CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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 App6pNTA~KG oUNp l6 ON1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011944A00030 9050001-8
Y September
September.10-13 Sofia International Conference
of Solidarity with the
Workers and People of
Palestine. Sponsored by
the (Communist) World
Federation of Trade Unions.
September 12-18 Dublin 38th International Congress
of PEN, the respected
writers organization.
Representatives from the
Soviet Union and other
Bloc countries have some-
times attended previous
congresses. However, the
Secretary of the Board
of the Soviet Writers
Union, Georgi M. Markov,
told the 5th Soviet Writers
Congress in Moscow on
June 29th that the Soviet
Union would continue to
boycott PEN congresses, as
it has done in recent
years, because of Western
criticism of Soviet
literary policies, including
the imprisonment of un-
orthodox writers in the
Soviet Union.
September 13-24 New York UN Preparatory Committee
meets for the 1972 World
Conference on Environmental
Problems,
September 15 Bulgaria 25th anniversary of the
Bulgarian Peoples Republic.
September 21 New York 26th United Nations General
Assembly opens.
September 23-25 Santiago 1st Latin American Journalists
Conference of the (Communist)
International Organization
of Journalists. The main
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objective of the conference
is to establish a Latin
American Journalists
Federation affiliated to
the IOJ0 The conference is
also to discuss "freedom of
the press" -- although the
main organizers of this
conference come from
Communist countries where
freedom of the press is
not tolerated (e.g., the
beginning of a free press
in Czechoslovakia in 1968
was one of the principal
reasons why the Soviet
Union invaded that country).
September 27- Japan Emperor Hirohito is to
October 13 Europe visit Belgium,-the UK,
West Germany, Denmark,
The Netherlands,, France and
Switzerland. It will be the
first trip abroad for a
reigning Emperor of Japan.
September 30- Prague 4th All-Christian Peace
October 3 Assembly. Sponsored by
the Soviet-dominated
Christian Peace Conference.
See backgrounder, "The
Soviet Church in Political
Action," in this issue.
October 2-3 Warsaw Seminar on European
Security. Sponsored by
the (Communist) World
Peace Council. The WPC is
trying to promote a people-
to-people approach to
European Security so as to
create a public opinion in
Europe that would exert
pressure for the convening
of a governmental European
Security conference "with-
out prior conditions."
October 13-16 Iran 2,500th anniversary of the
Persian Kingdom. Dignitaries
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from all over the world,
including many heads of
state, will attend.
October 19 Japan 15th anniversary of the
USSR signing of a protocol by
Japan and the USSR ending
their technical state of
war (WW II). The protocol
left hanging the question
of sovereignty over the
Kuril Islands, which the
Soviet Union seized when
it entered the war in
the closing days as Japan
was collapsing.
October 19-21 Poland 15th anniversary of the
Polish Communist Party's
successful defiance of
the Soviet Union in
choosing Gomulka, only
recently released from
prison, to head a more
independent government.
The Polish action was a
repercussion of the Poznan
workers riots in June 1956.
October 23- Hungary 15th anniversary of the
November 4 Hungarian Revolution
started by students and
workers, joined by liberal
Communists, and crushed by
Soviet tanks, 1956,
October 28 Europe British House of Commons
is to vote on British
membership in the Common
Market.
October 31 USSR 10th anniversary of removal
of Stalin's body from
Lenin's mausoleum and
reburial at an inconspicuous
place beside the Kremlim
wall. This symbolic,
though very important
act of de-Stalinization,
was partially undone by
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the Brezhnev regime last
year when it had a bust
of Stalin placed over his
new grave at the Kremlin
walla In May this year
Stalin's portrait was
paraded before top Soviet
leaders for the first
time since 1956, at
celebrations in the
Georgian SSR and Brezhnev's
speech at the celebrations
included praise of Stalin.
November 11 USSR 150th anniversary of the
(October 30, birth of Fyodor Dostoevski.
old calendar) Although Dostoevski is
reputed to be one of the
most popular authors among
Soviet readers today and is
regarded internationally as
one of the world's great
writers, his works are
still censored in the USSR.
Key passages in The Brothers
Karamazov, for instance,
are missing from Soviet
editions. Soviet schools
do not teach Ibstoevski in
their courses on Russian
literature.
November 26-27 Czechoslovakia Tentative dates for
parliamentary elections.
There have been no
parliamentary elections
since 1964 -- the elections
scheduled for 1968, the
year of the Soviet invasion,
never took place. The
elections this year will
be held under provisions of
a new repressive law passed
in July that insures the
Communist Party control
of the selection of
candidates.
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November 28 Uruguay General elections. A
leftist Frente Amplio
(Broad Front), under
strong Communist influence,
is striving to duplicate
the Allende victory in
Chile.
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PENETRATION OF AFRICA VIA THE'TAN=ZAM RAILROAD
25X1C10b
1. The construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad, now in progress,
will provide a 1200-mile rail link between the rich copperbelt of
Zambia and the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania,
thereby freeing land-locked Zambia.f rem dependence on white-
minority regimes for an outlet to the sea, Construction of the
railroad also brings into sharp focus the foreign policy objectives
of Communist China, as reflected in its huge subsidy of men, money
and materials for this project, It is a major step in the Communist
Chinese objective of increasing its influence and enlarging its
presence in Africa,
2, The railroad is Communist: China's most important foreign
aid project, and for it the regime has granted an interest-free
loan of almost $400 million, divided equally between Tanzania
and Zambia; both are considered major influence targets of China.
Among all African countries the Chinese Communist presence is
strongest:in Tanzania where they have steadily increased their
investment and involvement, and where they have identified them-
selves with President Nyerere's commitment to liberate the white-
dominated blacks of south Africa. In addition to the railroad,
Peking is helping to build a naval. base in Tanzania, is training
and equipping the 10,000-man Tanzanian army, known as the Tanzanian
People's Defence Force, and is aiding the air force, Chinese
Communist military aid to Tanzania is by itself estimated between
$10-$15 million. Other Tanzanian projects in which Communist
Chinese aid is involved include a state farm, construction of a
stadium and a saw mill. In Zambia they are helping to build a
major highway between Lusaka and Choma, and three broadcasting
stations near Lusaka,
3, The probable motives underlying such heavy Communist
Chinese in.vol?: ement in East Africa
25X1C10b
a) The Chinese decision to undertake the railroad
project demonstrates not only that Peking is willing to
take on a project that was turned down by the West, but
it also provides a showcase for displaying Chinese
technical capabilities. (This despite a recent report
that, a railroad tunnel has collapsed, killing three
Chinese and about twenty Africans, and another report
of a British TV documentary on the construction work:
The film showed Chinese workers loading flatcars with
rails which had been pre-laid in concrete ties. The
rails were stacked vertically and then moved down the
tracks to be set down, one after another, as sections
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of a ladder might be laid end to end, According to one
who saw the film, this seems to be a fast method of track-
laying, but the railroad has a slightly "meandering" appearance.
Presumably it will be adequate for slow-moving freight if not
for crack passenger trains,)
b) Commitment to the railroad ostensibly puts the
Chinese Communists squarely on the side of African nationalism,
since it is probably viewed by other African countries as a
major Chinese effort to support Zambia in its struggle to
have its own route to the sea; thus no longer having to rely
so greatly on transportation routes through Rhodesian and
Portuguese African territory. Likewise, their almost exclusive
presence in Tanzania gives the Chinese Communists access to
the numerous southern African insurgent groups based there.
Furthermore, if Nyerere fears possible retaliation from the
south for harboring the liberation movements, he probably
believes that it would be only the Chinese who would give
him any substantial support against the countries of southern
Africa,.
The railroad project provides the Chinese with an
easy means of infiltrating their own propagandists and
revolutionists into Africa. Of the estimated total work
force of 50,000, there are already close to 15,000 so-called
Chinese technicians posted in the-area -- outnumbering the
Tanzanian army by several thousand. Most of them are reported
to be soldiers in the engineering or signal corps of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army, and among them are doubtless
experts in propaganda and in guerrilla warfare Assuming
that the railroad will require a long period of maintenance
by Chinese technical personnel, once it is completed, and
given the fact that many such Chinese workers traditionally
remain for years in the areas where they have worked on
building projects, they can probably count on solid and
prolonged entrenchment in this areas.
(i) With such entrenchment, enhanced as it will be by
the railroad, the Chinese will be within easy reach of the
vast natural resources of Central Africa with its cobalt,
copper, gold, diamonds and other minerals, as well as its
natural agricultural wealth,
e) Since the Chinese are trying to develop a long-range
missile capability and are therefore probably considering the
Indian Ocean as a likely test impact area, they would then
need monitoring facilities near this area, and a land-based
facility in East Africa would have many advantages over an
instrumentation ship,
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4, Since construction began on the railroad last ear there
have been reports of a variety of new problems
25X1C10b 25X1C10b
a) Under the terms of the aid agreement, about half
of the credit for the railroad project is being used to
finance imports for sale locally to defray the cost of the
Africans' participation, However, the commodity imports
from Communist China during the past year have not been
sufficient to provide the required local revenue, This
has stemmed from high import prices, the poor quality of
many.Chinese goods, uncertain shipping dates and Chinese
inability to guarantee a steady flow of spare parts for
someof the imported equipment,
b) African workers on the project are becoming
increasingly disgruntled about work conditions: They feel
that: salaries are too low, the workday is too long and
that the work shifts are badly timed for workers to get
adequate transportation to their homes They have also
complained that the key jobs are all held by the Chinese,
and even some of the menial jobs have been taken over
by the Chinese. These conditions, plus growing racial
tensions, have led the Africans to threaten a strike if
the situation is not soon improved.
5~ Attached is a detailed backgroundfstudy of the-T.an-Zam
Railroad: It was written in 1969 and contains a wealth of
information useful for propaganda. Your attention is called
in particular to Section 4, "Possible Chinese Gains," for
several additional themes, Also attached is material from the
U.S. and foreign press which provide analysis and comment on the
Chinese involvement in Africa.. Although most of these appeared
last year, before or at the time construction on the railroad
began, they contain themes still valid for our purposes,
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1971
THE TAN-ZAM RAILWAY
1. Background
Serious interest in a railroad connecting the Zambian
Copperbelt to the Tanzanian Indian Ocean port of Dar es
Salaam dates to the early 1950's% In 1951, Sir Alexander
Gibbs and Partners undertook a feasibility study on behalf
of the government of the territory of Northern Rhodesia
with the purpose of determining the possibilities deriving
from a rail link between Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika.
The firm's conclusion was that such a railroad would not be
economically viable although it might provide political and
strategic. advantages to the territories concerned. With
decisions for Northern Rhodesia being made in Salisbury,
the huge cost was the dominant consideration, and the
scheme was shunted aside.
In the election campaign in Northern Rhodesia in 1962,
the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the present
ruling party in Zambia, focused on the political rather
than the economic benefits of the rail line and exploited
the rail issue to its advantage. UNIP argued against
dependence on Rhodesia for exporting Zambian copper and
importing almost everything that Zambia needed. Victorious
in the ellection of January 1964, UNIP under President
Kenneth Kaunda undertook to carry out its campaign pledge
for the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway (see the map, inside
front cover) and requested the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD - World Bank) for a
loan to build the line.
The government of Zambia was joined in its request to
the IBRD'by the government of Tanzania. President Julius
Nyerere saw the rail line as an opportunity to open up the
agricultural potential of the Kilombero Valley and the
mineral resources of the Mbeya area, both stymied by a lack
of transport. A recent survey indicated a potential of 300
million tons of coal and 45 million tons of iron ore south
of the area through which the railroad would pass. In
addition, Tanzania expects to share in the revenue result-
ing from the passage of Zambian copper shipments through
its territory.
The Tanzanian-Zambian request was rejected by the IBRD,
which concluded after a survey that the railroad would cost
some $162 million and would operate at a-loss?until about
1990. Later the cost estimate was revised upward to $390
million. The IBRD noted in its report that transport
through Rhodesia'`s existing railroads was economically more
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sensible, that no political development was really likely
to disrupt it, that the Zambian economy was unlikely to be
able to afford a second railroad system, and that if routes
were needed to the north and east, a road system would be
economically more feasible. These findings were confirmed
by two further surveys, one by East African Railways and
another by Lonrho.
As Rhodesia's threat to proclaim a Unilateral Declara-
tion of Independence from the UK approached, the sense of
urgency that the Zambians felt toward the Tan-Zam Railway
increased'. Zambian dependence o,n Rhodesian railroads was a
political handicap to any Zambian government, however much
more sensible economically such an alternative might be.
During 1964 and 1965, Tanzania and Zambia, alone or in
concert, sought assistance from the US, the UK, Canada,
West Germany and Japan -- public or private, as individual
contributors or in consortium -- but to no avail. All the
western countries made reference to the 1964 IBRD report as
the basis for their refusal to subscribe to the under-
writing of the railroad and instead offered to assist in
the improvement of road facilities. In despperation,
Tanzania had even turned to the USSR for?help in August
1964 but was rejected outright by the Soviets who refused
not only to build the railroad but even to conduct a survey.
It was then that Nyerere seriously looked to Communist
China for assistance.
The Initial Tanzanian approach to the Chinese for aid
may have taken place as early as July 1964 during a visit
by Vice President Kawawa to Peking. A more urgent request
for assistance probably was made by President Nyerere
during his trip to China in February 1965. In any event,
in July 1965 Nyerere announced that China was willing to
help. A month later a Chinese'survey team arrived in
Tanzania. The team studied the proposed route in Tanzania,
but not in Zambia, and remained in the country for several
months. Although their report, in Chinese and Swahili,
turned out to be of little help, the Chinese indicated a
willingness to undertake a more comprehensive survey and
even to build the railroad.
While Tanzania concentrated on seeking Chinese
Communist aid, Kaunda continued to seek aid from the West
because of his preference for Western financing and his
concern over Chinese political intentions in Africa.
Finally in September 1965 -- just two months before
Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence,-the UK
and Canada agreed to finance a $420,000 feasibility survey
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which was carried out by?three firms headed by Maxwell'
Stamp Associates, a British economic consultant firm. The
survey was: completed in August 1966, and the resultant
Stamp report recommended that the project be undertaken and
concluded that the high capital investment was justifiable
on economic grounds even if there were no political objec-
tions to using Rhodesia Railways. To handle the increase
in Zambian, traffic assumed by the report, the -Rh*ode'sia
system itself would have to make a large capital increase.
The Stamp report put the cost of construction and
rolling stock for the Tan-Zam Railway at $353 million, in
addition to $33 million required to enlarge the harbor at
Dar es Salaam to handle annually an estimated 2.5 million
tons more of cargo. Thus the total cost would be $386
million on the assumption that the railroad were built by
:modern construction techniques.
On the. basis of assumptions that (a) the line would be
completed by the mid-1970's; (b) almost all of Zambia's
non-fuel traffic would be transferred from existing routes
through Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola to the new line,
bringing total freight on the line to more than 4 million
tons by 1981; and (c) operating costs per ton-mile would
rank among the lowest of the world's railroads and would be
nearly 30 percent below those of Rhodesia Railways, the
report estimated that by 1981 revenues would reach about
$100 million and profits almost $52 million.
Complete comparisons of railroad versus road systems
have not been made, but copperbelt experts have pointed out
that most of the rail traffic would travel the full 1,000
plus miles, of the railroad. American and Western European
arguments for the superiority of roads assume that traffic
will be picked up and let off at many points along the
route, an assumption which is not valid for the Tan-Zam
Railway.
On the: basis of the Stamp report, Zambia'hoped that a
consortium of the UK, US, West Germany, Japan and the IBRD
could be formed to pay for an engineering survey and even-
tually for; construction of,the railroad. It was largely
this hope which kept Zambia -- and through Zambia, Tanzania
from pursuing any Chinese offer of assistance during
1966. Early in 1967 the Starr report was submitted to the
African Development Bank (ADB) and to the IBRD for joint
review and financial assistance. This was the second time
that the IBRD reviewed the project. Experts from the
United Nations Development Program were also asked to
review the report.
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In March 1967 the.ADB and the IBRD issued.a report
sharply criticizing the Stamp surveys economic analysis
and recommending a re-examination of its findings. Addi-
tional technical studies were also suggested for both the
railroad and the-port of Dar, es Salaam before a decision
could be taken to finance an engineering study. Zambia and
Tanzania indicated their willingness to allow the IBRD and
ADB to undertake further technical studies, but they refused
to permit a re-examination of the-projectts economic feasi-
bility. The United Nations Development Program experts
reached conclusions similar to those of the ADB-IBRD review.
Stamp's traffic projections and revenue forecasts for
the proposed railroad were overly optimistic. Zambia is
unlikely to transfer all of its non-fuel traffic to the new
line as many of its imports will continue to come from
South Africa and Rhodesia because of lower prices. More-
over, Rhodesia is likely to insist on a share of Zambian
traffic in exchange for low railway rates on coal shipments
and other goods. As a result, revenues would be substan-
tially less than Stamp estimated. The IBRD, for example,
estimates that roughly 50 percent of Zambia's imports and
about 20 percent of its exports will continue to be shipped
over existing routes. The IBRD believes that the railroad
would carry less than 3 million tons of freight in 1981 and
that revenues would be roughly one-half those estimated by
Stamp. The lower traffic levels would result in higher
operating costs per ton-mile because,of high fixed costs.
The low operating costs envisioned by Stamp seem to be .m-
realistic in the light of experience on the Rhodesia
Railways, which now.handles the bulk of the traffic to be,
carried by the new line and which is an efficiently run
system. The anticipated revenue of the line does not
provide an adequate basis for financing the project.
The railroad would result in few economic gains for
Zambia and Tanzania. Zambia's northeastern region, through
which the railroad would pass, has little development
potential. The area is sparsely populated and for the most
part the land is infertile and can support little more than
subsistence agriculture. Although deposits of manganese,
coal, copper and a few,other minerals are located along the
proposed right of way, they are small. While Tanzania
would earn some foreign exchange from transit services
provided to Zambia, few other benefits may be expected.
The government's scheme to develop the relatively fertile
Kilombero Valley in the southwest would require large
investment and numerous skilled personnel -- both of which
are in critically short supply in Tanzania. Also, much of
the area through which the railroad would pass is infested
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with Tsetse fly, and the population is small and widely
scattered. Some minerals are located in southwest Tanzania,
including the Songwe coalfields, but the deposits are
generally of poor quality and not commercially exploitable,
even with relatively low-cost rail transport.
Zambian goods are expected to account for almost all
the railroad's tonnage. Tanzanian traffic would'be very
small because southwestern Tanzania is largely unpopulated
and the country does not have the capital or skilled man-
power needed to develop the region. Some traffic would
also come from the Katanga copperbelt, but the amount would
not be very great. Congolese exports over Rhodesia Railways
now total less than 10,000 tons annually, and it is unlikely
that all of this traffic would be diverted to the Tan-Zam
railroad.
Outbound traffic on the railroad would consist almost
entirely of copper, and the inbound traffic of a wide
variety of imports. The railroad would not carry POL for
Zambia, because of the Italian-built, 1060-mile 8-inch
petroleum pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola on the
copperbelt can carry the required POL. Also, the coal
needed to operate copper smelters in Zambia would probably
continue to be imported from Rhodesia because the Wankie
Colliery is the cheapest source of coal for Zambia.
2. Chinese Offer
After the negative review by the ADB and the IBRD of
March 19.67, Kaunda finally realized that Western support
for the-railroad was not likely to be forthcoming. More-
over, Zambian efforts to develop other railroad transport
routes which would avoid Rhodesia had proved equally
unrewarding. Thus the long-standing Chinese offer became
more attractive. Overcoming his inner doubts, Kaunda
sounded out Communist China regarding its willingness to
construct the Tan-Zam Railway. Encouraged'by the Chinese
response, Kaunda visited Peking in June 1967. Shortly
afterwards, negotiations began between Tanzania and Zambia
on the one hand and China on the other, and on 5 September
1967 an agreement was concluded.
Tanzania and Zambia see the 5 September agreement as a
firm commitment by Peking to follow through with the
project. According to the tripartite agreement, China was
to finance building a railroad through an interest-free
loan with no strings attached. If current Chinese aid
practices continue, loan repayment is likely to extend over
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a very long period and.might well include at least partial
payment in Zambian and Tanzanian goods. These terms would
be highly favorable by Western and even Soviet standards.
In addition, the agreement called for China to provide
technical assistance for surveys and construction of the
railroad. The agreement was necessarily vague on the size
of the over-all Chinese loan and the number of Chinese
technicians to be involved because accurate'estimates were
not available at the time the agreement was signed. In any
case, this very simple contractual form is often used by
China. According to the agreement the project was to pro-
ceed through three stages: (1) preliminary investigations;
(2) engineering and design surveys, for which the Chinese
pledged a $14 million interest-free loan; and (3) construc-
tion. Discussions among the three governments will take
place between each stage, and more detailed agreements will
follow.
Present Chinese planning is reported to call for a
single-track railroad between Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, and
Kidatu, Tanzania, a distance of about 960 miles. Other
reports have indicated that the Chinese will extend the
line from Kidatu tD Dar es Salaam to avoid transshipping at
Kidatu. All rolling stock, signalling and communications
equipment will be supplied by the Chinese. The railroad
engineers will be provided by the Tanzanians and Zambians,
but maintenance of line and equipment will be handled by
the Chinese for at least 10 years after the completion of
the railroad. During this period the Chinese will train
Tanzanian and Zambian maintenance teams. The construction
loan will be for 10 years with the terms and dates of repay-
ment to be determined after the railroad is in operation on
the basis of capability for repayment by Tanzania and
Zambia.
The estimated Chinese cost for the construction of the
railroad is reported to be $60 million for the Tanzanian
section and $20 million for the Zambian section if maximum
use is made of Chinese materials and labor. The Chinese
estimate is between 20 and 25 percent of the best Western
estimates.
3. Chinese Survey
Starting in December 1967, a nine-man Chinese team of
railroad and construction experts carried out preliminary
investigations of the Zambian section of the Tan.Zam
Railway, similar to the 1965 preliminary study of the
Tanzanian section. ; A 600-man team of
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Chinese technicians began the detailed railroad survey in
Tanzania in February 1968 and a 350-man team began the
Zambian section of the survey in November 1968.. The
Tanzanian' portion of the survey is already completed and
the Zambian portion should be completed before the end of
1969. At present the number of Chinese in Tanzania is
estimated at up to 1,200 and in Zambia between 500 and 700.
