters the U.S. Government spud.
ders. But otherwise, It seems likely that
Castro could,become Increasingly embar??.
rassing to Moscow.
Since he has foreclosed all his other
options, Castro can only straighten out
the economic mess he has created by
stepping up the militarism of his regime.
As It Is, 11 of the 24 cabinet posts in his
government are held by soldiers; military
organization, he seems to feel, Is the only
way to discipline the Indolent work force..
Last year Castro put the military in the
vanguard of his attempt to harvest 10,-'
000,000 tons of sugar. And then the effort
was, a crushing failure; workers from all
sectors of the economy were sent, into
the; fields and still the harvest fell short
by 1,500,000 tons. This year he can not
even make his goal of 7,000,000 tons.
THE MIAMI HERALD
14 April 1971
CPYRGHT
Compiled by our Lom Amitits SIsii
WASHINGTON -- Soviet
technicians are being sent to
towns and cities all over
Cuba In what U.S. Officials
regard as a novel attempt to'
revitalize the island's sag
Bing economy. ''
"They're actually being In-
corporated Into relatively
low-level positions," said one
U.S. official noting the move
is one of several examples of
a growing Soviet role in the
Cuban economic structure....
an "anti-loafing" law, probably the most
repressive In the hemisphere, was put
Into effect. "Loafing," or vagrancy, has
been made a crime punishable by six
months to two years in a "rehabilitation
center," a forced-labor camp.
'Stalinization' Under Way?
In February, the French press reported
that Heberto Padilla, a 39-year-old Com-
munist poet, was arrested in Havana.
Mr. Padilla supposedly had given manu-
scripts critical of the Castro -regime to a
French photographer, who was also ar-
rested as he was about to leave for
Paris with the documents. There have
been other reports that Castro recently
closed the University of Oriente after stu-
dents there publicly called him "an auto-
crat." At the University of Havana, the
French press also reported, Castro told
a student assembly In March that no.in-
-tellectuaI who engages In counter-revolu-
tionary activities will escape the sanc-
tions he deserves, and that It does not
matter what intellectual, repercussions.
are released by the case: The Cuban
armed-forces magazine, Verde Olivo, has
Str'es have- been convinced a "Staliniza-
Lion"~ of Cuba Is well under way.
One semlott#cial view of "what's
wrong with Cuba" was offered last No-
-veMt)er by Castro's ,minister-without-
port'olio, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who
represented Castro at the Allende inau-
guration in Chile.
4t a press conference in Santiago, :Rod.
rlgueZ tendered some free advice to the,
Chileans: "We must not be bone 4Ient
toward ppr enemies-tolerant toward' our
eneiiies. The Cuban revolution, which
has's been so talked about In Chile, es
pecially by mention of the firing squads,
sinned in Its early days not by excessive
executions, but by being too generous
,with certain elements that had attached
themselves to the revolution." There
,were 700: executions.
echn~cian,s Spread Ovee*, Cuba
Officials say the Soviet
Union began taking a viore
active rote in Cuba f+fpwing I
Premier Fidel Castro's admts-
sion last year that his ece-
n o rn I c poilcles had not
worked.
There Is official specula-
tion here that assignment of
Soviet technicians to as
far removed IF ro in Havana
may be linked to azt U.S.
officials .ere as an affe to.
restructure the Cuban eco-
-nomy.
These officials say the d. to U.S. officials provides for'
fort involves tailoring the a more active role In Cuban
Cuban economy to comple-. economic planning and for
went economies of the Soviet continued economic assts-
Union and of ComMunist Lance. Estimates of this assts.
East Europe. Lance range between $380:
Another element of the million and $500 million an-
close cooperation. between finally. __ .. -
the signing late last year of Cubs's eight million people
bilateral economic coopers. ever the past several years
. t l o n agreement, eftectiiive has exceeded 'the entire'
1971 through 1975. U.S. development loan pro-
The agreement, recording franc for Latin America's 280
Whion people.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :1C~IA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
23 March 1971
THREAT OF FORCIRD LABOR BY FIDEL C 4STRO
IDLENESS AND ABSENTEEISM CII ALAINING RISE IN CUBA
CPYRGHT
campaign. All over Cuba company meetings are being held_
Production, Fight for Maximum Utilization of the Workdays"
d ItLna _.7_i a -_:..
an
Cuban economy have reached such proportions that their
effects -- according to the official version -_ "se-rim sly
d
isrupt the natioal"
n economy..
The mandatory "debates" center aroun +6- u-""
work. The bill is aimed at two groups._ Theafirstu~rn?n
com
ass
-
p
es the suca~jLea.va os or vagabonds, able-bodied
m
b
t
en
e
ween the agesf 1d 60
o an years who are neither
in any type of training nor gainfully employed. The
weeks, or continued work slowdowns rfollowing ytwofjunheeded
warni
ngs According t th Cb
.oeuan press there are few
group continues to grow. It is officially admitted that
work loss resulting from this type of absenteeism generally
taking off from work now and then at irregular intervals.
As motivation for the new bill and Axelanati~? of
ad o an isoc
n
r
al
cam -c
i
-
-
conduct" in Cuba,: the regime is holding moral and ideolo
g
ical admonitions in. readiness- First of n11- i + wo l .a
?a-
-
socialist social order allegedly liberated from o
ressi
pp
on
exploitation, and alienation.. are sought in har f?l +red{ +,
Since officially the problem. is thus viewed as
purely political and ideological, the conclusion drawn is
that. it can only lye ,overcome through patience and persuas-
ion. Mass meetings,, political. education,, and prepared
:"discussions".seem: indicated.. Also, the Bill. for
'
Pproved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A00030006
I-7
 CPYRGA-IT
nnrr
meat of "asocial elements" is so far preventive in
character. Forced` labor -- prettified as "work duty in
retraining institutions" -i of up to two years is provided
for ya.g~o..s, and up to one year for those guilty of "offenses
anted ent to vagabondism." Initially, all seAtenoes are
to be suspended. They will be set aside in oa4es where the
perpetrator mends his ways or shows remorse. `
Yet, in view of the realities of the Cuban situation,
the line of reasoning followed by the Castroit;es in
Havann& is nothing but ideological embellishment. The
causes for the growing idleness and diminishing productivity
in Ctba can by no means be Sought in supposedly degenerate
habits ahd traditlonler, They are rooted in economic
realities. During the early sears ? of Vidal Castro' a reign
revolutionary enthusiasm dotild still move mountainesy The
people accepted a radical savrifice- of consumer goods and
were sustained by the hope that powerful efforts *Ottld
soon enable them to attain a higher state of deVels dent
and drastically improved luting conditions. IneeteU, the
economic situation continued to deteriorate. TOdt there
is nothing to buy except rationed goods. Life boa become
bleak and dreary. That there are no longer aim nitres,
nor medical or telephone bills to be paid does not alter
this fact.
Every worker can figure out for himself .that he
need only work one week eadh month to have the sum needed.
to buy the rationed goods. WYE', then, work longer and
harder if the additional wages cannot buy anyt ng, anyway?
Absenteeism in places of busi!ieas and factories has become
the rule. Faded is Castro' s vision of a "new man in a new
society," a man whose values are not based on moo and
material wealth but on the criteria of a revolutionary`
Utopia.
The cautious approach used by the government to
combat the waning productivity is indicative of the advanced
state of lethargy and idleness prevailing throughout the
nation, Though Castro eviientiy still believes. .s charisma
and continuous propaganda can once more make him master
of the situation, the ueatish is whether the people's
disillusionment over Cuba's economic decline hat-not already
reached Such proportions to render campaigns 4d threats
useless. If that is the o"s forced labor he last
resort. All that would r. ' ` of the Utopia of as new,
liberal., socialist society old be a heap of MO IC
Approved For Release 1999/09/q# : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7 -'`.
r. ,; I , i. ~ Mm~tr+~V~f~3tc w~th~+,xPAV+hYKSd'fini~F-1-/'Mrfrrl:KSrllfx't-fiiS"Al~tt~flKf,k864i,'d~rTtitwu+.rvl~t?jru't1 YP.i fi7tM1 `E,t~#iPlit"f7,'fl WW6'I,IAM Yt7YtYlrIY, Idr1VA Yl U If s', :A t. ~~r.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
FRANKFURTER ALIJ3EMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt
23 March 1971
Fidel Castro droht mit Zwangsarbeit
Arbeitsunlust and Absentismus nehmen auf Kuba bedrohliche Former an / Von Harry Hamm
CPYRGHT
Fidel Castro hat in diescn Wo en erne
neue Kampagne bc;onnen. Auf ganz
Kuba finden Betrhebsversammlungen
statt. Zur Diskussion stchen die The-
men:.Kamp? um die Erhohung der Ar--
beitsproduktivitat", ?Kampf um die
voile Ausnutzung des Arbeitstages" und?
?Kampf gegen das Vagabundentum".
Der Iider maximo" sieht sigh zu diesen,
Mafinahmen gezwungen, %bei1 die Ar,=.
beitsunlust and der Absentismus in der
kubanischen Wirtschaft in einem soichen
Umfange zugenommen haben, data sich
die Phiinomene - Hach amtlicher Ver-
sion in ?bedenltlichem Matte des-
organisierend aut die Volkswirtschaft
auswirken".
Irn M tteipunkt der ahgeordnetca
?Debatten" stcht ein Gesetzentwurf, der
barte Sanktionen gegcn diejenigen vor-
sieht, die sich systemattsch and hart-
nackig einer geregelten Arbeit zu ent-
ziehen suction. Von dem vorgesehenen
Gesetz sind zwei Gruppen betroffen.
