VLASOV SIDED WITH THE CZECHS, RUDOLF STROEBINGER, DIE WELT, 26 FEBRUARY 1974:

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• Publication Date: April 22, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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Die Welt, 26 February 1974
VLASOV SIDED WITH THE CZECHS
Who Took Part in the Prague Rebellion of May 1945?
The question of who liberated Prague in May 1945 is a central issue of the
campaign raging in the Soviet Union against Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn
writes in "The Gulag Archipelago" that the credit for having driven the Germans
from the city belongs to the Vlasov units, i.e. units composed of Russian prisoners
of war who were placed under the command of the German Wehrmacht. The official
party critics of Solzhenitsyn state: "This person ... invented his own story
about the mysterious liberation of Prague by the Vlasov units... The entire
world knows that Prgaue was liberated from Nazi control ... by the Soviet and Czech
armies." No known materials about the background that led to the expulsion of
German troops from Prague are so far at hand to prove the case one way or the other.
The undeniable participation of Vlasov units in the fight against the National
Socialist occupiers of Prague has always been concealed both in Czechoslovakia and
in the Soviet Union. The present Soviet reactions to Solzhenitsyn's attempt to bring to
light the role of the Vlasov units demonstrated that the truth is to be veiled even
in this chapter of modern history, just as was done in connection with the secret
agreement between Hitler and Stalin on 23 August 1939 about the division of Poland.
When Soviet authors indirectly mention the participation of Vlasov units in the
Prague rebellion, they do so to show that the "traitors," who until the end of the
war had fought with the Germans, wanted to secure an alibi before history by their
intervention in Prague. The fact that the Czech national council, a type of parliament
of Benes' government in exile, had expressly and successfully asked the Vlasov army
for help is still regarded as classified material in the East.
There are documents in the well-guarded archives in. Prague and Moscow in connection
with this subject. At any rate, it is an established fact that Prague Radio which
was in the hands of the rebels since 5 May, on 6 May appealled in Russian to the
soldiers of General Vlasov to take part in the fighting. This fact is also proved
by a document of the "Bartos" rebel command, which broadcast a message to Czech General
Fiser in Kladno via radio on 6 May at 0650 hours, stating, "It is absolutely necessary
that you and the Vlasov units immediately advance on Prague from the West ..." The
final military report about the Prague revolt, which was dictated and signed on
11 May 1945 by the comander of the rebels, General Kulvaser, Confirms the fact that
units of the Vlasov army took part in the fighting at the request of Czech officers.
Prague Communists must have contacted. the Soviets in the meantime and were ap-
parently tipped off- by the latter that it was immoral, reprehensible and detrimental
to the party to have dealings with "traitors." This course of events is made plausible
by the fact that Vaclav David)later Czech foreign minister under Novotny and now First
Vice President of Parliament, became enraged and said it would be better to accept
"limited local failures" than to fight against the Germans with the Vlasov units.
Other CP officials stated that, if necessary, one should make allowances for losing
the revolt; at any rate, the Vlasov units should not get any credit for the liberation
of Prague. However, the attack of David and his colleagues, as shown by the report
of the meeting, was not accepted. Some sort of resolution was agreed upon, entitled:
"Point of view of the Czech National Council with respect to the military actions
Of General Vlasov and his troops against the armed German forces in the Prague area."
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ARRE2V0) FOF-RWMA(19/91q0 .UPINIIPsipsUMPWc9191PPaUPP?14
Czech
National Council is indebted to General Vlasov and his soldiers for having c me to
the aid of the Prague fighting population in response to a radio appeal. TIie same
officials wrote in a letter sent to Vlasov: "General Vlasov: The Czech Nat onal
Council expresses its thanks to your soldiers for the quick assistance they Illave
given our capital in_response to the radio appeal..."
The role played by a Soviet liaison officer during the revolt is still not
clear. Their officer, who was dropped by parachute, had a covert meeting place
in the Prague district of Weinberge. Eyewitnesses report that the Vlasov negotiators
stated during the discussions with the Czech National Council that their collaboration
was based on a telephone conversation of the Vlasov command with this officer. He
is said to have guaranteed exemption from punishment for all Vlasov soldiers; ,The
officer, however, disappeared imiladiately after the arrival of the Soviet units on
9 May 1945. Communist historians suspect that he was an emissary of the Soviet
supreme command. The Vlasov soldiers, who were handed over to Stalin, were Sub-
sequently either liquidated or forcibly repatriated.
Wiassow auf der Seite der Tseneche
In den Mittelpunkt der Kampagne, die
un der Sowjetunion. gegen Alexander
.Solschenizyn tobt, riickt jetzt die Frage,
veer Prag im Mai 1945 befreit hat. Sol-
sehenizyn selbst schreibt irn ?Archipel
GULag", das Verdienst, die Deutschen,
airs der Stadt vertrieberr zu haben;'ga-,
biihre den Wlassow-Soldaten, das ?heifit
Verbanden, die aus russischen Kriegs-
gelaingenen zusammengestellt worden
und der deutschen Wehrrnachtfiihrung
unterstellt ? waren. Die parteiamtlichen
Kritiker Solschenizyns sagen: ?Dieses
Subjekt dichtete seine eigene Ge-
schichte tiber die mystische Befreiung
Brags durch die Wlassow-Leute zusam-
men ... Die ganze Welt wei3, daB Prag
von der sowjetischen und der tschechoi
slowakischen Armee... von der Nazi-
Ilerrschaft befreit wurde." Tiber die
Hintergrtinde, die zur Vertreibung,
del.:Ascher Truppen aus Prag ftlhrten,
liegen bisher keine bekannte Materia-
lien vor, die unserer Darstellung zu-
grunde liegen.
Die unleugbare Teilnahme von Wlas-
sow-Soldaten. an den Karr:igen gegen
die NS-Besatzer in Prag ist soWnhl in
der Tschechoslowakei- als auch in der
Sowjetunion- stets verheimlicht worden.
-fiber diesen Vorgang clurfte von keiner
Seite die Wahrheit gesagt werden. Auch
die jetzigen sowjetischen Reaktionen
auf den Versuch Solschenizyns, die Rol-
le der Wlassow-Truppen ins rechte
Licht zu rucken, beweisen, daB auch
clieses Kapitel der Zeitgeschichte ilber-
tiancht werden soil, wie dies schon im
Zusammenhang mit dem Geheimabkom-
men zwischen Hitler und Stalin vom 23.
August 1939 tiber die Teilung Polen9
geschehen ist.
