CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES MARCH 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Propaganda
PERSPECTIVES
MARCH 1972
SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN THIRD WORLD WATERS
THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED
STAKES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS?
DATES WORTH NOTING
SHORT SUBJECTS
UNCENSORED RUSSIA
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PROTESTS TREATMENT
OF JOURNALISTS IN PRAGUE
P.S. TO SOLJENITSYNE
INDEX TO PERSPECTIVES
SEPTEMBER 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972
25X1C10b
re?prommi
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INDEX TO PERSPECTIVES
September 1971 - February 1972
SUBJECT DATE
AFRICA
Penetration of Africa via the Tan-Zam Railroad
Moscow and the Arab World: A Turning Point?
WILE
September
November
Chile's Free Press in Danger October
Chile's Deteriorating Economy December
Castro in Chile: The Leopard Fails to Change January
his Spots
USSR's Reported Offer of Credits to Chile February
CHINA, PEOPLF'S REPUBLIC OF
Penetration of Africa via the Tan-Zam Railroad
Shifting the United Nations Scenario on China
CUBA
September
October
New Legal System for Cuba September
Castro in Chile: The Leopard Fails to Change January
his Spots
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Czech Underground Makes Election Plea October
The Smrkovsky Incident November
Czechoslovakia's "Consolidation" Election January
A Cold Winter in Prague February
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
The Berlin Agreement October
Soviet Leaders Pack Traveling Bags October
Brezhnev's Paris Debut December
ESPIONAGE
The Ubiquitous KGB
Addendum to "The Ubiquitous KGB"
November
November
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KGB/GRU Operations Abroad December
FRANCE
Brezhnev's Paris Debut December
A New Year's Greeting from the CP February
ITALY
The Italian Communists and Europe January
JAPAN
Tokyo and Moscow Wrangle Over the Northern February
Territories
KOREA, SOUTH
South Korea is Setting an Example January
MALAYSIA
Malaysia's Scarlet Pimpernel November
MERRY-ANDREWING
Can the New "Svetova Literatura" Accept September
Solzhenitsyn?
Warsaw Intercontinental on Its Way September
The New Admirals February
NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA
Moscow and the Arab World: A Turning Point? November
Moscow's Plan for South Asia January
View of Bangladesh February
POLAND
Whither Poland? The December Party Congress November
PRESS, LITERATURE AND ARTS
Can the New "Svetova Literatura" Accept September
Solzhenitsyn?
Samizdat: The Unofficial Soviet Press October
Chile's Free Press in Danger October
Rigor Mortis on the Left: "Without Marx or November
Jesus"
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?"'"Eitnivorms
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Two Soviet Views of Stalin: Let History Judge January
& Tupolev's Sharaga
One Year in the Life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn February
ROMAN IA
Recent Soviet-Romanian Tensions September
SOVIET UNION
Foreign
Recent Soviet-Romanian Tensions September
The Russian Church in Political Action September
Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote September
The Berlin Agreement October
Soviet Leaders Pack Traveling Bags October
The Ubiquitous KGB November
Moscow and the Arab World: A Turning Point? November
Brezhnev in Yugoslavia (special) November
Addendum to "The Ubiquitous KGB" (special) November
KGB/GRU Operations Abroad December
Soviet Contempt for Yugoslavia December
USSR's Reported Offer of Credits to Chile February
Brezhnev's Paris Debut December
Moscow's Plan for South Asia January
Tokyo and Moscow Wrangle Over the Northern February
Territories
Domestic
Samizdat: The Unofficial Soviet Press October
Perversion in Soviet Psychiatry January
Two Soviet Views of Stalin: Let History Judge January
& ayolev's Sharaga
On Eliminating Dissent February
The Bukovsky Case: A Travesty of Justice February
One Year in the Life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn February
SWEDEN
Morality - Swedish Government Style October
One Year in the Life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn February
URUGUAY
Election in Uruguay: Challenge from the Left October
Uruguay Rejects Leftist Election Bid January
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VIETNAM
Get Out of MV Cabbage Patch! January
Some Facts on U.S. Disengagement in Vietnam November
South Vietnam and the Question of POWs December
Where is the Dedicated Communist Warrior of December
Yesteryear?
WORLD-WIDE
The Russian Church in Political Action September
Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote September
A Message for Revolutionaries February
YUGOSLAVIA
Brezhnev in Yugoslavia November
Soviet Contempt for Yugoslavia December
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"Svisaaja.
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STAKES IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
The attached backgrounder attempts to put into global and
European perspective the rather serious current Soviet detente
effort in Europe, of which the initiatives for a European security
conference appear to be an important part. Pegged to the Warsaw
Pact meeting and European Declaration of 26-27 January, it presents
the Western posture (expounded in part in a 1 December 1971 speech
by Secretary of State William Rogers - excerpts attached), reviews
Soviet expansionist foreign policy historically and places in this
context the evolution of Soviet European policy. Finally, it
points to the dangers and advantages to the West of the current
Soviet detente drive and of participation in a European security
conference.
Specific challenges to Soviet motives in calling for a
European security conference are given in the final section of the
Backgrounder.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972
STAKES IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
Renewed interest in a European security conference which
developed following a recent Warsaw Pact meeting makes it worth-
while to re-examine the issues and stakes involved for both the
Western allies and for the Eastern Bloc of Communist countries
led by the Soviet Union --- particularly Soviet motivations in
pushing the project.
January Warsaw Pact Meeting
The Warsaw Pact (WP) powers, consisting of the USSR, East
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria,
met in Prague 26-27 January. In addition to a declaration
routinely condemning U.S. policy in Indo-China, the WP Political
Consultative Committee signed a separate Declaration on Europe
(attached). The main purpose of the Declaration was to promote
the long-standing Soviet project of convening a Conference on
European Security and Cooperation (CESC) with the participation
of all European countries, East and West, plus the United States
and Canada. The Declaration suggested the conference take place
in 1972, but most observers feel the Soviets would be content
even with a preparatory conference (Helsinki would probably be
the site) in 1972. While the Declaration contained nothing
substantially different from many earlier proposals, hints at
possible concessions and its generally optimistic, conciliatory
tone can be regarded as a measure of the eagerness with which the
Soviets are pressing the issue.
Western Posture
The Western allies have recently become more willing to
explore the value of a European security conference as a means of
seeking a genuine East-West detente, Among the factors contributing
to the West's greater interest are a number of tension-reducing
moves, such as the treaties the USSR and Poland recently concluded
with West Germany, normalizing their mutual relations; the apparent
progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), in which
the Soviets indeed seem to be negotiating in good faith; and the
successful Four-Power negotiations on Berlin, guaranteeing Western
access to the city and thus removing the Berlin issue as the source
of a possible East-West military confrontation. The Berlin
issue is particularly important in that the Western powers had
made it a kind of test of Soviet detente intentions.
Nevertheless, the Western allies have felt, and still feel,
a certain skepticism about the value of a European security con-
ference. Simply put, they mould be pleased to see progress made
on those specific issues that separate and create tensions
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between East and West Europe, and would wish to avoid convening a
conference merely for the sake of the appearance of detente, as
a grand propaganda forum that did not address itself to the
solution of practical issues. Among the issues calling for
solution would be a mutual and balanced reduction of military
forces (MBFR) in East and West Europe, reduction of the
barriers to the free exchange of information and ideas,
and freer movement of people across the boundaries that separate
East and West Europe (see U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers'
statement, attached). The WP Declaration did not address itself
directly to any of these issues.
Soviet Aims
What advantages do the Soviets see for themselves in the
convening of a European security conference? During the 15 or more
years the Soviets have proposed such a conference, changes on the
international scene, especially the steady progress toward European
integration and the intensifying Soviet conflict with Communist
China, have forced the Soviets to modify their major objectives
in Europe. However, there is reason to believe that their original
motivations retain their essential validity today.
A 11116001- Soviet objective since World War II has been to
vitiate U.S. influence in Europe, ideally by eliminating the U.S.
military presence there. Of comparable importance has been the
Soviet objective of preventing the military, economic, and political
integration of West Europe. These objectives simultaneously served
a defensive and an offensive Soviet strategy. There is little
doubt that as a result of tremendous human and material losses in
the conflict with Germany in World War II, the USSR acutely feared
the emergence of a strong, united Europe which the Soviet Union
considered might well fall under the domination of a powerful
Germany. It seems likely that the early offer of an all-European
security conference was designed in part as a defensive maneuver
to preclude the formation of a West European military and economic
organization including Germany and strongly supported by the U.S.
(It should be remembered that early proposals for a European
security conference made no provision for American participation.)
Motivations of Soviet Foreign Policy
But Soviet policy toward Europe (and the rest of the non-
Communist world as well) has deeply-rooted, offensive, expansionist
motivations as well. And here it will be necessary to digress
briefly and review Soviet global strategy in order that Soviet
European policy and Soviet aims with regard to a European security
conference can be seen in proper perspective.
Regardless of the weight one attaches to the persistence of
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the Russian Messianic tradition or Czarist imperialistic ambitions
in Soviet foreign policy, there is little doubt that the modern-
day Soviet leaders' view of the international arena in which the
USSR operates is deeply influenced by Soviet-Marxist conditioning.
From Lenin and Trotsky to Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev-
Kosygin, Soviet leaders have regarded Soviet Communism as a
universal form of society arising from an inevitable historical
process. They have seen their own function as one of moving this
historical process forward. Thus, they protect Soviet Communism
where it has been imposed (in the Soviet homeland, and as in
Czechoslovakia in 1968), support and encourage its growth where-
ever it manifests itself (primarily in local pro-Soviet Communist
parties), cooperate with non-Communist forces which either show
sympathy for the Soviet Union or antipathy to the capitalist
camp headed by the U.S. (in Latin America or the Arab world),
and seek converts among neutral and even anti-Commumist states
(Egypt or India). Finally, they resort to any means, short of a
self-destructive war, to weaken, divide, or subvert those states
which they consider incurably hostile, above all, the U.S. and its
European allies, among others. (This last strategy is one proper
way to describe what the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistence.")
Meanwhile, Communist regimes like Yugoslavia, Albania, and
China, which at one time supported and cooperated with the Soviet
Union, found their national interests or ideologies Oar both
intermixed) at cross purposes with the Soviet Union, and were
successful (unlike Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) in
pursuing a policy independent of (and when necessary, hostile to)
the Soviet Union. Of these, only China, because of its sheer
size and its proximity to the USSR, represents a potentially
serious threat to Soviet global strategy and aims.
Soviet Post-Wdr European Policy
Soviet expansionist policy in Europe has undergone considerable
modification under pressure of events and successful Western policies.
In the chaotic aftermath of World War II, there was a high
likelihood of a Communist takeover in the key countries of France
and Italy (the reason that Italy and France were the only non-
Communist countries to be included in the Cominform, which
was established in 1947, was that Stalin expected they soon would
join the ranks of the other "people's democracies"). With the
demilitarization of Europe, there was a constant danger of a Soviet
military overrun, which NATO was eventually created to counter.
When an indigenous Communist takeover failed to materialize
(largely because of the Marshall Plan), and military overrun
became too risky to the homeland of socialism, nuclear threats
combined with pressure tactics, as in the Berlin blockade,
were used in the attempt to force Europe to the Soviet will.
Concurrently, using the Donimunist front World Peace Council as their
main vehicle, the Soviets mounted a massive, long-term peace
campaign. Though unsuccessful, it evidently was calculated to
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convince the West Europeans that military defense measures were
unnecessary. At various times since the mid-fifties, the Soviets
have offered one or another form of a European security conference
as an alternative to NATO, until recently with the hope of
excluding the U.S. from such a conference. Eventually, all these
maneuvers to prevent the strengthening of Europe and to eliminate
the U.S. from Europe failed.
Strategy of Detente
Now, faced with the prospect of a full integration of
Europe militarily, economically, and ultimately politically, the
Soviets seem to have been forced in Europe to accept the path of
real detente in which the current proposal for a European security
conference appears to be one move.
The current detente campaign has both an offensive and
defensive aspect. Its defensive aspect is clearly related to
Sino-Soviet relations. An increasingly powerful, influential,
and hostile China looms larger and larger in Soviet thinking,
both as an immediate problem and as a long-range threat to Soviet
security. Thus, it has become important for the Soviet Union to
seek a stabilized, friendly atmosphere in Europe, in order to have
a freer hand to deal with China.
As an offensive strategy, detente (and a European security
conference) is designed to show Europe not only an air of reason-
ableness, but to grant judicious concessions which are either
unavoidable, or limited but sufficent to convince a skeptical
West of Soviet good intentions. In the long term, the detente
strategy is calculated to soften Western resolve in its military
defense posture, to soften Western resistance to Soviet foreign
policy requirements, and to encourage Europe to seek closer
relations with the Soviet Union, as much as possible at the expense
of the U.S. It is not too far-fetched to see the following
emergent strategy in Soviet European policy: unable to prevent
European integration or to eliminate U.S. influence in Europe,
the Soviets are seeking over the longer term what is coming to be
known as the "Finlandization" of Europe. This may be defined as
Soviet use of its multiple resources as a global super-power:
a) to erode the will of a people (Finns or Europeans) to
resist encroachments on their legitimate claims to independence
and sovereignty,
b) to exercise a veto power over a people's foreign and
domestic policies which the USSR considers undesirable.
Thus, the Soviet Union seeks to create not a truly neutral area but
a neutralized area which has a severely limited capacity to act
in its own enlightened self-interest because it has to take prior
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account of favorable Soviet reaction. "Finlandization" is a
status of which West Europe and other areas close to Soviet power
should be acutely aware for the long term. Mbre immediately, the
West should seek from detente and a European security conference
whatever will enhance its own sovereignty, but at the same time
beware of merely helping create an atmosphere in which avoiding
offense to the Soviet Union becomes the touchstone of foreign policy
(the attached analysis by Walter Laqueur describes how this
"Finlandization" process is already beginning). The West should
seek concrete achievements rather than pronouncements of good
Soviet intentions.
Questions for the Soviets
In examining the seven main points made in the January Warsaw
Pact Declaration for Europe (attached), the West European countries
should first of all be aware that they are being asked to endorse
Soviet hegemony over its East European satellites. Apart from
the difficulty of accepting this proposition, the West should ask
whether the Declaration's requirement for the renunciation of
force, the inviolability of borders, and the recognition of the
principle of sovereignty of nations as now constituted, means
repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which would be a commitment
by the Soviet Union never again to invade its neighbors as it did
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It should question whether a concept
of true and equitable balance of conventional forces in East and
West Europe is contained in the assertion that mutual reduction
of forces should not be "to the detriment of countries taking
part in such reduction."
If a European security conference can advance mutually pro-
fitable exchanges on such questions, it should be welcomed, but
West Europe should not accede to a conference whose main purpose
would be merely to create an atmosphere of euphoria which would
begin a process of. "Finlandizing" Europe. Finally, whatever
moves the Soviets undertake in Europe, the West should not take the
Soviets' detente campaign as the abandonment of their conception
of the operation of the dialectic in international relations.
Under the dialectic, conflict in one form or another, rather than
peace, stability, and harmony, is the natural law of international
relations in Soviet eyes.
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CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
27 January 1972
East Bloc Nations Suggest
Cuts in National 'Armies
?MOSCOW, Jan. 26 ? Com-1
munist-bloc leaders, deferring
slightly to the demands of the
? Western allies, declared today
that any East-West accord to
reduce forces in Europe should
Include the Euoropean nations'
own armies as well as foreign
ones.
In a conciliatory communique
at the conclusion of a two-day
meeting In Prague, the leaders
of the seven Warwaw pact
powers for the first time of-
ficially embraced the idea of
Including national troops as
well as outside forces in even-
tual recudtions.
This will help ease Western
sears thatthe reduction of So-
'viet and American forces alone
;would work to the disadvantage
of the West because of the So-
viet Union's proximity to
'rope and the relative ease with
which it'eould put its forces
.back inte, the center of the
continent: To offset such an
'advantage, some Western pow-
ers wanted advance assurance
that other East European forces
could also, be cut back.
New Formula Adopted
Moreove`r, the Warsaw Pact
.Conuntiniqho said that any cut-,
back in foOes should not work
"In' the delriment of the coun-
tries taking, part." which West-
ern diplomats read as corre-
sponding rrghly to NATO's
icall for "m tual and balanced"
reductions. The formula was
used last September in a coin-
muniqua issued by the Soviet
party leader. Leonid I. Brezh-
By HEDRIC1C SMITH
Special to The New York Times
....v. and Willy
Brandt of West Germany, but
the entire Warsaw Pact has
never before adopted it.
The communique, carried In
full by Tass, the Soviet press
agency, also seemed to allow
for the East-West arms talks
to take place outside a Euro-
peen security conference as the
West, especially the United
States, prefers. But in keeping
with Moscow's objections to
bloc-to-bloc negotiations, it in-
sisted that this topic "should
be the prerogative" of the
existing alliances.
This comment appeared once
again to rebuff NATO, which
has demanded that Moscow
begin preparations for East-
West talks on force reductions
.by receiving Manlio Brosio, the
Italian diplomat designated
.last October by several NATO
,countries RS an emissary on
the issue. The communiqu?
said merely that "appropriate
agreement' could be reached
on the "way of conducting
talks" or force reductions.
As expected, the Communist
powPrs called for the start of
multilaterial preparatory talks
for a European security con-
ference to begin in Finland "in
a very short time" and an-
nounced their decision to name
deleeatcs.
Early Conference Urged
The preparations, the War-
saw Pact leaders asserted,
should promote the "Speediest
r?onvocation" of a European
security conference, a cherished
objective of the Kremlin and its
allies. They voiced confidence
that the meeting could be con-
vened in 1972, despite Western
forecasts that it is not possible
beluie 1111.-S, but put less in-
sistence on a conference this
year than previously.
The leaders of the Warsaw
Pact countries ? Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and
the Soviet Union?took a gen-
erally positive view of develop-
ments in Europe and avoided
any sharp attacks on Western
powers in their official com-
munique. They issued a sepa-
rate declaration, however, con-
demning the latest American
actions in Vietnam.
The absence of any direct
criticism of Communist China
despite the current intensity of
the Chinese-Soviet dispute, was
taken as an apparent indication
that Moscow preferred to re-
tain Rumania's support on
European issues rather than
risk her opposition to a public
attack on Peking.
Nor was there any public
comment on the expansion of
the west European Common
Market or of the internal situa-
tion in Yugoslavia, topics pre-
sumed by Western diplomats
to have come up in the talks.
West Germany was praised
not only for having negotiated
nonaggression pacts with Po-
land and the Soviet Union, but
also for follow-up agreements
with East Germany to the Big
Four accord on Berlin, and for
negotiations seeking to normal-
ize relations with Czechoslo-
vakia. The time has come, the
communiqu?sserted, for ad-
mitting both East and West
Germany to the United Nations
"without further delay."
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-WASHINGTON POST
27 January 1972
CPYRGHT
RedsRejectNATOBid
For Troop Cut Talks
MOSCOW, Jan. 26 ? The
',Warsaw Pact powers today re-
jected Western ideas for pre-
liminary discussions on troop
reductions in Eur op e and
p re s e nted a seven-point
agende for a European security
...conference.
Though today's proposals
were: more detailed than any-
thing the Communist nations '
have saki previnusly, tiono
? of their suggestion's were sur-
prising. Like previous state-
ments favoring a security con-
4crence, this one points clearly
in' one direction?toward rec-
ogeition of the status quo in
Europe with a weaker role for,
the two military blocs. the!
Warsaw Pact and NATO.
As if to emphasize this point,
the senior lenders of the So-
viet Union and its six East
jEuropean allies said in a coin-
numique issued after a two-
day meeting in Prague that
talks on troop .reductions in
IEurpoe "should not be the
prerogative of the existing
Imtlitary-politeal alliances in
, Europe."
Although the communique
suggested reductions of "both
Inational arid foreign" troops
I in Europe. it sidestepped carkt
'ber Western proposals for pre-
liminary talks between NATO
"and the Warsaw Pact by say-1
ling that "appropriate agree-;
I ment could be reached on the
way of conducting talks un this
' (troop reduction) question."
This appears to be an out-
right rejection of the U.S. and
NATO positions on the troop.
reduction issue. NATO has
been trying unsuccessfully to
get an invitation to Moscow
Or its former secretary gen-
eral, Manlio Brosio, who was
supposed to represent the
Western 'allies in preliminary
Appr oved Fur Reledbe
By Robert G. Kaiser
Wsshlitotoit Post Foreign Service
talks on troop reductions.
she Sestets aersist
ently avoided inviting Brosio
to Moscow. Soviet officials
and journalists have been tell-;
ieg Westerners in Moscow re.!
cently that they saw no reasonl
to receive him. "He Is out of,
office, he doesn't represent.
anyone," as one prominent So-
viet commentator put it.
Today's Warsaw Pact coin-,
munique seems to put the
whole troop withdrawal clues-
? lion on a far distant back
burner, though It does say ,
that "reducing armed forces
and armaments in Europe,
both foreign and national"
would "correspond with the
interest of strengthenIng Eu-
ropean security."
The communique is also a
strong restatement of the So-
viet policy of detente ? in Eu-
rope. It says that the seven
Communist powers "are of the
opinion that European secu-
rity and cooperation require
the creation of a tstem of
commitments precluding any
use of force or threat of using
force in the mutual relations
among the states in Europe, a
system of commitments guar-
anteeing all the countries that
they are protected from acts
of aggression, promoting the
' benefit and prosperity of
every people."
I The Warsaw Pact offered
seven "principles of European
security and relations among
!European states," including:
1 ? "The frontiers existing
t now between the European
states, including the frontiers
that were formed a result
of the Second World War, are
inviolable. Any attempt to vio-
late these frontiers would
threaten European peace. . ."
* "Force or threat of force
must not be used in the mu-
tual relations arnong the Euro-
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peen states."
"
The ealatonee of differ
ent (social) systems (In Eu-
, rope) must not be an unsur-
. mountable obstacle to the all-
; round development of rein-
'
tions among them. . ."
! ? "Good neighborly rela-
tions truong the European
states must develop on thei
basis of the principles of in-
dependence and national sov-
ereignty, equality, non-inter-
ference in internal affairs
and ?mutual advantage . . .
(to) make it possible to over-
come the splitting of the con-
tinent into military-political
groupings."
The Prague communique
Inlso advocated An improve-
ment in relations between'
European states in fields rang-
, in-g, from trade and culture to
tourism and environmental
'
controls.
The communique added: "It
would also be possible to agree
nt the all-European ainferenee
: on concrete directions for thel
I further development of recip-
rocally advantageous relations
by European states in every
; sphere for the elimination of
, all discrimination, inequality
I and artificial barriers. Their
1 cooperation in the rational
I utiltration of the raw mated-
, als and power resources of
' Europe, in raising the indus-
trial potential and Improving
. I
land fertility, in utilizing thei
achievements of the scientific
and technological revolution
will allow the opportunities
for raising the well-being of
the European peoples to mul-
tiply. Blutual enrichment in
spiritual values and acquaints
lance with each other's culture
and Art will assume still great-
er scope."
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WASHINGTON STAR
23 January 1972
CPYRGHT
CROSBY S. NOYES
two Grand Conferences That May Never Be Held
It is pot accidental that the
two moSt heavily ballyhooed
diplomatic events scheduled
for Europe in the coming year
? talks on "mutual and bal-
anced" force reductions on
both sides of the Iron Curtain
and a grand All-European
Conference on Security and
Cooperation ? show no signs
of getting off the ground any
time soon.
The fact is that the more
they are examined, the more
dubious both of these projects
appear. At this point, neither
we nor the Russians seem par-
ticularly anxious to find out
what the other side really has
In mind.
Both sides, to be sure, have
expressed an interest in tht.
talks at one time or another.
The West Europeans look on
them as tying in with their
general quest for "detente"
with the East. The Russians
have been clamoring for the
security conference for years
and last year Soviet Party
Chief Leonid Brezhnev was
saying. he was all for force
; reductions as well.
The; Nixon Administration
has used the prospect of mu-
tual foIrce reductions as a con-
venient argument against re-
peated' Senate efforts to force
a unilateral withdrawal of
American forces in NATO. It
also has indicated that. once
the status of Berlin is finally
settled, it has no objection to
taking part in the wider Euro-
pean security conference.
But no one seems in any
hurry to get on with it. Last
October, former NATO Secre-
tary General Manlio Brosio
was assigned to go to Russia
to explore SoViet views on the
possibilities of troop reduc-
tions, lie has been waiting in
vain for an invitation from
Moscow ever since and it is
now considered highly unlikely
to be forthcoming.
Everyone at this point
seems to be having second
thoughts.
When it comes to troop re-
ductions, the Russians could
very well be interested in low-
ering tensions along their
western border and relieving
themselves of some of the ex-
pense that their huge military
garrisons in Eastern Europe
entail. But the Russians also
are very well aware that there
are definite limits to the ex-
tent to which they can with-
draw and still continue to ex-
ert effective political control
in their East European do-
main. The lessons of Hungary
and Czechoslovakia have not
been forgotten.
Similarly, in Western Eu-
rope a sober reappraisal of the
possibilities seems to be under
way. As a talking-point, mu-
tual force reductions are fine.
As a practical proposition,
they raise uncomfortable com-
plications. ?
The Europeans are aware
that the only meaningful force
reductions that are likely to be
made in Central Europe will
be those of Russian and Amer-
ican forces. They also know
that NATO forces are heavily
outnumbered by those of the
Warsaw Pact.
Whatever "balanced" may
mean in the context of a mu-
tual withdrawal, it is clear that
the Americans would be pull-
ing back 3,000 miles, while the
Russians would move, at
most, a few hundred. Europe-
ans who have been arguing for
years that any reduction in the
present American force as-
signed to NATO would under-
mine the security of Western
Europe are not happy about
the prospects.
The same thing goes for the
plan for an all-European secu-
rity conference. In theory, ev-
eryone is all in favor of it. But
as they define their ideas of
what such a conference should
produce in the way of results,
it becomes less and less likely
that the meeting ever will take
place.
The purpose of the Russians
is calling for the conference in
the first place never has been
in much doubt. The major
objective from their point of
view would be to confirm their
own hegemony in Eastern Eu-
rope and perpetuate the pre-
sent division of Europe, in-
cluding. Germany. Anything
else that the meeting might
accomplish, in the view of
most experts. would be mere
window-dressing.
?The objectives of the West '
are, quite different. In a lit-
tle-noted speech last month,
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers spelled out in the hfird-
est terms yet used what a se-
curity conference should and
should not do.
What it should do, in Rogers'
view, is to spike Leonid Brezh-
nev's famous "d oc tr in c"
which proclaims the right of
' the SovietUnion to interfere in
the affairs of other socialist
states. It should do this by
affirming "the independence
and equality of sovereign
states, whether their political
or social systems are different
or similar.'
? Beyond this, the conference,
according to Rogers, should.
take steps to encourage the
freer movement of people,
ideas and information through-
out the European area.
"We would firmly oppose
any attempt to use it to perpe-
tuate the political and social
division of Europe. We would
see a conference not as a rati-
fication .of the existing divi-
sions but as a step on the long
road to a new situation. . ."
It is not overly pessimistic
to predict that, if the Russians
can prevent it, this is a step
which will, not be taken soon.
Excerpt from the NEW YORK TIMES,
31 January 1972
byline Bernard Gwertzman, dateline Washington, 30 January 1972.
Larger Soviet Cut
Mutual and balanced reduc-
tion of forces was first pro-
posed by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in 1968 as
a way to reduce military
spending without harming either
side's security. It was argued
that any reduction in the force
of 310,000 Americans in Eu-
rope had to be matched by a
larger Soviet cut because of ge-
ography. It was suggested, for
example, that if the Americans
withdrew a thousand men 3,000
miles to the United States, the
Russians'should pull back 6,000
men the 500 miles to the? Soviet
Union.
NATO has about a million
men in Europe, with West Ger-
many's 466,000 the largest con-
tingent, but United States troops
the best equipped and trained.
The Warsaw Pact nations have
about 1.2 million troops, of
which about 275,000 are Soviet.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
20 December 1971
Our Permanent Interests in Europe
Following is an address made by Secretary
Rogers before the 50th anniversary dinner
of the Overseas Writers at Washington on
December 1, together with the transcript of
the questions and answers which followed.
Press release 279 dated December I
ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ROGERS
I was reminded recently that this Nation
had a press before it had a foreign policy.
Possibly this timing accounts for the belief
in some quarters that with a press corps
there is no need for a foreign policy. It
should be mentioned, too, I think, that there
is also a respectable body of opinion which
believes that when you have a press corps it
is not possible to have a foreign policy. And
then there is a growing segment of public
opinion that thinks the United States would
be better off without either a press corps or a
foreign policy. It is against this latter group
that we must unite.
For this reason I am particularly honored
to be asked to join you in marking the 50th
anniversary of the Overseas Writers. It
marks the durability of this distinguished
association?and for those of us in public
life, durability is a quality that is highly re-
spected and too little honored.
I am honored, too, to be your guest at this
public meeting. I understand that the Over-
seas Writers traditionally operates in secret.
I applaud your new policy of openness. I
knew that you would finally have to knuckle
under to the public's right to know! We in
the State Department empathize with you.
I think you will agree with me when I
say that President Nixon came to office with
an experience in foreign affairs matched by
few of his predecessors. A review of his
public statements shortly before and after
he assumed office foreshadowed the major
initiatives that this administration has taken.
Yet few would have been willing to predict
their sweep. They can be broadly stated this
way:
First, maximum practical efforts in every
.forum to achieve a more peaceful world, RS
with the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks), Berlin, and Middle East talks;
Second, concerted action to achieve a bet-
ter balance of responsibilities to reflect the
growing shift in political-economic power in
the world; for example, the Nixon doctrine,
which has resulted in the reduction of more
than 420,000 men from East Asia, and the
new economic policy;
Third, intensive diplomatic activity to im-
prove relations throughout the world in or-
der to provide a foundation for a generation
of peace, as illustrated by the President's
forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow.
Basic to this third point is a fundamental
? and often ignored concept in 'foreign -af-
fairs?that nations do not have permanent
enemies, only permanent interests.
I will not attempt to cite the various ini-
tiatives the President has undertaken to
carry out these objectives, because you are
all well aware of them.
Rather, tonight I want to speak briefly
about the U.S. relationship with Europe?
about our permanent interests and, in the
true sense of the word, our permanent
friends. In each of the permanent interests
Of United States foreign policy?security,
economic well-being, peace?Europe con-
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6ppecotvoesgoar icutpaqsAll.9woomepiAgpfp-m3A4Nowsopsarg and
curity is indivisible from our own. Europe's
economic strength reinforces our own. And
as the President has said, "if we are to
found a structure of peace on the collabora-
tion of many nations, our ties with Western
Europe must be its cornerstone." This
statement is fundamental to our foreign
policy. We hope it will not be forgotten by
our friends in Europe.
It is more than symbolic, then, that the
President has scheduled meetings with Pres-
ident Pompidou, Prime Ministers Heath,
Trudeau, Caetano, and Chancellor Brandt
and that within a few days I will be attend-
ing a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting.
These consultations are all important aspects
of implementing our foreign policy, in which
our relations with western Europe remain
of fundamental importance. They will give
the President and members of his adminis-
tration an opportunity to discuss in person
the visits he will be making to Peking and
Moscow, economic and monetary issues, and
other matters of common interest.
Europe today is in an important period
of transition, a transition embodying two
processes. The first, the process toward in-
tegration of western Europe, is progressing
rapidly. The second, a process toward recon-
ciliation between countries in eastern and
western Europe, appears to be beginning.
The United States Government fully sup-
ports both of these. Since the days of the
Marshall plan the unity and strength of
western Europe have been central objectives
of American foreign policy; we will not
cease to be active supporters of these objec-
tives now that they are on the threshold of
success. And we are no less determined to
participate actively in the process of re-
ducing the political and social barriers which
still divide the European Continent.
In the process toward western European
integration, we have always known that,
as western Europeans developed collective
policies and a collective identity, their views
" The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 appears in
the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971.
694
transitory differences would develop.
In the economic field this has happened
from time to time over the years, but we
have resolved our disputes without damaging
the underlying strength of our relationship.
We realize that the international aspects
of the economic policy announced by Presi-
dent Nixon last August directly affect the
interests of western Europeans. We believe
that they understand why we had to take
drastic action to correct a balance of pay-
ments deficit running at three times the
1970 rate. It is not our intention, of course,
to damage the economies of our allies and
friends or to impair the system of economic
cooperation which has served all of us so
well over the past quarter of a century.
Since August 15, we have consulted
closely with the principal industrial and fi-
nancial nations about the measures we have
taken. There is a wider measure of agree-
ment among us than is evident from some
of the public comment on the subject. There
Is a recognition that exchange rates had got-
ten out of line and that a substantial realign-
ment is necessary if the international sys-
tem is to function effectively. There is un-
derstanding that we have unfinished and
urgent business of major importance in the
area of trade rules and trade practices to in-
sure freer and fairer trade. There is no dis-
agreement that the burden of the common
defense should be shared more equitably and
that multilateral efforts must be intensified
to accomplish this result. We believe that
mutually beneficial solutions can and will be
worked out.
U.S.-Western European Interdependence
Moreover, whatever our contemporary eco-
nomic problems, the broadest interests of
western Europe and of the United States
remain inseparable. And neither these nor
any other problems will cause us to abandon
our support of western European alliance or
our commitment to a strong NATO alliance.
First, there is, of course, no intention on
our part?as has been suggested in some
quarters?to exploit the economic situation
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to try to divide western European countries
from each other. We hope western Europe
will continue to speak with unity and co-
hesion in the economic as in other fields.
Second, while we firmly believe that de-
fense burdens should be shared more equi-
tably, economic differences and problems
have not caused us to change our views on
the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe.
As President Nixon pledged a year ago:
Given a similar approach by our allies, we
will maintain and improve those forces and
will not reduce them unless there is recipro-
cal action.2 The administration's steadfast-
ness of purpose on this point should be clear
from the determination and success with
which we have continued to oppose attempts
in the United States Senate to cut U.S.
forces in Europe unilaterally.
Third, we will not withdraw?in the eco-
nomic field, in the security field, or in the
political field?into remoteness or isolation
from western Europe. Rather, in recogni-
tion of U.S.?western European interdepend-
ence in all these fields, we will remain com-
mitted and involved.
This, then, is the message that the Presi-
dent has asked me to take next week to the
NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Brus-
sels: that America's partnership with west-
ern Europe and America's commitment to
its defense are undiminished.
At that meeting the allies will be con-
cerned, too, with the second process I have
referred to?the movement toward recon-
ciliation in Europe as a whole. In particular,
we will be discussing two elements in that
process, the mutual and balanced force re-
ductions (MBFR) and a conference on Euro-
pean security and cooperation.
We hope that it will soon be possible to
move into more definitive preparations for
a negotiation on force reductions. At the
Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in Oc-
tober, former NATO Secretary General
[Manlio] Brosio was named to explore So-
viet views on approaches o nego ia io . e
regret that the Soviet Government, despite
its earlier public assertions of willingness to
proceed at once to negotiations, has not
agreed to receive Mr. Brosio. We hope it
will do so soon.
Concern has been expressed in certain
quarters in western Europe that the United
States Government may consider the discus-
sion on force reductions as little more than
a cover for American troop withdrawals.
This concern is without any foundation. We
have no interest in an agreement which
would alter the conventional-force balance
in Europe to the West's disadvantage. Only
reciprocal withdrawals which are carefully
balanced could be contemplated. Only such
withdrawals can contribute to the overall
process of East-West reconciliation to which
we and our allies are committed. Together
with our allies we must make certain that
all proposals for force reductions are care-
fully examined for their security implica-
tions.
'For a message from President Nixon read by
Secretary Rogers before the ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council at Brussels on Dec. 8,
1970, see BULLETIN of Jan. 4, 1971, p. 1.
Conference on European Security
Another step in the process of reconcilia-
tion which will receive active consideration
at the coming NATO meeting is a conference
on European security and cooperation.
NATO has made clear that it would not
engage in preparations for such a confer-
ence until the Berlin negotiations were suc-
cessfully concluded. The first phase of the
Berlin agreement was signed by the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and France in September. The second
phase, the talks between East and West Ger-
many, has now reached the point of decision.
If those talks succeed?and there is now
every reason to believe they will?the four
powers would subsequently proceed toward
the signing of a final protocol bringing the
entire Berlin agreement into effect. When this
would occur is uncertain at the present time
because of the Soviet Union's insistence that
it will not sign the protocol until the time
of the ratification of the treaty between the
Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of
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Germany. They insist that it be done simul-
taneously. The United States, for its part,
would be prepared to sign the final protocol
as soon as the results of the German nego-
tiations have been found acceptable. And
we expect this to occur very soon.
However, when the protocol is signed?
so that a satisfactory solution to the ques-
tion of Berlin is an accomplished fact?the
way will be open for concrete preparations
during the coming year for a conference. In
this connection we would be prepared to
support the convening of a special NATO
Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting to con-
sider ways to proceed.
Let me outline the basic United States ap-
proach to such a conference.
In the first place, we believe that a con-
ference should emphasize substance over at-
mosphere. It must attempt to mitigate the
underlying causes of tension, not merely its
superficial manifestations. It should there-
fore deal with any security issues on the
agenda in a concrete way.
In the second place, we believe that the
discussions could usefully address the basic
principles that should govern relations
among states. A conference should encour-
age the reconciliation of sovereign European
states, not confirm their division. The con-
ference could help make this clear by affirm-
ing?as President Nixon and President Tito
affirmed in October?the independence and
equality of sovereign states, whether their
political or social systems are different or
similar.
In the third place, we believe that a con-
ference should give major emphasis to issues
of cooperation on which East-West progress
is attainable. While a conference might con-
tribute to enhanced security, the progress
achieved on Berlin and in the SALT talks
suggests that detailed negotiation of indi-
vidual security issues is more likely to be
handled in less general and less highly vis-
ible forums.
A conference could, however, stimulate
cooperation in Europe toward increased
East-West trade, toward more frequent and
696
more useful exchanges of science and tech-
nology, and toward common efforts to pre-
serve the human environment.
In the fourth place, we believe that a
conference should go beyond the traditional
pattern of cultural exchanges between East
and West. It should take specific steps to
encourage the freer movement of people,
ideas, and information.
In general, we would view a conference
on European security and cooperation in
dynamic rather than static terms. We would
firmly oppose any attempt to use it to per-
petuate the political and social division of
Europe. We would see a conference not as
a ratification of the existing divisions but
as a step on the long road to a new situa-
tion?a situation in which the causes of ten-
sion are fewer, contacts are greater, and
the continent could once more be thought of
as Europe rather than as two parts.
Improving Relations With Eastern Europe
I have spoken of our efforts with our al-
lies to lessen tensions and improve relations
with the peoples and states of eastern
Europe. In our bilateral efforts as well, we
are seeking the same objectives and making
progress. As you know, we have been mak-
ing progress in the SALT talks. The suc-
cess of Secretary [of Commerce Maurice H.]
Stans' visit to the Soviet Union underscores
the progress we are making in our relations.
You know, for example, the progress that
has been made in trade recently.
In May President Nixon will become the
first American President to visit the Soviet
Union in 27 years. As the official announce-
ment of the trip made clear, both we and
the Soviets had agreed that a summit meet-
ing "would be desirable once sufficient prog-
ress had been made in negotiations at lower
levels." a We are pleased that such progress
is taking place.
The objectives of the President's visit?
to improve bilateral relations and enhance
'For background, Bee BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1971,
p. 473.
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the prospects for peace?cannot be attained,
nor will they be sought, at the expense of
the other countries of Europe, eastern or
western. Indeed, we are prepared to im-
prove and expand our relations with the
eastern European states at whatever pace
they are willing to maintain. Good begin-
nings have been made. In bilateral trade,
the area in which the Soviet Union's allies
have shown the greatest interest, the total
is expected to reach $415 million this year;
although still small, it is an increase of more
than 50 percent since 1967. We hope to in-
crease it substantially in years to come.
We welcome the authority President Nixon
was given by Congress to approve Export-
Import Bank financing of trade with eastern
Europe. Yesterday, as you know, the Presi-
dent notified Congress of his intention to
apply this authority to Romania, and we
have some possibilities under active consid-
eration now to carry out in practice that au-
thority.
Other eastern European countries, notably
Poland and Hungary, have also shown a de-
sire for improvement in their relations with
us. We reciprocate this desire and are re-
sponding to it. With Poland, for example,
our overall trade already approaches in vol-
ume our trade with the Soviet Union, and
we hope further steps will soon be possible
to increase it.
Our approach in eastern Europe, as else-
where, corresponds to the words of Presi-
dent Nixon's inaugural address in 1969: "We
seek an open world?open to ideas, open to
the exchange of goods and people?a world
in which no people, great or small, will live
in angry isolation."
There are voices in this country calling
for United States withdrawal from the af-
fairs of Europe. Such withdrawal would be
folly. It would not be in the interests of our
allies. It would not be in the interests of a
more peaceful and more open European Con-
tinent. It would not be in the permanent in-
terests of the United States.
Therefore we will work to strengthen our
partnership with our allies in western Eu-
rope. We will work to improve our relations
With the states of eastern Europe. And we '
will work to help clear the way for more
stable and cooperative relationships within
the whole of Europe.
