NEW YORK TIMES EXCERTS (31 AUGUST 1974) FROM THE WORLD PLAN OF ACTION ADOPTED BY THE U.N. WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE.

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

New York Times excerpts (31 August 1974) from the WORLD PLAN OF ACTION adopted
by the U.N. orld Population Conference.
C P W articles from Scientific American, September 1974 on various aspects of
over-population.
Despite some adverse publicity, progress was achieved at the first World
Population Conference sponsored by the U.N. in Bucharest in August 1974 in
which 1300 delegates from 135 nations sat down and discussed one of today's mos.
controversial subjects. Debates were heated, but some of the areas of mis-
understanding they exposed are repairable and the conference provided for a
continuing review mechanism in the U.N. to monitor population trends.
The draft plan identified runaway population growth as a threat to worldwide
development and recommended that population limitation be made a major componen
of all national development policies. The role of economic and social develop-
ment as?a means of coping with population problems was emphasized at the
insistence of Third World nations but even with the obvious resentment and
trepidation of the have nots as to the motives of the haves, worthwhile recom-
mendations for social.and economic development came out of the final plan
including: expanding educational opportunities; discouraging early marriages;
eliminating child labor; upgrading the position of women; establishing social
security and old-age benefits, etc. Population experts state that such measure
have historically had the effect of lowering birth rates. The reasons are
spelled out in the attached articles which are filled with solid background
material that can be turned into articles for mass-circulation newspapers
and magazines.
Reservations among developing nations that family planning programs would
deprive them of the larger population they are counting on to swell their
industrial labor force are covered in two articles, "The Human Population" and
"The History of the Human Population", which describe the decades-long lag
between lower fertility and a lower population growth rate. Hence, Third
World countries can be assured that they will not lose out on the benefits
of population growth if they adopt family planning programs now.
This issuance coiitaii s articles from domestic and foreign
publications selected for fielyd operational use. Recipients are
cautioned that most of this material is copyrighted. For repub-
ll }t i! lr. .tir ?}r ..rte i;r {.+ ir-, ~riiv;cnynnh mAV no nc' r~ nh-
Icn}s payment of copyright.fees not to exceed $50.00 is authorized
per previous instructions. The attachment is unclassified when
detached.
r-2-,- r?vedi r Re ease 1999/ - DP79-01194A000100500001-0
 % r%%
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E3r
Ful70' are excerpts from ices, as well as statistics In labor and child abuse and the inform women at all sccio-
0,t-x. a :ae..zw :vrc ..:+.+ AULIUU appropriate marrialower limit lot
General Objectives Cauntrip _S which consider age at g in P; .annina development,
J De. an-1 nartirrrlarly in planning
d
sine
e- ?
-
rU ecuonsUL future
subna~knal, regional and hamper their goals of pro- r
_rl-eC .~ -,ter IF nnr))tarinn or social services and amen-
a?---- ~ .. , anu Louse cuuctau:u~ ---- a- -
divers: _ of the problems in- invited, if they have not yet a;nrroaowtn ceri arnarla)nn of HiP take into account not only
riercogr?oi.icand socio eeo- are consistent with basic rrom the pr eseo ^iCVCt Vt JO
ti. .repo i rn ?n er t!)n)1- voived as wall as equity and
scone of the contribution of countries wnlcn ail=, aL ---??-' ---- -- -- -- that all
demographic factors to the achieving moderate or low developed countries remain it is ilnperative tha_ +
ld ~..., in the region of 15 per thou- cou_Ztrs, and within them 1
.. _.,...,+L, sh
ou
and
.-
vancing human welfare, on co achieve" it through a low ?
the one hand, and the impact level of birth and death To achieve by 1985 these adapt themselves to more ra-
lE!vels of fertility would re- tional u iliza:ion of natural.
of broader social, economic raLCS.
ita Quire substantial national resources, without excess, so i o
vs. wry,,; ,;
er ca
that
g
p
p
-
.._.-.?.----
idle: P-1- -.... b-" _-?. in population, consumption once. ouch ciwiu wvuau ...": .. ...... b...
rrorb- and also be reat_ired to achieve gise high priority to improv-
e
-
ropullation distribu- mans the need for luuuameu-
trop. the investigation and
mati r tat improvement in inter- life.
'-~- ... i S.?tnrn
m; -r rinn __ __.--_ w
i
_
ide_ development of new sources
io
h
t co
s
curse :=ally demographic Development Goals Listed to their national purposes are utilization of existing sources.
ess, articularl by To promote the status of p e p y tended and diversified -- to ri r,.t..
rocns
ontr ; bute Tn.ternatinna[ cooperation.
rn e of their greater Tar- !1-
em
roles n r,ationahlife. ^^l ~?e recommendations should be and every level in the plan- to rational and regional re-
for p~puiuaon policies can intte discrimination in, and
development programs, in- economic development assist-
an a _-ais anp whir 11iL~rLiW- education, training, employ
recognized princi_ a C. The economic contrau- is rec .
troop::5 ment and career advancement tion- of women. in household monitoring of population
pubilc and the promot;on of incon e ad, social services sped out in the Declara- 1977. A comprehensive and
irai:-:7. ._5earch. in.' rrra? ti'e rkir- cenern:ion. and rract._e through effec- Nkt'nns SVSteri.
n ~s ; F c er,t and 10- uncert3ren
3 1mcU~!(s~~ r t ts0 1~3 t'.:e
AU (Al
 ApproVeo.'J* *f 09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000100500001-0
Established 1845 13b1 1 E I CAN September 1974 Volume 231.
CPYRGHT
the H. uman Popula tion
11
The articles presented in this issue point out, among other thngs,
that rapid population growth cannot last long. The question is: Will
population level off because of high death rates or low birth rates?
by Ronald Freedman and Bernard Berelson
The rate of growth that currently
characterizes the human popula-
tion as a whole is a temporary de-
viation from the annual growth rates
that prevailed during most of man's his-
tory and must prevail again-in the future.