Wenn von Sovvjetautoren die Teil-
nahme von Wlassow-Einheiteream Pra-
ger Aufstand indirekt angedeutet wird.
dorm geschieht es in dor Absicht, die his
Kriegsende auf deutscher Seite stehen-
den ?Verrater" dem Verdacht auszuset-
zen, sic h5tten sich durch ihr Eingreifen
in Brag em n Alibi vor der Geschichte si-
che?rn wollen. DaB der Tschechische Na-
tionalrat, eine Art Parlament der Exil-
reeierung Benesch, die Wlassow-Armee
attecirticklich und erfolgre.ich em 1-Life
gebeten hat, gilt im Osten noch immer
als geheime VerschluBsache.
Zit diesern Thema gibt es Dokumeate
in den wohlbehiiteten Archiven in Prag
und Moskau. Fest steht jedenfalls, daB
der Prager Rundfunk, der sich seit dem
5. Mai in den Handen der Aufstandi-
schen befand, in den Morgenstunden des ,
6. Mai einen Appel" an die Soldaten des
Generals Wlassow in russischer Sprache
richtete end sie beschwor, in die
Klimpfe einzugreifen. Diesen Ta the-
stand beweist auch em n Dolkument des
Aufstandischen-Kommandos ?Bartes"?
Dieses Kommando sanche tiber Funk am
6. Mai urn 6.50 Uhr eine Botschaft an den
tschechischen General Eiser nach Klacl-
no. In i'nr hie3 es wortli: ?Es ist uner-
laBlich, &di ihr zusammen mit den
Wlassow-Leuten so schnell wie meglich
von Weston her auf Prig vorstolit ..."
Im militarischen Abschluf3bericht dhO
den Prager Aufstand, der vom Kom-
mandeur der Aufstandischen, General
Kulvaser, am 11. Mai 1945 diktiert und
unterschriehen wurden wird atisdreck-
iich besthtigt, daf3 Einheiten der Wlas-
sow-Armee auf Wimsch tschechoslo-
wakischer Offiziere in die Ktimpfe eM-
gegriffen haben. ? ?
Inzwischen rraissen Prager Kommu-
nisten Kontakt mit den Sowlets aufge-
nommen end von diesen den Tip erhal-
ten haben, claf3 es unmoralisch, verwerf-
lich unci parteischadigend sib, sich auf
eine Zusammenarbeit mit den Wlas-,
sow-?Verrlitern" einzulassen. Ftir die-
sen Gang der Binge spricht, daf3 in der
Sitzung des Nationalrates Vaclav David,
der spatere CSSR-AuBenrninister enter
Novotny und gegenwartige Erste Vize-
priisident des Pariaments, aufbrauste
und sagte, Ps ware besser, ?lokal be-
grenzte MiBerfolge" hinzunehmen, als
mit den Wlassow-Einheiten gemeinsarn
gegen die Deutschen zu k5rnofen. An-
dere KP-Funktionare erklarten, notfalli
milsse man in Kauf nehmen, daf3 der
Aufstand niedergeschlagen wird: Wlas-
sowisten cltirfe kein Verdienst bei der
Befreiung Frees zufallen. Der
Davids und seiner Genossen
lerdings, wie dos Sitzungsproto
weist. nicht akzeptiert. IVIan emn
auf eine Art Resolution, die d
erhielt: ?Standpunkt des Tsche
Nationalrates zu den milithris'
tionen General Wiassows en
Trupnen gegen die bewaffnete
schen Kra fte im Prager Baum."
In Punkt II des in Russis
orsto3
rileoll hael
sich
.n
Tidal
hischen
en Ak-
seiner
dent-
h unci
Tschechisch abgefaliten Do' urnents
heilit es: ,,Der Tschechische Nationalrat
dankt General Wlassow und seinen
Saldaten, da0 sic auf omen Ru dfunk,
airmed bin dor Prager kampfen 'en Be-
vdlkerting zu Mite letimere" In tinem. an.
Wlassow solhst gerichtteen Brief
schrieben dieselben Absentler elierr
General Wlassow! Der Tel-chisehe
Nationalrat dankt Tb ten Snlde ten fur
die schnelle Ililfe, die sic' unserer
Hauptstadt Prag atif den Rundfunkap
pull hin geleistet haben ..."
"inkier ist bis lieute die Roll
sowjetischer Verbindengsoffizi
rend des Aufstands gespielt hat
Fallsehirm Abgesetzte hatte s
laufstelle im Prager Stadtteil
ge. Augenzeugen berichten, di
sow-Ernferh!imiler batten bei
sinSichen im Nationalrat mitget
Eilfsoeceitschaft sub :etch out
fengespraeh des Whissow-Not
mit diesem Oifizier zuruckzufil
sell slob flit die Straffreih
, die ein
.r with-
Der mit
inc An-
einber-
Wlas-
len Ge-
.ilt, ihre
in Tele-
mandos
iren. Er
it aller
Wiessetv-Seldal en verbUrgt ha len. Der
Oflizier it, tvie ce; iehereinslimmend
sch der
'hi 1943
? Histo-
-tatigen,
Einieshr
dos ge-
;eliefer-
spater
so fort nacir dem Einma
Sowjetrussen in Brag am 9. 1
verschwunden. Knmmunistisch
riker, die diesen Sachverbalt he
vermitten, daf3 es sich um einen
des sowjetischen Oberkomma
handett babe. Die an Stalin rats
ten Wlassow-S"oldaten wurde,
103 liquidierf, tells deportiert.
j.r DO! 1' STP.0
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IINGER
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BY
GEORGE FISCHER
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., 1932
SOVIET
OPPUSITEON
TB STALIN
a case study in
world war II
Copyright 1952
By the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Distributed in Great Britain by
GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE
Oxford University Press
London
This volume was prepared, in part, under a grant from the Car-
negie Corporation of New York. That Corporation is not, how-
ever, the author, owner, publisher, or proprietor of this publica-
tion and is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its
grant any of the statements made or views expressed therein.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 52-9387
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Chapter VII
KONR: Committee
for thc
Liberation of the
Peoples of Russia
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In the history of the Vlasov Movement,
the city of Prague twice played an out-
standing role. It did so once in x944
and once in 1945. On the earlier occasion,
Prague was the happy scene of the es-
tablishment of General Vlasov's KONR
? the Committee for the Liberation of
the Peoples of Russia. But if the Vlasov
Movement had by then embarked upon
its Himmler stage, and hoped for the
nco-Utilitarian backing of the power-
ful SS chieftain, there remained one de-
cisive obstacle.
This obstacle was the war situation.
By that time, disastrous and unceasing
defeats were being suffered constantly
by Hitler Germany. If Himmler's con-
cessions to the Vlasov Movement were
caused to a large extent by these war
reverses, the entire brief life of the
KONR took place in an environment
of unmitigated disaster. Only four days
after its founding in Prague on Novem-
ber 14, 1944, General Patton's Third
U. S. Army entered German territory.
By the end of December 1944, the Red
Army had flooded into the Balkans and
was fighting inside Budapest. The
Western Allies were driving ever deeper
into Germany. And all along, increas-
ingly heavy bombing raids were destroy-
ing the major cities of Germany as well
as its communications.
