'THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMBATING TERRORISM,' DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY, JANUARY 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100560001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 20, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
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['THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMBATING TERRORISM," Department of State,
Current Foreign Policy, January 1973.
"tf.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS,"
partment of State Bulletin, 28 January 1974.
"THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: A GLOBAL APPROACH' by Lewis
Hoffacker, Department of State Bulletin, 18 March 1974.
"TERRORISM: THE CaMPANIES IN THE GUERRILLAS' SIGHTS," Economist, 1 June 1974.
The three State Department articles attached give a fairly comprehensive
view of the need for worldwide cooperation in curbing international terrorism,
the problems in achieving effective international action and the international
conventions now in existence which could become useful instruments against
terrorism if ratified by a larger number of countries than is now the case.
The Hoffacker article also goes into domestic measures taken by the U.S.
Government. The Economist piece deals with terrorism against business
representatives abroad.
This material provides convincing background for briefing media contacts,
liaison or agents who are in a position to influence governments to
support international efforts against terrorism.
State Department review completed
This issuance contains articles from domestic and foreign
publications selected for field operational use. Recipients are
cautioned that most of this material is copyrighted. For repub-
lication in areas where copyright infringement may cause prob-
lems payment of copyright fees not to exceed $50.00 is authorized
per previous instructions. The attachment is unclassified when
detached.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT
FORHGN POLICY
THE ROLE OF iNTERNATiONAL LAW
IN COMBATING TERRORISM
The deep concern of the United
States about the spread of global
terrorism and violence and the
threat it poses to the basic right
of the individual to security has
been underscored in two recent
speeches by key U.S. officials:
John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser
of the Department of State, and
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett,
Representative of the United
States to Committee V (Legal) of
the U.N. General Assembly. This
pamphlet is based on those state-
ments.
The problem of international
terrorism has significant political
overtones, but the international
legal initiatives the U.S. Govern-
ment has taken in this area have
been based on the humanitarian
and economic interests of all na-
tions. In taking these initiatives
we have sought to avoid political
complications in meeting a com-
mon danger.
There has been an alarming in-
crease of late in. incidents of inter-
national terrorism. These have
not involved any one political
cause or any one area of the
globe. In Sweden, 90 people
boarding an international flight
were made hostage and held for
ransom by Croatian terrorists. In
Israel, 26 tourists, 16 of them
Americans, were slaughtered in an
attack at Lod Airport. As of No-
vember 1, 1972, 30 airliners from
14 countries had been success-
fully hijacked;, 29 other hijacking
attempts had been frustrated; 140
airplane passengers and crew had
-been killed and 99 wounded by
acts of terrorism. Letter-bombs
have been posted. into interna-
tional mail channels from Amster-
dam, New Delhi, Belgrade, Singa-
pore, Bombay, and Malaysia to
individuals in. countries around
the world, including Canada, Aus-
tria, Argentina, United Kingdom,
Australia, Egypt, Brazil, Cam-
bodia, Italy, West Germany, and
Jordan.
In the past five years a total of
27 diplomats from 11 countries
have been kidnapped, and three
have been killed.
These incidents bear witness to
the terrible potential of a de-
ranged or determined person or
group to terrorize the international
community. This potential for
traumatic disruption appears to
grow larger with the increasing
technological and economic com-
plexity Of our society, and the fre-
quency of such incidents may well
be multiplied by the rapid and
wide publicity they receive.
Secretary of State Rogers, ad-
dressing the U.N. General Assem-
bly on September 25, 1972 under-
scored the gravity of the situation.
"The issue," he said, "is not
war-war between states, civil
war, or revolutionary war. The
issue . . . is whether millions
of air travelers can continue to
fly in safety each year. It is
whether a person who receives
a letter can open it without the
fear of being blown up. It is
whether diplomats can safely
carry out their duties. - It is
whether international meetings,
like this Assembly, can proceed
without the ever-present threat
of violence. In short, the issue
is whether the vulnerable lines
of international communication
-the airways and the mails,
diplomatic discourse and inter-
national meetings-can con-
tinue, without disruption, to
bring nations and peoples to-
gether. All who have a stake
in this have a stake in decisive
action to suppress these de-
mented acts of terrorism."
It may be impossible entirely
to eliminate the threat of terror-
ism, but this is no excuse for in-
action.
ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the effort to reduce the
threat of terrorism, there is an im-
portant contribution to be made
by international law. The U.S.
Government is taking a leading
role in this area. Our efforts are
aimed at deterring terrorist acts
by eliminating any safe haven for
the perpetrators of these crimes.
We are also attempting to estab-
lish a broad international legal
and moral consensus that will dis-
credit these activities and moti-
vate both governments and pri-
vate groups to discourage, rather
than to support, these actions. To
this end, the U.S. Government has
supported a series of international
treaties in which the states which
are parties to the treaties pledge
themselves either to extradite or
to prosecute the perpetrators of
specific offenses defined in those
instruments. This has, of course,
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involved as a corollary the estab-
lishment of a species of.universal
jurisdiction over the specified
offenses-that of any state party
where the perpetrator is found,
regardless of where the offense
was committed.
Obviously, the key to the suc-
cess of this approach is wide-
spread acceptance of the obliga-
tions of these treaties by the
international community. Despite
the revulsion to acts of terrorism
felt in most countries of the
world, there are serious problems
in obtaining general acceptance
of binding and effective interna-
tional measures against terrorist
acts. In some cases, particular
states are deeply interested in the
political aspirations of the terror-
ist groups. In other cases, states
are inhibited by their commercial
and political interests from taking
strong measures against states
which support the political cause
of a terrorist movement.
Further, in many countries of
the free world there is consider-
able attachment to the legal insti-
tution of diplomatic or territorial
asylum, which has applied histori-
cally not only to such strictly
political crimes as treason or sedi-
tion but also to certain common
crimes directly connected with po-
litical activity such as organized
rebellion. Perhaps most important
is the regrettable fact that public
opinion often views acts of terror-
ism from a political perspective
rather than from a legal or hu-
manitarian perspective.
In this context, the United
States has thought it would be
counterproductive, even if it were
technically feasible, to attempt to
define terrorism. Instead, we have
attempted to identify specific cat-
egories of offenses which, be-
cause of their grave and inhuman
effect on innocent persons, or be-
cause of their serious interference
with the vital machinery of inter-
national life, should be con-
demned by states of every ideol-
ogy and alignment.
These have included:
? First, hijacking and sabotage
of civil aircraft;
? Second, the kidnapping and
assassination of foreign diplomats
and other foreign officials;
? Third, the export of interna-
tional terrorism to countries not
involved in the conflicts which
spawned those acts.
Hijacking and Sabotage
of Civil Aircraft
The first area in which wide-
spread support for legal action de-
veloped was that of hijacking and
sabotage of civil aircraft, which
is extremely vulnerable to terror-
ist attacks. Such attacks have dis-
astrous consequences for the civil
aviation system.
The work in this field has been
done in the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
its Legal Committee. Discussion
of the first convention in the field
began in 1950 and culminated
with the adoption and signing at
Tokyo in 1963 of the Convention
on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft.
The Tokyo convention, to which
the United States became a party
in 1969, provides a series of rules
for, the exercise of jurisdiction
over offenses committed aboard
aircraft in flight. The convention
establishes neither exclusive ju-
risdiction nor universal jurisdic-
tion; rather, it assures that at least
the state of registration of the
aircraft will have the competence
to exercise its jurisdiction over
crimes committed aboard that air-
craft. In addition, the convention
establishes certain rules of con-
duct for the commander and crew
of the aircraft, and provides for
rules and procedures for the dis-
embarkation of an offender. Fi-
nally, the convention req ires that
a contracting state in which a hi-
jacked aircraft lands must permit
the passengers and crew to con-
tinue their journey as soon as
practicable and return the aircraft
and cargo to the person lawfully
entitled to their possession.
To deal specifically ith the
then-increasing' number of hi-
jackings, a second conve tion was
prepared in ICAO and formalized
at a diplomatic conference in De-
cember 1970 at The Hague. The
United States became a party to
it in 1971. The Hague hijacking
ccrvert in applies to an un!aw-
f-ui seizure or exercise of control,
by force or threat of fore, or by
any other, form of inti idation
committed on board a ivil air-
craft in flight, and to an attempt
at. such an act comm tted on
board.
Each state is obligated to make
.hijacking punishable b~ severe
penalties and to establish its crim-
.i,nal jurisdiction to cover cases
:where an alleged hijacker is pres-
ent in its territory, regardless of
where the hijacking takes place.
If..a state in which a hi acker is
found does not extradite him, that
state is obligated witho t excep-
tion whatsoever, and whether or
not the offense was committed in
..'its territory, to submit the case to
its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution. I is note-
worthy that agreement on this
convention was reached only after
' hijacking became a clear and in-
crmasi menace in may differ-
ent parts of the world.
Two acts of aircraft abotage
occurred in Europe on February
21, 1970-one involving Swissair;
the other, Austrian Airlines. Both
aircraft were on irate national
.flights. The Swiss airpla .e tragi-
cally. crashed, and all pa sengers
and cr-,~, members were killed.
As a rF s_jlt of these i cidents,
work .,.s begun on a third con-
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vention-the Montreal convention
-adopted in September 1971.
