'POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRAGUE SPRING AND SOVIET INTERVENTION', ZANINOVICH AND BROWN, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NO. 1, 1973.

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860100-1
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• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
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CPYRGHT
"POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PRAGUE SPRING AND SOVIET INTERVENTION", Zaninovich and Brown, Journal
of International Affairs, No. 1, 1973.
r FIDENTIAL
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One of the more lasting effects of the movement of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968 was the
dissipation of good will that the Soviet Union had created as the
liberator of Czechoslovakia from German tyranny in World War II, an
advantage which had been exploited for Soviet diplomatic purposes in
Eastern Europe. A possibly and equally lasting effect is that the
Czechs and Slovaks, so widely separated by cultural and economic
cleavages, for the first time had a new enemy that both could share.
There appears little doubt that antagonisms between the
Czechoslovaks and the Soviet Union will remain a permanent condition.
At the same time it can be argued that the psychological impact of the
experience of being invaded and occupied by the Soviet Union, "the
big Slavic Brother," may well continue to act as a key catalyst
for a more genuine integration of Czech and Slovak national
aspirations.
25X1C10b
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JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CPYRGHT
Editor's Foreword xi
THE POLITICS OF ETHNONATIONALISM
Walker Connor I
NATIONALITIES AND THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN HIS-
TORICAL OUTLINE
Roman Szporluk 22
PLURALISM AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION: TILE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
Ainslie T. Embree 41
CANADA AND THE CRISIS OF QUEBEC
Richard Pious 53
POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PRAGUE SPRING AND SOVIET INTERVENTION
M. George Zaninovich and Douglas A. Brown 66
Is NATIONAL INTEGRATION NECESSARY? THE MALAYSIAN CASE
Nancy L. Snider 80
ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS, AND MULTINATIONALISM
Don Peretz 90
RACIAL SELF-RELIANCE AND CULTURAL DEPENDENCY: NYERERE AND
AMIN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 105
Ali A. Mazrui 122
BOOK REVIEWS
Richard Ned Lebow, Evan M. Wilson, Gary Bertsch, James Mittelman,
Cynthia Enloe
Copyright ? 1973 by the Trustees of Columbia
University in the City of New York
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Political Integration in
Czechoslovakia: The Implications of
CPYRGHT
the Prague Spring
and Soviet Intervention
Czechoslovakia's experiences during the process of becoming a binational communist-
party state are in many ways unique among socialist countries. The Communist coup
of 1948 had important effects upon prospects for political integration of the Czechs
and Slovaks, especially in the application of nationality policies similar to those of the
Soviet Union. Despite their consistency with Soviet practice, these policies were
destined to exacerbate the tension between Czechs and Slovaks, rather than initiate
the process of harmonious integration that was desired.
Up until the end of World War II, the two major sources of difficulty that threatened
Czechoslovak political integration were the large, German and Magyar minorities.
Assorted factors, including the forced migration of the bulk of the German
population, resulted in lessening the importance of these minority issues for the
post-World War 11 era.' Consequently, the key political integration issue became the
friction between the two major component nationalities in the country-the Czechs
and the Slovaks.2 The fact that the Czechs and Slovaks shared a related ethnic heritage
was not sufficient to overcome the cultural and economic cleavages between the two
M. George Zaninovich is Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon and his
publications include The Development oj' Socialist Yugoslavia and Comparative Communist
Political Leadership (co-author). ltd is also currently cochairman of the Research and Development
Committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.
Douglas A. Brown is currently a Graduate Teaching Fellow at the University of Oregon. He has
served as an area development officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development in
Vietnam (1967-1969). Much of his previous research has been on the developing areas and his
article "Administration and Dependency in the Third World" (The New Scholar, 3, no. 2) will
appear this spring.
' A perceptive history of the postwar expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia is
found in Radomir Luza's The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York: New York University
Press, 1964), particularly pp. 267-300.
'Peter A. "Coma. "The Czechoslovak Question Under Communism," East European Quarterly,
3, no. 1 (March 1969), p. 15.
66 Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 27, No. I. 1973
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CPYRGHT
nationalities. These cleavages had their source, initially, in the tenth century Hungarian
conquest which led to the separation of Slovakia from the Czech lands for the next
thousand years.3 Even though a longing for reunion between these related Slavic
peoples existed through the centuries, the isolation of the Slovaks resulted in a fervent
nationalism based upon their unique historical experience and a distinctly separate
Slovak language.