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CPY*10Toved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200WARGHT
COMMENTARY JANUARY 1972
The Fall of EuropeP
Walter Laqueur
1,
Lyra in its history has Europe suffered
From so large and perceptible a dis-
crepancy beciveen mmomic strength on the one
hand. and political and military impotence on
the other. II is true that economic predictions for
1972 are not too sanguine and that Britain for
instance is still in the throes of a severe .economic
crisis, but the foreign visitor would be hard put
to discover signs of it in the streets of London
CII elsewhere. Italy's economy has taken a down-
.Ivaid nun. but a traveler classing from -Italy into
Switio land, or the oilier way around, would not
observe a great difference in prices or in the
standard of living on the two sides of the line.
A heated debate recently held on French tele-
vision between a leading Gaullist and the new
Secretary General of the French Communist party
focused on the issue of whether the average French
income has trebled (as the Gaullist claimed) or
only doubled (according to the Communist thesis)
in the last two decades.
On paper. the new Europe is a major world
power: with a total population of 250 million,
a combined GNI' of some $6.10 billion (about two-
bir(Is of the American GNP and considerably
larger than that of the Communist bloc), it ac-
counts for sonic 10 per cent of world trade. But
thete is something profoundly askew about this
continent which for the past twenty-five years has
lived on borrowed time, incapable of mustering
sufficient strength to overcome national partic-
ularism and establish some form of political
unity. Europe now finds itself in a perilous polit-
ical and military situation. It is usually said that
1973 will be the European year of decision, when
the general elections that are scheduled to be
held in France, NVest Germany, and Italy will
produce new governments, armed with a mandate
to engage in more decisive and far-reaching
,policies. Yet even if all should go well from this
' point of view in 1973, Europe will still find itself
SS A1,111( 1.101 I I 11. IS (III IC MI Of 110! I,iiic or Cron-
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at the Univet shy of 1 (.1 Ills books ludo& The Re-
birth oArivtbireAD
crfeiraRelleag?E1903/09/02 :
on y at the start of a long-drawn-out march to-
ward political unity, and if that march is not
undertaken, it is doubtful whether even the Com-
m( n Market will manage to survive.
n recent days there has been a great deal of
movement in European politics. Only a few
months ago the entire Continent was agitated
over the issue of Britain's entry into the Europe-
an Economic Community, but by early October
the debate bad fizzled out even in Britain itself,
wl ere the issue had been regarded- as the gravest
thr nation had to decide upon in this century.
W ICH, on October 28, the !louse of Commons
finally voted to join the Common Market, the rest
of Europe hardly noticed, so many more impor-
taut problems having intervened and taken prece-
dence: Brandt's Ostpolitik, the impact of Amer-
ica's .new economic policies, the Soviet drive for
a European Security Conference, Still, had the
vox on October 28 gone against joining the Mar-
kc ., it would have meant not just the further(te-
ch le of Britain but very probably the beginning
of the end for Europe as a whole.
The debate over Britain's entry into the EEC
is closely connected with the other problems fac-
ing Europe. West Germany's growing indepen-
de Ice, both in economic matters and in areas
of foreign policy, contributed decisively to Porn-
pickles decision to make British entry possible.
Tr put it in somewhat oversimplified terms,
wl ereas in the 50's and 60's the French -needed
West Germany as a counterweight to British in-
fluence, in the 70's Britain herself has become
?for France the counterweight to West Germany..
Moreover, the French, notwithstanding official
declarations, now share British skepticism with
ref ard to Soviet intentions in Europe. In view of
du near certainty of American troop. reductions
in the years ahead, it has become clear to the
French government that only a common defense
pin icy can prevent what is now commonly re-
ferred to as the Finlandization of Europe. In this
rewect, as in others, the pendulum has swung far
since the era of Charles de Gaulle. ?
Though Parliament voted in favor of entry, the
majority of Englishmen were against joining Eu-
rope. In this sense the decision was undemocratic,
tiMkemiteltsivc9liguytitrattriein fon
9
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? Icirm polls. 77 per rent o Ilic I titis c cc- LI Ma a
milt. would also voic iii favor of restoring
Apir.11 punishment, and in addition would no
Imuln have stopped non-white immigration into
Ittitdin long ago. The opposition to joining the
10110%1rd of a strange assortment c)I extreme
ight-wing Tories and .extreme left-wing Labour-
tes. both of which groups exploited all the free-
loafing conservatism, fear, distrust, envy, and
etiaphobia abroad in British society. For once
Bernadette Devlin and Ian Paisley were on the
;ante side of the barricade.
One of the basic arguments employed by left-
wing critics was that British social services would
suffer as a result of entry into the EEC. The Wel-
fare State and the National Health Service have
been the pride of Britain for several decades.
What is less well known is that all the European
Community countries have overtaken Britain and
now spend a higher proportion of their GNI' on
social welfare. In absolute terms the discrepancy
is even more striking: Britain spends $285 per
person per annum, West Germany $507; a Brit-
ish worker gets between 16 and 20 paid holidays
a year, an Italian worker between 29 and 47. No
European government spends less on housing
than Britain does, and France spends almost
three times more. Family allowances on the Con-
tinent arc more than double Britain's.
But, opponents argued, the Common Market
was inward-looking, parochial, oblivious of its
duty to the countries of the "Third*World." Here
too a closer look reveals that every European
country contributes at least as much as Britain to
the Third World, and many contribute more.
The Common Market, these critics went on, is
right-wing, reactionary, dominated by the super-
cartels. This argument may have had some force
five years ago, but West Germany, the most pow-
erful European country, today has?what Britain
does not?a socialist-dominated government; So-
cial Democrats are also represented in the Italian
government, as well as in Benelux. But, still an-
other group of critics said, Britain is likely to lose
the Commonwealth, or the special relationship
with the United States, or above all its sovereign-
ty, the time-honored traditions that have always
set England apart from Europe. The truth is,
however, that the Commonwealth has for a long
time been a fiction, the special relationship with
America was lost years ago, and the idea of Brit-.
ish "apartness" did not even come into being un-
til the 19th century.
rrIIE economic argument (non-Com-
munist variety) against entry can be
summarized under two headings: (a) the scheme.
would not work; and (b) the price of Britain's
entry was too high. It would not work because
British industry, being outdated, poorly managed,
and strike-ridden, cannot compete any longer
it advantages of the Common Market (the avail-
ability of a wider market, lower wills against in-
(lustrial goods, etc.). There is no denying that
this is a real consideration. But even assuming.
on the basis of the defeatist argnment, that Bui-
tain is destined to become Eitiope's depte%sed
area, a second Ulster, the country would still
probably be better off inside the European com-
munity than out in the cold, For, once inside, it
can count on the help of the other members. The
real nub of the matter is the price of Britain's
entry, estimated by the government at 5250 mil-
lion in 1973 and rising to twice that sum in 1977.
Will not this outlay devastate the country's re-
cently-restored balance-of-payments position and
thus -inhibit economic growth? Why should Bri-
tain support the Common Market agricultural
policy which, whatever its original intentions, has
done nothing but subsidize inefficient farming at
a ruinously high cost? Will not the British house-
wife end up paying the price of British entry into
the Market?.
There does seem to be general agreement that
food prices in Britain are bound to rise substan-
tially once entry into the Common Market is
effected, though why this should be so is not
al-
together clear. During a recent visit to the Con-
tinent I found that, butter aside, food prices in
France, Switzerland,. and Italy are more or less
the same as in Britain: fruit and vegetables are a
bit cheaper, meat is a little more expensive hut
of better quality. It is taken for granted that
whereas the benefits of having joined will not be
felt for a long time, the toll., in the form of higher
food prices, will make itself felt almost irnmedi-
ately. Maybe so, but on the other hand an in-
crease of even a half of one per cent in Britain's
growth rate would more than cover the member-
ship fee. And since exports will unquestionably
increase as a result of the merger, the inordinate
amount of time being wasted in the debate. over
the future price of butter already seems a little
ridiculous.
The Tory campaign in favor of joining was
helped along by the fact that the Labour party
had only two years earlier favored British entry
into the EEC on conditions that were certainly
no better than those finally obtained by Prime
Minister Heath. If anything, the Conservatives
were hampered by a lack of enthusiasm in their
own ranks; their new Europeanism, however
loudly proclaimed, is limited in scope and not
altogether convincing. Certainly the propaganda
put out by the Conservative Central Office in de-
fense of joining Europe would be disquieting to
anyone who regards Europe as something other
than a free trade ?one, an economic convenience.
One pamphlet, in trying to allay public fears of
a "faceless bureaucracy" and a reduction in the
prerogatives of Parliament and the Queen, noted
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Approved For Release 1999109/02
tim onirinov dim there "has teen tto progress yet
towaid t loser polnital unity, - ami that there was
list k likeliht,od of ally pooling of sovereignty in
the foieserable future.
This argument is self-defeating because the
case tor Britain's entry rests in the last resort
precisely on not economic, premises.
The real issue is not the price of butter and
sugar. not even the rate of growth, but the sim-
ple viability of the various countries of Western
Europe. Taken one by one these countries do not
count for anything politically, they are defense-
less militarily, and they arc economically highly
vulnerable. European unity is the only way to
overcome these weaknesses and to prevent the
suicidal infighting which has so far in this cm,
tiny caused Iwo world wars. In a recent. article,
Andrew Shoulield rightly complained about the
apparent lack of concern with international re-
lations manifest in the British debate over the
Common Market. For if a slowdown should occur
in the growth of international trade in the years
to come, would there not he an overwhelming
temptation for individual European nations to
seize short-term advantages at the expense of
other nations, unless a firmly established frame-?
work existed to contain and regulate economic
tensions? The same goes, a fortiori, for the -re-
crudescence of violent nationalism in any Euro-
pean country. Seen in this light, the trouble with
the Common Market is not that it has moved too
far and too fast toward supranationality, but that,
.on the contrary, movement in that direction has
been agonizingly slow.
It is of course quite possible that political and
military cooperation in Western Europe will pro-
ceed independently of economic development. In
a press conference in early 1971, President Pom-
pidou ridiculed the idea of Europe as a third
Force in world politics. But the fact of American
disengagement from Europe, combined with tra-
ditional distrust of Soviet intentions and the fear
of a deal between the two superpowers at Eu-
rope's expense, may well cause a quickening in
the pace of cooperation outside the economic
field. The political argument for British entry
seems so overwhelming on the face of it that fu-
ture gencrations?will no doubt be puzzled that it
took so long to accept the obvious and that Eng-
land had to be pulled into Europe kicking and
screaming. The cost of joining may be high, but
the cost of not joining .would in the long run be
insupportable.
II
H E course of Soviet-German talks in
J. recent months highlights the dilem-
mas involved in the current phase of European
politics. For more than two decades Germany
CPYRGHT
CIA-R9P79-01194000200200001-t2
in %mope. It is clear in retrospect tha the
official German attitittle was too rigid; Bonn
should have accepted long ago, unilaterally if
necessary, such consequences of World 1Var II
as the Oder-Neisse line, and it should have re-
nounced the Munich agreement of 193g. Instead
of insisting on the Hallstein Doctrine (threaten-
ing to break with all countries recognizing East
Germany) it should have put up with the fact
that an East German state had come into being
and would not disappear in the foreseeable fu-
ture. It was argued for too long that for domestic
reasons?the opposition mounted by refugee or-
ganizations?any accommodation with the East
would have suicidal consequences for the party
in ww/cr.
But if it was not really necessary to wait until
the great coalition came into being in late 1966
For an initiative in German Ostpolitik, it is also
true that up until that time the Soviet Union
continued to threaten West Germany with mil-
itary intervention (on the basis of paragraphs 53
arid 107 of the UN charter) and had launched a
massive propaganda attack (with accusations of
"neo-Nazism," revanchism, etc.) against Bonn.
Not until the spring of 1969, when the Soviet
diplomatic offensive aimed at the establishment
of a European Security Conference was stepped
up, did hints emerge that the Russians were will-
ing to engage ,in serious negotiations. This coin-
cided with the advent to power in Bonn of a new
government; when Willy Brandt became chancel-
lor in September 1969 he devoted much of his
energy to the discussions which led to the Soviet-
German treaty of August 1970. This treaty, very
broadly speaking, envisaged closer relations be-
tween the two countries on the basis of the recog-
nition of the status quo in Europe. But it was to
come into force, as the Germans insisted with
full NATO support, only after a satisfactory solu-
tion had been found for the thorny Berlin issue;
and this finally occurred in August 1971.
There is some promise in the new German
Ostpolitik, and there are many dangers. Brandt
can rightly claim that he did only what was in the
long run inevitable, and what his predecessors,
lacking courage and foresight, had failed to do?
that is, to recognize, de jure, that Germany had
lost the war. He can claim furthermore to have
defused a potentially dangerous situation. West
Germany is no longer the main villain of Soviet
foreign policy; on the contrary, Brandt was
praised in almost extravagant terms by Brezhnev
in the latter's recent talks with Tito. This is a
far cry from the past situation and it is only hu-
man for the architects of the Ostpolitik to believe
that?far from having given anything away?they
have restored to their country ("an economic
.giant but a political dwarf") much greater free-
dom of maneuver than anybody would have
dreamed of even a year ago. Once the outcast.
was tAilf81/86t0SelidRtintrisOlgagt/2 : dilk-Ikti/17gf-OSt/ffalbeeore/206M1Y2 has
11
CPYRG HT
461/8418'P: c
Yet West Germany may one day have to pay
a heavy price for these achievements. Ilowevcr
often Brandi and Scheel may profess their loyalty
to their Western allies, there is a great deal of
her-floating distrust in Europe of Germany's re-
emergence as a leading power. Some of this ap-
prehensiveness is exaggerated if not downright
hysterical; Brandt and his colleagues are good
Europeans and they have had too many dealings
with the Communists in their own lifetime to join
a Popular Front on the interstate level, as a few
commentators have implied they might. But the
distrust persists; the recent French-British rap-
prochement was caused at least partly, as noted
above, by French feais of Germany's growing
role in Europe.
Potentially more dangerous than these relative-
ly harmless rivalries, however, is the general
climate of make-believe concerning Soviet inten-
tions to which Brandt and his colleagues have
succumbed and also contributed. The German
Social Democrats may in fact have taken their
stand on a slippery slope. ? For if Brandt and his
government fail to live up to Soviet expectations
in the political and economic fields, the Soviets
will not hesitate to bring strong pressure to bear.
Brandt realizes that but for a militarily credible
American presence in Europe his deal with the
Russians is bound to turn sour; his government
has been among those protesting most loudly
against any American troop reductions. But at
the same time the Ostpolitik has given invaluable
ammunition to American Senators and Congress-
men who favor troop withdrawal below the point
of credibility. After all, U.S. troops were kept in
Europe mainly to defend Germany against So-
viet encroachments; if Germany has reached an
agreement with Russia which supposedly guaran-
tees its security, what further need can there be
for an American presence? According to a public
opinion poll taken a few days after Brandt re-
icived the Nobel Peace Prize, 50 per cent of the
German people now favor neutrality and only
38 per cent support the Western alliance; why
should they be prevented from having it their
own way? Brandt knows of course that neutrality
is just not practical so far as Germany is con-
cerned, and that, the balance of power in Europe
being what it is, the only alternatives are either
close collaboration with the West or gradual ab-
sorption into the Soviet sphere of influence. But
he has already to some degree fallen captive to
the illusions nursed by too much loose talk con-
cerning Soviet-German rapprochement.*
III
9-HE signing of the agreement on Ber-
lin has been seen by some as an of-
ficial acknowledgment, so to speak, that the post.
ppluvtu rut lttictbG
war era is over. But periot ization is an enterprise
14f- RUFUS 94A00a2062000014 these
are not the best of times. When, for example,
did the previous postwar era end? The question
is of course unanswerable. In one sense it ended
in 1923, in another it lasted until the outbreak of
World War IL With equal justice, it can he
claimed that the second postwar period ended in.
1948-9, when the European economy had once
again attained its pre-war levels and the location
of the Iron Curtain was fixed. Yet most of the
problems created by the war remained unsolved.
As a consequence orWorld War II the balance of
power in Europe underwent a radical shift; the
resulting situation has continued in force despite
years of East-West dialogue, diplomatic activity,
security conferences, unilateral and multilateral
talks, and no end of new schemes, ideas, and ap-
proaches. In other words, to a very real extent
the postwar era is not over: Europe remains
divided, the Soviet Union is the dominant mil-
itary power, and but for the military alliance be-
tween Western Europe and the United States it
would be the dominant political power as well.
Such are the harsh facts, and no new formulas,
however ingenious, no theoretical legerdemain,
can make them disappear.
The age of dialogue, we are told, has replaced
the age of confrontation. This is only partly true.
Western Europe no longer fears a Soviet inva-
sion, but on the other hand neither the funda-
mental assumptions nor the political aspirations
of the Soviet Union have changed. It is the age
of d?nte?not, unfortunately, a d?nte that
signals real peace and security, but a d?nte in
the more narrow meaning of a "period that suc-
ceeds a period of crisis in the Cold War."t For
European security since the end of the war has
rested not on dialogues and mutual understand-
ing but on the existence of a certain balance of
military power, and this balance, never complete
or perfect, has in recent years been radically
upset.
The facts are not in dispute: the Soviet Union
and its allies now have three times as many tanks
in Europe as does NATO, and 3,500 more tactical
aircraft. From 1962 to 1968 American forces in
Europe were reduced from 462,000 to 300,000,
whereas the number of Soviet divisions has grown
during the last four years from 26 to 31. The
number of American ICBM's has remained static
since 1967 at 1,054, while during thc same period
the number of Soviet missiles has almost doubled,
? To provide but one example, Brandt's Foreign
Minister declared its an Interview in late November that
"structural changes inside the Soviet Union in recent
years" could provide a good balls for a further reduction
of tension. Even Communists outside the Soviet Union
have been hard put to discover the presence of any such
"structural changes."
Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management oi
Menge, London, 1971..
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PYRG H
CPYRGHT
Approve&Pori Release ift999169/02 :IGIA-RDE11*-04144M1092002400014 ph,' to
No?ret lice! publicized :mil need not be prevent the consolidation of NATO in Europe.
desi e 0,411 in detail. In sum. between 19(37 and When this failed, various schemes for tliwymage.
1971) the military expenditures of NATO de- mem were introduced (slid] .as the Itapm ki
co eased by tell billion dollars. those of the War.
5.1W Pact countries rose by five billion. The Soviet
Union now spends two to three times more per
capita than NATO on military affairs.
These facts. 10 repeat. are not in dispnte. What
is at issue is their significance. Thus, for exam-
ple. it has been said that they are of no great
political consequence: the Soviet Union is too en-
grossed with its allies and with domestic problems
to desire any further expansion. All the Russians
need in Europe?at any rate so long as the con-
flict with China continues?is security and recog-
nition of the status quo. Having acquired the nec-
essary strategic parity with the United States, the
Soviet Union is unlikely to engage in a ruinous
arms race in order to gain a superiority which, in
the age of modern nuclear warfare, might well
prove specious. On the contrary, proponents of
this line of reasoning find much evidence that
the Soviet Union wishes to expand trade rela-
tions with the West, and they suggest that the
West make the most of the situation and work
for a modus vivendi in Europe that will help es-.
tablish a climate of mutual trust and security.
The argument is alluring but many of the
premises on which it is based are debatable, and
some are manifestly wrong. First, the Soviet mil-
itary build-up is by now well in excess of what
can be reasonably considered essential for Soviet
security in Europe. Second, and more important,
the argument rests on the assumption that the
Soviet Union (like the United States) is now a
status quo power. This is simply not the case, and
those who th?k it is are merely succumbing to
the escapism which these days pervades political
thinking in the United States and Western Europe
alike.
True, Chinese pressure may induce the Krem-
lin to make certain concessions?on SALT, for in-
stance?and as a short-term goal the Russians do
also wish closer economic ties with Europe. But
beyond this, the Soviet Union has more ambitious
plans of which it has never made a secret. As the
greatest European power it aspires to political,
economic, and military hegemony, and it hopes
to achieve this goal by inducing Western Europe
to relax its political cohesiveness and military
vigilance, by encouraging an accelerated program
of American disengagement, and by preventing
all moves toward closer political and military co-
operation or integration among European coun-
tries.t
HE main instrument of Soviet foreign
policy in Europe in recent years has
been the demand for the establishment of a Euro-
pean Security Conference.** The basic concept
dAtislOaalcrUirveiPtivieitihit3it1 srciA474tirrrytoni awistootnteitomo 1 2
plan), all of which were widely discossed but in
the end discarded by the West because they were
thought to contain no elements which would
have contribmed to real security in Europe. The
Soviet aim all along was to dissolve both NATO
and the Warsaw Pact and to create something like
a European co-prosperity sphere. But the scheme
was too crude, the lack of symmetry all too appar-
ent: the Communist countries of Eastern Europe
were . tied together by bilateral defense agree-
ments which would have remained in force,
whereas Western Europe had no such arranger
ment. Furthermore, if hostilities broke out, Amer.!
ican forces would have had to cross the Atlantic,
while Soviet divisions merely would have had t4
move two hundred miles eastward.
Gradually the schime became more sophisti-
cated: in July 1966 the Warsaw Pact leaders is-
sued a declaration on peace and security in Eu-
rope which included some concrete proposals.
But the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia two
years later put an end, temporarily at least, to
negotiations. It was only in October 1969 that
talks began in earnest on an agenda proposed by
the Soviets "to insure European security, to re-
nounce the use or threat of force in mutual
relations, to expand commercial, economic, sci-
entific-technical, and cultural relations for the
purpose of developing political cooperation
among European states."
By time the project had begun to make a
more solid and tl oughtful impression. Skeptics
still argued that, given the character of the Soviet
regime, vague talk about the renunciation of the
use or threat of force lacked credibility. More-
over, since both the Soviet Union and th,_. West
European countries were already signatories to a
declaration to the same effect?the United Na-
tions Charter?what was to be gained by affirming
these principles yet another time? As for expand-
ing trade relations, the Soviet Union's interest in
this matter was never in doubt; the Russians
badly needed (and need) Western computers and
other modern equipment. Cultural relations, the
free flow of people and ideas across international
borders, posed a more problematical issue, rais-
? The impact of nuclear parity has been discussed in
considerable detail in Walter Slocombe's recent study,
The Political Implications of Strategic Parity, London,
1971.
.1- Michael Palmer, The Prospects for a European Security
Conference, London, 1971, p. 18.
**Several recent studies analyze Soviet policy on this
matter in detail: Karl Birnbaum, Peace in Europe, London,
1970: "Europe and America In the 1970's." Adelphi Papers
70/71, London, 1971; Hans Peter Schwarz, ed., Europlibehe
Sicherhetts Kortierenz, Opladen, 1970; Thomas W. Wolfe,
13
iw the sovict,s* vicw_thr possibility of ideo-
logic,ffiPPPYRa,forAVA-a?galiNg.9/0M2
ne, mid other Soviet leaders have stressed time
and Pine again (most recently at the 24th Party
Comp ess) that there can he no coexistence in the
ideological spliete. This raised the old problem
Which has bedeviled East-West relations for so
long: it Soviet doctrine does not in the long run
envisage coexistence with political systems differ-
ing from its own, how can anyone be expected to
take seriously the constant Soviet invocation of
an era of "mutual trust and security"?
Despite all these reservations and other, pro-
cedural, misgivings, NATO at its meetings in
Reykjavik, Lisbon, and Rome (May 1970) de-
cided to take up the Soviet suggestions and
explore them further. The NATO Council made
its participation conditional on the further im-
provement of the situation in Central Europe.
Such improvement appeared to be rapidly forth-
coming: with the Soviet-German treaty, the
Berlin agreement, the prospects for further ad-
vance in the SALT talks, and Soviet hints con-
cerning discussions on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions (MBFR), it was decided last
October to delegate Mario Brosio, the outgoing
NATO Secretary, to explore Soviet intentions in
Moscow.
The West has been strongly urged to partic-
ipate in the European Security Conference, not
only by the Soviets but by East European leaders
as well. The interest of some of the latter is ob-
vious: while the Soviets negotiate, any military
initiative against Rumania and Yugoslavia, for
example, would be self-defeating. Since the talks
would last a long time, perhaps several years, Ru-
mania and Yugoslavia would gain, at the very
least, a breathing space. Other East European
leaders, notably in Poland and Hungary, think
that they, too, would gain more freedom as a
result of ESC, but the position of these particular
states would more likely worsen; for the Soviet
Union, fearing that its allies might go too far to-
ward rapprochement with the West, would be
inclined to tighten rather than loosen its hold
over them.
ANOTHER group of lobbyists for the ESC
is made up of politicians from neu-
tral countries. Some of these sincerely desire to act
as mediators and bridge-builders; with others ulte-
rior motives may be at work. Not much need be
said about Finland in this context; in view of its
relationship with Russia it cannot very well re-
frain from supporting its powerful neighbor.
Swedish foreign policy has pursued a middle line
between West and East which, if not morally rep-
rehensible (as the late John Foster Dulles
claimed), does not reflect either superior moral
courage or wisdom: but for the existence of a
balance of power in Europe, Sweden could not
afford to be neutral. There is a tendency in
Sweden to forget its unfortunate record oF deal-
CiiiA-Kiftni011194A00120102000034 -044;
there may or may not be lessons to he drawn from
that record for the present time, but it might be
hoped that study of the period would neverthe-
less serve to curb the Swedish habit of moraliz-
ing about situations involving the security of
others.
The British and French attitude has been one
of "polite reserve," in the words of one observer,
though not necessarily for the same reason. The
? French prefer bilateral talks to mass circuses;
dc Gaulle certainly would not have approved of a
scheme as lacking in substance as this one. In
most British eyes, American disengagement from
Europe seems likely to produce in the long run
a situation more dangerous to peace than the
present state of affairs. In Italy, Norway, and
Denmark, on the other hand, the idea of ESC
has found a considerably more friendly reception.
The Italian government, in its insistence on
responding to the Soviet initiative, has taken ac-
count of the' fact that one-third of Italy's elector-
? ate votes regularly for parties which oppose
NATO and which, in contrast to the situation
in France, constitute a very real political factor.
These parties are eager to find compromise for-
mulas in their opening to the Left?and it is far
easier to find them in matters of foreign policy
than in matters of domestic policy. "Neutralism"
is an important factor in Norway and Denmark
as well; recent elections in both countries saw an
increase of support for anti-NATO parties. While
these two governments in general exhibit an
awareness of just to whom it is they owe their in-
dependence, public opinion is not so clear on
this point. Soviet intimidation too has had a cer-
tain effect here; Russia has tried hard, and not
entirely unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that it is
the strongest military power in the area and that
American help cannot be relied upon.
The advocates of ESC in Western Europe main-
tain that dialogue with the East, even if limited
at first to areas like oceanography and the envi-
ronment, will gradually gather momentum and
lead to an improvement in the general political
climate. Some of the main obstacles toward such
dialogue were removed by Willy Brandt's Ost.
politik. Brezhnev's announced approval last sum,
mer of the NATO proposals for balanced troor
reductions seemed yet another step in the right
direction. It is, however, by no means certair
that the Soviet leadership has accepted the West
ern demand that troop reductions be asymmetri.
cal (because the conventional forces of Westerr
Europe are so much weaker than those of the
East). Even so, the, signals from Moscow encour
aged President Niion and other Western lead-
ers to probe Soviet intentions further.
Nevertheless, it is not altogether certain that
conference is what the Russians really want. It it
obviously in their interest to prolong the present
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CPYRGHT
Apprnvp For RIcP inqin9 ?
"1.111,s it lonl la 's For as long as possib r; con-
ference that is bound to reveal disagreement on
the one issiie that really matters, namely who is
going to dominate Europe, wottlil constitute an
anii-elimax after the present upsurge or expecta-
tions.
CAN bc argued that the pessimism
I expressed here is unwarranted. To be
stile, the resolutions of the last Soviet Party Con-
gress mention the "consolidation and extension of
the Soviet ['socialist'] order"?but why -take at
face value the ritual invocations of a basically
conservative leadership that has no use for rev-
olutionary fervor and no expansionist aims? The
answer is that a regime need not be revolutionary
in character to aim at expansion, provided the
temptation is strong enough and the risks in-
volved not too high. It may well be that Soviet
leaders are willing to make certain concessions in
order to achieve their principal aim in Europe?
the removal of American forces. They do not, for
instance, insist any longer on the exclusion of
the United States from the proposed conference.
Similarly, as the threat from China increases?
more Soviet divisions arc now stationed on the
Chinese border than in Eastern Europe?it is ,not
unthinkable that. the Soviet Union may evince a
willingness to engage in more meaningful talks
with the West. And it is also not impossible that
if this state of affairs were to last long enough,
the Soviet Union would give up its more am-
bitious aims in Europe altogether.
But this optimistic outlook presupposes one of
two conditions, neither of which unfortunately
exists at present: the 'continuation of a strong
American presence in Europe, or alternatively,
the existence of a strong Western European de-
fense community. So far as the first is concerned,
domestic pressures in the U.S. for disengagement
from Europe are no secret to the Soviets; and as
for the second, nobody in Western Europe seems
ready to shoulder the cost in money and man-
power necessary to bring West European conven-
tional forces up to a level roughly equal to that
of the Warsaw Pact forces.
It would take .a Soviet invasion of Rumania
or Yugoslavia, or Soviet participation in a Middle
Eastern war, to galvanize West European public
opinion on this point. This the Russians of
course know, and they will no doubt refrain in
the near future from actions which may cause
disquiet in the West. In the meantime, while the
Russians greet unilateral American troop reduc-
tions and cuts in American defense spending with
polite and reassuring professions of good will and
peaceful intentions, we may be sure that they are
not about to make any far-reaching concessions
of their own.
In the face of all this, the only alternative
would seem to be appeasement or, in more re-
SI
CPYRGHT
ciA_Rnp7A.ni 1 Ad Annn9nn9nnnn1_9
term used, the likely result will be the gtailital
growth of Soviet power in Europe. At piesent,
there arc not many outright advocates of Soviet
hegemony in Ettrope, even atnong the Commit-
nisi parties. But if the American retreat con.
finites and if Western ,Ettrope proves incapable
of strengthening its own defenses fairly rapidly,
the argument will increasingly be heard that ac-
commodation with the Russians, being inevitable,
should be sought sooner rather than later.
What would Soviet hegemony mean in practi-
cal terms? Certainly not the physical occupation
of Western Europe. Europe would be expected,
however, to help with the economic development
of the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union would not
necessarily insist on the inclusion of Communists
in every European government, but (as in Fin-
land) it would surely demand that untrustworthy
political leaders or parties be excluded from po-
sitions of power and influence, and it would ex-
pect a ban on any criticism of Soviet policies. To
a limited extent it is possible to discern some-
thing of this pattern already emerging. Soviet
leaders have declared unequivocally that they
would take it as a threat to peace if the German
? Bundestag should fail to ratify the Soviet-German
treaty. Broadcasting stations critical of Soviet pol-
icy have been called a danger to European secu-
rity and Soviet _demands have been issued for their
removal from the air; needless to say, no such
' restrictions have been suggested with regard to
'Soviet broadcasts. Similarly, the Soviet Union re-
gards interference with the activities of its intel-
ligence agents in Western Europe as a hostile act;
protests are brushed aside or dismissed as cold-
war propaganda or even a threat to peace. (After
the recent expulsion of some ninety Soviet agents' -
from London, it was sadly observed in Bonn and
Paris that such drastic action would now be al-
most unthinkable in any other European cap-
ital.)
There is still a chance that out of the present
confusion a new European defense community
will emerge, based on Anglo-French nuclear co-
operation and the combined conventional forces
of ten European countries. Attempts to establish
a European defense force date back to the early
1950's; they were voted down by the French Na-
tional Assembly while Pierre Mends-France was
Prime Minister and they failed to kindle much
enthusiasm in any of the other countries in ques-
tion. For twenty years Europe lay under the
American nuclear guarantee, and by a stroke of
unique good fortune resulting from the Soviet
conflict with China, the Continent has now re-
ceived a second respite. No one knows how long
this breathing space will last, or indeed whether
it can be successfully exploited. Pooling their re-
sources, the West European countries could mus-
ter a sum total of $23 billion by way of a military
budget (as against the $63 billion spent by the
. I . ' C. .1 I ?
15
men and :MO combat vessels. Sill], if one takes
nnApprowediFoiAeleasell9991109/021*
in other parts of the world the overall picture
is not as hopeless as it appears at first sight.
p) or would a European defense corn-
munity bc of any consequence
'without att independent nuclear deterrent? The
immensely complex issue of Anglo-French nu-
clear cooperation has recently been analyzed in
some detail by Ian Smart.* Britain has had much
longer experience than France with nuclear
weapons, whereas the French have made more
progress in producing their own missiles. The
French tactical nuclear artillery (Pluton) will be
deployed in Germany later this year. The main
obstacle is not, as is frequently thought, an eco-
nomic one; Britain has spent less than 0.2 per
cent of its GNP on strategic weapons, France
about 0.6 per cent. France's progress has been
hampered in recent years above all by certain
technical difficulties which will, no doubt, be
overcome in due course. But there are immense
political problems. Should Germany and other
European countries participate in this program?
Leaders of the German CDU have in the past
welcomed the concept of a British-French pool
as an important step toward an all-European de-
terrent. But it is doubtful whether the present
German government' would risk incurring Soviet
? "Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French
Nuclear Cooperation." Adelpht Paper 714 London, 1971.
displeasure and ilms Me achievements, real and
CIAADP194111(94)A0002E0W00601-2 finan-
cial contribution. Moreover, how tremble would
an Anglo-French deterrent be? in Smart's view,
the only threat such a deterrent told pose would
he the threat of retaliation either for a Warsaw
Pact military action which could be held to en-
danger vital British or French interests, or for a
strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.
"The former threat is one which entails suicide,
the latter a blow from the grave." Nevertheless,
a European capacity to retaliate, however small,
would not be lightly dismissed by the Warsaw
Pact countries.
Considerations of this nature will, of course,
appear outdated and irrelevant (if not altogether
heinous) to those who have decided to their sat-
isfaction that the cold war has ended at long last
and a new era of peace and cooperation is auto-
matic and inevitable. But there is still a distinct
danger that by unilateral concessions and disar-
mament those who strive for peace will under-
mine the very basis on which the prospects for
peace and security in Europe rest?namely the
ability of Europe to defend itself. A European
Defense Organization could play a decisive role in
bringing about a real detente. If, on the other
hand, the .Europeans put their trust in high.
sounding but basically meaningless dialogues and
security conferences, while at the same time fail
ing to take adequate measures to insure their own
defense, the outcome, short of a miracle, will be
only too predictable.
TASS, Prague
26 January 1972
Warsaw Pact Declaration on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in
Europe
Prague January 26 TASS--Follows the full text of a declaration on peace, security
and cooperation in Europe. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's
Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist
Republic of Romania. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Treaty member-states held in Prague on 25-26 January, 1972, examined
the course of recent events in Europe. They analyzed these events in the light of their
steadfast goal of working to turn the European Continent into an area of permanent,
lasting peace, into an area of fruitful cooperation between sovereign and equal states,
into a factor of stability and understanding throughout the world. The meeting
participants noted with satisfaction that further progress has been achieved in this
direction.
The proposals of the socialist States for Strengthening European security and convening
an all-European conference with this purpose play a most important role in rallying .
all the forces that come out for peace and cooperation in Europe. These proposala
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are contained in the Bucharest declaration of 1966, in the Budapest address of 1969,
and the Berlin statement of 1970. These proposals of the member states of the Warsaw
Treaty, as well as further actions and initiatives undertaken by them1 constitute a
broad peace program and promote the creation of a new politioal climate in Europe.
.Other European states are also making an ever growing significant contribution to the
common cause of European peace. The policies of some of them definitely put first the
interests of European peace, which has a favourable effect on the situation in Europe.
The participants in the meeting point to the great poeitive significance of the contacts
growing of late between European states belonging to different social systems, the
development of political intercourse between them, particularly in the form of consultations
on questions of mutual interest. This promotes mutual understanding between European
states in regard to their common long-term interests in the sphere of peace and cooperation.
As a result of the efforts and the constructive contribution of the member states of
the present meeting and also due to the efforts and constructive contribution of other
states, the relations of peaceful coexistence between European states are Asserting
themselves more and more. /n this connection the meeting participants note the importance
of the principles of cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
-Franck which were adopted at the conclusion of the recent Soviet-French summit talks:'
Relaxation of tension on the European Continent is also promoted by the expansion of
economic1 trade, scientific toOhnologicalv cUltural%and,other,rpleitions between European
states.
The relationships between European peoples are growing stronger and are acquiring a
more diversified content. There is growing activity by the Eurdpean public in the
struggle for deepening the relaXation of tension, for peace and security in Europe.
The states represented at the meeting expressed satisfaction over the fact that the
results achieved in the process of easing tension in Europe are supported when necessary
by appropriate documents, valid under international law.
The political consultative committee positively assesses the beginning of the ratificatidn
of the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, between the
Polish Peoples Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The putting of these treaties
into force will promote the interests not only of their direct participants, but of all
European states as well, will lead to the consolidation of the foundations of peace in.
Europe.
The member states participating in the meeting stressed the positive significance of the
four-power agreement of September 3, 1971, over questions related to West Berlin, and of
the agreements between the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal
Republic of Germany, and between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and
the Senat of West Berlin.
The widening international recognition of the German Democratic Republic is a major
factor in strengthening peace. Further progress in this direction, including the
establishment of relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic
of Germany according to norms of international law, will be an important contribution to
peace, security and cooperation.
The participants in the meeting come out for deciding without further delay the question
of admitting the GDR .and the FRO to the United Nations Organization.
The participants in the meeting point out with satisfaction that the governments of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany conduct an exchange
orANslialecf*Ohre Iffelavn 110?/613/61 heiX113f319b-ecinegtaticind841661651 I*"
17
all, on the question of declaring the Munich agreement null and void from the very
3 tartApPISSIMdrS5ritt% 9#91i)SI/ efArlit 01518:017 pnotyty2
Republic and believe that an achievement o an agreement w e p improvetttql36 on
in Europe.
The implementation of these steps will promote the rapid and radical elimination of the
consequences of the lengthy period of distrust and tension from the relations of the
FRO with the socialist countries, will promote complete normalisation of these relations,
which would, in turn, promote relaxation on the European Continent and the development
of cooperation among all the European states. '
The states taking part in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee welcome
the prospects for further positive changes in Europe. At the same time, they are taking
into account the fact that the forces that are interested in maintaining tensions, in ?
opposing some European states to others, in preserving the opportunities for pushing
the development of events on the European Continent to aggravation continue operating in
Europe. These forces, as seen from the faets, including the latest facts,'cannOt imaginf
the European policy free from blocs, are striving to intensify the arms race in Europe.
The Warsaw Treaty member states cannot but draw from this the definite conclusions for
their security. But they are convinced that by now such a correlation of forces formed
in Europe that it is possible to overcome the opposition of those who are againht relaxation,
if the efforts to consolidate peace are made jointly and consistently.
The states taking part .in the meeting expressed the conviction that it is particularly
important and quite possible at the present stage to achieve collective, joint
actions of the European states towards conselidation,of the European security. in,this:.
connection, they declare for the speediest holding of an all-European Conference on
security and cooperation in which all the European states arid also the United States
and Canada should take part on an equal footing.
At the all-Europech-Conference,*its,participants..00Uld Werk out practical' measures' '
.for further easing of tensions in Europe and lay the foundations for the construction of
a European security system.
The participants in the meeting are of the opinion that European security and cooperation
require the creation of a system of commitments precluding any use of force of threat
of using force in the mutual relations among :the etates in Europe, a system of commit-
ments guaranteeing all the countries that they are protected from acts of aggression,
promoting the benefit and prosperity'of:.every people.
The states taking part in the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee declare .
for general recognition and practical implementation in the political life of theEuroliein
Continent of the.following basic principles of European security and relations among
Europepn states:.
Inviolability of the frontier The frontiers existing now between the European states,
including the frontiers that formed as a result of the Seeondjiorld War are Inviolable
Any attempt to violate these frontiers would threaten European peace. Therefore, the
inviolability of the present frontiers, the territorial integrity of the European
states must continue to be observed unswervingly endsthere.Mmat be no territorial claims
from some states to others.
Nonuse of ferce.-Fprceprrthreat of force must noti)euse0 In the mutual relations among
the European states,? All the disputable questions mustbe?solved.by peaceful pelitical.
means, through talks, injiccerdance.with the ,basic principles of international law,,
--so that the legitimate Interests, peace and security of the peoples are:nnt'Jeopardise4.
Peaceful coexistence. The states of the two social systems?the socialist and the.
capitalist--have formed in Europe in the process of the historical development 7and
existnow.. The_existence pf.the,different.syetems.must.ne.t be an insurmountable
obstacle to the allround developmentof.relations aping them.; Renouncing'war'es a .
means of 'their policy,-the?Eutopean stateei belonging to-different.social systems, "
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. 1 i ns on e'basis of accord and cooperation in the
interests of peace.
The foundations for goodneighbourly relations and cooperation in the interests of,
peace. The.goodneighbaurly relations among the European. tates must .develop on.
the bSsis of the principles of independence ahd. natiOnal.sovereignty, equality, '
noninterference in internal affairs. and mutual advantage. this approach must become _
the permanentpolicy in the relatOns.among;the.EUropean states, the
:..,perManent factor in the life ofall.:the.EuroOan pqoplasapdpiust:.leid,to.tiqe::
development of goodneighbourly ielaticins'sand-tUtuai Un4eistiniiing'among the 'sates in
different parts of Europe. It is necessary to strive forsucha tranefOrmation Of
relations among the European states that will make it possible to.nirercomesthe
splitting of the continent into the military-politleal groupings
Mutually advantageous relations among the states. Diversified mutually advantageous
relations among the European states in economic, scientific, technical and cultural
fields, in tourism and environmental control must be widely developed in the
conditions of peace. The development of these relations, in turn, adding material
content to the striving of the European peoples for peace, calm and efflorescence,
will consolidate the stability of the system of security and cooperation forming
in Europe.