This convention covers sabotage
of aircraft. It requires extradition
or prosecution of persons who
commit acts of sabotage or other-
wise destroy aircraft, or who en-
danger the safe flight of an air-
craft by damaging it, or by destroy-
ing. or damaging air navigation
facilities. The convention also
covers acts of violence against
persons on board aircraft and
bomb hoaxes which endanger the
safe flight of an aircraft. Basically,
the provisions of this convention
parallel those of The Hague con-
vention. -
Issue of Safe Haven
The adoption of rules that
would appear sufficient to cover
the problems of. hijacking and
sabotage of aircraft have, none-
theless, not eliminated the prob-
lem. While the attitude of all
states toward hijacking has
shifted, and hijackers rarely re-
ceive heroes' welcomes, there are
still a number of states which
continue to serve as a safe haven
for hijackers. These states have
not ratified the existing conven-
tions. They continue to allow hi-
jackers to land in their territory
and to escape prosecution or ex-
tradition. Therefore, while we con-
tinue to work actively for. more
general adherence to the hijack-
ing and sabotage conventions, we
recognize that stronger action is
required.
The United States has proposed
a new treaty, supported most ac-
tively by Canada, which would
provide a basis for joint action,
such as suspension of all air serv-
ice to countries which fail to fol-
low the basic rules set out in The
Hague and Montreal conventions.
This would create a strong in-
centive toward compliance, for
boycott action would entail isola-
tion of a state from the interna-
tional aviation system. An ICAO
subcommittee met in Washington
recently and considered a draft
treaty cosponsored by the United
States and Canada to accomplish
this end. Because the concept,
though eminently reasonable and
justifiable, seems to some coun-
tries to be radical-i.e., inducing
compliance from states to obliga-
tions recorded in treaties to which
they are not parties-there has
been significant resistance to the
adoption of this treaty. However,
even if the treaty that is finally
adopted were only initially to at-
tract a small number of like-
minded states active in interna-
tional civil aviation, its impact
would be quite significant, for a
nation that provided a haven for
hijackers could have much of its
civil aviation cut off.
In this connection, the ICAO
Council on November 1, 1972
decided to convene a special ses-
sion of the ICAO Legal Committee
in January 1973 and to provide
for the convening of a diplomatic
conference on air security in
August-September 1973.
Protection of Diplomats
A second specific and limited
area in which we have sought to
apply the techniques developed
in the area of hijacking and
sabotage is the protection of
.diplomats.
The first convention on this
problem was drafted by the Orga-
nization of American States (OAS)
at a special session of the OAS
General Assembly held in Wash-
ington in. 1971. The convention
was drafted in that forum because
of the self-evident need for action
in the Americas. There had been
more than a dozen incidents of
kidnappings and violence directed
against diplomats in six countries
of the Western Hemisphere in the
two prior years, nine of which
involved U.S. personnel. Two am-
bassadors and an AID employee
were murdered.
The OAS convention provides
that kidnapping, murder, and other
assaults against the life or per-
sonal integrity of those persons
to whom the state had the duty
under international law to give
special protection, as well as ex-
tortion in connection with those
crimes, shall be considered com-
mon crimes of international sig-
nificance, regardless of motive.
If the fugitive is not surrendered
for extradition because of some
legal impediment, the state in
which the offender is found is
obligated to prosecute as if the
act had been committed in its
territory. To make this procedure
effective, it has been necessary
to establish (1) a firm obligation
to prosecute where extradition is
withheld, and (2) a clear basis
for jurisdiction based on the char-
acter of the offense, regardless of
the place in which the crime is
committed. President Nixon sub-
mitted the OAS convention to the
Senate, which unanimously gave
its advice and consent to ratifica-
tion on June 12, 1972. The United
States is awaiting the enactment
of implementing legislation be-
fore depositing its instrument of
ratification.
Despite the fact that the OAS
convention is open for signature
and ratification by other states,
not just by members of the OAS,
accession by many non-OAS mem-
bers is not anticipated. Many
states apparently prefer to de-
velop another convention in the
broader U.N. forum, based on the
work and comments of a wider
group of states.
In its 1971 report to the 26th
session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC)
volunteered to develop such a con-
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-vention if the Assembly thought it
desirable. The Assembly agreed,
and asked the ILC to develop a
convention on the protection of
diplomats as quickly as it con-
sidered appropriate. The ILC re-
sponded to this call by developing
draft articles at its 1972 meeting
which form the basis for such a
convention. These articles have
been submitted to the 27th U.N.
General Assembly. The ILC's draft
articles vary somewhat from the
OAS convention, but the aim of
the two instruments is the same.
They both require extradition or
submission for prosecution of
persons alleged to have com-
mitted certain enumerated crimes
against diplomats.
In its report the ILC gave a
detailed explanation of why it
accepted various alternative ways
of tackling the problems before
it in drafting the articles. For
example, the ILC did not list a
series of covered crimes such as
murder, kidnapping, and serious
bodily assault because the com-
mission thought these words
would have significantly different
technical meanings in the munici-
pal criminal law of a large num-
ber of states. Instead, the ILC
chose to use nontechnical and
general language to describe the
acts covered by the draft articles.
Thus the ILC draft covers "violent
attacks" upon the person or
liberty of an internationally pro-
tected person, as well as violent
attacks upon his official premises
or residence if these are likely to
endanger his person.
In his September 25, 1972
statement to the U.N. General
Assembly Secretary of State
Rogers called for urgent action
and prompt adoption of a con-
vention based on the ILC draft
articles. This item was taken up
first in the Legal Committee of the
Assembly. In that committee the
U.S. delegation sought the con-
vening of an early diplomatic con-
ference to adopt a convention.
Despite the urgency of the matter,
however, most delegations were
not ready to adopt a convention
without additional time to study
it and to seek' and circulate gov-
ernment comments on the draft
articles. The committee therefore
on October 20 decided that rather
than request a special conference
it would request government com-
ments on the ILC draft articles
and place on the Assembly agenda
for 1973 the final elaboration of
a draft convention on the protec-
tion of diplomats.
The process of seeking inter-
national cooperation for the pro-
tection of diplomats is founded,
at least in part, on the recognized
rule of customary international
law that states have a duty to
provide a special degree of protec-
tion to diplomatic agents. This
includes taking reasonable pre-
ventive measures when required.
Thus the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations provides in
article 29 that tha receiving states
shall treat the diplomatic agent
"with due respect and shall take
all appropriate steps to prevent
any attack on his person, freedom,
or dignity."
The obligation to provide do-
mestic protection to diplomats
was reflected in a statute passed
by the Congress in 1790, which
was based on Great Britain's Act
of Anne of 1708. The congres-
sional statute, codified in title 18
of the United States Code, pro-
vided for Federal criminal penal-
ties for assaults on certain foreign
officials. However, largely because
of its limited scope and ambiguity,
that statute has fallen into almost
total disuse, and the protection
of diplomatic agents in the United
States has generally been left to
State and local governments.
With the increase in violence
and threats directed against dip-
lomats within the United States,
especially in New York City where
U.N. headquarters is. l Gated,
there have been increasing reper-
cussions or, our internation ! rela-
tions. For this reason, the U.S.
Government developed new legis-
lation which was submitted to the
Congress jointly by the Secretary
of State and the Attorney eneral
in August 1971. This proposed
legislation was designed t com-
plernent state law by ma ing it
a Federal offense to mu de; or
kidnap, assault or harass foreign
officials in the United States. The
proposal also established a gen-
eral rule prohibiting, under cer-
tain conditions, demonst ations
,within 100 feet of buildi gs be-
.icnging to or used by foreign
officials. Finally, there was a pro-
vision outla~.ving the inte tional
destruction of property belonging
to foreign officials.
After the tragedy at the Munich
Olympics, a new provision was
added to allow the Secretary of
State to designate foreign na-
tionals as official guests of the
United States. Once so I desig-
nated, most of the pro isions
~ctescribed will apply to such
:'guests. While the bill had slow
start in Congress, with the in-
creasing domestic concern about
the issue of terrorism, it ulti-
nrately received overwhelming
.s-_~aport, and President 'I Nixon
s ._ned it into law (Publi~C Law
92-539) on October 24, 1972.
Enactment of this bill provides
tt-e Fe~eral Government with
cr;ciai new legal authority to in-
ve_ ga`e or prosecute covered
orenses.
Export of Terrorism:
Draft Convention
Just es recent years, there
h Y^ _.. increase in . ttan.ks
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against civil aviation and diplo-
mats, in recent months we have
witnessed a new and equally
dangerous trend-i.e., a trend
for terrorist groups to export their
violence to countries not party to
the conflict that spawned it. The
Munich tragedy and its continu-
ing progeny are prime examples
of this trend. At Munich a Pales-
tinian group attacked Israeli ath-
letes. The attack took place not
in the occupied territories, or in
Israel, but in Germany-a coun-
try not a party to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The continuing attacks
by letter-bombs provide additional
examples of this trend to expand
the locus of violence and to
"internationalize" conflict.
Secretary of State Rogers cir-
culated with his September 25,
1972 statement to the U.N.
General Assembly a draft "Con-
vention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Certain Acts of
International Terrorism," which is
aimed at this ominous develop-
ment. The draft convention does.
not seek to define terrorism or to
deal with all acts which might
reasonably be called "terroristic."
Rather, it is a narrowly drawn con-
vention which focuses on the
common interest of all nations in
preventing the spread of violence
from countries involved in civil
or international conflict to coun-
tries not a party to such conflict.