During the half-century prior to World War 1, the Czechs had been preoccupied with
their conflict and competition with the Germans, while the Slovaks were energetically
and successfully resisting forced assimilation by the Magyars. Because of their
association with the Austrian state during this period, the Czechs in Bohemia and
Moravia also experienced a steady industrial growth, while the Slovaks retained their
traditional agricultural orientation and remained economically less developed. As a
result, there were substantial differences between the two peoples when they joined to
create the Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1918. Thus, the more developed and more
numero us Czechs had an economic advantage as well as a sense of cultural superiority
in relation to the Slovaks.
During the formative years of the Republic, the government in Prague sent large
numbers of Czech administrators into Slovakia to establish central government
control. A general influx of Czechs into Slovakia continued throughout the 1920s, and
by 1930 there were some 120,000 Czechs living in Slovakia. The tendency of these
Czechs to displace Slovaks in both industry and commerce quickly led to friction, and
Slovaks began to demand clarification of their position in the unified Czechoslovak
state.
Even the founder and first president of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, appeared
to support a constitutionally autonomous Slovakia when, in 1918, he signed the
"Pittsburgh Agreement" with Slovak-Americans in the United States. Although
Masaryk later refused to be bound by this agreement, which predated the existence of
the Czechoslovak state, the Slovaks continually used this agreement as an indication of
unfulfilled promises.4 In the interwar period, Slovak concern over their lack of
autonomy, and resentment towards the growing Czech presence in Slovakia, led to the
creation of a Slovak nationalist movement. This movement sought to establish an
independent Slovakia or, at the very least, a separate national-territorial unit within
the framework of a binational Czechoslovak state. This goal was realized briefly (and,
one might say, perversely) with the establishment of a German-sponsored independent
Slovakia after the 1938 dismemberment and Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. The
fact that a homegrown fascist independence party, the I-Ilinka, collaborated in this
German activity increased the tension and the misunderstanding between the Czechs
and Slovaks following World War 11.
During World War 11, numerous Communist leaders from Czech areas under German
occupation went to Moscow to await whatever opportunity an Allied victory might
bring. ln'cluded in this Moscow group were the more prominent members of the
politburo, led by Secretary-General Klement Gottwald. Among them were Rudolph
Slansky, Vaclav Kopechy, Bruno Kohler, and Jan Sverma. All, with the exception of
Sverma, were later to hold high positions in the Czechoslovak Party and state. After
infiltrating back into Slovakia in 1944 to bring dissident Slovak Party elements under
control of the Moscow ieadership, Sverma died in the partisan retreat from Slovakia
'Barbara W. Jancar, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power (New York: Praeger,
1971), pp. 165-68.
'Sec Paul L. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48 (New York:
Praeger, 1963), pp. 12-3.
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following a German offensive in October of that year. By way of contrast, the Slovak
Communist leadership, for the most part, remained in Slovakia and participated in the
popularly-based resistance movement against the Germans. The isolation of Slovak
Communist leaders during this time, as well as the Czech Communists' own
embarrassment over their anemic participation in the resistance against German
occupation, provided additional substance for later Czech-Slovak animosity within the
Party concerning Slovakia's position in a revived Czechoslovak state.'
The idea of a unitary and integrated Czechoslovak state had always been favored by
the predominant Czech population since they had little to fear from such an
arrangement. While a semblance of autonomy had been provided by the post-World
War II constitution, Slovak national aspirations suffered a clear setback after the 1948
Communist assumption of power. The Communist party, dominated by Czech
elements in Prague, "imposed on the twelve million people of Czechoslovakia a
Stalinist unifying political dogma which required commitment to an integrated
concept of statehood." 6 There were, in fact, a series of purges, eliminating from the
Party those Slovaks who were branded as "bourgeois nationalists" because of their
support of Slovak national autonomy during and after World War II.' Furthermore,
"in keeping with the effort to suppress the Slovaks, the Prague government rewrote
history by downplaying the importance of the Slovak contribution to the war
effort.i' Thus, not only was it necessary to eliminate Slovak nationalist elements from
the Party, but it was also expedient to redo history and education curricula in order to
enforce the "unity" principle, regardless of how artificial the unity thus produced
might be. At the same time, a large-scale program of economic equalization between
the Czech and the Slovak territories was undertaken as officially sponsored and
enforced Party policy.
By the application of these two techniques-cultural assimilation and economic
equalization-it was hoped that the differences between Czechs and Slovaks might be
reduced enough to allow the "development of a homogeneous, cohesive, and
assimilated national community within one generation.i9 But, though theorists of
development have proposed the hypothesis that increased modernization within a
society will lead to steady political and economic integration, this would not appear to
be the case, at least when nationality conflicts are brought into play. This has been
amply demonstrated recently in many parts of the world (specifically Ireland,
Pakistan, Nigeria, and, more directly relevant to this analysis, Yugoslavia). On the
contrary, the impact of modernization, as reflected in socio-economic mobility,
exposure to mass media and information, educational opportunity, and a broadening
of economic horizons, appears in many instances to have strengthened the narrower,
more particularistic linguistic and ethnic identifications of individuals. Even more
important, crude attempts at. forced assimilation (not unknown to communist regimes)
which seek to forge integrated, unitary states seem to increase resistance to the
effective integration of minority racial and cultural groups.