Einmal die sogenannten ,,vagos" oder
Vagabunden, arbeitsfahige Manner im
Alter zwischen 17 and 60 Jahren, die
weder In irgendelner Ausbildung Hoch
In einem Arbeitsverhaltnis station. Die
zweite Gruppe von Personen umfaBt
jene, die ein sogenanntes ,Vordelikt des
Vagabundentums" begehen. Darunter
versteht man das unbegrOndete Fern-
bleiben von der Arbeit Ober einen Zeit-,
raum von mehr ais zwei Wochen oiler,
nark zweimaliger erfolgloser Verwar-
nung, fortgesetzte Bummelschichten.
Wirklich ?vagos" im Sinne des Gesetzes
soil as mach Angaben in der kubani-.
schen Presse nur wenige gegen. Die
zweite Gruppe sci Jedoch immer grol3er
geworden. Offiziell wird zugegeben, da13
der Arbeltsausfall Burch these Art von.
Absentismus in der Regol?~ZO'-Prbzent'
betragt. Nicht dazu gezghlt sind all die
Falle'eines;.weitverbretteten zeitlids?be+'
das Regime moralische and ideologische
Ermahnungen bereit. Zunachst einmal
nchme, onne selbst ent vedcr auch nur
den geringstcn odor nur cinen, unvoll-
Da es sick somit aus offizteller Sicht
um ein rein politisches and idcologisches
Problem handelt, zicht man daraus den
Schlui.1, es konne nur mit Geduld and
't7 berrcdungskraft uberwunden warden.
Masscnversammlungen, Politunterricht
and vorgepragte ?Diskussionen"' or-
sdhcinen ais der gegebene Weg. Auch
der Gcsetzcntwurf zur Bestrafung dot!
,,Asozialen" hat ?zunailtst ?-PravenTtiv-
charakter. 'Zwwangsarbeit'L-i'veriiiedli-
chend ais ,Arbeitspflicht in Umerzie-
hungseinrichtungen" bezeichnet - bis '
zu zwei Jahren ist fur die ?vagos" vor-
gesehen, fur diejenigen, die das ?Vor-
delikt zum Vagabundentum" begehen,-
bis zu einem Jahr. Alle Strafen sollen
vorerst bcdtngt verhangt werden. Sic
werden ausgesetzt, wenn der Ubeltater
sich bessert oiler seine Fchler cinsieht.
lichkcit begriindct. In den Anfangs-
jahren der Herrschaft Fidel Castros ver-
mochte revolutionare Begeisterung noch
Berge zu versetzen. Das Volk nahm
einen radikalen Konsumverzicht in Kauf.
.in der Hof?nung, bald durch eine fie-
waltige Kraftanstrengung eine hohere
Stufe der Entwicklung erklimmen and
die Lebensverhaltnisse drastisch verbes-
sern zu konnen. Statt dessen wurde die
wirtschaftliche Lsge immer schlechter.
'Heute giht as abgesehen von den ratio-'
nierten Waren nichts mehr zu kaufen.
as Leben ist We and trist geworden.
Daft keine Steuern, keine Arzt- and
ke1ne?Tclefonk6sten'meht bezahlt'wer
con mussen, iindert nichts an au 'r
Tatsache. ?? ? ,
`1Jeder'Arbeiter kann rich ausrechnen,
daft or nur eine Woche in Monat 7.u
arbeiten braucht, um die Summe zu vcr-
dienen, die fur den Ankauf der zu ze-
teilten Waren notwendig 1st. Wozu also
Langer and mehr arheiten, wenn der
zusatzliche Verdienst doch nicht umge-
setzt werden kann? Absentismus in den
i3etriehen and Feb01ccn wurde nur Re-
gel. Castros Vision vom ?nouen Men-
schen in einer ncuen Gesellschaft'?, fur
den nicht Geld and materieller Wohl-
stand, sondern die Kritcrien einer revo-
{ lutionaren Utopia Maf3st6be setzen, er-
losch.
Die Bchutsamlceit, mit der das Regime
dem Ubel der absinkenden Produktivi-
tat zu Leibe ruckt, 1af3t das Ausma13 der
Lethargte and Arbcitsunlust im Volke
erkennen. Zwar glaubt Castro offenbar,
'trait seinem Charisma and permamentcr
Propaganda We Lage nosh einmal mei-
stern zu konnen. Doch fragt sich, ob die
Enttauschung Ober den wirtschaftlichen
Ntedergang Kubas in der Bev6lkcrung
nicht bereits ein soiches Mali erreicht
hat. da13 Kampagnen and Drohungen
nichts mehr bewirken. Dann mag
Zwangsarbeit der letzte 'Ausweg sein.
Von der Utopia einer nouen, frethelt-
lichen, sozialhstischen Gesellschaft bilebe
nur noch?eln Scharbenhaufen iibs?ig.
der lcubanischen Situation in Betracht,
.erweist sich die Argumentation.der Fi
delisten in Havanna a1s eine ideolo
i
ch
g
s
e
Letyten, die bier and da in unreget--' Verbrimung. Die Urmmncon der um'rich
mgt3iger Foige blau machen. grolfcndert Arbeitsunlust and absinken-.
Zur Motivierung des nouen Gesetzes den Produktivitat auf Kuba sind keines-
und zur Erkliirung der Ursachen der;; welts in angoblich' verderbliehen Ge-
immer atl;rker urn sich grelfenden anti wohnheiten and Traditionen zu su(hen.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
15
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS
19 May 19 71
' ;,;,~ .~i.- I oil: oLert S. ARen' & Jo19n 6- o1dsmt; ,
CPYRGHT
Misi UP Ou
Te media are saying nothing about it, but Washington Apparently there are a. lot of "social rlminals" who
and R vans are currently the scenes of dramatic and pro-
ave run, afoul of Castro's new draft.
foundl;y significant contrasts on the draft Issue. Id a May lay speech, Labor Minister' Sorge Risquet de-
'In Washington, still in the process of recovering from clared that In the short time the edict has been in effect, more
extensive battering and soiling of the communist-instigated , than 100,000 Cuban workers have been arrested and sentenced
,nand directed "anti-mar" disturbances and disorders, a bitter, junder It to "rehabilitation centers."
tight is being tivaged,in the Senate against continuance of the RISQUET MADE another equally revealing disclosure-'
draft. An assortment of anti-Vietnam doves, paclfists, ultra-,., that these culprits "represent only about one-third of sus-
liberals and other militants are furiously I4lbu3tering to de'- : 'pected violators." . d
fcat the House-passed bill extending the drift two more years, a The Castro henchman warned that no mercy will be shown.
Outcome of this fateful struggle Is uncertain.'TIe exlsthtg' 'those deemed guilty. Menacingly, Risquet declared the gov-
Selective Service Act" expires June 30. 4 ernment Intends to rigidly enforce the new draft regardless
hleanivhile in Cuba where, as in all of how many are seized and sent to labor camps.
Iron Curtain countries, universal military 1 . Representative Richard Ichord (D., Mo.) chairman of the'
training is permanent and mandatory, dic- :iinternal Security. Cotnm#ttee_commenting -on this matter,,,
tator Fidel Castro, the Idol of radical U. S. noted that'recently several large groups of radical U. S.
youth, has put Into effect still another draft youths went to Cuba to- cut cane. He cited these so-called
system. " Venceremos Brigades" as graphic examples of "mindless
By arbitrary edict-with no debate, con- absurdity." - "
sultation or anything else-the bulky despot -
has proclaimed. a . so-called "anti-loafer "While these American youths, are voUmtarily going to a.
Aimed at work shirkers and similar "so-
cial criminals," as they are officially brand.
ed, the purpose of this latest terrorism Is to
strike at the widespread and increasing absenteeism and idle-
.mess among workers.
That's nothing new In Red-ruled Cuba, but It, Is the first
time Castro has attempted to cope with it by?a so-called lhw.
.-UNDER THIS new "law," violators are punished by being
That goal In Itself was an acknowledgment of a major set
back.
LAST YEAR the bombastic Cuban dictator -vainglo?iously
'.announced a 10 million ton record. Somewhere between 6 and
;7, million tons was finally squeezed out:
Sugar experts say Castro will be lucky ?to wind up with!
that much this year. Untimely heavy rains and mounting:
labo'r and mechanical difficulties are severely craft pro
tltrctlon. .. . ,
During this time they will be required to."do productive
work"-as decided by the communist i?state. Currently, that
.means being -sent Into the sugar fields to cut tane. .
Right now, that Is admittedly particularly urgegx because'
the sugar crop Is running seriously behind schedule. In a blay.?J
'Day speech, Castro Conceded this year's crop is likely tti be, '
'800,000 tons less than his loudly .fanfared goal of 7.S million
communist ponce state," said Ichord, "the terrorist rulers of
that state have prescribed a new law that says in effect their
workers have no rights, not even the right to decline to toll
for little pay and comforts."
KEY PROVISIONS of Castro's new anti-loafing draft -act
are:
"In. the new society, work Is a sncn-1''duty for all able-
bodied men and women.
Loafing may take different forms,-running from those
who have no work. connections and are dedicated to'a life-of
Idleness and crime, to those who try to disguise their lazy
ways with occasional *}ork, quitting one job after another, to
those having work, but repeatedly absent.
"it Is the duty of the Revolutionary Government to. de.
nource and fight such manifestations, and to adopt measures
leading to the eradication of loafing and parasitism.
"The guilty will be sent to rehabilitation centers for a
.period of from six months to two years, during which time
15ey will do productive wont.
"The Ministers of labor and the Interior are authorized
to take all necessary measures to guarantee the fulfillment of
this law. ? . . . - , ? .. ? .