This draft convention does not
represent the final or only answer
to the problem. It is one approach
to that problem-an approach
which the United States believes
meets the most serious threats
of violence, while at the same
time remaining sensitive to the
aspirations of peoples seeking to
emerge from colonial status. The
containment of violence within
the narrowest feasible territorial
limits has been a traditional func-
tion of international iaw in cases
where it has been difficult to elim-
inate violence completely.
The convention covers certain
criminal acts such as murder,
kidnapping, or causing serious
bodily harm.
The mechanism that limits the
convention's scope to those cases
in which we hope there will be an
international consensus for joint
action is the requirement that
each of four separate conditions
must be met.
? First, the act must be in-
tended to damage the interests
of or obtain concessions from a
state or an international organiza-
tion. This provision differentiates
covered acts of international ter-
rorism from everyday crimes dealt
with by domestic criminal laws.
For example, assume a citizen of
another country is kidnapped in
the United States. If it is done for
ransom from a relative in the
United States, it is a crime under
U.S. law, but it is not covered by
our draft. If, however, it is done
to secure the release of guerrillas
in the prisons of another country,
it is also covered by the draft
convention.
? Second, the act must be com-
mitted or take effect outside the
territory of a state of which the
alleged offender is a national. The
convention does not seek to cover
acts by a state's own nationals
within the state's own territory
even if the acts are directed
against a third state. The problem
of maintaining civil order among
its own nationals in its own terri-
tory is primarily one for each
state. Assume, for example, that
a national of one state kidnaps
a person, even a foreign national,
in that state in an attempt to
obtain the release of imprisoned
persons. This act will be a crime
under the state's criminal law
but it is not covered by the
convention.
? Third, the act must be com-
mitted or take effect outside the
territory of the state against which
the act is directed. That is, the
convention is not aimed at acts
taking place within a particular
state and directed against that
state even if committed by non-
nationals. For example, if a guer-
rilla comes into a state of which
he is not a national to commit
a terrorist act directed against
that state, that situation is left
to that state to control and is not
covered by the draft convention.
Though this third kind of vio-
lence is one dimension of the
problem, it is more difficult to
control and has not represented
the principal thrust in the recent
trend toward the spread of vio-
lence to third countries. Moreover,
it is a dimension for which the
primary responsibility and oppor-
tunity for control lie with the state
attacked. There is one exception
under the draft convention to this
third condition: Acts committed
or taking effect within the territory
of the state against which the act
is directed will be covered if the
act is directed against a non-
national of that state. The attack
at Lod Airport in Israel by Japa-
nese terrorists is the most notori-
ous example of this type of act.
? Fourth, the act must not be
committed either by or against a
member of the armed forces of a
state in the course of military hos-
tilities. If the army of a state car-
ries out an attack against another
state, that act is not covered by
our draft convention. The legality
of the attack will be judged by the
law of war and the U.N. Charter.
The attack may thus be either legal
or illegal, and there is no implica-
tion of legality to be drawn from
the fact that it is not covered by
the draft convention.
Similarly, the new draft con-
vention does not seek to replace
existing or emerging international
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rules for the conduct of armed
conflict, such as the Hague Rules,
the 1949 Geneva conventions, or
the projected protocols which may
emerge from the 1974 diplomatic
conference to supplement the
Geneva conventions. Moreover,
the requirement also limits cover-
age on attacks against civilians
and other noncombatants. This
limitation parallels the general
consensus in the law of war that
it is not permissible deliberately
to attack civilians or the civilian
population.
All four of these conditions
must be met for the convention
to apply. Moreover, the conven-
tion deals only with the most
serious threats to international
order: acts involving unlawful
killing, serious bodily harm, kid-
napping, or attempts to commit
these acts.
Despite its narrow focus, the
convention would cover most of
the recent acts of international
terrorism, which evidence the
dangerous trend toward expansion
of violence to states not party to
a particular conflict.
On the other hand the conven-
tion would not deal with internal
conflicts within a state unless
such conflicts were exported to
the territory of third states or
directed against third country
nationals. Examples: The conven-
tion would neither cover the act
of a freedom-fighter in Rhodesia
or Angola who attacks a govern-
ment soldier, nor an attack by a
member of the Irish Republican
Army against a British soldier in
Northern Ireland.
Right of Self-Determination
Indeed, the convention does
not affect the right of self-deter-
mination in any way. That right is
enshrined in the U.N. Charter and
is strongly reaffirmed in the Gen-
eral Assembly's Friendly Relations
Declaration. The United States, in
line with its own historic experi-
ence, is a strong supporter of that
right. The convention would yield
to any of the other more spe-
cialized conventions governing
attacks against diplomats or civil
aviation where such conventions
are applicable. For example, the
recent hijackings by Croatian ter-
rorists in Sweden would be gov-
erned by the 1970 Hague hijack-
ing convention if there were a
conflict between that convention
and the new draft convention.
By not seeking to cover all
types of international terrorism,
the United States does not mean
to imply that all acts not covered
are permissible and should not
be of concern to the interested
country. We are merely trying to
concentrate on those categories
of international terrorism which
present the greatest current threat
and on which there is the best
chance of achieving international
agreement. Many other kinds of
terrorist acts, particularly the in-
volvement of states in assisting
terrorist groups, are already illegal
under international law. They will
remain illegal, wholly apart from
the new convention.
Once the critical threshold of
coverage is reached, the new con-
vention would establish substan-
tially the same framework for
dealing with offenses as The
Hague hijacking and Montreal
sabotage conventions. That is,
states party to the convention
would be required to establish
severe penalties for covered acts
and either to prosecute or extra-
dite offenders found in their
territory.
In addition, the convention
would create an obligation to co-
operate with other parties to con-
sider and implement measures
to combat covered acts of inter-
national terrorism. By using The
Hague-Montreal formula, as im-
proved to some extent b the
work of the ILC in the draft Con-
vention for the Protection of
Diplomats, we are seeking both
effective measures and measures
which,. because of their wide-
spread acceptance, maximize the
chances of acceptance of th new
convention. '
The new draft convention was
not voted upon by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly's 27th session.
Instead, the Assembly's egal
Committee approved a resolution
establishing a committee. to tudy
comments of member states on
the problem and to explore the
causes of terrorist acts.
International Action Urgent
We need to move forward
the principle of the G
Assembly's Friendly Rel~
Declaration which provides
from
neral
tions
hat:
"Every state has the duty to
refrain from organizing, insti-
gating, assisting, or participat-
ing in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another state
or directed towards the com-
mission of such acts, whe the
acts referred to in the pr sent
paragraph involve a thre t or
a use of force."
International action will be
taken, one way or the other. There
is talk of like-minded states agree-
ing among themselves on controls
and sanctions with respe t to
transport and other facilities
under their jurisdictions. Private
groups, such as airline pilot asso-
ciations and labor organizations,
speak of acting in their ow self-
defense. There have already been
some moves along these lines. On
two successsive days recently,
news dispatches carried t reats
by British and Egyptian labor
groups to impose sanctions on
their own responsibility.
Such actions by groups of
states rather than by the whole
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international community, or by
private organizations, would be
less than complete in their appli-
cation and far from fully effective
in their results. They might, in
fact, do more harm than good to
the delicately interwoven and
interdependent structure of mod-
ern communications and trans-
portation. Such activities would,
at the least, detract from the long
efforts to build an orderly struc-
ture of international law. Such
activities should be of first con-
cern to members of the U.N.
Legal Committee. The task of
dealing with the effects of inter-
national violence on innocent per-
sons is preeminently a role for
the United Nations. The fact that
no less than 92 sovereign U.N.
member states included a discus-
sion of it in their statements be-
fore the General Assembly shows
that this issue is undeniably one
of the difficult and complex prob-
lems demanding a practical solu-
tion from the United Nations.
Not only is the credibility of
international law at stake in the
U.N. debate on terrorism but also
the type of world in which we and
our children are going to live.
A convention, by itself, will not
make the world safe from terror-
ism, but failure to achieve a
generally acceptable convention
could only encourage increased
resort to anarchy, violence, and
terror, It is hard to believe that
responsible governments will, in
the end, decide to run that risk.
Department of State Publication 8689
General Foreign Policy Series 270
Released January 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Price 20 cents Domestic postpaid
or 10 cents GPO Bookstore
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THE UNITED NATIONS
U.N. General Assembly Adopts Convention
on Protection of Diplomats
Following is a statement made in plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly on
December 14 by U.S. Representative TV.
Tapley Bennett, Jr., together with the text
of a resolution adopted by the Assembly that
day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SENNETT
USUN press release 134 dated December 14
This Assembly can justly be proud of hav-
ing successfully completed its work on this
important convention.
A debt of gratitude is owed to the Interna-
tional L--,,v Commission. The Con mission
produced the excellent draft which was the
basis of the Assembly's work and which by
its excellence greatly facilitated our task.
Since work of the highest caliber is what we
can routinely expect from the Commission
by now, it is worth noting that the Com-
mission produced this draft at a single ses-
sion in response to the request of the Assem-
bly.