That this would appear to be the case in Czechoslovakia is a point that needs little
further amplification. The Communist regime's 1948 equalization program, which
s Regarding the isolation of Slovak Communist leaders during the war, see Zinner, Communist
Strategy, op. cit., pp. 7I-80.
6Toma, "The Czechoslovak Question," op. cit., p. 16.
'Regarding these purges, see Zdenek Suda, The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), pp. 47-9, and Vladimir V. Kusin, The Intellectual Origins
of the Prague Spring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 28-9.
' Jancar, Czechoslovakia, op. cit., p. 169.
'Toma, "The Czechoslovak Question," op. cit., pp. 18-9.
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ught to develop Slovakia economically, was a "success" (i.e., between 1948 and
965 industrial production in Czech territory improved only about threefold, while in
lovakia it increased almost seven times over);' o however, the result was that an
conomically advanced Slovakia emerged as more challenging to the concept of a
nified Czechoslovak state than had been the case previously. To counter this
evelopment, Communist leaders responded with more vigorous efforts at forced
ssimilation, including the abolition of Slovak national institutions and a de-emphasis
Slovakia as a distinct geographic entity. By the late 1950s, there were already
timations of a greater centralism with more emphasis upon integration, which would
fave e to come at the expense of the Slovaks. The new constitution enacted in 1960
erved in effect to eliminate Slovakia as a distinct administrative entity.'' In fact,
ratislava, the traditional Slovak cultural and political center, was reduced to a mere
egional administrative seat. Slovak territory was also divided into three new regions
vhich were placed under the direct administration of the central government in
rogue, as well as being dissociated from any specifically Slovak national institutions.
ne writer has commented that
(ti he consequences of the Novotny nation-building strategy and the overt
suppression of the long-sought Slovakian rights and aspirations was to
kindle Slovak resentment against the Czechoslovak state. The obvious
outgrowth of this resentment through the 1960s was the development of a
stronger national consciousness and the growth of ethnic particularism
within the Slovakian ethnic group.' 2
In short, the impact of political and socio-economic modernization, which
nexpectedly served to increase Slovak national particularism, was offset by the
ffects of the Novotny political integration strategy which threatened the survival of
lovak national existence. The uncertainty and the discontent that emanated from this
'ailure of the Novotny regime to deal effectively with the Slovak national issue
ontributed much to the pressure for liberalization and reform and to the now tragic
vents that culminated in the August 1968 Soviet invasion.
factors Leading to the Prague Spring
ignificantly, the January 1968 changes in Czechoslovak leadership, during which
lexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny, were actually the end product of a
-emulative process of liberalization. This process was a response to the demands of
zany segments of the population which began as early as 1963. It was this long period
f change resulting in Novotny's ouster which made possible the much more radical
eforms of what has become legend as "The Prague Spring." The most important
ersonnel change was the removal of Novotny from the offices of first secretary of the
arty and president of Czechoslovakia and his replacement, respectively, by Dubcek
nd General Ludvik Svoboda. To some degree, the importance of their succession lay
n their opening the door for men, even more radical than Dubcek, who had clear ideas
oncerning a reorganization of the Czechoslovak system.' 3
' ?Jancar, Czechoslovakia, op, cit., p. 169.
"See the relevant sections and commentaries in Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist
epublic: A Background Report (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1960).
"Gary K. Bertsch, "Molding the `New Man' in Communist Societies: The Multi-National
zechoslovak, Soviet, and Yugoslav Cases," mimeographed (University of Georgia, 1972), p. 49.
ofessor Bertsch's work on changing patterns of political integration in multi-ethnic societies
oxides a useful methodological approach to studying the effect of modernization on integration,
d the role of ethnic marginality which militates against such integration.
' 3A. H. Brown, "Political Change in Czechoslovakia," Government and Opposition, 4, no. 2
1969), pp. 172-73.