As a result of unfortunate experiences in Southeast
Asia as well as in Africa resulting from excessive local
Chinese revolutionary zeal, the Chinese attempted initially
to keep their presence unobtrusive and their visibility low.
Indeed, at the outset in Tanzania and Zambia, they sought
to present an image of hard-work and austerity with an
almost total absence of adornment and frivolity. In support
of this image, the Chinese railroad surveyors keep to them
selves, carefully refraining from fraternization with the
local population except for group meetings sponsored by the
Chinese embassies in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. The only
regular and continuing contact with the locals is main-
tained by Chinese public relations men or medical tech-
nicians. As a result of this low-key approach, the Chinese
surveyors. have made a generally favorable impression on the
Tanzanians and Zambians whom they meet in the bush during
their surveying work.
Shortly after their arrival in Zambia, the Chinese
surveyors established three base camps as regional head-
quarters for the railroad survey.
The base camps are located at the Mkushi River
Hotel in Mkushi, the Crested Crane Hotel in Mpika, and a
large building in Kasama. Security is very strict at all
the camps, which are surrounded by barbed wire and guarded
by Chinese personnel. Local Zambians who are employed as
guides and manual laborers live outside the camps. Visitors
are discouraged, and even official visits are only reluc-
tantly permitted. All visitors, including government
officials:, are closely questioned before admittance, All
activities in the camps, including even simple domestic
routines, are discontinued until the visitor departs.
Living conditions in the base camps are very crowded
with most: of the workers living under roofs with only the
spillover in tents. (All personnel in'the field camps live
in floorless tents set up over sand.) In the headquarters
buildings, 8 men sleep in rooms 8 feet by 12 feet on tiers
of bunks. Each room has a wash basin, but the entire
building uses the same toilet facilities, which are filthy.
Meals are eaten in-the bedrooms because what used to be the
dining rooms are used as sleeping quarters for additional
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Chinese. The bedrooms are also used as offices during the
day. The food is almost all canned and imported from China.
There is little variety. Occasionally, vegetables are
obtained from local markets, but so infrequently that the
Chinese are planting their own gardens.
Life in the camps is austere and monastic.. There is
group study of Mao's thoughts in the morning before work
and singing of revolutionary songs in the evening. Each
man carries with him into the bush his book of Mao's
thoughts. Each member of the survey teams does his own
washing and a certain amount of manual labor, regardless of
his position.
The only women with the survey teams are attached to
the medical staffs. There have been unconfirmed, reports of
the Chinese taking Zambian women into their camps at night
and of engaging in homosexual practices with local men.
r
Although most Chinese in the camps are not permitted to
move about on their own, conditions are different in Lusaka,
and the Chinese there are rapidly becoming as evident as
those in Dar es Salaam. Groups of six or seven Chinese may
be seen in most hotels, with the Ridgeway Hotel apparently
the Chinese favorite. The Chinese in Lusaka are always seen
in groups and do not talk to or mix with the local popula-
tion. They are apparently free to come or go into the city
as they please, using any form of transport -- road, rail
or air..
The activities of the Chinese medical technicians
attached to the survey teams have been especially rewarding
from the Chinese point of view. Originally these techni-
cians only accepted patients for treatment in clinics set
up at the camps of the railroad surveyors, but when the
Chinese saw how popular their medical work had become among
the local population, the medical technicians began moving
'out among villages in the bush to increase the number of.
prospective patients treated. Local government officials
have been included among their clientele.
The primary method of treatment of the Chinese medical
technicians is acupuncture -- a method of treatment invol-
ving the puncturing of a part of the body with needles two
or three inches long. This treatment is combined with.the
passage of drugs to the patient. Although stories of
miraculous cures have come -out of the bush, other reports
indicate that the general inattention to basic sanitary
.procedures by the Chinese "doctors" may well result. in
acupuncture practices inducing infection as well as cures
8
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in the patients.
Dissemination of Chinese propaganda accompanies all
treatment.by the medical technicians and provides a channel
to get propaganda into the remotest corners of Tanzania and
Zambia. Initially the Chinese were more agressive in their
propaganda efforts in Tanzania than in Zambia. Several
sharp rebuffs from the government of Zambia to'the Chinese
embassy in Lusaka and a written protest by Kaunda to Chou
En-lai served as?a temporary check on Chinese distribution
of propaganda in Zambia. With the recent large influx of
Chinese into Zambia, however, Zambian government capability
to monitor and control the activities of Chinese propagan-
dists has declined.. This decline is apparent in the
villages where unsuspecting schoolteachers are provided
with propaganda materials by the Chinese and even in the
cities where the Chinese employ seemingly innocent accounts
of the activities of the surveyors to insert into local
med.ia pro-:Chinese and anti-Western and anti-Soviet
propaganda..
The Chinese attacks on the USSR have inspired Soviet
counterattacks. for example, the newspaper, Times of
Zambia, on 6 May printed a Radio Moscow broadcast which
claimed that the policies of Mao had caused a drop in the
Chinese standard of living. Again on 7 May the Times
reported a Moscow broadcast on the "armies of Ma This
same issue of the Times also included a reply from the
Chinese embassy in Lusaka to the Soviet blast of the
previous day. Thus, Zambia is becoming a propaganda battle-
ground for the Chinese and the Soviets.
The gradual step-up of Chinese propaganda output in
Zambia began in February 1969 with the arrival of a top
NCNA propagandist whose objective was to gain wide play in
Zambian media for news of the ostensibly beneficial
activities:of the surveyors. The new visitor was immedi-
ately successful, and favorable local coverage of the
surveyors immediately increased. Coverage'by the Zambian
press, radio and TV, and the Zambian Informati-on Service
became frequent and friendly. Subsequently the Chinese
undertook several surveys, to assess the impact of their
overt propaganda in Zambian media and their covert dissemi-
nations in the bush. They have been reported to be pleased
with the results of these surveys obtained to date.
In addition to Chinese propaganda activities, the
governments of Tanzania and Zambia have experienced, as a
result of the Chinese presence, problems in other fields
including labor and security.
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The Chinese engineers and workers on the survey teams
are setting labor norms that disturb the trade unions of
Tanzania and Zambia. Surveying in some of the most diffi-
cult terrain in East Africa, the Chinese teams work ten
hours every day, including Sunday, for a base pay less than
that of local trade unionists and with no overtime or extra
allowances. The Chinese eat frugal five-minute lunches and
flaunt their spartan work methods before the -locals. They
are virtually self-sufficient in all their requirements,
having brought wi.th them from China almost everything that
they believed they would need, ranging from dustbrooms and
gasoline tanks through electricity-generators and engineer-
ing equipment to trucks and Chinese-style landrovers. They
service all their equipment themselves.
The Chinese take advantage of the inability of the
governments of Tanzania and Zambia to keep a close watch
and control over the activities of the railroad surveyors.
It is very likely that these governments do not even know
the actual number of Chinese surveyors ih their countries.
Several techniques are employed by the Chinese to infiltrate
more of their people than show up on airport manifests or
transient rolls. Under one technique, after the arrival of
a plane full of Chinese, a single Chinese will sign the
manifest for large numbers of his incoming colleagues who
mill about the airport. He will write a Chinese surname --
for example, Li -- and beneath it write a dozen or so ditto
marks. Another technique was first observed in Mali. To
obfuscate the local custom authorities, an incoming group
of Chinese surveyors is met at the airport by a large group
of Chinese already in the country. The two groups mingle
in a spirit of exuberance and make a mass exodus past the
bewildered customs officials.
Other Chinese activities may be more serious in the
long run. These activities in the movement of arms
into Tanzania and Zambia for passage to African liberation
movements and the unobserved use made of the freedom given
the survey teams to survey and map an enormous area of
Zambia, much of it previously uncharted.
It seems certain that the
Chinese will be able to prepare detailed military topo-
graphical maps of Tanzania and Zambia as a byproduct of the
survey. Such maps could prove invaluable if the Chinese
ever undertake large-scale military support of the liberation
movements located in Tanzania and Zambia.
The extra-curricular activities of the Chinese survey
teams have greatly disturbed President Kaunda, who on
numerous occasions has publicly expressed his fears and
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frustrations resulting from these unauthorized Chinese
activities in Zambia. Even President Nyerere of Tanzania,
considered by many to be more lenient to the Chinese than
Kaunda, noted in a press interview on 5 May in Mwanza that
he was aware of the dangers of a policy of close relations
with Commuryrst China. He made clear his understanding of
the anxiety of the outside world since his policy "might
let the Chinese into their sphere of influence," but China
was willing to build the Tan-Zam Railway which Tanzania
wanted and the West had refused to build it. Nyerere added
a warning to China. "'We are a stubborn people,," he said,
"The Chinese will learn that if they want to control us
they will :get into trouble,*
4. Possible Chinese Gains
The Chinese offer of assistance for the construction of
the Tan-Zam Railway is unprecedented for Communist China
and represents by far China's single largest foreign aid
project to date. It would be the third largest foreign aid
project in all Africa, outweighed only by the billion-
dollar Aswan High Dam, where the USSR provided about one-
third of the cost in credits, and by the Volta Dam in Ghana
which was mainly financed by the US.
On they basis of the Stamp report estimates of cost
(see page 3, above), if the Chinese do eventually construct
the railroad, they would be undertaking a project which
could equal more than one-third of their total economic aid
commitment's since 1956 and almost match all of their actual
aid expenditures to date. Since the inception of.the
Chinese aid program in 1956, China's total worldwide
commitments amounted to somewhat more than $1 billion while
actual expenditures were about $400 million. Annual
commitments reached a peak of $310 million in 1964 but
averaged about $120 million in 1965 and 1966 and declined
to under $100 million in 1967. Drawings on aid since 1964
have averaged about $75 million annually.
China has had a series of political and diplomatic
reverses in Africa since its highwater mark in 1964 when 18
African governments recognized Communist China. Since then,
as a result of Chinese subversive activities, Burundi,
Dahomey, the Central African Republic and Ghana have broken
diplomatic' relations with China; Kenya and Morocco have ex-
pelled Chinese diplomats; Ethiopia, which has never had
diplomatic relations with China, threw out the local NCNA
representative, and China withdrew its mission to_Tunisia.
Presently more African states (21) recognize Taiwan than
Communist China (14) and more African states have voted
against Chinese Communist admission to the UN (20) than
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have voted in favor of admission (15). One important objec-
tive of the Tan-Zam Railway, therefore, is to permit
Communist China to recoup some of its recent losses in
prestige and position in Africa and to reassert its interest
in Africa's development.
The Chinese are publicly committed to a policy of con-
tinuing revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries.
In the process of constructing the Tan-Zam Railway, the
Chinese will improve their access to masses of the local
peasantry who may be :"ripe for revolution" as Chou En-lai
noted in 1964. The Chinese also will increase their
ability to work with members of-southern African liberation
movements, far from prying eyes, in remote bush areas of
Tanzania and Zambia. In view of previous Chinese
performances in Ghana, Congo CBrazzavi.lle) and Mali, the
Chinese may very well set up on-the-scene guerrilla train-
ing camps, even unknown to most members of the Tanzanian
and Zambian governments. Such camps would provide bases
for subversion not only against southern African targets
but also against Congo (Ki'nshas-a). Once the Tan-Zam
Railway was completed, it could provide an artery for sus-
taining a large-scale Chinese-supported military effort
directed at Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Congo
(Kinshasa). With the availability of the railroad, such an
effort could encompass heavier weapons, including artillery,
not used to date by the guerrillas.,
A permanent, secure Chinese position in Zambia would
give the Chinese access'to mineral resources of which they
are currently in short supply such as copper, gold and
diamonds. The potential access to Congo (Kinshasa) would
place the Chinese within reach of the world's largest
known source of cobalt as well as uranium. In 1962, the
Union Miniere du Katanga produced 68 percent of the Free
Worlds cobalt. Since the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, the
Chinese'have been hard pressed to obtain for their reactors
sufficient quantities of suitable uranium and the cobalt
required to enrich it.
China must rely on labor-intensive methods to build the
railroad as it does not.have sufficient construction
machinery.
Consequently, large numbers of laborers will be required
for the period of. construction, a period that should last
at least five years. Tanzania and Zambia cannot supply the
required labor force, and on the basis of its previous ex-
periences, China would not be willing to accept local
laborers in large numbers even if they were available.
Therefore, China can be expected to import the requisite
labor force. In the short run, the impact on the local
economics of such a force could be significant and In the
long run it could become an ethnic and subversive'prob.lem._
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Historically speaking, Chinese railroad workers employed in
the US and in Peru and Indian railroad workers in East
Africa remained behind. after completion of the projects on
which they were employed.
Present Chinese plans call for the provision of con-
tinuing technical assistance in running the railroad and
providing: replacement equipment as necessary. There have
been reports that the Czechs and Japanese were willing to
supply rolling stock for the railroad, with the Czechs
indicating a willingness if necessary to participate with
the Chinese in the funding, This Czech willingness
predates the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and probably
has now given way to sentiments host'i'le to the Chinese,
Even if the Czechs were still willing to participate in the
railroad, the Chinese are unlikely- to accept them or the
Japanese and are likely to induce the governments of
Tanzania and Zambia to refuse recent rtali'an offers to
provide*operati,ng personnel after the railroad is built,
Zambian problems operating present railroad facilities
indicate conditions probably will deteriorate further.
Therefore, in the absence of other foreign assistance, the
Zambians will have to rely increasingly on the Chinese for
help in the operation, maintenance and repair of railroads
in Zambia
In spite of sincereprotestations of non-alignment by
Nyerere and of friendship for the West by Kaunda, these
African leaders will find themselves increasingly at the
mercy of the Chinese once construction of the railroad is
well underway. The governments of Tanzania and Zambia, of
necessity, will have to curry favor with their Chinese
benefactors. They will gradually have to provide special
treatment.for the Chinese at the expense of other countries
toward which the Chinese are hostile. A partial list of
anticipated Chinese gains, based lar ely on precedents
established elsewhere, include: (a.)) limitations on the
freedom of movement of all foreigners other than Chinese
Communists,; (b.) increasing toleration of Chinese efforts
to spread propaganda; (c.) favored treatment for Chinese
imports, including consumer items which are non-essential
or of marginal quality; (d.) growth of Chinese influence in
the military, police and other local elements which come in
frequent contact with the Chinese (it appears that in the
future only th.e Chinese will train the Tanzanian Peoples
Defense Force); (e.) virtually total suppression of any
criticism 'of China and the Chinese in local media and by
public officials; (f..) partial Chinese. control over the
local economy through long-term loan and barter deals which
commit the participating country to import Chinese goods
that are not necessarily compatible with national needs at
foreign exchange rates set by-the Chinese;
on the part of the host countries to look the.otherdwayies
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while the Chinese use their land as a sprin board for sub-
version-against neighboring states; and (h.) support for
China in international councils such as the UN.
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Railroad
A Oil refinery
Coalfield
Kabwe
LUSAKA
_ Kafue
Sakania
KNdola
Mbea
Tup~maf
Chipata
J JKARIaA
r 'HYDROELECTRIC DAM
/ r;OribO
SALISBURY
ZOMBA
Bla tyre
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,fs;
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, London
January 1970
CPYRGHT
Approved
CHINESE AII) AND TRADE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES
T I-IE decision to build three new Ci nese radio transmitters in Za-nbia
following the visit to Peking by Sikota Wirta, Zambian Minister of
Information, signifies further evidence of China's growing involvement
in Africa and. the revolutionary movements in Southcra Africa and
Rhodesia. China has already built two similar transmitters in Brazzaville
and Tanzania which have been used to broadcast anti-Wcstern propaganda
and revolutionary theory to neighbouring states.
The radio stations are only part of the invisible foothold China is gaining
in Africa. Visible Chinese influence is evident with the growing number
of stores selling Chii;ese goods a --d books and the increasicg army c.
:.:r.._i.:1+ .::Z..s.. L..u-uS ?L....-~~+r.~ , C...: ,4a~4az
Yore man 300 Chinese personnel are expected in i..vsak to ad+d io f:.:.
340 surveyqrs already employed on the '1,042 milt:. Tanzaaia-Zmb;a
railway.
Work on the railway is progressing rapidly according to reports from
Chinese and African sources. Since the initial survey started it-. D:.ccn~~cr,
1958, the survey-team-is said to have completed the preliminary suvey
of the 550 mile main route from Dtr-cs-Salaam to the heart of the copper-
belt. The whole project is due to be completed by 1975.
By providing an advance of the capital cost of between z:00-?130
million, most of the ]a.bour and ~nrobably all the contract, including rolling
stock. China has surprised bona African aid Western observers, a;any of
whom declared the project both uneconomic and impractical without
massive British and American support. The routo rolls through some of
the most difficult terrain in the region, rising from the coast at Dar-es-Salaam
to the high, hilly areas-of the Cenral African plateau at 7,000 feet with
its bushland and savanah before reaching the Zambian copperbclt.
Apart from gaining valuable enginecring expcric:rcc, ('Icarning while
oing and doing while le: rnirg' according to Chairman Mao's teaching
China is hoping to win friends andinfiucnce enemies. Much has been made
n both the Africar, and Chinese news media of the conditions under which
he Chinese are employed. The Chu;ese engineers accept what appears to brs
onditions similar to the local Africans. They exist separately and frugally
hough their standards; arc still considerably better than the average rural
i?ican's. Nevertheless-this provides a useful contrast to Europeans work-
ng in the copper-mines and expatriate officers in government institutions
ho expect to maintain living stauda:als well beyond the means o: tho
w affluent Africans.
Moreover, it appears than in additioL to their spartan lift the Chinese;
rc willing to devote much, of their Sparc time to welfare projects such as
epairing bridges, helping with harvests; and according to one N.C.N.A.'
eport of March 25, they also provide medical services, acupuncture and
ther forms of traditional Chinese medicine for local Africans. Successful
rcatnicnt of local ailments includes one outstanding cure of a five-year-old
1c?f mute.
Feasibility studics by British firms who laid the permanent way across
ndia, South Africa and much of Latin America, found the financial
ost of the railway too great and the economic returns too small; on the
Cher hand, China has igncre.l tic cost, putting politics to the fore on Ilia assumption that as a prestige project the railway would be an ideal
EeF~I's =Ar9 s: I - ~ ~9uOcha 94A0003000500
1-8
 CPYRGHT
ApproN
,ea or a ease - -
Chinese assistance is not only limited to the 1A i way.
The Friendship Tcxtild Mill, built with Chinese labour at a cost of ?3
million in the form of an interest-free loan, is turning out 90 million square
yards of cloth annually and is expected to make Tanzania self-sufficient
in cloth by the end of 1970. The mill, the first of its kind in Africa being
fully integrated and capable of printing patterns on cloth spun from locally
produced cotton, was completed in 18 months from design to finish and
is now operating with the minimum Chinese supervision and is providing
employment for 3,000 workers.
The Upcnja State Farm in Zanzibar, built on 1,300 acres of arable land
with Chinese assistance, is now producing rice, fruit and vegetables and !
poultry-meat on land previously thought unproductive. While in Somalia,
a Chinese hydro-geological survey team has been drilling wells and map-
ping Inc territory since March. 1969, and Chinese bicycles are on sale in f
Mogadishu.
This activity adds up to a new rise in Chinese influence in Africa which,
following the 1965 Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Algiers,. fell to its
lowest ebb and remained ineffective during much of the cultural revolution.
The mainspring of China's campaign to gain support in Africa began late
in 1966 with the formation of the Sino-Tanzanian shipping line and the. first of a new series of loans to African countries starting with U.S. $17
million to Zambia.
African opinion was generally apathetic and prior to 1967 in some states
it was positively hostile. Coups in Ghana, Dahomey. The Central African
Republic and. Burundi preceded the exit of Chinese personnel accused of
sabotage and subversion. Ghana's new Head of State at the time, General
Ankvah, emphasised China's efforts had been in setting up spy-schools,
military. training camps and instruction in sabotage in jungle camps
rather than agro-technical stations and rural industry.
Chinese involvement need not, however, be construed as part of a plot.
China is publicly committed to revolution in the region, but at the same
.time is willing to offer aid to countries who turn their eyes away from
U.S.-Soviet sources: The countries falling into this category are still few in
number and so quite a small fragment of China's resources allocated
for aid . against imperialism .can have a marked erect on recipient
territories. In 1968 China budgeted ?750,000 for African liberation move,
=cuts.
This dual personality China displays in Africa as a provider of aid
to non-aligned newly-emerged States on the one hand and as agent-
provocateur in the wars of liberation on the other means that no African
Head of State can ever be quite sure that the Chinese are on his side or if
they .are secretly plotting against him. Thus, Col. Bokassa of the Central
African Republic (C.A.R.), himself the recipient. of. a Chinese U.S. $4 }
million loan, could say realistically in July, 1967: 'To have peace one must
not admit the Chinese Into one's country because they teach subversion. I
tell you that the C.A.R. had in its territory a Chinese school for subversion
and even a military training camp'.
Westerners who tend to see the growing Chinese influence in Africa as a
curious mixture of the yellow peril and red menace seem to forget the
extent of Western assistance; for every Chinese technician there are ten or
twelve Westerners working on joint aid ventures. Perhaps the Africans are
more pragmatic than Europeans. China's aid, in any case, tends to be
piecemeal. Most aid is-in the form of long-term loans rather than direct';:
grants and since 1954 China ,has provided little more than U.S. $950
million. Zambia and Tanzania are the chief recipients of this aid. Since
1961 Tanzania received ?121 million. A further ?I17 million was promised
for rural - development. Ir contrast, in 1968 East African countries, ex-
cluding Tanzania and Zambia. received from Britain alone approximately
U.S. $56 million in bilateral grants and loans. ?
D1-8
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CPYRGHT
China's trade with Africa is not great; in 1962 it registered approximately
4 per cent of her total trade. In 1964 this was valued at U.S. 590 million.