This effort which the Assembly' has
brought to fruition was in response to an
urgent need. The long-established principle
of the inviolability of diplomatic agents was
being threatened by random acts of violence
in various parts of the world. The continued
effectiveness of. diplomatic channels, the
means by which states communicate with one
another, has been jeopardized. Although the
legal obligation to protect these persons was
never questioned, the mechanism for inter-
rational cooperation to insure that perpe-
trators of serious attacks against such per-
sons are brought to justice, no matter to
where they may flee, was lacking.
The Assembly here and now declares to t~e
world that under no circumstances may ; a
diplomat be attacked with impunity. In ad i-
tion, the convention sets up a valuable legal
mechanism which requires submission for
prosecution or extradition of persons allag d
to have committed serious crimes again t
diplomats.. This mechanism is similar to th it
employed in the field of interference with
civil aviation-specifically in the Hague ( 1-
jacking) and Montreal (Sabotage) Conve -
tions.l Indeed,. many of the provisions oft e
new convention have been modeled on pr
visions of the Hague and Montreal Conve -
tions. While the new convention in sever l
uses makes d: ufting improvements or r
finements, these are intended simply o
clarify the intention of the previous conven-
tions.
Paragraph 2 of article 1 defines the ter
"alleged offender." The definition, while
couched in apparently technical language,
must of course be- read more broadly so it can
be applied by the various legal systems. We
shall regard it as incorporating the standard
? applied in. determining whether there are
sufficient grounds for extradition in accord-
ance with normal extradition practice.
Article 2 of the convention defines the
crimes covered. The Legal Committee de-
cided to cover serious crimes, as was the
initial intention of the International La v
Commission. Subparagraph 1(a) has been
clarified so that instead of referring to "vi),-
lent attack" it refers to "murder, kidnap-
ping or other attack." Obviously, the wor s
"other attack" mean attacks of a simil r
' For texts of the conventions, see BULLETIN of
Jan. 11, 1971, p. 53, and Oct. 12, 1971, p. 4G5.
January 28, 1974
Dept of State BUlLE INS 23 Jan 74
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United States Signs Convention
on Protection of Diplomats
Statement by lyillian4 E. Schaufelc, Jri
I am gratified to sign today on behalf of the
United States the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, Including Diplo-
matic Agents.
As Ambassador Bennett assured the plenary
in his statement on this subject, in the two
weeks since the adoption of the convention by
the Assembly my government has undertaken
an urgent review of the final text of the con-
vention. We have concluded that the text on
the whole is excellent. In signing .the conven.
tion, the United States signifies its intention
to begin the necessary process of submitting
the convention to the Congress and of seeking
appropriate legislation in order to put us in a
position to be able to ratify the convention.
Since the United States thinks this conven-
tion should go into force as promptly as possi-
ble, we have acted with a sense of urgency.
Both the International Law Commission and
the General Assembly considered the adoption
of this convention a. most urgent matter. In-
deed, the preamble off the convcn;io n itself
points to the concern generated in the interna-
tional community by attacks on diplomats.
The United States hopes that all other govern-
ments will consider the matter with a similar
sense of urgency and take prompt action so
that this convention can be brought into force
as promptly as possible on a wide geographical
basis.
'Made at U.N. Headquarters on Dec. 28
(USUN press release 140). Ambassador
Schaufele is U.S. Deputy Representative in the
U.N. Security Council.
serious nature to those expressly mentioned
-murder and kidnapping. Covering threats,
attempts, and accessoryship is appropriate
because of the initial seriousness of the acts
covered under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
paragraph 1.
? The crimes covered in paragraph 1 of
article 2 are those to which reference is made
throughout the convention by the phrase "the
crimes set forth in Article 2." Paragraph 3
of article 2 does not add to the crimes cov-
ered by the convention but merely states a
basic fact that would be true whether or not
this paragraph were. included in the conven-
tion.
? Together with articles 1, 2, and 3, articles
6, 7, and 8 join to form the basic mechanism
of the convention. This mechanism is ob-
viously central to the object. and purpose of
the convention, and without it the convention
could not operate effectively.
Article 6 establishes the obligation upon
states parties' to insure the continued pres-
ence for the purpose of prosecution or extra-
dition of an alleged offender when he is on
the territory of that state party. The phrase
"upon being satisfied that the circumstances
so warrant" merely reflects the fact that
before a state may take action it must know
of the presence of the alleged offender in its
territory.
The obligation in article 7 is clearly stated
to be "without exception whatsoever." It
forms a central part of the mechanism of the
convention.
Several articles in the convention deal with
cooperation among states in the prevention
and punishment of the covered crimes. These
are -articles 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11. Article 4 deals
with taking all practicable measures to pre-
vent preparation for the commission of the
covered crimes. The United States under-
stands this obligation to refer to .doing the
-utmost to prevent attempts to commit such
crimes or conspiracy to commit such crimes.
Article 10 is notable in that it substantially
? improves the prospects for. proper presenta-
tion of cases when prosecutions are con-
ducted outside the territory of the state
party in whose territory the crime was com
mitted. In such cases assistance in connec-
tion with the criminal proceedings, as well
as the supply of all evidence at the disposal
of other states parties, including witnesses
who are willing or can be convinced to attend
proceedings in another state, will be neces-
sary for the mechanism of the convention to
operate successfully.
Article 12 is a compromise article which
was the result of a difficult negotiation. While
the Uziited States does not see the need for
such an article in this convention, we recog-
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nize that there are some other countries that
believe it essential that such an article be
included. This having been said, we worked
cooperatively with those countries to draft
an article that is limited in its scope and
clear in its language. The article states that
this convention shall not affect the applica-
tion of treaties on asylum in force as be-
tween parties to those treaties inter se. That
is to say, even if the alleged offender is pres-
ent on the territory of one party to such a
treaty and the state on the territory of which
the crime has taken place is also a party.to
such a treaty, if the internationally protected
person attacked exercised his functions on
behalf of a state not party to such a treaty
or the alleged offender was a national of a
state not party to such a treaty, the state
where the alleged offender is present may
.not invoke that treaty with respect to the
non-party state. Thus, the non-party state
can hold the state where the alleged offender
is present to its obligations under article 7
and may, if it wishes, request extradition
under article 8.
The United States would have preferred a
stronger dispute-settlement provision than
the one contained in article 13.. The U.S.
delegation made proposals to this end dur-
ing the negotiations. However, many coun-
tries preferred to follow the model of the
Hague and Montreal Conventions. Nonethe-
less, we are gratified that minor technical
improvements have been made in paragraph
1 of article 13, which we consider reflect
more precisely the intention of the drafters
of the provisions in the Hague and Montreal
Conventions.
We are also pleased that an acceptable
compromise has been arrived at with regard
to. the final clauses which permits the widest
possible adherence to the convention without
placing the Secretary General in an impossi-
ble position.
Since the Assembly did such excellent work
in completing the convention, we were
pleased to vote in favor of the resolution
.which constitutes the formal act of adoption
of the convention. Such a resolution consti-
tutes the procedural step by which the inter-
national community, whether operating ih
the context of the General Assembly or a
diplomatic conference specially convened for
the purpose, concludes its legislative actions.
While this resolution contains some para
graphs which we would not have considered
necessary, we nevertheless see no particular
harm in their inclusion since they do not pur-
port to impinge--and of course cannot im-
pinge-upon the convention. One such para-
graph restated propositions we were all
pleased to accept . in the authoritative
Friendly Relations Declaration at the 25th
session. It is perhaps always useful to recog-
nize fundamental human rights, including
the legitimate exercise of the right of self-
determination in accordance with the char-
ter.
Regarding the injunction in paragraph 6
of the resolution to the United Nations to
publish the resolution in conjunction with the
convention, we consider that this requires
the convention to be published as part of the
United Nations volumes of resolutions of the
General Assembly; in addition, the idea of
including the resolution in the treaty series
for information purposes could be regarded
as useful in that those referring to the treaty
series can conveniently have ready access to
the resolution.
The convention will be. opened for signa-
ture today, and my government has begun
the necessary review of the final text in order
to enable. us to sign it before the end of the
year. We hope a number of others will do
likewise.
The convention would not have been possi-
ble without the positive cooperation of all
regional groups. Such cooperation was
forthcoming, and as a result this Assembly
has a major positive achievement.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2
The General Assembly,
Considering that the codification and progressive
development of international law contributes to the
implementation of the purposes and principles set
forth in Articles I and 2 of the Charter of the
United Nations,
'U.N. doe. A/RES/3166 (XXVIII) ; adopted by
the Assembly without objection on Dec. 14.
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Recalling that in response to the request made in
General Assembly resolution 2780 (XXVI) of 3
December 1971, the International Law Commission,
at its twenty-fourth session, studied the question of
the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents
and other persons entitled to special protection under
international law and prepared draft articles on the
prevention and punishment of crimes against such
persons,
Having considered the draft articles and also the
comments and observations thereon submitted by
States and by specialized agencies and intergovern-
mental organizations in response to the invitation
made in General Assembly resolution 2926 (XXVII)
of 28 November 1972,
Convinced of the. importance of securing int_rna-
tional agreement on appropriate and effective meas-
ures for the prevention and punishment of crimes
against diplomatic agents and other internationally
protected persons in view of the serious threat to
the maintenance and promotion of friendly relations
and co-operation among States created by the com-
mission of such crimes,
Having elaborated for that purpose the provisions
contained in the Convention annexed hereto,
1. Adopts the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Pro-
*tected Persons,. including Diplomatic Agents, an-
nexed to the present resolution;
2. Re-emphasizes the great importance of the rules
of international jaw concerning the inviolability of
and special protection to be afforded to internation-
ally protected persons and the obligations of States
in relation thereto;
3. Considers that the annexed Convention will en-
able States to carry out their obligations more effec-
tively;
4. Recognizes also that the provisions of the an-
nexed Convention could not in any way prejudice
the exercise of the legitimate right to self-deter-
mination and independence in accordance with the
.purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation -among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United -Nations by peoples strug-
gling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign
occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid;
5. Invites States to become parties to the an-
nexed Convention ;
6. Decides that the present resolution, whose pro-
visions are related to the annexed Convention, shall
always be published together with it.