Disarmament. In the interests of consolidating the world peace, the European
states must promote in every way the solution of the problem of universal and
complete disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, and implementation of measures
for limitation and ending of arms race.
The support for the United Nations. The goals of the European states on the
international arena are in keeping with the articles of the United Nations Charter
calling for maintenance of the world peace and security, for the development of
friendly relations and cooperation among the states. The European states declare
in support of the United Nations, for its consolidation in accordance with the
provisions of the United Nations Charter.
By taking these lofty principles and goals as a basis for relations between the stqtes
of Europe, the all-European conference will adopt a decision of great historical
scope. This will set the beginning to joint fruitful.work, capable of turning
Europe into a truly peaceful continent.
It would also be possible to agree at the all-European conference on concrete
directions for the further development of reciprocally advantageous relation by
European states in every sphere; for the elimination of all discrimination,
inequality or artifical barriers. Their cooperation in the rational utilization
of the raw materials and power resources of Europe, in raising the industrial
potential and improving land fertility, in utilizing the achievements of the
beientific and technological revolution will allow to multiply the opportunities
for raising the wellbeing of the European peoples. Mutual enrichment in spiritual
values, acquaintance with each others culture and art will assume still greater
scope.
It would be expedient to set up at the all-European Conference a permanent body of
all the participating states concerned that after the conference could continue
'joint work to agree on further steps in this direction.
In the opinion of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty all these questions
should be high on the agenda of the all-European conferenc,
The states represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
believe that an all-European conference can be convened in 1972 and regard the
statements by a number of West European states to the effect that they adhere to
the a
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The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Ccomittee regard with
understanding the reasoning of many states who favour the carrying out of necessary
preparations for an all-European conference in order to promote its speediest con-
vocation and its success. They believe that the Finnish Government's proposal to
conduct in Helsinki multilateral consultations with the participation of all
interested states of Europe, as well as of the United States and Canada, should
be realized.
The member states participating in the meeting reiterate that they decided to
appoint delegates for taking part, together with the delegates of other states, in
multilateral consultations aimed at reaching agreement on questions related to
the preparations for and the organization of an all-European conference. They
note that the proposal on multilateral consultations as a form of preparing for
an all-European conference is now meeting with the agreement of all the states
concerned, and call for starting the multilateral consultations in a very short
time.
The member states of the Warsaw Treaty believe that achieving agreement on reducing
armed forces and armaments in Europe would also correspond with the interests of
strengthening European security. In this they proceed from the fact that the
question of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, both foreign and
national, ought to be solved in such a manner as not to be to the detriment of
the countries taking part in such reduction. The examination and determination of
ways toward solving this question should not be the prerogative of the existing
military-political alliances in Europe: Appropriate agreement could be reached an
the way of conducting talks on this question.
The People's Republic of Bulgaria. the Hungarian People's Republic, the German
Democratic Republic, the polish people's Republic, the Socialist Republic of
Romania. the Union of Soviet,Socialtst Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic believe that historical development has brought Europe up to an important
juncture, apart from a new hope for lasting peace and security the year 1972 may
bring the European peoples a real advance towards translating that nope .into
life. The supreme duty of all states is to vigorously help in bringing this
about.
The declaration is signed:
For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: by Todor Zhivkov, first secretary of the
Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, chairman of the State Council
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; by Stank? Todorov, chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the People's Republic Of Bulgaria.
For the Hungarian-Peopae!s Republic: by Janos Hadar, first secretary of the Central
committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party; by Jeno Pock, chairman of the
Hungarian Revolutionary Government of Workers and Peasants.
For the German Democratic Republic: by Erich Honecker, first secretary of the Central
Committee of Socialist Unity Party of Germany; by Wolfgang Rauchfuss,vice chairman
of the Council. of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic.
For the Polish people's Republic:- by Edward Gierek, firstilecretary of the-Central.---
7Coamittee of Polish United Warkers.Party; by-PiotrZaroszewicz chairman .of the--
Council:of Ministers of the polish People's Republic' r).%
For the Romanian Socialist Republic: by Nicola? Ceausesou, general secretary of the
Romanian Communist Party. chairman Of the State Council of the Socialist Hepublic of
Romania; by Ion Gheorghe Maurer chairman of .the Council of Ministers of the Socialist
'Republic of Romania.
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For the Union of Soviet'SocialistRepubliessby L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; by A.N. Kosygin.
chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist:Republics.
For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: by Gustav Huaak, general secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; by Ludvik 81/abode, president
.of the Czechoslovak Socialiet Republic; by Lubamir Straugel, president of the,Gavernment
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
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THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED
The attached backgrounder provides current information on the
situation in Yugoslavian Tito's measures to restore order in Croatia
are apparently succeeding; however his ability to find long-range
solutions to regionalism, economic stagnation and the problem of
his own succession remains in doubt.
In treating the Yugoslav situation, we should suggest:
a. that Croat leaders had lost their persepective
and had became swept up in the tide of the extreme
nationalist demands of their constituents;
b. that Moscow is working with Croat refugees in
West Germany and elsewhere to overthrow Tito and establish
an independent Croat state under Soviet control;
c. that Tito's purge of Croat party leaders was
necessary and that the Yugoslav president did not over-
react;
d. that despite some harsh words for "rotten
liberalism" and "legal niceties" (used for the purpose
of goading somnolent party leaders into action), Tito
wants the essentials of his decentralization program to
survive and has DO intention of bequeathing his regime
to discredited hard-liners;
e. that nationalist difficulties, while serious,
are not inevitable, permanent or incapable of solution;
f. that Croat leaders were -- with possible
exceptions -- guilty of no more than reflecting the
excessive national enthusiasms and aspirations of their
constituents and will not be the victims of traditional
Communist purge trials;
g. that the Yugoslav system is strong enough that
even when President Tito (who currently enjoys excellent
health) eventually leaves the scene, the commitment to his
unique form of socialism and federalism will not be in
doubt
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972
THE YUGOSLAV EXPEREENT'CHALLENGED
For over twenty years Yugoslavia has been involved in a
political experiment which seeks to combine Cannunist state social-
individual freedom and capitalist production methods. Last
summer a constitutional reform granted almost complete autonomy
to the six republics and two autonomous regions that comprise the
Yugoslav federation, However, decentralization has not worked out
as planned, and the Yugoslav experiment is currently Challenged
by acute problems relating to the erosion of federal authority,
regional separatism, economic stagnation and the question of what
to do when Tito is no longer around to hold things together.
The immediate crisis has been posed by Republic of Croatia
efforts to obtain a larger share of federal funds. In the political
marketplace in Belgrade where federal policy is formed and funds
disbursed, the bargaining power of a regional party representative
is proportionate to the amount of mass support and pressure he can
generate in his local republic. In mobilizing such support, the
regional representative has all too frequently chosen to play upon
the Chauvinism of his constituents. Swept up in the tide of
nationalism and local interests, he has increasingly assumed the
role of the defender of these interests at the expense of the
federation as a whole. For, pace Marxist orthodoxy which holds
that national rivalry is a bourgeois aberration and that by
eliminating capitalism and building a classless society national
contradictions will disappear, the substitution in Yugoslavia of
the Communist political system for the monarchy has not resolved
the nationalist appetites of either the party bureaucracy or the
regions they represent.
In the case of Croatia, local party leaders felt strongly
that their republic was not getting a fair share of federal funds
and their demands on Belgrade were reinforced by student demon-
strations. The actions of student organizations and the voices of
Croat extremists who were publicly demanding the real prerogatives
of independence (such as a Croat army, customs service and foreign
office) alarmed and angered President Tito. However, when he
called upon the central party apparat to intervene, he discovered
that decentralization had eroded federal authority to the point
that neither government nor party was capable of taking effective
action,
Faced with the intransigence of top-level Croat leaders and
the paralysis of central party organs, Tito was obliged to engage
his personal authority and prestige to cope with the situation.
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Castigating thwyjnigt forces at work in all the republics, he
specifically accusea the party leadership in Croatia of "rotten
liberalism" and a lack of vigilance which permitted counter-
revolutionary elements to thrive. Subsequently he forced the
resignation of Croat party president Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Mika
Tripalo, a Croat representative on the federal party executive
bureau and a member of the collective presidency set up by Tito
last summer to resolve the succession problem. All together the
purge in Croatia has affected at least 400 persons. Criminal
proceedings have been initiated against one outspoken Croat
delegate to the federal parliament and pre-trial hearings have
begun for 11 Croats suspected for counter-revolutionary activity.
These procedures may presage the first Yugoslav treason trials
in over twenty years.
A Conference of the League of Yugoslav Communists, which met
from 25 - 27 January, cut the decision -making party executive
bureau from fourteen to eight members. It also reduced the size
of basic party organs and resolved to increase the workers role in
the party. However, despite Tito's exhortations, the Conference
was unable to formulate a program for dealing with the resurgence
of national antagonisms. The meeting did affirm the validity of
Yugoslavia's self-management principles and Tito made a point of
disclaiming any intent of encouraging the party to reassume its
former omnipotent role. Nonetheless, Conference decisions and the
tone of Tito's own remarks indicate the Belgrade will continue
to take measures against national dissension.
In Croatia the new party leadership is proceeding to restore
public order and party discipline. It has asserted that the basic
liberal orientation of the Croat party is not in question, And
the position of the new leaders has been strengthened by a federal
decision to allow the individual republics to retain a greater
share of their own currency earnings. On the other hand, in
trying to reassert party control, these leaders will be working
against the dominant mood of the party and people of Croatia which
favors more independence and resents the dismissal of their most
popular leaders.
Events in Croatia have obliged Tito and his lieutenants to
re-examine the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslav life..
The concept of a party that guides but does not direct has been
tried and found wanting. In calling for a more compact, disciplined
party led by men dedicated to the principles of socialism and
federalism, Tito wants an organization which can bring its authority
to bear on the regions whenever local interests impinge on the
unity and well-being of the federation as a whole. However, the
erosion of federal authority was not accompanied by the development
of alternate power centers and Tito is discovering that it is much
easier to surrender authority than to take it back again.
2
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972
THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED
For over twenty years Yugoslavia has been involved in a
political experiment which seeks to combine Communist state social-
ism, individual freedom and capitalist production methods. Last
summer a constitutional reform granted almost complete autonomy
to the six republics and two autonomous regions that comprise the
Yugoslav federation. However, decentralization has not worked out
as planned, and the Yugoslav experiment is currently challenged
by acute problems relating to the erosion of federal authority,
regional separatism, economic stagnation and the question of what
to do when Tito is no longer around to hold things together.
The immediate crisis has been posed by Republic of Croatia
efforts to obtain a larger share of federal funds. In the political
marketplace in Belgrade where federal policy is formed and funds
disbursed, the bargaining power of a regional party representative
is proportionate to the amount of mass support and pressure he can
generate in his local republic. In mobilizing such support, the
regional representative has all too frequently chosen to play upon
the Chauvinism of his constituents. Swept up in the tide of
nationalism and local interests, he has increasingly assumed the
role of the defender of these interests at the expense of the
federation as a whole. For, pace Marxist orthodoxy which holds
that national rivalry is a bourgeois aberration and that by
eliminating capitalism and building a classless society national
contradictions will disappear, the substitution in Yugoslavia of
the Communist political system for the monarchy has not resolved
the nationalist appetites of either the party bureaucracy or the
regions they represent.
In the case of Croatia, local party leaders felt strongly
that their republic was not getting a fair share of federal funds
and their demands on Belgrade were reinforced by student demon-
strations. The actions of student organizations and the voices of
Croat extremists who were publicly demanding the real prerogatives
of independence (such as a Croat army, customs service and foreign
office) alarmed and angered President Tito. However, when he
called upon the central party apparat to intervene, he discovered
that decentralization had eroded federal authority to the point
that neither government nor party was capable of taking effective
action.
Faced with the intransigence of top-level Croat leaders and
the paralysis of central party organs, Tito was obliged to engage
his personal authority and prestige to cope with the situation.
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Castigating chavyjnist forces at work in all the republics, he
specifically accusea the party leadership in Croatia of "rotten
liberalism" and a lack of vigilance which permitted counter-
revolutionary elements to thrive. Subsequently he forced the
resignation of Croat party president Savka Dabcevic-KUcar and Mika
Tripalo, a Croat representative on the federal party executive
bureau and a member of the collective presidency set up by Tito
last summer to resolve the succession problem. All together the
purge in Croatia has affected at least 400 persons. Criminal
proceedings have been initiated against one outspoken Croat
delegate to the federal parliament and pre-trial hearings have
begun for 11 Croats suspected for counter-revolutionary activity.
These procedures may presage the first Yugoslav treason trials
in over twenty years.
A Conference of the League of Yugoslav Communists, which met
from 25 - 27 January, cut the decision -making party executive
bureau from fourteen to eight members. It also reduced the size
of basic party organs and resolved to increase the workers role in
the party. However, despite Tito's exhortations, the Conference
was unable to formulate a program for dealing with the resurgence
of national antagonisms. The meeting did affirm the validity of
Yugoslavia's self-management principles and Tito made a point of
disclaiming any intent of encouraging the party to reassume its
former omnipotent role. Nonetheless, Conference decisions and the
tone of Tito's own remarks indicate the Belgrade will continue
to take measures against national dissension.
In Croatia the new party leadership is proceeding to restore
public order and party discipline. It has asserted that the basic
liberal orientation of the Croat party is not in question. And
the position of the new leaders has been strengthened by a federal
decision to allow the individual republics to retain a greater
share of their own currency earnings. On the other hand, in
trying to reassert party control, these leaders will be working
against the dominant mood of the party and people of Croatia which
favors more independence and resents the dismissal of their most
popular leaders.
Events in Croatia have obliged Tito and his lieutenants to
re-examine the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslav life._
The concept of a party that guides but does not direct has been
tried and found wanting. In calling for a more compact, disciplined
party led by men dedicated to the principles of socialism and
federalism, Tito wants an organization which can bring its authority
to bear on the regions whenever local interests impinge on the
unity and well-being of the federation as a whole. However, the
erosion of federal authority was not accompanied by the development
of alternate power centers and Tito is discovering that it is much
easier to surrender authority than to take it back again.
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During the Croatian crisis Tito has had the unequivocal
support of the Yugoslav military and he made it clear to Croat
nationalists that he was prepared to use force if necessary to
restore order in the republic. As a result the role of the
military has been strengthened. Should the party prove
incapable of regaining its authority, the Yugoslav military
would remain the only force capable of holding the country
together. Its influence will be felt even more strongly after
Tito's demise.
Since World War II Yugoslavia has withstood the threat of
regional separatism internally and external pressure from Moscow
which dates from the time of Tito's break with Stalin in 1948.
The country's survival attests first of all to the ability and
prestiage of President Tito. It also attests to the flexibility
of Yugoslav socialism and to the pervasive fear of. Soviet inter-
vention. Tito has made it clear that he expects the economic
and administrative essentials of his decentralization program
to survive. He obviously does not wish to bequeath his regime to
those who would attempt to reimpose authoritarian rule. Moreover,
liberal elements in Croatia, Tito's home province, have always
been the strongest supporters of his reforms.
The fate of the Yugoslav experiment has an influence transcending
its own borders. As a leader of the non-aligned nations, Yugoslavia
can exert considerable influence on the developing countries of
Asia and Africa. As such it constitutes a relevant and unique
example of a regime which seeks to combine participating social
democracy (the self-management principle), individual freedom,
a market economy and a large measure of autonomy for its component
republics.
The Soviet Union, ever fearful that the Titoist heresy is
infecting its East European empire, is an interested observer of
Yugoslavia's problems, Tito and the new leadership in Croatia
have already accused Moscow of abetting nationalism and separatism.
While this accusation cannot be confirmed (it is probably the
only point on which Yugoslays of whatever nationality or political
persuasion can agree on), there is ample evidence that the Soviet
leaders are exerting economic and psychological pressure to achieve
their aims. Thus, Tito's recent problems in attracting western
capital have not gone unnoticed by Moscow which is offering
attrative loans and credits to hard-pressed Yugoslav firms in an
effort to increase their trade with the Soviet bloc. And a January
article in the Soviet Pravda, observing the Croat crisis with
obvious satisfaction, compared the current climate in Yugoslavia
with that which existed in Czechoslovakia during the period of the
Dubcek reforms; that is, before the Soviet-led invasion
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GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY, London/Paris
8 January 1972
CROATIAN NATIONALISM
Afly in the f
ointment
By M1LOVAN DJ1LAS
CPYRGHT
The Yugoclay Communiats ore side by side in Bosni:., Herzegovina ing variety of national traditions and in the very existence of the Mon-
guided by the same doctrinal and and Croatia. These resemblances the problems posed by fostering ihe tencgrin nation a dismemberment
practical considerations in handling may well bring the.two grouPs closer various grouPs? There were also the of their own group. Before the war,
the question of national groups as .together, but they also give rise to nationalist appetites of their own the Communists were inclined to give
in dealing with all other problems. fears of losing their identities. party bureaucracy. The fact is that a measure of autonomy to Bosnia
In orthodox Marxist terms nation-, The complexity of their relations is some of these- bureaucracies seemed Herzegovina. With the revolution they
allies are the product of capitalisin better seen against the background to be ? to borrow Orwell's phrase decided to go further and give the
and national rivalry is a bourgeois of their differences. Their traditions ?more equal thanothers.
conflict.. So by eliminating capitalism' 'region Instead the status of a repub-
and their -mentalities are different, For the first time in their history lic, although half the population is
rind the bourgeoisie, and "building" as are their religions (the Serbs are Slovenen and Macedonians were given Serb and the rest Croat and Moslem.
the classless society, national con- Orthodox, the Croats Catholic).. Be- the right to set up their own State,. They thus effectively blocked the
tradietions should gradually die- tween the two world wars. Political and this could not hut please them. historic aspirations of Croatian
appear. The operation or -building parties were formed on the basis .of The same right was given the Mon- nationalism and the ethnic hopes of
this classless society is presided over national differencea, unleashing tenegrins, although they were an Serbian nationalism while at the
by a monolithic and internationalist irrational forces, reviving old myths, integral part of the Serbian national same time meeting the wishes of
party which, by the same token, is destroying legal order, and delaying group. Both the Kornintern and the Moslems anxious to affirm their own
the embodiment -of nationalistic life social progress. In 1929, King Mex- Yugoslav Communist party regarded identity. An outburst of nationalistic
and tendencies. ander I tried to save the country Yugoslavia as sornethinst aretriiaciiiaellRy fervour could turn Bosnia Herzegovna into a battlefield. Apart from the
As this same docttine holds that fr o vsf
am breaking up by resorting to per- created by the Treaty f i
there are no differences. between sonal rule, and by promoting the idea The Montenegrins, in their view, six
I
republics, the Communists also
national groups except language, of a "Yugoslav nation" and of "Yugo- constituted a special national group created
tailturat. traditions. psychological atavism." . because they had had their own two autonomous regions in-
characteristics, and economic condi-
sde the Serbian republic?Voivodina
inns, the Communists?once they are
in power?do not permit anything
more than cultural and administra-
tive autonomy when they recognise
the rights of national groups.
The - Yugoslav ' Communists aban-
doned this position only when they
were forced to. But there is no deny-
ing that they have gone a step further
than the Soviets, who pioneered in
this terrain, by giving official recogni-
tion to the rights and special charac-
teristics of national groups. There is
no "Big Brother" among Yugoslavia's ?
national groups, no single party
bureaucracy leading the others.
This departure from Soviet practice
atems not from principles but from
the Yugoslav reality. If this reality
Is discounted there is no way of a revolution, and the time seemed So it was that a region which had
understanding the policy pursued by ripe for the Communists to PinS:ittria every ground for demanding autoa-
the Yugoslav Communists in handling decisive role in safeguatdIng.
the yogosiev state. Is.,Y, emY found itself elevated to the rank
national problems, nor the national- restor ing"? of a nation and State. This peculiarity
isle rivalries which are today Shaking did this by launching_iiceinrovridt, created no problems as long as
up and eroding socialist structures 'ag I-nr aihst the occupying a 'n. Ideological and party unity ensured
just as they once did In a monarchist their collaborators. They 'wen. t-ht? a de facto centralisation. Today, with
and bourgeois Yugoslavia. ? struggle because ? albeit. ,ini their the party hold loosening and repub-
What happened? What is happen-- nwn way ? they were the einbodi- lies enjoying near-sovereign power
Ing today? flew Is It that there haa merit of the Yugoslav idea, that 18 t? the "Montenegrin nation" assumes
been a resurgence in . Yugoalavia Ray the idea of a eommon Yugdstris .
peat significance for the Croats ?
of nationalist movements and an- State grouping a variety of nationali- whose own nationalism is in full
tagonisma These stirrings have ties. It is worth noting here that - this flower,
taken the whole world by oirprige, visiOn is. at the root of Yugoslavia's
and borne, especially the Communist quarrel with Stalin anti its determined
countries,. view them with concern. opposition to Moscow's attempts at
' The Serbs and Croats constitute extending Soviet control.
the large.St national groupa ? in Yugo: ? The Communists Were prepared
Slavic There Is a very close simi. to grant equal rights to all the
larity between their languages and national groups, but they were con- .en they are not
The Serbs. on the
their ethnic ons and they liye fronted with more than the bew when
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His action did stave of the country's State until 1918, and since then
disintegration, but there was nn had represented a separatist ten-
way of injecting life into the idea of dency in the Yugoslav kingdom. Dur-
one Yugoslavia. The entire Croat ing the Second World War, the Serbian
population challenged this concept. counter-revolutionary movement (the
the Serbs' democratic parties made Chetniks) was the most active group
a futile attempt to head it off, while in Montenegro. By turning this
extremist elements in all camps region into a State, the centralist
sharpened their axes 1 or the day when and hegemonistic tendencies of
they could settleold scores. Serbian nationalism which constituted
That day came with the Nazi In- the most serious threat to the Corn-
vaslon. Croat Fascists (the Ustachls) munists, were weakened. Besides,
got the German invader to set up a during the war, bases of party strue-
so-called independent state, and used hire and administration were laid
It as a basis for an attempt to eider- which took Montenegro's special
minale the Serbs. IteactIonariss itsal characteristics ' into consideration.
fanatical chauvinists trot? the ranks Equality with other republics which
of the Scrim hit back using similar the new structural order bestowed
melluxia. could only help the newly created
All the ingredients were there for Montenegrin party machines
Republic status
and Kosovo.
These provinces have identical con-
stitutions, although the Serbs form
the majority in Voivodina, which also
has a large Hungarian minority, and
the Albanians predominate in Kosovo,
where the Serbs constitute a little
more than a third of the population.
As far as I can recall, the question
of the Hungarian minority played only
a secondary role in the granting of
autonomy to Voivodina.
Decisive
There was an autonomist current,
admittedly weak, among the Serbs
of this region before the war. But
during the revolution the party sup-
ported the idea of setting up an
autonomous party apparatus. All this
had a decisive influence when the
question of granting autonomy to
Voivodina was taken up.
It was different with Kosovo. The
Communists had also set up autono-
mous structures in this region, which
borders on Albania. Since at that time
the Yugoslav and Albanian Com-
munists were hoping to unite the two
countries, Kosovo's autonomy was
considered an intermediate step
towards such a union.
When the Yugoslav constitution was
amended last year, Voivodina and
Kosovo were nearly awarded the
other hand, even status of republics, and this in the
nationalistic, see teeth Of Serbian opposition. The
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solution finally decided upon was
bizarre: in order to meet the demands
of the Albanians, the same rights
were granted to Voivodina ? which
had not asked for any of them.
Although they. represented almost
half the Yugoslav population and
Kosovo was part of their republic, the
Serbs found themselves coming under
increasing pressure. The dream of
uniting Albania and Yugoslavia gave
way to a threat of Albanian irre-
dentism.
It would be wrong to conclude
from the present resurgence of
nationalism that the Communists
have done nothing here or that they
have made serious mistakes. The
truth is that the substitution of social
and political ? systems does not do
away with nationalist problems. In
a multinational State these can be
solved, even given optimum condi-
tions, only for a particular period
and within the framework of certain
social and political structures. Each
time these structures are altered, the
relations between the national groups
change, and vice versa.
This is what has happened in
Yugoslavia.
The party monolith and its ideology
have been gradually transformed,
largely as a result of 'changes in
social structures. The break-up of the
party bureaucracy was accompanied
by the emergence of a middle class.
Officials installed by the revolution
were replaced ? before their useful-
ness expired ? by men less dogmatic
and more ingenious. The social and
intellectual climate resembles that
of Louis Philippe's time, as seen by
Balzac and Stendhal. True, the
middle class in Communist countries
is not properly speaking a bourgeoisie
because there is no bourgeois owner-
ship of property. It has, however, cer-
tain things in common with the
bourgeoisie, such as its goals of
technical progress and aspirations
towards a high standard of living.
It is made up of all social classes
? managerial and professional men,
party bureaucrats, petit bourgeois,
even workers and peasants.
The beliefs and outlook of this ciass,
with Its reliance on what are in fact
modern "capitalist" production
methods, impregnate eVery fibre of
the nation's life. This transformation
of society and the party is built on a
natural, and the only possible, founda-
tion ? that of national groups. It is
evident in claims made by the party
bureaucracies in the national groups,
and in other aspects of "bourgeois"
nationalism.
Disintegration
There are as many Yugoslav Com-
munist parties as there are republics,
and the disintegration has been ac-
celerated by differences in social and
other tendencies of their members. As
national bureaucracies ? bureau-
cratic nationalisms, that is to say ?
began to press their special claims.
there also appeared an "ideology"
of superiority and intolerance among
national groups. "Scientific" studies
have been published, especially in
Croatia, on the exploitation of one
national entity by another and the
"limitless" possibilities for develop-
ment in the exploited national group.
Dark, illogical forces were thus set
in motion by the charges of exploita-
tion and hegemony. There was, of
course, exploitation, not as a result
of the predominance of this or that
national group, but because of waste
and the exercise of _privileges in the
party bureaucracy at the expense of
the rest of the Yugoslav national en-
tities. In this context, the criticism
directed against Belgrade can be
justified, not because it is the Serbian
capital, but because it is the com-
mon capital of the federal bureauc-
racy. The reality of national relations
and national claims remains well
hidden.
This is true of society as a whole
and of the Various tendencies which
exist in it. For the changes that have
taken place in society have not been
backed up by a renewal of ideas and
Institutions. In many respects, the
political structures have not changed
since the end of the revolution.
The party bureaucracy may well
have been unable to stop social
change, but it was strong enough to
suppress new and more democratic
tendencies. The changes have been
limited to reshuffles within its own
ranks. It gave legal recognition to
the independence and equality of the
party bureaucracies in the various
nations, but it refused any liberalisa-
tion in other domains.
In view of the traditional and
legendary aspirations of its people,
it was inevitable that Croatia should
become the theatre of the most seri-
ous outburst of nationalism. Contri-
buting to it were both actual and
potential economic difficulties in the
area. The party bureaucracy's "pro-
gressive" wing struck a nationalist
posture: But it was weak, and all it
did was open the door to the tradi-
tional sort of nationalism, which led
to the merger of two nationalist struc-
tures ? the party and the bourgeoisie.
Croatian slide
The policy was pursued in seem-
ingly democratic fashion, with leaders
paying lip service to "Yugoslavism."
But quite clearly Croatia was sliding
towards separatism and authori-
tarian nationalism. It could hardly
have been .otherwise: not a single
popular or democratic measure was
sanctioned in the republic. Although
the party's nationalism came to be
Identical with that of the bourgeoisie,
It was neither dynamic nor inventive.
The bureaucrats were stunned when
students from Zagreb University
went on strike last month. Marshal
Tito reacted by getting rid of the
nationalists in the party and arrest-
ing student leaders. The drive has
been contained, but the Croat ques-
tion and the other problems afflicting
the system have yet to be solved.
By and large, Yugoslav society has
been liberalised, but its political
structures remain authoritarian. It
is for thh re ison that a crisis like
that of CI:oat an nationalism seems
to involve thE whole of Yugoslavia.
Yet the 3asi4 of the Yugoslav State
and its sGeietor is far sturdier than
appears a first sight. Note that the
outburst E f Croat nationalism was
Isolated - at d led to unfavourable
reactions !'rons the other republics.
Officially, these reactions came from
top-level -revolutionaries." In fact,
however, it was the entire post-
revolutions ry consumer society, eown
to its humble >t levels, that insisted
upon ant. obtained the vitally
essential mak tenance of the State's
unity.
Authoritarian
As long a5 Yugoslavia's present
bureaucra ic itructure remains, the
country will c ntinue to be shaken by
crises. No on can say just when or
where they wit end. There seems no
possibility of renewing or stabilising
the party bu eaucracy, nor does a
political d mocracy of the sort known
in the Went seem likely. Yugoslavia
is tending towards a political State
which is rot dogmatic, but continues
to be au horrtarian. The structures
-which carte ir to being as a result of
the revolt' ton including the national
structures, nevertheless continue to
be modified, and in some instances
are even di ;apt earing.
But all :his is being done without
disturbing the foundations of society,
particularly n ationalist rights. There
Is every iodic ition that the country's
social andf economic life is evolving
towards greater liberty, thereby
offering tie rational groups greater
opportunit es or their individual de-
velopment Tt e vision of confedera-
tion of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes. and
Macedonians all enjoying wider civil
rights belong to take on the dimen-
sions of mE thing more solid than
a pipe drea
BALTIMORE SUN
9 February 1972
Fourteen Centuries Apart
MILOVAN DJILAS
CPYRGHT
Croatia and the 'Yugoslav Idea'.
By JOSEPH it. L. STERNE
Zagreb a line roughly comparable to d dive
For those who prefer the long sion perceptible in Yugoslavia even
view of political affairs, the latter ,to this day. To the south and east,
years of the Fourth Century might the Byzantine Empire with its
be a good starting point for assess- Orthodox Church and Cyrillic al-
ing the upsurge of Croatian phabet held sway; to the north and
nationalism that is now roiling west, the power of Rome persisted
Yugoslavia. in the Catholic Church and the
In that distant epoch, the Roman Latin alphabet.
Empire finally bilklp pity etrF (Inn pipxia trilndogifinm
stIte illtrfiLaPtitd 2n:
2
the Sixth and Seventh Centuries,
their political and religious fates Thus these two Slavic tribes,
were determined by the cleavage though speaking a common Ian-
between East and West. The Serbs guage with no greater differences
became subject to the Byzantine , than "English" and "American,"
Empire and later to Its Turkish remained politically apart through
successors. The Croats after a fourteen centuries?from the days
heady period of independence fell of the migration until 1918.
under the domination of Hunger- In that year, as World War I
Oth2gptgemitttgArMI) 2 tozdoodiuzslualav;5,orivtlaies
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT
formed by big-power decision from
the debris of the Ottoman and
Habsburg Empires,
. . ?
From the beginning, Yugoslavia
has never been an easy Union. Not
only the Serbs and the Croats, but
the Slovenes, Bosnians, Monteneg-
rins, Albanians, Macedonians and
ungarians who live within its
borders have nurtured nationalist
passions quite contrary from the
assimilationist Ideal that has
shaped the American Union.
The Serbs, who by 1918 had been
nominally independent for a cen-
tury and fully independent for half
a century, were the dominant force
in Yugoslavia from the outset. Al-
though leading Croats had long sup-.
ported the "Yugoslav Idea," they
were quickly disillusioned after the
1921 constitution established a cen-
tralist monarchy with power firmly
entrenched in Serbian hands.
Political turbulence prevailed in
the period between world wars.
Croatian parliamentarians often
boycotted meetings of the Skupstina
in Belgrade and then withdrew al-
together after their leader, Stjepan
Radic, was shot dead during a de-
bate in 1927.
One product of Croatian disil-
lusion was the assassination in 1934
of King Alexander by a member of
Ustashi, an extremist, separatist
group which considered him the
embodiment of Serbian hegemony.
Another result was the creation
during the Nazi occupation of a
separate Croatian state, led by
Ustashii which committed atrocities
against Serbs comparable to the
bloodiest deeds of Hitler's hench-
men.
? ? ?
As a result, the resistance move-
ment in Yugoslavia deteriorated
into a civil war between Serbs and
Croats?with only the Communist
partisans under the redoubtable
Josip Broz Tito holdihg firm for thtks
"Yugbslav Idea."
When World War IT ended and-
Tito took power, the new regime
made the historic decision (after a
decade of Communist theoretical
indecision) to make Yugoslavia a
federation with considerable power
vested in the nation's six republics
and two autonomous provinces....
The purpose was to defuse na-
tionalist passions, but in practice
difficulties have never ceased. In
the early postwar years, the Com-
munists imposed a Stalinist rule
from Belgrade in which Croatia
was treated almost as an occupied
state despite Tito's Croation origin.
After the Tito-Stalin break in 1948,
there was quite a change. To court
popular support in' the struggle
against the Soviet threat, Tito
preached national rather than in-
ternational communism and insti-
tuted a more democratic, "self-
management" style of socialism.
Since that time, political life in
Yugoslavia has been characterized
by constant experimentation, with
the pendulum almost dancing in
response to a myriad of national-
ist, economic, ideological and for-
eign pressures.
The early 1950's brought the
democratic heresies of Milovan
Djilas, an old Tito ally who flirted
'ith the unforgivable idea.o a
mull-party system. The mid-1960's
saw a return of Serbian centralism
in the form of Aleksander Rank-
ovic, another old Tito ally who
used his control over the secret
police to reinstitute a touch of
Stalinism.
Now, today, Yugoslavia Is going
through Its third internal crisis
since the break With Stalin., In
many ways, it is the most serious'
crisis because it Is the most pert-
inent to Yugoslavia's peculiar prob-
lems.
What Djilas and Rankovic re
fleeted, after all, were the basic
dilemmas of Communist regimes
everywhere: democratization ver-
sus repression, stability through
relaxation or through control.
In the present case, Tito is deal-
ing with a fervent Croatian ha-
tionalism which grew to proportions
he bluntly defined as a threat to
the entire Yugoslav state.
Accordingly, Tito has deposed a
?
number of Communist Party
leaders who had made themselves
quite popular by appealing to the
nationalist sentiments of the Croa
tian population. And he has tacitly
approved the indictment of eleven
members of "Malice Hrvatska"
(Mother Croatia), a cultural organ-
ization now being charged with
promoting a political mass move-
ment and having links with
"Ustashi" separatist groups in
exile.
While the deposed Croatian
leaders, Miko Tripalo and Mrs.
Savka Dabcevic-Kticar, proved no
more capable of surviving Tito's
wrath than Djilas and Rankovic
were, they reflect a force that will
buffet Yugoslavia for years to
come.
memories of Tomislav, 'by jealoue:
rivalry with the Serbs and by. con.
flicting political theories.
- Some Croats want "pure" sep-
aratism, an idea harking back to
Tomislav. Others dream of a highly
autonomous political connection
with undefined western powers, a
concept reflecting the years of
Habsburg rule.
? ? ?
Among the majoritrlhat has ac-
cepted the reality and Arability ef
the Yugoslav state, differences re?
main over the degree of control :
from Belgrade that should be per-
mitted.
President Tb, perhaps realizing
this is an age of nationalism .from
Northern Ireland to the: Ukraine,
made major constitutional changes
last year to decentralize govern-
mental authority. It was a bold
move to appease jealousies within
Yugoslavia, and it may yet prove
to be a major achievement.
But as an instant defusing mech-
anism, the granting of greater
,powers to the various republics
just did not work.
Blaming Croatia's continuing
economic problems (one tenth of
its 4 million people have to go to
Western Europe to find work), na-
tionalist elements put forward es-
calating demands: complete control
of foreign currency earnings, a sep-
arate banking and marketing sys-
tem, a Croatian seat in the United
Nations and even a Croatian army.
Tito's response?mass arrests of
striking students, the firing of lead-
ing party and government figures.
the indictment of _eleven intellec-
uals on treason charges?reasserted
the cohesive power of the party
(and the army, if necessary).
Over the short run, popular sup-
port of the "Yugoslav Idea" will
regain strength in Croatia only if
there is economic recovery. Over
the longer run, mixed marriages
and common interests may erode
separatist sentiments. But It is a
process of decades, one that could
be accelerated only if the danger
of outside intervention becomee
Urgent.
? ? ?
The Croatian people, It must be
remembered, have clung to their
separate identity and heritage
through the vissitudes of centuries.
Soon after they migrated into the
Balkans they were in conflict with
the Vatican over the use of their
own language instead of Latin.
Then, In the year 925 A.D., Duke
Tomislav of the Dalmatian town of
Nin declared himself King of an
independent Croatia that remained
a major Balkan power until 1102
A.D. An imposing statue of Tomis-
lay astride a bronze horse can be
seen today outside the Zagreb rail-
way station.
After 1102, the Croats were never
fully independent again although
,they frequently enjoyed a high
degree of autonomy. Until the Six-
teenth Century the Hungarian mon-
archy held sway only to be re-
placed by the House of Habsburg
and Austrian influence. For con-
siderable periods, the Venetians
controlled Dalmatia and at one
point the Turks pushed within 35
miles of Zagreb.
During the Nineteenth Century,
while the Serbs alreadk were in the
process of gaining initOpendence
Croatian nationalism hills modern
form , took shape. It Ia a heady
phenomenon, marked by romantic
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972
SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN THIRD WORLD WATERS
Introduction
Until the mid-1960's the Soviet Union limited its approaches
to the Third World to diplomatic ties, economic and technical
assistance arrangements, military aid and training agreements,
trade relations and educational exchanges. The military power
factor was a relatively small part of the overall Soviet posture
and policy in its dealings with Third World areas. Only within
the past decade have the Soviets become more consistent in trying
to project military power into distant areas, and to do this they
have depended primarily on naval deployments.
Although the focus of this paper is mainly on the major buildup
of Soviet naval power and facilities, there has also been a spec-
tacular increase in the merchant fleet, making it the third largest
in the world. The USSR has likewise developed highly sophisticated
oceanographic ships which operate throughout the world, and it has
built up a tremendous fishing fleet, with an estimated total of
over 4,000 vessels, many of which frequently become involved in
international incidents because of illegal fishing operations within
territorial waters.
Along with this expansion in sea power, the Soviet Union and,
to a lesser extent, other East European Communist countries, have
been involved in developing ports and obtaining shipbuilding and
repair facilities in some twenty-five countries throughout the
world. Mast recently the USSR entered into a commercial agreement
with Malta which was signed on 27 December 1971. According to the
Soviet news agency, TASS, by terms of the agreement Soviet vessels
will be able to use drydocks in Valletta for repairs in return for
"definite payment," plus assistance in developing Malta's light
industry. In August 1971 TASS had reported that during talks between
Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff and Mikhail Smirnovsky, Soviet
Ambassador to London and Malta, Mr. Smirnovsky had promised "total"
Soviet support in "liquidating colonial domination and liberation:
from commitments imposed from outside." At stake in the Malta issue
is the balance of power in the Mediterranean which would be drastically
altered if the USSR were to acquire rights to the naval and air
bases located on the island.
The Mediterranean and Emt
The Mediterranean, especially the Middle East, is where the
Soviet Union has attained its greatest prestige and influence through
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a combination of diplomacy, trade, military and economic aid,
military advisors, the presence of some military personnel, and a
growing naval presence. In the Mediterranean it maintains a squadron
of SOM2 fifty surface ships and submarines, and an estimated 16,000
Soviet citizens are stationed in Egypt alone. Activities of the
Mediterranean Squadron are directed mainly against NATO naval forces
and the U.S. Sixth Fleet in particular. In these activities the
Squadron is in effect an extension of the Black Sea Fleet's defense
of the maritime approaches to the southern flank of the USSR. Since
the Soviet Union is also interested in extending the range of its
naval operations into the western Mediterranean, it is therefore
working to develop its relations with the North African states as
well as with Malta.
Moscow has concluded a number of arrangements for use of Egyptian
facilities, including repair facilities in Alexandria and storage
and billeting facilities in both Alexandria and Port Said. They make
more limited use of the port at Mersa MetrUh, which is still being
developed.
The Soviets have apparently not acquired other Mediterranean
port facilities similar to those they have in Egypt. Mbst of the
Soviet visits to the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and to the
Algerian ports of Algiers and Annaba have been brief, probably to
"show the flag" and to take on provisions and fuel. The geographic
location of Mers-El-Kebir in Algeria would be suitable for ships
operating in the western Mediterranean, but it is unlikely the
Soviets will obtain use of its facilities since the Algerians increas-
ingly oppose the presence of any great power fleets in the Mediterran-
ean. However, a small number of Soviet naval and technical personnel
are assigned to this base to assist the Algerian navy. Likewise,
Tunisia and Libya have accepted Soviet assistance in port construction
but have consistently refused Soviet requests for repair and refueling
facilities. Elsewhere, units of the Squadron make occasional formal
visits to the Yugoslav ports of Split and Kotor. Moscow has been
putting increased pressure on Tito for port and supply facilities at
Kotor, but to date Tito has steadfastly refused-
A number of anchorages are used by the Soviets in the Mediter-
ranean, ranging from one located in the area of Gibraltar, and used
by vessels in the western Mediterranean, to one south of the
Peloponnesus which is reported to be the principal eastern Mediter-
ranean anchorage for combat ships. Others are located off Tunisia's
east coast, one within Egyptian territorial waters, one near Malta
and two located in the area of Cyprus and Crete.