?'AD legal measures which, In whole or in part, block the
fulfillment of this law are declared null and void. The law
will go into effect as Mn as it k published in the Official
Gazette." t :.. b'" _.. ~~.., .; ?t
16
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
TE GUARDIAN
11 June 1971
ff"m /r d
By RICIIARD I,VA..NS tinn iry fervour in some ?e - hother to ask the peasants,
nu'nt:; or wit 71vc vt, a . f:u?ln' driver in Vinales who wa.
nn Inr due note rnnn s a to nu'c s they still believ,! in free enterprise basis. Some
ntinati'n in Cuba, but I would the faihlrr? to prur;t:et, the pro- I'id'I Castro. It was for them times he earned as much as 30
snv 1bore is social rllsctintina? jeered r:oal of lu million tons of that the revolution was fought pesos a ntunt.h. But in return he
U(,n. t\(- discriminate a;;ainct su:::.r for laid, that is not sur- Intl Ilie. question soenrs had to work one clay a seek in
p(.np:e ,+hu do not want to I),., mg. Like runny peoples of ah:urdly irrclevanl. when one fs the local hospital for noth?
cork,W'11 tl crnnnnworins. i tlndlor? `imil.lr tenipcramvnt, idle invited iMn a house like that ing,
tl? it , : ('ub;rns are not about to break helon;tng to Nirnnredes Brien
rid h-tw there can he People their backs t+hile the sun still in the flan Andreas district of Were it not for the chronic,
like' bent uhf d there is so much shines and the food manages Pinar rlel Itio Province, distribution of food - a sur.
to N. doer' " soon how to find its way to the Ttclen, a 50?vear-old black plus of cabbages or whatever
lit, nits a Gcrtnan?Ian;nl; a tlhle. fanner, w:1s tolling me how he one week, none the next - one
student al the University of in llav:am, where the quality had lived all his life in I hnusc could not help but he trcmcn-
llavana. but he got his message of life is a1i+ru.;t as had as tilt, with halm leaves,fo-? a roof and dourly Impressed with the pro.
arr'i-. prc-ityl~ul:cinvtly in 1?:n;;? American Right-wing tvnuld -trlrrl for a floor. "I rlcver g'ro'ss in the countryside. Apart
1r.`I1, too. At W:l, he 1?: of lit;- a1;e? MV YOU h.,1i..ve wntil;c..1 dreamed that ....- ?--- I -- - ?-' from the building boom. much
roin;u;lrl: 1'llprlUl"i;l ~rh eh :at,' llrgeiy at tho indolent Inc! dis? this," cotnprisecd a t vc?bcd- started two or three years ago
rulmdt'd ]1dl'i ('a~lrn's enter- content-mod cif
now see-iu near
d+e
roomed h
ll
th
l
t th
ti
}
c
er
a
comp
e
on.
e
ouse, a new television
g.?nrt from the, Siena \dnestra, ants-loafint, law is aimucd, But it' set. radio, and 'fridge. It had On the perimeter of the newly-
'fhrrr surci.?rc I-rlip( in the t+, ;c Act rr Castro's intention to not cost him a cent. developed green brit around ,, fir rived thrtlrR itofrtthrs p14 if r- Ia `o`+, the seeds of ills revolution Every family in this half?com? Ilavana, two hue dams are
tt+eive ~t :Ire;, ,Intl c'astro can in Havana. pl under construction and the
\l'alt It, cracked and crtrd new town of some 300 largest, the dlamposton, con.
r?r,unt on ti;l-ir continllill;: su;r pccling p op1C had also been given tele? taining .151 million :uoie
port. 'l'ire next generation m;iv buildtn4s, Its Spluttering fleet vision sets, primarily as a metres of water, will be
be h;ird.,r to plc-:ow. of patc?'rtrd?up American sedans, coIward for being the fir:;! to finished later this year, as will
We wert! cUpeu.sing tlu: anti. shops drva,d of all !usury con- In in the new collectivity the ?16 million British-built fer?
to:,frn~ II+e wliich t+ac evcntrr., snorer goods and queues for [arming plan, If few other
ni:v luau-?111 torn 1,11"'pt (liu?inn .,.ter t.t__a ?4 - hnucis In run-in?. k(t- ? ( .... i tiliser plant at Cienfuegos.
a law that now mikes it an ad print of a Secon d tiVorld of Pinar del ]tic, were quite so beneficial e(Tt,ct on lift in poor,
nITence; lumnl.hah1e by a ye r'.,; War film. If one took Havana as well equipper!, the people had neglcctccl Havana, but more
iorcrd I.,h-mr. to he out of work ;I yardstick, one, coo;d be lulled little to complain about. direct help will also he needed.
ur lo he ,tioe-ii from one's lob into believing that Cuba was No one I met was earning Castro's life-style is still
1nr more.Ih,m 15 d. ys 1eithout a ripe for nnnUter Bay of Pigs. hr-'s than 100 simplicity itself. 73ut the fact
Peso., a high ? remains that Cubans
drrl The yl;twr t rrflrcta both the plater last year, in April and S:nI;Y workers' wa;es go as s hiI' tlecclnired a taste for snperllu-
September, the coturier?revohr- as ' 10. With medical care, our wants" and fit Havana. :rt
strent;tli and thn weakness of Lion:ii irw in Miami sent over education, rents, children's least, they will not tolerate tht
Castro's ('uha 10 years after, miniature invasion forces. The meals at school and some
Guh:rs wale a different sea of , second group was told that it workers' lcrnchi-s all free it was total absence of luxury iten s
i . for ever
would
with th
fi
t
t to
ee h
*.........
link t,1.
rs
s
ow tn
e
r'y could
rr,^,Ite ,t ttIr? I:Iy of INn,?s. Its which had supposedly gained spend more than half 't'he h
d
f
an
o
fti( MINI] ip
5irer11;th is Circle uhvrntts by its local support in Oriente their salary. stretched across a continent
very nature. Thera is more than pr-ovince. Thct true results of ."This is one of the prob. from (agile has helped enor-
ert iii It ~ m rtt for everyo } inc. NO those expeditions were shown 1emc," one Communist party nrously to boost morale and.
( in a television documentary official told me at Slndino, coupled with other L'ft?wing
tally, no Illiteracy ; sufficient' broadcast for the first time another new town. "We are rumblings throughout Latin
food for All: compulsory free. during my visit
It took the huiliiin
America
m
ih
t
f
.
,
g a n
ay pence
o be o
t?cluh with
crlur,itlon? for all children. form of a trial of the survivors. cabaret and first-class res considerable significance to
voluirtary free c' uc, lion for all All were either sentenced to taurant here so that people can Cuba's future. An airline's
adults -- these are achfeve? death or 30 years' imprison- have somewhere to spend their service between Santiago and
nivots no other I.3tirr?Americanf ment. money." Havana has been fnau;urated
country can claim. Nnr, indeed,' It is that kind of openly and there are ru
po
the Unih'd Statc-s itscif. They failed for lack of what that *make,;; Castro that
Cubic attitude that makes' Castro may seis th ? c ent
-
tut thn very existence of ant made Castro succeed -- the pea- Cuban Communism a
anti-loafing law is an a(tmittsion cant support which propelled doctrinaire than little less toe nO visit e rerden
of a cert;ttn cooling of rovolu? the original guerrillas 9nto.'i rpevens found as taxi if taxi hinge else, Fidelu could
power. Today one does not even teach his new friend a let.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
17
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
9 May 1971
CPYRGHT
ecantations in Cuba
ecall Soviet Purges
By DON BOHNI C; ',has been made public by
~nato?ni~rr r~nw?ee. ant.. ~rnri-ofit^ Latin UIV
Cuba's lntellectuafs, under c a eCa an news
tionary zeal, are ccontronted '
with growing pressures remi-
niscent of the Soviet Union
under Stalin Immediately fol-
lowing World War U.
Government concern, with
Intellectual dissidence and ef-
forts to counteract It are best
dramatized by the case of
Heberto Padilla, the prize
winning poet and novelist ar-
rested March 20 by Cuban
authorities.
I Subsequent events, lnclud-
4Ing Cuban Prime Minister,
1Fidel Castr6's own remarks,,
;make It clear that the prob-
'Iem goes far beyond Padilla,
however.
I Padilla, 39, was released
.April 26 and the next night
he appeared before 100 of his
intellectual; colleagues In Ila.
vane.
THERE, In a remarkable
performance, Padilla present.
ed a lengthy monologue of
self-criticism in which hq
,also chastised several other.
'Cuban . intcllectufls In-
Icluding his wife -- for their.
'failure to adopt a p o er rev`,
j lutionary attitudes
A partial transcript of the
imonolo tie and Padl's later
exchange with his
,it all reminds me so much
tot my first period In Moscow
when Stalin cracked down on
the intellectuals," says Foy
,Kohler, former U.S. ambassa-
Idor to the Soviet Union now
associated with the Universt-
ty of Miami's Center'fer In-
Iternational Studies.
KOHLER, in his recetrt
b o o k "Understanding the
Russians," describes the In-
tellectual crackdown In the
'late 191405, as follows:
"In the press and In public
meetings, writers, authors,.
dramatists. actors, compo$-
ers, were accused of 'format-,
.um' or 'cosmopatftnnii3tn? or
1'bourgoola tandoncles.' The
victims either groveled and .
S recanted publicly or they dis-
appeared Into the Siberian.
ilaborcampe." .
t ' Padilla chose to recant and
t at the same time was used as
,is toot against others whose
revolutionary credentials
were being questioned.
Kohler regards as particu-
early revealing In the Padilla
confesslon the totbrencet
I to state security -- s gent
tali he was subjected to
strong pyacholog press
sure9 - and his "reporting
ze . craatlens with e t
"UNDER THE GUISE, of._
the rebel writer," said Padilla.
in his self-criticism, "I. mere-
ly concealed' my discontent
with the revolution. But I
asked: Was this really dis-
content, disaffection?
"I discussed this with state
security. And. when t saw the
number of activities, opinions
and judgments that I had en.
gaged in among both Cubans
and foreigners, and the num-
ber of Insults and' defame-
;'tions. I stopped In my tracks
and had to saytsincerely;,
This is my truth, this is my
true size, this Is the man I
really was, this Is the man
who committed these errors,
this is the man who objec-
tively worked against the
revolution, not for It.
. "And It. I say this here be-t,
fore you."' Padilla told hit
j :colleagues, ,,"It is because I
j. see In many of the comrades
present here. errors very simi-
lar to those I committed."