ANNEX
,CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED
PERSONS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
The States Parties to this Convention,
having in mind the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations concerning the main-
tenance of international peace and the promotion of
friendly relations and co-operation among States,
Considering that crimes against diplomatic agents
and other internationally protected persons jeopard-
izing the safety of these persons create a serious
threat to the maintenance of normal international
relations which are necessary for co-operation among
States,
Believing that the commission of such crimes is a
matter of grave concern to the international com-
nnmity,
Convinced that there is an urgent need to adopt
appropriate and effective measures for the preven-
tion and punishment of such crimes,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
For the purposes of. this Convention:
1. "internationally protected person" means:
(a) a Head of State, including any-member of a
collegial body performing the functions of a Head
of State under the constitution of the State con-
cerned, a Head of Government or. a Minister for
Foreign Affairs, whenever any such person is in a
foreign State, as well as members of his family who
accompany him;
(b) any representative or official of a State or
any official or other agent of an international orga-
nization of an intergovernmental ch.-ranter who, at
the time when and in the place where a crime
against hint, his official premises, his private accom-
modation or his means of transport is committed, is
entitled pursuant to international law to special
protection from any attack on his person, freedom
or dignity, as well as members of his family forming.
part of his household;
2. "alleged offender" means a person as to whom
there is sufficient evidence to determine prima facie
that he has committed or participated in one or more
of the crimes set forth in article 2.
ARTICLE 2
1. The intentional commission of :
(a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon
the person or liberty of an internationally protected
person;
(b) a violent attack upon the official premises,'the
private accommodation or the means of transport
of an internationally' protected- person likely to en-
danger his person or liberty;
(c) a threat to commit any such attack;
(d) an attempt -to commit any such attack; and
(e) an act constituting participation as an
complice in any such attack
shall be made by each State Party a crime under its
internal law.
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? 2. Each State Party shall make these crimes pun-
ishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way
derogate from the obligations of States Parties
under international law. to take all appropriate
measures to prevent other attacks on the person,
freedom or dignity of an internationally protected
person.
ARTICLE 3
1. Each State Party shall. take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
the crimes set forth in article 2 in the following
cases:
(a) when the crime is committed in the territory
of that State or on board a ship or aircraft regis-
tered in that State;
(b) when the alleged offender is a national of that
State;
(c) when the crime is coimitted against an inter-
nationally protected person as defined in article 1
who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions
which he exercises on behalf of that State.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its juris-
-diction over these crimes in cases where the alleged
offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite, him pursuant to article 8 to any of the
States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.
.3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal
jurisdiction exercised in' accordance with internal
law.
States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention
of the crimes set forth in article 2, particularly by:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent
preparations in their respective territories for the
commission of those crimes within or outside their
territories;
(b) exchanging information and co-ordinating the
taking of administrative and other measures as ap-
propriate to prevent the commission of those crimes.
ARTICLE 5
1. The State Party in which any of the crimes
set forth in article 2 has been committed shall, if it
has reason to believe that an alleged offender has
fled from its territory, communicate to all other
States concerned, directly or through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, all the pertinent
facts regarding the crime committed and all available
information regarding the identity of the alleged
-'offender. 2. Whenever any of the crimes set forth in
article 2 has been committed against an interna-
tionally protected person, any State Party which has
information concerning the victim and the circuni-
stances of the crime shall endeavour to transmit It
under the conditions provided ;or in its internal law,=
fully and promptly to the State Party on whose
behalf he was exercising his functions.
ARTICLE 6
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so
warrant, the State Party in whose territory the
'alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate
measures under its internal law so as to ensure his
presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradi-
tion. Such measures shall be notified without delay
directly or through the Secretary-General of they
United Nations to:
(a) the State where the crime was committed;
(b) the State or States of which the alleged
offender is a national or, if he is a stateless person,
in whose territory he permanently resides;
(c) the State or States of which the internation-
ally protected person concerned is a national or o
whose behalf lie was exercising his functions;
(d) ?all other States concerned; and
(e) the international organization of which the,
internationally protected person, concerned is an
official or an agent.
2. Any person regarding whom the measures
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are beings
taken shall be entitled:
(a) to communicate without delay with the nearest
appropriate representative of the Stata of ^:l::ch he
is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect
his rights or, if he is a stateless person, which he'
requests and which is willing to protect his rights;
and
(b) to be visited by a representative of that State.
ARTICLE 7
The State Party in whose territory the alleged
offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him,
submit, without. exception whatsoever and without
undue delay, the. case to. its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedingsi
in accordance with the laws of that State.
ARTICLE 8
1. To the extent that the crimes set forth in article!
2 are not listed as extraditable offences in any extra-
dition treaty existing between States Parties, they
shall be deemed to be included as such therein.
States Parties undertake to include those crimes as
extraditable offenses in every future extradition
treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition con-1
ditional on the existence of a treaty receives a re-
quest for extradition from another State Party with
which it has no extradition treaty, it may, if it,
decides to cxtr:.ditc, consider this Convention as the
legal basis for extradition in respect of those crimes.,
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Extradition shall be subject to the procedural provi-
sions and the other conditions of the law of the
requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recog-
nize those crimes as extraditable offences between,
themselves subject to the procedural provisions and
the other conditions of the law of the requested State.
4. Each of the crimes shall be treated, for the pur-
pose of extradition between States Parties, as if it
had been committed not only in the place in which it
occurred but also in the territories of the States re-
quired to establish their jurisdiction in accordance
with paragraph 1 of article 3.
ARTICLE 9
Any person regarding whom proceedings are being
carried out in connexion with any of the 'crimes set
forth in article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment
at all stages of the proceedings.
ARTICLE 10
1. States Parties shall afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance in connexion with
criminal proceedings brought in respect of. the crimes
set forth in article 2, including the supply of all evi-
dence at their disposal necessary for the proceed-
ings.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article
shall not affect obligations concerning mutual judi-
cial assistance embodied in any other treaty.
ARTICLE 11
The State Party where an alleged offender is pros-
ecuted shall communicate the final outcome of the
proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who shall transmit the information to the
other States Parties.
ARTICLE 12
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect
the application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force
at the date of the adoption of this Convention, as
between the States which are parties to those Trea-
ties; but a State Party to this Convention may not
Invoke those Treaties with respect to another State
Party to this Convention which is not a party to those
Treaties.
ARTICLE 13
1. Any dispute between two or more States Par-
ties concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention which is not settled by negotiation
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted
to arbitration. If within six months from the date of
the request for arbitration the parties are unable to
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one
of those parties may refer the dispute to the Inter.
national Court of Justice by request in conformity
with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State Party may at the time -of signature
or ratification of this Convention or accession there-
to declare that it does not consider itself bound by
paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties
shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of this article
with respect to any State Party which has made such
a reservation.
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation
in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at
any time withdraw that reservation by notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 14
This Convention shall be open for signature by all
States, until 31 December 1974 at United Nations
Headquarters in ? New York.
?
ARTICLE 15
This Convention is subject to ratification. The
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE. 16
This Convention shall remain open for accession
by any State. The instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
ARTICLE 17
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the
thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the
twenty-second instrument of ratification or acces-
sion with the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Con-
vention after the deposit of the twenty-second instru-
ment of ratification or accession, the Convention
shall enter into farce en the thirtieth day after
deposit by such State of its instrument of ratifica-
tion or accession.
ARTICLE 18
1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention
by written notification to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months fol-
lowing the date on which notification is received by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 19
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
inform all States, inter elia:
(a) of signatures to this Convention, of the de-
posit of instruments of ratification or accession in
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accordance with articles 14, 15 and 1G and of notifi-
cations made under article 18.
(b) of the date on which this Convention will enter
Into force in accordance with article 17.
ARTICLE 20
The original of this Convention, of which the Chi-
nese, English, Freneh, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, who shall send
certified copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly
authorized thereto by their respective Governments,
have signed this Convention, opened for signature at
New York on 14 December 1973.
U.S. Approves UNHCR Efforts
To Secure Rights for Refugees
Following is a statement made in. Comrnit-
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)
of the U.N. General Assembly on November
26 by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde
Ferguson, Jr., together with the text of a
resolution adopted ' by the committee on
November 27 and by the Assembly on De-
cember 14.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FERGUSON
USUN press rclense 118 dated November 26
lily government 'wishes to commend. the
High Commissioner for his excellent report.'
It is a particular pleasure for me to note the
fine humanitarian work that he ` is doing
throughout the world. I personally count it a
privilege to have been able to work with the
High Commissioner on other occasions on
many matters of great import.