The Indian Ocean Fleet and Activity in Contiguous Waters
The Soviet Union's increased visibility in the Indian Ocean
includes not only its growing naval presence, first established in
1968 and now considered to have attained fleet status, but also its
civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for the Soviet fishing
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fleet and increased diplomatic and trade relations. There are more
ports open in the Indian Ocean than in the Mediterranean for short
naval visits and the frequency and duration of these have generally
increased. In the Gulf of Aden alone, Soviet naval units have made
at least six appearances since the British announced their intention
to withdraw. But the Soviets have not obtained access to or use of
facilities comparable to those available in Egypt or in Cuba. Naval
activity has apparently been limited to their port visits, "showing
the flag," hydrographic research and space support. There has been no
indication they engage in operational exercises to the extent they do
in the Mediterranean.
Other Soviet activity complementing the naval presence has been
important and includes the following: signing a friendship treaty
with India, in which they probably requested the use of naval facil-
ities; signing a trade agreement with Thailand; dispatching military
aid to Ceylon following the latter's insurgency crisis and also
signing a fishing agreement; negotiating with Singapore for use of
commeroial and perhaps port facilities; continuing to supply military
and economic aid to many countries in the area; extending their civil
air routes and increasing their fishing operations.
The Soviets' prompt use of expanding naval power was exemplified
by the fact that Soviet naval units began calling at Persian Cult ports
within three weeks after the British announced in 1968 that they
would withdraw from east of Suez by 1971. These deployments have
ranged from a single missile destroyer and a tanker of the Pacific
fleet to surface combat ships, submarines and auxiliaries from all
four Soviet fleets. They have made calls at Abadan, Kuwait, Basra
and Uthm Qasr. In this area Soviet activity in construction or
improvement of port and shipyard facilities has been most extensive
in irag* ports, where the leftist regime has favorably received
such aid.
Shore facilities along the Red Sea, at Aden, or along the coast
of the Horn of Africa would facilitate Soviet operations in the Indian
Ocean. Probably with the aim of obtaining these, the Soviets have
helped with the construction of port facilities at Berbera and
Mogadishu in Somalia, where it is also rumored they have obtained some
access to the port of Alula at the strategic tip of the Horn. They
have also been involved in similar activity in Aden where they are
known to have used the airfield in past years. It is not known,
however, if they have applied for permanent facilities in these
areas. The island of Socotra, belonging to Southern yemen, has been
reported used as a Soviet forward base because of its position near
the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.. So far, however, it appears that
nearby anchorages are being used more by the Soviets, and these are
in international waters. In Yemen, the port of Hodeida was built by
the Soviets in 1968-1969, but there are no indications that they
have actual port or other base facilities there.
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On the island of Mauritius, further south in the Indian Ocean,
Port Louis has been used for visits and supply purposes by Soviet
naval and space support ships. A recent fishing agreement will enable
Soviet fishing boats to use these facilities also.
So far the Soviets have been refused the right of unrestricted
access to shore facilities in India, although they are assisting in
the improvement of the east coast naval base at Vishakhapatnam.
Ceylon, with suitable facilities at Colombo and Trincomalee, would
also probably refuse such a request in view of Prime Minister
Bandaranaike's campaign to make the Indian Ocean a neutral area.
Through a 1971 fishing agreement, however, Soviet fishing boats have
access to the port of Colombo and the smaller port of Galle on the
southwestern coast. In Singapore, the Soviets have been trying for
over a year to gain access to important dockyards for naval and
merchant ships, but no firm agreement is known to have been reached.
Apparently, however, the Soviets have obtained permission for short,
informal naval visits to Singapore?
In addition to the anchorages in the vicinity of Socotra, which
are reported to be used frequently by both combat and support ships,
two or three other anchorages in the Indian Ocean are allegedly used
more by space support and hydrographic research ships.
West African Coast
Although sporadic Soviet naval operations off West Africa are
known to have started as early as 1967, for the past three years
Soviet ship operations have been related to political events: a
Soviet task force patrolled the Ghana coast in the spring of 1969
to effect the release of two Soviet fishing vessels that the Ghanaian
government had impounded. Since 1970, the date of an attempted
coup against Sekou Toure, the frequency, duration and conspicuousness
of naval ships visiting at Conakry has mounted to the point which
suggests the Soviets have now established a floating naval presence
off the Guinea coast. The vessels reportedly include one or two
destroyers, a landing ship and an oiler. There is no evidence that
Nbscow intends, or that Guinea would agree, to the Soviets' building
a naval base at Conakry or on the nearby islands, but both obviously
have a mutual interest in a standing Soviet patrol of Guinean waters.
In view of the Soviets' apparent success at having won entry
into Conakry, which they will certainly seek to consolidate and
expand, ?this will probably became a model for similar operations
along the African coast in the future. Already Soviet ships have
called at least twice at Freetown, Sierra Leone, the first time in
May 1971 when President Stevens claimed to fear a plot against his
regime. Since the Soviets have no strategic need for a naval base
on the West African coast, and the cost of operating such a base
would most likely outweigh any defense gains, their naval presence
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serves primarily their political aims of establishing and defending
Soviet interests in the area.
The Caribbean, Cuba and Latin America
After the missile crisis in 1962, Soviet naval activities in
the Caribbean were negligible until July 1969 when Soviet surface ships
and submarines begain to visit the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos, Havana
and Mariel. Although the purpose of these visits has been mainly
political, the ships had access to supply facilities and were known
to engage in a few basicexercises with Cuban navy ships. Nbst
recently a Soviet task force visited Cuba in late 1971. A repair and
supply facility for both surface vessels and submarines is known to
have been established at Cienfuegos, but to date the Soviets,
apparently aware of possible US. reaction, have been very careful as
to the type of ships which they deploy to the Caribbean and which use
the Cienfuegos facility. Other Soviet aims in the Caribbean are
similar to its aims elsewhere; to enhance its international prestige
and to improve its operational capabilities, Specifically, such
activity demonstrates Soviet support for Cuba and increases Soviet
prestige in Latin America where it doubtless sees, in the trend toward
radical nationalism, an element which will strengthen its position in
the area and, over a period of time, draw a number of countries into
a pro-Soviet posture.
In Chile, the former Christian Democratic administration of
Eduardo Frei was offered $50 million in credit by the Soviet Union
to modernize the port of Valparaiso, but as far as is known, that
credit has never been used. Nbre recently an agreement for use of
the port by fishing vessels was reportedly signed, and a similar
agreement has been drawn up with Peru,
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CPYRGHT
TIME
31 January 1972
Reaching for Supremacy at Sea
C INCE early in 1970. U.S. intel-
ligence experts have been partic-
ularly interested in satellite photos of
a ship with an exceptionally long keel
being constructed at the big Soviet
naval shipyard in the Black Sea port
of Nikolayev. In recent months, as
the hull began to take shape, the pho-
tos disclosed a number of significant
details?large shafts for elevators, huge
fuel tanks, a flattop deck. Last week
some Defense Department experts
were finally willing to make a striking
prediction: the Soviet navy, which for
years scorned U.S. attack carriers as
"floating coffins" and "sitting ducks,"
is now building one of its own.
The Pentagon's leak about the mys-
terious ship at Nikolayev was obviously
limed to coincide with President Nix-
on's request for more defense funds.
It is possible that the vessel, which is
about half complete, may turn out to
be a tanker or a big cargo freighter.
But some Allied naval experts are al-
ready willing to bet that the Pentagon
is right, and that the ship really is Rus-
sia's first attack carrier (it already has
two cruiser-sized helicopter carriers).
If so, the decision to build an attack
carrier represents a dramatic and fun-
damental shift in Moscow's naval strat-
egy, with profound consequences for
the rest of the world. "It changes the
whole ball game," says retired U.S.
Commander Robert Waring Herrick,
a onetime naval attache in Moscow
who wrote the authoritative book, So-
viet Naval Strategy. "It could be an
event of historical significance that
would change the entire mission of
the Soviet navy."
Throughout its rapid buildup dur-
ing the past decade, that navy has re-
mained basically a defensive force. Its
chief military mission has been to deny
the U.S. unrestricted freedom of the
seas, especially in waters within Polaris-
missile range of the Soviet Union,
and to limit U.S. options for inter-
vention in areas where the Soviets
also have an interest. A decision to
build attack carriers, however, would
shift the capabilities of the navy from
defense to offense. It would show that
the Kremlin is determined to extend
its own global reach by equipping its
navy with seagoing airpower that conic!
Alarming Rate. Even without a
carrier force, thc psychological and po-
litical impact of the Soviet navy is far
greater than its actual power and poten-
tial would warrant. In terms of firepow-
er and megatonnage, the other Russian
services are more awesome. Moscow's
arsenal of 1,510 nuclear-tipped ICBMs,
which outnumber the U.S.'s Minute-
men by 3 to 2, remains the major Rus-
si arf strategic threat. Its superbly
equipped army (2,000,000) is still the
biggest worry to the U.S. and its NATO
allies in Europe. Russian airpower,
which is continually probing the air de-
fenses of Western Europe and the U.S.
(Britain alone made 300 intercepts of
Red bombers last year), is developing at
a rapid and alarming rate.
On the world scene, though, the
Red fleet is the most dramatic and as-
sertive manifestation of Russian will
and determination to make its pres-
ence felt. Russian men-of-war are far
more visible symbols of national pow-
er than the barely visible contrails of
a high-flying jet bomber or the re-
mote exploits of a spaceflight. Though
the U.S. Navy still holds a sizable
edge over the Soviets in firepower,
technological prowess and mobility, the
Russians have cleverly managed to pro-
ject an image of rapidly shifting bal-
ance of naval power that has had a
sizable impact on much of the world.
Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, the deputy di-
rector of London's International In-
stitute for Strategic Studies, jokingly
taunts American friends by saying,
"Remember, you still have the second
most powerful navy in the world."
Moscow's naval buildup began in
1961 as a response to the U.S. de-
cision to deploy its Polaris subs with-
in missile range of major Russian tar- '
gets. It gained considerable momentum
after the Cuban missile crisis; the per-
formance of the U.S. Navy convinced
the Russians of the political and dip-
lomatic value of seapower. Under the
brilliant leadership of Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov (TIME Cover, Feb. 23,
1968), the Soviet navy has been able ,
to apply pressure on points that would
cause the U.S. the most political dis-
comfort. In less than a decade, for in-
stance, it has started a sweeping pin-
cers maneuver to outflank NATO on
contest the U.S.'s dominance at sea. both its southern and northern sec-
and more,yffilbias era of competitionasetlonn9WS3/62siat 1"DrhY?,11
antic numbering ose o
That coul cAgfitirewteptpitit flew. s
between the U.S. arid the Soviet NATO by a 6 to 1 margin, Denmark
Tin enn 4 gvs "in I ss
bus about continued membership in?
an alliance that In times of war could
hardly be expected to effectively pro-
tect them. In the Mediterranean. Mos-
cow's armada now outnumbers the
powerful U.S. Sixth Fleet, 61 ships
to 40. Not only are Turkey. Greece
and Italy uneasy, but Yugoslavia is
worried that in the event of a new out-
break of fighting in the Middle East,
the Russians might try to seize one of
its ports on the Adriatic as a base.
The strategic value of Yugoslavia as
a naval outlet for the Mediterranean
heightens the temptation for the Rus-
sians to intervene in that country's af-
fairs in the uncertain situation that
may well follow Tito's resignation or
death.
Russian warships are frequently at
anchor in Egyptian and Syrian ports,
in part to inhibit Israel from making
air attacks. The Russians are building
huge new naval facilities on the Egyp-
tian coast midway between Alexandria
and the Libyan border. In the event
of a new Middle East war, the Soviet
fleet might try to blockade Israel, cut-
ting it off from possible help from
the West?even though such an act
could mean a confrontation with the
Sixth Fleet. Moscow juStifies its loom-
? ing presence in the eastern Mediter-
ranean as a sign of its determination
to protect the developing nations from
imperialist machinations. Admiral
Gorshkov has declared that "the pro-
tection of the fraternal and peace-lov-
ing peoples of the Arab world is a
sacred mission of the Soviet navy."
At the Doorstep. In Washington's
eyes, a recent ominous development
in the Kremlin's naval strategy has
been the increase in the number of its
ships in the Persian Gulf and the In-
dian Ocean. Defense and State De-
partment officials believe that sooner
or later India, in return for support dar-
ing the Indo-Pakistani war, will allow
the Russians to construct port facil-
ities on its territory, as Egypt has
done. (The Indians, who are intensely
proud of their own muscular little
navy, have persistently denied any such
deal.) As a response to the expanding
Soviet presence, the U.S. announced
that units of the Pacific-based Seventh
Fleet would make more frequent pa-
trols of the Indian Ocean. That de-
9Uctovankfttnitiont) who fear
be lured away from its role as part of
Japan's defense. In additinn, _the la
CPYRGHT
u.s.
MEN 460, NAApprzymd IfEars
610,985 000
Attack carriers
umilimmoir
Helicopter and 10
support carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers, frigates 214
& destroyer escorts
4-momIMOININI
Nuclear-,powered
submarines
Destroyers, frigates
& destroyer escorts
Nuclear-powered
submarines
ralliara
Other submarines
diameadir 68
Landing craft
Other submarines
Landing craft
Torpedo and
missile boats
Torpedo and
missile boats
Fast and Young. In its style and IS comparable in size and speed to
e aS etrieni019102niCikApiRr1194119 tirn
KVORM2,Ssfmtiiry of, De-
might almost have been inspired by 1 Wthably dis-
close in testimony to Congress this
- week, the Soviets now have in com-
mission or under construction 42 Yan-
kees. They are adding new ones at a
! present annual rate of twelve a year
while the U.S. years ago leveled off
its Polaris fleet at 41. The Russians
are developing a new 3,000-mile un-
dersea missile that would require the
construction of an even larger sub. In
response to the Soviet buildup, Pres-
ident Nixon last week requested funds
from Congress for the start of de-
velopment of a 5,000-mi. undersea
missile called ULMS (for Undersea
, Long-Range Missile System). Russia's
desire to strengthen its position in un-
derwater missile-delivery systems is a
-major reason for the hick of progress at
. the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
Meanwhile, the Soviets arc engaged in
buildup of hunter-killer submarines,
which the Russians regard as the best
- weapon against the Polaris subs.
The emergence of Russia as an
ocean superpower has touched off a gi-
gantic global war game on the seas.
Sometimes the game is played with a
- dash of old-style chivalry and locker-
room humor. As the rival ships ma-
neuver, often coming within only me-
ters of one another, the commanders
exchange congratulatory signals on
smart seamanship and derogatory re-
marks on poor shows. "Gorshkov
wouldn't be impressed with that per-
formance," one Sixth Fleet captain re-
cently signaled to his counterpart after
a particularly awkward maneuver.
Sometimes close is too close, and, the
warning goes out: "You are interfering
with my right of freedom of the seas."
Crucial Factor. Russian ships of-
ten cut . across the bows of U.S. car-
riers as they launch and retrieve air-
craft, mostly to ?annoy and distract.
But they also come close to learn. As
a possible preparation for starting up
carrier operations of their own, the So-
viets have filmed hours upon hours of
U.S. and British carriers in action.
Last summer, a Soviet destroyer in
the Eastern Mediterranean was
rammed and badly damaged by the
British carrier that it was watching con-
dile( nighttime landings and takeoffs.
In time of peace (or at least of non-
war), the most important aspect of
the high seas game is surveillance,
which could be the crucial factor in vic-
tory or defeat if a real war broke out.
While the Russians deploy a larger sur-
veillance fleet of trawlers jampackcd
, with electronic gear, U.S. technology
is vastly far ahead of its rival's in the
highly sophisticated field of submarine
detection. Russian subs are what U.S.
Navy men call "clankers"; their "Mg-
: nature"?the distinct and definable
4.1?11bsigrai
Merchant fleet 14Merchant fleet
(millions of cl.w. lens) = (millions of d.w. Ions)
anese fear that the growth of Soviet
naval presence near the Chinese main-
land will spur Peking into building up
its own navy, and thus trap Japan be-
tween two naval powers hostile to
each other.
The most audacious challenge is
taking place almost literally on Amer-
ica's own doorstep. Five new Russian
subs are now stationed off the U.S.'s
East and West Coasts, their nuclear
missiles aimed at American targets.
During the past two years, Soviet task
forces, in conjunction with Cuban na-
val units, have conducted antisubma-
rine exercises in the Gulf of Mexico,
cruising at times to within 30 miles
of the U.S. coastline.
The Nixon Administration insists
that this naval presence in Cuba is
not permanent. But U.S. Navy com-
manders in the Caribbean believe that
the fleet will stay. The Russians have
built a modern logistics base at Cien-
fuegos on Cuba's south coast that in-
cludes three large docks, a deepwater
anchorage, repair facilities and, inter-
estingly, a radio tower for commu-
nicating with subs. Russian fishing
ships, merchantmen and oceanic re-
search vessels operate from other
Cuban ports. "In the 1970s," predicts
Robert A. Kilmarx of Georgetown
University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies, "we may expect
to see a Soviet naval presence in the
the Russians' most Relent
Caribbean undersea
the Soviet U ritAllioseitaleasee*S9 9/091102a ss euKeREIR19-0 11 Igagtitagatts.pisronpoelieerr
co
Mediterranean." kee in American navy parlance, which
the prophetic writings of the American
naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan
(1840-1914). who contended that sea-
power is essential to a nation's eco-
nomic well-being and political prestige.
Russia's new approach to the sea, more-
over, is not limited to building war-
ships. Its merchant fleet is now even
with the U.S. in tonnage. Its fishing
fleet, which is three times as large as
second-place Japan's, provides one-fifth
of the country's protein supply.
The Soviets have also built up an
oceanic research fleet of 200 ships
?larger than the combined research
fleets of all other maritime powers. In
nearly every major body of water,
their sea scientists are plumbing the
depths for data on currents, water tem-
perature and the sea bed that are
vital to fishermen and submariners
alike. Although responsible to different
chains of command, the commercial
and armed navies often work in tan-
dem. A visit to a neutral port by a Rus-
sian freighter, for instance, may be fol-
lowed by a request for docking priv-
ileges by a trawler fleet?then by the
flag-showing appearance of a rakish,
gray-hulled missile cruiser.
Russia's navy is divided into four
geographically grouped fleets?the Bal-
tic, the Northern, the Black Sea and the
Pacific?of 270 to 350 vessels each. It
is second in overall size only to that of
the U.S., and in some categories of
ships, it is far ahead (see chart). In gen-
eral the Russian ships?which range in
size from swift 83.7-ft. Komar missile
boats to the 19,200-ton Sverdlov cruis-
ers, no longer in production?are fast-
er and younger than the U.S.'s (an av-
erage of about eight years, v. about 18
for American ships).
Fleet for the '80s. The Soviets
are developing great momentum. At
present, they are outbuilding the U.S.
in naval vessels by the impressive ra-
tio of 8 to 1. In addition, major Pol-
ish and East German builders are pro-
ducing merchant ships for Russia, and
the Soviets have ordered others from
foreign yards from Japan to The Neth-
erlands. In the front-line, high-sea
naval squadrons, some classes of ship
are being replaced by more advanced
designs after only eight years of op-
erational duty. The Kresta II cruisers
(see picture box, next page), whose de-
sign is much admired by U.S. naval
architects, will apparently be replaced
in the near future by the smaller,
cheaper but more heavily armed Krivac
destroyers. "The Soviets," says British
Military Expert John Erickson, "are
building a fleet for the '80s."
That fleet will certainly include a
powerful armada of nuclear-powered,
missile-carrying submarines. Currently
than that of U.S. submarines. To the
CPYRGHT
01194A000200200001 2
great irritAPPAPIVOtifsigks, wnOSC
RQI 1
sonar-laden "fishing trawlers" period-
ically tear up international cables in
- an effort to find America's undersea lis-
tening devices, the U.S. has criss-
crossed parts of the ocean depths with
lines of supersensitive acoustic receiv-
ers that pick up, sub sounds (as well
as whale songs, grouper grunts, and
shrimp Crackles) and flash them to a
land-based central computer that can
? instantly identify the vessel's particular
signature.
In addition to the . cable systems,
which arc known as Sostis and Cae-
sar. the U.S. also tracks submarines
with sonar buoys dropped by aircraft
and floating robot platforms that ma-
neuver around the ocean surface. Cur-
rently under construction, at an initial
cost of $1 billion, is an even more so-
phisticated system called SAS (for Sus-
pended Array System). It consists of
a towering triangular frame, its three
legs situated ten miles apart. which
will rest somewhere in the Atlantic
on the abyssal plain, about 16,000 it.
below the surface, SAS will take ad-
vantage of the oceanic phenomenon
that sound travels vast distances hor-
izontally through the ocean's chilled
lower layers. With ultra-acute hydro- -
phones, which will be strung along its
structure, SAS will be able to detect sub-
marine noises in the deeper reaches
throughout the entire Atlantic. A sim-
ilar listening system is planned for
the Pacific.
Bird Farms. In the unlikely event
of an outbreak of war, which navy
would win? Many U.S. Navy men
are no longer so cockily confident of
America's overwhelming superiOrity.
Says one ranking naval officer: "Take
the Mediterranean.. If we lost those
two bird farms (attack carriers), we
would be in big trouble. It would be
the 5-in. gun [the U.S. destroyer's
basic weaponj against the 300-mile
cruise missile. Sure we might beat
them. But it is not certain, particularly
RR9199(Pc1,11-dclA,RTP7A.
Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller,
commander of the Sixth Fleet. is con-
siderably more optimistic. "I'm not
running for Gibraltar yet," he says. A
"brown shoe" admiral who still wears
his pilot's wings, Miller believes that
America's air superiority gives his fleet
a decisive advantage over the larger
Russian flotilla. The Sixth Fleet has
about 160 A-6 Intruder and Phantom
jets stacked aboard its two attack car-
riers, the John F. Kennedy and the In-
dependence. Miller's Russian counter-
part has only the limited aerial sup-
port of fighters and medium bombers
at airfields in Egypt.
Test of Will. In the event of war,
the Soviet navy would be a prisoner
of its geography. Ships that were not
already at sea might never get there.
, With the exception of the Northern
Fleet's base at Severomorsk near Mur-
mansk, the principal bases of the other
three fleets are located in tactically dif-
ficult positions. A few hundred well-
placed mines in the Kattegat and the
Dardanelles would serve to bottle up
both the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.
In addition to having shallow and of-
ten ice-clogged approaches, the Pacific
Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok is k
cated on the Sea of Japan, which has
only four narrow straits opening to
the Pacific and is relatively easy to
keep under surveillance.
The Soviet navy also has some se-
vere shortcomings as an offensive force.
In view of its growing global role, Brit-
ain's Erickson regards it as "over-
stretched." It badly needs air cover at
sea and more permanent and developed
bases near its new areas of operation.
Though it might be able to deliver a
powerful first blow, the Russian navy
still is basically a one-shot outfit that
would be virtually defenseless after it
had emptied its quivers of missiles
and torpedoes.
Admiral Gorshkov, who has run
the navy for 16 years?considerably
longer than the other service chiefs
?is trying to remedy these shortcom-
ings. Exactly how far the Soviet Union
is prepared to go in its quest for dom-
inance of the oceans will become more
evident after the mystery ship in Ni-
kolayev is completed. If it is indeed
an attack carrier, naval experts would
then feel that four to eight more must
be in the planning stage if each of
the major fleets is to enjoy the pro-
tection of seaborne aviation.
Even so, the carriers could not be
truly operational until the end of the
decade. It would probably take even
longer to acquire proficiency in the
complex business of running the float-
ing airfields. If the carriers are any-
thing like the ship at Nikolayev, they
are only in the 30,000-ton range. They
would be no match for the nuclear-
powered 75,700-ton Enterprise apd the
other big U.S. carriers.
Still, the creation of a carrier fleet
would be a test of Russia's intentions in
decades ahead. The cost of building
even one is so enormous and the re-
quirements are so taxing for the already
strained Soviet technological capacity
that this decision must have ranked in
the minds of the Soviet leaders as a
crucial and historic choice. Moscow's
political strategy holds that the out-
come of the struggle between capital-
ism and Communism will be decided
not by a clash between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union but by the ability of the
respective superpowers to create dis-
sent among their opponent's allies and
to exert influence upon the uncommit-
ted nations. Russian policy toward
Western Europe and Moscow's treaties
with Egypt and India seem to bear out
that theory. For the U.S. it would be a
stunning irony of the nuclear age if
such traditionally old-fashioned objects
as naval ships should serve as the force
that helped to tip the balance of power
away from the world's most technolog-
ically advanced nation.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
t/.5 RAVI
CPYRGHT
soviAPAtivieicMositei.crwtww. ontaii-10921,9-01194A000200200001-2
Bock to-back search radar
SAM control radar
SAM launcher
tietwopter
pod
Surveillance radar .
SAM control radar
Surtacelto-surface missile launcher
171.11. %Ow irs?b.
geik Ise 7,4 sos 41, 4.1.6"
Or ON A
ies Op Al 41.
A? tho Or
d's - 'strict& 1141* t A.. 40,? 4.
A A
AL ? A A - at. es; .104, %, doe;
SAM launcher
-
ma; I
ADEN with a fearsome array of
L missiles and electronic gear, the two
operational Krestei If-class guided-mis-
sile cruisers Felled the skill of Soviet
naval architects in muting the max-
imum punch in the smallest package.
Equipped to operate without long
range air cover, the 6.000-ton Kresta
II has a crew of 500 and a cruising
speed or 33 knots. It carries one pair
of surface-to-air missile launchers for-
ward and another aft, each pair with
its individual radar-guidance and lire-
control unit. Towering atop the Kres-
The Sailor's Life
ta II is its big Top Sail surveillance
radar, designed to spot enemy ships
and planes. One back-to-back search
radar unit tracks targets for Kresfa
Il's principal weapons: eight t surface-to-
surface missiles housed in tubes on ei-
ther side of hc ship's bridge. The
missiles reportedly have a range of
150 miles anc can carry either con-
ventional or nuclear warheads. On a
landing platform aft, the Kresia It
can accommodate two helicopters,
which arc used' for submarine detection
and act as tar#t spotters for missiles.
THE life of the average Soviet sailor?at least by com-
parison with that of his counterpart in the U.S. Navy
?is austere, uncomfortable, constrained and boring.
Some U.S. experts feel that if American sailors had to
live under the same conditions, they would all mutiny.
Despite the sleek, functional modernity of their
lines, Soviet ships are not designed for living. Ar-
maments and electronic equipment take up all avail-
able space, and 20 Russians must hang their hammocks
in quarters that would house ten U.S. sailors.. Few Rus-
sian ships have air conditioning. Thus vessels on duty
in tropical waters are frequently rotated not so much
for maintenance as to provide relief for "roasted crews."
At the bitterly cold bases of the Northern and Pacific
fleets in Murmansk, Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Pen-
insula, crews spend uncomfortable winters ashore in
badly heated, uninsulated barracks.
Nonetheless, Soviet sailors are among the elite of
Russia's armed services, ranking in prestige with the
men of the missile forces. Although there are periodic
shortages of staple foods in Russia, sailors have a plen-
tiful but monotonous diet of borsch, meat, potatoes,
bread, butter and tea, supplemented by vitamin pills to
make up for the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables, chance to visit foreign lands on shore leave, but even
The base pay of a seaman is six rubles per month then their liberty is severely restricted. Sailors travel in
(about $7). Sailors on duty at northern bases get an ad- groups of six while ashore, under the supervision of an of-
ditional two rubles per month, and base pay is doubled ficer; seldom do they have enough money for anything
for submarine crews. A specialist, like a sonar tech- more than the price of a sandwich and a bus trip back
nician, earns about $10 per month, a chief warrant of- to port.
ficer about $55, a lieutenant $65 and a captain $135, Aboard ship, the sailor is even more subject to dis-
which is doubled if he commands a ship. There are enor- cipline and ideological indoctrination than his civilian
mous differences between the life-styles and privileges brothers at home. "Recreation time" is filled with Corn-
of the various ranks. Officers above the rank of corn- munist Party lectures, propagandistic books and films.
mander, for instance, are provided with housing near TV shows visible in foreign ports are often banned as
bases for their families; enlisted sailors?mostly three- "corrupting." Ashore or at sea, the sailors' activities are
year conscripts who quit the service for jobs at home closely watched by the ship's zampolit (political of-
when thqir enforced tqui? are gndcd?get neither a hous- flee r) a combination cheerleader, disciplinarian and f a-
ing nor Aipligif WiMalieGfr imeased 999/09/02 :tlethOPIRDP7890111194A000201000Gtinin,
Unlike most of their countrymen, the sailors get a with full authority to punish any wayward salt.
RUSSIAN SEAMEN RELAXING ABOARD CRUISER
4
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200897GHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 February 1972
.7r 0 o
J /11? ilfaT
?AL A 2:7.5 eltratePTIC paWe? pagltiOn
? It .4:J)
Bandar Abbas, Iran
? Big-power naval politics, in the wake of
the Indo-Pakistani war. and Britain's with-
drawal from the Persian Gulf, have moved
this subtropical port into the spotlight of
strategy.
Iran's 1p00-man Navy ? already the
strongest ia the gulf and now building a
strike force of destroyers, frigates, and
hovercraft ? will shortly move its main
headquartefs here from Khorramshahr,
1,500 miles to the north on the Shatt al-Arab
river boundary with Iraq.
Up to now these subordinate naval head-
quarters have kept watch on the gulf islands
and on the area beyond in the Gulf of Oman,
adjoining Pakistan'.
- The impending move of the main Iranian
naval headquarters here from Klierrarn-
shahr, where it is within rifle shot of Iraqi
territory, reflects more than just the peren-
nial and recently sharpened Iraq-Iran ten-
sions.
Clearly a shift
It is clearly a shift in the entire center of
gravity of Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi's cld(ense effort southward toward
.the Strait of tIformUz?through which more
than half the Western world's oil supplies
must 'pass?and toward the Indian Ocea.n,
Where tar& American and Soviet fleets have
been watching one , another since Decern-
ber's Inclopkistani war.
.' ObServett,. here:believe the next Iranian
port to bd developed will be the (excellent
natural h4rbor of Shah Bahr on the Ara-
bian .Sea (theta htitidred miles from the
Pakistan border.... ???????
Iranian ?Officcia .ih this booming city of
:70,000?where Iran is using its huge oil
revenues to build an air and naval base.
low-cost tesusing for the growine labor
force, and-twill soon begin a naval dockyard
?are well aware of the new emphasis,
But therOseems to be no feeling here of
an impending Arab-Iranian clash or of any
other emertency in the Persian Gulf area.
"We are wit. particularly worried just now
about an eticiny getting control of Oman,"
said one ollicer. .
Xs:lands occupied
One reason for Iranian self-confidence is
recent Iranian possession of the islands of
Abu Musa and Big and Little Tunb, west '
of here. Iranian marines occupied Abu
Musa and 13ig Tunb despite a wave of-Arab
protest and Iraqi diplomatic action.
cilaliT.1:404#0001104Ktelt99/09/02
5
In the gulf. Formerly, our 12-mile territorial
waters exi.ended Oulwant trom our coastime
and au, ,,aa..1 eat( 1,51a such as L+a-
vancma, Farur, and Iiindarabi.
"Now, the chann*el between Qeshm Island
and the outer islands, Abu Musa and the
two Tunbs, has become indisputably Iranian
territorial waters.
"Of course, the right of innocent passage
by all ships through these waters is recog-
nized. But this does not include warships,
for which there have to be special clear-
ances and arrangements."
Statements studied
The Shah's government has been care-
iully studying U.S. and Bahraini stateme
about U.S. naval rights in Bahrain. In an
exchange of letters, the Sheikh of Bahrain
agreed with Washington to continue port
facilities extended to U.S. naval unit:
during the last 25 years, while Bahrain was
under British protection. Bahrain denies
that it granted the U.S. any new base
rights since it became independent last
year.
? U.S. officials repeatedly have been assur-
ing Iran and Arab governments that Wash-
ington has no wish to take over Britain's
former senior naval and political role here.
These assurances were given formally by
the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of State
for the Near East and South Asia, Roger
' Davies, during a gulf tour in December,
shortly after Iran's occupation of the three
outer islands.
Settlement urged
Diplomatic sources say he urged a dis-
creet diplomatic settlement of the disputed
three outer islands. U.S. overtures were
made to Iran and, through Saudi Arabia, to
the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which
claims the Tunb islands.
Washington also reportedly proposed its
good offices in settling an old dispute over
:he Buraimi oasis area, which is partitioned
between Oman and Abu Dhabi, but also
claimed by Saudi Arabia.
Sultan Qabbus of Oman visited King Fai-
sal of Saudi Arabia in late December. They
announced agreement in principle on Burai-
mi. But the United States is reportedly re-
placing the British in representing Abu
Dhabi in detailed talks to follow, to the an-
noyance of Saudi Arabia.
The senior U.S. diplomatic mission in the
gulf area is the Embassy in Kuwait. A new
Embassy in Bahrain is headed by U.S.
charge d'affaires John Tatch. The U.S. Em-
bassy to the new six-state Federation of
Arab Emirates will he in its capital Abu
: CIA-Rbla791-0,t
Dhabi and a ecmitimo4
404
Oman.
1-2
poroyed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
NUSANT 'ujakarta
28 January 1972
ARAB LANDS SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIET UNION
By A.H. Shahab
CPYRGHT
? "Egypt will not go comMunist and we will strangle any effort to bring
the communist-party.to life." This was what an Egyptian diplomat told me
in Djakarta. This statement by the diplomat is. indicative of Egypt's
annoyance, for Egypt feels that its lack of success in winning the war
against Israel is due to the hesitant attitude of the Kremlin.
The general attitude in the Arab world toward the role played by the
Soviet Union was quite evident following the India-Pakistan war, for nearly
all of the Arab press criticized the "policy of imperialistic intrigue"
of Mbscow. ?
"Russia is an aggressor and opposes Islam" -- this was the title of
. articles and editorials in the. dailies AnNadwah; \1-Madinah, and'AlBilad,
which are published in Saudi Arabia.
Setback
.Soviet diplomacy really experienced a setback following the abortive coup
d'etat in the Sudan (1971) and the large-scale arrests of Communist leaders
in Syria by General Hafes Asad at the end of 1971. The failure of the
. communists in the Sudan was followed by the suppression of communist elements
not only in the Sudan but also in Libya, North Yemen, Morocco', and in Egypt --
Where there was also an attempted pro-Nbscow coup d'etat under Ali Sabry.
The most diligent anti-communist is Prime Ndnister Muammar Qaddafi, who
has prohibited, the circulation of a communist book defaming Islam which was
written by Klimovich. Last year Qaddafi convened the Conference of Islamic
Scholars. Here he said, "Our religion,. Islam, is far more progressive than
communism. Islam was teaching the fulfillment of life and the happiness of
. man long before Mark. We do not need communism, or another party which is
obedient to a foreign power."
Faisal's Victory
When between 1960 and 1967 the Kremlin wind blew across the barren
stretches of the Arab Sahara and heated the minarets of the mosque, Faisal
constantly declared that danger lay in the Soviet role in the Arab world.
Official voices in Saudi[Arabia declared, "Russia will not bring victory to
the Arabs but to communism in the Arab ,world."
Now, one by one, the Arab states Are encountering disappointment in
their relations with the communist bloc. Some, like Iraq, Egypt, and
Algeria, have had hitter experiences in the industrial sector because of
accepting machinery of poor quality. Some have been subjected to political
pressure: Egypt was pressed to free or at least change the sentences of the
Ali Sabri--Fawzy conspirators who plotted to overthrow Sadat.
The rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has resulted in warm'
relations between the two countries and now Egypt is more active in Islamic
conferences than in leftist conferences. Even more, the E Ae tiamysfs and
publtIppriiitedaF003ilielagem$999i0N92agtRagg9tifilit
Pi l! with401-2
religious tenor are being produced.
6
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200Mq9NT
Anti-Islam Campaign
h0111.e two or three months ago the dailies in Saudi. Arabia exposed Soviet
attacks on Islam, covering both the Moscow broadcasts which.defame Islam and
also the condition of the Moslem population behind the Iron Curtain.
For some time most of the press in Saudi Arabia has paid little attention
to the condition of the Moslem population behind the Iron Curtain, but now
articles on this subject appear regularly. Soviet dailies, like the Turkmen-
skaya Iskra, which attacks Islamic principles, are opposed. The dailies 'An-
NadWah and Al-Madinah have revealed how Moslems are pressured and forced ET
leave the Islamic religion.
The young prime minister of Libya certainly was angry when Soviet books
defaming Islam were circulated in his country. This colonel said, "We don't
need communism."
Trapped
The Soviet naval forces and fleet are making the Mediterranean into their
own lake, and they are not having much difficulty in doing it. One of the
recipes they use is: Maintain tension and don't reach a settlement in the
Middle East. The existence of a state of permanent tension has lured several
Arab countries into obtaining aid, but the fact is that this aid is for (the
Soviets) themselves. The Arab countries are beginning to realize this even
though it is rather difficult to change overnight, although Algeria and Libya
did succeed early on in freeing themselves from the Soviet trap and dared to
say, "Soviets, leave the Mediterranean."
Anwar El Sadat, a pragmatist, gradually is loosening his ties with, the
Kremlin and has begun purging his apparatus of pro-Moscow-men'even though, he
still needs weapons from the Kremlin because, until now', it is his only source
of supply.
Alab Tjurigai Sovjet Uni
A.H. SHAHAB:
CPYRGHT
"Mesir tak akan djad) komu Setback.
nis dan apabila adv. usaha Diplomasi Soviet benar2 me
rnenghidupkan partai komunis ngalami Setback, setelah usa-
akan kita tjeltik". demikian ha kudeta gagal di Sudan
berkata seorang diplomat Mr (1971) dan pentangkapan besar2
sir pad?a saja di Djakarta. an terhadap pentolan komunis
Utjapan diplomat itu menggam di Syria oleh Djenderal 1-infes
barkan kedjenkelan Mesir L.; Asad diachir tahun 1971. Ke
selama mi merasa dirinja tak gagalan kau.m komunis di Su
berhasil memenangkan peran.g clan diikuti dengan penindasan
terhadap Israel, disebakkan Si' anasir komunis ,bukan hanja
kap ragu2 Kremlin. . di Sudan tetapi djuga di Libya
Sikap umum didunia Arab Jaman Utara,' - Marokko dan
terhadap peranan tint Soviet Mesir, jang djuga mengalami
terasa seltall setelah perang pertjobaan kudeta pro-Moskow
India-Pakistan, ?dimana ham, dibawah All Sabry.
pir senma pers Arab menglcri
tik "politilt intri kimperialistis"
Moslcow.
"Rusia agressor dan anti Is
lam" dernikian djudui berita2
dan tadjuk rentjana harian
? Jang paling getol anti-komn
nis adalah PM Muammar Qad
duff, jang melarang bereclarnja
buku komunis karangan klime
vich jang menghina Islam. Pa
d,a tahun jang lalu Qadclafi
An-Naciwah, Al-Madinah dan inenjelenggralcan Muktamar
Al-BiIad jang Approve4lForfte4ease4999/09102a:
Arabia. berkata : "Agama kita,
cljauh lcbith progressif .darina
da komunisme. Islam monga
cljarkan kescmpurnaan hidup,
kebahagian ummat ?djauh sebe
lum Marx. Kita tak butuh lto
munisme, atau partai lain jang
taut pada kekuatan asing.
Kemenangan
Ketika antara 1960-19,07,
Angin Kremlin menghembusi
padang sahara Arab jang ger
sang dan membuat menara2
Mesdjid mendjadi gerah, Fai-
sal terus tak henti2nja menja
taltan bahwa peranan Sovjet
didunia Arab adalah berbaha
ja. Suara2 resmi Saudi Arabia
rnenjatakan bahwa : "Jang
akan dimenangkan Rusia bu-
katilali Arab, melainkan- Itoniu
nisme diciunia Arab".
Kini satu demi satu negcri
Arab mengalami pengaltamnn
caatiiik9IMAXixia
laman pahit dibidang indusiri,
ripngarr n-trn.arirng rnecin9 ignr
djelek ? kwalitasnia separli
Irak, Mesir clan Alcijazair. Ada
jang menerima tekanan2 non
tik seperti Mesir, jinn! ?clitylcan
agar memlyibaskan atau paUng
tidak merubah hukuman lerha
dap Icomplotan jang alt:nn
menggulint-r,kan Sadat dibawah
komplotan Ali Sabri-Pawzv.
Ranrocherne.n Mesr-Satidi,
rnembut hubu.ngan lce(l'ua nrtqa
ra hil mesra don Mesir kini
lebih giat dalam muktamar2
Islam darirada muktamar2 jg
berbau kin. Malahan pars dan
'penerbitan2 Mesir kini barials
dihiasi tartikel agama rta
jproduksi filmnja penuh sclera
keagamaan.
Kampanje anti-Islam.