By; 1968 this value had dropped to an estimated U.S. $74 million. Before
relations were severed with Ghana, trade agreements were signed for
inoroasas in two=way trada up to U.S. $12 million. But this sever ma.eria.-
lised, despite the exchange of Ghanalan industrial diamonds, grains and
cotton for Chinese machinery, fertilisers and agricultural products. Total
trade amounted to less than a quarter of the original estimates. Guinea's
five-year trade agreement suffered a similar fate.
In spite of China's cash -rant of U.S. $2.8 million in May, 1964, relations
with Kenya have never been good. Two Chinese diplomats and an
N.C.N.A. correspondent were expelled from Kenya for `interfering is
Kenya's internal affairs'. In June, 1967, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires
was expelled for attacking a speech by Tom Mboya In a Nairobi news-
paper. Red Guards retaliated with an attack on the Kenyan Embassy in
Peking. a few weeks later. In 1968, China accused Kenya of pursuing a
two-China's policy as a result of articles on Taiwan in the Kenyan press.
VWhen Tom Mboya was assassinated in July 5, this year, the Chinese
embassy was. the only mission that failed to fly its flag at half mast.
It is unlikely that China will improve her trading position among
African states. Even Chinese low-priced goods are too costly for un-
sophisticated rural markets and in any case they tend to compete with
local products. In countries such as Kenya where relatively buoyant markets
are available, relations have been soured by political failures. Because
of this China favours emphasis o--i small but well chosen projects.
The TANZAM line is a Jambi-: to recoup in the '70s the lost ground of
the, '60s. In the meantima, Peking will continue to focus its aid on
favoured recipients- such as the Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National
Union (Z.A.N.U.) which advocates hit-and-run tactics across the Zambian
border into Rhodesia, and the South African Pan African Congress
(PA.C.), trying at the same, time to block all Soviet in,.rference in what
China now considers her rightful sphere of infl'ience. This was evident at
the International Conference of Solidarity with the Freedom Fighters of
South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies, held in Khartoum in January.
19.69. China denounced this meeting as a 'Soviet revisionist plot'. Peking's
African allies were conspicuously absent from the meeting.
China's future position in Africa hinges on her capability of main-
taining friendly relations with African states with hostile political systems.
Coups and rumours of coups are endemic in developing Africa. Zambia
has had its share of rumours of a coup for some months now, and Peking
could be faced with a similar situation to Ghana, but with an expensive
railway line on her hands. The truth is that while ? China is trying to
sweep Africa with revolution, like the Soviet Union she remains willing
to pursue ties with bourgeois and military r6gimes In the economic
field China continues to maintain trade worth ?S' million a. year with
South Africa.
The time has come for, i eking to make up for lost ground. The
Chinese now have relations with nine African states south of the Sahara.
compare.1 with 12 in 1965. In this respect the railway and other projects
are gambles that have to pay off.
[Kieran P. Broadbent is a member of the staff, of. the. Commonwealth
Bureau of Agricultural Economics.]
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What puzzles Tanzania's friends, and scares its enemies, however, is China's role
as arms supplier and military adviser. Up to January of this year ,Canadians advised
the army, and trained Tanzania'i pilots. This arrangement was not totally satisfactory
because of Canada's membership of Nato- which Tanzania accuses of arming Portugal
with weapons to. suppress African guerrillas. Sweden and Czechoslovakia were..mcn-
tioned as alternatives, and it was pointed out that Italy is training the Zambian ail`
force. It soon-became clear, however,'that it was China. that would fill the gap. Naval
and air force personnel 'went to China for training, and Chinese engineers began work
on a naval base in Dares Salaam harbour. They had already biuilt'.several army
barracks.
All these mcasures'nre being taken in preparation for`what Tanzanians believe will
be an eventual armed confrontation' with the south. Their greatest fear in fact is of a
Rhodesian, South African or Portuguese pre-emptive strike.""(It has been. reported
that the Chinese have warned them not to provoke one at this stage; the present low
level of 'freedom fighting' in Africa -except in the Portuguese .territories.-- suggests
this advice may have been offered, and heeded. President Kaunda even denies
harbouring any guerrilla bases in Zambia, although this *is patently untrue. But it
would be naive in the extreme to imagine that in the' long run the Chinese will be a
restraining influence.)
The African guerrillas welcome Chinese help, but they are at pains to point out
that they are first and foremost nationalists. Just as President Nyerere tries to balance
the Chinese by western advisers, so the guerrilla groups make much of the assistance
they receive from private groups in America and Britain, and government contribu-
tions from Sweden. .
Supporting the guerrilla groups gives the Chinese the.chance to engage in political
indoctrination in the training camps, particularly those remote from Dar es Salaam
and Lusaka. They undoubtedly have made some useful converts. But Chinese penetra-
tion of Zambia may not be as far advanced as some western observers fear. . ,.,
TIMES OF ZAMBIA
29 October 1970
CPYRGHT
In the Western world's Britain to sit ba-cl~ and
consistent devaluation dread the myth of
of its own political Chinese expansion in
TI33'RF is little doubt
that the world's eyes
will be focussed on
Tanzania and Zambia
to see if what they
expect to happen as a
result of the generous
gesture by the People's
Republic of China to
finance a railway link-
ing the two countries
does, in fact, come
about.
Indeed, what they are
saying is to see to what
extent China's manipu-
lation of African states;
is more crafty than
that of people who
in
erest.
have been with us for notions of the West
many decades. It is all very well. for ' about the real meaning
tbproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001 8
s; us, which imrnedia-
telyy gives room to the
o v c r - estimation of
Chinese effectiveness,
we are not competent
to intervene. But - we
can only say that the
West must surely be
the best judge of its
own capabilities.
This thought process of
the West must also
best be summed up as
"condescending" and
somewhat insulting in
its under - estimi.tinn
Africa. Perhaps if the
Chinese are as politi-
cally crafty as the
West credits tlhem, then
they in i t h t have
already taken a leaf
out of the now
unscrambled British:
Empire
The predictable politi-
cian does not get very
far. The West must
have made its predic-
tions about Chinese
intentions in this part
of the world, It cannot
of the African leaders' ring true that the
ability to choose what ' Chinese would be as
they consider to be in ' naive as to give cred-
once to the wild
their national i
t
 APPr 1Tor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
of their gesture in this
railway project.
1n all this there is one
man, in addition to the
Chinese people, to
vj'itiM the %ambian
people owe a debt of
gratitude. It is Mwali-
mu Julius N'yerere,
President of Tanzania.
He has been unflinching
in his determination 4w
-get us out of a predi-
cament that can only
be the inevitable
concomitant . to our
land-locked geographi-
cal position.
EAST AFRICAN STANDARD
27 October 1970
Last, but not least, we
would draw attention
to a recent picture
story publshed in an
East African news-
"The
%' ron'~sed L,and." It has
the following caption:-
"Wall posters in Peking
call for volunteers, to go
to Tanzania to help build
the Tanzania railway line,
in this picture issued by
the Irsinltua news tr;,ency.
Thin poster being ktudied
by workers calls for volun-
teers to come forward in
their thoutsattds.
'.Those workers who
decide to settle in Africa?
after the said task is coin-
pleted will reccivo good
land and houses for them-
Kelvei4 and their fitrniiies.
Similar calls for volunteers
are taking place through-
out China.
"This photolfru~)+h was
contributed by Dr Eiieg-
mund Brauncr, of the
German-Af inean Society,
which works to build
frlndship - between East
Africa and East Germany."
It may be worth our
leaders trying to dis-
cover the authenticity
.of this article. How
they do it is not for us
to say.
si r'e
CPYRGHT
Approved For RO
Tanzanians and Zarnbiaiis are; naturally jubilant over
Tazara, the new name for the Tanzain rail link, and the
Chinese join in the general satisfaction.
This venture is the most ambitious overseas aid project launched
by the Chinese People's Republic and the first of any uia?.nitudo on
the African mainland. When fiiniFhcd, in about five years time, the
1,056-mile railroad will be the longest built by the Chinese inside or
outside their own country. Paradoxically, it has been left to them ?
to carry through a 1>restigioua scheme bandied about by Western
concerns for decades, just as the Russians stcpped in, when the World
)lank -and the U.S. withdrew, to construct the Aswan Dam.
Tho circumstances which gave impetus to the project are widely
known - Zambian isolation aftcr the Rhoiicsian U.1) 1. Surveys were
undertaken before U.D.L., with the object of linking the Zambian and
Fast African networks, c-xpanduhg the opportunities for trade between
the two areas.
British cthginers commissioned in 1952 to make a survey found
no insurmountable obstacle. After all, the British forged the Mombasa-
Kisumu railway 70 years ago, without all the modern aids to hearing,
excavating, )eveliing, bridging and so on, besides the medical and
other welfare facilities for the thousands of workers. The British
cng.,ineers relied for labour on Africans and imported Indians, some
of whom stayed behind when the work was finished, founding families
living chiefly in t{enya.
'this was the origin of the' Asian problem which confronts the
Kcnvan and British Ciovcrpntents today. Several thousand Chinese
workers have bccn sent to Tanzania and Zambia. There is no reliable
evidence to. prove the Chincsc Government has this colonial type of
African ;wnetration in mind.'
A picture allegedly slhowing Peking wall posters appealing for
volunteers to heap build tits railway, and promising land and houses
for those ici:o wi>ih to stay on, has bccn denounced as false propaganda,
circulated by the C.I.A. and not the Hsinhua News Agency, as indicated
in the caption. Whatever the truth of this incident may be, the Gov-
crnments of ilia two countries will not be anxious to repeat the massive
political and human errors committed in fast Africa, bcyucatlhed on
today's independent countries by the British railroad pioneers, even
though they acted in good faith and could not foresee the consequences.
Both the World Bank and a U.N. study undertaken soon after
Tanzanian independence found against the Tanzam project on economic
grounds. Zambia would be enabled to export copper, it was argued,
but what would the trains carry hack from Dar cs Salaam? It is
honied the successful completion of Taira will swell the trade between
Zambia and Last Africa, So many items, including agricultural produce,
consumed in Zambia today but imported from South Africa because
of the special conditions caused by the geographical situation could
te~544999/Q81 Tanzania 4A000&
l 9@l 60001
to loin.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
(THE ECONC LIST)
FOREIGN REPORT
29 October 1970
CPYRGHT
Peking's : `Trojan' horse' ?in'' frlca
The ceremonies in Dar es Salaam this week to mark the start of construction o t e
Tanzania-Zambia railway have put the spotlight on China's mounting influence in
Africa. The railway is being financed by a long-term, interest-free loan from Peking of
approximately ?169 million; it is the biggest aid project the Chinese have ever under-
taken. There is little doubt that China hopes the railway will be both a Trojan horse
for Chinese trade and a conveyor belt for the spread of Mao's thinking.
To some extent the project marks a' shift in, Peking's ' 15'olicy; towards Africa. -The
excesses of the cultural revolution prompted several'African states to sever .diplomatic
relations with 1?eking,' on the ground 'that Chinese agents were. engaging in ?subvcrsive
activities on African territory. Peking decided at this stage to combat western and
Russian influence by concentrating on a few selected countries.' F',
Tanzania is -one of the chief of these. 'Even before the railway deal was fixed, -Peking-
had become involved in about 20 aid projects in that country. But what the ,Chinese,
wanted was' a major prestige' project - something that would :parallel the Russians'
building of the;Aswan Dam. The Tanzania-Zambia rail line was the answer.
So far the Chinese ~ there are 6,000-of.them -have behaved impeccably in Tanzania
and Zambia; they seem content to let their political ambitions wait, for 20 years. if
necessary. They were fully aware of the initial handicaps they had to overcome.
Indeed, in 1965 the Zambians were so suspicious"ofChina (whose.embassy had been
expelled from nearby Burundi for subversion] that, they refused to let the preliminary:
rail survey team enter Zambian'. territory; the first report was' confined to 'the Tan-'
zanian section. President Kaunda, -dragged his feet for nearly two years, 'I presumably
hoping for a late counter-offer from the west, which never came, before entering into
an agreement.
Today China finds itself the major aid giver to both Tanzania and Zambia, and
sole military adviser and chief arms, supplier to 'I'anzania.A'Lcommodity, agreement
tied to the railway loan indicates that China will replace Britain as the two African
countries' most important trading partner. Meanwhile, the two countries' support for
the liberation struggle enables the 'Chinese to maintain close contact with southern
African guerrillas.
But China's presence is balanced by that of other aid-giving' nations, notably Canada
and the Scandinavian countries (whom Dr Nyerere often praises). The Tanzania-
Zambia highway is being built by a western consortium including USAID (United
States Aid for International Development). And, to underline the Tanzanians' prag-
matic approach, an American business efficiency team is , currently advising the
Tanzanian state trading corporation and the development planning ministry. There
is not a single Chinese adviser in any ministry in either Dar es Salaam or Lusaka. Very
few senior officials of any sort go to' China for training, partly because it has been
found difficult to integrate them into. the administration when' they return..
Nor are the Chinese particularly popular with local people. They appear humourless
and aloof, and they do not mix. Those Tanzanians who have been to' china for training
complain of condescending behaviour on the part of their hosts.';
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
CPYRGHT
Lil?,i;.ed by air, pipeline, road and rail
immediately after' U.D.I., we Canadians, British and Americans
oivratcd an emergency airlift of oil and 'other vital supplies into
Zambia, besides taking out copper. Subsequently, the hell run"
started. Tar,z.:ads: and Zambia got to;;;,thcr, with an Italian company.
to run articu]a all trucks tr sporting eta $Ua ta$ 12 00i1 to tt a month
it the peak. Tho oil pipa1lna was 1a1d, with ital~an help, and the
highway from Dar cs Salaam to Tunduma started, with loans from
Sweden and the U.S.
In addition to the airways, Zambia will ultimately have the
combination of the oil pipeline, railway and trunk road as outlets
through friendly country to the Indian Ocean, instead of having to
'depend on the ovar]and route via the enemy territories of Rhodesia
and i'oru.,guesc-hcid Mozambique or South Africa.
After the World Bank had turned down the project, the British
and Canadians were approached for help. A joint survey formed the
opinion that the railroad was both feasible and an economic proposi-
tion. but nothing practical materialised. - It was at this juncture that the
two nci~hbours turned to the Chinese. Their tripartite agreement was
signed ut Peking a 1'cttte over three years ago. The Chinese had
responded with alacrity. Alter the terms had been agreed and the
paper work finished. they began at once to scud io 'ocul'ars and
technicians, with equipment for the ~rorkshops and buUdirg the line.
1 he cost is estimated at the colossal figure of ?169,000,000, for
4thich the Chinese Goverornen has made available a loan repayable
over a p~ricd of 30 years, without interest. The internal costs, includ-
ing indigenous labaur sad materi.ls, wit] amount io rather more than
half the total f; cr.:. These will be defrayed by the generation of local
crcJit arisi tg from the parcht?se of `tines: goods. Manufactured
rd racessed acrict:1hi r.l produce have begun to appear in
Ur.
a
."
i-
th shops. Stocks will become greater as more consumer goods are
imported and, as a result of the visit of a Tanzanian State Trading
Corporation mission to Peking, Chinese vehicles and machinery are
bought. It follows-axiomatically that such an enormous increase in
imparts from China, to build up 'radii as part of the loan will mean
curtailing nmports of similar goads frortt other countries; though
Tanzania and Zambia will still hope to continue tradini? with them,
or else the Chinese local credit cannot ba created as envrsaged. When
repayments start in 1973, the two" countries wit} have their railway
for the low cost of about E2,700,00t} annuallyy, which tl+cy will share,
roprea(1 ever vcnrti whvn money at today`s valut s will altnnrt certainly
i,avu sniaciil:d,
WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1970
TANZAM RAILROAD COULD ENHANCE PEKING'S ROLE IN AFRICA
CPYRGHT
DAR I;S SALAAM, Tanza-
nia-Driving a spike into a
railroad tic hardly seems
like n political act. But it
may he so here. The Chinese
,Communists are building a
railway through Tanzania
Into Zambia that could
change the politics of Africa
far more than its economics.
Ceremonies recently at
the two terminals-Dar es
Salaam on the Tanzania
coast of the Indian Ocean.
and Kapiri ?1poshi on the
copper belt in Zambia-offi-
ciofly Inaugurated .construc-
tion of the 1,056-mile rail-
road. the greatest foreign
aid project ever. attempted
act promis$ one simple po?
litical gqinatjc;c. It will free
black 1,itnil)ia from its de.
pendent-4 on white southern
Af?iea, especially for the ex?,
pord,?nf iTs copper. Isconomi?
cally, tile'. of white
Af?ic,i;Yhll, do the Job for
Zamb'iti . Politically, how.
ever, they have become un?
pnintabre.
For the Chine-se. the ntoti-
vatioit 'is not as clear and
slmple.,?But the railroad will
give the Chinese enormous
presence and potential influ.
ence ;ifs? nn area that could
become vital if there ever is
a race war between white
and black Africa.
other foreign county in the
world. In fact, the only
larger Chinese Communist
groups elsewhere are mili-
tary units in North Vietnam
and Laos.
In strict financial terms,
the Chinese project is an ex-
ample of extremely gener-
ous forcian assistance.
The Chinese are financing
the project with a $400 mil-
lion. interest-free. loan that
Tanzania and Zambia will
pay back over 30 years, be
ginning in 1083. Considering
the interest that $400 mil.
lion would earn by the 21st
Century. the loan is prticti-
cally a gift.
Fur trite 4 Cricar s, the prof. already have more w ceo? In the past decade, West.
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Lank, opposed construction
of the railway on two
rounds:
First, Zambia already had
an outlet to the sea through
the Rhodesian and Portu-
guese African rail sgait'tens
and, second, an Amertcan-
built tarred road from Tan-
zania to the Zambian copper,
belt, scheduled for comple-
tion next year, would enable
Zambia to export all the
copper it wanted through
lack Africa.
But these strict economic
8rguments Ignored both pol-
itics and history.
As a Tanzanian govern-
ment press release put it
last week, the Western
world had "forgotten that
elsewhere many similar
schemes were undertaken
regardless-of immediate eco?.
nomic benefits.
As an example, the -gov-
ernment cited the first rail-
road in cast Africa, the
Uganda Railway built by the
British from the Indian
Ocean to Lake Victoria at
the turn of the century.
That railroad. which
moved through undeveloped
tribal lands, was derided in
the British Parliament at
the time as "a gigantic
folly" and "a railway with
two ends and no middle."
The British government,
however justified it on polit-
ical grounds. Ministers said
the railway would end the
caravan slave trade and
would enable the' British,
rather than the Germans, to
control the source of the.
Vile River.
In the end, the railway,
had an even more Important
political result. It opened
Kenya to white settlement"
and made that country 'the
only "white man's colony
in cast Africa.
In the opening ceremonies
for, the Chinese ra'.lway in
liar es Salaam last week,'
President Kenneth ICaunda
ofZnmbia dealt With one of
the major political problems
of the railway-ruspielon of
the Chinese.
Kaunda said Western op-
poncnts of the railway had
"a rather psychopathic fear
of the intentions and objec-
tives of the Chinese." He
dismissed this, as -arro-
gance."
'-The Chinese people are
our friends," he said, "and
they will remain so as loner
as it is to the benefit of our
respective peoples."
Kaunda also told the .
Chinese delegation on the
platform that the Africans
"pledge to fight malicious
campaigns being waged
against the railway by the
detractors."
An example of the kind of
campaign ICaunda had In
mind came up recently In a
Nairobi newspaper. The
newspaper published a pic-
ture that showed a recruiter
in :China promising volun-
teers free land in Tanzania
if they would ' work on the
railroad there. The 'Chinese
government has denounced
the photograph as phony
and diplomats here agree.
The fabricated photo.
graph, -however, did awaken'
fears some Africans and
many outsiders have about
the numbers of Chinese
coming to Africa. Already
4,700 Chinese are at work on
the railroad alongside 7,000
Africans. The number of Chinese should reach 6,000
by the end of the year.
The photo also recalled
another historical. problem
of railway building In east
Africa.
To build their railway, the
British imported 32,000 In-
dian coolies at the turn of
the century. Of these. 2,500
died in Kenya and 6..5001)(1-
i too sick to work, The
British returned the slck-
coolies and 16.000 healthy;
ones to India. But .7,000.?re
mained to settle in cast Af-
rica and become the nucleus
of the resented Asian minor-
ity that controls much of the
commerce of cast Africa
today.
tt'hen the Chinese project
was first announced.; many
Western skeptics did not he- s
lieve they could do the job.
It took the British twice,
as long as they intended and
it cost them twice what they
expected to build their rail-
way. But the British were
slowed by lions that ate 28
Indian workers and two
British supervisors. warring
tribesmen who stole rails to
make spears and telegraph
wire to make necklaces, and
terrible climate, terrain and
disease. .
The Chinese also will face
difficult problems in push-
ing their railway through
mountainous terrain a n d
trop cal climate. But. they
actually are ahead of sched-
ule.
Although the o f f i c i a l
opening was celebrated last,
week, the Chinese began
work several months ago.
More than 100 miles of
bridges, culverts and em-
banknt'ents have been bulk.
all ready for the laying of
rail.
The belting now is the
Chinese will finish the job
by their target data of Ia7A._J
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8
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NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Z ric.h_ _
8 November 1970
Die c1iiinceische Eieeubahtzx in Herz Afrika s
Verbindung des sambischen Copperbelt durch. Tansania
mit derv lrulischen 1)zctrri
Rasches It ortschreiten
der Bauarbeiten
CPYRGHT 'Le. Dar es Salaam, Ende Oktober
lithe - vor allcni amerikanische - Diplomaten in
liar es Salaam mit cincm Ausdruck milder Ueber-
legenhcit zur Kcnntnis, wenn von den Chinesen
and ihren Pienendie Rede war, eine Uber 1800 knt
lange Eisenbahn von der Hauptstadt Tansanias
durch das toils sumpfige, teils gebirgige and uner-
schlossene Hinterland, kurz durch sehr schwie-
rigcs Gclendc bis nach Kapiri Mposhi zu baucn,
wo sic AnschluB an das sambische Bahnnetz haben
soil. Man zwcifelte daran, ob die Chinesen genu-
gend technische Voraussetzungen and technisches
Gcrat besitzen, urn ein solches Projekt zu verwirk-
lichen, this nach'ciner Studie der Weltbank un-
wirtschaftlich sein soil and deswegen als nicht
unterstutzungswurdig erachtet wurde. Im ubrigen
werde, so wurdc eingewandt, cin gutes Jahrzehnt
vergchen, bis die Arbeiter and Techniker Mao
Tsetungs den crsten Zug uber these Strecke laufen
lasscn konntcn. Was abcr konne alles in dieser
Zeit geschchen? Bis dahin werde die Stra a zwi-
schen Dar es Salaam and Lusaka, fiber die das
Kupfcr aus Sumbia an die Kiiste transportiert wcr-
men konne, mit' schwedischer, italienischer and
amcrikanischcr Hilfc asphaltiert scin. Im Verlaufc
diescr Zcit konntcn der President Sambias, Ken-
neth Kaunda, unit scin Kollege in Tansania, Julius
Nyercrc, davon ! uberzcugt werden, daB sic mit
ihrem Bahnprojekt auf das falsche Pferd gesetzt
hetten.