Perhaps no other group has suffered the
almost complete deprivation of human rights
as have had refugees. No other group has
been so shorn of hope. It is the task of the
U.N. high Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCIR) to rebuild that hope. This re-
quires above all the restoration to refugees
. A/9012.
of a great many of those very rights %vhie
are so clearly enunciated in the Univers 1
Declaration of Human Rights.
We consider that Prince Sadruddin Agt
Khan has brought the influence of his ofl d
to bear, in the most salutary fashion, upo
the lives of refugees the world over. H
humanitarian 'work has also contributed si
nificantly to the stability of the countries 4f
efuees
g.
r
o
f
l
um
asy
11iy government has consistently stress d
the overriding importance of the function of
international protection of refugees ainoi*
the activities of the UNHCR. In the first i
stance it is essential that effective safe haven
or asylum be secured for refugees. The pr
vision of asylum is the function .and the du
of the country into, which the refugee h
fled. But it is likewise the duty of the High
Commissioner to maintain close coordination
with governments of asylum countries, '?i
h
the view to insuring that the forcible retu
?n
of refugees to their country of origin-1
e- .
foulement-shall not take place. Indeed, tie
High Commissioner is given a supervise ?y
function in that respect by t? ?o intcrratio al
Refugees.
treaties-the 1951 U.N. -Convention and tie
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
These treaties are surely two of the most
important instruments yet formulated to
implement the, Universal Declaration of Bu-
man Rights. Both. treaties recognize the
priority need for protecting the actual safety
of the refugee. Some 67 nations have thus
far acceded to one or both of these interna-
tional treaties. Yet it remains true that
roughly one-half of the nations of the world
have not yet accepted either treaty. hey gov-
ernment applauds the High Commissioner or
his unrelenting efforts to secure further rati-
fications of the refugee convention and proto-
col.
My government finds it particularly 4dis-
turbing to learn that cases of refoulem nt
continue to occur. We deplore the fact that
any country would knowingly depart from
the time-honored U.N. principle that q ny
repatriation of refugees must be volunt
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The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism:
A Global Approach
Address by Lewis Ho$acker 1
The world has lived with violence and
terror since the beginning of time. But we
now are experiencing new forms of Inter-
national terrorism which have reached the
point where innocent people far removed
from the source of a dispute can be victim-
ized. Nothing has more dramatically under-
scored this fact than the cruel tragedies at
the Munich Olympics of 1972, the. virtual
epidemic of kidnapings in Latin America,
and the wanton murder of two of our -dip-
lomats and a Belgian official in the Sudan.
These and other incidents bear witness
to the terrible potential of a disturbed or
determined person or. group to terrorize the
international community. Moreover, this
capability for traumatic disruption of society
appears to expand with the increasing tech-
nological and economic complexity of our
society and with the added incentive of wide
and rapid publicity.
What is terrorism? Last summer a U.N.
group failed to agree on a definition of the
term and became diverted by an inconclusive
discussion of the causes and motives of ter-
rorists. Such disagreement, however, should
not deter us from getting on with the busi-
ness at hand, which we, for our working
purposes, regard as defense against violent
attacks by. politically or ideologically moti-
vated parties on innocent bystanders who fall
under our protective responsibility. I am
'Made before the Mayor's Advisory Committee on
International Relations and Trade and the Foreign
Relations Association at New Orleans, La., on Feb.
28. Ambassador Hoffacker is Special Assistant to
the Secretary and Coordinator for Combating Ter-
rorism.
talking primarily of Americans abroad and
foreign officials and their families in this
country. At the same time, we are concerned
with terrorism throughout the world, even
though our people may not be directly in-
volved, since this Is a global phenomenon
to which we are all vulnerable and which we
cannot solve without global attention.
The U.S. Government has responded forth-
rightly to this serious challenge in fulfillment
of its traditional responsibilities to protect
its citizens and its foreign guests. In Sep-
tember of 1972 President Nixon established
a Cabinet Committee To Combat Terrorism
to consider, In his words, "the most effective
meu.1s by which to prevent terrorism here
and abroad." The Secretary of State chairs
this Committee, which includes also the Sec.
retaries of the Treasury, Defense, and Trans.
portation, the Attorney General, our Ambas-
sador to the i ed Nations, the Director of
the FBI an Ve President's Assistants on
National Security and Domestic Affairs. This
body is directed to coordinate interagency
activity for the prevention of terrorism and,
should acts of terrorism occur, to devise pro-
cedures for reacting swiftly and effectively.
Under the Cabinet Committee, a Work-
ing Group composed of personally designated
senior representatives of the members of the
Cabinet Committee meets regularly. It is
this Group which I chair and which -is in
daily contact as issues arise and incidents
occur. While we would prefer to be a policy
planning body dealing in preventive meas-
ures, we are geared to respond to emergen-
cies.
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Over the past year and a half, this 'inter-
agency group has dealt with a wider variety
of matters and in my view had made us as
a government more effective in responding to
the continuing threat from a variety of orga-
nizations or Individuals seeking to strike at
us at home and abroad. This is not to,say
that we have solved all the problems facing
us. But we are using governmentwide re-
sources to better advantage and have at least
reduced the risk to our people and our for
eign guests. We must face the reality that
there is no such thing as 100 percent se-
curity. But we are doing our job if we re-
duce risks to a practical minimum.
Resources To Deter Terrorism
I would like to make clear at the outset
that individual departments and agencies
continue to manage programs dealing with
terrorism under their respective mandates.
The important difference is that these efforts,
which individually deserve commendation,
are now fully coordinated. and consequently
are greater deterrents to potential terrorists.
Intelligence is one of our more valuable
resources in this self-defense endeavor. Alt's
security agencies have improved the quality.
of their intelligence relating to terrorism,
and the Working. Group insures that this
product is fully shared and coordinated
throughout the government.
Abroad, security at our embassies and
consulates has been steadily improved. Last
summer the President submitted to the Con
gress a request for $21 million for personnel
and materials to better our overseas `security
and, hopefully, reduce the risk which our of-
ficial personnel suffer throughout the world.
These funds are .now being disbursed, based
on highest priority needs at our posts abroad.
'We are mindful that our mandate also
covers' private citizens as well as American
ofllcials. For example, we are pleased to ad-
vise American businessmen with overseas
interests. Our embassies and consulates are
in constant touch with American businesses
abroad, especially in such places as Argen-
tine, where they are particularly vulnerable:.
We are prepared to share with them security
techniques and experiences. Although we'
may not agree on tactics such as' the advisa-1
bility of paying ransom, it is important that
we stick together In tight situations such as
Buenos Aires, where terrorists have taken
advantage of serious internal security defi-
ciencies to kidnap businessmen for increas-
ingly higher ransoms. We were concerned
with the Bank of America case in Beirut,
where a representative of Douglas Aircraft
was murdered by bank robbers posing un-
convincingly as fedaycen.
Visa, immigration, and customs procedure
have been tightened. The regulation allowing
a foreigner to transit the United States with-
out a visa has been suspended except for
passengers with immediate onward reserva-
tions to a point outside the United States
This suspension applies to every traveler orb
a nondiscriminatory basis and closes a loo
hole through which 600,000 visitors per year
formerly passed.
In several categories of visa applicant
which have beeni'particularly susceptible t
terrorist penetration, deeper screening of ap.
.plications has shown some useful results.
In the fall of 1972 Congress approved
public law aimed at increasing protection fo
foreign officials and their immediate families
in this country through the creation of Fed
eral criminal offenses for various acts di
rected at them and at other official guests
Under this legislation the FBI has Investi
gative jurisdiction; concurrent with that al
ready held by local law enforcement author
ities. This expanded legal coverage of our
foreign guests will, hopefully, add a further
deterrent to those who might be tempted t
molest them. There has been one conviction
under this law, and several other cases art
now before Federal courts or are expecte
to be submitted soon.
For some time the Postal Service ha
alerted post offices and other likely targe f
of letter-bomb activity. Many hundreds o
such devices have been circulating interns.'
tionally. Some have been intercepted in thi
country by 'alert customs and postal em
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ployees, with one injury sustained by a postal
clerk in the process. Unfortunately a letter
bomb exploded in the British Embassy last
September, maiming a secretary and illus-
trating dramatically that international ter-
rorists can probably penetrate our security
screen.
Hijacking within the United States has
fallen off significantly since the beginning of
last year. This happy trend is not just a
stroke of luck. Aside from the rigorous air-
port security program now underway, a prin-
cipal factor in this favorable evolution is the
bilateral agreement with Cuba whereby hi-
jackers are denied asylum in that country.
Other countries, with or without our encour-
agement, have taken similar steps to close
their doors to individuals who look for refuge
from prosecution after a hijacking. Let us
recall, at the same time, that the domestic
variety of hijacker in the United States is
usually different. from those who operate
abroad, often with special ruthlessness, under
the control of terrorist organizations.
U.S. International Initiatives
The United States has been busy interna-
tionally. We have been in the forefront of
those who have sought tightened interna-
tional air security.
We have pressed for three important mul-
tilateral conventions dealing with hijacking:
the 1963 Tokyo. Convention, which in effect
requires countries to return a plane and
passengers if it has been hijacked; the 1970
Hague Convention, which says that countries
should either extradite or prosecute the sky-
jackers; and the 1971 Montreal Convention,
requiring that any kind of sabotage of avia-
tion such as blowing up planes on the ground
be dealt with by prosecution or extradition
of the offenders: We had modest expectations
as we sent a delegation to two conferences
in Rome last summer in the hope that the
international community would advance a
step forward in tightening controls on sky-
jackers and aerial saboteurs.