Kira2 dua tiga bulan 'hula
kangan mi harian2 Saudi Ara
okimbur4et t
gungekririci pk aan
he
Ir-
lam. Balk bcrupakan siarrin2
MrvArrvur inn?. .mnr,g1lin,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R0P79-01194A000200200001-2
CPYRGHT
itaupun kea dam ummat Ts1rn-
ang berada dibelakang tirai
lesi.
Sedjak lama. urnumnia per
5audi -Arabia talc begitu meng
airaukan keadaan ummat Is-
arn dibelakang- tircl besi. na
mun kini setjara perioclik kca
(lama ummat IsIrm mendiacli.
topic. Harian2 Sovjet seperti
"Turkmenskaya Iskra" jang
menjerang akidah2 Islam, dila
wan.- Marian An-Nadvrah dan
Al-Marlinth mengungkapkan
11,-telms?na keaclaan Muslimin
ditCcan clan dipaksakan tmtuk
meninggalkan agama Islam.
Kernan saclia PM Libya jang:
mucla marah2 ketilca dinegeri?
nja ,disebarkan buku2 Sovjet;
jang ? menghint: Islam dan ber
katalah kolonel itu : "Kita tak
butuh komunisme".
Terdjebuk.
Koltuatan taut Soviet dan
madmija mendjadikan lautan.
Tengah sebagai danaunja, dgn
tak banjak usaha atau bersti
Sala pajah. Salm resep clipakai
nia adalah : "relihara kete-
gangan tanpa penjelesatan di
Timur Tengah". Dengan .ada-
nja ketegangan penmanen, ma
Ica dlcuiratnja beberapa negeri
Arab untuk mendapatkan ban
tuari, tetapi njatanja bantuan
itu hanjalath bunt dirinja sen
din. Dan negara2 Arab mulai
,menjadari mi, walaupun agak
nia sukar untuk merubah se-
kaligus, ketjuali misalnja Al-
cljar.air dan Libya jang sudah
Ingi2 berhasil melormsken rh
ri dari diebskart Sovjet clan
berani berkata : "Soviet ting:.
galkartlah Lautan Ten gab".
Anwar El Saciat jang MCrli
pakan orang pragmatis, setlara
berialrap mengcndorkan ikat-
an2 dengan. Kremlin, dimuall
clenrian pembersihan aparatur
dan i orang2 pro Moskow, na-
num dia masih buttth sencliata
dari Kremlin karena hinega
nt masih merupaltan satu2nJti
sumber.
NEW YORK TIMZS
17 January 1972
CPYRGHT
Warships at Latakia Upset
Shipping and Arab Trade
tpwai o ne Neve Yora Toles
BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jan. 16?
A visit by units or the
'fleet in the Mediterranean to.
.the Syrian port of Latakia has
played havoc with Arab trado
and affected international_ ship-
ping in this area.
Since late last month, two
Soviet destroyers, two cruisers,
a submarine and a supply ship
have been taking up much of
the space in the small Latakia
Harbor, forcing Syrian authori-
ties to turn away gome privatel
shipping and to divert other
vessels tn neighboring Lebanon,'
to the already congested port
of Beirut.
Foreign owners of the af-
fected ships have complained
that the situation has upset
RUSSIANS PROLONG.
SYRIAt PORT GALL
their worldwide selicaules aria
aused costly delays. According
bo shipping sources, the situa-
tion for the companies has been
rendered worse by the fact that
die Syrian authorities have said,
Ii reply to inquiries, that they
o not know how long the So-
?ief naval craft intended to
rc-
iiai i in Latakia.
Pr Mous Visits Were Shorter
Ti the past, such visits (lid
not last more than five days.
ionte diplematic sources have
?ep nted that the Soviet units
on the currtnt port call are either
in6Tgoing repairs or buying
monlies from Syria for the rest
)f the winter.
'like Egypt, has been
no riding, Soviet warships in the
ViefliterrNnean with facilities at
ler ports in part payment for
5o% let .assistance, including
we: pons,
The Beirut port authorities
tat e accepted the extra business
thaL has come their way, but
sinx diverted hero from Lata-
kia have had to dock outside
tile pier ared kind ..1. their
turn. Workers and officials at
the port have been put on dou-
ble shifts to accommodate the
added work load.
Most of these ships are bring-
ing commodities from Europe'
or the United States for Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf countries. Diversion of the
unloading from Syria to Leba-
non means extra transit costs
and delays for the Arab im-
porters.
Meanwhile, press reports to-
day told of the arrival here of
40 Chinese Communist business-
men to promote commodities
from their country In Lebanese
and Arab markets.
According to the reports, the
Chinese will form a commercial
community in advance of the
establishment of an embassy
representing the Peking Gov-
ernment here. The embassy is
expected to be functioning
either at the end of this month
or early next month. An agree-
ment in November establishing
diplomatic relations between
CPYRGHT
luLo..),,ft and Ch"
'months as a deadline for set-
tin up embassies.
4 '1 ? y
? Latakia"
SYRIA
*Horns
eDanzscus
ielsradkowpia.
tynAct.
Tho Now York Thou/Jan. 11. T472
Visit to Latakia (1) by
Soviet ships has diverted
port traffic to Beirut (2).
THE ECONOMIST
15 January 1972
A vacuum that's
filling up fast
CPYRGHT
The Americans may have rescued Mr
Heath from his problem about selling
arms to South Africa. The American
Aircraft-carrier Enterprise and its seven
attendant !hips, which sailed into the
Indian Ocean during the India-
Pakistan wgEknoroxirtej RCI rtirriTR:e woo
3tviiuLIi I Lt iii hc p
S woo
But on January 7th it was announced
that thel Enterprise had gained
" operatin ' experience " in the Indian
Ocean ai1 that there would be fre-
quent pa 'ols of the same sort in the
future..Tlip Seventh Fleet already had
q bin sliy. of the eastern part of the
maigwava; A IAA D !V&A, *1
domain. But last summer, it is .said
It was decided to extend its responsi
bilities (rim the start of 1972 up to
line drawn due south from the western
border of Pakistan.
For a long time the United State
has had three warships operating ou
94401002Mo sit_pahrain in tlw
u , dnJ t at lhl..itin *i d
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020020094AGHT
pendent the Americans have nego-
tiated a new agreement to allow them
to stay on. The Americans have already
leased from Britain the tiny atoll .of
Diego Garcia, plumb in the middle of
this vast ocean, and are busy building
a communications centre and airstrip
which are due .to be finished late next
ear, The difference from now
on is that the: Seventh Fleet will pre-
sumaltiv send some of its ships into
the Indian Ocean whenever it feels
that the gap between the size of the
Russian Beet there and that of the
western navies is getting dangerous...
According to American intelligence
sources, the Russians now have some
15 combat and support ships in the
area, and an unknown number of.
submarines, against the five or six'
British frigates which are based in
Singapore along with one Australian
and one New Zealand frigate and an
Australian submarine.
Australia is building a fairly sub-
stantial base at Cockburn Sound on
its west coast, which will be com-
pleted by 1975. There .are also several
airfields in western Australia that mari-
time reconnaissance planes can operate
from. So eventually Australia will be
able to make a sizeable contribution to
the defence of the area even if Mr
Cough Whitlarn's Labor party does
win this year's eleotion and fulfil its
promise to withdraw the Australian
share of the force in Singapore. But
in the shorter run it is the new Ameri-
can, contribution that will cancel out
the Russians' advantage.
With the Seventh Fleet coming in
reinG,ree the British rciursdre..
Singapore, the Russians will no longer
have local naval superiority unless they
greatly expand their presence in the
:Indian Ocean. This makes it less
necessary for the British to rely on the
co-operation of the tiny and increas-
ingly ?ancient South African navy.
Anyway,- in December South Africa
placed orders for the hulls of six cor-
vettes to be built in Portugal that
will keep the South African navy going
for some years. But the unpalatable fact
is that the weakness of the British?
and the other Europeans?has made
. it necessary for the United States to
redress the balance of power in the
Indian Ocean at a time when most
Americans want to limit their com-
mitments abroad, not expand them.
WASHINGTON POST
2 February 1972
CPYRGHT
U.S. Seeking Indian Ocean
aval Cm's
By William Greider
The Nixon administration has approached the Soviet
Union about arranging a mutual limit on naval arma-
ments in the Indian Ocean, a top State Department of-
ficial disclosed yesterday.
Without providing any details, Under Secretary of
State U. Alexis Johnson assured the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee that the'
U.S. government has no inten-
tion of competing over mill-
tary installations on the South
Asian subcontinent, compar-
able to what has occurred in
the Mediterranean.
Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-
Ark.), chairman of the commit-
tee, asked Johnson: "Has your
department ever approached
the Russians concerning mu-
tual restraint on the naval
race in the Indian Ocean?"
"We have made such an ap-
proach," Johnson said. "There
have been discussions."
Johnson added that, while
the United States will continue
to keep its navgyfiskeewed
Ing through the WonnlOfcean
regularly, "We do not plan a
regular presence in the Indian'
Ocean. ... We have no inten-
tion of engaging in competi-
tion or maintaining a regular
force."
The question arose out nf
the Senate committee's fear
that the United States is again
inching into major new de-
fense commitments via "exec-
utive agreements" which are
not submitted to the senate
for ratification as treaties.
The hearings yesterday and
today focus on two new agree-
ments for U.S. military facili-
ties, one with Portugal to
renew an airbase on the
Azores and another to estab-
lish naval support facilities on
the oil-rich island of Bahrain
in the Persian Gulf. Johnson,
in his testimony, insisted that
both were properly handled as
executive agreements because
neither involves any new
Ainerican defense commit
-
significant foreign policy
moves. They both involve the
stationing of American mili-
tary forces abroad. As we have
learned in the past, this can
lead ultimately to war."
Case is sponsoring a Senate
resolution which would call pn
the President to submit both
issues to the Senate as treat-
ies. , This represents a new
round in the Senate's continu-
ing struggle, so far largely un-
successful, to regain control
over foreign commitments
under its constitutional au-
thority to ratify treaties.
Last year, the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee challenged a
new agreement on U.S. bases
in Spain. In recent years, the
committee has scrutinized se-
cret executive agreements
with Asian nations and their
close relationship to the con-
duct of the war in Vietnam.
2t T Johnson u ed
ien r
For Release 1999/09/0gelAifPP9414%A0e&Yeastptd;at-
rain k agreements are es.sen-
9 N.J.) warned, however, that tially continuations of current
both Azreentents drenresent
u.o. practices anti nut witmn
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999109/02 ? rIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
the President' constitutional,
authority as commander-in-
chief to arrange for troop fa-
cilities.
Sen. Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.)
asked Johnson if this means
the President can station
troops anywhere in the world,
without consulting the Con-
gress, and the diplomat
replied: "The powers are very.
broad. I would not like to be
quoted as saying they are un-
limited. At the same time, I
would not want to say where
those limits are."
Fulbright remarked testily,
I"For practical purposes, that
amounts to?he can do any-
thing he likes. You don't want
to say that because it won't
look good in a headline."
The Bahrain agreement,
Johnson said, was necessary
because the United States for-
merly "subleased" docking
and supply facilities from the
British who are terminating
their protective military pres-
ence in the sheikdom. Now the
United States is continuing
the arrangement for a "mod-
est naval presence" directly
with the Bahrain government
but he stressed "we have no
ihtention of replacing the Brit-
ish in the area. We are not in-
creasing our force."
Sen. Fulbright portrayed
the arrangement as the begin-
ning of another costly round
of escalation in which, now
that the United States has es-
tablished a base, the Soviets
will follow, and then the
'United States will seek to out-
do the Russians. "What do we
gain by this constant escala-
tion?" he asked. "I don't think
we gain anything in security.:
All we do is deplete the Treas-
ury."
Johnson was asked what'
would happen if U.S. person-
nel stationed in Bahrain were
attacked by nationals there))
and he replied: "If trouble!
were to break out on Bahrain
and oUr personnel , were:
threatened, the thing to do!
would be to put them on a
ship and sail away."
WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1972
CPYRGHT
U.S. Squadron Leaves
The Indian Ocean Area
A carrier-led naval task
force that maintained a strong!
,U.S. presence in the Indian
lOcean for nearly a month dur-
ing the India-Pakistan war I
steamed out of the area yes- f
terday, the Pentagon an-
nounced.
Defense spokesman Jerry
W. Friedheim said the nine- .
ship squadron, including the
nuclear-powered carrier Enter-
prise, has "returned to normal
operating control of the com-
mander, Seventh Fleet."
He said the Enterprise is
'due to arrive Wednesday at
Subic Bay in the Philippines
where the crew will be given
five days of liberty after
spending two months at sea.
Last week the 'Pentagon in-
dicated that the visit of the En-
terprise marked the beginning
of regular U.S. naval opera-
? tions in the Indian Ocean.
This is something that has
been urged by U.S. naval lead-
ers ever since 'the British
began pulling out and the Rus-
sians sent their first naval
' squadron into the area more
than three years ago.
The departure of the Enter-
prise came rather suddenly.
As of Friday, "they had not
been directed to move," Fried-
heim said. Asked why, he re-
plied, "liberty for the crew.'
Friedheim said 15 to 20 So-
viet ships remain in the In-
dian Ocean, including five or
I' six combat vessels. The Sovi-
ets normally maintain 10 or 12
, ships in the area. ?
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 January 1972 .
WUU?? lake?
By Paul Wohl
CPYRGHT
Tim &via inediu ure avcusing he United
States of gunboat diplomacy and of trying to
turn the Indian Ocean into an American
, lake.
From recent Russian naval movements,
however, it would appear that it is. Moscow
that regards the Indian Ocean as a Soviet'
lake.
On Dec. 29, Hsinhua, the official Chinese
news agency, reported, "When the Ameri-
can aircarft carrier Enterprise and some
other warships of the 'United States Seventh,
Fleet appeared in the Bay of Bengal, the So-4
viets countered by moving cruisers and
'other warships of their Pacific fleet also into
the Bay."
Approved For Relea
'Intelligence gathering ;fishing, is are their large factory ships
The Soviet Pacific Fleet is not normally in 'in proceising the catch. But since every
the Indo-China area, so the new units must ,economie activity of the U.S.S.R. is directed
have come from the China Sea ser ..:ral thou., by the state, it is only natural that the
sand miles away. Thus it would appear that fishing tiffpt acts as an auxiliary to naval 1n
the Russians must have had advance knowl- telligened operations.
edge and have reacted with surprising The Soviets also have had, and still
speed. ? have, several oceanic scientific research 1
The mobility of the Soviet fleet and its ships in the Indian Ocean. These, too, prob.
'
speed of communications may have its ably are used for naval intelligence.
explanation in the presence in the Indian ( According to the Chinese news agency, '
Ocean of naval vessels disguised as fishing. the Soviet Union in 1968 purchased from ,
trawlers. India against delivery of the number of air. 1
For several years, -the Soviets have been craft a right for their naval vessels to use '
reaping the fish riches of the Indian Ocean. ithe ports of Madras and Bombay. In ex. ,
gVii 9 rine/Aim migyet ini MA tibraiblp use. India's naval '
ileilso gave several
x7;Mr';':1311111PAPrtiNiTriftwarmfA n r uvA iTt It Few JI/14611qt.fi !!,'
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020020000Y-P2YRGHT
? naval ships to India,
Moscow makes no bones about its interest
in the Indian Ocean, Last year, the cruisers
of the Soviet Pacific fleet carried out a
naval exercise there. Earlier, Adm. Sergei
G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Navy, said, "Our ships sail in the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans . ?
wherever it is required by the interest of
otir country's security."
A political chief of the Soviet Navy, Adm.
,Vladimir A. Kasatonov added defiantly on
Navy Day that "the flag of the Soviet naval
forces is today flying in all latitudes, even
on waters traditionally considered as pre
serve of the British and American navies.'
Now that Britain no longer controls the
most convenient access to the Indian'
Ocean-..through the Suez Canal and by way
of Singapore?the Indian Ocean for all prac-
tical purposes has become an open sea.
Its coastlands which once were in the,
Western orbit now are held largely by third-
world countries. China, as well as the Soviet,
Unioti, has begun to establish strong points
along its shores.
The Indian Ocean carries more traffic'
than the North Atlantic. The defense of its
supply lines is thus vital for the West.
Naval visits
For the past six years units of the Soviet
Black Sea and Pacific fleets have appeared .
from time to time in the Indian Ocean visit-
ing almost every country from thp Gulf rif
Aden and the Arabian Sea down to Mom-
basa and Zanzibar.
Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, serves several
routes which either have relay stations or
terminate in Indian Ocean ports. During the
recent Indo-Pakistani conflict the Soviet
Union, according to the Japanese paper
Mainichi Shimbun, airlifted large quantities
of weapons to India.
According to another Japanese newspa-
per, Yomiuri Shimbun, "The prevailing
Indo-Pakistan situation offered Moscow a
golden opportunity to realize its Indian
Ocean strategy," which is to Use India as
a "pawn" to ensure a passage through the
Win" (1"'n fr expaulen 3',U. .t
Asia.
NEW YORK TIItES CPYRGHT
8 January 1972
CPYRGHT
11 British Go, Maltese Ask, Who'll Help Us?
By PAUL HOFMANN
Sccia I TM New Ycrk
VALLETTA, Malta, Jan. 7
72"yal Nem/ hulli_upLerg"
dangling heavy bundles have
been busy over this island
In the last few days. Royal
Air Force transport planes
have been sitting at Luqa
Airport and hundreds of fam-
ilies of British military per-
sonnel have been packing
amid arguments
. The Talk -DIneq PO aql
up ?pumaq ?AUDI
02 3cqm puu jJO
Aialta
TP s oi arum Jano
mcnts of Valletta
small knots of Maltese have
been standing day after day,
staring glumly at the British
cruiser Blake lying 200 feet
below in the Grand Harbor.
"I just can't believe they're
pulling out," an elderly man
said. "I hope there'll he an
agreement at the last minute.
If the British leave we'll have
an awful lot of unemploy-
ment . here. Who'll help us? ?
The Russians? The, Arabs?"
Despite the possibility that
negotiations might still be
reopened, Operation Exit was
already under way. "It is
not our naem," said eftar
Adm. John Templeton-Cotill,
commander of British forces
in Malta, 3,500 men in all.
"It's Mr. Mintriff's."
Mr. Mintoff, the short
sulphuric Prime Minister of
this island state five times
the size of Manhattan has in-
deed coined his own sarcastic
code name for the British_,
withdrawal. OnAppromeu
set Jan. 15 as at deadline
by which the British forces
niest. leave necause London
had rejected his demand for
a $45-million annual rental
for military bases.
nit 1,-t effrr h Britain
and the North Atlan a Treaty
Organization, after lengthy,
pokrrline bargaining was for
a $5-million annual ent and
some supplementa pay-
mens. Mr. Mintoff said no
and 14andon announ ed that
it would recall its r mining
forces?the fleet left in 1969,
five years after MaR became
fully independent?b March
15,1
NATO maintains that it
does not really need Malta's
facilities and defers to the
British. The alliance' South-
ern Naval Command, ?rifler-
iy here, was transf red to
Now, it secni:;, to time
has come for the itish to
go. "Fifteen days to get out
after we have been ere for
170 years," Admiral emple-
ton-Cotill mused in n offi-
cers mess still hu g with r
Christmas deocratio s. "We
are acting out a v ry sad
story."
In Aden, Singapor, , Libya
and other places fro which
Britain has recentl with-
drawn her military p sence,
he explained, there lid been
hardly any contact th the
local population. Bu Malta
was different?"here ehave
deep roots."
A real-egtate agen said:
'Can you imagine. at it
means for a tiny entry
with 320,000 populatioi when
3,500 decently pal
c ? ?
4 /641102
cincMs?imm-e than
10,000 people altoget
InaM, A
er
Duv
a $20,000 home overlooking
the sea at half that price?"
The spending power of the
British forces and their de-
pendents is placed at nearly
$40-million annually. The
possible loss is just one of
the many problems faced by
Mr. Mintoff, a Socialist.
Right after his Labor party
won a one-seat majority in
Parliament in ? the election
last June and he was back
in power for the first time in
13 years, he had to ration
butter and milk. Now the new
Miami-style hotels with their
heated swimming pools just
west of here on St. Julian's
Bay are nearly empty al-
though there is plenty of sun-
shine.
30,000 British Residents
On the other hand there
are still 30,000 British civil-
ians living permanently in
the tax haven on these wind-
swept islands?Malta, Gozo
and Comino?which lack any
rivers and mountains, and
have only a few trees but do
have 300 Roman Catholic
Churches.
The 1600 policemen look
more genuinely British than
London bobbies these days.
Restaurants still serve the
joint with two vegs, both
limp. Tea is excellent and
coffee abominable.
The Maltese still queue up
for their buses with a disci-
pline totally unknown in
nearby Italy. However, the
"Cinderella" pantomime,
used to make $251 day, but
most of this island's 200
taxis will be idle now.
Three of my girls married
British boys and the fourth
an American from Cincinnati,
so you can imagine how I
feel."
Frank Brizzi, a bartender
at a British club, said: "My
wife has been worrying for
months?will I keep my job
or lose it?" Joe Robbins, a
Royal Air Force ground crew-
man, said: "It's kind of hard
on the wife?I married a
Maltese girl, you know. She
has been to England only
once for a week and we don't
know where we are going to
live."
The British Government pre-
pared this week to fly out
more than 5,000 women and
children by Jan. 15. The five
schools for the 1,800 British
children were closed last
week.
The British informed Malta
that they would withdraw
the military forces "with all
reasonable speed" but did not
feel bound by Mr. Mintoff's
deadline. Britain contends
that her $12-million payment
in September covered use of
the bases until March.
"If the British didn't pull
out now, they would have to
pull out in three or four
years," a trade-union official
who backs Mr. Mintoff said.
"It's inevitable."
"For years," he continued,
"we have been told that the
:auttiby
gla)Vglept000diSb
s r 6615f.ffur island
week beca Ise of events.
A taxi utivor 404,314.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001PYRGHT
1111.""1"111111r-
\"\
VALY
Rome
Naples
Palermo
it"
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0
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1lMALTA
cttaZIN,
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LIBYA
Say
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?
The New York Times/7m C? 1072 I
is gone in the era of nuclear
warfare. So Mr. Mintoff asks
for more money to develop
new nonmilitary industries.
If Britain and NATO don't
want to shell out a fcw lousy
millions, we'll have to turn
elsewhere."
He conceded that if the
5,000 Maltese civilians em-
,ployeci by the military lost
their jobs, the unemployment
figure would rise to 11,000,
a whopping 11 per cent of
the labor force.
"Mr. Mintoff has assured
us that no worker will suffer
any hardship," the union man
said. "I hope he knows what
he's doing. He clearly needs
a lot of cash now, and I'm
confident he has a firm pledge
from the Libyans."
Ready Cash From Libya
Libya, a major .oll pro-
ducer, has plenty of ready
cash and the head of the
military regime, Col. Muam-
mar el.Qaddafi, has come to
Mr. Mintoff's aid with loans
in recent months. When the
two men met again in Tripoli
last week, Colonel Qaddafi
reportedly promised more
money to tide Malta over the
crisis that British withdrawal
will cause.
Over the weekend two
dozen or so men in civilian
clothes with large crates ar-
rived in n Libyan military
aircraft and were whisked to
a compound of the 500-man
Maltese Army. The official
explanation is that the new-
comers are Libyan techni-
cians who will take over
flight control at Luqa Air-
port, but many Maltese are
convinced they are Egyptians ,
?or Russians.
An Italian who knows
much about Malta observed:
"People hem don't care for
us although they avidly
watch Italian television?
Sicily is less than 60 miles
away. We mustn't allow
Malta to become our Cuba.
Valletta still has one of the
finest deep-water ports in all
the Mediterranean, and if it
is of no use to the Wester
alliance, can we permit this
Soviet Navy to install itself
here just half-way betwes
Suez and Gibraltar?"
Backers of Mr. Mintoff
insist that he does not wan
the Russians in Grand Ha
bor and that Colonel Qaddaf
doesn't either. However, .
Soviet economic mission wa
here over Christmas and hat
talks with the Prime Ministe
on construction and repai
of ships, industrial cooper
tion and tourism. Malta hal
also concluded trade agree
ments with Poland, Hungary
Rumania and North Korea.
The island saw Phooni
clans, Carthaginians, Romans,
Arabs, Normans, Germans,
Spaniards, the multinational
Knights of Malta and French-
men as its masters before the
British came. A young left-
wing intellectual, 'recalling
the past and noting the possi-
bilities? said: "1 horn) we are
left alone and don't see any
new faces around here when
the British go."
WASHINGTON POST
8 January 1972
CPYRGHT
uge New Soviet Ship
Is Under Construction
By Michael Getter
Washlrartors Post eltaff Writer
t...onstrucuort la uutles way
on the largest surface ship
ever built in the Soviet Union.
It is still too early to tell
what type of vessel is being
built, but the prospects out-
lined in recent intelligence re-
ports ? reflecting the latest
U.S. reconnaissance satellite
photos ? are said to focus on
_either an oil super-tanker or a
much more startling develop.
ment: the first Soviet aircraft
carrier.
" The Russians have made no
.secret of the fact that they in-
tend to build their first giant
led tanker. But a Soviet newa
tagency dispatch last February
Indicated that the ship would
be built at Baltic Sea ship-
s
! While atellites is at Black Sea ship-
the carrier possibility
Is said to be advanced, not sur-
ards. prisingly. by Navy analysts, cl-
While U.S. officials refuse
vilian intelligence
Is known that the largest ship- point.
specialists
to provide any more details,
are not discounting it at this
it.
a ?ds in the Soviet Union are. The Russians do not have
at Nikolaev on the Black Sea.: any planes that are designed
TI at is where the only two hel- for carrier use in the style of
cc pter carriers in the Soviet the U.S. Naval air arm that is
with folding wings, tail hooks
ae1t?the Moskva and the and specially designed fuse-
aningrad?were built.
, lages to take the jolt of car.
The Soviets have tier landings.
aid that
k
, it re is the possibility that ' Russians have overcome their s
h y intend to build a fleet of'
I But some intelligence
he large new tankers, andi sources speculate that if the
ithe work at the Black Sea' disdain of the carrier's mill-
yards ! the
such tanker. be planning to use vertical
is e beginnings of a tary usefulness, they may well
e
f lowever, there is enough and short take-off jets (V/S-
ir certainty about this to lead TOL), rather than the type of
'Acme members of the intent- U.S. planes which require el-
gence community to wonder if ther rolling down the deck or
title Russians may have made a catapult shots.
Ac cision to build a true air- The ' Soviets have built at
let-Ift carrier, big enough to least two experimental
yards near Leningrad. carry fighter and attack
I The newshAppicitifsiskFor. eeleatmr11909109102. : MiAlaifi_ a Ain
opters anjile
'spotted recently by the U.S. The only operational plane
CPYRGHT
of dial 1yp1101111-b1,1n
!
Harrier jet, which the U.S.
Marines are buying and intend
to use from aircraft carriers
and amphibious ships outfit-
ted with special platforms.
Though the carrier has been
the backbone of the U.S. fleet
for decades, and the U.S. atill
maintains 16 of the floating
airbases, the Russians have al-
ways downgraded their effec-
tiveness.
Those holding the theory
that the Russians may have
changed their mind, claim
there is also some evidence of
a "more positive tone" about
carriers reflected In recent So-
viet internal military publica-
tions and an alleged Soviet
Navy concession that these
ships may be "a valuable polit-
ical tool."
If these reputed hints of a
I Soviet shift in position are
true, they would tie in neatly
with the U.S. Navy's massive
02OQOOO11t4d in large
measure by a strong bloc in
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
Congress?to greatly expand
and modernize the U.S. fleet
In reaction to the Soviet naval
modernizations of recent
years.
It is estimated that it will be
several months, or perhaps a
year, before construction Is,
far enough along to identify,
the type of vessel being built.
THE ECONOMIST
8 January 1972
The Ull AS
in war
CPYRGHT
The British of all people should know what sea power
means: it gave them their century of predominance in
the world, and it saved them from defeat by Napoleon
and by Hitler. And yet it sccms that even the British
arc in danger of forgetting. The argument about Malta
this January, like the argument last January about selling
naval arms to South Africa, has shown how difficult it is
for public opinion to come to grips with the idea of sea
power: what it is, what it can do, why it still matters in
the last third of the twentieth century.
The real rcason for not giving Mr Mintoff the amount
of money hc wants for the British base on Malta (see
page 28) is that Malta is no longer particularly important
? for the control of the Mediterranean. It is not that it has
stopped mattering whose navy is the strongest in those
waters. Sea pmver does still matter, in the Mediterranean
and in every other sea that is not either for all practical
purposes a private lake or too frozen to be worth sailing
through. The curious thing is that people who understand
what an armoured division can do, or an intercontinental
missile, have come to find it hard to grasp the meaning of
command of thc sea.
How sea power still gets used
Of course, sea power alone can never again do for
any country what it oncc did for, Britain. It is too easy
for ships to be sunk by aircraft, unless they have aircraft
of their own to protect them. It is too easy for almost
every movement of almost every warship to be kept
under inspection, by radar and radio, like a snail in a
torch beam. It will never again be possible to say of any
navy what Mahan said of the British navy's frustration
of Napoleon:
Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the,
Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the
dominion of the world.
The limitations that sea power has to work under in the
twentieth century arc obvious enough: it is the hope
of regaining invisibility, and safety, that is making the
navies go under water to do more and more of their
job in supinarines. But even the ships that have to crawl
across the surface are still much more useful things than
many peOple realise. It is worth remembering what they
can do, anAppiomerlifehRebpasevle .401911112c1:
out the warship:
After all, thcrc is no need to look any further back than
the past month to find examples of thc use of naval power.
The most basic way of using it is simply to put it on
display in order to persuade a foreign government to do
something you want it to do, or not to do what you don't
want it to do. The Americans sent the aircraft-carrier
;Enterprise into the Indian Ocean last month partly to
divert the attention of thc Indian navy from the Pakistani
one, and partly to discourage the Indian government
from attacking West Pakistan after it had won the war
in Bengal. The Indians say that they never intended to
do anything of thc sort, although their defence minister,
? Mr Jagjivan Ram, has been saying things that cast some
doubt on that ; but if they were thinking of it the
Enterprise was onc good reason for abandoning the idea.
It is easier to use a detachment of warships for dropping
this sort of hint than to put your air force into the sky
or to send your army clumping up and down. The sea
, is open to everybody, and you can always say afterwards
that you sent your ships that way just to give their crews
a change of air. It is a technique every aspiring naval
power has used in its time, from Commodore Perry's
arrival in Tokyo bay in 1854, and thc Panther's at Agadir
in 1911, to thc first visit by a Soviet squadron to the Gulf
in 1968.
If the mcrc demonstration of strength turns out not
to be enough, you can then move to thc next step up
the ladder, which is to stop the other man's ships. That
is what President Kennedy did in the Cuba crisis in 1962,
which was the cleanest-cut success of American fureign
policy in the past quarter of a century, and he was able
to do it because he had local naval superiority ; if the
Russians could have scnt a naval escort with thc ships that
were carrying -missiles to Cuba it would have been far
more dangerous to give thc order to intercept them. It is
what the Indians did to thc Pakistanis in thc Bay of
Bengal last month, and what the British have been doing
off Beira since 1966, and what Nasser tried to do to the
Israelis in the Straits bf Tiran in 1967. If that is riot
enough, the next move is to use your command of the
sea to put -troops ashore. The Americans did that in?
Lebanon in 1958 and irr the Dominican Republic in
C !AMOK 941 ri tiNIAV60200120 Vacan countries
Iii 1961. Every time it-wavenough to settle the argument:
the govi:rnment that could move its soldiers across the
sea without a gre9gi , Afi. a Ractfe he p irom air
power, achieved almost everything it had set out to
'achieve.
it can do it so quietly
Those are all examples of the use of sea power in the
past few years, at a time when many people in the west
were being encouraged to believe that sea power 'was
obsolescent. It is worth noting that in most of them the
ships involved never had to fire a shot. Of course, there
arc more brutal ways for a navy to make its presence felt.
The British navy used its guns against the Indonesians
off Borneo in 1966. The American aircraft-carriers off
Indochina provide something like half the bombers that
arc keeping up the American part of the Vietnam war.?
It might even be argued that the most brutal means of
enforcement of all is passing into the hands of the navies,
because the nuclear powers are increasingly coming, to
look on missile-carrying submarines as the best way of
keeping the nuclear deterrent safe from enemy attack.
But the point is that sea power can, often achieve its
purposes with remarkably little violence. The trouble
with armies and air forces is that they almost always have
to usc their weapons in order to establish that they are
stronger than their adversaries; there arc not many
countries that will tell their soldiers, as Czechoslovakia
did in 1968, not even to try to put up a resistance. In
the wide open sea, once a naval squadron has shown that
it is the strongest force around the place, it has a
tolerably good chance of being able to go about its
work unchallenged.
The other point that needs to bc made is about the
relationship between sea power and air power. Certainly,
in a straight fight between aircraft and ships, the aircraft
will generally win. But the only places where a straight
fight is likely to happen are those parts of the world
where the aircraft have bases to operate from, 'and where
they cannot be prevented from getting at the ships by
the other side's air power. Nowadays the two kinds of
power work in tandem, and indeed where local naval
superiority is established its instrument is often an aircraft
carrying bombs or a helicopter carrying troops.
In the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean, both the
Soviet fleet and those of the western countries have to
spend most of their time with unfriendly eyes watching
them from above their heads. But there are other parts
of the world's seas?the south-western Pacific, and large
stretches of .the Indian Ocean?which arc still outside
the range of the land-based aircraft of the major powers.
It is here that aircraft-carriers may still have a few years
of useful life left in them, as providers of a local monopoly
of air power. It is here too that even a fairly small naval
CPYRGHT
- hind them.
The snag about planes is that the only way they have
of cancelling out the ships' advantage is by actually
attacking them. That is a major act of war, and a govern-
ment is not going to order its aircraft into action against'
somebody else's fleet unless 'it is prepared for a. major,
confrontation? ,
? Sea power does still count: It is no longer the' final'
arbiter of relations between the powers, even the powers
'that need the sea most for the purposes of trade ; the
invention of the aircraft has turned that page of history.
But it still matters too much for any major country
willingly to leave the.command of 'any important piece of
ocean in the hands of a potential adversary. This is the,
unending.war. It is why the Russians in the past to years
have put so much-of 'the money they can ill afford into
.an attempt. to match' the naval strength of the United
States. It is why the rival fleets in the various 'oceans
still shadow each other, and the planes keep watch on the
surface ships, and the hunter-killer submarines 'try to
hang on to the heels of the missile-carrying submarines
in the terrifying game of underwater tag that goes on
beneath the surface. Above all, it is why neither side
wants the other to establish a clear superiority in naval
power in any of the world's major oceans. ? ?? ?
.? ?
Can Europe even look after its own?
The curious thing is that a western Europe which now
lays claim to a separate identity of its own should be
willing, to remain so dependent on the United States
on and over the seas around Europe. It is the Americans,
as much as the Europeans, who guarantee the shipping
routes across the north Atlantic. The ? Europeans rely
upon the American Sixth Fleet to hold the balance
against the Russians in the Mediterranean even more
than they rely on the American troops in. central Europe
to keep things even there. If ;the Sixth Fleet went away
the, political effect on southern Europe and north Africa
?not to mention the Middle East?would be stunning.
The .Pacific, of course, is left almost entirely to the
Americans. And the one sea where the Americans do not
yet have a permanent presence, 'the Indian Ocean, has
seen the Russians establish a local superiority within the
past four years over the one Nato country?Britain?
that does keep a regular force there. If Mr Heath and
M. Pompidou and Herr Brandt /man what they say,
i'when they talk about taking some of the burden off the
Americans' backs, they will have to include sea power,
especially the submarine sort, on their list of things they
have to tackle. There is something not quite serious about
a Europe that talks of unity but does not take the main
responsibility for ,the sea and air around itself.
force can still hope to establish ? a local superiority of
power?the command of that bit of the sea-L7-and use.
it to do all the things, from showing. the Rag 'to putting.
the marines ashore, that are the prerogatives .of. -naval
supremacy. And even in the other. parts of..th-e. world,
-which do lid within range of the .great powers' airfields,
it is worth bearing in mind that aircraft work under one'
major han di I6illtrpeetliggisilitrattln# : CIA-RDP7941194A000200200001-2
? ?
part of thei ?
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HINDUSTAN TIMES
4 January 1972'
6 ?
P CIO; 1-3 ^n1
k..1.0 Ct5.
ICI 71 C.A. T'
-r
L?74"..-,?-.1
LONDON. Jim. 3 ? The
H`k 1,131111(M, ATI 1111.
1):11,0 near the Aswan
c.am in Er.ypt, and its completion.
hy the of this
year, aialomatie sourceL: said to-
day.
Ttie bar,e has been under con.
gl ruction for some time tinder
strict secrccY. sources said.
Diplomatic- sources said 3.-wlet-
operated and piloted planes to be
bal:ed on this now air have ere pri-
madly intended for protextfon of
the Soviet-hullt. Aswan dam.
Egypt and Russia are worried
lest the Aswan dam he a pritne.
target for Israeli attack in the
event of a now war.
Attack on the Aswan dam, 016
pert s warned. could result in (11.,s;.
ris...or on a big scale, drowrtnn
nctreds of. thousands Pr ever,
mire were the waters held back
In the clam rclen.?!rd.
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London CPYRGHT
5 January 1972
POLITICAL
AIMS OF .
SOVIET AID
IV STEPHEN CONSTANT
inunist Aftalrs Matt
1.Z.USSIA'S export of major
weapons to untie r-
d eloped countries has
shown a drastic rise over
1 he past decade. Total ?
value of Russian weapons
exported over the past 20
years is estimated. to be
over ?2,101 million.
CPYRGHT
The aim is political rather
11 au commercial. Major red-
!iients :of Russian Nvrapollry in
he 111idille T.7,ast, the Indian sub-
7ontinetit, the Kai. East mid
..at in America (Cuba), have all
wen countries whose military
mslures were seen as bringing
wnelits In . Moscow's global
Inti-NVestern aims,
A dirNI benefit to Moscow of
inns shipments to sensitive
,i?nas is that they are accom.
Med by 'Russian technicians.
ese remain to 1 tam local
local
(T5 in the Ilse of the weapons
ti to T1dOCI rina lc flint. Cuba
d Egypt are glaring examples,
ill 10.000 Russian technicians
ported in the latter country.
.1;
I'h
Long-range aims
A survey or Russia's arms-
pplying policy shows that the
Moscow leaders are prepared to
forgo immediate benefits to
establish long-range strategic
footholds.
Catba can Ilins be seen as
!something of " old-age. pen-
sioner" of Russia's. The island
!has receivnd ?115 million in
? weaPons since 1959. It is estim-
ated to cost Moscow an average
1135 million a year to underpin
.its "skid-row " economy.
The size of 'Russian spending
!abroad by means of weapons
!and other aid-with-strings shows
:clearly that Russia would find
.Malta a cheap proposition should
it consider tlie Medite.rranean
island as a useful footholcl for
its Mediterranean and Middle
:East ambitions.
Malta's economic and military
requirements would IT present a
minute frac-lion or Russia's total
spending on . Ihe subversion of
. the Free. NVorld.
Among the earliest and loudest.
!warnings about Russia's desians
!on /mold V( ?f! I hose! by com.
animist A limn in. China's tiny IIlY
by the Adriatic. ?
The official Albanian news
agency has declared Ilia! the:
British novernment's announcfl..
men! about preparations to with-
draw forces from Malta had
caused the "Soviet revisionist
clique " in intensify its efforts
to gain influence on the island.
Malta, said Albania, was a
"very good MEM t' Kir posit ion for
the Soviet Navy, which is sabre-
rattling iii thr Alediterranean
alongside I he A merican neet."
The recent trade agreement
between Bussia inn! .711alla " will
rnsiirr Soviet warships a port
or, to put it bet ter, a base in
the Mediterranean."
Nal YORK TIMES
29 December 1971
CPYRGHT Malta Moscow and the': West
By C. L SULZBERGER
PARTS?A new allied (nista over
CPYRGHT
Malta, at any rate, another flare-up of
the old one, can he regarded as prob-
able. The strategically located island,
republic has not figured much in re-
cent news?but only because it hat
been negotiating with Britain and
NATO. These negotiations appear to
have failed.
Dom Mintoff, the Socialist Prime
Minister elected this year, is a fiery
and emotional man who has the praise-
worthy idea of seeking to raise Mal-
tese living standards and alter Malta's
economy to such a degree that by 1977
the is1andzi4 tin knakazed tc4i
colonial ruler and still Malta's source
of military sustenance, sees no point
In paying heavily to finance this goal
: imply in order to prepare its own
permanent expulsion from Maltese
lacilities. And Britain's allies?particu-
larly interested in the Mediterranean?
: hare this view. '
Mintoff, after early hints that he
might turn to Moscow if he could not
ome to terms with the West, original-
ly proposed that Britain and NATO
pay thirty million pounds annual rent
or continued use of facilities?a stag-
gering increase from the previous fee,
of slightly over five million pounds.'
The British, the North Atlantic allies
italVtienrealitvglfgRrInti?
acceptable compromise. They haven't
on its nav p QK ease
The trouble is that Britain, former
succeeded. Mintoff reduced his original'
asking price to 18 million pounds a
year. Britain and NATO came back by
upping their original offer to 10 mil-,
lion?half British, half from the all-
*ance.