Tcchnisc1ic Leistnngsfuhigkcit
der Chinesen
Damals wic hcute wci13 man im Grunde'recht
wenig fiber das kommunistische China. Man denkt
in der Regel an gewaltige Hcere von Kulis, die in
Fronarbeit mit primitiven Wcrkzcugen uniibersch
bare Erdinassen bewcgcn and in technischar Hin-
sicht ctwa dort stchen sollen, wo der Wcstcn vor
rund fiinfzig Jalren stand. Man hat uber China
inrwischcn zwar cinigcs hinzugelernt, zum Bcispicl,
da13 seine Techniker Wasscrstolfbomhen herstellen
and Lnngstrcckenraketen Uber riesige Distanzen
schicl3en k6nnen.; Aber auch wcr Gclcgenheit hatte,
die Chinesen self 1967, als die crsten Geologen
and Balu-expcrten das Trassec festzulcgen and zu
vermessen bega-inen, in Tansania zu bcobachtcn,
mutate seine Vorstellung von der technischen R(ick-
stlindigkcit der Untcrtanen Maos zicmlich rasch
and grundlich revidicren.
Inzwischen sand in Ostafrika nach nffi71e11en
CPYRGHT
gebracht wvrden - and mat ilinen n-ouerncs tcch-
nischcs Gerat wie Erdbcwcgungsmaschincn, Trak-
toren, Stahltriiger fur Brucken sowic Bohrmaschi-
nen fur den Tunnelbau. Schon jetzt sind die Chine-
sen mit ihrem Prograrnm betrechtlich weiter voran,
Sie haben bereits etwa 110 Brricken fertiggestellt
and auf weiten Strecken Demme aufgeschUttet. In
der Niihe von Dar es Salaam.soll noch im kom-
menden Monat mat der Herstellung von Beton-
schwellen begonnen werden, wobci mit cincm tag
lichen AusstoB von 2000 Stuck gerechnet wird.
Die gegenwertigen Berechnungen schen vor, daB
die Strecke in etwa vier Jahren betriebsbereit sein
werde.
Verpaf3tc Chance des Westens?
Am 26. Oktober hat Kaunda vor den Toren
Dar es Salaams in Gegenwart des chinesischen
Ministers fur auswartige . Handelsbeziehungen,
Fang Yi, den Grundstein fur dieses gewaltige Un-
tcrnchmen gclegt. Kaunda streifte dabei in seiner
Rede kurz die Vorgescl-ichte des Projckts: eine
Studic der Weltbank, die zu dem Ergcbnis kam,
daB die Balm unokonomisch and den Aufwand
nicht wort sci - tine spetcre Studic, die von der
kanadisch-amcrikanischcn Firma Maxwell Stamp
nngcfertigt wurdc, sci allcrdings zum gegentci-
ligen I igchnis gckommen; uber alie Ueherrcdungs-
Die dynamische Aktivitet der Chinesen in Tan-
Kihin1 1141101 n-ihls pen11141: ill) Wtstcn sc- CC
allerorten auf ki hle Ablehnung gcstoBcn. Der
Weston habe den Fchler gemacht, das Projekt nur
nach wirtschaftliehen Gesichtspunkten zu bcurtei-
len, and die besondere wirtschaftliche Lage Sam-
bias als Binnenland, das von feindlichen Nach-
barn umgeben sci, nicht sehen wollen. Moglichcr-
weise sci these ablehnende Haltung auch aus.cpoli-
tischen and ideologischcn? Motiven zu erkliiren,
aus Rilcksicht auf Sidafrika, Rhodesien and Por-
tugal. Besonders GroBbritannien hielt Kaunda die I
avested interests im aweiBcnu, sudlichen Afrika
vor, die durch das Bahnprojekt gestort wvrden..
Sambia musse sich aber langsam von der wirt-
schaftlichen Abhangigkcit gegeni ber dem si d-
lichen Afrika losen, wobci mehr die politischen
als die okonomischen Faktoren im Vordergrund
stn nden. Im ubrigen stehe es Tansania and Sam-
bia frei, sich seine Helfer sclbcr zu wahlcn -
auch seine Freunde and seine Feinde. Dem Ver-
trag mit Peking fiber den Eisenbahnbau liege die
Zusicherung Kgegenseltlger Aclitung and Nicht-
einmischungzx zugrunde. Also bestche aller An1aB,
den Chinesen dankbar zu sein. Es konne kcin
Zweifel mchr darubcr bestchen, daB das Projekt
verwirklicht werde.
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 CPYRGHT
AW 9
ecAir rf ~nV~e?i FRO
'den der damalige amerikanische AuBenminister
John Foster Dulles nicht zu interessieren war. Der
Auftrag zum Dammbau an die Sowjets offnete
diesen zunachst den Wag zu eincr wirtschaftlichcn
Penetration Aegyptens and schlieBlich zu mili-
tarischem and politisehem EinfluB, der nicht nur
auf Kairo bcschr5nkt geblicben ist, sondern sich
auf die melsten Under des arablselaen Raum?s
crstrcckt, dies in eincrn MaBe, daB Moskau sich
nicht nur wichtige strategische Basen gesichert hat,
sondern auch in der Lagc ist, in der Auseinander-
setzung mit Israel ein entscheidendes Wort mitzu-
radon.
P'est etablierte chincsische Priiscnz
Achnlich ki nntcn sich die Dinge in Tansania
and in Sambia unter chinesischer Regic entwik-
kcln; denn in Tansania beschrankt sich Peking
nicht nur auf die Finanzicrung and den Bau ciner
Eisenbahn, sondern hat auch andere Projcktc Uber-
nommen and bildct schlieBlich die Landarmee,
die Luftwaffe and die Kriegstnarinc aus. Peking
ist auch auf den Wunsch der tansanischen Regie-
rung nach modernen Waffen wie DOsenj lgern
gegen mogliche Bedrohungen durch die Portu-
giescn eingcgangcn - ein Wunsch, den Endo
letzten Jahres cine kanadische Militarkommission
ablehnte, da cin solches Instrument vial zu kost-
:,pici:g sti, die Ausbildung viel zu lange_daucre
9Gi+iaRp113r ePIVOhFiriANOWiCbhtttlErit?
nicht entspreche. Diese Tatsachen Sind sicherlich
auch den Chinesen bekannt. Aber wie bci den
Sowjets in Aegypten stehen auch bei ihnen in
Ostafrika politische Aspekte im Vordcrgrund. Sic
werden daher in KUrze Diisenjdger an Tansania
liefern, well sie wissen, daB dadurch bis in unab-
sehbars Zit Instruktoren, Berater and teehnische
Assistenten unerlhBlich scin werden.
Man wird daher wohi auf Jahrzehnte hinaus
mit einer chinesischen Priisenz in Tansania and
Sambia zu rechnen h4ben, die sicherlich auch ihre
Ausstrahlungen auf die Nachbarli nder ausubcn
durfte. Nicht nur starkt sie den ROcken der Afri-
kaner im Kampf gegen die portugiesische Herr- i
schaft in Mocambique and in Angola, sondern sie
verschafft ihnen in Ostafrika auch eine propa-
gatidistische Basis in eutem MaBe, wie as ihncn
bisher iri keinem Tail des schwarzen Kontinents zu
errichten gelungen ist. Zwar mogen die Zusiche-
rungen der cgegenseitigen Achtung and Nichtcin-
mischungx, den Priisidentcn Nyerere and Kaundti:
geniigen; doch besteht dabei die Gefahr, daB beide
sich einem na'iven Wunschdenken hingeben, wenn
sie glauben, daB Peking nur aus Motiven briider-
licher Nachstenliebc gegenubcr carmen and aus-
gebcuteten schwarzen Briidern? handle. Wenn
dcrartigo I3esorgnisse in Dar as Salaam geliuBert
warden, bckommt man allerdingc von den Tan-
niern immcr w`c"'er die
:ht unbcrechtibtc Ant-
)rt an hi ran, dalI cs
der Weston in der
and gchabt hlitte, den
hincscn den Zugang zu
irsperren, daB aber jetzt.
ese Chance vertan sci.
Subversive
Ausstraahlttngcn
Arts dent Kongo-Kin-
iasa ist aus zuverlas-
gen Quellen zu erfah-
:n, dab scit Bcginn die-
s Jahres schon wicder
zinesische Waffen Ober
,an Tanganjikasee zum
':'csttifer im Bercich von
"izi geschmuggelt , war-
on. in den Jahrcn der
ongolesischen Rebellion,
as 11cil3t von 1964 bis
966, waren die Chinescn
?ic Hauptwaffcnlicferan-
-n tier Aufstlindischen
,nd henutzten Schlcich-
tegc ' von Bujumbura in
lurundi and von Kigoma
.nt Ostufer des Tanga-
rjika?,ces aus. Die Halb-
nsel vor Fizi am Tanga-
ijikasee war das letztc
PVidcrstandsnest der Re-
,ctlen, das 1966 von wci-
len Siildnern unter dem
:iidalrikaner Mike Hoare
nach hartem Kampf aus-
;ehohcn wurde. Man
`and damals cin gan-
tes Arsenal von chinesischen. Waffen: schwere l wird 1859 Kilometer betragen. Man bat die sam-
Anschinengewehre, schwere Minenwerfer, Hand- { hindhe S urwcitc von 1,064 Metern gewahlt, was
II ~9~O419~1A 941300 9i90A~- -
Appr wea Fi?n Re4 ase 1999/09/02
Zwar ist der Kongo-Kinshasa haute gegen Auf-
itando nicht mchr so anfiillig. Aber die Chinesen
ilanen in alien ihrcn Untcrnehmungen auf lange
cit. Und die gegenwiirtigc Lagc im Kongo
ki nnte sich auf allzu afrikanischc Art Oar Nacht
andcrn. Die a Bcfreiungsbewrgungeno im sud-
lichen Tansania, die gegen die Portugicsen in
Mocambique opcrieren, werden schon seit Jahrcn _
mit chinesischen- Waffen vcrsorgt, and offenbar
hat die tansanischd Regicrung selbst scit langem
die Kontrollc dariihcr verloren, wieviel milita-
risches Gcriit aus'Pcking in ihr Land gelangt.
Von besondcrem Gewicht rind naturlich die
wirt haftlichen interessen Pekings. In crstcr Linic
is( da der Kupferreichtum Sambias zu erwiihnen;
aber auch die noch uncrschlosscnen Eisenerz- and
Kohlenvorkoinmen in den siidlichcn Landcstcilcn
Tansanias dtirflen mitspiclcn, wie auch die groBe
Viclfalt tropischer Agrarprodukte. Durch den An-
schlUB an das sambischo Eisenbahnnetz stellt die
tacuc Liuie nicht her einc lcistungsfabige Verbin-
dung zwischen dam Indischen Ocean and dam
sambischen Copperbelt dar, sondern daruber hin-
aus noch mit der Schatzkammer des kongolesi-
schen Katanga. Zudcm glaubt man in Peking wohl
schwcrlich an die Aufrechterhaltung des Status quo
,in Afrika, sondern rilstet sich vermutlich mit
Geduld auf einen allmlihlichen Zerfall der weil3en
Herrschaft in den Landern sudlich des- Sambesi.
- -- - ---------
Tcclutische Aspekto
Zu der fcieriichen Grundstdinlegung in Dar as
Salaam wurden von dem tansanischen Informa-
tionsministerium zum erstenmal cinige nahere An-
gabcn and Zahlen Ober das Eisenbahnprojekt ver-
i ffentlicht. Die Lange der Strecke von Dar es
Salaam bis nach Kapiri Mposhi in Sambia, wo sic
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rcil+ hesleltrndrn Oslafriknni+chcn I kenbahn ver-
arndel tvc'rden kaum, die fiber c:inc tit)1u?w610 von
nur einent Aleter verliil;l. In men offiziellen Infor-
nmli+nttihGillrrn winl atevchlit7.t, d:ilt %lie neuo
i.kenlwhn rifle Kapazililt unit 1,75 Millirnarn Tim-
1101 1171n?li 1, in l cider Kiehlufl);en werdu hewiilli-
gets 01111011. 11'i+hrend der I lulirluw der t,4tal?r]-
1?+tsi?, lell 1 +~,?,t{q~ltn, n nUl' Iatit 611(.11) (iewicht v(1 1)
.41 Kilo (+t,ti Nli'wt heln',I,'( werdcu knurl. eull Ilie
ncuc Tansania-Zambia Railroad (abgekUrzt
Tazara) 45 Kilo l3clastung pro Meter aufnehmen
konnen. Man rechnet mit Hochstgeschwindigkei-
ten bis zu 100 km/h, wahrend auf den ostafrika-'
nischen Linien nicht schnellcr als mit 60 km/h
gcfahren wcrden.darf.
Abecschen davon, data Sambia nach Fertig-,
stcllung der Tazara auf die portugiesische Eisen-
bahn nach Beira vcrzichten kann, wird sic..
auch das Hinterland von Tansania erschlicBen, in
dem reiche Eisen- and Kohlevorkommen pro-
spekticrt worden sired. AuBcrdem erhofft man sich
ncuc landwirtschaftliche Anbauflachen im Rufiji-
Tal, das bis dahin 'wegen seiner verkehrstech-'
nischen Unzugiinglichkeit praktisch brachlag. Am
Streckenbau sand gegenwartig nach den offizicllen
Angaben insgesamt 12 000 Arbeiter and Techniker
beschuftigt, wovon 4700 Chinesen. Man erwartet,.
daB sick these Zahi noch auf 20 000 Arbcitcr and
{{ Techniker, crhi. hien werde..,
Kredit and Im-iportzwang
Peking hat Tansania and Sambia fiir den Bahn-
b u cincn zinsfreien Kredit von 2 866 000 000 Wn-
sanisch. n Shilling (rued 1,5 Milliarden Schweizcr-
franken) eingeriiumt. Die Ruckzahlunccn sollcr.
1953 beginners and sick fiber einen Zeiirawn von
30 Jahren erstreeken. Die ortliehen Kosten (fecal
costs) werden auf 52 Prozent des Kredites berech-
net, die von den Regierungen Tansanias and Sam-
bias durch Import chinesischer Waren auf Grund
eincs ((Commodity credit agrecmentp aufgebracht
werden sollen.
Nach den Informationsblattern soil die bereits
angelaufene Einfuhr chinesischer Gebraucltsgiiter
(Spielzeug, Porzellan, Textilien usw.) nicht erhi ht
werden, sondern man will vielmehr sogenannte
IKapitalgiiter wie Baumaterialicn importieren,
deren Gesamtwert sich etwa auf 200 Millionen
tansanische Shilling pro Jahr (etwa 110 Millionen
Franken) belaufen dUrfte. Peking wird auch das
Rollmaterial fur die Bahn liefern. Die Kosten dUrf-
ten etwa 20 Prozent der Gesamtausgaben aus-
marten. Die Au'wendungen fur den Ausbau des
11a/ens von Dar es Salaam werden von den Chine-
sen nicht finanzicrt.. Gcgcnwlirtig existieren nur
drei. Piers Air i tochsceschiffc. Drei weitcrc sind
abet bereits im Ilau; zwci zuslitzliche sired geplant.
Sobald diu 1?isenbahn in 13etrieb genommen scin
wind, 8laubt maul ucht his zelin weilcrc Piers mit
t,ticzicllen Vurht{lccinriclUuall en z.u hcui tigen, vor
allrm flit Itrutlo Mnn,cnl;tnfratcLlcr, diu hpeziell
flit men 'i'rumu+lsnrl Von I:rznn einl,crlcLlcI hind,
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
8 November 1970
CPYRGHTCHINESE GAIN INFLUENCE THROUGH RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION
Three or four years ago many western diplomats' in Dar es Salaam,
especially Americans, wore expressions of mild superiority while
listening to Chinese plans to build a railroad in Tanzania.
was to be more than 1800 kilometers long and extend from the Tanzanian
capital through hinterland that was either swampy or mountainous or
inaccessible, through difficult terrain, to join the Zambian railroad
system at Kapiri' Mposhi. There was, some doubt that the Chinese had
sufficient technical qualifications and equipment to carry out such a
project. After all, following a study showing it to be economically
unfeasible, the World Bank had refused financial backing. Furthermore,
it was argued that it would take Mao Tse-tung's workers and technicians
at least a decade before they could run their first train on this road.
How much could happen during that time? By then the Dar es Salaam-
Lusaka highway, over which copper could be brought to the coast,
would have been paved with Swedish, Italian and American aid. In that
time Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda and his Tanzanian colleague
Julius Nyerere could become convinced that they had backed the wrong
horse in choosing the train project.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
CPYRGHT
Chinese Technical Skill
Then as now very little was known about communist China. As
a rule we tend to think of tremendous hordes of coolies doing compulsory
labor with primitive tools on endless masses of land; we'think of them
being technically where we in the west were about 50 years ago. Of
course we have learned a little more about them in the meantime; for
instance we know that their technicians can build hydrogen bombs and
propel long-range missiles over tremendous distances. But anyone
who had the opportunity to see the first geologists and railroad experts
mark out and survey the line in Tanzania quickly had to revise his ideas
about archaic technical knowledge in Mao Tse-tung's subjects.
In the meantime, according to official figures, some 4700 Chinese
have crossed the ocean. With them they have brought modern technical
equipment like earth moving machines, tractors, steel girders for
bridges as well as drilling machines for tunnel building. The Chinese
are already considerably farther along in their program than western
experts had anticipated. They have already finished some 110 bridges
and thrown up dams over long stretches. By next month they are sup-
posed to start on the manufacture of concrete blocks near Dar es Salaam.
and figure on producing 2000 per day. Current calculations picture the
stretch in operation in about four years.
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 CPYRGHT
DAppr&\ edsEaroRelEtasOA99S 9tQ2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
On 26 October Kaunda laid the cornerstone for this tremendous
undertaking at the gates of Dar es Salaam in the presence of the Chinese
chairman of the Economics~elations with Foreign Countries Commission,
Fang I. Kaunda, in his speech, briefly outlined the early history of the
project: a World Bank study had shown that the road was economically
unfeasible and not worth the expense;' a later study by the Canadian-
American Maxwell Stamp Company had, it is true, come to the opposite
conclusion; but all attempts at persuasion had been in vain; the project
had been coolly received everywhere and met with refusal. The west
had made the mistake of looking at the project only from the economic
point of view. It had not considered Zambia's special economic situation
as a landlocked country, surrounded by hostile neighbors. Possibly
this negative attitude could also be explained by "political and ideolo-
gical" motives: they did not want to offend South Africa, Rhodesia and
Portugal. Kaunda pointed especially to Great Britain whose "vested
interests" in "white" southern Africa would have been disturbed by the
railroad project. But Zambia would slowly have to free itself from
dependence on southern Africa and political rather than economic con-
siderations were more important here. Furthermore, both Zambia and
Tanzania were at liberty to choose their own helpers -- and their own
friends and enemies. The contract with Peking to build the railroad
was based on the assurance of "mutual respect and non-intervention."
Thus there were due grounds to be thankful to the Chinese. There
could no longer be any doubt that the project would be realized.
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14
 CPYRGHT
App rod fpmftke n1 9AQ9?1O-ty ~'xl~ (i'k~ A$A~301 ~Q01-8
ready made several western observers reevaluate their thinking. They
remember the Aswan Dam in Egypt in which Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles would show no interest. The contract with the Soviets
to build the dam opened for them the way to economic penetration
of Egypt. Finally it led to military and political influence that did not
stop in Cairo. It has extended to most of the countries in the Arab
sphere, and to such a degree that Moscow has'not only secured im-
portant strategic bases but is also in a position to have a decisive say
in the dispute with Israel.
Chinese Presence is Firmly Established
Under Chinese administration, events could develop in a similar
fashion in Tanzania and Zambia. Peking has not limited itself to financing
and constructing a railroad in Tanzania; it has also taken over other pro-
jects and is now training the army, air force and navy. At Tanzania's
request, Peking has agreed to supply modern arms such as jet fighters
against possible Portuguese threats. At the end of last year a Canadian
military commission denied this request on the grounds that such in-
struments were too expensive, training would take too long and anyhow
the military situation did not warrant it. The Chinese certainly also
knew these facts. But just as for the Soviets in Egypt, political aspects
are more important to them. Therefore they will shortly deliver jet
fighters to Tanzania because they know that this will make it necessary
to keep instructors, advisers and technical' assistants there for some
 CPYRGHT
mppi %.#
Thus we will have to reckon with a hz.n se p
for decades. And this will surely have its effect on the neghboring coun-
tries. This not only stiffens the Africans' backs in their fight against
Portuguese domination in Mozambique and Angola, but also presents
the Red Chinese with a propaganda base in East Africa to a degree that
till then they had been unable to secure anywhere on the black continent.
The assurances of "mutual respect and non-intervention" may be enough
for Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. Yet they may be giving in to wish-
ful thinking if they believe that Peking is acting purely out of motives of
brotherly love for the "poor and exploited black brothers." When such
concerns are voiced in Dar es Salaam, however, the answer the Tan-
zanians give, not without some reason, is that the West had the oppor-
tunity to keep the Chinese out butt now it has lost this chance..