Despite our disappointment over the
meager results in Rome, we are confident
that there remains a sufficient sense of Inter-
national responsibility and national self.
interest to make possible other steps-to dis-
courage those who would threaten interna.
tional air travelers, For one thing, we are
seeing a steady stream of accessions to the
aforementioned conventions by countries rep-
resenting all ideologies. This in itself should
have a good deterrent effect.
In Interpol [International Criminal Police
Organization], in the Organization of Amer.
ican States, and in other appropriate forums,
we achieve what is feasible in the way of
multilateral discouragement of the interna-
tional terrorist. Simultaneously we maintain
quiet liaison with individual governments
which share our abhorrence of terrorism. We
are pleased to assist others when they suffer
hijackings by providing communications and
other services even though the affected plane
may not be over or in our country.
At the United Nations in 1972 we sought
to prohibit the export of violence to inno-
cent persons who are many countries, some,
times continents, removed from the scene of
a conflict. This approach became bogged
down in debate over what some countries
called justifiable, as opposed, to illegal, vio-
lence even against innocent parties. Accord-
ingly, for the time being we have narrowed
our objectives to more specific categories of
offenses which, because of grave and inhu-
man effect on innocent individuals or because
of their serious interference with the vital
machinery of international life, should be
condemned by states of every ideology and
alignment. We therefore supported in the
last General Assembly a convention for pro-
tection of diplomats. The Assembly agreed
in December to this measure, which requires
that persons who attack or kidnap diplomats
or officials of foreign governments or inter-
national organizations be extradited or pros.
ecuted.
Dealing With Crisis Situations
If in spite of all our efforts, an act of
terrorism should occur, we are prepared to
deal with it as swiftly and effectively as
possible. Within the State Department, task
forces can be assembled on short notice to
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manage such critical events as the Southern
Airways hijacking, the seizure of American
diplomats in Haiti, the murder of two of
our officers in the Sudan, the kidnaping of
our consul general in Guadalajara, the hi-
jacking last summer of the Japanese airliner
out of Amsterdam, the attack on emigrant
Jews in Austria last fall, various incidents
at Rome and Athens airports, and the recent
terrorism.in Karachi and Singapore harbors
and in Kuwait.
Such task forces are composed of selected
specialists who can call on the full resources
of the U.S. Government to rescue, or at least
to monitor, the beleaguered parties. The
State Department Operations Center, which
is the site of such task forces, is in instant
contact with the White House, Pentagon,
CIA, and other agencies concerned, as well
as with foreign governments and overseas
posts. By swift and intelligent action in
such circumstances we, hopefully, can over-
come the terrorists by one means or another.
Firmness in Response to Terrorism
Tactics vary in each crisis situation, but
one consistent factor should be understood
by all parties concerned: The U.S. Govern-
ment will not pay ransom to kidnapers. We
urge other governments and individuals to
adopt the same position, to resist other forms
of blackmail, and to apprehend the criminal
attackers.
I hasten to underline the importance which
we attach to human life. We do not glibly
sacrifice hostages for the sake of this ad-
mittedly firm policy. We believe that firm-
ness in response to terrorists' threats, if ap-
plied with the best diplomacy we can muster,
can save lives in the long run and probably
in the short run as well.
We have had more terrorist experiences
than we had anticipated in the past five
years, during which period 25'of our officials
abroad who normally enjoy diplomatic pro-
tection were kidnaped. Ten of these indi-
viduals- were murdered and 12 wounded.
When we Foreign Service people elected to
follow this career, we appreciated that there
w ere risks different in type and intensity
from those to which we are exposed in this
country. Abroad we experience increased
threats of subversion, kidnaping, blackmail,
civil disturbances, and politically motivate
violence, including assassination.
In my 23 years' Foreign Service exper -
? ence, mostly abroad in the Middle East and
Africa, I have not seen any of our people
behave cowardly in a dangerous sil uatio .
We have learned to 'take reasonable preca u-
tions. We do not want to live in fortress s
or armed camps. We use ingenuity to reduce
risks. Most importantly, we must remind
the host government of its undoubted respon-
sibility for protecting foreigners within its
territory. I recall, for example, when I was
once put under house arrest by an angry
Minister, I reminded him and his government
that that government continued to be respon-
sible for my personal security and would face
dire consequences if anything happened to
me. I am glad to report that my consular
colleagues rallied round me and after a week
I was able to resume my normal movements.
It would be unfair to assign labels to
countries as to their hawklike or dovelike
qualities in facing up to the terrorist chal-
lenge. Each country naturally performs in
the light of its own interests, which may
vary from case to case. Some are more
cautious than others to avoid provoking mil'-
tants who engage in terrorism. Even coun-
tries friendly to us are understandably self-
ish about their sovereign right to decide wh t
is best in a terrorist confrontation; e. g,
whether or not to yield to demands for ra
som, release of prisoners, et cetera. More-
over, we in the United States have not found
ourselves in excruciating circumstances such
as some countries like Haiti or Mexico have
. undergone with foreign diplomats held
their territory under terrorists' guns.
The U.S. approach to counterterrorism
based on the principle derived from our li
eral heritage, as well as from the U.N. De -
laration of Human Rights, which affirms th t
every human being has a right to life, liberty,
and "security of person." Yet the violen e
.of international terrorism violates that prin-
ciple. The issue is not war. The issue s
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not the strivings of people to achieve self-
(jetermination and independence. Rather the
issue is-and here 1 quote from formgr,Sgc-,
retar"), of State Rogers before the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly:2
(The issue Is) whether millions of air travelers
can continue to fly in safety each year. It is whether
a person who receives a letter can open it without
trur of being bluwn up. It is whither diplomats can
safely earry out their duties. It is whether Interna-
tional meetings-tike the Olympic games, like this
Assembly-can proceed without the ever-present
threat of violence.
In short, the issue Is whether the vulnerable lines
of international communication-the airways and the
mails, diplomatic discourse and international meet-
ings-can continue, without disruption, to bring
nations and peoples together. All who have a stake
in this have a stake in decisive action to suppress
these demented acts of terrorism.
We are all awnre that, aside, from the psychotic
and the purely felonious, many criminal acts of ter-
rorism derive from political origins. We all recog-
nize that issues such as self-determination must con-
tiuue to be addressed seriously by the international
community. But political passion, however deeply
held, cannot lie a justiflcntion for criminal violence
ac?afnst innocent persons.
The United States has attempted to show
lcrttdorship in stimulating a, global preoccupa-
tion with this apparently?growing interna-
tional threat. We have not achieved all that
have sought in international cooperation.
Our multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral ef-
forts is must continue because the outlook is
not as promising as it might be. There
seems to be increased collaboration among
terrorist groups of different nationalities.
Such groups seem to be moving farther and
farther afield, including toward North Amer-
ica. There is, moreover, evidence of ample
financial sources. for some terrorist groups
not only from ransoms collected but also
from governments which, for one reason or
another, are sympathetic toward certain ter-
rorist groups. And last but not least, there
For Secretary Rogers' statement before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1972, see BULLETIN of
Oct. 16, 1972, p. 425.
seems to be no shortage of politico-eccmomic-
social frustrations to spawn terrorists ot.
all continents,.
Accordingly, we must increase our vigi-
lance, 'our expertise, and our determination in
the face of what may bean expanding threat
to our personnel and other interests abroad,
as well as on the homefront. In fact, this
global epidemic still threatens the very fabric
of international order.
. We as a government must be cool and
tough-and I might add, sensitive-in re-
sponding to these vicious attacks against our
citizens and other interests. As we seek to
defend ourselves against this viciousness, we
are not unmindful of the motivation inspir-
ing the frustrated political terrorist who
feels he has no other way to deal with his
grievances than by terrorist action. As ways
are found to convince him to reason other-
wise, he must be made to understand now
that it is unprofitable for him to attack in-
nocent bystanders.
In the meantime also, we as a government
have a continuing obligation to safeguard
the most fiindameittal right of all-the right
of life. There is no reason why protection
of this right and of our citizens need neces-
sarily conflict with outer human rights such
as self-determination and individual liberty.
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The companies in the guerrillas' sights
Breaking with a long tradition, the
social atbiters of Boston decided not to
publish the local . debutantes' list this
year. It was one sign of how wealthy
Americans. shaken by the Patty Hearst
affair and a series of kidnappings of
American executives abroad, are.coming
round to the idea that low visibility
may be one way of escaping terrorist
attack. The reason for their concern is
obvious: today, private corporations
and prominent businessmen are as much
the targets for political terrorists as
governments, and tend to be even more
vulnerable.
The ideological pretexts for such
attacks usually boil down to Proud-
hon's bald assertion that "property is
theft". This, it appears, is seldom so
bitterly felt as by people such as Dr
Bridget Dugdale-charged with the
#8m an theft in Ireland-who are re-
acting against their own affluent family
background. But the terrorists' favourite
corporations tend to be those whose
activities can most easily be reconciled
with a conspiracy theory of multinational
string-pulling. Over the past six months,
for example, offices of the International
Telephone and Telegraph corporation
in Nuremberg, west Berlin, New York,
Rome and Paris have been bombed.