This widespread defeat and destruc-
tion, the thorough disorganization and
disruption of the entire German govern-
mental apparatus, affected the KONR
deeply. Now even those German
officials who either from conviction or
from bureaucratic habit were quite ready
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to furnish the KONR with the military, organizational, or propaganda
aid needed for its new activities were often unable to do so. It would be
erroneous to attribute all of the KONR's many frustrations to conscious
and organized German opposition.
But the KONR was affected by the war situation in an even more
fundamental way. When wartime Soviet opposition at last attained a
semblance of German recognition and assistance, that Germany was
unmistakably crumbling. The KONR was born in an atmosphere of
defeat and black pessimism. Behind every action, every thought, every
hope of its leaders was the haunting vision of failure, of doom, of
death ? a devitalizing, dispiriting atmosphere indeed.
Yet on the occasion of the founding of the KONR, the specter of
defeat was pushed away. So many frustrations had marked the whole
path of the Vlasov Movement that it was only natural that this formal,
even ceremonial, recognition of long-cherished hopes should have been
greeted as a notable achievement. Arid indeed this attitude still prevails.
Despite its ominous future, despite the fact that neither the achievements
nor the drama of the event were great in absolute terms, the Prague
meeting of the KONR is remembered as the most historic event in the
annals of wartime Soviet opposition.
The activities preceding the founding meeting of the KONR were of
a kind all too familiar in the story of the Vlasov Movement. The Vlasov
Movement's proposal that the founding take place in a non-German
city was adopted. The meeting was scheduled not for Berlin, as first
planned, but in the Slavic capital of Prague. But with plans well under
way, Rosenberg addressed one more protest, an unusually sharp one, to
Bormann, Ribbentrop, and Lammers, as well as to Himmler. The out-
come of this was that Himmler gave orders to conduct the Prague
meeting on a far smaller scale than had initially been proposed. Instead
of the four undersecretaries slated to represent the German government,
there was actually only one SS General Lorenz, as a deputy of the
German Foreign Minister and President of the Society of Interstate
Associations.'
Vlasov and other key KONR figures arrived in Prague, and returned
to Berlin, on the day of the meeting, November 14, 1944, in a special
section of the Berlin-Prague night express. They were escorted to
Prague's best hotel, the Alcron, in front of which a German honor guard
was posted for the occasion. An exclusive luncheon was given for Vlasov
and his closest associates by Karl-Hermann Frank, Reichsminister for
the "Protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia (not to be confused with
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Hanns Frank, Gauleiter for occupied Poland). The KONR meeting
itself began at 3 :oo P.M. in Prague's most festive hall, the Spanish Hall
of its ancient palace, Hradany.2 The meeting was first chaired by the
oldest member of the KONR, Professor Rudnev. (The other published
names of original KONR members appear in Appendix IV.) Vlasov
was then elected chairman, and took over the conduct of the meeting.
After a welcome by Reichsminister Frank, Lorenz delivered a speech
which conferred official endorsement upon both the KONR ?"an ally
.of Germany"?and its Prague Manifesto. "In the manifesto issued
today by you, the foundations for a joint struggle against Bolshevism are
outlined with conclusive clarity. On the path to the realization of the
aims cited in the manifesto, you may be assured of the support of
the German government." 3 Following the reading of a congratulatory
telegram from Himmler. came the principal address of the day ? that
of General Vlasov.
Vlasov stressed that although opposition inside the USSR never.
abated, Soviet totalitarianism made a struggle practically impossible. It
was only World War II that gave opposition an opportunity to organize
itself outside the USSR. Thus, "for the sake of saving the motherland,
we sought an honest alliance with Germany. We know that the help
which is being furnished to us by the German people is today our sole
real possibility to organize an armed struggle against Bolshevism."
Vlasov next described his recent interviews with Himmler and Ribben-
trop, apparently with the desire of stressing the "spirit of mutual under-
standing" and the "full support" of these Nazi chieftains. At the same
time that he made his formal bow to Hitler, Vlasov once again struck
his usual independent note in concluding: "On the basis of trust and
common interests between the German and Russian peoples, with an
unswerving will to victory, we build our collaboration on the basis of
mutual respect. Today we can assure the Fiihrer and the whole German
people that in their difficult struggle against the worst enemy of all
peoples ?Bolshevism -- the peoples of Russia are their best allies and
will never lay down their arms but rather will go shoulder to shoulder
with them to full victory." After Vlasov's speech, and one by General
Trukhin, came the climax, the adoption of the Prague Manifesto.
The Prague Manifesto is the only major ideological pronouncement
of theN -stage. It-is_alsathc roost detailed and
most famous programmatic statement issued by the Russian Liberation
Movement. In the postwar period, and to this date, the Prague Mani-
festo is cited by a broad range of Soviet exile groupings, and unaffiliated
erhigres, as the most acceptable credo for a future struggle against the
Soviet regime. It thus enjoys a unique standing in the annals of postwar
as well as wartime Soviet opposition to Stalin. Two circumstances stand
out as the Prague Manifesto is analyzed. One is the changing status of
Germany and the West. The other is the ideological picture within the
Vlasov Movement, a subject to be discussed further in Part III.
Faced with imminent defeat, German officialdom by the fall of 1944
had far less absolute self-confidence. This meant an easing of the pro-
hibitions and restrictions that had for so long hampered the Soviet
opposition movement. Hence the Prague Manifesto comes closest to
reflecting the beliefs of Soviet opposition in World War II. But the
counterpart to German defeat was Allied victory. With this prospect
ever closer, the Vlasov Movement began to think far more in terms of
the Western world and the slogans that might appeal to this possible
new ally of Soviet defection. This adjustment to a changing power situa-
tion was in large measure not conscious. Even the assertion of its exist-
ence might well be met with indignant denials by surviving key figures
of the Vlasov Movement. Nevertheless, along with genuine non-Nazi
convictions, the shift of the offensive from Germany to its opponents
increasingly affected the ideological position of the Vlasov Movement.