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Primary among those reforms leading up to the Prague Spring was that which dealt
with the malfunctioning of the command economy. Between 1963 and 1967 reform
economists had succeeded in convincing Novotny of the need for a series of changes
designed to make planning and management a responsibility of the specific industrial
enterprises, to improve worker performance, to attract more qualified people into
management by improving wage scales, and to introduce variable prices so as to reflect
the actual conditions of production and market needs.' a According to Ota Sik, noted
Czech economist of this reform period: "We wanted to have real entrepreneurs
and ... to achieve complete separation of enterprises from state control. We hoped to
create a completely unique, new collective ownership of enterprises which would
differ fundamentally from the old ... state ownership."' S The purpose was clearly to
introduce certain elements of economy with a distinct Western capitalist flavor and to
gear the industrial process to specific incentive and market structures.
The probable effects of a decentralization of economic decision making upon the
nationality question were apparent. They meant, first and foremost, that rather than
tolerating professionally competent managers of Czech nationality from Prague,
Slovaks would come increasingly to occupy such positions of authority. The overall
effect would be to create a unified Slovak ethos among workers as well as managers in
the enterprises of Slovakia, with understandable antipathy toward Czechs who, since
the founding of the Republic, had insisted upon asserting their presence. A similar
phenomenon occurred in Yugoslavia in the period following the 1965 economic
reforms. In that case, many well-trained and qualified Serb managers found themselves
in difficulty with their Croat, Macedonian, or Albanian workers' councils, and usually
not for any good economic reasons. These diverse peoples simply wanted to control
their own factories, which meant having a managerial cadre with an ethnoculture with
which they could identify. Whether Slovak versus Czech, or Serb versus Croat, these
situations unavoidably created tensions between nationalities. Furthermore, as the
Slovaks (or the Croats) became increasingly aware of being masters over their own
economic destiny, an element of regional economic competition, intensified by strong
national awareness, would also develop. This involvement of national pride in
economic structure and decision making also had its understandable ill-effects upon
the operations of the market.
Many Czechs and Slovaks also began to feel that their once highly regarded
education system was beginning to deteriorate under the influence of the Soviet
model.' 6 The low quality of education resulting from this Soviet-style system so
disturbed the Novotny regime that by the early 1960s it was prepared to move toward
large-scale educational reforms. Changes were made in the curriculum to restore
certain areas such as the humanities and aesthetics, and teachers were selected in terms
of their demonstrated teaching skills rather than for their Party loyalty. Meanwhile,
the regime set aside its prerogative of control over the appointment of rectors at the
university level, and formal entrance examinations as well as degree titles of the
pre-Conununist era were reinstated. The generalized effect of these basic reforms was
to revive earlier traditions of education in Czechoslovakia and, specifically, to allow
for a renewal of an awareness of Czech and Slovak cultural and political heritage which
had been underplayed for nearly a generation.
14See Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), pp. 59-81.
s As quoted in Jancar, Czechoslovakia, op. cit., pp. 82-3.
' 6Golan, Czechoslovak Reform Movement, op. cit., pp. 109-11.
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The most vulnerable aspect of the structure of Czechoslovak state power that
reformers could attack was the growing centralization of power that followed the
adoption'of the Stalinist model. A convenient way to remedy this problem was to
apply the principle of "the separation of the Party and government." In explicit terms,
this problem involved the duplication of administrative personnel across the two
structures. As one observer has put it: "It was precisely the fusion of state and Party
roles in an enormous accumulation of power that was seen as one of the most negative
manifestations of the Stalinist system."" During 1967 official Party rules and
procedures were in the process of being reconsidered. This resulted in a definition of
the Party as the leading political organization charged with specifying the basic aims
and purposes of all spheres of endeavor, and with the overriding task of inducing and
encouraging the people to give effect to the Party's general policies.' 8 On the other
hand, in order to avoid unwarranted duplication, the Party would be expected to
refrain from superseding or displacing state agencies and organizations. The Party
would, in effect, be expected to change its role to suggesting the general outlines of
state policy and leaving the more explicit administrative tasks to the appropriate
governmental body. The formal Central Committee vote to separate leading state and
Party functions was in effect the legal instrument which brought about the collapse of
Novotny in January 1968. Given the general concern about undue centralization of
political power, and its unavoidable entanglement with the Czech-Slovak nationality
issue, the focus upon the need formally to distinguish state governmental from Party
political functions became a logical derivative.
As in Yugoslavia, where, governmental and Party functions have been separated, the
Czechoslovak changes in this regard would also suggest a reinforcing of the authority
of the regional Communist parties. Since in the parallel Party-government organiza-
tional structure model the centralist apex meant a more or less full integration of
Party-government-personality elements, any organizational reform that would remove
these elements would unavoidably strengthen regional units of political power. In the
case of Yugoslavia and its League of Communists, this process has led directly to the
intensified assertion of regional parties, especially the Croatian, and the growth of
political leaderships with widespread support among the populace in the various
republics. The parties in the various Yugoslav republics have assumed increasingly
independent postures vis-a-vis the federal League. In fact, tensions between federal and
republic Party organizations reached such a level that it required direct intervention by
Tito himself. Any attempt to divorce the two organizational structures-the Party and
the government-leads first to an increase in popular support for regional political
organizations, and second to a growing tension between regional Party cadres and
those at the federal center.'