In all but one instance the bombers
(who included the so-called "Black
Help" group in Germany, a_ successor
to the Baader-Meinhof organisation,
and a French group that calls itself;
with frankness if not profundity, "We
Must Do Something") were reacting
to disclosures of ITT's political med-
dling in Chile.
Palestinian groups such as Dr
Habash's Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine (PFLP) are known
to have short-listed companies with
Jewish directors or with business
interests in Israel; the chances are that
there will be a new terror campaign
to follow the past letter-bomb attacks
on Jewish - businessmen in London and
the attempt on the life of the chairman
of Marks and Spencer. Recent threats
against companies with interests in
South West Africa by a group calling
itself the "Friends of the United
Nations" have been dismissed as a bluff.
But it is equally on the cards that a South
African (or South African-related)
guerrilla group will also try out the
methods of kidnapping and extortion
that have been used with spectacular
-success in Argentina and by groups like
the Red Brigade in I*40*p )Rel
But the main rea o erronsm
against corporations is simply that it
has been proven again and again that
they are readier to give in to ransom
demands than. goverriments-and are
likely to pay faster. Some governments
have tried to prevent the payment of
blood money, with varied results. In
Northern Ireland (where the directors
of a company that paid ransom could,
under the emergency regulations, be
detained without trial) this may explain
why only one private businessman
has been kidnapped so far-although
it was no help to Herr Niedermayer. In
Argentina, where the security forces
have been manifestly unable to contain
political kidnapping, the attempt to
prevent Fiat from negotiating with the
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
over the kidnapping of an executive,
Sr Oberdan Sallustro, in March, 1972,
resulted in his murder-and led to the
cave-in of both the government and the
companies in the subsequent chain of
abductions.
The situation in Argentina (see page
38) is a showpiece of how ordinary
criminals, scenting rich returns, have
joined the attack on the corporations
under the camouflage of a political
cause. There were more than 400 kid-
nappings in Argentina last year; and
to date the pace-setting ERP is thought
to have netted more than S30m in ransom
money, including the record S t 4.2m
that Exxon paid out for the general
manager of its Campana refinery, Mr
Samuelson. in April. But the Buenos
Aires mobsters have had their share
of the pickings. The focal police believe
non-political groups were responsible
for the kidnappings of an Amoco oil
executive, Mr Willkie, last October
(producing a reported ransom of $im);
of a Peugeot executive, M. Boisset, in
December (released in March for a
reported S3m); and of Pepsico's Buenos
Aires director in January.
Kidnapping is not the only means of
extortion that has been used effectively
against private corporations. The mere
threat of sabotage or assassination-
often conveyed by cassette tapes-has
induced several American corporations
in Argentina to meet blackmail demands,
starting with Ford's payment of $lm
to the ERP in March last year. The
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine is reported to have been suc-
cessful in extorting protection money
from four of the western airlines that
fly to Lod in Israel. It seems probable
of sabotage against extreme y vulnerable
but easily damaged installs ons such as
oil rigs, oil refineries an computer
complexes and the broadening of kid-
nap targets to include execut ves' families
and junior staff members. American
company might arguably come under
greater psychological pressure to pay
out for a black storeman.t an for, say,
a white managing director.
Thus the list of targets or terrorism
is expanding at the same rate as the
number of urban guerrilla groups. Some
idea of the ruthlessness of the modern
terrorist can be gleaned from the instruc-
tions on kidnapping con ained in a
manual of the California-b ed "Black
Liberation Army" unearthed by the
FBI during the investiga 'on' of the
Hearst affair. The manu suggested
two effective methods:
(1) If the ransom dead ' e is set for
a week or less, the hosts e should be
buried in the ground with enough food
and water to see him thro gh. The ter-
rorists can -then either reveal his where-
abouts without going near
deal falls through, they can I
to death.
dim or, if the
t him starve
(2) If the deadline. is 2 hours, the
victim should be drugged and left in the
boot of a car. He can then be sprayed
with armour-plated bullets from a pass-
ing car if the ransom demand is not met.
This grim advice has no
that is no reason for faili
seriously. The primary rol
terrorism clearly rests with
and their security forces.
petent police authority ca
of ecti; e defence over
targets is proved by the s
anti-hijack campaign in
States. There were 32 hij
in the United States in 19
world total): there have bee
since the start of 1973.
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the modern city is vulnera
points. What the authorities
reasonably ordered soci
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in fighting
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hat a com-
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ited target;
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er potential
restall their
groups in the effort to fo
actions; to make it harder fo
mercenaries to cross fronti
tighter airport controls; t
rapid follow-up to terroris
and to suggest guidelines
companies and individuals
in their own defence. It i
much will depend on self-def
for corporations, will invol
the following things:
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ideological
rs through
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is particu-
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 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP79-01194A000100560001-4
refuge there for 10-15 minutes, allowing
time for an alarm call to be followed up.
3. Emergency action plans. Any corpora-
tion (or any government) running the
risk of political blackmail should have
worked out the tactics to be adopted
in advance. In kidnapping, this involves
a prior decision about whether ransom
should be paid at all. There is little doubt
about most companies' answer to that:
private executives working for a salary
seldom accept the sterner ethics of
diplomats in the service of a government
that has made it plain that it will not
and the sources of political terrorism
will continue to multiply in the rest of
the 1970s. There will be an increasing
tendency for terrorists who have failed
in their own countries to seek easier
targets abroad. Some of the exiled Latin
American revolutionaries who have
come together in Mexico City and
Buenos Aires may be among the first
to move along these lines. Equally dis-
turbing is the rise of would-be guerrilla
groups among minority communities in
western Europe. The activities of
such groups constitute one of the every-
give in to blackmail. Governments can day hazards that companies, as well
resolve the dilemma by forbidding the as governments, . must now take into
payment of ransom. but that would be account.
an agonising law to have to enforce, and
it would begin to be acceptable only if
the police in the country in question
were effective in catching kidnappers.
One problem for companies faced
with kidnap or extortion demands will
be to determine whether the threat is
genuine. Acts of violence attract hoaxers
and bluffers as well as imitators; the
most spectacular bluff that paid off
recently involved a fictitious bomb on
a Qantas airliner in Australia. Some
quite simple tests can often determine
the authenticity of a threat. For kid-
napping, executives' fingerprints and
voice recordings as well as their hand-
writing could be compared with material
kept on file.
Corporate planners have to work
out who will do what in a kidnapping.
Who has authc.ity to negotiate? How
can he determine the scope for bargain-
ing? (Word-codes agreed on in advance
with senior executives may help to dis-
cover something about the kidnapped
man's situation.) At what stage should
the police be consulted? (The answer
is automatically, in most western socie-
ties, but it may differ in situations where
terrorism has got entirely out of
control.)
4. Insurance against terrorism. Insur-
ance against kidnapping is not, as some
people have argued, an inducement to
political crime-although it would be
if details about who was insured were
allowed to leak out. The Lloyds brokers
are by far the largest suppliers of
political risk insurance, which is by no
means always profitable: $35m was lost
in a single day when the Palestinians
blew up those planes at Dawson's Field
in 1970. Lloyds sensibly impose the
restriction that ransom money cannot
be paid before- the appropriate law
enforcement agency has been informed,
although this can be deleted. in certain
areas. This may reduce the risk that
insurance against kidnapping increases
room or closet rein q easJ1rl~4 -P" A000100560001-4
that a potential kidna victim could to ke a od s are t at of t e techniques
which can be camouflaged under a
different name (where corporate pride
allows that). In trouble areas visiting
executives will have to learn to be more
discreet about photographs in the press,
the use of brightly painted company
planes, and so on. Locally based execu-
tives may have to adopt less conspic-
uous life styles and, in particular, less
obvious cars. More could also be done
to screen the identity of employees of
foreign corporations in a country such
as Argentina, where local agents (includ-
ing lawyers) are made to register on a
list that may be publicly consulted.
But it is not hard for would-be kid-
nappers. to get background data on their
targets. Many of the most popular ter-
rorist reference-books in America are
available in university and public
libraries. They include The Social Register,
Who's Who, specific business directories
(which often contain the home addresses
and family biographies of executives),
and magazines such as Fortune and
Business Week. Scrapbooks of clippings
from these magazines, with annotations
on the daily routine of potential targets,
were found by the FBI in a Symbionese
Liberation Army hideout. There is prob-
ably little that can be done about such
sources.
2. Improving security, especially at home
and in transit. The sale of sophisticated
.security equipment and the' hire ? of
private guards and consultants are be-
coming a fairly big business. The readi-
ness of company executives to use such
methods will depend on their willingness
to live in a virtual state of siege. Security
on the way to the office and in. the home
has been fairly generally neglected
in the past. But it is now accepted that
senior executives tend to be most vul-
nerable during the drive to and from
the office. It is now standard practice
in high-risk areas such as Buenos Aires
for senior executives to use bodyguards
and bulletproof glass in their cars and
to vary their routes to work. An in-
creasing' number have taken to using
a bleeper device-worn in the form of
a belt buckle, for instance-which with
luck and. speed might enable the police
or the company security men to track
them if they are kidnapped.
Homes can today be built like elec-
tronic fortresses if a company is prepared
to put up with the price and bother:
there are whole catalogues of intruder
alarm systems, electronic fences, night
lighting and personal mail screening
devices. A sensible principle, adopted
by one of the leading American security
firms, is that the basic aim in the home
should be to create a safe haven-a small