Today's situation is unique in mankind's
experience: the highest growth rate in
human history (about 2 percent per year)
from the highest hase in absolute num-
bers (nearly four billion). The world is
currently adding nearly 80 million peo-
ple per year, about as many as the popu-
lation of the eighth-largest country-
(Bangladesh).
Over the millenniums until very re-
cent times the human population in-
creased at a very low rate. From the time
of the agricultural and urban revolution
about 5,000 years ago the population in-
crease probably never reached as much
as .1 percent a year for any long period
until the late 17th century. As Ansley J.
Coale shows elsewhere in this issue [see
"The History of the Human Population,"
page 40], the acceleration of world pop-
ulation growth was particularly pro-
nounced in countries that are among the
most highly developed today: the Euro-
pean countries and the lands Europeans
settled overseas. That growth was the
product of the decline in their death
rates, prolonged over three centuries and
most marked from about 1800 on, and
the lag in the parallel decline in their
birth rates. Now the population is en-
gaged in what can truly be called a vital
revolution. We happen to live in the cru-
cial transitional generations. Earlier the
high fertility of mankind was balanced
by high mortality. Currently, however,
death rates have been falling almost ev-
erywhere. The birth rate has also been
falling in many nations and communities,
but this trey. ' has come along later and
more slowly. t'he population has there-
fore been increasing, and up to now at an
increasing rate. In the 1970's the rate of
increase has slightly exceeded 2 percent
per year. That means a doubling time of
less than 35 years, and the number cur-
rently being doubled is a very large one.
Projection of such growth for very long
into the future produces a world popula-
tion larger than the most optimistic esti-
mates of the planet's cam' g capacity.
In the long run near-zero growth will
have to be restored-either by lower
birth rates or by higher death rates.
M the world is c
~- calIy.divided. The deve
emographi-
oped coun-
tries are now close to replac
of reproduction (although
certainty that they will re
ment levels
here is no
ain there).
The underdeveloped countries are gow-
ing very fast: mortality- is fal ing more or
less rapidly, but fertility is changing very
little, except in a few small countries.
The differing age structures of the two
kinds of population contribute their own
problems.
The possibility that growth may be
halted and the population s abilized by
the control of fertility is illustrated by
the recent demographic his ory of the
developed countries: some 3 nations, as
classified by the appropriate agencies of
the United Nations, that sha in the ma-
terial abundance of industrialization. De-
cline in the death rates of the e countries
has given their populations lie expectan-
cies that approach or excee 1 70 years.
The a-e structure of these nnnlationc_
n m bees
t r
a"'! ` l '
inga on the opposite page. The paintings are in the Tassili, a remote mountainous region of `"'~
the Sahara on the southern border of Algeria. The running human figures carrying bows in every age cohort up to th sixth dee-
are hunters, but these people were probably pastoral nomads. The large animal in the cen- ade [see top illustration on p .ges 38 and
ter is a hull. At that time the Sahara was not as dry as it i today, and it may have been the 39], constitutes a biological novelty not
scene of the human migrations that attended the introduction of animal husbandry and seen before in human popul tions. Ter-
developed countries
tiility rates in many
agriculture. The photograph was made by L. L. CaavallliSySfo~r}zaa of StanfordUniversitcy, the
iq~.t to their
author of ap 6 0,nr6cle rlLliipft IGi5Ce .7.7 /V7/VLt ~rl/~iRLJ V 1 19'FAVOV I JOVV?1 Ct h
 CPYRGHT
e h. rates ~~i~ tP5 as `' ~~ ;? ' - j 194
row th, give years ego e 'z
of
g
about the ultimate stabilization of these
populations must be'qualified, however,
l,y collection of the upsurge in their
birth rates during the 1940's and 1950's
to U.S. citizens as the "baby
i,.,?.'j' f .he years that followed World
%Var II) that temporarily reversed the
trend of the preceding century. These
vital trends originally put in their ap-
pearance with the onset of the scientific-
industrial revolution and the populariza-
tion of material well-being that has made
the countries of the European peoples
the developed countries of today. The
same trends are observed in the Japanese
population from the time of the Meiji
restoration in 1868, which launched that
country's industrial revolution.
As early as the 1930's what has be-
come known as the demographic transi-
tion culminated, in many of those coun-
tries, in the convergence of birth and
death rates that brought their growth
clown close to zero. Since there is no ac-
cepted `: explanation for the subsequent
surge and decline of their fertility rates,
no one can say with assurance that some-
thing similar will not happen again. In
any case the demographic future of this
portion 'of the human population is now a
function of movement in its birth rates.
Further; decline in mortality (even to
' ' 117 h 1; P41 $ -
ee
achieved. Thus even if the country's fer-
tility persists at a replacement level, the
U.S. will not reach zero growth for 50 or
60 years, at which time its population
will be 40 percent larger.
he principal impetus to world popu-
-~? lation growth comes today from the
underdeveloped countries where nearly
three-fourths of mankind dwell. Death
rates in those countries have been falling
over the past 25 years toward the low
levels of the developed countries. Birth
rates, however, remain twice as high as
they are in the developed countries. The
result is a population increase averaging
2.5 percent and in many countries ex-
ceeding 3 percent.