Much of the pressure for general reform, 'especially as it concerned local political
autonomy and decentralization, had its source in the Czech-Slovak nationality
question, particularly in the demands of the Slovaks for national recognition and the
rehabilitation of Slovak Communists previously condemned as "bourgeois national-
ists." These demands, emanating mainly from Slovak intellectuals and the Slovak Party
media in the 1963-67 period, set the political stage for many of the reforms that
followed. There were two additional reasons why the Slovaks were eventually able to
"Jancar, Czechoslovakia, op. cit., p. 71.
"This This redefinition of the Party is discussed in Golan, Czechoslovak Reform Movement, op. cit,
pp. 163-76.
"Regarding the transformation of the Party in Yugoslavia, see M. George Zaninovich,
"Yugoslav Party Evolution: Moving Beyond Institutionalization," in Samuel P. Huntington and
Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established
One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
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achieve some political effect and influence reform in the direction of political and
economic decentralization. One writer defines these as follows:
The first was the very one to which Slovaks assigned a negative
value--the constitutional arrangement of Czechoslovakia. The unique
feature of Czechoslovak administration was the toleration of a quasi-
autonomous national unit within the framework of the centralist
state.... More important, the system tolerated the added anomaly of
the Slovak Party organization, over which Prague had little or no control.
Slovak ascendancy at the all-national level was made possible by this
unique pattern of participation in the centralist system. The mounting
Slovak opposition against the Party and government in Prague from 1963
to 1967 would have been impossible without Slovak management of the
policymaking organs in Slovakia....
The presence of a constitutionally recognized national government and
separate Party organization in Slovakia provided the focus for dissent
throughout the country prior to Novotny's fall, as they constituted the
only organized political vehicle that could consolidate the challenge to his
rule. With no solid institutional backing, the various Czech groups quite
logically sought support from the Slovak Party, which had all the force of
law behind it. However, because of the entrenched Slovak position, the
consensus of opposition produced by the asymmetrical coalition was
destined to be highly temporary. The events of 1968 proved that the
Slovak Party leaders would support Slovak interests above all else.2 0
The effect of this was that the Slovak Party element was able to gain considerable
political influence despite the absence of an effective constitutionally defined
autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak system. One segment of the Slovak
Communist party, which included Dubcek and his supporters, sought to achieve the
fulfillment of Slovak desires for full and equal participation within Czechoslovak
politics and the economy through a basic liberalization and democratization of the
existing state structure. Another faction in the Party, represented chiefly by Gustav
Husak, wanted to support liberalization of the system only insofar as it was useful to
guarantee the full political autonomy of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak state.2 1 As
a result, the interaction of three factors relating to the Czech-Slovak nationality issue
contributed to the process that culminated in the Prague Spring: the ineptness of the
Czech-dominated Novotny regime, the ability of the Slovak-Dubcek forces to operate
effectively within the existing state structure, and the pressure for greater Slovak
autonomy demanded by the Husak group.
Proposals for resolving the Slovak question ranged from continued integration and
centralism to complete separation for Slovakia. It became clear that what was required
was some variant of federalism or 'confederation. The confederation model involved a
delegation of political power to national (i.e., regional) Czech and Slovak councils
except for matters pertaining to foreign affairs and national defense. The Slovaks were
inclined to favor confederation as a solution to the Czech-Slovak nationality issue,
while, by contrast, the Czechs were more inclined to support federation, with the
retention of an effective central government (a formula which logically followed from
the advantage the 'Czechs possessed by virtue of their numerical superiority). The
individual who was most outspokenly opposed to the Czech solution of federation was
Gustav Husak, a Slovak nationalist as well as a Party member in good standing. The
rise to power of Dubcek, a Slovak himself, was viewed by the Slovak population as a
10 Jancar, Czechoslovakia, op. cit., pp. 172-73.
21 Golan, Czechoslovak Reform Movement, op. cit., pp. 197-98.
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sign that some structure of national autonomy might be finally granted. In fact, one of
the few durable achievements of the Prague Spring was that a legal framework for a
federation was drawn up just prior to the Soviet intervention in August 1968.
Soviet Intervention and Czech-Slovak Unity
The movement of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia on 20 August
1968 brought an abrupt end to the liberal reforms of the Prague Spring. The
consequences of the invasion were, however, more far-reaching than this simple
statement indicates. The Soviet move also had the effect of dissipating the fund of
good will that the Soviet Union had created as the liberator of Czechoslovakia from
German tyranny during World War 11, an asset which had been exploited for Soviet
diplomatic purposes in Eastern Europe. For the Czechs and Slovaks alike, the country
could now perceive a new enemy that both peoples might share.