Though united in its opposition to Stalin, the Vlasov Movement was
otherwise an ever-fluctuating gathering of varying, and sometimes con-
flicting, currents. And these currents changed considerably between 1942
and 1945. The Vlasovite ideology itself was nonexistent except as an
amorphous consensus between the "left" and "right" currents. Articu-
lated ideological positions should be ascribed throughout only to the
Vlasovitc elite, and far less to the Movement's rank and file. In the latter
case, sympathy with the middle grouping intermingled with ideological
confusion and apathy. To divine any, or particularly a single, ideological
pattern for such an amalgam is immensely difficult at best. It is only
necessary to recall the situation that existed at Dabendorf, that least un-
congenial spot in Hitler Germany, which was the spiritual and ideologi-
cal center of the Vlasov Movement. It is a curious paradox that the two
groups most responsible for this were the two extreme groups within
the Movement, its "right" and "left" currents. The influence of Zykov,
or the "left," is generally thought to have been considerable on Vlasov
Movement thinking. The "right" v . vaso . ?
manifesto . . . was inspired by NTS philosophy." 5
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There is much of interest in the Prague Manifesto, the full text of
which is reproduced in Appendix IV. Notable in the Manifesto are the
brevity and the stanchly independent tone of its sole reference to Hitler
Germany. "The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia
welcomes Germany's help under conditions which shall not impair the
honor and independence of our country. This help is at the moment the
only tangible opportunity to organize an armed struggle against the
Stalin clique." Interesting, too, is its unequivocal "sell-determination"
stand on the national issue. While insisting on "the unification of all
national forces and their subordination to the common cause of destroy-
ing Bolshevism as the prerequisite for victory," in its first programmatic
point it firmly endorses "equality of all peoples of Russia and their real
right for national development, self-determination, and state independ-
ence." Its list of reasons why the Vlasov Movement's crusade will be
victorious in the end seems incredibly unrealistic when one considers
the date of its issuance. BUt it remains worthy of attention not only as a
reflection of the Vlasov Movement's frame of mind but particularly if
the crusade's terminus is seen not in German victory but after a con-
tinuing anti-Stalin struggle. Yet these and other points are all subordi-
nate in interest to the ideological blueprint of the Prague Manifesto
and of its theme: "A new free People's political system without Bol-
sheviks and exploiters."
One of the most significant aspects of the Prague Manifesto is its
position on the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet regime. Despite its
bitter indictment of "Bolsheviks" and the "Stalin clique," neither the
Prague Manifesto nor the Vlasov Movement in general ever disavowed
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. According to the Vlasovite picture,
the Czarist regime was "bankrupt," and in the February Revolution, the
people themselves won for Russia the fullest political freedom it has
ever enjoyed. It was not only "the overthrow of Stalin's tyranny" but
also "the restitution of those rights . . . won in the people's revolution
of 19x7" for which the Vlasov Movement was fighting. "All reaction-
ary projects involving a limitation of the people's rights" were categor-
ically rejected. But though political liberty had been won in the
February Revolution, the Provisional Government proved vacillating
and undynamic, "unable to decide on bold and consequent reforms."
Therefore the Prague Manifesto does not deny the necessity for the
October Revolution with its social and economic innovations. Only
after the Soviet government had entrenched itself did it become clear
that the people had been betrayed into new tyranny.
"Genuine freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly and
press" are guaranteed. So are the "inviolability of persons, their prop-
erty, and homes," and "equality of all before the law." Laboring people
are guaranteed "the right to free labor." The land is to be turned over
gratuitously "to the peasants as their private property." "Trades, crafts,
artisan enterprises" are to be established. "Private initiative" will be
granted "the right and opportunity to participate in the economic life
of the country." "Free education, medical care, vacation and old-age
security" are to be guaranteed by the state "to all." Apparently it is
only private property that is "earned by work" that is to be inviolable.
The "free choice of land use" assured to the peasants endorses not only
individual farming, but also cooperatives as well. Intellectuals are to be
provided "with the opportunity to create freely" but only "for the well-
being of their people."
An illiberal monarchy, such as Tsarism, is repudiated, but liberal
capitalism fares no better, and not merely because, despite the en-
couragement offered to "private initiative," the great Vlasovite em-
phasis on state planning automatically excludes large-scale capitalist
enterprise. The Prague Manifesto reveals a deep distrust of the West-
ern capitalist democracies, the "plutocrats of England and the U.S.A.,
whose powers are based on the suppression and exploitation of other
countries and peoples." The image of the capitalist as the wanton
exploiter of destitute, defenseless wage earners was firmly fixed in the
minds of the Soviet-bred members of the Vlasov Movement.
There is no place in the Prague Manifesto for truly international
concepts ? the "powers of internationalism" are too indelibly identified
with "the Stalin clique." Although it is "convinced that the united
efforts of the peoples of Russia will receive support from all the free-
dom-loving nations of the world," it is in nationalism, the peoples of
Russia united, that the Vlasov Movement really puts its faith. And
finally, the great majority of Soviet defectors stressed emphMically that
neither Marxism nor any form of socialism, .with its "inevitable" sim-
ilarity to Stalinism, could lead to a happy and free post-Stalin USSR.
The same issue of Voila Naroda that published the Prague Manifesto
published other data of considerable interest to this study ? the names
of thirty-seven signatories who were members of the KONR, and of
twelve more who were candidates. Any analysis of KONR membership
is at once complicated by the Volia Naroda statement immediately fol-
lowing the listing: "The names of some members and candidates of the
Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia arc not published
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in view of their presence in the territory of the USSR or for reasons of
personal safety." And although it is known that the membership was
subsequently enlarged,6 no complete membership list is available. This
is not least because the top officers of the KONR as well as about half
of its final total of some eighty members are no longer alive (or are in
Soviet hands).
Of the thirty-seven identified full members of the KONR, the fol-
lowing categorization may be made: thirteen former members of the
Red Army, including Generals Vlasov, Malyshkin, Zhilenkov, Trukhin,
and Zakutnyi; nine Soviet professors and docents; seven old-emigre
leaders; and eight others, including one peasant and two workers.
A second type of breakdown is of interest, particularly in the light of
the furor and friction that previously arose regarding the national issue.
On the basis of very incomplete analysis ? based partially on the names
themselves, partially on the testimony of surviving members ? thirteen,
or just above one-third Of the original identified membership, were
non-Russian by nationality. The later additions to the Committee were
largely non-Russian. As a result, the proportion of non-Russian mem-
bers rose to half by the time the KONR reached its maximum of eighty
members.
? Yet the KONR was not able to recruit outstanding representatives of
the existing non-Russian National Committees. The one exception from
the outset was Shatnba Balinov, identified in the Volia Naroda of De-
cember 13, 1944 as chairman of the Kalmuk National Committee. More-
over, since Cossacks in part sought to be treated as a nationality, the
adherence to the KONR of their Lieutenant General E. Balabin may be
mentioned. Finally, a subsequent addition was a former wartime general
secretary of Kaium Khan's United Turkestan National Committee. But
on the whole the major figures of these separatist groups, unwilling to
subordinate themselves to Vlasov in a united movement, remained
adamantly separate. Vlasov himself and the Prague Manifesto em-
phatically backed the "self-determination" rather than the RUssian na-
tionalist position. But the gap between the Russian-led KONR and its
separatist opponents on the national problem was too great to be bridged
under the prevailing conditions, key among them being continuing
German cleavage and intrigue on this issue. As a result, despite numer-
ous negotiations, the Vlasov Movement was unable to gain the support
of the separatist National Committees, notably that of the Ukrainian
National Committee and its-Ukrainian National Army,-botiCirmally
established under Lieutenant General Pavlo Shandruk only on March
17, 1945, as a last-minute counterpart and counterbalance to Vlasov
and his KONR.8 Being at the same time unwilling to leave the field to
these national committees, the KONR by 1945 set up five national
councils of its own.