The populations of such countries are
now growing faster than those of the
developed countries grew during the
phase of rapid population growth of the
European peoples [see "The Populations
of the Underdeveloped Countries," by
Paul Demenv, page 148]. 'Mortality rates
in such countries are converging toward
those of the developed countries, al-
though there is still some way to go, par-
ticularly when age structures are taken
into account. (The chide death rates of
the underdeveloped countries run about
14 per 1,000 population, as against
g
zero:) woo av e I g
5. bout nine per 1,000 in the developed
almost everyone in the developed world about nine per 1,000 in the developed
now .lives past the childbearing years, countries) In some countries further de-
and saving the lives of older people does cline in mortality may come slowly with-
not affect the growth rate of a population out further improven.ant in nutrition, liv-
to any degree. With modem contracep- ingg standards and public health services.
tive technology widely available and in The large gaps between the underdevel-
use in most developed countries, their oped and the developed countries re-
birth rates may be said to be under vol- main in fertility, represented by an over-
untary control.. It can be anticipated, as all crude birth rate of 39 per 1,000 popu-
Charles F. Westoff observes [see "The lation compared with 17 per 1,000. Some
Populations. of the Developed Coun- large countries such as Nigeria, Bangla-
tries," page 108], that human fertility in desh and Pakistan have crude birth rates
these novel circumstances will oscillate that are three times higher than those of
in response to cultural and economic the U.S,
pull's and pressures, not yet securely un- Accordingly it is almost inevitable
derstood. The conjugal family of indus- that the world's population will grow to
trial civilization [see "The Family in between 6.5 billion and 8.5 billion in the
Developed. Countries," by Norman B. next 75 years, with nearly all the growth
Ryder, page 122] is typically a small in the underdeveloped countries. As
family, And the true liberation of women Tomas Frejka of the Population Council
from the commitment of their lives to has shown, employing a computer model
childbearing [see "The Changing Status of the world population that incorporates
of R'omen in Developed Countries," by data on age structure, the population
Judith Blakey page 1361 sets another would grow to 6.3 billion even if repro-
kind of inertia against return to high lcv- duction rates in all countries could be
els of fertility. brought down to replacement levels as
f t] o ul htions early as 1980 [see "The Prospects for a
#
0 o I. Ion in
IN erent of the ad li-
tional four-plus billion would be in e
underdeveloped countries, The wo ld
would know an India of 1.4 billion po -
lation, a Brazil of 266 million, a Bang a-
desh of 240 million, a Nigeria of 198 -
lion. China is the big unknown in wo Id
statistics; in spite of reports of a deel e
in the countrv's fertility rate, a popu a-
tion of more than a billion is probable in
the next decades.
Thus short of a catastrophic rise in
death rates a population increase of a-
jor dimensions is in store. Stabilize ' n
of the world population may not oc
this side of the 10-to-15-billion ran e,
and eight billion seems to be a minims .
Whatever mankind can do to mod !r-
ate ,U:.h trends, it must clearly accom -
date to growth. Over the next few d
ades roughly everything must be d-
bled just in order to stay even. ?Ro r
l;eveile [see "Food and Populatio ,"
~ha~e 160] considers that the project d
demand-amplified as it must be by the
appetites of the developed countries a d
by the development of the uuderdev l-
aped countries-still does not exceed t e
earth's resources.
Concurrent with such profou d
change in the facts of life and death a d
in the structure of populations, the livi g
generations have been experience g
equally revolutionary changes in e
family, the community and the state,
technology and the use of resources, .n
economic relationships and in man's "
pact on the environment. These char s
in the condition of man can be signaliz d
by the observation that the human po -
lation is in migration from the agric -
tural village to the industrial and co -
mercial city [see "The Migrations of -
man Populations," by Kingsley Da s,
page 92]. Everywhere cities are growl g
faster than countries. In the develop d
countries the majority of the inhabitants
are already resettled into great netwo s
of metropolitan centers with depend it
hinterlands. Although most people in t e
underdeveloped countries still live in N' -
lages,. their cities are owing too, in
spite of grossly inadequate facilities a d
relatively little opportunity for empl -
ment. Such high rates of populati n
growth prevail in rural areas that this
migration still does not diminish e
rural population or even slow its grow th
by much.
len so, some o 1es p p
still retain considerable potential for Stationary World Population," by Tomas ost of the world's people now live in
gro< th. Higher birth rates in the recent Frejka; SCIENTIFIC MIERIC N, March, -A I countries with programs or polio s
past Wean large proportions of couples 1973]. Arrival at the replacement rate by to change fertility levels and grog h
p
lausible
Ets- el
r increase or to
A proved For Release ern 9 194a 46
d
 CPYRGHT
met mg; an exar plc is the
be halted an s a t tzec v fertn ntv con- BS Countries, an estimate o now muc stantial soi um
trot, then the faster fertility is reduced, high growth rates would retard develop- 1g72 report of the U.S. Co: mission on
the smaller the .eventually stationary inent. In one underdeveloped country Population Growth and the American
popel;ition will be. The god?ernments of after another rapid population growth Future. Then there is population as a
most underdeveloped countries sponsor appears to increase the difficulty of work- L*anproblem (or even a fal e problem
fautily-planning programs, usually but ing with limited human and material re- with imperialist overtones), the real
not al avs with the explicit goal of re- sources to solve the problems of food problem being development or, how to
during the number of births. In some supply, of urban and rural unemploy- bring about a socialist organi2ation of so-
smaller countries, notably Taiwan and ment, of providing minimal social ser- ciety or redistribute income r improve
South Korea, birth rates have fillen to a vices. The predominant view still is that the status of women or rectify social in-
substantial degree because of birth con- rapid population growth is such a serious justice or promote technologi,a1 change,
trul practiced by couples served by such hindrance to development that the re- with the population problem eing auto-
programs. Whether this would have hap- duction of fertility rates will greatly en- matically taken care of as a y-product.
j.cned .without the programs is still a de hance the possibility. of social and eco- In short, the very nature of he popula-
hated question and one technically diffi- norr-ic progress. There is, however, an- tion problem-what the r al conse-
cult to resolve. These same countries other view. In the early 1970's a UN quences of population growth are and
have also made substantial progress in symposium preparatory to the 1974
what growth really means for human life
other ways toward the fulfillment of as- World Population Conference, with ex- -is under closer scrutiny and disputation
pirations for economic development and perts from around the world in attend- today than it was a decade ago.