Subversive Emanations
Reliable sources in Congo-Kinshasa report that since the beginning
of this year Chinese arms are again being smuggled across. Lake Tan-
ganyika to the western shore of the area around Fizi. During the Congolese'
rebellion, that is from 1964 to 1966, the Chinese were the chief arms
suppliers for the rebels and used secret roads from Bujumbura in Burundi
and from Kigoma on the east shore of Lake Tanganyika. The peninsula
at Fizi on Lake Tanganyika was the last rebel nest of resistance. In
1966 it was wiped out after a hard fight by white mercenaries under the
South African Mike Hoare.. At that time an entire arsenal of Chinese
arms was found: heavy machine guns, heavy mortars, hand grenades,
and automatic rifles.
 Approve ctf t"s@-(dgllpg Ja%%/a9s(02s CIA RDP s9 OP 1b susceptible yo
But in all their undertakings the Chinese plan for the future. And the
current situation in the Congo could change overnight, as it does so
frequently in Africa. The "liberation movements" in southern Tanzania
operating against.the Portuguese in Mozambique have been.supplied
with Chinese arms for years. Apparently the Tanzanian government
itself has long since lost count of the amount of military equipment from
Peking in i'ts country. ; .
Of especial importance, naturally, are Peking's economic in-
terests. The most important to be considered is Zambia's wealth of
copper. But of equal importance may be the iron ore and coal deposits
in the southern parts of Tanzania which to date have been inaccessible anu
also the great number of tropical agricultural products. The tie-in
with the Zambian railroad not only provides an efficient connection be-
tween the Indian Ocean and the Zambian copper belt but in addition,
with the great treasure chest of Congolese Katanga. In this area Peking
probably hardly believes in the maintenance of the status quo in Africa,
but is probably patiently girding itself for the inevitable disintegration
of white domination in the countries south of the Zambesi.
Technical Aspects
At the festive cornerstone-laying in Dar es Salaam the Tanzanian
Information Ministry for the first time published several details and figures
on the railroad project. The length of the stretch from Dar es Salaam to
Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia where it meets the Zambian railroad net will
b,ApSb 6xEeireAelea=e Q9/Q21;
 CPYRGHT
Approvea or a ease
Zambia. This means that the rolling stock cannot be used on the East
African road, which has a one-meter gauge. Official information re-
leases estimate that the new road will be able to handle 1. 75 million
tons annually in both directions. Whereas the East African roadbed can
take only 30 kilograms per meter, the new Tanzania-Zambia railroad
(Tazara for short) can carry 45 kilograms per meter. They figure on
top speeds up to 100 kilometers per hour as -against a maximum of 60
kilometers per hour on the East African line.
Apart from the fact, that Zambia, after completion of Tazara, can dis-
pense with the Portuguese railroad to Beira, the road will also provide
access to Tanzania's hinterland in which rich iron and coal deposits
have been prospected. In addition they hope to win new, agricultural
land for cultivation in the Rufiji valley. To date, because technical
reasons make it inaccessible, it has been practically a wasteland.
According to official reports, a total of 12, 000 workers and technicians,
including 4700 Chinese, are at work on the road. It is expected that
this figure will rise to 20, 000 workers and technicians.
Credit and Export Pressure
Peking has. made available to Tanzania and Zambia an interest-
free credit of 2866 million Tanzanian shillings (about 1.5 billion Swiss
francs). Repayment is to start in 1983 and extend over a period of 30
years. Local costs are calculated at 52 percent of the credit and are
to be defrayed by the Tanzanian and Zambian governments through
imports of Chinese goods on_the basis of a"commodity credit agreement.!'
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CPYRGHT
According to the information releases, the current. importation
of Chinese consumer goods (toys, china, textiles, etc) is not to be
increased, but rather so-called capital goods like construction materials
are to be imported.' Total value may run as high as 200 million Tan-
zanian shillings annually (about 110 million francs). Peking will also
supply the railroad's rolling stock. Costs may be some 20 percent of
the total expenditures. The Chinese will not finance the development of
the port of Dar es Salaam. At present there are only three piers for
deep sea ships. Three additional ones are currently under construction;
two further ones are planned. As soon as the railroad has been put
into operation it is thought that an additional 8 to 10 more piers with
special loading facilities will be needed, especially for large bulk goods
freighters, specially equipped to transport ores.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
NEUE ZUERQiEER ZEITUNG, Zurich
6 December 1970
VEP 0 .71 ~rtt'
Auf der Baustelle *der Tansania - Sambia-Eisenbahn
Von einem Sonderkorrespondenten
CPYRGHT
In den Stra(}en Dar es Salaams bringen unter Mtangobaumen. Potentials im jetzt noch unzuganglichen Hinterland. Der Wert des
aus dentin jetzt die rcifen Fruchte fallen, fliegende Handler die Bruckenkopfs fur Peking - der m3glicherweise hauptsachlich zur
Spruchweisheit des Vorsitzenden Mao an den Mann. Zwischen Subversion im sweillen* . Afrika sfidlich des Sambesi aufgebaut
Stadt and Ftughafeli waist cia mit chinesischen Zeichen beschrif? wird - ward wesentlich davon abhangen. ob es sick das Vet--
tetes Schild den Weg zwischen hoci;st;immigen Kokospalmen zum -trauen der. Gastlander find der AnstOBer, die zur ostafrikanischen
Yombo Railroad Centre. Und in derv prachtigen Naturhafen der Gemeinschaft gehoren, erwerben kann. Das Mil3trauen etwa
Stadt 1;iuft kurz vor Soanenuntergang die clianhuaa aus Banton Kenyas ist wach, Nicht nur gegenuber den guten Worten Maos
trait liunderten von Pekings E-'ntwkklungsheIfern ein and macht im roten Bdchlein, das in Nairobi konfisziert wi rde, sondern auch
unweit der Luxuskarawanserei des Kilirtandscharo-Hatels felt. gegenuber den nachteiligen Auswirkungen, die der Bau der Bahn
Die chinesische Pr?Isenz drangt sich bei eine-n kuren es::c5 . durch den Einstrom chinesischer Waren (deren Gegenwert zur
Tansanias. von den geschildcrten Z ufa1lsbco`, c;at:ugen Deckung der prtlich anfallenden Baukosten dient) auf einheimische
-bcgegnungen abgesehon, nicht auf. Das H.:upVor"I,em F, kings Industrien im Embryonalzustand habeas kiinnte. In dem behagen schwingen selbst historische Erinnerungen mit: der. Bau
der Bau einer fiber 1800 Kilometer langen Verbindungsbaltn der Ostafrikanischen Eisenbahn fuhrte seiuerzeit zu ciner starken
zwischen dem sambischen Kupfergiutel find dem Ilafen von Dar, der
der asiatischen Bevoikerungt die indischen Gast-
cs Salaam, der Tanzania Zambia Railroad (TAZAR) - falit kaum !arbeiter setzten sich im Lando fast.
In dio Augers. Die Camps der chinesischen Bautrupps liegen nicht'
nur hinter Stacheldraht, sondern zum Tell auch hinter spanischen Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob dio TAZAR fur Peking wird, was der
Wanden, die dcm Passanten jeden Blick auf die Materiallager undHochdamm von Assuan ftlr Moskau - e}n FuB zwischen Tar and
Baumaschinen sowio die notorisch kamerascheuen Untertanen ; Schwelle. Die Vorgeschichte des Projekts gemahnt an jene des
Maas vetwehren. Ebensowenig sind dio eigentiichen Baustellen'Staudamms: Cie Gutachter der Weltbank and westlicher Staaten
zug:inglicli. Besichtigungswunsche, bei den tansanischen Behorden, (allerdings auch der Sowjetuuion), zeigten Tansania and Sambia
vorgebracht, werden dcm fremden Besucher gerne mit dem Hin-! in Sachen TAZAR die kalte Schulter. 'Venn die Lektion von
weis auf dio Empfindlichkeit and Geheimnistuerei ?uuserer Assuan offenbar in dieser Hinsicht nicht beherzigt worden 1st,
chinesischen Freundev abgeschlagen. Aber or braucht nicht lange, kann sic wenigstens In anderer nachtraglich fruchtbar werden:
inn herauszufinden, daB so vial Diskretion auch dem einheimf im Verzicht darauf, bei Voraussagen fiber die technlsche Kora-
schen Bediirfnis eutspricht. Man hat wenig Lust, Pekings Engage- pctenz der unerwunschten Entwicklungshelfer den Wunsch tart
meat an dle groFe Glocke zu hangen. Da and dort 1st sogar dls der Wirklichkeit zu verwechseln. Die Schwierigkeiten des
Einsicht vorhanden, daB den, der sich grtln macht, gar leicht dio Streckenbaus im Kipengere-Gebirge sind offenbar gewaltig. Au'-,
Ziegen fressen-- auch wenn man dieso Bedenken afrikartischervorlaufig widerspricht nichts der Erwartung, daB Peking das
formulieren warde. gesteckte Ziel, einen betriebsbereiten Schfenenstrang binnen funf
Jahren, wird erreichen konnen.
Die Vorteile, die die Eisenbahn den drei Partnern bringt, liegen
Die Weltbank hat seinerzeit ein Darlehen mit der Begrundung
auf der I Iand. Sambia ward von der po}it}schen Hypothek fret,
abgelehnt, der Bahnbau set unwirtschaftlich. Nun erschent
se
scin Kupfer auf dem Schienensystem des RweiBen AfrikaA - viaauf der Liste moglicher Kreditgeber fur den Ausbau der Hafea-
Rhodesien and Mocambique - an den Indischea Ozean verfrach.
ten zu milssen. Tansania wiederum erhofft sich, abgesehen von an!agen von Dar es Salaam, den die - wider besseres Wissen
der Verstarkung des Transithandels, Anreize zur ErschlieBung von oder aus hoherer Einsicht, das with sich zeigen, ertrotzte - Bates
Koblen- and Eisenerzvorkommen sowie des landwirtschaftlichen notwendig macht.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Zurich
6 December '1970
CPYRGHT PEKING'S AFRICAN BRIDaaM
In the streets of Dar es Salaam, under the niango.trees from which
ripe fruit is falling now, vendors are peddling the wisdom of Chairman
Mao. Between the city and the airport a signboard lettered in Chinese
points the way through the cocoanut palms to the Yombo Railroad Center.
In the beautiful, natural harbor of the city, shortly before sundown
the vessel "Jianhua" from Canton arrives with a cargo of hundreds of
Peking development helpers and ties up not far from the luxury caravan-
sary of the Kilimanjaro Hotel. On the occasion of,'a brief visit to Tanzania
apart from the above-mentioned casual observations and encounters the
Chinese presence is not obtrusive. The principal Peking project --
construction of a railroad connection (more than 1800 kilometers in
length) between the Zambian copper belt and the harbor of Dar es Salaam,
the Tanzania Zambia Railroad (TAZAR) -- is hardly visible. The camps of the
Chinese construction force are not only behind barbed wire but also in part
concealed by "Spanish walls " which prevent the passer-by from catching
a glimpse of the materials stores and construction machinery as well as
of the notoriously camera-shy subjects of Mao. The actual construction
sites are equally inaccessible. Requests to visit the sites, placed
before Tanzanian authorities, are frequently rejected with a reference to
the sensitivity and the secretiveness of "our Chinese friends." But
the visitor does not need too much time to find out that so much discretion
also suits the locals. There is little inclination to broadcast
Peking's invdivement. Here and there it is understood that he who makes
himself green can easily be gobbled up by the goats -- even if this
idiom were to be phrased in a more African manner.
The advantages which the railroad brings to the three partners are
obvious. Zambia will be rid of its political mortgage of having to ship
its copper on the railroad system of "White Africa" -- via Rhodesia and
Mozambique--to the Indian Ocean. Tanzania, on the other hand, is hoping
that apart from strengthening transit trade it will be able to provide
stimuli for uncovering coal and iron ore deposits as well as expanding the
agriculture potential of the currently still inaccessible hinterland. The
value of the Peking bridgehead -- which is possibly being expanded mainly
for purposes of subversion in White Africa south ofthe Zambezi -- will
essentially be dependent upon whether it can earn the confidence of the
host countries and objectors which are members of the African community.
The distrust of, say, Kenya has been awakened. Not only vis-a-vis
the good words of Chairman Mao in the little red booklet, which was confis-
cated in Nairobi, but also with respect to the detrimental effects which the
construction of the railroad could have on native industry which is in the
embryonic stage through the influx of Chinese goods (whose value serves
to cover local construction costs). Even historical memories play a
role in this feeling of malaise. Construction of the East African
Railroad had, at one time, led to a strong multiplication of Asiatic
peoples; the Hindu workers settled in the land.
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It remains to be seen whether TAZAR will become for Peking what the
Aswan High Dam is for Moscow.-- a foot in the door. The preliminary
history of the project is a reminder of-that pertaining to the dam: the
experts from the World Bank and from Western countries (however also from
the Soviet Union) showed Tanzania and Zambia a cold shoulder with respect
to TAZAR. If the lesson of Aswan was obviously not heeded in this regard
it can at least bear fruit in other matters subsequently: refusal, in
predicting the technical competence of the unwanted development helpers,
to confuse wishes with reality. The difficulties of the construction
project in the Kipengere Mountains are obviously horrendous. But for
the time being nothing is contradicting the expectations that Peking
will be able to accomplish the goal of. constructing an operational rail-
road within five years.
The World Bank had at one time rejected a loan with the justification
that the railroad project was uneconomical. Now it [the Bank] appears on a
list of possible lenders for the improvement of harbor facilities at Dar
es Salaam which the railroad -- defiantly [built], be it against better
' o r ' r through_a stroke o! higher insight - now makes necessayr
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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
20 June 1971
CPYRGHT
CHINESE DOMINATE TANZANIA
C OMMUNIS i Chinese penetration- . of
Tanzania, which has long been alarming
to her African neighbours,' has now reached
danger point.
Chinese military person-
nel in the country now ex-
ceed in number the total
slrcnith of tits small Tan-
zanian Army, which s itself
failing under Chinese cone
trot,
'!'he latest figures given by
tile; 'l'alt7.;ltliall Covct'nnlCnlt
reveal that the 50,000-stronf;
]ahour force workingg on the
],200-mil. Tan-%um railway
projcca (front the coast ,.hand
to Y,anlhi;) now ncludes
1x.000 Chinese " technicians."
What Ills figures c,o not reveal
is lh;ll chinos., all or thccc tech-
nician; arc, in f;lct, soldiers or
the Ch6ncsc-1'coplc's Libcratioh
Ariu.?, TlivY conic from its ltail-
wa Corp. its l:u;:ini^cring Corps
and its Si; pal Corils, but have
all hall basic military training.
This is nt' the fn'st ime that
the C:hi(u'se Arnhy has been,
used for such major conslruc-
,ion projrcis abroiid. 1'urihcr-
moic, t h, s ;,n awkward habit
of ,, ,Bing: .,gilt eVeli after its
work is conlil:cicd.. ?
Thus Cicin2so Army personnel
ll Civilian g'ilise, as in 7arizania,.
13,000 Chinese hc:pcrs out of military instructors in 'Tanzania
Tanz;utia remains to be seen, . ),ad to be Nvilhdrawn nbruptlY
But quite apart from the alarm two years ago, when Preside. It
Shi'(:a(ilTig t uouguout East Nycrcro refused to renew his
Africa, there are already signs '.training agreement with Ottawa.',
of friction between the Chinese Beccnt Chinese arms deliveries
and the Tanzanians themselves. have included at least l6 medium
llint5 of labour.unt'est and racial' , tanks, similar to the Soviet T-G2
nninho,ily have appeared even class, to reinforce the small
in oilicial Tanzanian. reports. arntourccl clement of 12 Chinese
'Thus it is clear that there has; light tanks in the Tanzanian
been a head-on clash between; Army.
the native labourers and their Artiilcc;V provided has intludc.d
Chinese ovcrsccrs oil the rail,vay 24 field guns and sonic six to.
over the provision of food. The" eight howitzers. All this equip-
Chincsc decided that as tho amen. arrived with a full range
Africans' practice of preparing of spares and anlntunition.
their own meals wasted far too Large quantities of mortars
mach time. they would provide and light arms, together with
the food thcntscwcs. - auununiLion, have also been
The, nveragc African labourer shipped to liar-es-Salaam in the
elms about 170 Tanzanian past fcw months as well as at
shillings (CIO) a month and the least 100 military lorries and
Chinese started dcductiug 55. large numbers of deep-typo
shillings (1:3.24) from this for vehicles.
the meals service,
.s'oCrEs ; ;tcl j~luries
Quite apart from their rescl;t-
meat at losing such a chunk of In early April the Chinese
their wager, the. Africans found vessel Gui Lilt also off-loaded
Illey could not stomach the, two 100-ton Shanghai-class fast
o
overseers' fond. Piles of.it have conslal patrol boats for the tiny
been found thrown away'oti the 'Tanzanian Navy ihringing its
construction sites. total sirengtrt up to six patrol
The Chincsc are clearly boats.
a~care of this mounting domestic T1`king has also undcrtai(ci
hostility and of tilt growing un- to (,,Giver to Tanzania two
case among Tanzania's six squadrons (about 24) of MiG-17
AI?ricall neighllours. Tltey keep type ' intcrccptorS. ' The first
,their Array teams out of sirltt group of 50 Tanzanian Air Force
l
'
built the strategic highway link-
ing Eatmanclu nnd, Llnasa, tho
capitals of Nepal and Tibet. Thom
job was finished in, 1967.
Still KU. Nepal
13ut ill,-, Chincsc' soldiers are
still in, Nepal. They persuaded
11te Nepalese Goycrnnlcnt to.,
allow then. to remain. for 10
years to "maintain" the 72-mile
epalcsc scctiou of the road.
Whclher 1'residcnt Nycrcro
will need 10 years to get his
WAS=Qrk_0 110^00 VA
21 J"` mo 3.971
Approv
and conhned.to their. obit spec a
the
trainees left for China at
camps wilen not working oil the beginning of the year for train-
raihvay. inr? in tilt handling of these
Their supplies conic in Chinese Chnese-built aircraft.
vessels which brhi ia, and ult- { %vcntually, the Chinese have
load by? night, equipment foi`r agreed to train 250 Tanzanians
'rainailia's ? own Army, 1hl,- as pilots and technicians. All
10,000-strong "People's Defence. I candidates are being selected by
Force." ? : ! the Chinese on the spot and
Chinese control of military' subjected. to vigorous examina?
supply and training in this force thous by a ' team of,Chineso,
became absolute when Canadian doctors in Tanzania. ,
Scrv:ce to Start
Oil I auzain TIZLtilwr?ay
Router I 7tailway project, a Tanzanian
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzan-' official said today.
ia-Passenger trains will start Tlto section lies wholly in
416 t ` 1 1 02.(5 'Z 4(, -!AyAt 300050001-8
the Chinese-assisted Taman, road link with Zambia.. -
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RELTTER, Nairobi
17 July 1971
CPYRGHT
Dar es Salaam, 17 July (REUTER)--The Tanzanian Government said today REUTERS
had misquoted the Zambian finance minister over the cost of the Chinese-tinanoed
railway to link Lusaka and Dar es Salaam.
"The attention of the Tanzanian Government has been drawn'to a report which was
'circulated by REUTERS news service that Hon. Mwanakatwe, Zambian minister of finance,
told the Zambian Parliament on July 15, 1971, that the Tanzam railway now cost 17
milliarL k-iacha. (,nea.rlr iQ? m .1l1orz sterling): more than origiaa.~ estimated.. "The
-e=ra cost, the report -stated. .rose :becz use the 'Chinese engineers ,vund tun:eI ing
on some sections more difficult than originally thought. The government wants to make
it known to all concerned that the report is a complete misquoting of what the Hon.
Mwanakatwe is known to have told the Zambian Parliament. This case of misreporting is
is unfortunate because the estimated cost of the railway, which the People's Republic
of China so generously agreed to assist in financing, still remains the same as agreed
between China, Zambia and Tanzania.
"The Tanzania Government has information that what in fact the Hon. Mwanakatwe was asking
parliament was merely to request for budgetary provision to fulfill Zambia's obligations
as agreed on between the three parties," the Tanzanian Government statement said.
NCNA
25 June 1971
CPYRGHT
NYERERE DENIES RUMORS ABOUT PRO TECHNICIANS
Dar es Salaam, June 24 --"Tanzania is ours and we shall defend it for
the benefit of Africa," declared Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere when he was addressing
armymen of the Tanzania military academy at Mgulani, south of the capital, on June 22,
according to press reports here.
He said that former colonial powers would like to see Tanzania and other countries in
Africa play their former part--the victim of exploitation. Those who colonized Africa
would still like to maintain their sphete of influence should they have the opportunity
to do so. Tanzania's?resolution to gain independence was therefore not in their Interest
and they would go all lengths to ensure that they can continue with their exploitation.
Referring to the anti-China rumour concocted and spread recently by the $ritish paper
"DAILY TELEGRAPH" about Chinese railway technicians in Tanzania President Nyerere said
that this is just one of the ways in which colonialists wanted to pick up-a quarrel with
Tanzania in an attempt to exploit it.
He said that if the imperialists and exploiters win in one country, they look for another
where they can strike a blow. "If they come, they will come seriously, and"we must be'
prepared for them by being serious."
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CPYRGHT
The president called on the Tanzanian, soldiers, peasants, and workers to be as barious
and tough as the Vietnamese and Chinese in their fight against aggression and exploitation.
He said that Viet Jam has been fighting s war of liberation since 1945, firsts with the
French who later gave up and withdrew, and later with Americans who will have no
alternative but to withdraw.
The president oallad on the soldiers to learn diligently at the academy so that they can
demand the country! better for the benefit of the whole African Continent.
WASHINGTON POST
14 August 1971
Chiaa Trade Fair
Planned in Zambia
Reuter
LUSAKA, Zambia, Aug.
13-China will hold a trade ex-
hibition in Lusaka in October
in an attempt to boost
Zambian interest an. Chinese
goods:'
Zambia has to import
Chinese products worth about
$11 million each year under an
agreement by which Peking
sells goods here to offset the
cost. of the 1,000-mile railroad
the Chinese are building be-'
tween ? Zambia' and Tanzania.
CPYRGHT
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 25X1C10b
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1971
THE RUSSIAN CHURCH IN POLITICAL ACTION
If Lenin had felt sure of himself in 1918 he would no doubt
have outlawed all forms of worship in the Soviet Union. Instead,
he opened a period of religious persecution that still flourishes.