As interesting as the national element in the KONR is its old-e.migre
component. Many tory old emigres retained their hostility toward this,
as toward other Manifestations of wartime Soviet opposition, to the end.
Thus General Biskupskii, who acted as Hitler's plenipotentiary for
Russian emigre affairs in Germany, even while a guest of the KONR
at its Prague meeting, reiterated his opinion that Vlasov was an unre-
pentant Communist and his venture not to be trusted. Yuri S. Zherebkov,
however, who filled a similar position in France, became an original
member of the KONR. Though Zherebkov is said to have been a Ger-
man agent within the KONR, his Paris organ, Parizhskii Vestnik, was
more pro-Vlasov than any other Russian-language newspaper under
German control except the Dabendorf publications. In addition to the
six old emigres identified as members by Volta Naroda, at least three
others held key positions in the KONR apparatus. These were D. A.
Levitsky, chief of the KONR secretariat, A. S. Kazantsev, managing
editor of Volia Naroda, and K. G. Kromiadi, chief of Vlasov's personal
chancellery. Thus, while the overwhelming majority of KONR mem-
bers and of Vlasov Movement leaders in general were of recent Soviet
vintage, a number of old emigres were active and important in the
KONR. In general, the KONR stressed its hospitality to all who sub-
scribed to its ideological position, and decried a formal division between
"old" and "new" emigres.' But, contrary to the situation since World
War II, it was the recent Soviet defectors who at all times headed and
dominated the wartime opposition movement.
The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia met five
times after the Prague gathering, once a month from December 1944
through April 5945. There is, however, general agreement that KONR
matters were not transacted by the KONR itself. This committee of
fifty, and later eighty, members was mainly a representative body which
? not unlike Soviet procedure ? would merely approve decisions made
elsewhere. Formally, the governing body was a smaller group within
the larger committee, the KONR Presidium. Another widely held
opinion is that the membership was far from outstanding either intel-
lectually or organizationally. In the make-up of the KONR the stress
was on social and national cross section ratha 41
capacity or leadership. The truly decisive voices were those of the four
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ex-Soviet generals who headed the KONR apparatus, and, above all,
Vlasov himself.
Not long after the Prague meeting, Vlasov issued the statement: "The
Committee had hardly any time for what is usually called the prepara-
tory period. The central organs of the Committee were created the day
after the founding meeting, and immediately started practical work." 10
In the same statement, Vlasov named the four organs ? administrative,
military, civilian, and propaganda ? that became the framework of the
KONR apparatus, headed by Generals Malyshkin, TrUkhin, Zakutnyi,
and Zhilenkov, respectively, and described in the notes to this chapter.'
After the Prague meeting, the KONR apparatus returned to Daben-
dorf and to Dahlem, the fashionable Berlin sector where Vlasov had
resided throughout most of the war and where the KONR had been
granted three additional villas from which to carry on its activities. But
the immense Allied bombings forced it, early in February 1945, to move
from these centers to the Gzech resort of Karlsbacl, where headquarters
were established in the principal hotel, the Richmond. The Dabendorf
School was moved to nearby joachimsthal. As if this one move were not
sufficient to dramatize the nightmarishly uncertain and ephemeral ex-
istence of the venture, steady German retreats forced the KONR into a
second move two months later, in the middle of April. This time the
move was to what the Allies had feared would become the great, last-
stand Nazi redoubt, the Bavarian and Austrian Alps. This new, and
last, KONR center was in the Upper Bavarian town of Fiissen.
If the KONR's actual physical existence was uncertain and ephemeral
during this grueling last half-year of the Thousand Year Reich, its
political existence was no less so. Though finally permitted to build up
a comparatively formidable organizational structure, the KONR was
still hampered and frustrated at practically every turn by the continuing
rigidity of German officialdom. And the waiting had been so long, the
collapse was now so imminent, that the total impact of the years of
frustration, shattered illusions, and unrewarded compromises became
particularly burdensome. A poignant and revealing eyewitness account
comes from Dr. N., whose identity, as well as his prominence both in
the KONR and previously in the USSR, is known to me. As a leading
member of the KONR, Dr. N. speaks of the repeated shocks and
disappointments that came with the Vlasov Movement's latter-stage
dependence on Himmler. It was after the actual establishment of the
KONR that "the greatest disappointment awaited us. It turned out that
all our decisions had to be coordinated with the appropriate [German]
commissar. Nobody had the right to write evex . the smallest paper with-
out his commissar. . . Many times during this period both I and other
members of the KONR doubted the correctness of our decision to join
the KONR. However . . all bridges had been burned, the departure
of individuals from the KONR would not improve the situation. There-
fore only one thing remained, to grit one's teeth and to try to accom-
plish at least the minimum which we might be able to." 32
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Chapter VIII
The KONR Army
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to form the Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Committee for the
Liberation of the Peoples of Russia according to approved tables of or-
ganization.
The brief life of the KONR not only
began in Prague. Seven months later,
it returned to Prague for its climax ?
the climax preceding the tragic end.
In 1944, the .prologue to Prague was
Vlasov's rapprochement with Himmler
and the SS. In 1945, the KONR return
to Prague was preceded by the forma-
tion and the combat actions of the mili-
tary arm of the Vlasov Movement ?
the KONR Army.
In many ways the experience of the
KONR Army is strikingly similar to
that of its political center, the Corn-
mittee for the Liberation of the Peoples
of Russia. As with the KONR, this
seeming realization of the Vlasovite
dream for an independent army began
with high hope ? and with formal
ceremony.
In its January 31, 1945 issue, the front
page of Volia Naroda was devoted to a
major announcement:
ORDER No.
To: All Armed Forces
for the Liberation
Russia
Headquarters
of the Committee
of the Peoples of
January 28, t945
1. This date the Fiihrer of Greater
Germany transferred to me and I assumed
command of the Armed Forces of the
Committee for the Liberation of the
Peoples of Russia.
2. The list of subordinate units is con-
tained in a special appendix.