Padilla, near the end of Ills
monologue, reflected what
appeared, to be the growing
-Cuban concern over Intellec-
tual dissent.
A.
CPYRGHT
.` "IT, IS MY DUTY to tell
YOU HIM. 1 C11110 tv this
c us on as uttiougnE o
the cultural field," said Pa-
tfiila. "That If there is--with
exceptions, as ;there always.
are - a sector Chat drags Its
!heels behind the revolution
In a political sense, it Is art
1. and culture. We have not
,been worthy of this revolu.
`tion, despite the 12 or 13 dra.
matic years we have lived
with It"
Two nights later, Castro
-himself' reflected the same
concern In a speech closing a
national congress of educa-
tion and culture with his ref-
erence to "some writers who
sire Influenced by oertain ten-
! dencles and who want lo be-
come famous -- not by writ-
Ing. something, useful for the'
country but by serving Impe-
rialist Ideological move-
ments.
"How many times these
entlemen. these writers of
trash, have won prizes," de-
clared Castro. "Regardless of
the technical level, regardless
of the Imagination required,
we as revolutionaries
evalu- ate cultural works according.
to how valuable they are to
tale paopte ... ,
'Our evaiuaUon, is.polo
18
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
'Ij MANILA CHRONICLE
17 May 1971
Castro' s Po1itic~l Prisoners
f'DEL Castro has always bet that year, and was lock-
bc n a believer in "revolution- ed up after a hasty and melo-
ary justice", and over the years dramatic trial in which Cas-
it as become increasitlly clear tro himself spoke as a wit-
ju',t what that ambiguous ness for the prosecution.
phrase means. Now Major Matos' wife,
According to Amnesty Inter- Maria Luisa,. ' has put her
nrtional, there are around 30, name to an appeal sponsor-
000 political prisoners in Cuba e1 by the American branch
- a figure that can be com- of Amnesty international that
pared with Castro's own ad- calls on five governments that
mission that there were at least have diplomatic relations with
20,000 in 1965. Many of these Cuba (including Britain) to
pr Boners are being held for intercede on. behalf of the
ofl'ences that would not be country's political prisoners.
considered "political" in the How much Amnesty will be
West. Political prisoners include able to achieve is debatable.
people, who have tried to leave That organization has been
Cuba in secret, people who attacked from the right and
have traded money on the black from the left, and the Russian
market, and even people who paper Izvestiya lammed into,
have sold places in restaurant it recently on the grounds
queues. that "all its frantic activity
They also include some of for the protection of, human
Castro's . oldest personal rights amounts to stereotype
enemies. Major Huber Matos anti-Communist outbursts."
has been serving a 20-year But Amnesty's campaign
sentence since December is bound to deepen the mood
1959. He was not one of Cis- of despondency amongst
tro's earliest comrades (the those'Who started out as ear-
barbudos or ."bearded ones" 1 admirers of Castro's revo-
who joined in the attack on lution and have since been dis-
the Moncada barracks or illusioned by the Govern-
sailed on the Granma) but he ment's economic blunders
played an important role in and use of repression: In
,the later stages of the Cuban Paris, Jean-Paul Sartre and
revolution as the leader of an Simone de Beauvoir have just
armed. column. He was always put their names to a petition
suspect to Castro's intimates hat condemns the arrest of
as a bourgeois liberal with a Heberto Padilla, the celebrat-
doctorate in education, and, ed Cuban poet who is rapid-
he earned Castro's own dis- ly becoming the Solzhenitsyn
trust when he made a speech, of his country. He gave vent
in June 1959 attacking the: to his disappointments in a
rising influence of Commu- series of poems criticising Rus
nists over the new regime. sia and the local regime, and
He finally fell victim to the tried to have some of them
purge that followed: the ap- smuggled out of the coup-
pomtment of Raul Castro as Now it is on the cards
Minister of Defence in Octo-. that he will be charged with
being a CIA agent, like other Despite repeated offers
writers and journalists who from the Americans to grant
have been locked up by Cas- asylum for Cuban exiles and
tro's police. deported prisoners, the, Cu-'
Mario Rivadulla was one bans have shown no willing-
newspaperman who wai gaol- ness so far either to loosen
ed precisely on those grounds up the emigration controls or 41
and was finally allowed to to barter prisoners. OnF pen-
leave Cuba last year. Id exile, at official has said that the
he spoke freely about the American offers "merely en-
conditions that .prisoners have courage counter-revolutionary
to face in Cuba. He claimed prisoners who decline to join
that - the institution of habeas the rehabilitation programme."
corpus had bL'en. entirely sup-; But, at least in theory, the
pressed, that men were, held, Cubans have been stressing
indefinitely without trial, and the need to liberalise the pre-
that prisoners were subjected: sent prison system - mainly
to "cruel and intolerable agri- .through more intensive "re-
cultural work." He claimed education" courses. At the
that his own trial had lasted inauguration of a new train-
25 minutes, and that he had ing course for prison officials,
been allowed only five min- the Minister for the Interior,
utes in which to defend him- del Valle, said that "by the
self. That is not an isolated quality of our penitentiary
story.,
Broadly speaking, Cuban
political prisoners are divided
into two categories. The
"irredeemables" are those who
are considered unregenerate
and held in close confine-
ment without privileges - they
were sent to Batista's prison-
island, the Isla das Pinas,
Until. 1967, then to La Caba-
na fortress outside the capital.
Prisoners who are locked up
on lesser charges, or con-
sidered amenable to political
"re-education" ; are classified
as rehabilitades and allowed
to work their way to freedom
through a system of minor
privileges and incentives.
These prisoners are sent to
agricultural work camps, al-
lowed regular visits from their
wives, and permitted to go. absenteeism and low product
home on parole at increasing- ivity among Cuban workers
lv frequent intervals.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
19
system, by the flexibility with
which we face differing situa-
tions, we will bring those who
have strayed from the straight
path back to the revolution."
The Cubans are relying more
heavily on psychological tech-
niques.
The system of "revolution-
ary justice" identifies social,
as well as political, criminals.
Under the terms of the new
Anti-Shirkers Law, for ins-
tance, males between 17 and
60 years of age are consider-
ed guilty of delinquency if
they (a) abandon their place
of work for 15 days without
good cause; or (b) receive
two reprimands from their
Work Council, composed o
loyal party_ members. Thi
 CPYRGHT n......,.... 0,... M-1---., A eeeiheinn . ('IA Dr1D70 nA A AA Annn4nnn&nnnI 7
The scale of the problem can is where almost half those Legislation or this kind is Is Castro giving the don-
be grasped when one learns 90,000 were sent) are weighty. clearly designed to act as a key too much of the stick
that by April 1, when the Persons found guilty under kind of moral corset to hold and too little of the carrot?
law took force, some 90,000 the Anti-Shirkers Law are Cuban society together. The Economic recovery is a long
men had signed on for new either put in rehabilitation can- material incentives that are, way off. And in the men-
jobs. The sanctions against' tern or placed under close lacking are replaced by nega? time, Caatro's honeymoon
those who refuse to go out supervision. And they can tive compulsions to work. . with his intellectual admirers
into the sugar-fields (which be denounced by anyone. appears to have clouded oVerr,
PARIS MATCH, Paris
12 June 1971
DEATH C MPS IN CUBA
The Revelations of Two Escapees from Castro's Prisons Confirm
the Terrible Accusations Leveled against the Island's Regime
CPYRGHT
by Jean Cau
Research by Jerome Duhamel
Think back. It was only a few years ago. The wind of great libertarian
revolutions was uprooting the rotten trees of the Old World and sweeping
up Cuba in a heady whirl. There was passion and style. Berets. Heroic
beards. The romanticism of brandished weapons. -Power and government were
both in the streets. The word was "hope." Cuba and her "lider maxima"
[supreme leader], Fidel Castro, had invented a new way for men. to be
free.' Posted on the walls of students' rooms all over the world, the
picture of the bearded chieftain, cigar in mouth, excited the dreams of students
and the heartbeats of the radicals.
Today, Cuba is enveloped in silence and terror. In the past few years,
in the past few months, the revolution has been giving the image of the inescapable
cog-wheels, of the dizzy. historical fatality which follows days of celebration
with days of terror. Castroism has become another Stalinism.
My purpose here is not to retrace how this terrible evolution took place,
but to lift the veil which hi&-s the hells of Cuba by producing sane testimony.
The Prisoners are used as Guinea-Pigs by newly trained Doctors
It was not in a "reactiona r" newspaper, but rather in REGENERACION, the
rgan of the Cuban libertarian movement, that we read of the recent sub-machine
execution of twenty-two political prisoners. The text adds, "Communist
civilization has invented the "gavetas" (literally, "drawer"), a cell 70
centimetdrs wide, 1.8 meters low and two meters high. Three men are piled
inside without any room to move, and forced to relieve themselves in
the cell.... At Prince Hospital, they use sick prisoners in operations
rformed by surgical students. Prisoners who are executed by firing squad
see their own blood drawn out to be sent as humanitarian gifts from the
Approved or Release
 C P'Y G H'T
?n:.::..:.....~ o... o,.i........ ~nnninmm~ . rin o131279 04 494 nnnnonnncnnne 7
Cuban government to Vietnam and Laos. Women suffer the same treatment..."
Similarly, the bulletin of "Democratic University Students," published by
Cuban refugees in Argentina, reports the testimony which forty-eight political
prisoners in Cabana prison sent to the Commission on Human Rights. What do
they say? They say that on the Isle of Pines (in the bay east of the island),
over 7,000 prisoners are "concentrated" in four circular buildings, each with
a "capacity" of 870 men. They say that life in,the prisons and camps of Cuba
consists of beatings, torture, harassment, constant searches, punishments
which last for weeks or months, forced labor from five o'c~ock in the morning
until seven or ten in the evening, depending on the season Exhausted, starving,
decalcified, toothless, the prisoners serve as guinea pigs, for newly certified
"doctors." The same report gives a long list of prisoners killed for no reason
or dragged from their cells to be tried. The sentence is always the same:
death. Recently, eight hundred prisoners went on strike out of hunger and
despair. The account states, "It was a horrible sight to see 800 men (on a
hunger strike) in a state of total starvation, lying on beds, at the mercy of
the unleashed passions of our jailers.... Is this the country, we sufferers
cry, which is so admired today by young people all over the world?"