The Soviet hope was to effect a quick change of government by having both Party
and government leaders replaced with more conservative types willing to cooperate
with the occupation; however, this proved to be a difficult task since few Czechs or
Slovaks were willing to step forward as replacements for the Dubcek regime. Given
what appeared to be a more difficult task than Soviet leaders had anticipated, the next
move was to apply pressure for the purpose of reorganizing the regime through
President Svoboda, with the assistance of conservative Czechoslovak elements.22 The
refusal of President Svoboda to accede to these pressures meant, however, that no
constitutional sanction could be given to the attempted compulsory change of the
Czechoslovak government. The result was that the Soviet leadership had no choice but
to allow Dubcek to remain in power for an indefinitely extended tenure. While the
Czech and Slovak reformers were retained in their positions for the moment, it was
not possible for even the solid unity of the Czech and Slovak peoples in resisting the
new "enemy" to withstand the pressures for change indefinitely. The strength of this
unified Czech-Slovak resistance did, however, have the threefold effect of lessening the
severity of the conservative regime when it was finally brought to power, possibly
saving the lives of a number of reform leaders, and certainly prolonging the process of
rolling back those liberal reforms that were achieved.
The Soviet leadership wanted to break the united front of Czech and Slovak
resistance to occupation and an apparent weak spot was the Slovak wing of the Party
(due to the lingering memories of Novotny's assimilationist policies). Perhaps to
exploit this perceived weakness, the Soviet occupation forces had allowed the Dubcek
government to go ahead in January 1969 with the establishment of a federal system for
Czechoslovakia. This solution called for the creation of separate and distinct Czech
and Slovak territories, each with its own national (i.e., regional) organs of government
-as well as Party authorities. However, these institutions were to be placed under a
Czechoslovak federal administrative structure with a joint premier and a centralized
Communist party apparatus. The federal assembly of Czechoslovakia was to contain
two chambers, one chosen on the basis of population (a one man, one vote Chamber
of the People), and the other apportioned equally between the Czech and Slovak areas
(a Chamber of Nations). Indeed, this would make it appear that at least one goal of the
reformers-that of a federal structure-had been realized.
Determined, more than ever, to demote Dubcek, as well asto make up for their loss
of prestige during August 1968 when the popular support for Dubcek had frustrated
their attempts to remove him from office, the Soviet leaders sought an excuse. After
the Czechoslovak ice hockey victory over the Russians in March 1969, anti-Soviet
demonstrations began to spread throughout the country. Conveniently, this provided
' `Harry Schwartz, Prague's 200 Days (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 219-20.
A
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the Soviet Union with a justification to condemn Prague's leaders for their reluctance
to impose "normalization" and to question the commitment of Dubcek and his
followers to the Communist cause.2 3 Finally, Dubcek was forced to resign from his
position and in April 1969 he was replaced by Gustav Husak, first secretary of the
Slovak wing of the Party. Husak certainly seemed to possess mixed credentials. He had
been jailed by Novotny in 1954 and thus could be identified as one who sought to
improve, and even liberalize, the Party. Yet the attraction of Husak for the Soviet
leadership was his consistently outspoken championing of Slovak national autonomy.
In short, the one tactic that might be used to undermine the unity of the Czech-Slovak
populace was to manipulate aspiring Czechoslovak national leaders, whether Czech or
Slovak, in such a way as to magnify the desire of the Slovaks for separatism.
Having been a long-time advocate of Slovak rights and quite visible in liberal reform
activity during the Prague Spring, Husak had become one of the loading "realists" after
the Soviet intervention of August 1968. There was also evidence of political
opportunism in Husak's behavior (which had its specifically Slovak nationalist flavor).
In the early days of the reform movement in January of 1968, Husak had been vocally
in favor of liberalization and, shortly after Dubcek's ascension to power, had published
a call for genuine democratic reforms within the communist state apparatus.24 It
seems, then, that his own particular collaboration with the Soviet occupation was
guided more by his nearly total commitment to Slovak national rights than by any
fervent support for a Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia.
The assumption of power by Husak, with Soviet support, cleared the way for
further "normalization" of Czechoslovakia and a rollback of the 1968 reformist
course. Within the Czechoslovak Party the restoration of pre-1968 normalcy became
commonly known as the "consolidation" which required the cleansing of Party ranks
of all reformist elements. It has involved, in the main, a thorough-going purge of any
and all Party members associated with the reform movement of the Prague Spring.