"modernization." ante, concluded that "a preoccupa- It was . inevitable that the increased
Government policies with respect to lion with population should not divert interest in population during the 1960's
fertilit-v in developed countries, whether attention from critical issues in the would move the subject into he political
implicit in welfare programs or explicit world development process.... Popu- arena. Indeed, that was de anded by
in the promotion of large families, tend lation growth is not always an obstacle the emergence of governm(nt popula-
to be pronatalist. There is no evidence, to development [although] very high tion policies. As a result population
ulation growth are usually issues are now caught up in broader and
however, that such policies have been rates of
o
p
p
ment " deeper political tensions, bo h domestic
notably successful in deflecting the an obstacle to develo
p
downward trend in birth rates in those and international: tensions concerning
countries more than temporarily: It may odav such analysis is questioned with natural resources, food, ener , , medical
be expected that when the underdevel-regard to the handling of discount care, neocolonialism, the terms of inter-
oped countries have changed all those rates and the extent to which savings by national trade, the provision of assistance
characteristics that distinguish the tra- low-income individuals contribute to for development and the rel tive merits
ditional society from the modern one, capital investment. Moreover, the ad- of socialist and nonsocialist firms of gov-~
they too will be developed, and one re-
ulation growth are as- ernment.
o
es of
nt
va
p
p
ag
suit will be the reduction of their fer- serted: stimuli to harder work and agri- Any strong international trend, an
tility. cultural innovation, and larger markets population-related actions ere such
As the other contributors to this issue, to foster the substitution of imports. Such trend in the 1960's, is likely to generate
give evidence, there is substantial agree q,;-;Hors have led some to the funda- a countertrend. Now, for bettor worse
ment about the demographic trends and n.,~ntal position that it is not population there is a kind of political backlash a
conditions that set the terms of public - _ ,vtli that matters but the proper or- work in many parts of the world it
policy. The making of policy, howes-er, which workers in the field o fl population
` g n zation of; ociet, the redistribution problems must contend in addition t
involves ideology as well as the demo o: income and the rectification of social
graphic and social facts. It may seem tr. .;lice. Does population growth Seri- the problems themselves. Any effort t
strange that some people question the L threaten economic development or limit this sensitive topic to scholarly an
validity and definition of "the populations is onlt a marginal issue? Today quell- professional discussion was doomed t
problem' at this late date, but there are failure; after all, if a policy to be rec
fire experts can be found on both sides
ommended by a governmen , it by deft
at least two recent developments of Cots- f
b
t
i
d
e
a
e.
:
ne
o
i- ninon becomes a political ma ter.
siderable importance. The first is a o"'
i
h
h
h
e recent concern w
t
e env
t
In t
scientifichistication about t e
rc_mental aspect of population the
consequences of population growth- taoles are turned: in one scenario the y key controversy centers on the strat
the simpler answers of 10 to 15 years a_t.' p:,_,lolem is not the problem of countries e for reducing fertility rates in th
give way to more qualified and more su underdeveloped countries. i the public
.h as India but the problem of coup. forum such consideration has tended t
complex ones. The second is a broaden- ti-:es such as the U.S.; the solution calls
ing of the definition of the problem to in- n. t for fewer babies there but for less dfeveocusloppn the e and family alternatives ly economic
pl ning. It i
elude not only economics but also the consumption here. The debate has an unrewarding polarization. Politica
terrestrial environment, to regard popu- s,,z sng between extremes, with one po- leaders are pushed by events' to trea
lation grosti th not only as a burden on the si; on being stigmatized as doomsaying o station and develo men policies
.development of underdeveloped coun- and the other as technological optimism. p F. p tries but also as a multiplier of the stres- : One can distinguish.at least three gen- being integrally related ratl~ner than
ses on the resources and the environment eral positions on the population problem. alternatives.
of developed countries. There is population as crisis, so grave Developmcnt, ?which requires eaten
g sine social change, impincr s at even
On the economic side the bible of the &-:Lt catastrophe is near unless drastic Dint on factors that sustain high fertilit
early 1960's was Ansley Coale and Ed- sups are taken to stop world population in the underd von o d c~jun res. Power
gar M. ' I loov-AO f } POOR V 116 as er. 1,90910'9'IQ2eTeCIAV#ROP9201194 (~~ Q i( ~~f an ersisten
-A of nhl- -;'l p
 CPYRGHT'
change. The high rate of infant mortality Beyond general development, wnicn
against high mortality rates. In many grounds; family-planning programs have
countries the preference for sons presses been organized in many countries as di-
fertility still further against that other rect action on the problem of population
lottery of sex determination. The eco- growth. Such effort has found its own
nomic value of children in these circum- justification, furthermore, on humani-
stances contrasts with the dependency tarian and medical grounds, even though
of youth in the developed countries: they its success in fertility control is debated.
help to make the family's living; they are The effort also commends itself because
it provides access to contraceptive ser-
cial and religious life. Women are held
their life role to that of mother, wife and es motivation. Here again the developed
worker in the family enterprise. Illitera- countries have a role to play. As Sheldon
ev reinforces social isolation and tradi- J. Segal shows [see "The Physiology of
tional behavior; lack of. education con- Human Reproduction," page 531, the ex-
fines the range of choice and the time isting technology of contraception may
horizon of decisions about life. Village have serious limitations in the physical
life limits the exchange of goods, ideas circumstances of the traditional village
and people; it also limits the complexity and in the slums of the new cities of the
of technology and the division of labor. poor; the "ideal contraceptive" is stilt
All aspects of this pattern of under- awaited in the underdeveloped countries
development do not prevail everywhere, as it is in the developed ones and may
and various countries have arrived at ? have a more decisive historic role in the
different states of change in these char- former, allowing fertility control in less
acteristics. Many countries differ in im- favorable physical circumstances and at
portant ways from their European pre-
cursors at a similar stage in the transfor-
mation, exhibiting a 'much more rapid
decline in mortality, a greater access to
advanced technology and an aspiration
to quickly reach demonstrated goals
that were attained only slowly by the
first arrivals. These differences may fa-
cilitate reduction in fertility, along with
development in general, in some coun-
tries. Modernization is proving to be
slow and difficult, however, in many
countries; if decline in fertility must wait
out the process of social transformation,
it will be some time in coming. In the
last article in this issue Gunnar Myrdal
reminds us that the task of technology
transfer requires action-by the developed
as well as the underdeveloped countries
[see "The Transfer of Technology to Un-
derdeveloped Countries," page 1721.