Since Mintoff spurned this, London
suggested he negotiate bilateral aid.
agreements with other NATO members
on an individual basis. The Maltese
have had little luck with this idea. The
'gap between what is being demanded
? and what is being offered remains ap-
parently unbridgeable.
The British maintain Mintoff is be-
ing unrealistic by not taking into
account expenditures?separate from
11
9ttorddaluglowat_pfirments but
WWI flee island's
facilities by Britain and its allies.
success at pulling together po-
lit;cal support, hardware, and
er ws to float, almost over-
night, a modern navy. But he
bably miscalculated when he
decided that the aircraft car-
ria was an obsolete weapon,
and intelligence photographs,
wi ich closely scan the Russian
sh pyards, disclose no evi-
de ace of any effort to correct
hi! mistake.
A lack of carriers and bases
ak ng the North African coast
ans that Soviet ships sailing
beVond the defense radius of
tlu Egyptian bases have no
air cover. They carry the of-
fensive sting of surface-
to-surface missiles which can
jf jet first-strike damage on
thc NATO fleet. But outnum-
be .ed and trapped in a sea
wi h narrow outlets, they
would be easy prey for NATO
aircraft.
Wisely the top American ad-
mi:als in the Mediterranean,
NA TO Comdr. Hondo Rivero
and 6th Fleet Comdr. Ger-
alc Miller, are taking a cool,
unexcited view of the Soviet
pr sence. There was a time
when the navy seemed to mag-
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002002000ReGHT
London estimates such disburse-
ments amount approximately to 13
million pounds a year and provide jobs
for seven thousand of Malta's labor
force of one hundred thousand. It is
ftifotable that unemployed workers in,
tilts now total roughly seven thou-
n4. .
In n sense, therefore, London feels
it ltas ri strong bargaining position,
bemire if a crunch were to come
Mintoff might be faced with double
an already high unemployment rate.
But the excitable Prime Minister also,
has trump cards in his hand. While:
he appears, to have once 'held hopes
that Libya might take up the finan-
cial burden if Britain were expelled,
he now seems to mistrust the reliabil-
ity of support from that Wealthy oil-
pi-educing land.
Nor has Libya any navy that could
conceivably require the services of
Maltese shipyards; but this is by no
means the case with the Soviet Union.
Both Britain and NATO are acutely
conscious of the danger to their West-
ern Mediterranean position should the
Russians sign a pact gaining access to
Malta's facilities.
The island republic is not quintes-
sentially important to allied navies.-'
Including the U.S. Sixth Fleet?but it
is considered strategically vital that
It be denied to Moscow's admirals.
Were Malta open to Soviet vessels,
the U.S.S.R. would be well on its way
to penetration of the western Mediter-
ranealt as it ' has already penetrated
the eastern Mediterranean.
? Moreover, there is a lurking fear
in West Europe that, in the latter
case, the United States might thin out
or pull back its Sixth Fleet rather
than Tisk seeing it bottled up. Such
a precaution would have strategic
logic and would also be consonant
with the -present American mood for
military retrenchment
The Maltese problem?although no
longer as flamboyant as when Mintoff
first took power?represents a matter
of urgent seriousness. The Russians
have not recently been expanding in
the Mediterranean. Indeed, their air-
craft have been expelled from Algerian
Mers-el-Kebir. ,
Nevertheless, Soviet strength in the
inland sea is extensive and well
backed up by a ring of bases to the
east. Should Malta open its arms,
Moscow is, in a 'position to take Im-
mediate advantage of the break. Min-
toff knows this and is ,going to bp
gain hard when the next found starts
?quite possibly preceded by at least
another minicrisis.
1LLSEINGTON STAR
24 November 1(371
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Seviiteit'fi? rJsk ithe /Ale iterraneen
NAPLES ? Soviet diplomats
are running so far behind the
Soviet navy in Moscow's pene-
tration of the Mediterranean
that the show of force must be
counted, in military terms, an
extremely high-risk venture.
However, Russian rhetoric
is running ahead of the cold
facts of Mediterranean life.
Boasting in July that the new
Soviet fleet "ties the imperial-
ists' hands," Adm. Grashkov
said the skill of Soviet ship-
builders is attested by the
navy's ability to spend long
periods at sea without using
overseas bases.
But the Soviets' lack of Med-
i ter r ane an bases outside
Egypt is a deficiency that will
leave the shiny new ships dan-
gerously exposed if hostilities
develop. Even their peacetime
purpose of "showing the flag"
is restricted by their lack of
access to ports. They can't
pour vodka for visiting digni-
taries as long as they must
anchor at sea.
Greshkov is rated brilliant
by American admirals for his
nify its implications. But these
admirals candidly ba lance
their concern at sharing the
sea with 10 Soviet submarines
and a shifting number of capi-
tal ships against the power
which they can call into ac-
tion.
Miller even explains the
psychology which produces
incidents when Soviet ships
or helicopters brush close to
6th Fleet units. "There are
squareheads in the Russian
navy like there are in all
navies," he says, "and when
they get orders to ascertain
the identity of an American
ship, they sometimes take
foolish risks to be sure they
don't make a mistake."
Most incidents of Russian
brashness are like the eve.
berance of a man driving his
first sports car. They want to
show off their navy, but they
are well enough aware of its
vulnerability, to avoid great
risks. In fact, the stubborn,
presence of a sinkable Soviet
navy in the Mediterranean is
something of a promise that
Moscow intends to behave. It
is even a reassurance in re-
gard to the Middle East.
So the real significance of
the Mediterranean confronta-
tion lies in the fragile politics
along the shore. It is hard
for. Americans to understand
how a ship can affect politi-
cal attitudes, but this reporter
is satisfied, after a swing
through most of the fragile
countries, that the outlook of
peasants in places which
have known much aggression
is colored by the flags they
see flying 'on ships offshore,
This floating American pres-
ence grows more important at
a time when this part of the
world is unclear on the impli-
cations of the Nixon doctrine
and the daily press carries
exaggerated accounts of the
isolationist intentions of the
United States. The fleet sails
as a refutation of fears that s
shift is occurring in the bal-
ance of power.
Even at its cost of $2 billion
,a year, the 6th Fleet is a good
Investment. And it will be a
secure investment as long as
the Soviet diplomats find no
new bases.
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16
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002002M:2
Way' YO; IS UHT
9 Dec eat er 1971
East Mediterranean NATO Fleet Asked
By DREW MIDDLETON
La The New York Time,
BRUSSELS, Dec. 8? Seem-
rary ot Defense Melvin R. Laird
proposed today the formation
of a permanent allied naval;
force operating in the easter&
Mediterranean in cooperation
with the United States Sixth
Fleet.
Mr. Laird also told the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
that the United States would
make available to other mem-
bers of the alliance weapons
systems, especially those relat-
ed to electronic warfare, that
have been tested and proved in
South Vietnam.
The emphasis at today's
meeting of the Defense Planning
Committee was on progress in
1 strengthening the alliance and
on programs for build-ups in
this decade.
The object of this exercise
In what American and British
sources call "realism" is appar-
ently to convince the Soviet
Union and its allies that there
will be no unilateral disarma-
ment by the Atlantic allies and
that the East's only hope for
force reductions lies in nego-
tiations.
American officials, military:
as well as civilian, praised the;
alliance's "new spirit" and re-
ported some results. Tim Dan-'
ish Defense Minister, Kjeld Ole-,
sem, for example, told Mr. Laird.
that the new Socialist Govern-i
me it would not carry out a
campaign promise to reduce
the Danish Army from 24.000
-to 7,000 or 8,000 men during
1972.
The connection between an
stei. dy increase in Western
strength and negotiations with
the East on mutual zald bal-
one :..r1 reductions of forces,
whi h the Atlantic alliance:
first proposed three years ago,'
was stressed by United States
offii lats. They said that the
Soviet Union was likely to be-.,
gin talks when it was con-
vir=d that the West was do-
tern ined to maintain its
streagth.
T1 Is determination was
shown yesterday by 10 Euro-
pear nations, which pledged to
raisc their defense expenditure
in 11172 by a billion dollars. and
itoda 7 by a series of reports by
ldefcfse ministers of "signifi-
cant" additions and improve-
ments in equipment of forces.i
U.S. Troop Level Rises I
Mr. Laird reported that the!
United States had increased its,
troops in Europe by 20.000.
This results from the Defense;
Deeartment's ability to bring:
units in Europe up to etrengthi
as the Vietnam ,war winds;
down and its call on draftees!
dezreases.
There are now about 310,000?
American servicemen in Eu-
rope. including those of the
Sixth Fleet.
, Ships of six NATO navies,
those of Britain. France' Italy,
Greece, Turkey and the Unita
!States, onerate in the Mediter-
ranean. But only till Ameri-
can Sixth Fleet operates at
?vill into the eastern Mediter-
ranean, where Sol-let naval:
and air forces are strongest.
The United States proposal
calls for a "standing" force,
comprising Greek, Italian, Turk-
ish, British and United States!
vessels to operate in the East-
ern Mediterranean.
The French Mediterranean;
fleet cooperates with other al-
lied squadrons in exercises.i
But national policy forbids'
military inteeration of the type
proposed by Mr. Laird. France,
because of her rejection of mili-
tary integration in the alliance,
is not represented on the De-
fense Planning Committee.
The alliance has a standing
force in the Atlantic, made up
of Canadian, Dtuch, Norwegian,
British, Portuguese and Amer-
ican vessels. lits political pur-
pose is to show alliance soli-
darity by visits to ports. The
military aim is to provide joint
training in antisubmarine war-
fare and escort duty.
The United States is press-
ing West Germany, whose fleet
? Is mainly concerned with the
defense of the Baltic Sea, to
detach a destroyer for service
In the North Sea. The West
German Defense Minister, Hel-
muth Schmidt. apparently was
more amenable to this proposal
today than in the past.
American officials did not
specify the types of weapons
the Defense Department is
ready to make available to
European allies. They are
understood to include some of
the newest sensor systems,
' tactical air-control systems and
'other electronic equipment de-1
signed to improve control and;
command functions in Now.
WASHINGTON STAR
CPYRGHT8 November 1971
TRIPOLI, Libya?Outside of
r.gypt and targety oceause 01
Its experience with the Rus-
sians, the revolutionary re-
gimes on the north coast of
Africa are supplying no assist-
ance to the Soviet aim of pene-
trating the Mediterranean.
When Chairman liosygin
visited Algiei's in October, he
elicited warm avowals of the
. bonds which link the two so-
cialist governments. But when
he asked for a Soviet naval
base at Merselkebir, he was,
according to sources deemed
reliable, politely told no. When
he asked for docking rights for
Soviet ships, he was again re-
fused. He reportedly succeed-
cd in persuading his hosts
? to let a few local Communists
out of prison.
Here A mitrimiecifidt
have so raf Tiff alrigtTrecep-
CPYRGHT
:
ececon for the Soviets
i 4
a,i,dk
lion. the wife of the new Sovi-
et ambassador relates how she
plcaded with her husband to
ast Moscow to install central
he .ting and air conditioning In
thc ir uncomfortable residence.
Th., Central Committee could
no be expected, he replied, to
m; ke even that modest in-
vei tment in the current state
of 'elations with Libya.
The uptight regime of Cot
Qa idafi offers no levers for
So ict diplomacy. Bursting
wiU1 oil revenues, the govern-
ment has no need for financial
aick Qaddafi did buy some So-
vie: tanks and military equip-
me it from the Russians, but
he would let no Soviet techni-
ela is come in to teach his sol-
die -s how to use the hardware.
He used Egyptian instructors
4Vgla?te tuls919/a9t9/13e
no secret of Ills dismay over
the extent to which the Egyp-
tians have grown dependent on
the Soviet Union. The bristling
Soviet presence In Egypt and
their success at squeezing a
base at Alexandria out of
their hosts affront this purist
Moslem as ground lost in the
Arabs' struggle to get the En.
means off their back. He also
scorns the Soviets' lack of reli-
gion..
The urgency of the Russian
quest for holds on this coast is
indicated by their earnest
courtship of West-oriented re-
gimes in Tunisia and Morocco.
They have exerted their wiles,
but they have done no better
than to secure occasional ac-
cess ? for Soviet ships in Tunis
and a fueling_azekosaxg, %yew,
1310PREJF7r11111191
been turned de?vn cold on re-
peatcd requests for a naval
base at. Bizerte.
None of this can be attribut-
ed to the brilliance of Wash-
ington's diplomacy or love of?
th,.1 United States.
These Arabs, like the rest,
count the Nixon policy as sol-
idly pro-Israel. Tunisians fee1.
they have gotten nowhere in
pleading with the State De-
partment to give Egypt's'
President Sadat more encour-
agement as a counterweight to
the Russians. Qaddafi is cool
with American officials and
tough with the 19 American oil
companies that have conces-
sions here.
As with the Algerians, whose:
hostility has been mellowed by
their anxiety to market frozen
@ILI Amer-
a Merit-es the
Amorirsan ermecsciorairos only
Approved For
CPYRGHT
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to the extent that he can
squeeze them for revenues to
develop his country. But he
says frankly to Americans, we
need your technology, and
more Libyans are studying in
the United States now than
were there in the days of King
Idris.
The black and white view of
the world which emerged in
the early days of Algerian in-
dependence has matured into
a pragmatic study of how the
colonialists can be useful,
Recently Qaddafi even
brought American rainmakers
to Libya. But the dusty, shab-
by streets of Tripoli exude the
essential isolationism of the
regime's mood. Tourists are
treated miserably, and the ab-
sence of the Italian communi-
ty which kept things running is
reflected in a discomforting
lack of maintenance.
But Qaddafi wants a pure,
prohibitionist, unfrlvolous
.Arab state, and he is willing to
pay the price for it. Outsiders
.and the outside way of life
Were chief targets of the revo.;
lutions in Libya and Algeria,
and the Russians will find it
hard to dent the stability and
standoffishness of the regimes
they produced.
CPYRGHT
BALTIMORE SUN
28 October 1971
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
stronaer Mediterranean,
? By JOSEPH n. L. sTERNE 1 terranean stuoic-s coula beup-
sun sin/I Correspondent I Plied, with modifications, to the ' the alliance.
.
Bahic and North Eeas, where the U.S.? Officials reported that the
Brussels?Defense ministers
'411-iptUnion also has stepped up defense,
secretary *iced concern' that
of the North AtiantIc .1 rem), Or. 'Its
ganization decided yesterday to na.ial strength considerably. some nations?not includi
1
seek improvements in the
Wit i the exception of the pro- Britain and Germany?May )1 ' The Schmidt offer would be:
be making this total commi F art of a CEA' West Gcrman-:
ectec .11editerannean study, the
redev of the East-West nude- .' -...;:-..'rno egeoment nom ur.e.N.
West's tactical nuclear deter- ment. ?
rent against increasing Soviet Lord Carrington, British d negotiation to help offset the
naval power in the 'Mcditerra- 1 .S. balance Of payments costs
, ar ba mice by the seven nations!
; assert bled here was basically' fense secretary, reportedly we
. corned Mr. I..aird!s warning an o' keeping 300,000 servicemen in
nean.
1 an updating operation.
They instructed military and said 1,1ATO members must ?*rope.
of Do_ prepared to make greater con American officials described
technical experts to make Acaording to officials, Melvin
studies comparable to those R. Laird, U.S. Secretary
tributions to their own defens his move by the Bonn govern-
nearing completion for the cen. fense cautioned against any nu- ment as very important?proba-
tral and northern land fronts?in merical change?up or down?in t Reduction expected fly the largest cash offer that
Europe. ? -"the e timated 7,000 tactical nu-
,. h 33 been formally presented.
clear warheads that form a key British authorities were sai ?
At a meeting of the alliance's The Pentagon,
nuclear planning group. there r art di NATO defense. to be of the view that Europ which has long
was stress on the possible .need He reportedly stressed to his must begin to face up to th teen worried about , the run-
for tactical nuclear defenses colleagues that it would be a possibility that after the end cbwn condition of barracks in
E urope, '
should the Warsaw pact launch gravo, mistake to make a President Nixon's present tern welcome im-
would s
an underwater, surface or air changp in the mix of weapons in office some reduction In th provement as. a Means of mak-
i g military service more at-
strike in the Mediterranean. at a ,ime when NATO and the number of U.S. forces In Europ
If the study about this south- Wars.iw Pact are moving1tt active.
to. is to be expected. ?
1 Ag
ern flank of the alliance should ward negotiations on mutual Helmut Schmidt, the Wes 1tb But final reement on the
tails of a new 'offset sigree-
follow the pattern set for pro-! and balanced force reductions. German defense minister. use
jected East-West conflict 0111 As he 'had signaled clearly the occasion of the Brussel lent,' it. ias Wed' will be a
natter for negoliationS being
land, there would be planningl even )efore leaving Washington, meeting to Make a cash offe conducted by the State DePart-
about initial Western responses' Mr. Laird warned the European worth "several hundred milli? n ent. ? - ' ' ' :' . ' " ' . .: ' ''' ?
, allies that if they really want deutsche marks" to improve di to an enemy strike plus paten- ?
tial follow-on measures. lapidated barracks occupied b
' detente they should Meet and
,
It was assumed that the Medi-1 improve their commitments to. U.S sentemen In his country.
. .
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
November 1971
R'isks of the Soviet Naval Buildup
CPYRGHT
The Soviet naval buildup, which actually began
in the 1930s and has been taken note of in the West
during the last decade,. is causing some alarm. In the
last twenty years the Soviet navy has developed from .
an insignificant marine force which was a mere un-
successful coast guard fleet in World War IL to the
world's second strongest maritime power (after the ?
USA) which already has more combat ships and
personnel than the leading Western naval power.
Even more important is the fact that, as far. back?
as 1968, 521 of the U. S. navy's 894 warships were
more than 19 years old, while of the 1,575 Soviet
combat ships only tWo were.that aged; of 146 Ameri-
can submarines, 68 were more than 20 years old
while all 375 Soviet submarines were built less than
14 previously. Depending on the class of ship, the
Soviets are currently building between three and five
times as many units as the Americans, while the con-
struction of warships by the other NATO powers
serves merely to replace obsolete units. As the Soviet
navy grows in size and strength, the number of NATO.
warships with genuine combat capability, and parti-
cularly the still-decisive aircraft carriers, steadily
diminishes.
The Soviet na'vy must also be given credit for the
fact that in recent years it has built quite a number
of solid, seaworthy craft of completely Original de-
sign, with interesting armament, and thus has freed
itself from its partial dependence on other countries
for certain equipment and electronic apparatus, a
dependence which was observable until about 1960.
The Soviet navy is now pursuing a completely in-
dependent and original policy of organization and
ship-building, which is claimed by Soviet ideologists
to be disproof of .the classical "capitalise' theory of
maritime domination by the mere presence of supe-
rior surface and air forces. This. typically Soviet
doctrine, which in a certain senie was already applied
during Word War II though it had extremely slight
success, comprises a mixture of new weaponry (pri.-
marily a wide range of missiles), the mass utilization
of subm! arines, and the subversive influencing of the
personnel of opposing navies. The Soviet navy today
unquestionably has a richer arsenal of missiles than
the NATO fleets, .at least in terms of variety?though
it remains to be proven whether, under combat condi-
tions, missiles have any greater accuracy than naval
aircraft over long distances and naval guns over short
range. At any rate even the most modern Soviet
cruisers, suO as ships A?fl.he Caladryndma
/02 :
shindasset,kiitiarcDOYErig :tt.W IdV
radius of land-based Soviet aircraft of successfully
combating for a long period of time an opponent with
a ship-based, flexible naval air arm. Moreover it is
known in the West that certain Soviet weapons sys-
tems, particularly those involved in anti-submarine
warfare, lag far behind those of the West technologi-
cally. On the other hand the formerly grossly lacking
seamanship of Russian sailors has improved sharply,
a fact which is linked to the worldwide activities of
the Soviet navy..
in terms of numerical strength ? and geopolitical
factors, the Soviet navy, in the North Sea, the
Black Sea, the Barents Sea and in general along tic
Siberian coast, is greatly superior (by a ratio of up to
10:1) to all non-Communist coastal states and there-
fore, at least at the start of a conflict, would largely
dominate these waters, particularly since in this area
the land-based Soviet air force can provide the neces-
sary cover. It is another question, however, whether
the Soviet navy's surface forces in their current make--
up could operate successfully in those far-reaching
oceanic regions in which they have been constantly
cruising in recent years, such as the Mediterranean,
the North and Middle Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.
As long as the NATO alliance remains intact, Soviet
surface combat operations in the Atlantic would have
little chance of success; to keep this situation un-
changed, however, it is necessary that the bases in
Iceland remain firmly in Western hands and the theo-
retically available air and marine bases in the Middle
Atlantic, such as those on the Cape Verde Islands,
Ascension, St. Helena, the Bermudas. and the Falk-
land Islands, be improved and better supported. The
exclusion of the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean
from NATO for political reasons seems militarily
dangerous today, in an age of worldwide Soviet naval
policy and strategy. Another obstacle is that the polit-
ical reservations of certain Scandinavian countries,
which are themselves making inadequate contribu-
tions to the defense of their own territories, are com-
pelling NATO to adopt a strategy vis-a-vis Spain,
Greece, Turkey, Portugal and South Africa which
can benefit only the Soviets.
The action potential of the Soviet Mediterranean
fleet is also limited, although it unquestionably now
has its own air forces operating from Egyptian and
Syrian bases and its reconnaissance aircraft can in
some zases also make use of Algerian, Yemenite and
Iraq airbases. The West no longer has any bases on
Ci
red:16eigf e Mediterranean. As to Malta, dbie
i1.1WWW4UPUMlelidnt of a
1 Q
CPYRGHT
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third world war, particularly if it is fought with nucle-
ar weapons, because of its small size the island would
be useless to either party as a naval and airbase in the
classical sense. In contrast to Iceland, Malta's great
importance is exclusively in terms of the present poli-
tical "war" in the Mediterranean region.
The Soviet capability to wage successful war in
the Mediterranean depends largely on the reliability
and operational capacity of its Arab allies and friends.
On the basis of recent events in the Sudan, the atti-
tude of Libya and Soviet experiences with Arab poli-
ticians and military in general, the Kremlin probably
reckons that the Soviet Union could hardly count on
the active help of the Arabs in a war with NATO.
This would eliminate the utilization of "neutral"
Arab ports and airbases, without which the Soviet
fleet would not be secure against attacks from supe-
rior NATO air and sea forces. The Mediterranean is
spatially too small for Soviet surface naval units to
be kept supplied and operating for very long without
'discovery. Similar considerations also apply to the
Soviet surface naval forces which are now more or
'less constantly present in the Caribbean, the South
'Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Of its six most impor-
tant tasks in the event of a war against NATO, de-
spite its great numerical strength and the modernity
- BALTIMORE SUN
. 1 November 1971 CPYRGHT
?Sbvitit 'Unioit's cliforts. to fill setrilower void.
. ? . ?
;1,11(Ja lu oceu
luringu
o J.1
MiC11111 'PARKS ?
Sun Staff Corrtsponttent
Singapore?The Soviet's Un-
ion's efforts to establish itself a
the dominant power in the Judi-
-an Ocean,- one of the world's
most important trade routes, is
luring the United States into a
Contest for naval supremacy
there.
Five years ago, there were no
Soviet warships operating regu-
larly in the ocean. Three years
ago,. there were a half dozen.
Now, the number averages from
12 to IS and has run as high as
30 at i time.
This growth has accompanied
extensive Soviet efforts to in-
crease its political and economic
influence in the developing na-
tions of Fest Africa and South
Asia that border the Indian
Ocean.
? Only major power
While Russia's ships In the In-
dian Ocean account for only a
tenth of its Pacific fleet, the
Soviet. Navy is, in fact, the only.
major. navy operating regularly.
in the ocean in signifitant
strength. in air ------,-----00- nuciettr-
'17ccolkon., a race to keep tip with in Ocean, says Vice Adm. Mau,
CPYRGHT
Soviet naval vessels are welcome at ni--.0y no bases. Western naval bases In .-..i.ca
ports near Indian Ocean though they h;.vo are underlined.
..s a, Africa and the Middle elle of the Indian awn. It vill! Navy officers also note that
1 a t. ' be finiOled in lt174. Diego Garcia's harbor could be '-
armed American naval offi; Although CSii4/1!:!MIT'k i't r'l 1"-.: dredged to accommodate an air-
ce 's plan to send U.S. 7th Fleet. base runs eoun!er to rre Nk....:. craft carrier. Its 8,000 foot land-
:h. )5 into the ocean as they are doctrine of loweriilg th". Arneri- ing strip LS already handling
N xi from duty off Vietnam so four engine cargo planes. ? '
irt Russia does not go unchal-, eerg .s; it is Pr tolqin:n1 tI.:.-
can profit.: Li A:..,i, :Vivy of,i?
i If the United States fails . to'
? I
1:11.4ed. The latest such exercise: . . - , , ' i %Int i ? in
Sia,ps ,:an n ? s crease its presence in the Ind-
With the once-mighty British r(H:el'ed *craft carrier Enter- ihe rapidly expanding Soviet rice F. Weisner, the deputy.
Far East Fleet reduced (0 SIX 'pre and a giiitird-missile frig- ,N8vy.
frigates and a submarine and f- e in September. - - chief of naval operations for air
? The 250-rilz,n, ScAmbilitt Oa- and a former 7th Fleet corn-
( y , aging U.. Navy he United States began con- - ii?,i tho iirq 1.; sha,e in the
face ships stationed in the area, 4 'teflon earlier this year of 1 '.:::. ..:vit ii.:IPI;e. it easier for
the Russians are approaching ; If million communications sta- : A;.,. :.i on -.:`?-,,I;-,cs !a or:t-
navaLdominatikn of the ocean, frea on Diego Garcia atoll, a I ; i. ;? y . T.. ', .? (1.:;:n, it wilt'
:an evont that ftpprioyeaFsamfteleiaift 11 9A7 Aalicri WO
mender, "we turn it over to the
Soviets. I think it's that simple."
Adm. John S. McCain; Jr.,
fie Command was re-
G040144st
0
.
significant political benefits in es south of India In he mi(.1
Bussian activities. ' of the Indian Ocean, said In an'
CPYRGHT
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interview: "We are in a global
competition with the Russians,
and we must not allow any por-
tion of the world to fall under
their exclusive influence: This is
the danger in the Indian
Ocean."
The United States, in fact, is
the only nation able to balance
the Soviet presence In the ocean.
The British fleet has shrunk
under economic pressures. The
Indian Navy is concerned only
with the Bay of Bengal and Ara-
bian Sea in case of war with
Pakistan. The Japanese Navy is
kept close to home as a self-de-
fense force. The Australian fleet
is modern but small.
The 1,001-ship Chinese fleet is
primarily coastal' but several
occan-going warships have re-
cently traveled to East Africa,
where China has aid programs.
A greater Chinese presence is
expected in the next two years
when Peking test-fires its inter-
continental ballistic missiles.
Major power struggle
A U.S. congressional commit-
tee, predicting that the Indian
? Ocean will soon be the site of
major power struggles between,
Russia, Japan, China and the,
United States, urged that "diplo-
matic finesse" and negotiations
be used in the area rather than
sheer military and naval power.
India and Ceylon, expressing
similar worries, have asked the
major powers to make the ocean,
a "zone of peace." The Russians
have said they are willing to
study the proposal with other
powers.
The American congressional
committee was told last sum-
mer by two former assistant
, secretaries of state, William
Bundy and Phillips Talbot, that
trying to match the Russians
,would be counterproductive.
Because of nuclear weapons, '
Mr. Bundy said, "I don't think
any foreseeable level of Soviet
power makes that much differ-
ence. . . . Naval gunboat diplo-
macy has las and less rele-
vance."
Russian diplomats in the re-
gion say, however, that it is the
United States that is practicing
gunboat diplomacy in the ocean,
They say the initial Soviet
move into the ocean was
prompted not by some grand
geopolitical design but by the
earlier entry of American sub-
marines cargaZaipolaris ? -
siles with a s
Soviet diplomats have shown
elaborate charts of the submar-
ines' movements to sonic of the
area's 'governments to justify
the Russian presence.
American officials refuse to
discuss the Polaris program, but
the submarines are presumed to
be operating in the Arabian Sea
and, according to Russian
sources, the Bay of Bengal,
from where their missiles could
reach targets in the Soviet Un-
ion and mainland China. ,
Tends to confirm presence
The construction of the com-
munications station at Diego
Garcia?far too elaborate for
the three surface warships oper-
ating from the Persian Gulf?
tends to confirm the presence of
Polaris submarines as does the
American acceptance of an Aus-
tralian offer to base U.S. sub-
marines at Cockburn Sound, a
new facility in Western Austral-
ia on the southern Indian Ocean.
The Soviet ships In the ocean
generally sail from the Russian
Pacific 'Fleet hcadonarters at
Vladivostok. A few have come
from the Black Sea port of Odes-
sa, a 13,000-mile trip around Af-
rica with the Suez Canal closed.
Western intelligence sources
report that the Soviet fleet in the i
Indian Ocean generally includes
two guilded-missile cruisers,
two missile-hearing frigates,
two to three missile-bearing de-
stroyers, two to three conven-
tional destroyers, a landing ship
Iand four or five oilers and sup-
ply ships. They are often accom-
panied by submarines, some of
Which are nuclear powered and
missile equipped.
. The ships make regular calls
at 30 ports In 18 countries bor-
dering the Indian Ocean, the
Red: Sea, the Arabian Sea and?
the Persian Gulf. .
Soviet merchant shipping In
the Indian Ocean is also Increas:
Ing. A quarter of the ships,
rounding the Cape of Good }lope'
are Russian, and another 15 per)
cent are from East European
countries, The increase is par-
tially due to economic assist-
ance and trade agreements Rtiss
sin has negotiated with at least 1
19 countries on the ocean's I
shores.? . .
Russian fishing and rhaling
fleets?including several of the
famous spy trawler?: aerate
continuously in wide a .eas of,
the Indian Ocean. Twelv.: mil;
tries have signed special I ishing
agreements with the Sovitt Un-
OThea?,glagninip2. : cl
To service these ships the
Soviet Union is lining no a chain
of facilities from the 'Bed Sea
down the African coast. It IS
admittedly eyeing parts in Cey-
lon, India and the Indian Nico-
bar and Andaman islands off the
Burmese coast in the Bay of
Bengal. But both Colombo and
New Delhi say they are wary of
the Rusins, and Indian offi- ? With the Suez Cannl closed,
dais say they arc trying to min- the most practical access to thc
imize Rbssian influence on their , ocean is through areas dominat-
heretofore British-equipped. ed by Western navies?the South
Navy. - China Sea and around the Cape
Western intelligence officials
-
of Good Hope.
believe that the Soviet Union is
Soviet sailors are gaining ex.]
,
establishing several bases of its
own?at ssas Banns in Egypt on perienee operating major naval
the Red S'en, on the South Yem- task forces for long periods of
- time thousands of miles from
en islandg of Perim and Socotra
I
Soviet marines have home ports, but hot-weather
landed) and, for its fishing fleet,1 ,
sailing In tropical waters still
(where
on Mauritius. , . 1 presents problems, according to
'No large bouys, seven feet In1 Western naval sources,
With no aircraft carriersi
and
no established naval airfields in
the area, the Indian Ocean fleet
lacks both tactical air support
and aerial reconnaissance.'
Western naval units moving
Into area would have both.
, Western-dominated waters
I diameter, have been placed in
; the Indian Ocean, apparently to
turn supply ships and submarine;
tenders into floating bases.
American naval officers warn ?
' that Soviet activity will increase
sharply If the Suez Canal is re-
opened, permit ling Russian
ships to sail from the Black Sea
through the cannel and the Red
Sea into the Indian Ocean.
. Threat to shipping ?
Western 'naval attache here
commented. "I would not be
surprised if the Russians in-
creased their activities?politi-
Finally, the Soviet Navy curs
rently lacks a secure base or
the ocean itself, although it has
the use of repair and refueling
facilities in a number of coun-
tries. ?
Western naval officers note
that these barriers would be
quickly removed with the open-
ing of the Suez Canal and the
establishment of one or two na-
val bases and airfields on the
ocean.
Number of obstacles
A European diplomat, assess-
ing the growing Soviet political
as well as military influence in
a the region, commented,. "there
,
naval-h'
a and co
eafnaonciic as wl a
factor of
five
elevlithin are a number of obstacles to
as
three
Years of the opening of the ?.Russian naval activity right
canal." ,
'now. But it is only a matter of
American naval officers speak time until they have the facili-
of the Soviet activity as a threat ?tics they need because of the
to Western shipping-50 per cent ?
Indian Ocean as does 90 per cent way governments in the area
of Europe's oil moves across the are welcoming them as a coun-
tering to interfere with shipping terweight to the Chinese."
of Japan's?but any Russian at- Most diplomats in the area, in
than regional.
"Interference with ships onl fact, see the Soviet activity in
i
? i the Indian Ocean as part of a
is likely to be general rather;
the high seas would be pretty! broader effort to fashion a cres-?
cent or influence beneath China,
Vice Mm. William P. Mack,
close Britishto staffvar ,oaffeictueart.iy," says one l commander of the U.S. 7th
'? Fleet, said in an Interview:
The British, however, have "How do you influence a', coun-
? used this potential threat to jus- try as to whether she signs a
I tify the sale of arms to South treaty with you? I am thinking
Africa despite widespread pros specifically of India (which re-
tests from black Africa. ?eently signed a twenty-year
Japan, one of the countries friendship treaty with Russia/,
that would be most affected by "The Soviets do it by putting
Soviet domination of the ocean, more ships in the area and visit.
has aodpted a wait-and-see atti- ing these countries more often.
tude. "We are still talking about In the Orient, countries are in-
potential not actual domina- fluenced a lot more if you pre.
tion," say; a Japanese ambas- sent yourself to them in a big,
20 ignitatile cruiser than
u saiT in with a little World
War 11 destroyer."
itl??7%-0;11tif,'01Re
Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean
hnc niy lit' if fl +oinacitv
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15 November 1971
CPYRGHT
A LOOK AT 'U.S.-SOVIET
RIVALRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Interview With V. Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.
With Soviet and U. S. warships maneuvering
at close quarters in. the Mediterranean, could
an accident lead to war? How good is Russian
surveillance? Would reopening the Suez Canal
add significantly to Moscow's global might? ?
Aboard U.S.S. SPRfNGFIELD in MEDITERRANEAN
(,) Admiral Now, %vault, reopening the buez t...anat give
the Soviet Union a dramatic new advantage in the Mediter-
ranean or thc Indian Ocean?
A From the Soviet point of Ariew, there would be less a
tremendous advantage than a tremendous convenience.
The largest single Soviet fleet in !mothers of surface ships
is their Black Sea Elect. Their "locker room" in the Black
Sea is convenient to the "playing field" in the Mediterra-
nean. Thirty-six hours after their ships leave Odessa or
Sevastopol, they can piss through the Dardanelles and be
(a Egypt. Or tiley can reach the entrance of the Suez Canal
in about 40 hours. ;
The Suez would lw a fine short cut to the Indian Ocean:
They could avoid the long way down, out past Gibraltar,
around West Africa and Up the other side. So, from the So-
viet point of view, (aiming the Suez Canal would be a
tremendous convenience. As you know, the Russians already
keep some ships in the Indian Ocean.
O Is the U. S.?and specifically the Sixth Fleet?in ally
danger of being pushed out of the Eastern Mediterranean?
A No?absolutely no.' We can't be forced out of any
placc, Someone might try to drive us out by fighting?or try
to bluff us out. That simply hasn't happened here.
? What do these two big fleets?U. S. and Soviet?do
in the Mediterranean? Is it mainly a matter of keeping tabs
on Cadl other?
A That is certainly part of it. They keep tabs on us, but
t h k business of watching works both ways.
I'm intensely interested, for example, in their new de- I
signs. the new systems that we see installed in their new
ships?their implied new capabilities. WC Nvatch their ships?
not all of theiu. hot those I select, based upon -a
corn-
hi;ituiii of Iiings. A new device: What is it? flow does it - -
work? We follow that ship?and watch and learn.
When a Soviet ship comes down with one of ,their more
advanced weapons systems installed?one that could pose a
serious threat to our ships?it stands to reason that we want
to Leep an eye on that ship and know what he is about all
die time. This we do.
0 Do Ow Stu. s harass you?try to interfere with your
I !rut nuu s?
A .1111.11` ttid,rd IICCatiiiIIIS WIWI) .tifiell MIMES, IMI 11M11
t,??oliyIN Itrn? 11, Ihe \irdnurranValt. There IMP Ind-
it, 11,,, tdif?ft? 111'111111S ecnbetallet? and carelessness
,tt% ,.liaves'.
For answers, Alex Kucherov of the staff of
"U. S. News & World Report" interviewed Ad-
miral Kidd shortly before he relinquished com-
mand of the Sixth Fleet last month. The inter-
view now has Defense Department approval.
A change has taken place, incidentally. Ten years ago
t c Russians used small trawlers or ex-fishing craft to trail
.,Now you see a guided-missile frigate doing the job. This
a good indicator of the growth of their navy.
Q Is this continuing surveillance dangerous?
A Their motivations, I'm sure, are very similar to ours?
e iriosity, a desire for close-in photography?and if t110
N cattier is bad, if the ceiling is low, they've got to come
1 w to see.
I've operated up in Norwegian waters on large exercises
s here the Soviets were intensely interested in what we were
dung. The weather is absolutely abominable tip there. The
c fling is low, it's rough, it's windy, it's cold. I tell you our
a lators there had nothing but admiration for Soviet air-
anship. These great big long-range Bears and Badgers
e me down low over the water to observe our ships. The veil-
ii
g was under a thousand feet, and they had to be that low
t see. ?
CI When Soviet ships approach lyours and you warn
t cm, do they respond? Do they keep clear?
A The question 'implies they come too close. The signals
e send are more often signals of intent: "I'm going to turn
I the right," "I'm going to turn to the kit," "FM going to
gin refueling; please keep clear." Generally, they do, -
CI Could an accident in the area escalate into war?
A We pride ourselves on being very, very circumspect
a id careful professionals. One of the absolute orders of the
y in the Sixth Fleet is to guarantee that we deport our-
Ives accordingly..
When their aircraft approach our ships and we intercept
t em far out from the ships that they might be reconnoitering,
I ere's no nonsense, no playing around, pointing things at
o c another?absolutely none. They will open the bomb bays,
a d we go under and look up inside?no bombs.
I would reassure you most careNlly and thoroughly on
t at point?most carefully. Anyone villo believes that World
ar HI is about to start over here because there are con-
f ontations by irresponsible people is just looking for a
adline.
? How powerful n force do the Soviets have here?
A They have an absohitely first-rate force here, and we
onld be fools to mulerestimate their potential. They are
lifessionals. Their ships are quite obvionsly well Imilt.
The Soviets are not 9 feet tall by a long shot, but they
we good. They have made it their business to 'flirt) from
t Ic best in the business?and that's us.
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They've been- following us around fon years?Watching,
koning. copying, We make mistakes, sometimes in tactics,
in uvollitions, Ill ship designs, in techniques, in such simple
things as replenishing at sea. They watch. Then within a very
t time we ronected from their watching, the adap.
lion of mho math] NVOrk best for tluan in installations on
their own ships.
Side-to-side refueling is an _example. They started out ns-
ing the astern method of refueling, which we used early in
Wodd War II, and then progressed to the more efficient
alongside refueling method.
Q Is the Soviet submarine fleet in the Mediterranean
much larger than yours?
A Indeed it. is--to the tune of about 4 or 5 to 1. If you
want to know why there is this tremendous concentration,
I think the answer can. be found somewhere among the
following: .. .
First, they have large numliens of stibmarirles in their
military inventory. If you have a, job to do and you've got
a toolbox filled with one kind of tool and are limited in
"tow of the other kinds of tools, Situ will use what you have.
So they bring in snbmarines.
Secondly, we have abominable sound conditions in the
%Iliterranetm. It probably thie worst body of water on
the face of the earth in which to locate a submarine, bar
11000. The hot winds off the desert rapidly evaporate the
v.,fliate water. The rusidnal salt sinks. That causes great
turbulence, and variations in salinity. This in turn affects
dm paths of sound waves: They bend. The fish down here,
the marine lily. iire very chatty creatures and create a very
elm noise level, The number of commercial ships at sea
Add!, It OR' 111.01110I11. ()II oily f/Ile day dm density of ship-
lUg square mile of Mediterrinwan water is fantastic?.
peihaps not as high as ill tile Nit dose to
This makes noise. All (il these factors affect the ability of
Antis( ibinarine sl ips lii find siihmarin es.
Thirdly, the Russians IlaVe a "choke point"- philosophy.
That is, tlICY Valli to he tillre that they have enough sub-
1,1a, mes to cont oil the natnral choke points in the Mediter-
rmcan. There .are seven of them: moving from west to east?
(dbraltar, the waters between Sardinia and the African
,tt4st, the Strait of Sicily, die Strait of Messina, the area be-
hymn Crete and Africa, and the two passages at each end
of Crete leading into the Aegean Sea.
If you and I are playing in the line of the Chicago Bears
and we want to stop the runner from getting through the
line, we line up shoulder to shoulder so he can't squeeze
through. And I think that's why they'v. got so many sub-
marines. They line them up side by 'side so that nobody
can get through?at least not undetected.
Q Do they have underwater ballistic missiles?
A Yes, we give them credit for that?not with all these
submarines but with their new boats and their new missiles.
. 0 Do the MIG-23s recently introduced into Egypt lilt
significantly the balance of power in the Mediterranean?