Today, churchmen who dare to be outspoken about their constitutional
rights to practice religion are imprisoned while those who are
politically docile and subservient to the dictates of the Soviet
regime are sent abroad for "dialogues" with Christians, Muslims,
Buddhists, etc. It is this subservient group that the Soviet regime
uses to build up its facade of religious tolerance at home, This
"tolerance" embraces some 14 officially recognized church denominations
throughout the USSR, the largest of which are the Russian Orthodox
and Islamic Churches. In exchange for official toleration, the
Soviet regime extracts obeisance from church leaders, support for
its foreign and "peace" policies, and uses Communist dialogues with
foreign religious groups to promote Communist popular front tactics.
Ecumenical Dialogues
In the decade preceding the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the USSR was highly successful in utilizing its own
subservient church representatives, particularly those from the Russian
Orthodox Church, to maneuver supposedly apolitical ecumenical groupings
into espousing Soviet foreign policy pronouncements. This was
accomplished by working through the Christian Peace Conference,
founded in 1958, and by the entrance in 1961 of the Russian Orthodox
Church into membership in the World Council of Churches. The failure
of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Christian Peace Conference to
take any significant action or stand following the invasion of
Czechoslovakia (with the exception of individuals such as Russian
Orthodox dissenter Aleksandr Levitin-Krasnov, later imprisoned)
convinced many world Christian leaders that what they had viewed as
positive experiment with a unique East-West dialogue had been fast
turning into an Eastern monologue. Mounting evidence of continued
religious persecution (as recounted in samizdat publications reaching
the West) that goes on behind the facade of official "tolerance" has
further increased the wariness of some Communist and most non-Communist
religious leaders about Soviet intentions.
Christian Peace Conference
Since its founding in 1958 by a group of East European theologians
in Prague, the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) has functioned as the
primary channel through which Communist churchmen reach and try to
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influence world Christian bodies and public opinion in general,
During the first ten years of its existence, the CPC also
characterized a new subtlety in Soviet manipulation of Communist
fronts and permitted Soviet "peace" propaganda to become an
effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy, Before the founding
of the CPC, Soviet peace organizations were notorious for their
inflexibility in prohibiting either pronouncements or proceedings
to deviate in the slightest from Soviet policy. Within the CPC,
however, individual Soviets stayed in the background and permitted
an impressive degree of freedom in theological discussions so
long as they could feel sure that the desired resolution on a
given topic (Vietnam, Zionism, West German revanchism, etc.)
would be forthcoming. This small degree of permissiveness in
organizations such as the CPC greatly enhanced the potential of
such groups to attract non-Communist support.
The Christian Peace Conference, which prefers to call itself
a "movement" rather than an organization, grew rapidly. Only 47
participants (of whom only four came from the West) attended the
founding meeting in 1958. During the next ten years, the CPC
sponsored three large international meetings called All-Christian
Peace Assemblies. The third Assembly, held in Prague 31 March -
S April 1968, was attended by over 500 delegates from 55 countries,
representing churches of 20 European, 18 African, and 12 American
countries, The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was
represented by a Roman Catholic theologian. Some 63 observers were
sent from organizations such as the World Council of Churches, the
Conference of European Churches, and the British Council of Churches.
Among non-Christian attendees were representatives from the Buddhist
religious societies of Ceylon and the USSR. Conference documents
listed the names of 82 newspapers, magazines, and radio-TV reporters
accredited to the Assembly, The "Czechoslovak Spring" was at its
height during the third Assembly, and for the first time after twenty
years of imposed silence, Czechoslovak Christians were free to
disclose how their churches had been manipulated and infiltrated
by the Communist Party.
Four months after the close of the third Peace Assembly,
Czechoslovakia was invaded, signaling the beginning of the metamorphosis
of the CPC from a quasi-independent grouping to one completely under
Soviet control, The president of the CPC, Dr. Josef Hromadka and its
general secretary, Jaroslav Ondra, both of whom spoke out against the
invasion, were purged from the CPC in the course of its "normalization."
Hromadka had been a firm believer in the Soviet socialist revolution,
a member of the Soviet-run World Council of Peace, and in 1958 he
received a Lenin Peace Prize for "his services to the cause of Communism
at home and abroad, and especially in the ecumenical movement." The
day after the invasion, Hromadka wrote the Soviet ambassador to
Czechoslovakia that "the Soviet government could not have made a more
tragic mistake.-O'ly a:- rrmediate withdrawal of the occupying armies
can partly mitigate our ceru"or tragedy." The reply came from the
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Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church who, in an angry
letter, called Hromadka's views "inadmissible expressions."
In a subsequent memorandum written for internal CPC use, Hromadka
wrote that the cause of peace could not be served "with views and
tasks given to us from outside" and without the "courage to listen
to each other and to make decisions freely in real dialogue." This
memorandum marked an irrevocable turn in the life of the CPC and
eventually forced the resignations of its general secretary and
president.. The 15 November 1969 issue of Frankfurter All em~eine
Zeitung noted that the CPC as "breaking up," and sai ait~l the
vo iet-led invasion some members of the organization had taken
"Soviet speeches about peace as genuine and had placed themselves
at Soviet disposal as a church program for such propaganda. The
invasion shocked many and the work of the CPS has been crippled
ever since."
Following Hromadka's departure, Metropolitan Nikodim of the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) succeeded in gaining almost complete
control of the organization and the situation within the CPC rapidly
deteriorated. During an early 1970 Working group meeting, for
example,'Nikodim's high-handed tactics in the handling of procedural
matters and his complete disregard for any opposition within the CPC,
caused a walkout by seven of the Western representatives, including
those from France and West Germany. By mid-1971, associated groups
in most of Western Europe, Japan,, and the U.S. had all but withdrawn
from active participation in the CPC as it is run under Nikodim
The Fourth All-Christian Peace Assembly is scheduled to meet in
Prague this month, from 30 September to 3 October 1971. The prognosis
is for a very slim attendance.
Nikodim, Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, at 31 and with
little theological training, became the youngest Bishop in the ROC
and in 1963, at age 34, was elevated to Metropolitan, a rank just
below that of Patriarch. As head of the church's Department of
External Relations in Moscow, Nikodim directs all ROC foreign relations
and is the ROC's representative in the World Council of Churches,,
How Nikodim functions as an articulate foreign affairs spokesman
for the Russian church, and thereby for the Soviet regime, is described
in the attached newspaper clip reprints.
After its founding in 1948, the Soviets at first viewed the
Geneva-based World Council of Churches (WCC) as "a tool of Western
imperialism." But by the mid-1950's and as the WCC grew in stature
and size, the Soviet regime began. to see a possibility for using the
organization as a co-activist in its own "peace" campaign. Feelers
were put out and by the time of the WCC Third General Assembly in
New Delhi in late 1961, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) had been
admitted to membership. The entry of Russia's largest church into
the WCC was hailed by many as a triumph of Christian unity over
political disagreement; others were not so sure.
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Concerning Metropolitan Nikodim as representative of the
Russian church in the WCC, Michael Bourdeaux noted, in his
book Opium of the People (1965), that upon Nikodim's entry into
the WC- C,he began campaigning for the WCC to play its part in
the peace forum, particularly by supporting resolutions adopted
by the Prague-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC). If
challenged, Nikodim would answer, "By supporting such causes
we gain standing in the eyes of our government." Bourdeaux
commented that it was "surprising that he never said that it
must be a basic Christian concern to further the cause of peace
in the world." When asked what contribution the Russian Church
could bring to the WCC, "instead of giving me an answer about
the richness of the Russian liturgy,.. or saying it would bring
a new stream of Christianity into a predominantly Protestant
movement., Nikodim started talking of the value to Western
Christians of the social experience they would gain from the
Soviet Union."
As the chief organizational. expression of the ecumenical
movement in the world today, the WCC is by dictate of its charter
apolitical, Nevertheless, as the ROC became increasingly active,
WCC statements increasingly reflected an imbalance in their
political orientation For example, following the August 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the statement issued by the WCC
"deplored the military intervention" and called for the removal
of the Warsaw Pact troops "at the earliest possible moment."
In contrast, WCC statements on Vietnam issued during the same
year had adopted standard North Vietnamese-Soviet terminology
in calling for "an immediate and unconditional" halt to the
bombing of North Vietnam. The U.S. presence in Vietnam, according
to WCC statements had brought about "mortal suffering of the
Vietnamese people," while the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia
was viewed by the WCC as an "ill-considered action."
The type of imbalance as reflected in these and other state-
ments on East-West political issues has been a source of disillusion-
ment to many Western churchmen. The inadequacy, if not lack of
response, from the WCC to appeals from those imprisoned in the
USSR because of religious persecution is to many an added frustration.
Within the ecumenical movement, an increasingly critical eye is
being cast on "what it means to be in responsible communication with
Christians in Communist societies." (Among the attached clippings
are included some which illustrate recent developments of political
trends within the WCC.)
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SAMIZDAT SOURCES' CN RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE USSR
The Soviet constitution guarantees each citizen the right
to practice religion and states that anyone who prevents him
from so doing is liable to punishment. Samizdat* sources, however,
,provide evidence of religious persecution anTTow that Soviet
laws are so framed as to enable the authorities to imprison believers
for nothing more than the normal practice of their faith.
Most samizdat documents on religious matters come from the
Russian Or its odo`x -and Baptist sources. Religious protesters
tend to concentrate on denominational matters. Only a few
individuals, such as Russian Orthodox dissenter and writer
Aleksandr Levitin-Krasnov or the late Boris Talantov, have signed
non-religious protest documents.
Modification of the constitution is one of the Soviet believers'
chief demands. Since May 1929, believers do not have the right to
teach religion to children or to other adults (except in officially
recognized seminaries). Soviet believers have also appealed for
their constitutional rights as they stand; they have petitioned
the officially approved religious authorities to permit a democratically
elected hierarchy and appealed for the registration of so-called
illegal sects, such as the dissident Baptists, and for the reinstate-
ment of dismissed churchmen and against the closure of churches.
Imprisonment
Believers are frequently charged under Article 142 of the RSFSR
Criminal Code - "violation of the laws on separation of Church from
State and school from Church" - for which the maximum punishment is
three years' deprivation of freedom. They may also be charged under
Article 227 for encouraging religious activities "harmful to the
health of citizens" or.inciting people "to refuse to participate
in social. activity or to fulfill their civic obligations." Since
1961 this: has carried a maximum sentence of five years deprivation
of liberty or exile. The longest known sentence on believers were
those of 15, 13 and ten years' imprisonment given to leaders of the
All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People
in Leningrad in 1967 and 1968. This group has produced a political
program for democratic reform 'and was engaged in clandestine para-
military self-education and organization work.
* samizdat translates as "we,publish ourselves," that is, not the -
state, but we, the people.
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According to a protest letter sent to the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet in 1969 by the imprisoned writers Daniel, Ginzburg
and Galanskov, believers are prohibited from receiving any religious
literature and may not even have a Bible while in prison.
One result of putting so many believers in prisons and labor
camps has been that they have sometimes formed religious groups
there. Mikhail Sado, serving a long sentence in one of the strict
regime prison camps for criticizing Khrushchev, founded the All-
Russian Social-Christian Alliance, according to a samizdat document
written and distributed by Alexander Petrov-Agatov, himself a prisoner.
Dissident Baptists
A great deal of documentation about persecution of their
members has been provided by the Evangelical Christian Baptists
or initsiativniki, who broke away from the Baptist Church in 1965
an have never received official recognition. They have at least
two regular samizdat publications - including a monthly, Brats
Listok, and a quarterly, Vestnik Spaseniya.
The initsiativniki, who had objected to the compromises made
by the leaders of e Baptist Church to.placate the Communist
regime, are particularly active, and some 500 of them have been
imprisoned since 1961. The repressive measures taken against
them were described in an appeal to the party leadership by
1,453 women in March 1969. They said their children were victimized'
and beaten up at school and sometimes forcibly removed from the
parents by the KGB (secret police) and placed in children's homes.
They had addressed thousands of petitions to the authorities
begging for an end to persecution but it became even harsher:
"Fines beyond our means, beatings-up, dismissal from jobs
and institutes, confiscation of flats, arrests of fathers,
husbands and, improbably as it may seem, mothers - this is
the reply we have received so far from you to all our
complaints..
Russian Orthodox Church
Less is known about the treatment of rank-and-file members
of the Orthodox Church but the cases of three leading dissidents
have been reported in the underground journal, Chronicle of Current
Events. Levitin-Krasnov who was arrested in September, 1969, and
subsequently released has signed a number of protests about the
abuse of civil rights in the Soviet Union and about the invasion
of Czechoslovakia. He was a member of the Action Group for the
Defense of Hunan Rights in the Soviet Union. After his arrest,
a number of documents were circulated attesting to the excellence
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
of his character and the legality of his actions. A letter
from seven Christians, addressed to the World Council of Churches
in September, 1969, said:
"Anatoly Bmrmanuilevich was doing his duty as a Christian
and none of his activities . . . infringed Soviet laws. . ."
Boris.Talantov, a lay member of the Orthodox Church, who
wrote a series of protest letters about the lack of religious
freedom in the Soviet Union, was tried in September 1969, for
allegedly publishing "anti-Soviet propaganda." Chronicle No. 10
(October, 1969) reported that he was given a two-year sentence
in a labor camp.
Neither the charge against the Orthodox priest Pavel Adelheim,
arrested in December 1969, nor his sentence in known, but his
character was smeared by Pravda Vostoka (the Uzbek Republican
newspaper); which accuse him o sadism towards his wife and
children. According to Chronicle No. 13 (April 1970) however,
his initiative and energy shad enabled believers in Kagan to
build a new, stone church. He was
'" . . a young, well-educated priest and a good preacher,
enjoyed great love and authority among his parishioners.
His ecclesiastical activity was beyond reproach from the
viewpoint of civil law."
Ukrainian Uniate Church
Increased activity of the Uniates, who acknowledge the supremacy
of the Pope (but have been illegal since 1945), has been matched
by increased persecution. According to Chronicles Nos. 7 and 8
( April and June 1969), priests have been etai.ne and beaten up
by the police. On 18 Ottober 1968, the homes of ten were searched
and religious objects confiscated. In January 1969, Bishop
Velichkovski, who was about 70 years old and in poor health, was
arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment for infringing
regulations. (Bishop Velichkovski had been sentenced to ten year's
hard labor when the.Uniate Church was forcibly integrated with
the Orthodox Church in 1946.)
Further information has come from a samizdat essay of
January 1970, Chronicle of Resistance, by-Valentin Moroz, a
Ukrainian historian. He con epnne e appropriation of religious
works of art from a Uniate church in the Kiev area,' which belonged
to a strongly nationalistic minority, the Hutsuls. Arguing that
religion and national culture had become inseparable in Eastern
Europe, he said:
"One must inevitably conclude that a fight against the Church
is a fight against the culture. The anti-religious struggle
is, in fact, a kulturk f. It is more convenient to destroy
the foundations o a nation as a whole under the guise of a
stru le against
ref1' '?
Approved Fg r Release 199ikft2 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
3
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
Sectarians
Few Sectarian protest documents have come to light other
than those of the Evangelical Christian Baptists, but Chronicle
No. 14 (June 1970) reported the case of a woman Adventist from
Belorussia who was detained in December 1969, and illegally
searched. Her money was confiscated without a receipt. In
April 1970, her house was searched and religious literature
confiscated. Chronile No. 15 (August, 1970) noted that ten-year
sentences had been passed on two women members of the schismatic
True Orthodox Church and sentences of ten years and seven years
plus five years' exile on two Jehovah's Witnesses.
TEIE DAILY TELEGRAPH
12 March 19 71
~: a a
MI A T, .4
~r ~
Iiristians .
wiuma
GPY RGHItO t e
By Dr, CECIL NORTIICOTT, Churches Correspondent
HRISTIANS imprisoned in the Soviet Union
for their-faith havefslnuggled out an appeal
through their relatives asking for help from',
Christians in the West. They claim that children
have been taken from parents because of their'
religious lLpbringing.
The appeal, in the form of
letter, bears 45 signatures
f prisoners' relatives.
The signatures have been
ouched for by authorities in
ritain who. know the
Irr tuation for Christians in
ussia:
The letter. published in todaj''s
hunch of f ucrland Newspaper,
ys that during the last months
last year, -A1 people spent
days each in pr,son for the
fcnce of being involved is
ayer and worship meetings.
Bibles confiscated
The Christians concerned be.
1 in gin the Evangelical Christian
alpttst groups who actively
ropngate the. Christian faith
a d distribute Christian literature
p
isoners ask Christians
3 W. ? ---- --- S-~ " ono. curs[ to Pray lot' them
Approve For? Release 1.999/09/,~obQr-'DQ?,~J'Q003
f- The letter asks that children
who have been taken away from
their -?parcnts..h use of re-
ligious 'upbringing should ?be
returned.
Bibles and * other religious
literature confiscated during
searches of believers' homes
should be given back.
The letter says: "Evidence
was ' given that hundreds of
prayer gatherings have. been
broken up by the authorities
and worshippers had been
bealen.? The tines for attending
worship and prayer meetings
amounted to over 94,300 roubles
(over x40,000)."
It adds that "scores of be.
-
lievers had been expelled from
higher and middle educational
institutions or had not been
allowed in because they were
known to belong' to thoso who,'
believed in God." ?
-
The
0050001-8
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CPYRGHT
PHILIPPINES HERALD
14 September 1970
Romanian Pastor _ Says Co nrnies Persecuting
Christians, with 200,00 a Still in ' Prisons
The Rev. Wurmbrand saw the sun or read Ila and the Netherlands.
said "communist . coun- newspapers and books Wurmbrand said be hopes
:tries Lo about tho free- during my internment. . to set up similar missions
dom of, religion. - Thou- Since he was released ? in Japan and o t b o r
t sands 'ox people are beinit ; from . prison ;1a Roman' Asian countries. ',"-4
~
a communist prison has peaking with news-
.,declared that communist men, the Rev. -Fr. Wurm-
,countries are persecuting brand claimed that in
;Christians with about 'Communist, c o u n tries.
;200,000 still in prisons. Christians are put into
T h a. Rev. Richard prison without reason.
' Wurmbrand, 61, was re- "I myself was put Into
.ccntly I:n Japan to attend a prison In 1951 and was
the 12th Baptist ' World given a 25-year sentence
"Congress, but was order- without reason," the Ro-
ed out of the meeting manlan pastor said.
when he shouted against "I was chained with a
the participation of so- 50-pound chain to my
..'vict de1'et:ates. legs in most of the time
In the prison. I hardly
ORYO - (AP) -. A.,persecuted every year in 1965. he said he or
Romanian pastor who and 200,000 Christiani ganized the Christian.
says he spent 14 years In are still in prisons.'?. Mission to the Commun-i
CPYRGHT
Lsvdi z-Kraynov, a. Critic -of
A;itis+:l, Signed Civil Mghts
Ap peril to U.N. iz'Flixy
Mr. Levitin, a 5- 4-year-cid? in which he said Soviet officials,
forester Russian Orthodox p ricst including the sccu - y police,
and a writer of articles accusing had tried to persuade him to
thr. Soviet Governrnent of sti-I +
1st World -- an under-
ground missions to help
Christians ,in Communist-
countries. He said ? this'
mission * helps by sending,
-materials such as bibles'
and evangelical ' tracts;
through secret "couriers!
or by balloons. 4
The pastor said he has
e s t a b 1 fished mission,
branches In 18 countries,;
Including the ' United;
States, ,Britain, Austra-
was Genrikh Altuayan, .who
was 'charged last July with
anti-Soviet -activity. Fla ? also
signed the prtit' to ? t ho
United Nations. ,
The: a:rests have reduced to
12 the number of inenbirs of:
the dissident group still at lib-:
erty. The sources said.. the
fiill- feligious froedoAl, wa.oEu'leglglg/Fgggj~ nCitRo~pityci ~if Il[ 'E30prlgti{Ffp(jgti extensive eco?
rly '~T(N"M ki n i- ov a ffdfiffet'fieiotrRallored to Hun-
Independent-minded Romania, which was taken by some as garlan conditions, opposes any'
Orrao
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form of Integriition that would
result In supranational organi-
zation! and decision-making.
Aside from the political Im?
plications of the Chinese de.
velopments of recent weeks,
the drive toward British entry,
into the Common Market is
also likely to have a powerful
impact an Comecon thinking.
Far more than the United
States, whose trade with East.
ern Europe Is miniscule, the
feast European contries look to
Western Europe as a markets'
and as a source of technology.
The specter of a mnnollthie,'
protective West l;uroptttn Coo-
NEW YORK TIMES
31 July 1971
REDS' TRADE BLOC
SETS INTEGRATION
Bucharest Meeting Ends-
An Accord on a Convertible'
Currency Also Reported
to facilitate multinational trad?
By JAMES FEROhf
within the bloc. Must of
8peelrt to The New York Unto ing
WARSAW, July- 30-Eastern
Eastern Europe's trade Is bila-
teral and the complexity of cur?
Europe's trade bloc, the Court, cil for Mutual Economic Assist
rencies offers little opportunity,
once, has reportedly agreed on
to settle accounts between port=
a complex plan for economic
nets and to make trading ar-
Integration, including a conv rangements with third parties.
vertibio currency. ? I The agreement is expected to
Czech sources said today that be published within a week.'
the agreement came at a three. Informants here said that the1
day meeting of Premiere and
economic ministers from the
eight member countries. The
meeting of the council, which
is known as Comecon, ended
yesterday In Bucharest.
nomic grouping, Including,
Britain, worries many East Eu.
ropeana,
Many of them feel that Inte
gration could put a stop to;
fruitful bilateral contacts at.
ready slatted with the Weal
and make economic contacts
with the Common Market and
$cnndinavla more difficult.
Achieved Little
Despite years of nri,~..~+a.
Lions and bargaining. Come.
con has failed to achieve a
real multilateral economic sys?
tern in Eastern Europe. Most
contacts between the Commu?
nisi countries remain bilatcrat
and supranational organtza-
Lions have accomplished little.
roland and Hungary, for
instance, want to move toward
monetary convertibility, and a
,monetary system for clearing
debts, gradually roplseinsl the
old barter system. But less de.
veloped countries such as Bul-
garls oppose this idea.