3._As_ Chief of Staff I appoint Major-
General F. I. Trukhin, whom I order
Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Committee for the
Liberation of the Peoples of Russia
Lieutenant General
A. VLAsOV
Two weeks after Vlasov's assumption of command of his new mili-
tary force, a formal transfer took place. The units brought together to
form the KONR Army were turned over to Vlasov by General Kiist-
ring, still OKH General for Osttruppen, or Volunteer Units, as these
formations were now called.' Yet nothing describes the formation of
the KONR Army so well as "too little and too late." It was now hardly
more than three months before Hitler's Germany would surrender ?
and in these remaining three months the KONR Army would see
much travail and frustration.
One of the sources of frustration was Himmler, who had promised
Vlasov an initial formation of five KONR divisions. As Germany's
fortunes declined catastrophically, he now withdrew more and more
from his troublesome sponsorship of the Vlasov Movement. Finally it
was decided that the OKH General for Osttruppen, KOstring, would
bc charged with the activation of the promised KONR divisions. With
the Other Germany center in OKH Fronde Heerc Oct decimated after
July 20, the task fell to Kostring's former Osttruppen deputy, Colonel
Herre. But the number of authorized divisions was whittled down from
five to two, with more to follow if these proved themselves in combat.
These were given the following German army designations:
t. First KONR Division ?600th Panzer-Grenadier Division;
2. Second KONR Division ?65oth Panzer-Grenadier Division.
Vast difficulties still stood in the way of the actual activation of the
long-delayed KONR Army. Most of these difficulties were not so much
political as stemming from the immense strain under which Hitler's
Germany was then seeking to keep itself from collapse. Weapons for
the KONR Army were extremely scarce. Germany's economic and
manpower chieftains protested vigorously against surrendering Ostar-
beiter for the manning of KONR units. The Wehrmac-ht was equally
reluctant to traff-sfer akttruppen units to the KONR Anuy. Vast -rtcl-
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ministrative chaos began to predominate throughout what once was
the vaunted German apparatus, Thus the KONR Army experienced
never-ending difficulties in equipping even its meager formations. The
extent of the chaos is revealed by an exclamation made by Hitler him-
self at a military conference on March 23, 1945: "We just don't know
what is floating around. I have just heard for the first time, to my
amazement, that a Ukrainian SS-Division has suddenly appeared. I
don't know a thing about this." 2 Lastly, an ever-present obstacle to the
expansion of the KONR Army was Hitler's continuing disdain for
and suspicion of Soviet opposition and its military formations. At a
staff conference on January 27, 2945 Hitler once again ranted against
issuing German uniforms to any foreigners, particularly singling out
the Soviet defectors. "One has no sense of honor around here. Every
wretch is put in German uniform. I was always against it." Even when
a KONR.Army was authorized, little practical progress was made.
It is remarkable that the' KONR Army came into being at all. One
primary explanation for this was the enormous influx from all over
German-held Europe ? particularly from areas being occupied by the
Red Army ? of refugees from among Soviet Ostarbeiter, Osttruppen,
and prisoners of war. Thus one of the peculiar features of the KONR
Army is its constant swelling in size, caused largely by this steady
stream of refugees. It is reported that on one day, November 20, 1944,
6o,000 voluntary enlistments reportedly had been received for the
KONR Army.'
The other major reason for the growth of the KONR Army despite
the many German obstacles is the already-mentioned skeleton general
staff created at Dabendorf during the months preceding the formation
of the KONR and its Army. When the signal finally came to go ahead,
in the midst of chaos and flux, the KONR Army set up a strikingly
elaborate headquarters and a number of units in addition to the two
KONR divisions. At this time, too, on the recommendation of Vlasov
and the KONR at its February session,' and with the approval. of
Kiistring, the German arniy promoted five KONR ex-Red Army
colonels to the one-star German rank of major general: Sergei K.
Buniachenko, commander of the First Division; G. A. Zverev, com-
mander of the Second Division; Victor I. Maltsev, head of the KONR
Air Brigade located at Eger and Marienbad, near Karlsbad; Mikhail
A. Mcandrov, chief of the KONR Officers School; and B. I. Boyarsky,
the deputy to Trukhin.
With a clandestinely organized general staff as its nucleus, the First
Division evolved. Its center was the Miinsingen Staging Area in
Wurttemberg, an old, undersize Army camp forty miles from both
the Swiss border and Stuttgart. The early strength of the division came
to 23,000, according to the ex-Soviet colonel who was chief of Trukhin's
Operations Section. At MUnsingen, the First Division had little if any
German supervision. Following Vlasov's acceptance of the KONR
units in February 1945, all remaining German insignia. were removed
from the uniforms. German headquarters were unwilling at this cru-
cial moment to transfer Ostbataillone from front-line duty to the
KONR Army. As a result, the base of the First Division was elements
of two SS Divisions: Kaminsky's including, according to one Ger-
man account, those in the Warsaw uprising's suppression, though
Vlasovites deny this ? and Siegling's 3oth Volunteer SS Division,
comprising Byelorussian units badly mangled earlier in the Allied
invasion of France.
The activation of the First Division began in November 2944 and
was completed by the next January; it was only then that work on the
Second Division really started. Therefore it was never as fully activated
as the First. But a number of Ostbataillone formerly in Norway were
assigned to it, as well as Soviet prisoners of war of recent vintage. By
the end it was almost fully trained, and equipped at least with small
arms. It was based in the Heuberg Staging Area in Baden, some 40
miles from Miinsingen, and, like the latter, from Stuttgart. Also
located there were the KONR Army's headquarters, its officer units,
a Reserve Brigade, and a Construction Battalion: The total of these
various units came to 25,000.
During the incredibly brief and chaotic period when the KONR
Army was formed, numerous schemes were proposed for expanding
it further. General von Pannwitz's Cossack Corps was formally as-
signed to the KONR Army, but the transfer was never actually con-
summated. The same was true of the old-emigre Russian Defense
Corps formed in Serbia. At the last moment, the old-emigre pro-
KONR generals Kreuter and Turkul were authorized by Vlasov to
form a KONR division in Austria, but little if anything came of it:
And throughout, German authorities either delayed or refused out-
right to transfer Soviet national units or Ostbataillone to the KONR
Army. Yet despite chaos and obstruction, the KONR Army finally
rose to about 5o,000.n A considerable potential, this. But it was a puny
number when compared with the Vlasovite blueprints of an All-
Russian Army uniting all Soviet nationals under German control,
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with the hundreds of thousands of Osttruppen? and with the inflated
numbers often ascribed to "Vlasov's Army."
One last feature to be noted about the organization of the KONR
Army is that months and years of past usage led to its designation,
even in print in the official Voila Naroda, by the old name of the
phantom ROA. The KONR Army drew little of its personnel from
the Osttruppen units that had been described by the fictitious collective
term of ROA. But the Vlasov Movement's propaganda had succeeded
in making ROA a vital symbol of the entire Soviet opposition move-
ment. Thus the old term continued to be used, even in 1945, rathei-
.than the new name of KONR Army. The practice thoroughly ob-
scured the great difference between the vast, scattered phantom army
of Osttruppen and the small, united KONR Army commanded by
Vlasov himself.