Fertility control may not require the
total transformation of the old order in
the underdeveloped countries. Recent
research on the demographic transition
in Europe finds that decline in fertility
did not "automatically" follow on attain-
ment of this or that bench mark in urban-
ization, industrialization, literacy or de-
cline in mortality. In our time major
declines in mortality have occurred with
little social or economic development.
Educational levels have been raised rap-
idly in Sri Lanka and in the state of
byRerala
some dec'Ti0~ eT lo
~rttility alt ugn
gLgainst this background what can gov-
ernments do to change fertility
rates? It can be said there are five courses
of action: persuade, manipulate services,
change incentives, transfonn social insti-
tutions, coerce. Family-planning pro-
grams provide services and persuasion,
and some countries restrict access to
modern means of fertility control; devel-
opment, of course, changes social insti-
tutions. In Singapore some incentives are
being tried: no paid maternity leave be-
yond two children, and similar scaling of
obstetrical delivery fees and income-tax
deductions; Taiwan offers a positive in-
centive in the form of educational bonds
for parents who stop at three children. If
community pressure backed up by a one-
party political apparatus counts as "co-
ercion," then China may be the first
country to employ all five ways of fertil-
ity'control specified here; reports from
some cities and communes indicate that
Chinas fertility rate is indeed falling.
India, in 1952, was the first country in
the world to proclaim a population poli-
cy designed to lower birth rates through
a family-planning program. It has con-
ducted a vigorous campaign of persua-
sion under the symbol of the "Red Tri-
angle"; jt has tried to provide services on
a massive basis, with spotty success; it
&s?t}e?Ir~pror,~'v~Eo n;t IJA4A
tions. The government of Bangladesh, an
even harder-pressed country, has reck-
oned openly with the possibility of such
coercive measures as limitation on ration
cards and compulsory' sterilization for
parents who have had more than two
children.
Finally, serious issues present them-
selves under the heading of the control
of human mobility. Today both internal
and international migration is predomi-
nantly- in the rural-to-urban direction:
from the countryside to the city, from
the. farms of one nation to the factories
of another. In most places this trend pre-
sents causes fdr concern: urban conges-
tion, unemployment, environmental de-
terioration, problems of housing and
sanitation and transportation, lack of so-
cial services, political unrest and diffi-
culties of acculturation.
International migrations are usually
controllable: the valve of immigratign
can be opened or closed. A few countries
want more immigrants (Israel and Aus-
tralia are examples), but even they want
only a certain kind. The industrial coun-
tries of continental Europe want more
laborers from the Mediterranean coun-
tries but only on a temporary basis: the
unemployed are exportable each'way. In
some tragic situations minority groups
are' forced out in order to make the re-
maining population more homogeneous.
In the U.S. the Commission on Popula-
tion Growth and the American Future
urged that the substantial illegal immi-
gration be stopped.
Internal migration to the cities is more
difficult to affect. Among the many ex-
amples of what has-been tried to limit
the growth of large urban centers are re-
gional development (Greece and Fin-
land), decentralization of government
activities (the Netherlands), relocation of
the capital (Brazil and Tanzania), sup-
port of new towns (Japan and Britain),
damping of wage differentials between
urban and rural areas (Zambia), reori-
entation of education toward agricultural
interests (Indonesia and Tanzania), sub-
sidies for industrial location (France,
Sweden and Togo), rural land reclama-
tion (Kenya) and even a "citizenship tax"
on living in the city (Seoul in South
Korea).
The effect of such efforts, although dif-
ficult to measure, has not been strik-
ing, and the further modernization ai
agriculture will intensify the pressures.
The cities can only be expected to grow
e problems that
N l1 ElreltJlis the (reported)
I
' ~ ` t
made some progress in the development counterexample of China, where as i
 CPYRGHT.
c~ n;za to o
matter o natiqnal poll
the cities is s M V 91 Teas ~`~ ?b9~/2~ft~t bpt'P6`-'~t1194
R rt. ttv is a very recent a art to deal
many people are actually exported for
witlr a very difficult problem. Successes
various periods from the cities back to
in sonic countries and the posibnity
the land, that
at there has been a major advance in
the task is to reduce popula oa
China provide some practical
a owth in the world as a wholz, and
ageinent.
hence in most individual countries, at s
rate substantially higher than the one ost countries are committed to con-
that would otherwise obtain?the pro s- sideration if not to action. indeed.
pert is uncertain. Reasons for pessir s 1974 is World Population Year, by proc-
are not hard to find. First, high" fertilit:' lamation of the UN. Representatives of
itself is greatly resistant to change. It l'' most of the world's governments huge
been ratified by the experience of cen- just met under UN auspices to discuss
turies, and for most people in the world population problems and to consider a
it is institutionally interwoven with the P orld Plan of Action." Such a meeting
entire cultural fabric. Beyond that to would have been unthinkable as recent-
demographic momentum built into t lv as 15 years ago, when even such mat-
age structure of populations is pro%ou="1 Ls as family-planning programs were
and long-lasting. If one were looking frr defined as being outside the area of le-
a promising arena in which to demon- gitimate government action. Population
trate the possibilities of social engineer issues, the preserve of a small group of
ng, one would not choose population. specialized scholars a few decades ago,
Second, the means of intervention may are now discussed everywhere and are
of be available. Coercion is not general- being acted' on in countries involving
acceptable. The modernizing of social most of the world's people.
nstitutions is a goal almost everywhere, Not all population measures are sue-
ut progress is disappointing, and in any cessful. How could they be? `either are
ase it is hardly achievable iu the im- measures on other great social problems.