On 20 March 1971, the poet Herberto Padilla, winner of the National Poetry
Award for 1968, was arrested. Fidel Castro announced that the arrest was his
personal decision, and that other intellectuals would suffer the same fate
"if they do not fall into line." When students organized readings of Padilla's
.poems, Castro immediately ordered the closing of the University of the East
cult, ,1111Pcu UL S LuueAiLs of Lo C~1 it il)lliiuay faniis. A bikjo i Ui. i'ie.tL
personalities (Marguerite Duras, Simone de Beauvoir, Anne Philipe, Claude Roy, Jean
Paul Satre, Jean Daniel, Alain Jouffroy, P. de Mandiargues and Maurice Nadeau)
sent Castro a letter expressing their concern over "the suppression of the
right of criticism within the Revolution." But on 27 April before the Union of
Writers and Artists of Cuba, Iierberto Padilla read a confession written and
signed in prison, a confession of which Castro already held a copy. In it,
he accused himself of "revolutionary-errors," and exhorted his colleagues
present to "overcome their weaknesses" which were leading them to "poll tical?--
and moral degeneration." At his example, other writers soon made their own
,confessions. Then on 21 May, sixty-one Western intellectuals and artists
wrote a.letter to Fidel Castro expressing their "shame and anger" at the
methods used by Havana to force Padilla to make his confession. This time,
they received a reply from Padilla himself. It was a volley of insults launched
by the poet in the faces of those who had tried to defend him: "defeatist
philosophers". .."reactionaries"... "fierce enemies of Socialism" whose only
concerns are "aesthetics, Paris gossip, honors, and theories, which were my
most odious faults and which you.represent in the highest degree." In
.conclusion, Padilla accused his defenders, "buffoons of the bourgeoisie"?, of
`-serving "the C.I.A., Imperialism, and international reactionaries".
More than twenty years after the Moscow trials and the "confessions"
of Boukharine, for example, it is clear that nothing has changed.
Ilore are two documents of-the totalitarian repression which is.strangling
Cuba under its yoke. Two eye-witness reports., Their authors have allowed us
to use their names.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
21
 CPYRGHT
1971o gcia pQcY 8 a &e -
'My name is Antonio Eerro. I am sixty-four years old.' I was born in
Santiago do Cuba. At presont I am living in exile in New York. I was a
teacher in what corresponds to your primary school, that is to say, of children
from seven to eleven years of age. I was anti-Castro, and my opinions were
son discovered. One morning, the police came to arrest me right in my, classroom,
in' front of the children, to whom the thing was undoubtedly even more
overwhelming than to.myself. The unforgiveable thing is not that I was
arrested for my opinions, but the fact that I was arrested in front of my
!students! I was taken directly to a cell in t Fe central prison of Santiago de
`Oka. sere was not even enough room to stand up, although I am not tall.
Width: 1.5 meters. I crouched there for nine hours. I suffered agonies.
Finally two guards came and pulled me brutally out of the cell by my feet.
My muscles stretched all at once, and I screamed. They made me stand, but
I fell down. So they supported me and-dragged me into the office of one of
the regime's feared inspectors, a sort of sadistic twentieth-century inquisitor.
Ile came up to me and struck me in the face-with a little leather whip, three
times. I felt blood run down my cheek. He insulted me, called me a traitor,
a slave of filthy American capitalism, I don't know what else -- he said anything
he wanted to. Then he sat down at his desk for an interrogation which lasted
for nearly four hours. I was standing all this time, and receiving whiplashes right
in the face when my answers were too slow in coming. Behind me, the two
guards made sure to stab me in the sides with the butt of their submachine
guts., Finally, in the midst of a fog of words, I heard the charge. I almost
laughed: the official reports, stated that I was under arrest for "offenses
,against morality." What a grotesque comedy! This interrogation was my
only trial, a seedy-looking sergeant my only tribunal. I was handcuffed and
led into.asnother cell, slightly larger than the other, in which two men were
already rotting. They greeted me with joy. They had been together, face to
face., for two'months. The explained to me the horrible life they led there.
Ilse' cell.'was big enough to stand up in, but hardly wide enough to take
four steps. There. was np ventilation except through the bars which opened
onto the corridor. No sink, no water and no toilet. The prisoners were
forced.to relieve themselves in the call.- At the end of the day,: a prisoner
chosen according to..the cruel whim of the guards had to go along with a huge
washpail collecting all this filth with his hands. Many times I saw. the
guards push the man and bury his head in the pail of excrement.
We were not able to shave either. Once every two weeks we were dragged
into the big collective shower roms and piled in fifty at atime. At the
entrance we were to undress, put our prisoner's outfit in the box, and take
a handful of harsh lye-wash to wash oiselase with. The guards had two favorite
games when we were in the water.. One rather tame one consisted of turning on
freezing cold and boiling water alternately. The other, frankly horrible
trick was to throw large handfuls of sulphur on us. When we came out of the
showers, our skin was raw. Then we put an new uniforms, only slightly less
dirty than those we had just taken off, which were made of a sackcloth similar
to that used for grain bags..
The food was also inhuman. 't>nce a day -- one single time -- the-guards
threw a few handfuls of poorly cooked, pebbly rice through the bars right onto
the ground, with the dust and filth. This rotten stuff had to be shared by
Approved For Release 1999/09D2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
. T ; ?",~ t ~r :4;iY ~ ~~T6 1r I Y 1'l+; l dcJ d"IRTRTT-W?9 W 61T1'AJT~~$S`di I I I Ili IFlY36.MI Cs' PAN rl ,141 i5?i11 M,'1(/PM 1 fWMMI Ili 17) Off 'i gmlf I (f
 ZdMi Tad Fnr Release 1999/09/09 ? C_IA-RIlP79-01194A000300060001-7
all three of us, eating with our hands. Personally, I was fortunate enough
to have as cellmates two admirable men, both former officials. But we could
hear terrible arguments provoked by each food distribution, which were savagely
encouraged by the guards. There were cries, screams and blues. You had to
understand these men -- they had been reduced to the state 4f animals.
One day in the cell next to mine, a man died, killed by his companion,
strangled. The guards watched it without saying a word. When it was all over,
I' heard them say, "Well, there's some more meat for the doctors!" Later I
understood what they meant by that.
I understood during my second interrogation. To force me to sign a
statement that I was indeed an American agent sent to sabotage the Cuban
revolution, the sergeant-judge threatened me with all the atrocities of which
he and his stooges were capable.. Nameless atrocities which were nothing short
of the best efforts of the German concentration camps. Here is a rough
account of the list they gave me: an acid bath; tattooing a hammer and sickle
with a red-hot iron; methodical plucking of the hairs of the crotch; stuffing
the stomach with pieces of cotton soaked in waste [used] oil; plunging the head
into a box filled with bees. What the sergeant told me next, I remember exactly.
I do not think I shall ever be able to forget his;words! "In any case, even
if you refuse to give us a little signature, you will participate anyway in
the training of our young doctors. Now, I can already give you an idea of what
lies ahead for you." He opened a large bound dossier. Inside were photographs -
terrible photographs. Horrifying documents. They showed yound medical students,
wearing the traditional white coat, performing dissections on the corpses of
prisoners. Corpses? What am I saying? They were the living dead, the suffering
tend sometimes even men who were only wounded. I remember one close-up color
photo in which you could see the expression of the man lying strapped to the
table, his stomach cut open. In this living stare one could read all the
horror in the world -- yes, all the horror in the world.
For my part, I admit that I broke down. I signed the statement which the
'sergeant handed me. I admitted everything they wanted.
This cowardice saved me. Two weeks later, I and five other prisoners were.
freed and put on a plane bound for Honduras. We were given no explanation.
'Thus, I left my country forever. Thank God, I did not leave anyone behind,
since my parents died when I was young and I had never married. A few months
later, I heard that our release had been in exchange for pro-Castro Cubans
imprisoned in the U.S. 'But why me especially, who had actually never had any
connections with the United States?. I believe that it was by chance."
The second eye-witness account is from Mr. Jose-Antonio Perera, born in
Bayamo, Cuba in October 1923. I collected this testimony somewhere in France.
"I am an agricultural engineer, and my underground activities before the
Revolution won me one of the most important posts in the Castro regime, if
you know the importance of agriculture, primarily'sugar cane, in Cuba. I helped
to develop the agricultural plan. I traveled all over the country, explaining
and convincing the people. I joined in.the harvest, as did Castro himself.
And believe me, if Castro did so, it was not out of demagogy, but because
Cubans are like Doubting Thomas: they only believe what they can see and touch.
Approved'PorRefease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
1gOC tpupC?V :; q,,,.2 qt'f o 4 .. re
moving alone the path of Socialism which we had so longed fob', but also and
primarily because we were beginning to see results. The future might be far
away, but it seemed open.
This lasted until 1967, for me at least. That year, thq country hit a slump.
After eight years of unstinting effort, the government and the people were
exhausted. Nobody was discouraged, far from it! But everyone needed to catch
their breath: It was time for a respite.
'!'hcre was only one person who did not understand this at the time:
Fidel Castro himself. Ile didn't understand weariness and fatigue. Ile was a
charger,' and he wanted to keep charging. Reservations began'pto Appear among
the governing group which reflected the feelings of the population. I was one
of those who tried to reason with Castro, but in Vain. !e would not listen.