Even though Husak projected the image of a conservative and a friend of Moscow, the
specifics of his policies had the apparent effect of easing the process of "restoration"
in such a way as to Minimize possible ill-effects on the Czechoslovak state.
Accordingly, it would be fair to conclude that despite his apparent conservatism,
Husak has been rather successful in avoiding the more onerous and severe aspects of a
reconstituted totalitarian Party and a Stalinist-style society. Political survival under
such circumstances, however, does not cone without its costs. In Husak's case they
represented a progressive, although perhaps strictly unintended, abandonment of the
more moderate positions he had held earlier.
In general, the Party has since moved toward a recentralization of controls in most
areas of its activity. Even in the area of Husak's greatest interest and concern, that of
Slovak national autonomy, the Party has abandoned the approach to the problem
which it earlier had felt to be crucial. As well as failing to reinforce the newly
created federal structure, the Party has taken certain new steps to effect more
centralized political and administrative institutions. Here we also find that
[a] December 1970 amendment to the 1968 law on federation restored
the control of planning and economic management to the federal
government, reintroduced a single Czechoslovak citizenship, and trans-
ferred the entire administration of state security to the Federal Ministry of
the Interior.25
"Suda, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, op. cit., p. 155.
z ? Swartz, Prague's 200 Days, op. cit., pp. 80-1.
x 'Robert W. Dean, "Czechoslovakia: Consolidation and Beyond," Survey, 17, no. 3 (Summer
1971), p. 106.
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The nearly total effectiveness of the Soviet strategy to return Czechoslovakia to its
pre-1968 situation would seem to be quite apparent. Paradoxically, despite Husak's
outspoken interest in Slovak national autonomy, he has been instrumental in initiating
a renewed phase of centralized rule and an enforced integration of the Czechoslovak
lands.
What have been the effects of the Prague Spring and the subsequent Soviet
intervention on the process of political integration in Czechoslovakia? Czechoslovakia
can no longer formally be called a unitary state, since the constitutional
implementation of federalism is one of the few enduring effects of Dubcek's
liberalization. However, it would appear that the concrete practical situation regarding
"centralized power" has in fact changed very little, and that the new federal
institutions may simply atrophy, much as they did after the 1948 Communist
assumption of power in Czechoslovakia. One major difference in the present situation
does nonetheless seem to stand out., namely, that (with Dubcck's leadership after
Novotny's downfall and with his successor in the person of flustk) Slovaks have, for
the first time in the history of the Czechoslovak state, been supplying the top leaders
for tile country. This could well have an important effect by reducing the feeling of
marginality which Slovaks brought with them into the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918,
as well as by moving the general society toward a balanced, yet politically integrated
partnership between the two peoples.
Another significant factor which must be mentioned is the common historical
experience that Czechs and Slovaks have shared in facing tine Soviet "enemy," an event
not dramatically at variance with that experienced during World War 11 and the
German occupation. There seems little chance that this significant unifying event will
pass out of the consciousness of the Czech and Slovak peoples in the near future.
Furthermore, given its undeniable need to control the territories of Central and
Eastern Europe, the intentions of the Soviet Union in maintaining and asserting its
presence in Czechoslovakia have become eminently clear. 'There appears to be little
doubt that the antagonism between the Czechoslovaks and the Soviet Union will
remain an enduring (if not permanent) condition. In general, it can be argued that the
psychological impact of the historical experience of being invaded and occupied by the
Soviet Union, "tine big Slavic brother," may well continue to act as a key catalyst for a
more genuine integration of Czech and Slovak national aspirations.
There is, however, the possibility that Soviet leaders may be able to counter this
unifying force by manipulating Slovak separatist feeling in such a way as to turn it
against solidarity with the Czechs. The structure of' federalism in the Czechoslovak
system might indeed be viewed as a convenient device through which one national
group might be played off against the other, the results accruing fully to the advantage
and the convenience of the Soviet Union as the occupying power. To effect such a
strategy the ideal situation would be to have the top leaders come from the smaller
partner in such a federation, which has been precisely the Soviet ploy in the process of
reconstituting the leadership of Czechoslovakia. What has mitigated against full Soviet
effectiveness in employing this strategy has been the apparent commitment of both
Czech and Slovak leaders to "the framework of Czechoslovak federation" rather than
to seeking "a formally independent Slovakia" through the help and intervention of [lie
Soviet regirne.2 e There apparently remain, even among 1-lusak and his followers, strong
' 6 SUda, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, op. cit., pp. 169-70.
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echoes of experiences stemming from the process by which the federation solution was
worked out. between Czechs and Slovaks during the months following Novotny's
demise.