Also, the lees developed.
countries such as Romania
and Bulgaria would like to sea
Comecon concentrate more on
spreading the development
funds, rather than on "special.,
izailolt" which they feet would
cultural "specialists" while
East Germany, Poland and
Crcrholsolvakin moved ahead
with advanced technology. '
Price polio, economic modJ
?els and the amount of decen-
tralization remain matters for
individual countries, ?t
As a result, there are algnJfi?
.Clint differences over such
vital matters as how much'
freedom to give the market,l
These range from the rigid So.,
iviet system to Hungary, which
its loosening up. i
Though Romania has been
the most outspoken opponent'
of deep integration, Comecon;
suffers from other frictions.
and Romania is not along L>s1
opposing radical intespratioa.,?ri
CPYRGHT
oIla.
Although some officials, both
zechs and others, were skeptl-
f over A he reported achieve-
ments at the meeting, the
one economist as it "milestone"
In East European efforts to
seek meaningful integration.
One of the agreement's goals,
he said, Is a convertible cur.
rency, possibly a special ruble,
preparation and that it would
take "several five-year plans to
implement.""
A communiqud Issued last
night at the close of the meet-
Ing in Bucharest spoke of
"gradual) implementation within
national interests an noninter?
erence in the intcrnatioal af?
fairs of other states."
Rumala's President and Come
munist party leader, Nicolae
Ceausescu, has lohg re9isted So.
viet efforts to ? turn Comecon
the entire economy of Eastern
Europe.
But a Czech economist said
the new integration program'
was intended to harmonize na-!
tional economies into an effi-
cient trade bloc rather than to
force them to adhere to un-
realistic programs as part of an
over-all plan.
The plan is said to Include
a multiplicity of subjects, from
tourism to scientific-technical
agreements. According to ex-
ports here, It seems to rcpre-
sent a practical effort to over.
comp the problems that have;
plagued Comecon since Its in?
ception two decades ago.
The organization is a loose
regional association without
executive powers. it was found-
ed to counter Marshal Plan aid
to Western Europe and early
Western efforts to isolate they
Communist bloc.
It has been beset by conflict-'
Ing national interests within
Eastern Europe, great diversi-
ties in local economies, lack of
Incentives In the more tightly;
controlled economic systems
and heavily bureaucraticoro?~
cedures. Attempts by so',et
eaders to: use Comecon u .ant
nstrumcnt for supranational
economic direction have failed.
One official here said that
`conditions In Eastern Europe
1nnarentlg had rhangnd n,ffi.
i n or -e new p an re?
ceive unanimous agreement
among Comecon members.
The passage of time, one
Czech economist said, had
helped close the gap between
Bulgaria and the more Indus.
trialized countries such as East
Germany' and Czechoslovakia.
Other factors ft.was said in-
cluded the present political
tranquility In Eastern Europe
and the continuing growth and
probable expansion of the rival
trading block, the European
Common Market.
Division of Production
One Czech official said, how-
ever, that it remained to be
seen whether the ambitious
Bucharest protocol would suc-
ceed. He said that It might if It
included plans for "a practical
division of production within
the socialist camp."
,No have five countries pro.
ducing, automobiles," he said.
'his is madness. Until. ?we
diversify properly. we cannot
prosper an dwe wots't compete
in the,W06V 7
was Premier Aiekset N. K03y lI'he communlqub appeared to
gin. The other countries repre- contain a gain for Rumania in
sented were East Germany, Po? its reference to Comecon's goals
land, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Ias including "respect for-state
Hungary. Rumania. and Mon? sovereisnty, independence, and,
Heading the Soviet delegation
CPYRGHT '
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WASHINGTON POST
31 July 1971
CPYRGHT
soviet Bid for Econoinic Union
Seen Slowed by East Europeans
By Dan Morgan
Washington Fast Foreign Service
BELGRADE, July 30-The
Communist bloc's prime minis-
tens agreed yesterday In Bu-
charest to work for closer co-
operation and integration over
a 20-year period, but along
lines that were left noticeably
vague In their final commu?
nique.
After meeting for t h r e'e
full days In the flag-festooned
Romanian government build-
ing, the governmental leaders
of the eight countries of Come-
con, the Soviet bloc economic,
organization, said that "Social-!
1st integration is not equatable
WASHINGTON POST
2 August 1971
CPYRGHT
with the foundation of supran?
ational" organization.
This phrase, which Incorpor.
ated a basic policy premise of
Independent-minded Romania,
appeared to rule out at least
for the Immediate future any
dramatic Impetus toward an
East European version of the
Common Market.
This also suggested to West-
ern analysts that there had
been no basic change in the;
preference of the East Europe-!
ans for bilateral rather than:
multilateral solutions to their
economic problems, which are
now being highlighted by
shortages of investment capi-
tal and modern machinery.
Diplomatic and Romanian
observers in. Bucharest said;
this week that whatever en
thustasm may have existed for
a strong, centralized grouping,
In the East had probably al-!
ready been dampened by the
prospect that the West Eurp-1
pean unit may soon be ex
panded to include Britain and:
its partners. ;
This is because the East Eu.
ropean countries, particularly'
Romania, are trying to expand
links with the West. Most of
them think this trend would
only be made more difficult
by transforming Comecon from
a loosely knit organization
into a rival economic bloc.
Details of the program
worked out and adopted this
week will not oe furry Known
until publication of an 8O?page-
document later. But the word.
ing of the communique sug?
!gested a disappointment for
the Soviet Union which has
led the movement for Into.
gration.
Pomailia Says independence
Nt Affected by Bloc TaCt'
VIENNA, Aug. 1-Romania
said tonight its agreement.tol
"Integrate" Its economy more'
closely with the other Com-
munist nations does not mean
It has surrendered any .inde-
pendence to them.
The agreement. announced
Thursday. was hammered out
by a three-clay session in
Bucharest of Comecon, the
Communist common market.
It said the seven nations had
worked out a 20-year program
of "cooperation and iniegra.
tion." but' the details shave
'not been released yet.
Scintela, the Romanian Com-
munist Party newspaper, anti.
cipated this release tonight
with an editorial stressing that
Romania's independence was
still Intact.
It singled out the points in
the announcement that talked
of "sovereign and equal social.
1st states . . which self-de-
pendently decide on the basis
of full sovereignty on all prob.
lcros pertaining to their eco.
1 nomic and social develop-~
I ment."
"The program," Scintcial
said, "clearly specifies that the
socialist economic integration
proceeds on the basis of fully
free consent"-meaning that
any nation can opt out of any
step of the integration process.
It said, the program "does
not affect the questions of,
Internal planning"--althoughi
one agreement reached was!
to set. up a central commft?
tee to coordinate the annual
plans of the Comecon mem.
hers.
Scinteia .indicated that a
battle arose at the Comecon
meeting over the issue of "nc-
tionai independence and sov-
ereignty." It said this issue
"has been the object of mul-
tiple concerns, and discussions
within which various opinions
and views have been ex-
pressed."
Although Scintcia did not
refer to China by name, the
!paper said that bcsirk' th
'Comecon countries, Romania
considered it "its lofty duty"
410 expand cooperation with all
the socialist states which are
mot member. of Cocoa.
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11
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NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1971
Soviet Bloc Holds Parley;'
China Seen as'Key Topic
CPYRGHT
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Speelel to The New York TI, ..
. 201 tvy r,- But Todor Zhivkov, the Bu l-
callers of all ? the Soviet-bloc garian leader. only yesterday
untrles except Rumania held was presiding. at a meeting in
one-day meeting today and Bulgaria marking the 80th an-
ssued a communique de. niversary of the Bulgarian
ouncing deviations from Mos. party, and 'thus had to travel
's line and expressing to the Crimea to participate.
. The Soviet Union was rep.
'grave alarm" over the anti- resented at the meeting by
ommunist campaign in the President Nikoiai V. Podgorny
udan. as well as Mr. Brezhnev. Two
'Diplomatic sources here be- days ago, Mr. Brezhnev and
Mr. Podgorny were reported to
ieved that the meeting, attend. have met with the Hungarian
d by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the leader, Janos Xadar, who was
evict Communist party leader, also present today.. Others
as called at Soviet Initiative listed as attending were Erich
o discuss primarily the latest Edward r of East Germany,
EdwarGierek of Poland and
evelopments in China's rela. Gustav Husak of Czecho.
Ions with the United States, slovakia.
and to agree o na joint posi. It was the first time Rumania
tion. has been absent from one of the
It was believed that the Ru? Warsaw Pact's top-level meet.
ings since 1968 when Mr. Ceau-
manian President, Nicolac, sescu refused to join In the
Ceausescu, who recently visited anti-Czechoslovak actions being
China, boycotted the session planned by the rest of the bloc
since alone of Russia's allies to end the liberal 'regime of
Alexander Dubcck. .
in. the Warsaw Pact organiza. The communiqud itself did not
tion, Rumania strongly sue- mention China and} was limited
ports the moves to improve to affirmation of well-known.
Chinese-American ' relations. Soviet position. But to Commu-
o gathering was held some. nists, the wording was clearly
where in the Crimea the south- anti-Chinese in nature and could
also be interpreted as critical of
em area of European 'Russia Rumania.
adjacent to the Black Sea. The declaration highly praised
In Soviet parlance, "left- the meeting of world Commu-
In parties held in' Moscow In
g opportunism" generally June, 1969, which in Soviet
refers to the policies of China. analyses has consistently been
On occasion, "right-wing op. interpreted as having attacked
portunism" can refer to Ru. Peking's policies, a point of
mania or to Yugoslavia, which view disputed by Rumania.
Is not a member of the'Warsaw "Experience bears out the his-
Is significance of the confer-
Pact. ence'for further strengthening
Another Communist country the unity of the world Commu-
not a member of the pact, Mon- nisi and workers' class move:
golia, was represented at the ment on the basis of Marxism-
meeting by its leader, Yumzha- Leninism and the struggle was preparing to relax its in
On Tsedcnbal, a further in- against right-wing and left-wine sistence on sovereignty guar.
dication that China was a major opportunism and for rallying all antees for Comecon countries,
subject of discussion, since progressive and national libera- under Soviet pressure, ap-
Mongolia plays a strategic role tion forces to the anti-imperialist! reared to be removed by an,
in Soviet military preparations struggle," it said. I agreement to respect the sovI
along the Chinese border. ' Presumably, Mr. Brczhnev; creignty, independence and
To avoid drawing attention explained the Soviet
osition
p
! National interests or members.
t6pvl Ruman ia's absence, Tass, the on the new turn in Chinese. Dllutual Dependency
vict press agency, described United States relations. That _ Outside Links I Despite these problems, the)
athering as "a friendly position, as expressed in, 'The prime ministers agreed , Comecon countries last year l
ceng of leaders Aow Pravda eight 'days ago. caiis that the further consolidation took an initial step towardondtheir Vacation IX the for. careful study of the devel? , s~ i>~olrl ~C elq~{
et Union.Approved Flo1"1'lI~W '199W0 i9 s 1te a Q} !iMQ 1gogf a [ban on'
attack on China and the United
States so long as their im.
proved relations are not di.
rected against the Soviet Union,
Regarding the situation in
the Sudan, the participants ins
the meeting "expressed grave
alarm in connection with
the ruthless terror unleashed
against the Communist party
and other democratic organiza.
tions."
Mey strongly condemn the
lawlessness and arbitrariness,
Perpetrated by the Sudanese
authorities, which is exploited
by the forces of imperialism
and reaction against the inter.
ests of the Sudencso people,"
the communique said.
But the seven countries gave
continued 'backing to the Arab
side in the Middle Eastern cld?
sis, ? as well as to the Indo-
chinese Communists.
The communique ,said the
participants "stressed the par.
ticular importance of the ef-
forts to strengthen the unity
and cohesion of the Socialist.
community, the international
working class and Communist
movement" as part of the ef-
fort to insure "new victories of
the working class and of the,
cause of Soolalism"' In the So.
vie[ interpretation, improving'
the "cohesion" of the Commu?
nist movement usually moans
closer adherence to Soviet.
policies. ,
'Though this movement has'
received support from some
countries, such as Poland,
which feels it would gain from
specialization in industrially.,
advanced branches, it has met'
:opposition from Romania and
to some degree, from Hungary
Ca unity and cohesion of the
Socialist countries."
But the eight leaders also'
left the door open to links
from the outside with Come-
con, and vice versa. They
agreed that outsiders could
"take part totally or partially"
in Carrying out the program
and. conversely, pledged to ex.
Band links both with underdo.
veloped and with capitalist
countries.
. The Bucharest meeting cul.
minated two years of work on
a long range program. This
has been beset from the begin.
ning by such basic questions
as how to coordinate planning
among countries that take dif.
ferent views on the relative
Importance of the market and
the planning process In the
economy.
Hungary, for instance, has
been experimenting with de
centralizing and allowing
some prices to 'find their own
level on the market, while the
Soviet Union, Bulgaria and
Romania all retain rigid cen?
tralized planning systems.
While Poland and Hungary
favor moving by stages away,
from the present financial sys.'
Lem, the Soviet Union has op-
posed this. Yesterday's com-
munique made only a general
reference to "improving coin.
modity-monetary relations."
East Europe and the Soviet
Union lack a convertble cur-
rency of their own, a fact
which has political 'signifi-
cance because it has impeded
efforts of smaller countries to
establish links with the West
and has complicated bbth
trade : and financial coopera.
tion.
Poland ana Hungary favor
moving away from the present
system of clearing debts by
commodity deliveries and to-i
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
CPYRGHT
which countries can draw for
hard currency to finance
Western purchases.
The "unanimous" agreement
of the Comecon prime minis-
-tore to support the general
principle of closer links ex?,
TIME
16 August 1971
CPYRGHT
presesd the recognition by.
each country that they are
deeply dependent on each
other at this stage. of develop-
ment.
Even RomanJa whose natu-
ral resources make It the most
It was quite a coincidence. The way
Moscow tells it, the Communist Party
boss of every nation in the Soviet bloc
-with one notable exception-just hap-
pened to be vacationing on Russia's
Crimean peninsula last week. Since they
were all on hand anyway, even Mon-
golia's Yurnshagin Tscdcnbal, why not
get together for a little fraternal talk?
The missing party chief was Ruma-
nia's independent-minded Nicolae Ceau-
sescu, who was sunning himself on his
country's own Black Sea coast. Was he
deliberately overlooked by the Kremlin,
or did he refuse to attend what was in re-
ality a Communist summit conference?
The question was asked with some ner-
vousness in Eastern Europe last week;
in August 1968 the Soviet-led invasion
of Czechoslovakia was preceded by two,
Warsaw Pact summit meetings from
which the leaders of Prague's "Spring-
time time of Freedom" had been excluded.
There are other ominous parallels.
The 1968 meetings were accompanied
by military maneuvers, and last week a
new Warsaw Pact exercise dubbed Opal
71 began in Hungary, uncomfortably
close to Rumania's western frontier. Ear-
ly next week full-scale war games are
scheduled to begin in Bulgaria, near Ru-
mania's southern border.
Cozy Relations. Moscow is irritated
with Ceausescu for a number of rea-
sons. Rumanian combat units have not
participated in Warsaw Pact maneuvers
for more than three years. Under a law
that he concocted shortly after the 1968
invasion of Czechoslovakia, foreign
troops may not cross Rumanian terri-
tory without permission ;from the Na
tional Assembly. As it happens, the As
sembly suddenly went into recess a few,
days. ago. That means that Moscow will
have to fly three full divisions, totaling
self-sufficient next to the So?
viet Union, depends on' Aios?
cow for iron ore supplies for
its vast steel works.
However, each country is
seekingg to expand trade aaod
other Ilnks with the West.
COMMUNISTS
The Crimean Summit
as many as 40,000 men, to the im-'
pending war games in Bulgaria, or ship
them across the Black Sea-unless it
wants to risk marching them through
Rumania without official permission.
What most unsettles the Kremlin at
the moment, however, is Ceausescu's
cozy relations with China, particularly
now that Peking and Washington are be-
ginning to speak to one another. The
Russians believe that the Rumanian lead-
er helped to open Peking`s door to Rich-
ard Nixon both before and during his
own trip to Peking in June. With 600,000
Russian troops stationed along China's
borders and no sign of an end to the
Sino-Soviet feud, Moscow considers
Ceausescu's conduct a grave breach of
Socialist solidarity.
Usual Secrecy. Accordingly, ever
since Ceausescu returned from China,
the Soviets have been seeking an op-
portunity to get the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries together to censure him for his
Asian indiscretions. Two weeks ago, the
Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest handed
Ceausescu a letter from Soviet Party
Chief Leonid Brezhnev. Foreign dip-
lomats in Rumania believe that the let-
ter advised Ceausescu that a Communist.
summit was going to be held in the Cri-
mea but they disagree over whether
Ceausescu refused an invitation or was
snubbed. But as one high-ranking Ru-
manian official put it, "If we had been in-
vited, we would have participated."
The meeting was surrounded by the
usual secrecy; non-Communist observers
are not even certain whether it was held
at Sochi or 40 miles away at Pitsunda.
Presumably, the conferees touched on a
wide range of foreign policy problems
-Berlin, the Soviet setback in the
Sudan, China. What most interested
Kremlinologists was the final conference
communique containing a short but
sharp denunciation of "left-wing and
Steps are under
Hungary and Rom~?=:.K to: ~~
foreign firms Into join. ven-
tures In Which III*, . Jttide
company would prc,vido work.
adA-pltal. ,
right-wing opportunism." Translated,'
that means China on the left and Yugo-
slavia and Rumania on the right.
Ceausescu's Law. In view of such crit-
icisms, how has Rumania's leader man-
aged to survive? For one thing. he has
remained markedly conservative in do-
mestic affairs. That has made it im-
possible for the Soviets to accuse him
of unorthodoxy. According to what
Western observers call Ceausescu's Law,
the more daring the foreign policy, the
more rigidly conservative the domestic
climate. Accordingly, Ceausescu fol-
lowed up his Peking trip with a tough
crackdown on those "invidious Western
influences" that the Soviets regularly
criticize as bourgeois and decadent.
Rumanians dubbed the new policy,
which was announced only two weeks
after Ceausescu's return from China,
the mini-culturalh, after Peking's Cul-
tural Revolution. Among the casualties
so far have been acid-rock music on
state radio and in youth clubs (too West-
ern), the movie Midnight Cowbny (per-
verted) and the American TV series
The Untouchables (too violent). Ccau-
sescu evidently believes that the mini-
culturali, begins at home; his teen-age
son Valentin appeared last week with
his formerly long locks closely shorn.
He explained to friends that his father
had ordered the haircut.
Will Nicolae Ceausescu's cultural pu-
rity save him from Russia's wrath? In
all likelihood, the Russian-Rumanian 1ri-
sis will prove to be nothing more than
a Soviet campaign of intimidation. The
situation is significantly different f roni
Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Russians
know that the Rumanians, like the Yu-
goslavs, would fight if they were at-
tacked. Even so, the current war of
nerves is an uncomfortable reminder to
many East Europeans of that terrible
August three years ago.
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13
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
THE WASHINGTON POST
29 July 1971
Soviets Plan
CPYRGHT
BUCHAREST, July 28-
Well-informed sources said
this week that the Soviet
Union plans to send three
alk~,n Exercises
By Dan Morgan
Waohinaton Pont Purelan aervlee
ment because it has no terri.
torial or political differences
with any other Balkan coon.
try. They have said that a se-
curity arrangement could
army divisions to Bulgaria fori consist of mutual renunciation
maneuvers in August, the first, of force and open discussion
time Since 1967 that Russian of differences, .
troops would enter the Pal-! Raikan Cooperation
k.tns for such exercises. Speaking in the Black Sea
However, the sources said port of Constanta last Friday,
that Romania has given no Romanian President Nicolas
Ceausescu called for the Bal.
sign that it will permit the de-' kien countries to "seek the
tachments to crops Its territory' path of cooperation", and be,
to reach their destination. As said this should mean dotfig
a result, the troops presuma- away with foreign military
hly will have to he transported bases In'the area, /
He A140 called.!efan end to
by ship across the Black Sea. the old policy-followed by lln+
Under legislation passed by perlalist powers of "dividing
the Romanian national assem- the Balkan countries and gen.
bly after the 1968 Invasion oft erally the small countries"
Czechoslovakia, only the as- and of "inciting a people
Sembly Itself can authorize against another."
the entry of foreign troops ! Though Imperialism is gene-1
into the country. With the par. rfaliy used In connection with!
liament now on a lengthy sum. the United States, political
Although there is no evi-
dence that the maneuvers
themselves are more than rou-
tine, diplomatic observers say
they clearly have politlepaI re-
levance to the larger issue of
long-range Balkan security.
Romanian officials have i
been emphasizing that their'
government Is In an excellent
also could be Interpreted as a
reference to the bad relations
between Yugoslavia and Bul-
garia, which some feel could
be exploited by the Soviet
Union in the future.
In an area composed of in-,
dependent-minded Romania, a
Warsaw Pact member, nona-
ligned Yugoslavia. Pro-Chinese
Albania and the NATO coun
position to press for some sort tries Greece and Turkey, Bai-
of regionnl security arrange.
THE WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1971
'Around the World
CPYRGHT
Xarise
units to exercises held by the',
Warsaw Pact. Last fall, for In.
stance, when the Warsaw Part'
held the exercises code-named
"Brothers In Arms" In Ea a t?
Germany, Romania sent a rria.'
jor as an observer. The surces
here said they believe Roma.
nia will probably send staff of-
ficers to the Bulgarian maneu-
vers, In which three Soviet
and two Bulgarian divisions
will participate.
While apparently remaining
firm In refusing to participate
fully in the ' military opera.
tions of the Warsaw Pact, Ro?
ipania has joined discussions
at the political level. More-
over, there have been signs
that Romania is anxious to
avoid becoming isolated from
'its Communist neighbors, as
Yugoslavia did after its break
with Stalin to 1948. This week,
for Instance, the primemInist?
ers of Comecon, the Conanu
nist economic organization, are
meeting here to discuss closer
forms of cooperation.
The sources here suggested
that the planned Bulgarian
maneuvers may have been
scheduled In the place of simi.
lar exercises planned f or
Southern Hungary in late
July.