Ile hardened his position; gave orders without asking anyone's advice, and imposed
laws. However, we did not give up hope of convincing him.
We tried seeing him one at a time: no result. We came as a group: again,
no result. Finally we gave him an ultimatum: to agree to the reforms which
were necessary, or to find himself in total isolation which could only lead to
his rbmoval. This was on the morning of 16 September 1967. wring the night,
at two o'clock exactly (I remember I looked at my alarm clock), I hoard
violent knocks against my door downstairs. Before I had time to put on a bathrobe
and go downstairs, the door gave way and men burst into the living room: ten
uniformed soldiers, two of them high-ranking officers. I understand at once,
and I felt fear -- real fear, for the first time in my life. Fora few seconds
I stood face to face with these men, without saying a word. I was surprised
not to receive a bullet. They said, "You have ten minutes to get ready, you,
your wife and your two children. (At that time my two children, Miguel and
Antonio, were thirteen and fifteen years ?ld.) Bring as little as possible.
Hurry up!" I knew that it was best not to argue with these men. My wife
remained very dignified.
We did not speak, but our eyes exchanged all the feelings of two people
who love each other and sense impending miffortune. My wife went upstairs to
wake the children. She explaino4 to them lust what was going on, without
.hiding anything. Fifteen minutes later, we left, in a powerful black American
car driven by one of the N.C.O.'a. There were eight of us in the car. We
must have driven for nearly four hours. They had,taken away our watches.
Dawn was breaking as we arrived at the gates of a sort of gigantic village;
made up of small, low pavilions with greyish-white walls,' laid out in impeccable
geometric order over an area about one kilometer long and nearly a wide. I
had never seen such a thing in my country. The spectacle which presented
itself to our eyes astonished us as much as it frightened us. A red sun rose
over the roofs. I shall rerer the sight for the rest of my life.
At,the gates of the camp, four guards stood with submachine guns slung on
their hip. Our car entered without stepping, drove another hundred meters
and stopped before a pavilion indistinguishable from the others. Steel bars at
the windows. Walls of poured concrete nearly thirty centimeters thick. A
single door of metal, barred from the outside by a heavy steel shutter. We.
were pushed inside. Only then did my wife give way to tears.
Approved For Release 1999/09/g? : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
t5~ nKi 1 t~ n ~r n t ~1 ;i
'nSrTi4!J?Q.f~f1riITTTiSlrrvmaa~~~t4tp1~~;'S~d'Tfi3TT~V 11'I~TF~t~'ti7451(IdP,F~iiP S.lfh~(S~M1ti'~~4~AiY114)Yll`f~ti,1~~T1[b11'1,7.i~1 ,
 -CPYRGHT -
The hut in which we found outselves was divided into three small square
roans, each three by three meters. with doorless partitions. The ceiling was
and a inucot above a Hole. That was al1FI
The door closed. We were exhausted from emotion and from the trip: we
real asleep on the camp beds. For my part, I only slept for a short hour.
\hen I awoke, I forced myself to take stock of the sittion. It did
not look promising. I knew only too well the intransigence pf Castro. This
snarcu L.ne same auventure at the same time as I, or else would do so soon.
My only thought, if.1had a chance.to meet with someone to ex
iEin m
p
y
situation or to hear the reason for my arrest
was first and above all to get
,
my wife and children out of this trap. That was to me the only real matter of
urgency. there would be plenty of time later to worry about my own fate.
It seemed to me that we were isolated. We heard no noise from the nei
hbor n
g
g
We ,heard were far orr, muffled by distance: a motor, a voice, sometimes cries.
Another day passed, during which I tried to talk to a guard through the
It was not until dawn after a second night
more than forty-eight hours
,
after'our arrival, that the door opened again. A man dressed in civilian clothes
he entered our quarters alone. He remained standing before me and saidonly
d
e
i
s
?.v&
~
n CL. monotone: air (ne deliberately stressed the -Sir-j, you
have committed an offense against the national security and the will of the
You will remain here until you are transported to one of the labor camps reserved
will resume the work she did before your marriage. ~We will find her31a;position.
learn a man's trade. They will leave this evening. Have you any questions?"'
"We would like something to eat, and some fresh water to drink!" was my only
answer. The man turned on His peel and left. An hour later, we finally ate --
separated. I particularly warned her against the temptation she might feel
one she was out of the camp to cry out her indignation, to alert our friends,
Rr to try to arouse public opinion.
Her silence and docility were our only chance -- if we still had onel I
.also told her to stand frequently in front of a statue of Lenin in the'cenrer if
our town, which would be our rendezvous place. That evening we were separated.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 CPYRGHT
Approve or Release 01-7
My wife was taken away in the same car that had brought us. fy two sons were
driven off in an old jeep. We said our goodbyes without tears, with an enormous
amount of dignity and courage, even if each of us gave way to despair as soon
.as we were alone.
I was never to sgc my wife again... I learned of her do4th -- that is to
say, I guessed her murder -- from a note which I received one morning: "Mrs.
J. --A. Percra died suddenly." Two years later, my children escaped from their
educational center, and three of my friends?took-them to the United States.
I was reunited with them there after I escaped in my turn, with -- extraordinary
fact -- the help of a guard, a former engineer like myself. .Twenty-four hours
in a tank truck and four days. in the hold of an old tub of a ship got me out of
Cuba and into Honduras.
An hour after my family left, I was taken to'another barracks already
jammed with about fifty'men. The guard pointed to a straw pallet. I was-to
remain in this hut for the whole time of my imprisonment, that is, nearly four
years.
After this, our life was marked only by the. increasingly violent and frenzied
rhythm of the mental and physical tortures which were inflicted upon is.
We lived in the close, stale air of the dormitory-hut. There were only three
small ventilators in the roof. There was one toilet in a corner behind a partition.
There was always a line there. Fortunately work was organized in the
camp. I sav fortunately, but believe me that in the long run,
it was not a blessing in disguise.- The work I did for four years consisted
of digging huge pits, then filling them up, d,:rect1y under a Fiery sun.
One of the favorite gmas of the guards was to-have each prisoner dig
his own grave and carve his name and birth date on a white stone. We were all.
forced to obey this macabre order. Even moro macabro, onto tho ravos wore dug,
,the guards forced us to. lie down in them. One day we' were forced to remain
there for four hours in burning heat. The result: one dead. The comment
of the guard: " "Iie won't have worked for nothing!" His. friends filled the. earth
in over him.
As far as food was concerned, we were treated as pigs, which, all things considered;
the barracks. Every morning at-,six o'clock the guards slopped into them a kind
nl
-_ __- -1 L___._ L___1._.... .......y . "A n little 'fl19 l fi - without
salt, sugar Or any seasonings. In the evening, around Z1UU Hours, we ace mash
of old meat scraps, corn and sugar... peakableI For a whole month.I-was sick ., malls clans
e Regencrncion s (otganc du motivcnictit 1iberlaire -cubain) que
loos npprenons 1'cxecution rccente. I In mitr:tillette. de 22 pri-
gnmiicns linliliAi013 iQS0Qa1-Zi file basis or
regularly change our governments in- western Europe,
soinctinics with results that cause"a good deal of trouble to
the Americans, without having to worry about American
and other foreign troops coining and telling us to stop it.
We cannot help renicmbcrinF what happened in Crccho.
slovakia in tgfid, and the Soviet Union's attempts later that,
year to provide a justification for it ; and -we reflect on the
difference between your position and ours.
The point is that each of us-you in eastern Europe and
we in western Europe-have to deal with the problem in
our own way. In western Europe we are trying to establish
a more equal relationship with the United States by the
THE GUARDIAN, Manchester
9 July 1971
Comm
CPYRGHT
Muffled and muted It may
he, but all the signs are that
Moscow and the East European
capitals are also having their
"groat debate" on the Com-
mon Market. Since the Treaty
of Rome was signed In 1957, the
Soviet Union has rigidly
refused to recognise the exis-
tence of the European Econo-
mic Community officially. But
now that the EEC is not only
here to stay but apparently on
the verge of expansion, the
mood in Eastern Europe has
shifted.
Poland is shortly to send
three senior diplorn,ats to
Brussels to make new contacts
with the Commission's head-
quarters. Although both Hun-
gary and Poland have had tech-
nical contacts with the Commu-
nity on the question of their
agricultural exports, the new
Polish team will be dealing at a
igher level.
It Is known that the Poles are
envious of the special trade
greement which Yugoslavia
lade with the EEC last year.
Both they and the Rumanians
ould probably like to follow
uit an as ? to safeguard their
ational economic interests as.
oon as they can.
The Rumanians have been
uielly pressing the EEC to
eclare e their country a develop.
ng area to enable it to get con-
cssions from the EEC. But the
omm'lssion in Brussels lnsLcts
hat the EEC must first be
ecognised diplomatically. This
something- which neither the'
the ideas which the members of that cotnniuriity sf
lare
about post-Keynesian capitalism in economics and pluralist
democracy in politics. I 'do not suggest that this is, or can
be, a model for the way you will want to deal with your
relationship with the Soviet Union. YOU will have to work
that out within the context of your own iiolitirnl and
economic system. Certainly we can help each oilier by
opening up new points of contact and co-operation betwcc t
the two systems, providqd that the meciianisrns we set tip
bring real changes and," not just apparent ones, But at
bottom each of ut has to solve our problems of indepen-
dence by our own will to be independent.
mist block in two mi.-nds
CPYRGHT
By JONATHAN STEELE
take such a s p, though it is " Washington and London
taking a more ealistic attitude obviously fear the West Euro-
compared with he days when it pean states' urge to be Indepen.
thought the EC would col- dent in shaping their policies.
lapse. There h ve been several Precisely for this reason the
changes of atti udes. At first in British leaders, linked with the
1957, the Rus ns published a US by bonds of their notorious
series of 17 t ses saying that 'special relationship ' are striv-
the EEC was oomed to fail. ing for an early invasion of the
Then in 196 the pendulum t;ontlnent to Interfere with the
swung and a w series of 32 trend towards relaxation, to
theses was fo ulated by Air restore the erstwhile Angio-
Khrushchev. Saxon influence, to preserve the
These saw t EEC as a new Atlantic orientation of
" centre of att ction " capable capitalist Europe, and to per
of rivalling the bitted States. It petuate the East-West con-
looked almost as though the frontation in our continent."