A Yes, the Russians have MIG-23s in Egypt. I don't
think it will have any great effect. No one weapon or weap-
ons system of this type?no matter what it is?can be that
important.
Q Does the U.S.S.R. have amphibious forces here?
. A Yes, they have their naval infantry in the Mediter-
ranean and a lift for that infantry ready in Egypt. They have
enough amphibious. lift down here to haul a battalifm?a
battalion landing team. That force of a half dozen or so
amphibious ships, LST's and smaller laniling craft they keep
here all the time.
O Does this Soviet expansion of naval power concern
you?
A 'I don't think we should suddenly reach for the panic
button. They are behaving the way many countries have
behaved over the centuries in pushing their trade frontiers
?and tlmin flag?as far as they can.
The Phoenicians' merchantmen sailed far and wide, and
I lie in eminlyYmon hi the rowing-machine warships, with
shields hung over the side next to the- oarsmen, and spears
in the seats beside them, were not far behind. This is the
way maritime-oriented and economically motivated nations
have operated for centuries. It's what the Russians arc doing
now.
The disquieting thing is their rate of growth and, of
course, their ultimate goals: flow will they use what they
have, and to What purpose? It's. clear to me OW they are
no longer interested in parity at sea. 1 believe they hare set
their sights on naval supremacy.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
13 September 1971
WHERE RUSSIAN THREAT
? KEEPS GROWING
Interview With Artim. Elmo N. Zumwalt, Jr.,
? U.S. Chief of 1Vavot Operations
? CPYRGHT
It mere were a showdown betwelen
U. S. and Soviet power at sea, who would
prevail? That's a vital question at a thine
when U. S. strength is dwindling-Lin
manpower, ships and planes?and Rus-
sia is showing more muscle.
How big a worry is this? Just what is
Moscow up to? What comes next?
Admiral Zumwalt came to the confer-
ence room of "U. S. News & World Re-
port" to answer these and other ques-
tions in this exclusive interview.
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? s .11.1ta hal _c isis, they
A l'here are pluses and minuses.
With reeard to personnel, we are generally better off f .nm
a quality standpoint. Our re-enlistment rates have impro ?ed.
.1 loweeer, we're not :Is strong in numbers because w I've
I een required to make major reductions in personnel--d nye
from 692,-135 officers and men a year ago to 622,500 now.
Nor are we as strong from the standpoint of ships, bee: use
we have also made major reductions there as well. Whereas
we had 769 naval ships a year ago, we are down to 70C to-
day. ?Ve also have 770 fewer aircraft than a year ago.
. So we have gained qualitatively with regard to people;
lost quantitatively with regard to people, ships and aircraft.
- Q Has this been because of the cost of the Vietnam war? .
- - A The effect of the Vietnam war has been, in essdnce,
to cost us the equivalent of about a generation of . hip-
building. What increases there were in Navy budgets have
been spent largely on attrition aircraft, bombs, bullets ' and
increased operating expenses. .
If you look at the years 1962 through 1972, in its Ship-
building appropriations the Navy was down to less thin a
billion dollars per year at a time when we should have )een
spending 3 billion dollars a year on new ships. We need that
much if we are to replace our 75-billion-dollar plant every
25 years.
Q Compared :Nvith 10 years ago, is the Navy a str nger
or a weaker force?
A Weaker in some categories and stronger in others.
With regard to the submarine force, the Navy is stn tiger .
than it was 10 years ago because we've been able to conitinue
our nuelear-eonstrection program, using nuclear submtrines
to replace the much less capable diesel submarines.
On the other liand, the number of Aircraft carriers has
been dramatically reduced, and this has meant major reduc-
tion in mu strength. We are down from 24 to 16 carriers.
The number of escorts has been dramatically reduced.
And although there have been qualitative improvements as
new ships have been built, the improved quality has not
been ade, plate to make up for the reduction in numbers that
we've lost.
O Against that background, Admiral, what has happened
to the Navy's responsihilitie.s worldwide? Have they tended
tia shriek in this period?
A No. In my judgment, the Navy's responsibilities ac
greater than they've ever been before. We've always been
the nation's first line of defense.
You will recall I hat during the Korean War it was the
? Navy carrier air support that made it possible for us to hang
on to the Pusan perimeter as our bases were overrun in i
South Korea, and it was the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious
landing at Inchon that outflankied the North Koreans and :
drove them out of the South Korean Peninsula.
During the Southeast Asia war, naval carriers carried the
large fraction of the action while we were building our air -
bases ashore irethe first year.
At the present time, under the Nixon Doctrine it is clear
that the high-technology services?air and naval power?are
going to be required increasingly to come to the support of
indigenous armies of our allies. I would have to say
that the Navy's mission is greater than it has been in the
past, as I understand the Nixon Doctrine.
C) Does the Soviet Navy worry you?
A The Soviet Navy is dramatically more powerful than it
was 10 years ago. You can trace, almost to the moment, the
point at which the Soviets began their tremendous construc-
tion program in two fields: one to achieve strategic nuclear
parity, and the other to achieve a strong naval capability
with the results of the lessons they learned in the Cuban
missile crisis.
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acquisition of a submarine fleet which outnumbers ours by 3
to 1 and which is outbuilding us at an appreciable annual
rate. They have acquired air, power increasingly capable
of coming to grips with ships at sea because they arc in-
creasingly picking up airfields around the Eurasian littoral.
They have built surface ships that have been optimized with
the surface-to-sm?face missile against our surface ships.
Q If there were a, showdown with the Soviet Navy at
sen, what would be your prediction as to the outcome?
A This is, of course, a very speculative question, but I
think that no matter who does the analysis he would con-
clude that if the U. S. continues to reduce and the Soviet
Union continues to increase, it's got to be inevitable that
the day will come when the result will go against the U. S.
Mr. Nixon pointed out in a press confereneC on July 30,
1970. a point that I think is most perceptive about sea pow-
and that is the dramatic difference between what the
'ix need?as basically a land power?and what we Reed?
as basically a maritime power.
Their vital interests require a large Army and Air Force to
protect the Eurasian heartland. Our vital interests require a
'capability to control and use the seas to hold together the
-.maritime alliance of Nvhich we're a part.
, The Soviets don't need a Navy superior to ours to protect
their vital int crests. They only can aspire to have a Navy
Luger tlian ours for imrposes of interfering with our vital
interests. -
Q Is the Soviet Union doing well in the Mediterranean?
challenging our superiority?
_ A Yes. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has just
recently?on Max' 27, 1971?negotiated, probably for some
very suitable price, a 15-year treaty of friendship and co-
operation that may well assure their continued use of
IEgyptian naval and air bases in the United Arab Republic.
They may not be successfel in communizing the Government
r of the U.A.R., but they have been successful in achieving a
. very firm geopolitical position.
- 0 We keep hearing that the Soviets want to drive east
III Suez. into the Indiau Ocean, an area the U. S. has stayed
pretty clear of. Is that your appraisal?
A Yes. It's exactly what I would be doing if I were run-
ning the Soviet empire and if I had the same ideology
that they have. They have several goals in going into the
intlian Ocean:
In the first place, the presence of their ships there in much
larger numbers than ours gives them the same opportunity
to convert this presence, coupled with an aggressive foreign
policy, into the acquisition of port capabilities that they've
been able to achieve in the Mediterranean and in the Red
Sea.
SeCO1ld, it helps them complete the encirclement of Corn-
011111151 China, which I'm sure is a national objective of theirs. ?
C) Would opening the Suez Canal help that purpose?
A Definitely. It would bring their Black Sea Fleet many
thousands of miles closer to its home ports. .
Q Wouldn't use of the Suez Canal bring the Indian Ocean
closer for the U. S. fleet,- too?
A The figures are roughly 9,000 miles closer for the So-
viets and roughly 2,000 miles closer frt es. That would he
the case if one believes that we could get through the Suez
Canal in times of crisis. I'm not sure that we conld.
Q Is it also true that some U. S. aircraft carriers are too
big to go through the Suez Omni? I
A That's also correct.
13 There are reports that, as the Vietnam war winds
down, some of our Pacific Fleet may go into the Indian
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YRGHT
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A This is a political judgment that has to he macle?and
hasn't yet been, made. U. S. naval ships arc able to go any-
where any time.
O 'What do you have in the Indian Ocean area now?
A We have maintained a World War Il seaplane tender
and two World War II destroyers there for a number of
years.
The Soviets have come from a presence much less than
that to maintenance, on the average, or eight to nine ships
'at :my one time in the Indian Ocean.
O What kind of new base are you building on the atoll
of Diego Garcia, south of India?
A A very austere communications facility.
? Could it he developed into something more sobstantial
if the decision were made?
A There are no plans to do so.
O When you talk about the presence of our fleet and
their fleet in the Indian Ocean, what do these ships do?call
at ports and generally show the flag or sail around hi
maneuvers? -
A They do both. It's the visible presence of naval power
that has such tremendous impact on littoral nations.
For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization n-
on the southern flank of Europe all onaninumsly feel
that the presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet is their guarantor
against encroachment by the Soviet Union, and that's why
it's so desperately important for this country to maintain
sufficient naval strength to keep our commitments in the
Sixth Fleet?and also in the Seventh Fleet in the Western
Pacific.
? In this regard, it is said that if a situation similar to
the 1958 Lebanon crisis recurred, the U. S. Sixth Fleet
would not be able to net as forcefully now as it did at that
time because of the presence of the Soviets in the Mediter-
unman. Do you agree with that?
A No. You will recall that during the Jordanian crisis
Inst year President Nixon made the decisir to reinforce the
Sixth Fleet with a third carrier task foire, and the U.S.S.
Guam embarked Marines?arid the crisis abruptly abated.
There were, of course, other things that happened at the
Sallie time that made a contribution, but it clear to me
that, as the President stated on Sept. 29, 1970, "the pOWer
and the mobility, the readiness of the Sixth Fleet in this
period was absolutely indispensable in keeping the peace in
the Mediterranean."
This was one of those cases where the capability of the
- United States to deploy naval and Marine power on the in-
ternational seas, without having to 'obtain base rights from
anybody, made the difference.
I 0 Admiral, getting back to relative strengths, is it true
that the Soviet Navy outguns the U. S. Navy, except for
carrier-based aircraft?
A Let me answer this Way:
If the United States today soddenly decommissioned all
of its aircraft carriers, we would lack ani' capability what-
soever to control and use the seas. We have a very, very
capable weapons system in the aircraft carrier?particularly
in the nuclear-propellcd aircraft carrier with its ability to
maintain very high speeds at t1I limes and to be constantly
rem:y-100 per cent rcady?to go the minute the decision is.
-made ;aid ?vitli the capahility La ontrange the surfaee-to-sur-
face missile of the Soviet ships.
O of the 16 U. S. carriers in commission, how many are
imelear-powered?
A We have one operating, two building. We badly need
a (mirth. We're going k) be making the most vigorous pos-
sible case fowiki6ir'sraliglivertii,fi. Illoiroosimp-Oyairo2
thanly both tyowtte Ifn h .
Mit% ,orOess.
o Do you have enough escort ships capable of keeping
pace with these nuelear carriers?
A We need more escort ships as well.
0- Do you have :my interest in using helicopter carriers,
the Nvay the Soviet Union does?
A We're in the process of designing at present a sea-
control ship?a ship that will be in the 12,000 to 20,000-
ton range and will carry helicopters and vertical-takeoff-and-
filed in g a ircraft.
These earl in no way be considered a substitute for air-
craft carriers. They vill have a very limited?practically
4ero?capability to project our power inland, as our carriers
have had to do to save us in Korea and Southeast Asia.
But they will make a significant contribution to the protec-
tion of convoys and of task forces which are confined to a
given geographical arca?by defending against both the
submarine and the aircraft, and. the missile coming from
either that aircraft or that submarine.
.ta Is it possible that weapons arc coming along that will
Make the carrier much more vulnerable than it is now?
A One of the most overstated claims, in my judgnient, is
the vulnerability of the carrier. None of the oldest class of
carriers which we have remaining in the fleet today?the
Essex-class carriers which were in World War II?was ever
Many of them took as many as five or six hits by the first
guided_ missile iu history?the Japanese kamikaze aircraft?
carrying payloads equivalent to the warheads of the current
surface-to-surface missiles. And many of them look several
torpedo bits. In every ease, within a relatively slinrt period,
they were back in action?frequently an hour later. NVIien
the time came, they went back to port for repairs.
Since that time, the modern class of carriers. all but
three of which are of postwar construction, has been given
mulch more protection?heavier armor, more compartmenta-
tion, much better damage control?so that, although our car-
riers will take 'hits, they will have a very high degree of
survivability.
The nuclear carrier Enterprise suffered a fire, you will re-
call, and nine 1,000-pound bombs exploded. Ilad the En-
terprise needed, she could have been back in action within
a couple of hours.
? A new nuclear carrier is priced at 800 million dollars.
How do you justify spending that much for one ship?
A One has to ask oneself how much we. have spent for
the privilege of having the equivalent of the aircraft .carrier
?that is, a hind-based airfield?in an overseas area where we
need it.
For example, Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya had a rela-
tively brief lifetime before the U. S. was asked to leave, and
yet the costs for that airfield during its lifetime were prob-
ably . very comparable to the costs of a mielear aircraft
carrier for its 40-year life cycle..
Furthermore, that aircraft carrier has the capability to be
anywhere in the world as the geopolitical situation changes,
and not just in one portion of the African desert.
As wc consciously shift to a posture in which we expect
our allies to provide. their own indigenous capability, the best
way to have the assets rapidly capable of concentration to
support one particular ally which may be beleaguered is to
. have your airfields seaborne.
O Do most members of Congress share this feeling?
? A No. There are many who do, but many are not
convinced.
I think the thing the Navy has to do is to continue to
make the case. The facts clearly speak for themselves. In the
Jordanian crisis, as an example, the only airfields capable
C IsCROPTO letiMee0002 0 sW20010Q*12rs.
Could I. take two or three minutes- to deal further with
r
CPYRGHT
this? I thi?APPrAYM'OnF9PRPIRWedigfatiiMa
tlw Navy has.
The first capability is our contribution to the strategic
nuclear deterrent of the nation. In the past this has been the
Polaris-missile-carrying submarine. It is being converted now
to Poseidon, which will give. its an invulnerable com-
ponent of the over-all deterrent through the '70s, and we
are designing a follow-on system for the '80s. Increasing*
in the future, we are going to have to rely on our sea-based
systems.
We then have conventional mks which we carry out. One
is our peacetime overseas presence?the kind of thing we
have been talking about: sea control and the projection of
power Overseas.
We control the seas with our aircraft carriers, capable of
sinking surface ships, surfaced submarines, shooting down air-
craft and, with our F-14 aircraft, shooting down the missiles
from any one of those enemy sources. We use our killer sub-
marines, our attack submarines, our destroyers.
We project our power also with the aircraft from our
carriers capable of projecting '600 and 700 miles inland,
with our Marines capable of being projected from our am-
phibious force, and with our merchant marine, which in
Southeast Asia had to carry 96 per cent of the millions of
tons required to support ourselves and our allies and which,
even after the completion of the purchase of the very fine
C-5A aircraft, will be required to carry 94 per cent of the?
logistics to go on the surface of the seas. Even the aviation .
gas to get that C-5A aircraft home so that it can carry a usable
:load overseas has to go in surface ships.
Q Admiral, if the aircraft carrier is so .important, why'
don't the Soviets have any?
A The Soviets started out way behind. Their first priority'
was to scramble frantically to get a capability to deal with
our superior Navy. That meant building submarines, and it
meant blinding surface ships which would be expendable
hut capable of firing a surface-to-surface missile in a first'
strike against our carriers?hopefully to create enough dam,'
ago that they could try to come in and finish up with sub-1
marines and aircraft. ?
We are doing a number of things to negatethis?a whole
host of things such as our own surface-to-surface missile.
We're working hard on antimissile defense, and of course
our carriers have a very high degree of invulnerability.
Ct Is the biggest threat still the Soviet submarines?
A Yes, because they have 3 times the number of sub-
marines that we do, and they are building at roughly 21/ ?
times the rate we're building.
O What progress has been made in antisubmarine de-
fenses?
A We continue to improve our techniques. In my judg-
ment, we know everything that we need to know in order to
deal with the threat. Om problertn is to retain adequate
forces to deal with it.
We have the antisubmarine aircraft?the aircraft oper-
ating from land bases, the antisubmarine aircraft operating
from our aircraft carriers?we have the antisubmarine es-
corts, we have our attack submarines, all of which are
capable collectively of dealing with this threat if we are
permitted to retain adequate numbers.
O Are you going to have adequate numbers under the
budget that you now are preparing?
A The Congress reduced the Navy budget submitted by
the President by 2 billion dollars in 1971. That represented
a serious setback in our capability.
There arc indications that the Congress will reduce the
President's budget in 1972. If that happens, then once again
our capability will take a further reduction. I don't know
the size of AroveklePtirAtelehasen14199f019P02
addition we willlose.
:CIA0-INGiRlefame4/400000000Mtaerinc force..
make the defense problem vastly more difficult?
A Yes. They are faster, they're capable of remaining sub- -
merged for longer periods ,of time, and they are therefore
more of a threat than the diesel submarines.
O Does that suggest that we might be losing ground?
A The question has to be answered in two frames of refer-
ence: We have made the. qualitative progress, and we have
the know-how. The question is whether or not we will be
permitted to retain the force levels necessary to do the job--
and that is a question that I can't answer.
o Talking about know-how, are you satisfied with, the
Navy's research programs? ?
A T am. We need to continue always a vigorous research-
and-development- program in order to stay ahead, because
the Soviets are always making iinprovements in their sub-
marine capabilities. But qualitatively I am satisfied with our
present superiority. If we had the force levels to go with! it
we would have no problem.
Cr A couple of ideas have been talked about receollyt
first, putting the land-based Minuteman missile at sea and,
second, possibly sending our antiballistic missiles to sea to
make them less vulnerable to a surprise attack. Do you see
any virtue in either of these ideas?
A Both of these ideas get into the field of strategic
iu-
clear balance, and that is something that is currently under
? negotiation in the strategic-arms-limitation talks with the
Soviets. I think it would be preferable for me not to dis iss
that.
? IN there an official policy against your talking about
strategic systems?
A None other than the obvious fact that when you have
diplomatic negotiations going on, the better part of valor.
, for a military man is to keep his mouth shut.
'TRAWLERS THAT NET INTELLIGENCE? I
Admiral, what do you think about these Soviet 114%0-
! ers operating off mu. coasts?
- A They are I here to collect all kinds of int dligence?
everything from the most sophisticated kind of electronics
, intelligence to picking lip debris dropped over the skip of
our ships.
? What do you mean by "electronics intelligence"?
A They record everything that they can hear in the
electromagnetic spectrum?that is, our radars, radios anfl so
, forth. They're interested in getting information on everything
we have, in our order of battle ashore and at sea and in the
. ; air: what kinds of radios we use, what kinds of frequencies;
what kinds of radars we use, what their frequencies fare?
things of that nature.
-o tfas the Navy been keeping a pretty close watch on
the possibility that the Soviets may still try to build a sub-
marine base in Cuba? And why did they try to build one in
the first place?
A We keep a constantly close eye on it.
What the Soviets would have gained had they achieved
a base in Cuba is a capability to maintain about one third
more missile submarines on station than they are nowl able
to maintain.
They also would have violated the agreements originally-
arrived at between Chairman Khrushchey and Presiden Ken-
nedy at die time of the Cuban missile crisis. And, the dare,
I think President Nixon took a very important and bo !d and -
courageous step in insuring that these understanding were
r not violated. ,
? Arc you sure that the Soviet Union in fact doesn't
have a submarine base in Cuba?
:
("114i14149440340(20020060492 of iSoviet
? subs in the Cull of Mexico or off our other coasts? I
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A 1 think I should limit myself to the statement that we
do know that they arc there?that the Soviets do maintain
missile Si ibmarines off our coasts.
O Are they increasing the number of missile submarines
off ow coasts?
A They obviously have, since they used to have none and
now they have some.
They am also building the new Yankee class at a fantastic
rate.
Q If a Soviet submarine were to fire a missile from 100
miles offshore in the Atlantic toward Washington, D. C.,
would there be any defense against that kind of attack?
A Yes. The best defense is to have your own missiles at
sea where they can't be damaged by such an attack. I'm
speaking about the threat of retaliation. In my:. judgment,
it is the very best answer we have.
Q Do you mean that antisubmarine-warfare devices won't
really protect you 100 per
cent of the time?
A No?because it takes
time to sink submarines,
and it takes only a very few
seconds to get missiles off.
Therefore, if an enemy na-
tion decides to strike first
it is going to be able to get
its missiles off before you're
able to move in for an anti-
submarine kill.
o On another subject,
Admiral: If we go to an all-
volunteer military service, is
this going to effect the kind
of recruiting you've been
able to do? Can the Navy
mailman) the kind of (milli-
at ive improvement you
tined about. if there's no
draft to encourage men to
enlist?
A First, it's absolutely
clear that we had to have a
two-year draft extension.
There was zero prospect of
achieving an all-volunteer
force while continuing to
fight the South Vietnam war
with the large number of
men required at its peak.
Second, having gotten the
extension, all of the service
chiefs must do their very
best to try to achieve the
capability to get nothing
but volunteers ,by 1973. We
all know that the three services that are all-volunteer at the
? present time?Navy, Marines :Ind Air Force?arc only all-
volunteer because there is a draft.
Third, I'm not able to perceive how rapidly the country
will recover from its typical, cyclical postwar syndrome.
which involves a considerable inumber of mit people having
a rather negative image of the military. And unless that is
corrected there. will be lots of disinclinatine for the young
man to volunteer to join the military force. He's got to feel
that it's an honorable, worthwhile profession.
Fourth, I don't know whether or not the pay scales will
have been noule adequate by that time.
Doesn'L the pay-seek increase in the Br 04000
on of the APPIPMA4RctriVtAtome a
one? -
A The pay increase is very heavily oriented to attracting
the new man?and hasn't yet made a significant increase hi
the pay el the 111111 who hos finished his first tou and is
cote:idyl-Mg whether or not to re-enlist.
? Can you give us any idea of how many men cin re-
enlist after completing, (H IC tour?
A Dining. Ow las( six months of calendar 19fir it was
9.5 per cent. During the last six months or calender 1970
it was up to 16 per cent. In February and Mardh! of this
year ii was 20 or 21 per cent. We need 35 per cent.
O I low do you account for the increases so far?
A T think its a combination of factors: continuing ens-
'Oasis on the need In improve conditions of life, begun by
my predecessor and contineed by me?both of us working
for a Secrelary of the Navy who is very interested in this
field; in part the result of the economic downtime and in
part- the rest& of the fact that there is a certain percentage
of men who, when their country gets into the kind of trou-
ble we're in, are patriotic enough to decide, "By go1ly6Em
going to give it another gor
o Are you getting those higher retention rates in the
highly skilled ratings. that you need?
A No?that's one of ow problems. We're doing better in
the less-skilled ratings and not as well in the ratings involv-
ing much more technical -education because those? young
- met] obviously, cae draw much higher salaries on the outside, ?
and it's more difficult to compete with civilian industry.
This is true of all the serVices.
Q What aboitt the officer corps?
A In the officer corps we have three primary categories ?
in the line?subioariners, aviators and surface officers.
The retention of submarinc officers has been improving as a
resnit of some improvements in the conditions of their detail-
ing mid as a result of a bonus we're now able to pay nuclear
SUbmariners as a result of legislation passed a year or so ago.
In I he case of our aviation officers, retention rates ore
also improving.
As for i hi irfacc officer, tlw retention rates are not im-
Famine. These are the officers who take the largest impact
11.,In din continuing long deployments of our surface Ahips
ill 101Vigil %staters.
"PEACE BY MILITARY STRENGTH"-
- Q You spoke a moment ago about a "postwar syedrome"
as a Mal ter of concern. Would you elaborate on that?
A I hink there is a significant :minority who feels that
the military services and military personnel arc simply no
longer reit-iv:nit in the modern world.
Foot manly, I believe (kit a respectable majority still con-
I irmes to imderst and that, as thc President has suggested, yott
can only have a generation of peace by maintaining the nec-
essary military strength.
? Is this minority feeling gaining ground?
A We have been going through- a period when it has
been spreading, tin not able to perceive when the pendulem
swing back.
We do know that historically we've gone through this
kind Of period alter each war. Vietnam is now the lengest
and most unpopular war in our history. It may take a little
longer for the pendolum to swing, but I believe that it
clearly will, given the tremendnus efforts that the Prelident
:and the Secretary of Defensc. arc making to insure that the
people understand, and given the fact that if we conthitue to
weaken ourselves it will be quite obvious from the wily in
Which the world community begins to destabilize that we
must- do more lommintain our military strength.
: CIPPRITif07,9-0T110, 009200200001e-2n"?",41 re-
futer. your snore estantisnment mut save money %yowl you
could net into nen, vcapons systems?
A we could and should reduce our shore establish-
ment as our fleet comes down in Si7.P. We r:111110i: however,
dir,Rtititi4e 119991199/02
s
save great Aivirtimille.i
year you 15fni-OSt not ting necause tnere are siunific.mt
closing cOsts. Alit I would say, as a erysial-ball guess, that if
we were able to dose all those bases that we ought to dose. '
we could save something ori the order of a quarter of a bil-
lion dollars per year:
"WE NOW EXPECT MORE FROM ALLIES"--:
o Does the Nixon Doctrine hold out some substantial
hope of being able to abandon some of your bases in the
Far East, for example? Could you scrap them all and move
back to Pearl Harbor?
A I would hope that the day would never come when
the United States is forced to fall back to Pearl. You remem-
ber that's where we started when we had to begin the long,
costly fight all the way back across the Western Pacific
after the attack against us at Pearl Harbor.
The forward basing that we now have is going to change
somewhat in concept. That is, under the Nixon Doctrine
we've come to expect Pinch more from our allies' contribut-
ing to their own strength.
But we are always going ItO want bases in some areas
overseas as a substitute for a Ouch larger and more expensive
number of forces that we would have to maintain in order
to keep our ships supplied, and so forth.
Q So you're not seriously thinking of falling back over
the next three to five years?
A No. As far as the Navy is concerned, I believe we're
going to want to maintain bases in most of the countries
where we're now based. There will be some retrenchments,
hitt none of major proportions.
O Several years ago there was talk of building some
fairly large bases in Australia. has this gone by the hoard?
nPYRGHT
A There's nothing currently on the horizon with regard
: Ciik-RDP7944494A00020020800/N12 snme' ba-se
improvements on their own.
Some Australians talk about an alliance?a naval group-
ing of Japan, Indonesia, Australia?to protect trade routes
through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. Is that
at all feasible?
A Under the Nixon Doctrine we will make every use of
Allied forces that are available in any kind of a crisis
situation.
if, for example, there were a crisis involving, say, the In-
donesian area and if the President determined that our na-
tional interest required it, or the Indonesians felt threatened
and joined with us in management of that crisis, certainly
any forces they had would be welcomed.
? We have treaty commitments with the Japanese and with
the Australians, and the President has stated that treaty
commitments would be honored.
? Are you happy about the pace at which the Japanese
are picking up their naval defenses?'
A I think the Japanese Navy has made significant prog-
ress. They started from a very, very low figure, as yotOcnow.
I would hope to see them do more in the years ahead.
? One final question: Is it not. a fact, Admiral, that the
Russian Navy has not been tested in battle since the Russo-
Japanese War almost 70 years ago?
A Not quite a fact. The Russian Navy had some engage-
ments in World War. 1 and in World War II. They did a
relatively pitiful job.
They have certainly demonstrated a much greater degree
of professionalism in the last quarter of a century, and a
very rapidly increasing degree of professionalism in the
last 10 years. ?
I consider them a first-class professional outfit.
SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS
August 1971
'Lae Soviet i1ee in Lae ivi,eciitprrankNa4
A.% ??? ? ? ' ? %
Arnold Hottmger .g
CPYRGHT ?
The Soviet-Egyptian pact of May 27 will help
.retain for Soviet 'warships their docking, supply and
repair facilities in the harbors of Alexandria and
Port Said. The Syrian harbor of Latakiya will doubt-
less &leo- remain open to them, although on a less
secure footing. In Egypt the Soviets. also have
bas.es,.wtiich are completely in their hands, manned'
by Russian trocip's and ground crews. It. is..Icnowp
that there are at least four such. bases, three near
the Mediterranean coast between Burj al-Arab and
Alexandria and at . least one to the south near
Luxor. From these bases Soviet pilots, flying Mig
aircraft with Egyptian markings, undertake regular
flights over the Mediterranean. In an emergency
situation they could fill the gap created by the ab-
sence of aircraft carriers in the Soviet Mediter-
ranean fleet. In Luxor, which is now barred to
tourists, the Soviet pilots reportedly begin operations
daily at k a. m. and finish at about 4 p. m. Word is
also circulating in Cairo about lively construction
Approved For RPlease 1999/0 02 ?
activity by Soviet- marine engineers near Marsa
Matrurr on the coast of the western desert., ,where.
Rommel once had his headquarters. This area is
also' barred to foreign travellers. It seems that, in'
a narrow rocky bay, a harbor is being constructed
which could serve as d ref* for submarines. rn
addition to the purely Soviet-run facilities there are
also joint Soviet-Egyptian airbases, missile stations,
training camps and so forth.
The Soviet .Union's intentions must doubtless be
seen in connection with the old Russian dream
I
of "access to the warm seas." This is an eminently '
imperialist dream. For the Czarist empire, it meant
competing with the great European colonial powers.
Colonial policy IN- th6 19 th ten ttiey- 'Wag -Baled -45-n?
the proverbialAgunboats..The Russian dream meant
that the Czarist empire also wished to send its gun-
boats out into. the seas of the world as instruments
of expansionist policy. In the 20th century, however,
there is no "classical" colonial policy any longer.
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but there is that which the Soviet ideologues and
the politicians of the Third World term "neo-colo-
nialism." By this they mean the economic and power
superiority which the industrially developed nations
have over less developed or underdeveloped lands.
The Soviet Union partakes of this superiority. Its
navy is an instrument designed to make that supe-
riority felt for its own benefit.
In the political sphere an ultimate issue is whether
the Third World, in the more or less distant future,
will attach itself to or incline toward the Soviet
power bloc or whether it will prefer and manage
to establish' a free political system which would
automatically bring it into closer contact with the
democratic Western world and make it view the
Communist system with mistrust. The presence of
a combat fleet of one or another great power near
the coasts of developing countries can have an
important influence on the decisions taken there. -?
1Tis process is well illustrated by the present
ease of the Mediterranean island of Malta. Poor
and over-populated, the island is compelled to co-
operate with great toreign powers. As long as the
ern powers had the Mediterranean to the.m-
, selves, Malta was constrained to seek its partner
? in the West despite severe friction between the
!Maltese, or at least important groups among them,
and their former British colonial masters. Financial
support from London could only be obtained, or
at least kept at a high level, if 'the Britiih maintained
their bases on the island. Now, following a change
in government, Malta has decided to regard its
agreements about those bases .as null and void.
Dom ?Mintoff, the island's new prime minister, can
afford to do this because of the Soviet presence in
the Mediterranean. Malta's strategic value for Great
Britain and NATO is no longer so great today.
Sicily is not far off, where airbases arc available free
of charge. But there is a serious danger that Malta
may eventually give the Soviet Union the right to
maintain strategic bases on the island and the NATO
powers cannot afford to ignore this possibility.
Miritoff is probably trying to exploit this situation
in order to extract higher compensation for the
use of the 'bases. Great Britain and NATO are
faced with the choice of yielding to this blackmail
or rejecting it. Without the .Soviet .presence they
could easily turn thumbs down?in fact the whole
matter would probably never have arisen. Malta
is forced to sell its Strategic position in order to
live, and the Russians are possible buyers. The island
could easily take a "neutralist" course, leaning to-
ward Moscow, and finally it might even form an
alliance with the USSR based on the Egyptian model.
There are other countries in the Mediterranean
in whicIAPPPGMICieEQinasilieaS euitnAgAig2
stable so that, in the long run, similar developments
might be possible. Aside from the Arab countries,
where feelings are getting progressively deeper about
Israel and Western support for the Jewish state,
there are dictatorially governed states such as Greece
and Spain in which, although they are presently
dominated by the extreme right, there is always the
danger of a domestic political swing to the other
extreme, because the moderate forces in these
countries are suppressed and in the event of a shake-
up would have a much more difficult time gaining
prominence than the groups of the extreme left,
which are always present and working underground.
Turkey too is undoubtedly heading for a difficult
period just now and it cannot be predicted with
certainty that the moderate forces which are present
there and currently dominate in the government .and
the military will be able to continue in control.
Mt? Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has an
I eminently political task. This means, however,
that the Mediterranean itself cannot be its final
goal, representing merely a way-station along a route
of penetration which runs through the Suez Canal
into the Red Sea and on to the Indian Ocean. The
number of potential political objectives beyond Suez
is incomparably greater. On the Red Sea there is
Sudan, if Moscow chooses to make the effort to
penetrate such a large and heavily populated country.
Saudi Arabia may sooner or later experience a
revolution, and this would open the way to the
Persian Gulf for whichever great power would be
on the spot at the right time and offer its protection
to the "revolutionaries" on the Arabian Peninsula
or impose it upon them. Further to the south lies
restless Eritrea, where a stubborn though small-
caliber guerrilla war is already in progress against
the Ethiopian emperor ancr his army. In general
Ethiopia, one of the last multi-ethnic empires in the
style of old Austria, will doubtless be faced by .
difficult times when Emperor Haile Selassie dies.
And just to the south, the "Issa and Afar" of ,
Djibouti are waiting for the end of French colonial
rule to leap at each other's throats, a conflict in
which Somalia wants to have its say.
On the western side of the Red Sea, Yemen has ?
developed into a momentarily stable country which is '
making rapid progress with Western aid. But in
South Yemen (Aden) the Chinese enjoy significant
political influence and are using it to maintain a
guerrilla movement. in Dhofar (Muscat and Oman)
which, should it develop further, cannot fail to have
an effect on the already disorderly?and apparently
irrevocably so?conditions in the interior of the
Persian Gulf, with its antagonistic sheikdoms. And '
beyond there spreads the Indian Ocean.
: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001 -2
79
CPYRGHT
are at a severe disadvantage because o?Ctileir support
7
of Israel. This might be another reason for America's
desire to open the Canal. With Suez reopened, thp
struggle for influence would be transferred to regiohs
where, aside from the important Arab coasts of the
Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the Western camp would
not be burdened by Arab resentment about Israel.
The proposals of Tunisian foreign minister Mas-
moudi, which have recently been repeated and which
suggest more active economic assistance from the
European countries to the Maghreb states, must be
understood in the context of the present power
struggle. If it would be possible to transplant
"European prosperity" to the Maghreb, the possibil-
ity of future Soviet influence there would be partially
eliminated. Today it seems rasher, a. utopian COTO'
cept, but nevertheless a fully prospering Mediter-
ranean might become such an unrewarding political
objective for the Soviet Union that it could possibly
evolve into that "Sea of Peace" about which the
advocates of a "European"? or a "neutralist" Mediter-
ranean policy speak so avidly.
ADDrovcd For Rhc CC13C
Once it can salt t rough t e Suez Canal, the
Soviet fleet will be faced by an embarrassment
of riches in choosing the point at which it should
first try to bring Soviet influence to bear in favor
of one or another local "progressive" force. But
as long as the Canal remains closed there is hardly
another part of the world so remote from the Soviet
Union as ? the politically promising Red Sea and
financially luring Persian Gulf. In view of these
rewarding possibilities the Soviets might even tem-
porarily reduce their pressure on the Mediterranean
if they could thereby pin access to the Red Sea.
This may be part of Wg'shington's calculations in an
effort to open the Canal.'iThe USA would apparently
? like to thus dampen the 'danger of an explosion h.%
the Mediterranean, although this would admittedly1
mean a tremendous expansion of the :Soviet radius
of action on the world seas.
However, as long as efforts to reopen the Canal
remain fruitless the Mediterranean will doubtless
continue to be the main field for maneuvering. On
the Arab coasts of the Mediterranean the Americans
NEWSWEEK
19 July 1971
CPYRGHT
Mediterranean Tide Runs for the Russians
BY ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE
Senior Editor
A71.ANTIC OCEAN
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Russia vs. the U.S. in the Mediterranean: A tireless drive to change the balance of power
lb Ohlonon
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3u
, IT 1 n1/.1t Pr.;:
PYRGHT
?
,s19w9e,Q,,,,104102
a young naval intelligence officer
could hardly contain his admiration for
the latest Soviet warships steaming in
the Mediterranean .Sea "That's a beau-
ty," he said, pointing to a photographic
blowup of a Kresta-class guided-missile
cruiser. "There's nothing,like it on our
side." Standing nearby, Vice Admiral
Isaac C. Kidd, the commander of the
U.S. Sixth Fleet, readily agreed. "A
humdinger," he said of the Soviet ship.
"Only 3,500 tons. But it's got the punch
of a pocket battleship."
Nowadays, . the Soviet Union packs
quite a wallop in the Mediterranean. On
a typical day last week, the wall-to-wall
situation room (map) at NATO's surveil-
lanre headquarters in Naples bristled
with symbols for Soviet men-o'-war: 55
versus the 44 in the Sixth Fleet (map).
And Russian political influence in the
strategically important inland sea has
grown apace with its fleet. Last week,
the Kremlin dispatched Ambassador
Mikhail Smirnovsky to the Maltese capi-
tal of Valletta in hopes of securing an
embassy in the onetime British posses-
sion. Both British and American spokes-
men professed to see no throat to the
NATO installation on Malta, doubting
that its newly elected leftist Premier
will turn over those naval facilities to
the Russians. But there was no mistaking
their fear?expressed also by Israeli De-
fense Minister I\ toNhe Dayan last week?
that the stwei , ssful Soviet penetration of
the Mediterranean is bringing nbont ft
fundamemal change in the balance of
power in the area.
There is no question in my mind that
the Russians see America's loss of taste
for international leadership as the oppor-
tunity to become the dominant power in
the Mediterranean and, ultimately, in the
entire Eurasian land mass and adjacent
oceans.
U.S. admirals in the Mediterranean
claim to be confident that, in the event
of a military showdown, the Sixth Fleet
could still overwhelm the Soviet fleet and
fulfill its "second strike" nuclear mission
against assigned targets in East Europe
and southern Russia. This claim to naval
superiority is evidently based on the
American fleet's two aircraft carriers,
ships whose firepower the Soviet fleet
cannot matcb on d ship-to-ship basis. But
it is worth remembering that the newly
installed Russian tactical air force in
Egypt?which has recently been dug into
220 hardened sites?can fly cover for the
Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and, if
need be, attack the U.S. flattops. More-
over, some military experts are convinced
that the two U.S. carriers have already
been effectively neutralized by the latest
Soviet guided-missile cruisers to arrive
in the sea. Finally, the ships of the U.S.
fleet are of much older vintage than the
Russian vessels, and at the present rate
of
the851,11Velplqdlcortlerleasit4999/09/02 :
-errancan cot will clear-
ly surpass the American armada in po-
? 1 icrpo
Al e.flWWi?
. est Eitropcans, this
expansion of Soviet power is directly re-
lated to critical changes in the American
home front. Tin Europeans realize that
the hitter test o of the Viet nnin war has
soured the U.S, on overseas commit-
ments, and they, me cooling to believe
that they may keen have to fend for
themselves. But with the proliferation of
Soviet power in the Mediterranean and
along Europe's oil-supply routes, Mos-
cow hopes to discourage a separate Eu-
ropean defense effort as futile, thereby
enoeuraging a trend toward West Eu-
ropean neutralism. The combination of
neo-isolationism in the U.S. and neutral-
ism in Europe could be the mix that re-
moves the Sixth Fleet from the Mediter-
ranean without a shot being fired.
Raymond Cartier, one of Europe's
most widely respected journalists, re-
cently wrote: "America has given Eu-
rope a quarter of a century of Invul-
nerability but Europe has not had the
foresight to transfer some of its opulence
to the problem of its own security. The
withdrawal of American forces in the
relatively near future is a.certainty. The
Mediterranean is now blanketed by So-
viet naval power lapping against Eu-
rope's southern coastline. The northern
front has also been outflanked by the
same Soviet naval power reaching into
the Atlantic."
Disarray: If Europe existed as more
than a geographic expression, there
might be an alternative to U.S. power.
But many countries that now might wish
to reduce their dependence on one or
the other of the two superpowers re-
gretfully conclude that there will be no
European alternative for a long time to
come. The European monetary union
project, a prerequisite for an integrated
European defense community, was dealt
yet another blow in the Franco-German
summit meeting last week when Chan-
cellor Willy Brandt and President .
Ceerges Pompidou failed to reach agree-
ment on the status of the floating
Deutsche mark (page 69). This kind of
Enropean disarray, coupled widi the fact
that the U.S. is already in retreat?al
least psychologically?means that things
will continue to go Russia's Wil y in an
area of vital concern to the entire West-
ern world,
Nlany Western officials and minim. 11-
[alms, convinced that gunboat diplomacy
is dead in on age of imilti-licaded nu-
clear missiles, have dismissed the Soviet
effort in the Mediterranean as wasti?ftd
and useless. But the Soviets Lnow better.