mediate future. Family planning can As has been said, some problems do not
claim some limited successes, but there have solutions, only consequences. There
is no proved formula for the mass adop- is now, however, an unpreeedentedly
tion of birth control in an underdevel- widespread recognition that the world is
oped country. Hence intervention comes going to have to accommodate several
up against real limits of social and gov- billion more people in the coming dee-
ernment policy. ades, that the curve of growth takes a
Third, population issues are them- long time to level off and that the earlier
selves chancing. On the one hand they it begins to level off, the better..
have become politicized, with all that
implies in the way of disputation, com-
promise and absorption into political
issues. On the other hand, the technical
bases of population issues have shifted
in recent years; as we come to know
more we seem to end up knowing less,
at least insofar as effective direct action
is concerned: The population problem is
more problematic now. The threshold
factors required for the reduction of fer-
tility. are more in dispute; the value of
family planning is called into question
with alternatives being advanced that
are hard to attain quickly, such as social
revolution or the redistribution of in-
come or the correction of social injustice.
Nevertheless, the effortcontinues.
The' present is a period of taking stock
and reformulating programs.- Growing
recognition of the difficulty of popula-
tion problems, together with the great
pressures exerted in many countries by
food shortages and a wide range of un-
nmet demands for a better life, are fore
ing many governments to reconsider
their ceom ew ~~ for d~eye nnen~p
part to o acc lease 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194,
~Ii6~
4000100500001-0
 11yeHisomy"f0theii
L rail some 200years ado the size of the huiiian PPoPtdcttiori r-eniained
fairly stable because high birth rates were balanced b)- high death
rates. The great demographic transition carne cc 'hell. death rates fell
CPYRGHT
F designating 1974 World Population
Year the United Nations has given
expression to worldwide interest in
the rapid rate of population increase and
to apprehension abotit the consequences
of continued rapid growth. Much less at-
tention is given to the growth of the
population in the past, to the process by
which a few thousand wanderers a mil-
lion years ago became billions of resi-
dents of cities, towns and villages today.
An understanding of this process is es-
sential if one would evaluate the pres-
ent c[ircunistances and future prospects
of the human population.
any numerical description of the de-
velopment of the human population
cannot avoid conjecture, simply because
there has never been a census of all the
people iti the world. Even today there
are national populations that have not
been enumerated, and where censuses
have been taken they are not always re-
liatble. Recent censuses of the U.S., for
example, have undercounted the popu-
]ation by between 2 and 3 percent; some
other censuses, such as the one taken
in Nigeria in 1963, are evidently gross
overcounts. Moreover, in many instances
by Ansley J. Coale
the extent of the error cannot be esti-
mated with any precision.
If the size of the population today is
imperfectly known, that of the past is
even more uncertain. The first series of
censuses taken at regular intervals of no
more than 10 years was begun by Swe-
den in 1750; the U.S. has made decen-
nial enumerations since 1790, as have
France and England since 1800. The
census became common in the more de-
veloped countries only in the 19th cen-
tury, and it has spread slowly to other
parts of the world. India's population has
been enumerated at decennial intervals
since 1871, and a number of Latin Amer-
ican populations have been counted,
mostly at irregular intervals, since late in
the 19th century. The first comprehen-
sive census of Russia was conducted in
1897, and only four. more have been
made since then. The population of most
of tropical Africa remained uncounted
until after World War IL A conspicuous
source of uncertainty in the population
of the world today is the poorly known
size of the population of China, where
the most recent enumeration was made
in 193 and was of untested accuracy.
As one considers earlier periods the
margin of error increases. The earliest
date for which the global population can
be calculated with an uncertainty of
only, say, 20 percent is the middle of the
18th century. The next-earliest time for
which useful data are available is the be-
ginning of the Christian era, v.-lien Rome
collected information bearing on the
number of people in various parts of the
empire. At about the same time imperial
records provide some data on the pope
lation of China, and historians have
made a tenuous estimate of the popula-
tion of India in that period. By employ-
in- this information and by making .
crude allowance for the number of peo-
ple in other regions one can estimate the
population of the world at the time o
Augustus within a factor of two.
For still earlier periods the populatiot
must be estimated indirectly from cal-
culations, of the number of people who
could subsist under the social and tech
nological institutions presumed to pre
wail at the time. Anthropologists and his
torians have estimated, for example, tha
before the introduction of agriculture tli
world could have supported a hunting
and-gathering culture of between fly
and 10 million people.
Frotn guesses such as these for the ear
her periods and from somewhat mot
reliable data for more recent times a pen
oral outline of the growth of the hutnat
population can be constructed [see i las
tration.s on nest pa cj. Perhaps the mos
uncertain figure of all in these calculat
tions is the size of the initial population
when man first appeared about a ntilliot
years ago. As the littnt:ut species grad
ually hecanie distinct from its hontirtu
predecessors there was presumably it
original gene pool of some thousands o
hundred.; of thousands of individuals
RUBBING OF A GRAVESTONE records the death of a mother and her child in 18th-
century Massachusetts. The inscription reads (with emended punctuation and orthogra-
ph% "In Memory of Mrs. Naomi, Wife of Mr. Ritchard. Woolworth, s+ho. died August
22d. 1,60,-aged 39 Years; also Joseph, their Son, died the Same Day aged 6 days." It is
probable that both mother and son died a~ a result of some crisis attendant on childbirth.
in the ca,e of the mother perhaps front puerperal fever. Such death, were very common
throughout most of man's history; the high death rate they contributed to demanded that
the birth rate also lie high merely to sustain the population. A decline in the death rate,
which had an important effect on the survival of infants and children, began in most parts
of Europe and America in the decades following the events recorded on this grave-tone.