Soviet Union 'ould take the A H
l
step of recog tion, but then
came the Gau ist period. The
Russians bega to emphasise
similar doubt as de Gaulle
about the da get the EEC
posed to nati aI sovereignty.
The 1965 crisis n the Common
Market wa greeted with
triumph.
Now we ar in the latest
phase, which as clearly left
Eastern Europ in two minds.
The mass me a has carried
little about th British entry
negotiations. neluding . the
Ileath-Pompido meeting. What
has been carrie has often been
contradictory. to dominate it,, the West
The point has een made that Germans or the British ?
British entry is Trojan horse If the Ideological and eo-
for the further penetration of political Issues which' the EEC
American capit Into Europe. poses are still uncertain in
The clearest ex resslon of this Moscow's eyes, the economic
came In an 'ar cle In " Izves?, ones are not. Although the total
tin" by Vladi r Oslpov, !wlio -trade, conducted 'between the
in
r
d
l b
e
ar
eco
g .?via
o
e en- is small /less than 10 per-cent
nlon does 30 itself. y
dent and less !n feed to accept of the EEC's world trade). this
Moscow is still trot. toady to American-Britt patronage. proportion is declining.
ar to se eir
agricultural produce
t through
he wall of the Common Mar-
ket's common agricultural
policy. An enlargement of the
Market will only make things
harder. At the same time the
Russians have set their eyes, as ;
have the Poles and the
Rumanians, on importing
advanced technology from
Western Europe. Moscow has
been stepping up Its large-scale
cooperation deals such as the
Fiat do.,[ with Italy, or the
lorry deal with the West
Germans. .
. Moscow's other defence
mechanism has been to pro-
mote Its own form or integra.
tion through Comecon. The last
two years have produceil a
marked quickening of the drive
towards so-called Socialist inte-
gration, with the Comecon
countries moving towards a
system of -coordinated national
economic planning that will one
day become supranational plan.
ning. Clearly the Russians will
hold the whip-hand within this
economic alliance.
In March the Hungarian
leader, Mr Kadar, said that
direct cooperation could be
expected between the two
groupings, the EEC and
Comecon. "Both these groups
are a reality and obviously will
remain so." That is the most
realistic statement on the Com-
mon Market to come from
Eastern Europe. Yet one result
of the expansion of these two
European bureaucracies is
likely to he a further erosion of
the tendous independence of
Russia's smaller allies.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
ungar
an .broadcast sees
the Trojan horse full of Ger?
mans rather than Americans. In
May a Budapest commentator
was saying that Bonn wel-
comed British entry because it
would ? help West German
capital to make large invest.
ments in Britain and cooperate
with British monopolies against
the really dangerous adversary,
the American monopolies.
So the East Is undecided. Is
the Common Market going to be
Independent of the Americans.
or a Trojan horse for them 7 If
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
LE MONDE, Paris
July 1971
CPY.RGHT L'AJUSTEMENT DES POLITIQUES MTRANGORES. DE L'EUROPE
dimension T
CPYRGHT
Par RENE DABERNAT
debut du March commun, de a Man ie.
France va bientot cesser d'etre le d$ part et d'autre de la Manche meme In tragedie de Mers-El- Comma pour is politique etran
seul Etat membre des communau- Pr'oche-Orient et Medlterranee, Kebir. en 1940, ne donne qu'une gore, une action monetaire effi-
tes ayant une vocation mondiale theatre de drames franco-anglals We incomplete. Pourtant, des cace des Dix impliquera davan
en mane temps qu'europeenne. durant la seconde guerre mon- 1904, 1'entente cordiale etalt con- tage d'integration et non pa
Si, comme on le prevolt, la diale. clue ; quinze area plus tard, elle moires. L 'Europe elargle, si ell
hambre des Communes approuve reconciliation des deux devait permettre aux democra-. vent s'imposer, devra non soul
finalement 1'adhesion, Londres Tine s montrerait egalement, sang ties de sauver la liberte suy lea ment preserver les realisations de
netaires du genera4 de Gaulle nt P er,ne quo 1'dares entree de 19, Grande- champs de bataille du continent. Six - sous peine de provoque
la responsabilite et lea tentations rats le Marche commun Quoiqu'elle sit rapproche les 9011- ; une arise majeure dommageabi
de cette double appartenance, Si- B g vernements plus quo lea nations,: aux membres anciens et nouveaux
tuation, de toute evidence, fort porte en germe le retour de l'Eu- elle montre quo la France et la mais, contrairement aux apps
differente de Celle qui existait rope en Asie. Dares cette region, Grande-Bretagne savent se re- rences. alter plus loin.
lorsque la France vivait aver cinq le, . caution anglaise sera, en trouver au coude-a-coude quand itENE DA13SRhlAT.
partenaires dont I'heritage extra- effet, pour lea Dix, ausst impor- des motifs superieurs entrent en
la
our lea Six
arable
com
i
,
p
sme
jeu. Un mecan
europeen etait mince comparatt- ta~~rp
mss eri route
vement all Bien, ou nul. ca n f d dares urea large pent done We
partie du continent noir. aujourd'hui.
A 1'epoque de la a Petite Il existe, au demeurant, des
Europe a, jamais les foucades pia- _' ? facteurs favorables. Sur Israel
netaires du general de Gaulle ni Paris et Londres out rapproch4
?meme la guerre d'Indochine (Al , Theoriquement, Is Communaute leurs vues. Quant aux Six, uIs
l'affaire d'Algerie n'ont vraiment ,Margie aux Anglais, aux Danots, parlent pratiquement d'une memo
menace la Communaute. La re- dux Norveglens, aux Irlandais, voix avec l'Angleterre, en ce qul
conciliation franco-allemande, la ! 'evet, face aux super-puissances, concern l'Ostpolitik. Mais, sur-
cooperation etroite avec i'Italie 1'apparence d'un nouveau geant, tout. l'Allemagne, is Grande-Bre-,
et le Benelux dependaient essen- par sa population, son poids eco- tagne et in France out aenoncd
tiellement, all depart, d'un accord pomique, sa valeur technique, sea l'une apres 1'autre, a jouer Isole-
sur les problemes Internes du -ichesses culturelles. En fait, elle ment un role mondial. Autant de
continent. Les prolongernents In- restera sans Influence mondiale Gaulle pposait avec :force le postu
ternationaux, par exemple mone- determinante aussl longtemps lat de rambition et de la ggran-
taires, ont ete is consequence de que survivront entre Franeais et dour nationales, autant MM.. am-
dix ans de developpement commu- Britanniques des sequelles dii pidou, Heath et Brandt admettent
riautalre, non leur condition passe, ou blen telle ou tells con- qu'ils doivent s'unir pour agir
premiere. :tradiction actuelle. utilement stir is scene Snternatio-.
vale. A trop regarder vers 1'Oural
Avec Londres, all contraire, un Dana le processus europeen, et le feuve Jaune, le general avast
accord limite a l'Europe ne suf- chaque decision d'tapprofondisse- fins par negliger l'Hexagane, le
fire pas. 11 faudra 1'etendre tres ment ou d'elargissement constitue Rhin, les Alpes et la Manche. .
vite a ces parties du globe oil une plate-forme provisoire a par- On apereoit, plus que jamals,
la' France et i'Angleterre ont ete tir de laquelle it fact, tot ou tard, apres in deception du dernier
si longtemps opposees et le sent aller plus loin, sous peine de c Sommet l- franco-allemand, lea
encore, parfots, aujourd'hui. A retomber. consequences de cette tendance a
defaut, Von risqueratt de contra- ! . De meme que la controverse placer l'univers avant l'Europe.
dire on de defaire, all plan mon- franco-allemande sur 1e mark Pour se limiter aux questions mo-
dial, en particulier dans des votes pout selon son evolution, imposer netaires, on rappellera que. lea
des Nations unies, ce que lea Dix ou tuer dans 1'eeuf l'union eco- plus vives attaques contre la poli-
auraient pu faire a Bruxelles, ail nomique et monetaire, de meme tique americaine sent venues, a
plan europeen. lea vieilles rivalites franco-britan- Paris, de.ceux qui refuserent long-
niques peuvent-elles Solt favors- temps Is participation britannique
all Marche commun. Or l'une des
Apres des annees de peripeties, ser tine confederation politique at
le de CT66 u n s la Luent qu c es all- elles disparaissent, soft is rendre conditions, non pas sufflsante,
n el sent qublent e es reli= impossible A elles subsistent. mais necessaire, d'une riposte de
tks nouvelles sem releguees 1'Europe aux Etats-tints consists
derriere 1'ecran des satisfactions A-t-on oublie quo le pool char- a dissocier le couple livre-dollar,
officielles. Comment no pas voir, bon-aacer n'aurait pas survecu ! base du systeme monetaire inter-
pourtant, que Is participation bri- sans is dimension que lot apporta'' national actuel qu'il s'agit de
tannique appellera un ajustement le -tl'aite ' de' Rome ? M.. Heath reformer. TAche qui suppose evi-
progressif des politiques etran- aura hautement servi 1'Europe si demment Is contours des Anglais
gores ? Une querelle entre Paris la dimension anglalse signifle done leur presence data le March.
et Londres du genre de celles du entre autre use cooperation dans commun.
Biafra, du Quebec libre, des Ii= lea domains jusqu'ici delaisses, Avant de le.recevoir A 1'Elysee,
vralsons d'avions francals a la teas que is politique etrangere, ou, M. Pompidou avast demande A.