Another element that should be considered is the impact upon Czech attitudes
toward Slovaks of Slovak collaboration with the Soviet Union in exchange for greater
Slovak political autonomy, especially if this should involve a government and Party
system in Czechoslovakia that would he more or less totally dominated by Slovak
elements. Historically, it has been the Slovak population that has felt threatened and
intimidated by the dominance of the more numerous Czechs in governmental circles.
That a similar type of feeling might emerge among Czechs living in a Slovak-dominated
Czechoslovakia supported by Soviet armed might is in no way inconceivable. It is clear
that Husak has upon occasion, if it served his own political needs, been inclined to
make compromises in principle, which were often also designed to further the cause of
Slovak national autonomy. Although this danger appears to be a real possibility, it
does not seem that the situation has as yet developed to the point of raising anxieties
among the Czechs. However, should Husak take a progressively more opportunistic
stance in relation to his intense Slovak national commitment, the viability of a
congenial and effective partnership between Czechs and Slovaks would be seriously
impaired.
It is difficult at this point to be very optimistic about the future prospects of a
Czech-Slovak federal state. While an outright breakup of the Czechoslovak federation
seems unlikely (if for no other reason than that the Soviet Union has been able to
achieve its goals without such extreme measures), the prospects for a Czechoslovakia
that can fully dictate its own destiny seems negligible. That the Czech and Slovak
peoples accept this situation seems to be indicated by their extreme sense of apathy.
Indeed "[t] he lassitude which has pervaded the public psyche since the invasion and
the anticlimax of Husak's accession to power has been manifest to a great extent in
insufficient labour discipline-absenteeism, failure to work to capacity, and shirking
during working hours."2 7 These attitudes of indifference and public apathy represent
a condition that the critical state of the Czechoslovak economy can not readily absorb
without great cost. Yet, from the standpoint of Husak, a largely passive and indifferent
populace may be the next best thing to genuinely popular support for which a leader
in his position might hope.
Still another question concerns the possibility of the Czechoslovak regime
generating reforms anew and recapturing the ethos of the Prague Spring. There seems
rather little likelihood of such a development taking place in the foreseeable future.
While a revival of liberalizing trends under a "conservative" regime did occur after the
suppression of the Hungarian revolution, there are few indications at present that the
Husak regime in Czechoslovakia might be contemplating such a revival. The Hungarian
case does at least, however, suggest that a new cycle of reforms can emanate from a
regime that adopts a "conservative" stance and has fully acquiesced to the dictates of
Moscow. The hope for such a renewal of reform activity would lie in part with the
inexorable demands for modernization and in the basic need to involve the
Czechoslovak populace in a constructive and meaningful life-process. The wave of
disillusionment and indifference that gradually swept through the country after
August 1968 has left an indelible imprint on the Czechoslovak landscape.28 A revival
"Dean, "Czechoslovakia," op. cit., p. 109.
"Survey data gathered by Radio Free Europe reveals that, after a great wave of initial
enthusiasm and optimism during the Prague Spring, Czechoslovak public confidence dropped
precipitously after just two months following the Soviet invasion. A majority of the Czechoslovak
populace (62 percent) by December 1968 had accepted the inevitable fact that "reform
communism" had little chance of being resumed. For more comprehensive statistical data, see
Radio Free Europe. The Crisk of Confidence tmnn^ Czechs and Slovaks (Munich. 196R).
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of the spirit of the Prague Spring, in the context of the need for both economic
progress and federation as solutions to Czech-Slovak differences, must remain at the
core of any rejuvenation of the Czechoslovak state.
The impact of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has surely been traumatic,
although perhaps no more so than the German occupation during World War II. The
fact that the Germans were able to manipulate Czech and Slovak separatist feelings,
leaving Czechoslovakia more divided at the end of the war than at the start, would
suggest that there is no assurance that the Soviet intervention may not also result in
increased tensions. Indeed, the Soviet leadership has already shown its penchant for
taking strategic advantage of Slovak nationalist sentiment in its attempt to weaken the
unity of the Czech and Slov,ik peoples. The one important and visible factor, however,
that has endured from the Prague Spring has been the federalization of
Czechoslovakia, although under IIusak this has not had the effect that the original
proponents of a federal structure had envisioned. Despite the prospect for continued
growth in nationalist feeling among the Slovaks (which is likely to be accompanied by
.a similar upsurge among the Czechs), the events of the past four years do suggest a new
basis for cooperation among these two peoples within the framework of a federated
Czechoslovak state. The glorious moments of the Prague Spring and the shared
misfortune of all Czechoslovak citizens under the heel of Soviet intervention remain
without question integral parts of this newly defined sense of historical consciousness.
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