The figures at the top of the stone are is scythe and an hourglass. traditional symbol- of
mortality; a crowing cock, which probably represents an admonition to vigilance, and an
object vybose identity is uncertain but that may be a candle with snuffer, another comnion-
place figure in the imagery of death. The stone is at Lon meadow. Class., and ha, been at.
tributed to Aaron Bliss. The rubbing is reproduced front Early New England Gravestone
nd Vincent Gillon Jr published by-Dover Publication-, Inc. Surveys of
: s h . E 1 t:nt
R bl
i
u tnl,, } t
xra~'e-tuAb clMV~e~t> ~~tF~~I~ ~l l0J1t02,.a '"1-Aj tf Fj7q,6jiMt9'4A~1~(S"~ 6 ~O'~tt'i i the populatiot
 ~,rrr;ht, ibn,+ Ile t vrr~ r0 l E I t 1 t~le T'ati
begun about 8000 n.c. The median of and the factors that determine the of. the sizes of successive gen ration .
several estimates of the ultimate size of growth rate.. This ratio is approximately equ I to th
the hunting-and-gathering cultures that Persistentgrowth at any proportionate average number of daughters orn t
preceded the introduction of agriculture rate produces ever increasing increments women who pass through the span .
is eight million. Thus whatever the size of growth, and the total, even at a rela- fertile years multiplied by the propo -
of the initial human population, the rate tively modest rate of increase, surpasses Lion of women surviving to the can a
of growth during man's first 990,000 any designated finite limit in a surpris- of childbearing. This product specifics
years (about 99 percent of his history) ingly short time. An increasing popula- the average number of daughters bo
was exceedingly small. Even if one as- tion doubles in size during an interval during the lifetime of a newborn female,
sumed that in the beginning the popu- equal to 693 divided by the annual rate after making allowance for those wom
lation was two-Adam and Eve-the an- of increase, expressed in additional per- whose biological fertility is abnormal an
nual rate of increase during this first long - sons per 1,000 population [see illustra- for those who die before reaching the ac e
interval was only about 15 additional tion on page 46]. Thus in the period from of childbearing. When the product
persons per million of population. A.D. 1 to 1750, when the growth rate was 1-signifying one daughter per w-om
After the establishment of agriculture .58 per 1,000, the population doubled under the prevailing condition of fe
the growth of the population accelerated about every 1,200 years; in the next few tility and mortality-successive getter -
X11'h
e
.
somewhat. The eight million of 8000 B.C. decades, when a growth rate of about 20 tions are the same average siz
became by A.D. I about 300 million (the
midpoint of a range of informed guesses
of from 200 million to 400 million). This
increase represents an annual growth
rate of 360 per million, or, as it is usual-
1Y expressed, .36 per 1,000.
From A.D. 1 to 1750 the population
increased by about 500 million to some
800 million (the median of a range esti-
mated by John D. Durand of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania). It was at this
time that the extraordinary modem ac-
celeration of population growth began.
The average annual growth rate from
A.D. I to 1750 was .56 per 1,000; from
11, 50 to 1800 it was 4.4 per 1,000, bring
ing the population at the end of this 50
year interval to about a billion. By 1850
there . were 1.3 billion people in the
world, and by 1900 there were 1.7 bil-
lion, yielding growth rates in the respec-
tive 50-year intervals of 5.2 and 5.4 per
1,000. (These totals too are based on
'estimates made by Durand.)
By 1950, according to the UN, the
world population was 2.5 billion, indi-
cating an annual growth rate during the
first half of the 20th century of 7.9 per
1,000. From 1950 to 1974 the growth
rate more than doubled, to 17.1 per
1,000, producing the present world pop-
ulation of 3.9 billion. The median value
of several projections made by the UN
in 19; 3 indicates that by 2000 the popu-
lation will be 6.4 billion, an increase that
implies an annual growth rate during the
next 25 years of 19 per 1,000.
rt is evident even from this brief de-
scription that the history of the pop-
ulation can be readily divided into two
periods: a very long era of slow growth
and a very brief period of rapid growth.
An understanding of the development of
C`"?~ n during these two phases
per 1,000 is anticipated, the population
will double in 34.7 years.
The cumulative effect of a small num-
the product is 2, the population' doubl s
8
with each generation, or about every
years.
her of doublings is a surprise to common
sense. One well-known illustration of this
phenomenon is the legend of the king
who offered his daughter in marriage to
anyone who could supply a grain of
wheat for the first square of a chess-
board, two grains for the second square
and so on. To comply with this request
for all 64 squares would require a moun-
tain of grain many times larger than
today's worldwide wheat production.
In accordance with the same .law of
geometric progression, the human pop-
ulation has reached its present size
through comparatively few doublings..
Even if we again assume that humanity.
began with a hypothetical Adam and
Eve, the population has doubled only
31 times, or an average of about once ev-
ery 30,000 years. This is another way of
saying that the peopling of the world has
been accomplished with a very low rate
of increase, when that rate is averaged
over the entire history of the species. The
average annual rate is about .02 addi-
tional persons per 1,000. Even when only
the more rapid growth of the past 2,000
years is considered, the average rate is
modest. Since A.D. 1 the population has
doubled no more than four times, or
about once every 500 years, which im-
plies an annual rate of 1.4 persons per
1,000.
In the context of these long term av-
erages the rate of growth today seems all
the more extraordinary, yet the source
of this exceptional proliferation is in the
conventional mathematics of geometric
series. The population of the world in-
creases tb the extent that births exceed
deaths; the growth rate is the difference
between the birth rate and the death
The fertility of a population can al
be measured by the number of o F-
spring, both sons and daughters, bo
per woman during a lifetime Of chil I-
bearing; this number is called the tot al
fertility rate. Mortality is s mariz d
by the average age at death, or the -
erage duration of life, which is c
as the expectation of life at birth
the total fertility rate of America
en was 1.94; the expectation
birth was 75 years. Thus w~
periencing 1973 birth rates at
would bear an average of 1.94
and women experiencing 19'
xpress d
an wo I -
)f life t
men i C -
childr
rates at each age would have an avera;e
duration of life of 75 years.