Between the tortuous formation of the KONR Army and the Vlasov-
itcs' return to Prague lies a fantastic episode ? the brief history of the
KONR Army as an active combat force.
The episode in question was preceded by a small volunteer unit's
going into action on the Eastern Front early in February 1945.7 The
second instance of KONR Army combat was the outstanding one?
and far more complex. At least two eyewitness versions exist, that of
the Vlasovites 8 and that of the German officers closest to the First
Division.?
According to both versions, what was in effect to be the grand finale
of the entire wartime Soviet opposition movement began on March
2, 1945. On that date, General Buniachenko, Commander of the First
KONR Division at NIOnsingen, received orders from the German
command to proceed with his unit to the Eastern Front, where it was
to occupy front-line positions between Stettin and Berlin. Instead of
prompt compliance with these orders, Buniachenko informed the
German command that the First KONR Division was under the sole
command of the Commander in Chief of the KONR Army, General
Vlasov, and that he could not act until ordered to do so by Vlasov
himself. Thus, Vlasov was called hurriedly at Karlsbad, the Czech
headquarters of KONR itself, and on March 5 he gave the order for
the First KONR Division to proceed to the Eastern Front. The move
of the division was completed by the end of March, when it was
located north of Cottbus, about 70 miles southeast of Berlin and near
the Czech border, with the front running at the time on the Oder and
.Nissen, Rivers During its mnve, the division_had_been joined by sev
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eral thousand volunteers from among Soviet Ostarbeiter and Ost-
truppen.
The decisive next step took place when General Buniachenko was
ordered on April 8 to go into action at a peculiarly difficult spot on the
Eastern Front, a Red Army salient near Frankfurt on the Oder River
which the German/army had not been able to capture during weeks
of fighting, and to which access had now been made more difficult
than ever by spring floods and continued Soviet entrenching. Bunia-
chenko had not questioned the preliminary order to occupy a certain
area just behind the front line of his German front commander. But
now he refused to make the move until ordered to do so by General
?Vlasov. Once again Vlasov was swiftly summoned, and once again he
agreed to a compromise with the German command. Thus, on April
it, the First KONR Division entered into combat. After the costly
failure of the division's first assault, Buniachenko abruptly ordered
withdrawal from its front-line position. It appears certain, from both
the available versions, that Vlasov did not participate in this fateful
decision. He failed to arrive at the near-front location of the First
Division by April 15, the deadline set by its commander, and on that
day General Buniachenko ordered the division to proceed southward.
It may be surmised, in the light of our entire study, that both the
Vlasovite and the German versions were at least partially true. German
cooperation, even if far from absent, evidently did fail to come up to
high-strung Vlasovite expectations. On the other hand, I3uniachenko's
uppermost concern to extricate his Unit from the foreseeable collapse of
the Eastern Front also appears completely plausible. On these facts,
the Vlasovite and the German versions agree. The difference between
them lies in the interpretation. According to the Vlasovite version, the
KONR had been promised that none of its military units would be
used separately and that Vlasov would have immediate charge of
combat operations by the KONR Army. As to the First Division's
frontal actions, the Vlasovite version emphasizes the suicidal nature
of the combat mission assigned to it, and also the criminal failure of
German commanders to supply the ,artillery and air cover promised.
Thus the emphasis is on the uniform ill-will and breach of faith on the
part of German authorities.
The other version, that of the surviving German officers most closely
connected with the First Division, emphasizes something rather differ-
ent. Asserting that beginning with Himmler's agreement? in his
latest capacity as Commander in Chtef- ot-the Weich-sel?Army-Group
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? to use the First Division in his sector, Colonel Herre and the other
German associates of the KONR Army managed to overcome most
if not all of the many obstacles placed in the way of both the activation
and the combat use of the First Division. They add that most German
field commanders involved approached the First Division with under-
standing, once its peculiar background had been explained to them.
Lastly, the German version does not support the Vlasovite statement
that promises had been broken when the First Division was moved to
the front without the rest of the KONR Army. Instead, the German
version heavily emphasizes the fact that Buniachenko's decision was
motivated by his only secondary interest in the Eastern Front; his far
greater concern was to preserve all of the First Division's strength for
merger with the rest of the KONR Army before the final onrush of
Soviet and Allied forces.
Now began a swift withdrawal, with the advancing Red Army
following close on the heels of the mutinous division. On April 23,
when the division was loCated east of Dresden, it was offered complete
reinstatement in German service if it would agree to stand and fight
there under the commander of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal
Schomer. This offer General Buniachenko rejected, and, after a tense
forced march, dodging both German and advancing Soviet forces,
Czechoslovakia was reached on April 28. With Colonel Sakharov's
unit added as its Fourth Regiment, the First Division by now had
reportedly grown to a force of 20,000.
With its arrival in Czech territory, the First KONR Division en-
tered upon the most dramatic single episode of the entire history of
wartime Soviet opposition. On that day, division headquarters were
visited not only by Vlasov but by the German commander, Marshal
Schomer himself. Once again Buniachenko refused to reEnter German
service. By May 2, the First Division had moved on to a village some
50 kilometers southwest of Prague. Here Vlasov, still with the First
Division, received an emissary who informed him that KONR Army
Headquarters, together with the Second Division and other KONR
units, were now in Austria, moving toward Czechoslovakia. The
emissary also stated that the principal German concern was no longer
to regain the services of the First Division, but merely to assure its
neutrality toward German units.
At this time, with both Soviet and American forces pressing toward
Prague, the Czechoslovak National Council had begun preparing for
an uprising against the German occupants. By May 5, the revolt was
under way, and the air waves of Central Europe were flooded with
desperate appeals from the Council: "Calling the Allied armies. We
need urgent help. Send your planes and tanks. The Germans are ad-
vancing on Prague. For the Lord's sake, send help." "
We know now that the Red Army did not enter Prague until after
German surrender on May 9, and that the more rapidly advancing
U. S. forces were kept from seizing Prague by an Allied decision to
leave it like Berlin?to Soviet capture. At the time, however, Czech
resistance leaders were not aware of this. They were particularly
anxious that the Western forces, rather than the Red Army, should be
the first to enter Prague. But these were held back by a political de-
cision, while the Red Army tarried, perhaps for reasons similar to its
delay before Warsaw in August 1944, when the revolt in the Polish
capital was led by anti-Communists, not pro-Communists. Therefore,
seeing itself hard pressed by German forces, particularly by the SS
concentration around Prague, the Czech resistance center repeated its
urgent pleas for rescue to General Buniachenko.