L i b y e , affaibliralt fatalement plus tard, Is defense. M. Heath i'engagement prealable
1'Europe ' elargle. A 1'Inverse, Edouard VII at Delcasse furent do faire passer o ressivement la
celle-ci tirerait une vaste au= lea premiers a her un accord sur ! livre du monderdu dollar dans
dience Internationale d'un solide les affaires europeentes all regle- celui des monnaies europeennes.
accord des deux gouvernements lnent de certains differends d ou Il l'a obtenu. Cola ne ' garantit
sur lour heritage d'~u-dose deg tre-mer. a L'achevement do notre nullement des solutions , rapides,_
mers. Et it ne manqque pas de oeuvre coloniale, disait alors Is ni memo satisfaisantes pour la.
points stir lesqquels Il so ?revble ministre francais des affaires France, surtout taut que rsiste'
pecessaire : Afrique,. oft ftanco= etrangerea, depend de notre en- I'echec gouvern tart ai e presi-
phones et anglophones s'opposent tente area rAngteterte.a
' dentist cur le front des prix. Tou-
Fachoda
de
$ouvent rapports avec lea Etats- En 1890 iInetdent
fgl
Unls et is Can j r ldt '49~99i-'/02? s,Fpg 9ce,_s1.$r s ?0?1300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY August 1971
August 13 Germany 10th anniversary of the Berlin
Wall, built by East Germany to
seal the border against the
flight of East Germans to the
West. (In.July 1961 alone, a
total of 30,444 refugees were
registered at the West Berlin
receiving center.)
August 19-24 USSR 35th anniversary of the Moscow
Show Trial of the "16 Cold
Bolsheviks" -- a landmark in
Stalin's Great Purge. The
trial set in motion a mass
witch-hunt for "Trotskyite
traitors" in the USSR, which
Stalin used to eliminate all
rivals and consolidate his
absolute power. Chief defendants
at the trial, Grigori Zinoviev
and Lev Kamenev, had been co-
members with Stalin in the
triimvirate that ruled Russia
during Lenin's illness. They
werq accused of having plotted
the assassination of Sergey
K'rov, a key Soviet leader
killed in December 1934, and
of being members of an interna-
tional Trotskyite conspiracy
that was planning to assassinate
Stalin and other Soviet leaders.
In fact, it is now widely acknow-
ledg_ed that the real conspirators in
Kirov's assassination were probably
Stalin and members of the Soviet
secret police.
August 20-21 Czechoslovakia Anniversary of the invasion cf
Czechoslovakia by Soviet-led
Warsaw Pact forces from the
LSSR, East Germany, Poland,
Hungary and Bulgaria, to put
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
an end to Czechoslovak internal
reform in 1968, Explaining the
Soviet Union's "necessity" for
invading a small neighboring
country, Soviet Party leader
Leonid Brezhnev announced
Communist countries reserve
the right to invade other
Communist countries to maintain
Communist rule.
August 21 China 5th anniversary of the start
of Mao's Cultural Revolution
in 1966 when Chinese teenagers
called "Red Guards" entered
Peking in a nationwide ideological
campaign that brought education
to a halt, disrupted industry,
revived outmoded forms of
medicine, and persecuted the
intelligentsia.
August 21-25 Santiago
Latin American conference on
Agrarian Reform sponsored by
the (Communist) World Federation
of Trade Unions. The holding
of the meeting in Santiago seems
significant, but otherwise the
meeting itself is likely to be
far less important than Communist
publicists will try to make it
appear.
August 29- Sinaia,
September 4 Romania Annual Pugwash Conference of
scientists from the Communist
countries and the West.
August 31- Santiago Meeting of North American and
September 3 Latin American Youth and
Students in solidarity with
Vietnam, Cuba and Chile.
Sponsored by the (Communist)
World Federation of Demorcratic
Youth and International Union
of Students. The holding of
the meeting in Santiago seems
significant, but otherwise the
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
meeting itself is likely to he
far less important than Communist
publicists will try to make it
appear.
September 4-5 East Germany The (Communist) World Peace
September 15 West Germany Council is to hold two symposiums
on European Security, the first
in the GDR and the second in
the Federal Republic. The
WPC is currently trying to
publicize a people-to-people
approach to European Security
so as to create public opinion
in Europe that would exert pressure
for the convening of a govern-
mental Conference on European
Security "without prior conditions."
September 12-18 Dublin 38t1 International Congress of
PEN, the respected writers organ-
ization. Representatives from
the Soviet Union and other Bloc
countries have sometimes attended
previous congresses. However,
the Secretary of the Board of
the Soviet Writers Union, Georgi
M.' Markov, told the 5th Soviet
Writers Congress in Moscow on
June 29th that the Soviet Union
would continue to boycott PEN
congresses, as it has done in
recent years, because of Western
criticism of Soviet literary
policies, including the impris-
onment of unorthodox writers in
the Soviet Union.
September 13-24 New York
UN Preparatory Committee meets
for the 1972 World Conference
or} Environmental Problems.
September 15 Bulgaria 25th anniversary of the Bulgarian
Peoples Republic.
September 21 New York United Nations General Assembly
26th session opens.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
September 23-25 Santiago lst Latin American Journalists
Conference of the (Communist)
International Organization of
Journalists. The main objective
of the conference is to establish
a Latin American Journalists
Federation affiliated to the
IOJ. The conference is also
to discuss "freedom of the press"
-- although the main organizers
of this conference come from
Communist countries where freedom
of the press is not tolerated
(e.g., the beginning of a free
press in Czechoslovakia in
1968 was one of the principal
reasons why the Soviet Union
invaded that country).
September 27- Japan Emperor Hirohito is to visit
October 13 Europe Belgium, the UK, West Germany,
Denmark, The Netherlands, France,
and Switzerland. It will be the
first trip abroad for a reigning
Emperor of Japan.
October 30 USSR 150th anniversary of the birth
of Fyodor Dostoevski.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 25X1C1Ob
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
 r
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300060001-7
CPYRGHT
LONDON OBSERVER
18 July 1971
DR ZHORES MEDVEDkrV carcerated for some months in all. Concerts are cancelled, per- i e close .
vie t hi `c one of those notorious mental formers changed without notice, listed ' not merely by name, but a is .chemchemist, st innp uibyshe''d, b)? the
A?linisterIs deprtt), a frofes-,
.vor Prokofiev, who said it would
he bc.,t if he pleaded ill-health :--
'The di'4cus:Sieldl began to get
heated, I said that Ishou'ld write
th,; real reason-dire fact that
the Ministry had refused me the,
trip. Prakoti.ev became indig-
nant and accursed me of lack of
patriotism. AtFcording to him an
honourable 1;pviet citizeal. would
never blame any Government
department to foreigners. With
this we parted, but, as I found
out, the, at once rang up the
Rector of the Timrrazev Aeaa-
emy and reeon1'rnended that
cthic:ational [i.e., disciplinary]
mcusua'cs should be applied to
nle.' t '
Uespiie tli' bait. Medvedev
telegraphed to America that the
Ministry 'could not approve'
his trip and tln'/t azldressed a
nienrorandrun -(fortified by
strong appeals to the Ministry
by American colleagues) direct
to the nrystcyiaiis 'head of the
'Exit Conunissian.' This, he dis-
covered. as Warne Other' than
the veteran Party Secretary and
international eongrets, not an -give a lecture in Sheffield spon towel in Mao's China---whereby
l,ers (but not
American one." c(u?cr1 by the CiGn Forurdatio all urban brainx?or
n. laolit,it-fans} are ?e required to show
b Vlell, so it's iruternatioial, desi;vied. to promote inter-' the imasses
but if ,thlis international congress ncrtiomi i co-operation in rne?di their solirla
c?al th oing nirt uul with labour
Wore in West Gprnta:ny, would and chemical research. d
o,, ' the morning, I I ,.
you still watt to go? This rune the Soviet Ministry illy wstach to British t.inle. qty
A cone satwon begun, in .is of I-lecilth we(((ed incapable of lecture was to take platy at the
at~1c was no good amen(. To understanding. that 111e Ftturjciq evening session. The monlin^
all my arguments, Fili.povna lion was not a commercial enter- eve f~ite? n ever to two sessions on
brought
aih~vaishe4lstandarq nc~h 1 tined to repSerrur, led ' edev was sharply problevits of the ageing of. lants.
gogi re rr for breaking tht p
Shaw th:vk' if Soviet scicritiyt?S regulations about correslhindenee 1 was -bested as chairman of one
took with of the n%. In Obninyk, however, a
part In in'ternationa'l con- w foreign tarns.' Only when sterner ;track awaited me... .
g'r esses it would help t.o ,ra-ise the backed by urgent appeals to the
prestige of Soviet science, Fallip. Minister and the State Committee 'That morning, with my coI-
ovnct at once rcjeoicd my a?rgu- on Science and Technolo,ty from leagues f,ron1 our laboratory, I
mends: "We ? don''t need the Ciba's director and a ru tuber of travelled. 25 kilometres by bus,
recognition of A rn e r d c a n his most respected Soviet col- ' c.ut to rhz . State farm. tit
pseudo-scientists; w ,. got our leagues was he able to tackle the Shetieid .they were just getting
sputniks up first, ." When 1 Central Corrmnirtee on a"higher ready for the first morning ses-
remindcd her that The trip was lei%el than before. At fir?u lie was. Sion, son;u:onc else was in the
beingpa?id.for bythe O,rgani'sing encouraged byy the'response. All chairman's scat instead of mc,
Committee of the Congress, iizr Would be well, he, was assured, while we -ricre carrying baskets
a'oaetion was no less swift: " We bitt this time a different technique and star?tin,g to sort the potatoes,
don't need, charity from Amer- was used. instead of corrmnittlug moving back and forth along the
scan capitali4ts:" W'hen,I asked itself to all outright refusal the fZirrosvs.... The potatoes had to
her w'h}i'tnis 'had' happened in relevant section of the Central be colieetc