The Yugoslav .government,
In connection with those ma?
neuvers, said that It bpposee
war games on the soil of other
European countries.
ins i~'Hungary
. BUDAPEST-The Warsaw appeared to be a political vers haci gotten under ways garia later this month.
Pact launched surprise- game of pressure on neigh. ont cave no after midnight n as The maneuvers take on
tactical maneuvers invoiv boring Romania and Yogos-, ; political significance in the'
'Ing Soviet, Czechoslovak Pavia. the size ,of the forces being light of recent Warsaw Pact
A terse onnougcerpent byj .deployed. Dip 1 o m a t i c ', critictam of ktornagian Presi?
and Hungarian troops lIn . e ,the official Hungarian news Sources reported earlier that dent NIaoIae Ceausescu,$
Hungary yesterday. The wat? (agency MTl said the maneuo; Warsaw Pact forces would, ;friendly policies toward
frames code-named Opal 71 - also hold, war games In But, a.
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garia stands out as the most
loyal Soviet ally. However;
Bulgaria's relations with
'Greece and Turkey.have Im.
proved recently and Bulgarian
leaders have also advanced
the idea of exchanging secu?
rity declarations to cover the
region.
Two weeks ago, the Yugo.
Slav' government protested
strongly to Bulgaria over the
alleged overflight of its tern.
tory by two Bulgarian aircraft.
The matter of Balkan secu-
rity will also be underlined
this October, when Yugoslavia
stages its biggest military ma?
neuvers in recent years. Bel-
grade sources say they are
aimed at demonstrating Yugo-
slavia's military preparedness
for any aggression. and, Indi-
rectly, at stressing the army's
role as a stabilizing domestic
element after a period of some
political unrest.
Yugoslav Maneuvers
At present, there are no So.
viet troops stationed In Hul.
garia.
Although a member of the
Warsaw Pact, Romania has
long opposed the division of
Europe Into military block,
and has. publicly opposed
"cross-border" military manetr?'
vers at the Geneva dlsarmn?
ment conference.
It has also declined to send
14
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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
27 June 1971
CPYRGHT
commission
of the Yugoslav Com-'
monist party has met in
Y~gosl~via fears
ussian threat
By STEPHEN CONSTANT, Communist Affairs Staff
TITO ATTACKED
The Russian official Press was
Belgrade to discuss anti 1 =used Mof-,comparing 4th vpre-
Yugoslav activities by ~ slavia with that which existed in
Russia.. Czechoslovakia before the inva-
Among those who took Part intended "too abresss comparison need clearly
1 the discussions was Mr.
comes onding action to be
eljko Misunovic, Yugoslavia ,s taken'
mbassador to Russia, and the;
untry's Deputy State Secre' Russia was attempting to iso-
try for National Defence. ' . late Yugoslavia on the inter-
According to Yugoslav re national scene. She was encour.
orts, the discussions were aging subversion by Yugoslav
rather pessimistic." Ever since Cominformists forces.
ussia and her Warsaw Pact The term " cominformist " is
llies Invaded Czechoslovakia in used by Belgrade to describe
68 "relations have not ? imr,? anti-Tito Yugoslavs who sided
oved in any way." with Stalin at the time of the
postwar Stalin-Tito break.
The
accusedpRussia ofmltucouuagging
WASHINGTON STAR
27 July 1971
tin
cominformists" Yugoslav "Geographically, Yugoslavia
emigres living in Moscow to give situated in the most sensitiv
public lectures attacking Pre- part of Europe. We are?washe
sident Tito and his policies. One y waves from all sides. In th
lecturer was a former Yugoslav Past We successfully repelle
partisan and now a Litut.- these waves and in the futur
Colonel in the Soviet Army. we must do this even mor
One lecture was given on successfully."
President Tito's birthday. It Tito was clearly referringg t
attacked him in "particularly Russia and the "cominformists
severe terms." when he mentioned the dat
The most significant of the 1948 the year of the Stalin-Tit
special commission's findings was row and the expulsion of Yug
that Russia was advocating that siavia from the Cominform.
Yugoslavia should be dealt with Recently certain . peo41
in the same way as Czechoslo. have even rejoiced at difficultie
vakia. in our country, thereby indicat
A few days ago at a meeting ing their wish that we ghoul
with Yu oslavian sportsmen not succeed ko as to prove tha
President Tito spoke of unnamed in 1948 and later we were moron
enemies " who do not want a in the choice of our path
strong and united Yugoslavia. sodatW~ developimeat;"' ,. tl t, t
THE YUGOSLAV, MOSAIC-2
al.
Hers vrepare
CPYRGHT
ussia invades
By A1`1DIti:JV BOROWIEC slipped the l into his hip pock-
Star Statt writer et, walking out into the sun-liti,
BELGRADE - The young streets of B~rade.
nn browsing in a bookstores Hundreds f thousands- If,
had fashiopably long hair and not millionsi*- like him form
as clad 1r' a sportshirt of tht the vast Ytcoslav territorial
atest Itallnn design. army, trained In guerrilla tac.
lie glanced at an array of tics over since Soviet tanks,
rolled into Czechslovakia in
Second,oi 5 Articles 10G8.
ble well chosen points of this
rugged country.
A casual tourist basking in
the warm sunshine of this
country can discern few
signs of tension or fear. Yet
the concern bb t S t t i t
a u ov
I rg
fident they could resist suc.
cessfully any invatlon from
the Soviet bloc, causing a fes-'
tering Vietnam type situation;
in the heart of Europe.
Country Unanimous
e n cn- "Let the Russians try," Is
lions mates official circles, facto- ' the phrase repeated through-
ries and villages, irrespective out ? the republics forming the
Few Signs of rear of Internal nationality feuds precarious Yugoslav mosaid.
Western comics and gtrlg and economic problems ? Dislike - and a certain do-
magazines es and selected two Organized in compact re p piled
crudely colored small formats gional units with handy am-' up before this country. gree of contempt - of the
y There is no fear. The sturdy. Russians is widespread.
booklets. . 1 munition and weapons dumps, "Tito (Marshall Josi Broz
One was entitled "$I~t sa; the territorials can be mob. s tough and proud Yugoslavs t) t succpped in
Ilomba" (1 ~JilflpmcVl of fi3drl),Itl(~r i 9jVetQca~,Cl.,~;; r a i a#fc~'0t6"3 "'e' et Union if it
Mow,
n sixura ey
h
"
i
ot
er Rucn
Bacac (Ba-
Nazi rmany. They are con- Was onl his idea," one Yugo.
zooka) Ile maid and camallw assume positions in in numera- stay eai
 CPYRGHdpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
. ,in this respect, the whole
country Is unanimous. Our
conflict with the Russians did
not start when they expelled
us from the Cominform in
10,18, but even before the war,-
when Tito defied Soviet efforts
to dominate our Communist
party."
"The Russians," said anoth
er, "have always wanted a lot
from us - without giving any-.
thing in return."
Today the Soviet Union con-
stitutes the biggest single out-.
side threat to Yugoslav sover '
eignty. +7his threat haunts the.
Yugoslav leadership, the
cadres of the Communist par-
ty and the ordinary citizens.
To the Russians, the success.
of the Yugoslav economic ex-
periment in workers self
management Is overshadowed
by the country's persistent ef-
forts to solve its nationalitie
problems.
Currently consisting of six
republics and two autonomous
provinces, Yugoslavia is im-.
plementing a far-reaching pro-;
,gram of accentuating the au-.
tonomy of the various regions
.under loose federal leadership.,
If this succeeds - and
,more Yugoslavs feel it,.
can - it would constitute an
enormous threat to the seeth-
Ing nationality problem in-
creasingly plaguing the Soviet
-Union.
That is why Russia Is the
biggest single enemy of this
venture in Yugoslavia, often
ideseribed as the first country
=ln modern history to become a
confederation of sovereign
states.
The constitutional amend-
ments gradually put into ef-
fect call for a large degree of
autonomy for the republics,
reserving for the federal gov-
ernment the management of
defense and foreign affairs
plus some over-all economic
guidelines.
Whispering Campaign
A rising whispering cam-
paign against the new form of
federation is in progress, fer-
mented by Soviet agents and
orthodox Yugoslav Commu-
nists, many of whom left the
country in 1948. Some are now
returning clandestinely, ap-
parently preparing for the
time when Tito leaves the
scene.
In keeping with its liberal
image, the Yugoslav government has no intention of limit,.
Ing the free movement of per.
sons In and out of the country.
But to cope ? with the iacreas%
14 underground threat, secret
Police services are being bol.
stered and the population of
some areas Is believed under
increased surveillance.
In ringing speeches at mass
rallies, politicians are stress-
Ing "bratstvo" (brotherhood)
-and "dinstvo" (unity). These-
are a weak points of the
multi-national Yugoslav state
on which Russia has been cen-
tering its efforts to subvert.
"Titoism."
' However, during the past 20
,ears the Soviets have mis
judged the country's internal
situation on more than one oc-
casion. Their often crude ant[-;
Yugoslav policies have con
tributed to the dissipation of,
Soviet leverage here.
As far as the West is con
cerned, the maintenance and
success of the Yugoslav exper-
iment is of paramount impor?
tance.
A strategic country occupy'
Ing the hearts of the historical.
ly unstable Balkan peninsula,,
Yugoslavia as a nonaligned
country in a way protects the
southern flank of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.'
Its collapse would shattc- the
equilibrium in the Mediterra-.
Wean and further contribute to
the instability in the Middle
East.
That Is why the United.
States has been bolstering this
,country with aid and grants.
totaling nearly $3 billion over.
.the
the past 20 years, including
$700 million in military;
assistance. The vaguely Marx.
tat ideology of the regime and
,the omnIpro n 'Communist
fred star appear~ot no impor.
tance.
First Lino of Defense
Nonalignment constitutes
Yougoslavia's first line of de-
fense, backed by an ambitious
foreign policy program and
aid efforts throughout the
countries of the "third world."
In his efforts to buttress the
country internally against the
possible Soviet threat, Tito has
not hesitated to use tough, un-
compromising measures.
Among the vicitms are former
Vice President and secret po-
lice boss Aleksander Rankovic
and one of Tito's early asso.
ciates now turned bitter critic,
Milovan Djilas.
Rankovic was dismissed In,
]9GG because Tito felt he was.
the only man capable of taking
over the country. It was not so
much the takeover by Ranko?
vie that Tito feared but the
fact that in order to cope with
Yugoslavia's precarious con-
struction, R a n k o v i c would
have to rely on outside props,
presumably provided by Rus
sta. This would mean an and
to "titoism" and an end of,
Yugoslav freedom.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1971
Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote. The recent announce-
ment that e Mexican-Soviet Cultural c tinge Institute has dis-
continued scholarships to Patrice Lunumba University in Moscow is
an appropriate footnote to the disclosuresthat followed the recent
arrest of the North Korean trained members of the Mexican guerrilla
group, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR). The cancellation,
which applies not only to students already accepted but to future
applicants as well, is obviously connected with the discovery that
the MAR guerrillas were recruited while studying at Patrice Lumumba
University. With the expulsion from Mexico of five Soviet diplomats
in connection with this scandal, the Soviet Union is now rightfully,
if embarrassingly, linked to North Korea in the business of promoting
world-wide revolution.. Thus it has apparently seen fit to lower its
profile until this affair blows over.. (See Perspectives issues of
May and June 1971 for articles on Lumunba University North Korean
subversion.)
Can The New Svetova Literatura Accept Solzhenits ? From 1956
until May 1970, Prague's eon publishing house urns ed its Czech
intellectual audience with- a bimonthly literary magazine designed to
fill the void created by regime-imposed isolation from both Western
thought, and that of dissidents within the Bloc and the Soviet Union.
Edited by prominent critics and writers this magazine, Svetova
Literatura, exposed Czech poets and writers to the stimu "provided
by the experimentation and innovations of proscribed Soviet authors
-- Anna Aehmatova, Boris Pasternak, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, etc. --
as well as the work of Russian emigres such as Ivan Budin and Vladimir
Nabokovo Predictable suspension carne in May of 1970? The Czech muse
was dead; but not quite. At. the beginning of August this year
Svetova Literatura reappeared -_ like Anne Boleyn atop the walls of
the Towerof Lon on, "with her, head tucked underneath her arm," The
new editorial board was revealed to be made up mainly of dogmatists
from the 1950's including the man who liquidated the Union of Czech
Writers, Karel Bousek of the Ministry of Culture. The new editorial
board decreed in its policy statement that it will be the task of
the revived periodical "to portray the progressive trends and
phenomena in world literature from commited socialist positions and
in the most accurate manner possible. Svetova Literatura will be a
literary revue of socialist orientation.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300050001-8
According to this policy, the revived periodical has every
right to sustain the exposure it so long accorded to Solzhenitsyn
in,such tributes as the one in issue no. 4, 1968, when the magazine
drew attention to the author's moral greatness. We have appended
a copy of Solzhenitsyn's challenge to the Soviet Security Police
as it appeared in the 18 August 1971 issue of The Washington Post.
The letter gives no evidence that it is the work of a person who
has renounced socialism; it cannot be said to deviate one iota
from socialist legality. Indeed, any strengthening of the legal
aspects of socialism must surely be a progressive trend or
phenomena of the sort that Svetova Literatura's directors wish to
emphasize. And no one can maintain that t e letter does not present
the facts with the utmost clarity.
Warsaw Intercontinental On Its Way. The Intercontinental Hotel
Corporation, a British construction fii
and the Polish tourist agency
Orbis in mid-August signed a preliminary agreement for the construction
of a 450-room hotel in Warsaw. Orbis will manage the hotel when it
is completed, probably by mid-1974. The agreement while still tentative,
ends a long period of Polish inaction on a project in which the Poles
first expressed interest over two years ago. It can be taken to
indicate that the Gierek regime is willing to conclude agreements
with Western firms which had evidently been rejected by the Gomulka
regime as too bold, and thus to catch up with the less timid Warsaw
Pact countries. Bucharest and Budapest already are graced by Inter-
continental Hotels.
New "Legal System" for Cuba. There has been a little-noted
but significant development in-Cuba in the recent declaration that
a new legal system, that recognizes only "the power of the revolution"
will soon be adopted, Known as the "Organic Law of the National Legal
System," the new code officially subordinates the country's legal system
to the Council of Ministers, headed by Castro himself. Although this
subordination has in fact existed since Castro took over the government
in 1959, it has now been officially codified and provides an opportunity
to point out that Castro will use every means possible to strengthen
his personal grip on the government.
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WASHINGTON POST
18 August 1971
Solzhepitsyn's Challenge to the. Police
"Fine methods you have," he said to those
who conducted him.
-,
"We are on an operatiogt, and on an opera-
Following is t7ie text of the 1'et iw
Nobel Prize winder Alexander Soizte-
nitsyn sent Aug.' t3 to Yuri V.'Andr$ov,
. To the minister of government security of
the U.S.S.R. Andropov
For many years I have borne In silenca
.the lawlessness of your employees: t:ha.
Inspection of all my correspondence, the
confiscation of half of it, the search of my
dcorrespondents' homes and their official and
administrative persecution, the spying
.around my house, the shadowing of visitors,
the tapping of telephone conversations, the
drilling holes in ceilings, the placing of re-
:cording apparatus in my' city. apartment and
,garden plot, and a persistent slander cam.
paign against me from speakers' platforms
when they are offered to employees of your
ministry.
longer be silent. My country house village of
Rozhdestvo, ' Naro-Fominsky Rayou was
empty, and the eavesdroppers counted on
my absence. Having returned to Moscow be.
cause I was taken suddenly ill, I had asked
my friend Alexander Gorlov to go out to `the
country house for an automobile part. But it
turned out there was'no.lock on the house
and voices could be heard from inside. Gor-
lav stepped inside and demanded the rob?
hers' documents. In the small strueturfy,
where three or four can barely turn around,
there were about ten of them, in plain
clothes.
On the command of the senior officer To
the woods with him and silence him'=--they
"bound Gorlov, knocked him down, and
dragged him face down into the woods and
beat him. cruelly. Simultaneously, others
were running by a circuitous route. through
'toe bushes, carrying to their car packages,
papers, objects perhaps also a part from the
`apparatus they had brought themselves.
However, Gorlov fopght back vigorously and
,yelled, summoning witnesses, neighbors
from other garden plots came running In re-
sponse to his shout$ and barred the robbers'
way to the highway and demanded their doe-
'uments. Then one of the robbers presented a
red identification card and thepeighbors let
Mted and his- suit torn to ribbons, to the car.
tkn we can do anything."
Captain-according to the documents he
peoserted to the neighbors-Ivanov, accord-
iii to his personal statement first took. Gor- ?.i
lov to the Naro-Fominsky millta, where. the f
local officers greeted "Ivanov" with defer-
ence. There, "IvanoV" demanded from Gor-'
lov written explanation of what had hap
pened. Although he had been fiercely,,
beaten, Gorlov put in writing the purpose of a
his trip and all the circumstances. After that
the senior robber demanded ? that Gorlov:
sign an oath of secrecy, Gorlov flatly re-
fused.
Then they. set off fors Moscow and on the {
mad the senior robber bombarded Gorlovj
vyith literally the following phrases: "If Sot-.
zhenitsyn finds out what took place at. the 4
Dacha,, it's all over with you, Your officiat
career t Gorlov is a candidate of. technical.
sciences and has presented his doctoral dis
tertation for defense, works in the Institute ;
Giprotis of Gosstroya of the ;U.S.S.R.] will go
no farther, you will not be able to defend'
any dissertation. This will affect your family:
and children and, if necessary,, we will put
yiiu in prison."
Those who know our way of life know the
full feasibility of these threats,, But Gorlov1
dill not give in to them, refused to sign the
pledge, and now he Is threatened with re-;
prisa1.
I demand from you, citizen minister, the
public naming of all the robbers, their pun- {
ishment as criminals and an explanation of.;
this incident. Otherwise I can only believe
that you sent them.
13 August 1971.
To the Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin.
I am forwarding you a copy of my letter
to the Minister of State Security. For all of'-
the enumerated lawless actions I consider
him lieraonally responsible. If the govern-
hr:ent of the U.S.S.It does not share In these
se'rions of Minister Andropov, I will expect
l3tt iuvestigtztion.
A. SOLZHENITSYN.
13 August 107L
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INDEX TO PERSPECTIVES
January-August 1971
SUBJECT DATE
Communism
Soviet Orthodoxy vs. Domestic and Foreign
Dissidence January
Fight on Among Venezuelan Communists February
The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of
Soviet Union February
Kim 11-Sung Has His Problems February
The 24th CPSU Congress (Special issue) 1 March
The Soviet Model: Forced Labor Colonies and
Other Prisons April
Australia: Communist Dissidence "Down Under" April
Cuba: The Soviet "Model" of Socialism in
Latin America April
Inside the 24th CPSU May
Czechoslovakia: Showcase of Soviet Colonialism May
Dissidence at the 24th CPSU Congress June
Yugoslovia: Can Moscow Tolerate an Independent
State ? June
Third Anniversary of Invasion of Czechoslovakia July
Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Protectorate July
The Reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine August
Sweet Life Under the Soviet Third Economy August
The Sovietization of Cuba August
Developing Countries
Chile as a Marxist State: It's Nature and Threat January
The Indonesian Success Story August
Economics
Lenin's Farmers January
Poland January
Cuba's Economic Outlook Continues Bleak February
Pollution in the Soviet Union May
The Petroleum Offensive of the Soviet Union July
The European Community Challenge and Soviet
Response
August
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International Conferences and Fronts
East-West Affairs: Much Diplomacy--Few Results January
The Soviet Security Conference Offensive May
Literature, Arts and Sciences
Khrushchev Remembers
Soviet Orthodoxy vs. Domestic and Foreign
Dissidence
Subversion and Aggression
January
January
Viet Cong Terrorism February
COMMunist Officials Abroad: Those in Trouble
Last Year February
Soviet Complicity in Sudanese Genocide March
Soviet Manipulation of Angela Davis Case March
Soviet Relations with the Arab Socialist Union March
Patrice Lumumba University: Training in the
"Science of Revolution" May
East Pakistan: Sino-Soviet Battleground May
The Common Factors of Political Terrorism June
North Korean Subversive Diplomacy June
Soviet Setback in the Sudan (Special issue) August
Africa
Soviet Complicity in Sudanese Genocide March
The Petroleum Offensive of the Soviet Union July
Soviet Setback in the Sudan (Special issue) August
Europe
East-West Affairs: Much Diplomacy--Few Results January
The Soviet Security Conference Offensive May
The European Community Challenge and Soviet
Response August
Far East
Hanoi's Prisoners : Dignity and Worth January
Vietnam January
Viet Cong Terrorism February
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Kim Il-Sung Has His Troubles February
U.S. Troops Withdraw from South Vietnam March
POW's: The Long Captivity April
Australia: Communist Dissidence'"Dowh.Under" April
Communist Pathet Lao Defections June
North Korean Subversive Diplomacy June
Prisoners of War--A New Twist July
The Indonesian Success Story August
Near East
Soviet Relations with the Arab Socialist Union March
East Pakistan: Sino-Soviet Battleground May
Soviet Orthodoxy vs. Domestic and Foreign
Dissidence January
Poland January
Lenin's Farmers January
Khrushchev Remembers January
Communist Officials Abroad: Those in Trouble
Last Year February
The 24th Congress of the CPSU February
The 24th CPSU Congress (Special issue) 1 March
The Soviet Model: Forced Labor Colonies and
Other Prisons April
Patrice Lumunba University: Training in the
"Science of Revolution" May
Inside the 24th CPSU May
Czechoslovakia: Showcase of Soviet Colonialism May
Dissidence at the 24th CPSU Congress June
Yugoslovia: Can Moscow Tolerate -an. Independent
Marxist State? June
Third Anniversary of the Soviet Invasion of
Czechoslovakia July
Czechoslovakia: The Soviet Protectorate July
The Petroleum Offensive of the Soviet Union July
The Reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine August
Sweet Life Under the Soviet Third Economy August
Western Hemisphere
Chile as a Marxist State: It's Nature and Threat January
Fight is on Among Venezuelan Communists February
Cuba's Economic Outlook Continues Bleak February
Cuba: The Soviet 'Model" of Socialism in
Latin America April
The Sovietization of Cuba August
3
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