And now the climax of our story is reached, with Buniachenko's
decision on May 5 to throw the First KONR Division, the "Vlasov
Army," into the Prague resistance against German units. By the eve-
ning of May 6, the First Division stood near Prague, and on the follow-
ing morning it engaged in combat against SS troops within the ancient
Slav capital. Here the Vlasov troops were given a jubilant reception by
the populace, VA0 were evidently never quite sure just who their
saviors were ? an understandable confusion resulting from the spec-
tacle of Russian-speaking soldiers in German-type uniforms savagely
opposing the SS forces. By the end of that day, May 7, after extremely
bitter and widespread fighting, the scales were tipped in favor of the
Czech uprising by the First KONR Division.
This, then, was the dramatic. finale of the military arm of the war-
time Soviet opposition movement. Founded as an act of collaboration
with Hitler Germany, denied all but an insignificant, eleventh-hour
part in combat, in its last moment it turned upon its erstwhile patrons
? and played a leading role in the liberation of a major European
center.
But if this episode may shine in glory in the annals of the Vlasov
Movement, it was an all too brief glory. For on the same day, May 7,
the commanders of the First KONR Division learned to their dismay
not only that Red Army rather than U. S. forces were to occupy
Prague, but also the more immediately disrupting news that the Czech-
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oslovak National Council, the resistance center that had sought the
aid of the Vlasov forces, was being rapidly replaced by representatives
of Eduard Bend's Czech government in exile. These new authorities
wanted the First Division either to await the arrival of the Red Army
and surrender to it or to make a spcedy departure from the city it had
just helped to liberate. And so at dawn of the next day, May 8, the
First KONR Division began its final withdrawal, returning from
Prague to the area of the near-by Czech town of Beraun, from which it
had begun its liberating action. For a fitting summary of this episode,
we have the account of an American foreign correspondent: "Prague
really was liberated by foreign troops, after all. Not by the Allies, who
did not arrive until the shooting was all over, but by 22,000 Russian
outlaws wearing German uniforms. . . When I reached Prague on
Tuesday, May eighth, General Vlasov and his men had melted away
as mysteriously as they had come." "
Extreme charges of treachery and of sheerest opportunism ?have
been lodged against the Vl,asov Movement for this action. How can we
explain this striking last-act Vlasovite defection from Hitler Germany?
As to the general charge of treachery, this entire study suggests that
so shabby and insolent had been the German treatment of wartime
Soviet opposition that concepts such as allegiance and loyalty appear
inapplicable. Regarding the specific allegation that the defection of
the First KONR Division was part of a long-prepared plan to betray
Hitler's Germany, neither the written nor thc oral testimony available
to me reveals the slightest evidence that the KONR or General Vlasov
had prepared this act in advance, either as treason to its former "ally"
or for any other reason.
Opportunism, as a factor, cannot be dismissed so easily. Oral testi-
mony to me by both German and Vlasovite officials involved in the
events indicates that both Vlasov and Buniachenko were unquestion-
ably concerned about the attitude the West would take toward the
Soviet opposition movement, and were therefore undoubtedly moti-
vated in part by the thought that liberating Prague from the SS might
make a favorable impression on the Western allies.
? At the same time, however, two considerations suggest that the
Vlasovites' desire to ingratiate themselves with the West was not the
most decisive factor. One of these? which we shall soon discuss at
greater length ? was their firm conviction that the West's outlook and
intentions were essentially anti-Soviet. _However_erroneous this con-
viction may have been at the time, the fact that they were so con-
vinced in this attitude greatly reduced any feeling that they might
have had of the necessity of appeasing the Western powers.
The other consideration is that events developed far too spontan-
eously to allow for such premeditation. So much in flux and limbo was
the entire war situation, so difficult had communications become be-
tween various KONR formations, that actions which might otherwise
have been ruled out by cooler heads were given free rein. From all
accounts, General Buniachenko was a quick-tempered, impulsive, and
far from sophisticated military man. Not only the German authorities
but Vlasov hirnself had difficulty in bridling his irascible temperament.
And we know specifically that Vlasov was not with the First KONR
Division the greater part of the time; in both key instances, at the
Eastern Front and regarding Prague, the final decision was taken by
Buniachenko without him. For throughout the month or two before
VE Day, Vlasov had become so deeply despondent and fatalistic, with
ever more frequent heavy drinking, that in the last critical weeks his
leadership was well-nigh absent ? as was he himself much of the
time. Nor was General Trukhin, as KONR Army Chief of Stall Bun-
iachenko's immediate superior, in Prague, as has been claimed by the
German novelist, Edwin Erich Dwinger, in his highly fictionalized
General Wlassoni.12 Moreover, it appears that to the end Vlasovite
chieftains were deeply divided on whether to place the KONR Army
at the mercy of the advancing Western Allies or to unite with anti-
Soviet formations, either in the Balkans (Draja Mikhailovich, von
Pannwitz's Cossack Corps, the old-emigre Russian Defense Corps) or
around Prague (as Buniachenko then did on his own). All this sug-
gests that actions which previously would have been given greater
and more high-level consideration were now decided upon with a
swiftness explainable only by the prevailing chaos.
Chaos was not the only result of the catastrophic decline of German
power. The resentments within the Vlasov Movement against the long
years of wanton maltreatment and abuse by German authorities now
for the first time could be unleashed. As long as no other' course than
collaboration seemed open, the Vlasovites, like most men in similar
circumstances, managed effectively to repress their resentments. But
now, although German treatment had actually improved in objective
terms, the changed situation made anti-Hitler actions not only more
possible but more likely than ever before.
Rebecca West,in hrr masterly work on pro-Nazi treason in World
War II, seems to mirror this explanation: "The Nazis were prone, in
4
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all sorts of circumstances, to make a peculiar error. When one of their
enemies became their friend, they went on treating him as an enemy.
However ready he might be to serve their interests, however much they
might need his help, they continued to savage him. The great historic
example of this curious trick is their treatment of the Russian soldiers
and civilians who, by tens of thousands, gladly surrendered to them as
they invaded Russian territory in 1941 and 1942. These people who
might have been their most valuable aids then and forever after, they
packed into cattle trucks and sent off to camps where they were starved
and tortured. Later they were fetched out and invited to fight along-
side the Germans, but by that time their enthusiasm was not what it
had been, and the treatment they received in training and at the front
failed to revive it." 13
One factor emphasized by a German author 14 must not be over-
looked. The liberation of Prague from German control would have
taken place within a few days under any circumstances. The part
played by the First KONR Division was only to speed the inevitable.
But the Vlasov Movement itself, born and raised under German pat-
ronage, did end with an anti-German act. Prague in 1944 saw the
launching of the KONR. In 1945, Prague witnessed its last act.
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