1,1,'hoti Egyptian President AllWar Sadat
piirged pro-Soviet plotters from Ins en-
tourage two months ago, Moscow man-
aged to morn than offset its losses; it
swiftly extracted front Sadat mm new fif-
teen-year treaty that tied Egypt even
closer to the Soviet (bean. Among the
mow reasons that led Sadat to sign the
viet presence in the
Niediterrimean was visible proof of Mos-
'0 041009200200001 -2
;
covvs .?? k.iii
CPYRGHT
301-2
vacuum: he same 1,111(1 of gunbthit.
di.phuilApprovedf OrRele*Sel 999/09/02
II conntrics alt :ming the iNorth
African and European littorals of the
Mediterranean in the years to come.
Nonalignmeut is tantamount to a power
vacuum iii the Soviet hook, and with the
itildraWal of 'Western influence from
North Africa, the Soviets are making a
determined effort to move in. Morocco,
the last remaining, monarchy in North
Africa, is ripe for revolution?as last
week's attempt to remove King Hassan
showed?and the Soviets would be hap-
py to help. Europe-oriented Tunisia,
squeezed between revolutionary regimes
in Algeria and Libya?and heavily de-.
pendent on ailing President Habib Bour-
gniba?would he another likely target.
This Soviet power in the Mediterrane-
an basin will also make itself felt in the
critically important Persian Gulf area
once the Suez Canal is reopened. The
gulf area supplies 60 per cent of West
Europe's and 90 per cent of Japan's fuel
needs. The British are phasing out of the
gulf later. this year and the U.S. has no
intention?or desire?to fill the power gap.
Moreover, London's plan for a gulf feder-
ation has collapsdd and the oil sheikdoms
are about to Opt for independence. "A
few modern Soviet warships calling regu-
larly at those ports and entertaining im-
pressionalde sheiks will work miracles," a
longtime gtilf resident told my. "Espe-
cially if there ism() conntervailing U.S.
force."
It won't be long before the sheiks
realize where thl: real power lies. T114!
Soviets already liave twenty new war-
ships on station in the Indian Ocean (as
against two U.S. ships). Anticipating the
reopening of the l Suez Canal, they have
also just completed construction of a new
naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea
(in return for frge MIG's and tanks for
the Sudanese), halfway between the
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.
Should the Soviets successfully expand
their Mediterran3an presence into this
part of the world they would be able to
exercise addition 1 political leverage on
Western Europe by controlling its sources
of oil.
Detente: No nue suggests that Ulu So-,
: OlAsRDP719914V4A100006200
iternmean in wnittever torce they wisn,
and in the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf for that Mat -er. But what is needed
is a credible conntervailing force. In-
stead, America is ?tilling out, and Europe
is dithering. In the past five years, NATO
forces in Central Europe have been al-
lowed to run down by 2.5 per cent (in-
chiding the loss of 500- aircraft). During
the same time, Soviet forces alone, on
the same front, I increased by six di
visions. Despite U.S..S pledges to maintain
and improve its !strength in Europe, it.
was revealed two weeks ago that two
Air Force squadrsms were pulled out of
Europe in 1970 without a word being
said to America's European allies. "The
very prospects of d?nte," commented
the outgoing NATO civilian chief, Manlio
Brosio, last week, 'have created a climate
in Western opinion in favor of tin ila tenth-
ly reducing NATO force levels." Mos-
cow, of coo Se, remains unencumbered
by the restraints of public opinion, and
whenever anyone in the West tries to
halt the drift toward a lax defense pos-
ture, the Russians fire off accusations
that such talk impedes d?nte.
EVCII more important than Soviet in-
tentions, however, is the American trend
toward introspection and isolation. "The
steady encroachment of Congress on the
President's ability to conduct foreign pol-
icy," one of Europe's leading policymak-
ers told me recently, "means that a for-
mal pledge isn't what it used to be."
Moreover, the release of the Pentagon
papers has, in a sense, vindicated those
in the U.S. who regard power politics
as evil and un-American. But, that doesn't
mean that the power realities will oblige
us by simply disappearing.
Under these circumstances, Europeans
are keeping their options open. Even
Franco Spain and the colonels in Greece
are doing what they can to improve rela-
tions with Moscow. For by conveying
the impression that over the next few
years domestic affairs will enjoy priority
over foreign affairs, America is, in effect
telling Moscow: "This is your round in
the Mediterranean. Make the most of
it." It is an absolute certainty that the
Russians will do just that.
32
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TIME CPYRGHT
28 June 1971
Soviet Thrust in the Mediterranean
NW I he spy will appear," murmured
the signal officer of the cruiser
Dzerzhitisky as thc Soviet vessel eau-
tionsl y approached the Bosporus on
its voyage from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean.
"What spy?" asked the man at his
side, an keestio correspondent who was
aboard the cruiser because Defense Min-
ister Andrei Grcchko, Fleet Admiral
.Sergei Gorshkov and General Aleksei
Yepishev, the top political commissar
for the Soviet military, were paying a
visit to Moscow's Mediterranean fleet.
"The American destroyer," said the
signal officer. "It always glues itself to
'us as soon as we pass through these nar-
rows." Sure enough, the Dzerthinsky
had no sooner passed Istanbul when a
Sixth Fleet destroyer, the U.S.S. Rick-
etts. took position alongside. Surveil-
lance was so close that the exasperated
captain of the Dzerzhinsky finally
flashed a message: "Sir, this is not Broad-
way. Please find a safer place for your
promenade."
Formidable Force. The skipper of
the Rickettx was acting out of habit.
Since World War II, the Mediterranean
has been an American promenade from
the Dardanelles to Gibraltar, 2,330 miles
to the west. A formidable task force of
warships and combat-ready Marines was
posted in the Mediterranean to protect
thc southern flank of NATO, to "project
force ashore" in thc event of political cri-
ses.* and simply to show the U.S. flag.
For a long time the Mediterranean was
an American lake; any warship sighted
was bound to be either friendly, neu-
tral or innocuous.
Since 1964, however, the U.S. has
increasingly had to share its mare nos-
? tram with a constantly growing Rus-
sian fleet. Today the two forces arc
very nearly equal. The Sixth Fleet, com-
manded by Vice Admiral Isaac C.
Kidd Jr. (who will shortly move up-
ward to become head of the Naval Ma-
terial Command and he replaced by
Vice Admiral Gerald. E. Miller), con-
sists of 45 ships, including three air-
craft carriers, along with four sub-
marines, 200 planes and 25,000 men.
Under Vice Admiral V.N. Leonenkov,
the Soviet force, an arm of the Black
Sea fleet, consists of 40 to 60 ships,
ten to 13 submarines and as many as
10,000 men?but no aircraft except
* it happened only once, in 1958, when Ma-
those aboard the helicopter carriers Mos-
kva ? or Leningrad. U.S. combat ships
on the average arc 19 years old; the Rus-
sian fleet averages only seven years.
Of . all Soviet warships serving in
international waters, fully one-half
are assigned to the Mediterranean.
Says Kidd: "We walk a tightrope of
adequacy."
In The Baffle Zone. U.S. officers are
understandably alarmed by this shifting
of balances. Soviet naval strength on
all oceans has been growing with re- -
markable rapidity for several years now
(Timis cover, Feb. 23, 1968). "Nothing
stops them," admits Admiral Thomas
H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. "They are moving in every-
where." Nowhere is this more true than
in the Mediterranean. Warns U.S. Ad-
miral Horacio Rivcro Jr. the diminu-
tive (5 ft. 3 in.) commander of NATO
forces in southern Europe: "What was
traditionally NATO's southern flank has
dtweloped into its southern front. The
Mediterranean, which was for NA-1?0
part of the zone of thc interior, a rear
area, is now within the battle zone." Con-
cern fillers down to officers at sea with
the fleet, "There is nn feeling now of
being on a second team." says Captain
John E. Ilamen, skipper of the 62,000-
Ion carrier Froriklin D. Roosevelt. Says
Commander Richard. Hopper, who heads
the Roos/we/es 75-plane air group; "This
used to he a sunshine cruise. Pilots vol-
unteered from here for Viet Nam. Now
the,act ion is here."
The Russians have become a con-
stant threat in the Mediterranean be-
cause they have learned to keep their
hips on station and, as the U.S. does, re-
supply them. at sea with the four es-
sential. b's?hombs, bullets, beans and
black oil. At the same time. Soviet di-
plomacy has carved out several im-
portant auxiliary pork for the fleet along
the Mediterranean coasts. Among them
are Latakia in Syria and Alexandria
and Port Said in Egypt. The Russians,
who now sail the western Mediterranean
more frequently. have also shown an in-
terest in using the Algerian seaport of
Mers-el-Kehir. Last week they got an-
other potential port of call when M il
ta J ahoy Party won a one-vote ma-
jority in dm island's Parliament. Malta
has long ['yen the Unsinkable aircraft
carrier of I c British Mediterranean de-
fense syste -a, but Labor Party Leader
Dom Mint 'If won thc election partly
rines waded onto Beirut beaches strewn with by promisii the island's 320 000 in-
Coca-Colatomor nPoriRrelerseb11999/09fin :w0tA4RD01.7c941194A000200200001-2
ties to protect 'a' pro- estern Lebanese go to?the West The Russians do not real-
ernment front a coup. ly need an, her naval base, but they
? may find .irresistible the idea of just
. showing the red flag on an island that
Ws loag a NATO bastion and won Brit-
ain's George Cross for heroism in
World War It. :
Historic Roles. In connection with
Grechko's visit hist week, hvestin em-
phasized Russia's ancient historic role
in the. Mediterranean, tracing its be-
ginnings to a navigation treaty signed
? by the Priniipolity of Kiev in the 10th
century. Th :. Russian presence in the
Mediterranqin was forcefully reaffirmed
in 1770 wh61 Admiral Orlov defeated
the Turkish fleet at Tchcsme. Later the
:Russians made a series of amphibious
landings on the Ionian islands and even
captured Corfu in 1799. "No. we arc
not guests in this sea," crowed lzgestia.
"Many glorious victories of our people
.are connected with it." (frycstia con-
veniently forgets, of course, that soon af-
terward the Russians gave up Corfu
and were bottled up behind the Bos-
Port's by the Crinican War.) The U.S.
is equally insistent on its Mediterranean
rights, which date back to Stephen De-
catur's arrival in 1803 to fight the Bar-
bary pirates.
With both superpowers patrolling
: the Mediterranean in force, the grim
game of surveillance is played in dead
earnest. Both sides are particularly vig-
ilant for submarines, which arc difficult
to &feet in the shallow waters whcrc
thermal layers and the screws of some
2,000 meNhantmen on any day dis-
tort sound. The watch is most intense
at six main "choke points," or "ticket
gates," as Admiral Kidd calls them.
through which maneuvering submarines
must pass. These arc Gibraltar, the
sea sonth, of Sardinia and Sicily, and
the areas' between Crete and Greece,
Crete and North Africa, and Crete
and Turltey. Both sides keep watch
on the ehoke points. At the same
time, surface ships frequently shadow
one another. Cruising aboard the Roo-
sevelt .e
rently, Tim!: Correspondent
it..
John Sh; w was Star m
tled to come on
deck on morning to find that during
thc night ,a Soviet Kashin-class destroyer
had taken station 500 yds. away.
Triple Trailers. The same shadow
played aloft, but there arc
ial rules. Soviet TU-I6 Bad-
crs with Egyptian markings
I Cairo West airbase to fol-
low the Sixth Fleet and look for Po-
laris submarines. Whenever .they gct
game Is
very spe
ger born
fly out
CPYRGHT
near the uAppEaved.FordReleastV979,9142toRVWAngip1
, a
alert" is sounded. and Phantom jos
on neutralizing the Sixth Fleet. For
arc catapulted off the carriers to keep this purpose they have assembled an im-
pressive array of missile power aboard
their ships. including the 22-mile-range
Styx aboard small gunboats, the 100.
mile Strela aboard destroyers, and the
400-mile, supersonic Shaddock aboard
Soviet cruisers.
To defend itself against the Russian
missiles, the Sixth Fleet has patched to-
gether new responses in recent months.
Two 240-ton patrol gunboats superpow-
erect by jet engines have 'been trans-
ferred from Viet Nam as an experiment.
The gunbdats move so swiftly (top speed:
40 knots) that their crews must he
strapped into their stations. Admiral
Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., who is Chief of
Naval Operations, has dubbed them "tri-
ple trailers" because they are assigned
to lurk behind the Soviet vessels that
trail U.S. ships.
Rethinking Roles. The U.S. is also fit-
ting out some ships -with surface-to-sur-
face standard missiles that have 35- to
the Badgers from getting too close.
The Phantoms always approach grad-
ually and at an angle. sometimes draw-
ing abreast of the Soviet planes. On
one such occasion. a Phantom pilot
was surprised to sec his Soviet coun-
terpart hold up a centerfold from, or
all things, Playboy magazine.
The two fleets have one mission in
common. Kidd estimates that much of
his time, like that of the Soviets, is
spent in showing the flag around the
Mediterranean. Beyond that, however.
the two forces have vastly different
roles. The U.S. carriers and their Phan-
toms still have an offensive nuclear ca-
pacity against East bloc targets. Half
the fleet's planes are kept in the air at
all times in order to make certain
that a strprisc Soviet missile attack
would not sink the entire Sixth Fleet
LoNG[R, A.
NATO
nieriibers
0 SPAIN
ct- itnin
0
Q.. (Its. Peinrii base)
(;i1vrtillor
(8.)
MOROCCO
FRANCE
(oomoilifori
member)
qmpontogat tivreetne
more efficient Harpoon missiles will he
introduced. In addition, in an unusual
move for a nation that has traditionally
developed its own weapons, the U.S. is
.considering buying either the Israeli stir-
face-to-surface Gabriel missile or the
French Exocet.
Ultimately the Navy and the Ad-
ministration will have to make some
new decisions about the Sixth Fleet's
makeup and mission. It now defends
NATO'S supply lines, provides a sall
but sinewy landing force, supports and
protects the Polaris nuclear submarines
that operate out of the U.S. bases of
Rota, Spain, and Holy Loch. Scotland,
.and furnishes a nuclear punch in case
of war. With aging ships and outmoded
ordnance, it is difficult enough to carry
out those assignments. Since the fleet
is taking on the added mission .of neu-
tralizing the Russians, the job may be
.growing close to impossible.
AMERICAN LAKE
W. GER. ...
Worsoof U. S. S. R.
:
HUNGARY C?"6^i PC41
et ItOdcra ? ' '
, ..s, -' ?'
. 1 :? Sevastopol
I / ?
/ Black Sea.
le
1?Soviet supply line
..
(NATO HO) GREECE /....? '.... ;juul R- K E y ,
NnOlco ? ?,? ?
sr a / ' Corfu? I \
Moho d --"'"'1/4--- ?
? U.S. SIMI ILCET ?
45 ships, 4 mihmtnInos, 700 idicroill, 25,000 mon "' Latatki4
......4441.......:
SOVIET FLEET Me, rt,s.. ISRAEL ?
40 60 shIpi o
,10-13 bmorines, . nikliviAN'A ? ?
7-10,000 mon
I TAL'Y
RUMANIA
31 I' 41 I
a P rat n en
?AlemotT?Kehir
(imtrible future
Sovint bore)
barttrineller
ALOE R IA TUNISIA
A Soviet port of con
200 A00 mi.
T114 r Mop hy V. Nei.
LIBYA
Cairn Wcat- A 641
(Soviet Sado,' homipers/ '? ?
FGYPi
34
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 AIA-pP79-01194A000110n008021-2
UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS?
In the attached backgrounder and press reprints is evidence
to support the contention that UNCTAD-III, scheduled for Santiago
in mid-April, will produce little but rancor. If anything, with
President Allende running the show (and abetted by Cuba, the latest
"non-developed" to join the club), this session of UNCTAD promises
to be pointedly anti-the-developed and more particularly, anti-
U.S. Delegates are expected to come from some 140 countries; the
topic has world-wide appeal. During the period between now and
the opening of the conference, we suggest exploitation of points
made in the backgrounder with the aim of somewhat muting the astring-
ent propaganda that can be expected from UNCTAD III: the pro-
government and government-controlled media of Chile can be relied
on for thoroughly subjective reporting of conference proceedings.
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''.5?LnimIPPT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972
UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS?
The third United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD-III) is scheduled for mid-April to meet in Santiago,
Chile, where President Salvador Allende will use the occasion, as
he says himself "to break the deliberate campaign of lies and
calumnies launched against our people from within and without."
That Allende is pouring some $9 million into constructing a
theatrical showcase to house the conference is indicative of the
importance he attaches to UNCTAD-1110
Allende wants to use the conference to show the world his
government's "progress on the democratic road to socialism" and to
prove that his government is attacking Chile's economic problems
intelligently. Now some Chilean officials are saying that con-
struction of the theater-office complex and provision of adequate
accommodations -- in less than a year -- is too ambitious an under-
taking, particularly given other domestic economic problems.
Allende has already called off an international trade fair that
was to run simultaneously with the meeting. He had envisioned a
sumptuous display of Third World products, but only the developed
nations responded. And now, construction of the conference hall
is lagging so far behind that there is doubt it can be finished
before UNCTAD convenes.
In addition to Allende's stated aim of using UNCTAD as a
propaganda forum, other new factors are likely to have consider-
able bearing on the political climate at UNCTAD. In October,
under the sponsorship of Chile and Peru, Cuba joined the so-called
"Group of 77" -- made up of the 95 developing countries which
participate in UNCTAD. Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Cuba's delegate
to the October preparatory meeting of the "Group of 77" held in
Lima, told that assembly that Cuba was participating in the Lima
meeting "because it was Latin American and Socialist. . .Cuba will
continue to support, through international agencies and outside
them, the just demands and revolutionary struggles of the peoples
of Africa and Asia." The Third World, Roa said, would have to
change its structure and outline a proper policy of liberation and
development, though this change would not necessarily have to be
socialist.
Another new factor will be the first delegation from Peking
to attend such an international gathering. China's possible
influence on the "Group 77" remains a question mark, but at the
time of the Lima meeting, New China News Agency said on 5 November
that the Group's call for unity against "big-power hegemony" had
become the main current of the conference. It also quoted at
length from Raul Roa's speech.
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It is anticipated that some 2,600 delegates plus 500 journalists
will come to UNCTAD-III representing some 140 countries, 50 inter-
governmental organizations and 40 nongovernmental groups. Santiago,
a city of three million people, has hotel rooms to house 1,600
delegates. The other 1,000 or so will go to furnished apartments
or private homes. A correspondent's visit to UNCTAD headquarters
revealed considerable confusion as to who would sleep where or
with whom.
2
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"program of action."
African delegates appeared
particularly upset by the re-
sults. One said that the
that the action program only
"pape ?cd over the cracks" of
the interregional disputes.
The countries represented at
the Li na meeting belonged to a
loose organization called the
.Group of 77. Actually, there
are 9! countries in the group-
ing, v hich p,ot its natne from
:the number of nations repre-
sentec at the founding meeting
,in Alt iers four years ago.
linens fication of Protectionism'
LUNA, :Nov. 8 (AP) ? Dele-
gates of the Group of 77 today
criticked the "intensification
of pr )tectionistn" among the
develcped countries and called
on the United States to lift its
10 pc ? cent surcharge on im-
ports.
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CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
9 November 1971
80 Poor Nations Warn Rich
Gap Cannot Remain Indefinitely
LTMA, Peru, Nov. 8
(Reuters) ? Developing na-
tams or Atrica, Asia ana Latin
America told the rick countries
today that "indefinite co-
existence between poverty and
affluence is no longer possible."
The warning came in a
preamble to a Declaration of
Lima, adopted by delegates of
80 countries who have been
meeting here since Oct. 25 to
develop a joint strategy for
the next confrontation with
the industrialized nations. The
indications were, however, that
they have not succeeded in re-
solving regional differences to
tho.degree that had been hoped
in preparation for the third
United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, due
in Santiago, Chile, in April.
With that conference in mind,
the delegates also adopted a
CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES
21 October 1971
CUBA IS ACCEPTED
IN ECONOMIC BLOC
Becomes the 95th Member
of Influential Group of
Developing Countries
By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The limo York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
Oct. 20?Cuba has been ac-
In a program drafted for
presentntion at the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and
Development in April, they also
I called on the developed na-
tions to establish a generalized
' system of trade preferences
favoring the developing na-
tions.
The delegates, who asked
that any modification of the
international monetary system
take into account the interests
of the developing nations, said
they recognized the authority
of the International Monetary
Fund in dealing with such
problems, but they asked for
increased voting rights for the
developing nations.
Lag in Per Capital Income
The group pointed out that
while average per capita an-
nual income increased by $650
in the developed nations dur-
ing the nineteen-sixties, it grew
by only $40 in the developing
countries.
The participation of the de-
veloping nations in world cae?
ports diminished from 21.3 per
cent in 1960 to 17.6 per cent
in 1970, according to the final
document. .
The group agreed to intensify
efforts in the United Nations
and the Organization of African
Unity to bring about the re-
opening of the Suez Canal,
closed since the 1967 Arab-Is-
reed war.
The Afrikan delegates had
sought a demand for the with-
drawal of Israeli troops from
all Arab territory occupied dur-
ing the 1997 war, but Asian and
Latin-American nations refused
to support the proposal on
grounds that it was too poll-
dee!.
CPYRGHT
depted as the 95th member of
an influential but loose group-
ing of developing countries
that seek to formulate a joint
strategy to protect their eco-
nomic interests.
This decision was made last
night at a meeting held in a
conference room here. How-
ever, Israel failed to gain ad-
mission because of the oppo-
sition of Arab members.
veloping countries, they con-
tinue to refer themselves as
the Group of Seventy-seven,
the number that first joined
In 1968 to seek a common eco-
nomic strategy. They are main-
ly from Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Yugoslavia is the only
European member.
The admission of Cuba to the
group suggests that her rela-
tions with some Latin-American
countries have continued to im-
prove, but the move ? is not
expected to please the United
States. ?
In 1962, rnabily at the 'urging
of the United States, the
Organization of American
States suspended Cuba from its
membership, charging that the
Government of Premier Fidel
Castro was aiding and instigat-
ing revolts in hemisphere c?mn-
tries. In 1964, the organization
called on its member to, cut
diplomatic and trade ties.
M lxico did not heed ' the
reso ution; Chile resumed rela
tioni last November and there
haw been clear indications here
that others are moving in the
same direction.
In the e bly
m=uNtr8M Vbie3Reieaselill
eadc Arrin of Peru deplored the
"prolonged isolation"- of Cuba
end urged that members of the
O.A.S. be free to resume rela-
tions with Havana at whatever
level they wished.
Peru is scheduled to be host
to ?the next meeting of the
group in Lima beginning Mon-
day. Conference planners say
that 82 countries have so far
said they would send delega-
tions headed by government
ministers.
Cuba reportedly intends to
send a 10-member delegation,
possibly headed by Foreign
Minister Raul Roa.
The conference is certain to
give, a high priority to the ef-
fects of President Nixon's new
economic policies and particu-
larly the 10 per cent surcharge
on Imports?a move most have
attacked in speches bete. ?
Before last night's session,
Peru had sought to persuade
Latin members that they could
admit Cuba to the group with-
out a major political shift for
those reluctant to act.
The Peruvian formula, which
was agreed to, admits Cuba as
a developing country to the
group but with the understand-
' intiMigtn
made up of Latin members or
?% 'I
I:
the Latin-American caucus,
which meets here from time to
time on political and other
matters.
At one point, the negotia-
tions were nearly wrecked
when Dr. Ricardo Alarcon,
Cuba's chief delegate, In an
assembly speech attacked Boli-
via, Brazil, Paraguay and
Argentina.
Dr. AlarcOn? who was waq-
Ing outside the room where the
meeting was held last night,
appeared undismayed by the
qualified welcome being ex-
tended. Invited to enter, he de-
livered his first remarks in a
moderate tone praised by one
Latin listener as "muy tran-
quilo." He emerged smiling say-
ing that "Cuba's legitimate
rights have been recognized
and a wrong has been recti-
fied."
Although United States offi-
dals did not comment on the
development officialy, it was
clear they were unhappy, say-
ing that Cuba had not demon-
strated any change of policy
but continued to aupport sub.
versivo groups.
200200001-2
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CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON POST
27 January 1972
Showcase Lags, Allende Frets
SANTIAGO ? Chile an
President Salvador Allende
put on his hard hat recently
and lectured construction
workers at the site of UNC-
TAD III, where 2,600 dele-
gates from 140 natiOns are
to meet in April:
"I came because, despite
the persistence and energy
of everyone working here, I
have been afraid that the
promise made would not be
kept ... Chile is internation-
ally committed. Think what
it would be if the confer-
ence could not open on the
appointed day."
The nervous betting here
Is that the third United Na-
tions Conference on Trade
and Development will open
April 13 as scheduled, but
that it will be close. If there
is paint on the theater walls,
it will be wet.
At the UNCTAD council
meeting in Geneva last
March, Chile requested that
the conference, which will
discuss economic problems
of developing countries, be
held here so that the world
could see Allende's progress
on the democratic road to
socialism.
Now some officials con-
cede that construction of a
theater-office complex and
provision of adequate ac-
commodations?in less than
a year?was too ambitious an ,
undertaking given other eco-
nomic problems here.
Allende has called off a
trade fair that was to have
run simultaneously with
UNCTAD. He said that he
had envisioned a showcase
for Third World industry, but
that only developed nations
responded. Local difficulties
were the tacit and probably
.determining factor in the
cancellation.
Along with Allende and
the workers under the bare
beams of the UNCTAD thea-
ter the other day was the
owner of the construction
uiu any. "We would be
niuc further along if in-
stea of 35 per cent volun-
tary work in Saturdays, we
woul have had 90 per
cdnt 'he said.
0 weekdays, 1,100 work-
ers sut in three shifts. But
to k ep within range of the
bud et approved by Con-
gre Allende asked the un-
ion for voluntary turns on
the eekend.
V luntary work gets much
pUb !city in Chile these
day , Yet the attendance has
bee slack. "We ought to
wor 48 hours . construct-
Ing he new Chile," said the
site uoss of the Workers' Con-
fed ration, the Communist-
led right arm of Allende's
gov rnment.
t hurts me that the fig- I
ure for Saturday work is so
lo " said Allende. He an:
no need that from now on
th minister of labor would
Pu' in volunteer work at the
sit. He added with a smile,
as the workers applauded:
"I am going to come on a
Sa urday, too, and I'm not
go g to tell you which Sat-
ur ay it will be."
hile's committee for the
U CTAD preparations is
he ded by Felipe Herrera,
fo er president of the In-
te American ' Development
B k in Washington. He
to I the several hundred
wi kers that there were en-
e ies of UNCTAD, and the
w to defeat them was to
fi sh the building. Ap-
pl use. Then he asked for
mire voluntary work, and at
th t point he had to ask for
ap lause.
ater Herrera explained
so e of the difficulties in
th project, which was budg-
et d at 100 million escudos
($ million at the official
ra e) and $1 million for im-
po ted materials.
? ne imported item was as-
b tos plates, from the
U ited States.
"They arrived on time,
but by mistake only half
were unloaded," he said.
, "When we found out, we
radioed the ship but it
didn't want to return. So the
boat was escorted into port
in northern Chile. We could
have lost months.
Herrera said that work
schedules are being met, but
while the dedication day of
the site is to be March 31,
he is talking in terms of
early April cornpletion.
Postponement of the con-
ference was out of the ques-
-lion, he said, as the prece-
dent could be disastrous for
future international con-
claves.
But there is a precedent
of sorts.
Algeria was to have
hosted a meeting of the
; Afro-Asian bloc in 1965 at a ,
center that was hopelessly '
behind schedule. At that
point the Algerian govern-
ment fell, the meeting was
forgotten and the bloc dis-
solved.
The first UNCTAD, in Ge-
neva in 1964, was a forum
for the underdeveloped 1,
nations to put their case for
preferential trade and as-
sistance policies to the in-
dustrial states.
Four years later, in New
Delhi, the same countries
met to denounce .the devel-
oped nations' failure to re,
spond to the needs set forth
in Geneva. The conference
was lengthy, and even its
enthusiasts concede it pro-
duced little but rancor.
At the meeting here
pointed references will be
made to the rich countries'
previous acceptance of the
goal of transferring 1 per
cent of gross national prod-
uct annually to the develop-
ing world?and to the gen-
eral failure to meet this
UNCTAD standard.
Other topics on the
agenda are disarmament,
shipping patterns, transfer
of science and technology,!
environmental control and
economic integration, all
from the point of view of
the under,ieveloped world.
The closing date, like the
opening date, it not certain. ,
Th P conference could rrn
well into May. This will be
the first international eco-
nomic conclave under the
United Nations to be at-
tended by Peking's dele-
gates.
? A major target of the ire
of the underdeveloped coun-
tries, and especially of
Chile, will be the United
States. A fundamental point
of Allende's foreign policy
Is that U.S. imperialism is
the major cause of retarded
growth throughout the hem-
isphere. 1
The United States will
send a delegation, though
? the level of it has not yet
been revealed. ,
Allende said the meeting
"will be a great opportunity
to break the deliberate cam-
paign 'of lies and calumnies
launched against our people
from within and without."
? Accommodations will be a
problem for the visitors.
This capital of 3 million pea:
pie has hotel rooms to house
, 1,660 delegates The other
1,000.or more will be placed
? in furnished apartments and
? private houses. A visit to
the UNCTAD offices showed
considerable confusion as to
who would sleep where.
Chileans are paying for
the big theater through spe,
cial taxes on cars, liquor
and luxuries. It is to become
a cultural center after the
conference.
The adjoining 23-floor of-
fice building?which was ac.
, tually four stories into the
air when Chile was named
UNCTAD lukst last March?
Is part of a renewal project.
? After Chile was named host
of the conference the thea-
ter was added to the project.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972
March
DATES WORTH NOTING
USSR! International 70th anniversary of the
publication of Lenin's
What Is TO Be Done.
April is the 55th
anniversary Of Lenin's
"April Theses."
March 5 USSR Anniversary of Stalin's
death in 1953.
March 6- New York 28th session of the UN
Arpil 7 Commission of Human
Rights.
March 8-15 USSR 55th anniversary of the
February Revolution
(February 23 - March 2,
Old Calendar) which over-
threw the Tsar, broke up
the Tsarist Empire, and
started Russia's short-
lived attempt at free
elections and parliament-
ary democracy, which
ended with the Bolshevik
seizure of power the
following November.
13th Party Congress of
the Italian Communist
Party.
March 11 Italy
March 19 Poland
March 20 USSR
March 25 Brazil
Parliamentary elections
are to be held; the
elections will be a year
ahead of schedule.
15th Congress of the
Soviet All-Union Central
Committee of Trade Unions.
Held every four years.
50th anniversary of the
Brazilian Communist
Party.
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March 29 USSR 1st anniversary of the
arrest of Vladimir
Bukovsky on charges of
anti-Soviet propaganda.
Bukovsky was recently
convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment in a
forced labor camp. He
had drawn attention to
the Soviet Union's use
of psychiatric imprison-
ment and 'hedical"
torture for sane people
who are dissidents.
April 13- Santiago UNCTAD III meets (See
May 17 article in this issue).
April 15 N. Korea Kim Il Sung's 60th
birthday, a landmark
in Korea.
April 28 Japan 20th anniversary of the
Japanese Peace Treaty
(World War II). The
treaty did not resolve
the status of the
Northern Territories
seized by the USSR in
the closing days of the
war. By contrast,
Okinawa is to revert
from the U.S. to Japan
on May 15.
2
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ApprRyig4AFdRORMacn1a9n09/02:CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2
March 1972
SIVRT SUBJECTS
UNCENSORED RUSSIA
Two March events can serve as pegs for focusing attention on
the Human Rights Movement in the USSR and on the official Soviet
disdain for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One, the
publication in London of "Uncensored Russia" and the other, the
28th Session of the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights
which opens in New York on 6 Mardi.
"Uncensored Russia," edited and with an introduction by British
author and Sovietologist, Peter Reddaway, was pubiished:by
Jonathan Cape, 30 Bedford Square, London (1,5.00). It is the
documented story of the Human Rights Movement in the USSR --
the annotated text of the unofficial Moscow journal "A Chronicle
of Current Events" (no.'s 1-11).
In his introduction, Peter Reddaway describes the growth of
samizdat in the USSR over the last few years, stimulated partly
by the tightening of censorship. He shows how contacts have formed
between the different factions of dissent as they are revealed
in the pages of the "Chronicle." Each chapter has an introduction
by Mr. Reddaway, linking its theme to related passages; the items
on a given subject appear chronologically and the text is generously
annotated. A special feature of the book is its unique collection
of 78 illustrations; photographs taken under difficult and dangerous
conditions, in camps and prisons and during civil disturbances and
smuggled out of Russia at considerable risk to the couriers.
"This is a most important book," writes Leonard Schapiro.
"Mr. Reddaway's work lays finally to rest any doubts that anyone
may have harboured about the authenticity of this material, which
no student of Soviet society, or indeed anyone who follows the
survival of the human spirit in diversity can now ignore." Enough
said (Watch "Press Comment" for reviews. U.S edition to be
published in March by American Heritage, $100(h)
ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PROTESTS TREATMENT
OF JOURNALISTS -IN PRAGUE
The Italian Communist Party was the only major party in the West
to unequivocally condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Since that time, it has continued to criticize the new Czech leader-
ship for its dogmatism and for its repression of the freedoms enjoyed
under Dubcek. Prague has again aroused the ire of the Italian comrades
by its heavy-handed treatment of Italian journalists, including an
Italian correspondent of l'Unita, a party member since 1938, who was
arrested and summarily expelled from Czechoslovakia.
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The official daily of the Italian Cammunisty Party (PCI), in
its 9 February issue under the heading "An Absurd Court Order"
protested the expulsion from Czechoslovakia the first week in
February of its Prague correspondent, Ferdi Zidar. Zidar -- who
is also a member of the secretariat of the International Organization
of Journalists, a Communist front headquartered. in Prague -- was
charged by Czech security organs with contacting farmer party
members now accused of an "anti-state activity." Emphasizing that
Zidar was doing no more than carrying out his newspaper duties as
instructed, l'Unita wrote: "As an activist of our party, comrade
Zidar adhered-most strictly to the political line of the Italian
Communist Party... Our protest is sharp and resolute." l'Unita
pointed out that Zidar has been a PCI activist since 1938 and that
he had previously been imprisoned by Italian fascists and by the
Nazis. Presumably, this allusion to Zidar's other jailers was
not lost on Czech (and Soviet) authorities.
The following day, 11 February, l'Unita ran a lengthy news item
reporting the steps taken by the Italian National Press Federation
on behalf of Valerio Ochetto, a left-wing journalist employed by
Italian radio and television, who was arrested in Prague in early
January. An Italian "Committee to Free Valerio Ochetto," supported
by the Communist-dominated CGIL among other labor and media
organizations, appealed to international public opinion through
large ads in Le Monde and the New York Times. The ads said that
Ochetto is probabfy the only journalist in the world who is in
prison because of his work. As a result of this pressure Ochetto
was finally released in mid-February.
Another l'Unita article on 11 February served to raise the
temperature level between Rome and Prague by several degrees. This
time the PCI took Prague to task for the way it treated its own
intellectuals and journalists. Quoting the PCI theoretical monthly,
Rinascita, l'Unita wrote: "We know some of the comrades who were
attacked, for example, Karel Kosik, Karel Batosek, Karel Kaplan and
Milan Hbebel, and we consider them to be communists by training and
by their activist spirit, by their rich contribution to the search
and the struggle for ideas free from dogmatism, as intellectuals of high
Stahdards sttongly.cotmitted:to.7.6Hsocialist .o.cietyTinTCzethosloVakia.
BUt,the serious hews from. Prague raises-4uestions of a 'broader-nature.
When the new methods (Bd.': a reference to the Prague "spring")
came to an end, we did not approve -- and expressed our dissent
in these columns -- with methods which tried to resolve severe
political disagreement by exile, by the humiliation. of-Communit
activists who were forced to find whateverwork they could in
order to live. In all this difficulty, one point appeared to have
been gained: the pledge that there would be no reprisals and
that no political trials would take place. Do the arrests this week
mean that this pledge is to be defaulted? Do they presage the
triumph of a rationale the price of which has already been so high?
2
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Certainly, the class struggle is a bitter one and the confrontation
between imperialisM and socialism harsh. The task of socialist
change is difficult in any country. But precisely because we have
a clear awareness of this, because we know how many positive things
have been set free for humanity through communist achievements,
we believe that a critical examination of the past and present
is worthwhile. Worthwhile because it tells us that force used
by the working class in power can never be the arbiter, that the
moment of coercion must never betray the substance and form of
socialist legality, that revolutionary discipline must never aim
at silencing dissent, particularly where -- as in this case --
events have been somewhat unusual."
P.S. TO SOLJENITSYNE
Year in the Life of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn," which was
included in the February Perspectives called special attention to
Leopold Labedz' excellent compilation of documents pertaining to
the Solzhenitsyn case, published by MaCMillan. The same work is
also available in French, entitled "Soljenitsyne Accuse" and published
in Paris, 1971, by Dominique Wapler. The French edition was translated
by Guy Piquemal and also includes an introduction by Armand Lanoux
of the Acad6mie Goncourt.
3
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l'UNITA, Rome
9 February 1972
Measures taken against Comrade Zidar
by the Czech Security authorities
An Absurd Court Order
CamradeFerdi Zidar, member of the secretariat of the International
Organization of Journalists, headquartered in Prague, last week was arrested
and subsequently asked to leave Czechoslovakia. This happened after
comrade Zidar had been asked (on the basis of Article 16 of the Public
Security Law) to explain his connections with former members of the Czech
Communisty Party who previously occupied leading positions and who now
have allegedly been accused of anti-state activity. Comrade Zidar firmly
rejected the accusation of having participated in any illegal activity
and of having in any way abused the hospitality of the Czech state.
Since Comrade Zidar was called upon to be a member of the secretariat
of the International Organization of Journalists in his capacity as a
democratic Italian journalist and since he comes from the editorial staff
of l'Unita, our newspaper asked the International Organization of Journalists
to protest vis-a-vis the Czech security authorities responsible for this
incident. comrade' Zidar has been an activist in our Party since 1938; he
was jailed first by the Fascists and then deported' to Buckenwald by the
Nazis. He has been working for the Communist press since 1943 and since
August 1969 has been on the secretariat of the International Organization
of Journalists.
We strongly hope that -- as could have happened -- the action taken
vis-a-viscomrade Zidar was unauthorized. However, even in such a case,
our protest is firm and sharp. Comrade. Zidar has always carried out his
assignments with the greatest integrity even in the recent difficulties
concerning the case of the journalist Ochetto.
As a PCI militant, comrade Zidar -- as was his duty -- has adhered most
loyally to the political line of our Party in all circumstances.
This line includes non-interference in the internal political affairs of
other parties.
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I ' UNITA, Rome
9 February 1972
Preso contro ii compagno Zidar
da parte della autorita di sicurezza cecoslovacche
Un assurdo provvedimento
CPYRGHT
II compagno Ferdi Zidar,
membro della segreteria del-
Organizzazione internazio-
nate del glornalisti che ha
sede a Praga, 6 stato nella
settimana scorsa ferrnato e
quindl invitato a lasciare Ia
Cecoslovacchia. CIO ?vve-
nuto dopo che al compagno
Zidar sono stati chlesti
chia-
rimenti (in base all'art. le
della legge di pubblica slcu-
rezza) suI rapport1 avuti
con ex membri del Partito
comunlsta cecoslovacco
quail ebbero In passato fun
-
eon] dirigentl e sarebbero
oggi accusati di svolgere atti-
vita antistatale. II compa-
gno Zidar ha respinto con
fermezza l'accusa di aver
partecipato a qualstasi attivi-
tit in contrast? con le leggi
cecoslovacche e di avere in
qualsiasI modo abusato della
ospitalita dello Stato ceco-
slovacco.
Poiche 11 compagno Zidar
era stato chiamato a far par-
te della segreteria dell'Orga-
nIzzazione Internazionale,..del,
glornalisti nella sua qualita
dl glornalista democratic? Ita-
liano e proviene dalla redszione 11 nostro
giornale si 6? rivolto alla Or-
ganizzazione internaztonale
del glornalisti perche esprIma
la sus protests verso quelle I
autorlta di slcurezza che so?
no responsabili di questo epi-
sodio. II compagno Zidar
militante del nostro Partlto
dal 1938, 6 stato incarcerato e
conflnato dal fascisti prima,'
6 stato ? poi ? deportato a
Buchenwald dal nazistl. Egli
lavora nella stampa comunl-
sta dal 1943 e dall'agosto del
1889 era membro della segre-
Lelia dell' OrganizzazIone inf
ternazionale del Glornallsti.
Not c auguriamo vivamen,
te che, com'd possibile che
accada, fa misura assunta nei
confronti del compagno Z.
dar sia U frutto d una inizia-
rtva tneontrollata. Aftoe m
ta caso, tuttavia, la 1ptra.
protesta a ferma e recfsa. II
compagno Ztdar ha aiiolto
sempre i corn pits cui e stet-
to chiamato con to scrupolo
pi? assoluto, anche nella re.
cente. vicenda riguardante U
caso del giornalista Ochetto.
In quango militante del
PCI, compagno Zidar ha
naturalmente mantenuto ?
com'era suo dovere ? a fe-
deUet pi? terma alla linea
Utica del nostro Part ito in
ogni circostanza. Di questa
linea la parte /a non ingeren-
tra negli aLlari interni degU
altri partiti.
?
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