When the average life span[ is sh
the proportion of women surviving
the mean age of reproduction is small.
fact, among populations for which th
are adequate data there is a
lation between these two num'
we can with some confidence
the proportion of women surviv
come mothers from the average
of life. Another predictable chat
of the human population is th
male births to female births; for
sample it is always about 1.05 t
Because of these constant r
the population it is possible to
all the combinations of femal
pectancy and total fertility that
)ers, aid
estim to
ng to e-
durat n
acteri is
ratio of
any l ge
1.
calcul to
le life x-
will yi ld
any specified growth rate. Of k>artic ar
interest are the conditions
zero population growth, sin
most of the past million years
lation has approached zero gr
illustration on page 45]. In a st
lation the average duration of
roduc g
e dur ng
he po u-
wth[es
ltic po u-
life is he
 CPYRGHT
Approved or Release - -
reciprocal of the birth rate. Expressed 1,000. Any further reduction in-rnortality was between 24 and 28, and from 1 to 3
another way, in a population of constant might raise the average duration of life percent remained unmarried at age 50
size the birth rate is the number of births to 80 years or more, but it would not sig- As a result the proportion of women o
per person-year lived and the average nificantly cha , e the proportion of wom- reproductive age who by being marrie
duration of lire is the number of person- en surviving to childbearing age, nor were exposed to the risk of childbearin
years lived per birth. would it much reduce the number of was less than half, and in some case
There are many combinations of fer- births per woman required to maintain such as Ireland, was as low as a third. .
tility and mortality that will just main- the population. The other limit is im- A much different nuptial custom tha
tain a population at fixed size. Consider posed by fertility. When the life expee- may also reduce fertility is common i
a static population in which the average tancy falls to 15 years, only 23.9 percent areas of Asia and North Africa. Wome
duration of female life is 70 years. Given of all women live to have children, and are married at age 17 or 18,. but the av
this mortality rate, the proportion of those who do must have an average of erage age of the married male populatio
women surviving to the mean age of 8.6 in order to prevent a decline in pop- 0
is often eight or nine years greater that
childbearing is. 93.8 percent. Because ulation. Although it is certainly biolog that of the married women. The fertili.
the size of the population is to remain ically possible for a woman to bear more of some of the women. is probably r
constant the average number of daugh- than eight or nine children, no sizable duced by marriage to much older me
populations have been observed with often widowers. Marriages are made b
tors born per woman must be male births
or total fertility much higher than eight arrangement with the bride's parents, i
1.066; since there are 1.05 maale births
for each female birth, the total fertility births per woman. many, cases requiring the payment of
rate must be 2.05 x 1.066 or 2.19. The Accurate records of human fertility bride price, and older men are more lily
birth rate in such a population is 1/70, and mortality are even more meager than lv to have the property or the prestig
or 14.3 per 1,000 population. records of numbers of people. Today needed to claim the more desirabl
If the average duration of female life fewer than half of the world popula- young women. Still another social infl
is 20 years, as it probably was at times cn live in areas where vital statistics ence on fertility is found in India, whey
during the premodern period, then 31.6 are reliably recorded; in most of Asia, Hinduism forbids the remarriage of wi
percent of the women survive to the almost all of Africa and much of Latin ows. Although the prohibition has not
mean age of childbearing and those who America, for example, the registration of ways been scrupulously observed, it h
live to the age of menopause have an ay- births and deaths is inadequate. Precise doubtless reduced Indian fertility below
erage of 6.5 children; the birth rate un- information about fertility and mortality what it might otherwise have been.
der these circumstances is 50 per 1,000. is therefore limited to the recent experi- Among cohabiting couples fertility
(It should be pointed out that there is no once of the more developed countries, obviously influenced by whether or n
inconsistency in the survival of many ce irning in the 18th century in Scan- measures are employed to avoid Navin
women to menopause in a population in nawia, the 19th century in most of the children. Louis Henry of the Insti
which the average age at death is 20 rest, of Europe and the 20th century in National d'Etudes Demographiques h
years. When the death rate is high, the Japan and the U.S. Much has been in- defined "natural fertility" as the fertili
average age at death is not at all a typi- ferred about the present vital rates of of couples who do not modify their b -
cal age at death. When the life expect underdeveloped countries from the age havior according to the number of chi -
tancy in a static population is 20 years, composition recorded in censuses, from dren already born. Natural fertility th
for example, about half the deaths oc- the rate of population increase between defined is far from uniform: it is affecte
cur before age five, about a fourth occur censuses and from retrospective informa- by custom, health and nutrition. Breas -
after age 50, and only about 6.5 percent tion collected in censuses and demo- feeding, for example, prolongs the peri
occur in the 10-year span centered on graphic surveys. For past populations, of postpartum amenorrhea and there -
the mean age at death.) however, valid data on births and deaths postpones the resumption of ovulati
are very rarely available, and they must following childbirth. In some popul -
~he importance of these relations is therefore be derived by analyzing the lions low fertility can be attributed
that they express the possible. combi- forces that affect fertility and mortality. pathological sterility associated .vi
nations of fertility and mortality that Differences in fertility can be attrib- widespread gonorrheal infection. Fin -
must have characterized the human pop- uted to two factors: the differential ex- ly, fertility may be influenced by diet,
ulation during each era of its history. If posure of women of childbearing age to has been suggested by the work of Re e
some other combination of fertility and the risk of childbirth through. cohabita- E. Frisch and her colleagues at Hawn 1
mortality had been maintained for more tion with a sexual partner, and differ- University. Age at menarche appears o
than a few generations (as has happened ences in the rate at which conceptions be determined at least in part by the f t
during the past two centuries), the popu- and live births occur among women who content of the body and is hence relat 1
lation would have expanded or contract- . are cohabiting. In, many populations the to diet. Furthermore, among women pa ;t
ed dramatically. only socially sanctioned cohabitation is the age of menarche a sufficient redu
These combinations also determine that between married couples, and thus tion in weight relative to height caul
the most extreme fertility and mortality the laws and customs governing the for- amenorrhea. In populations with meag r
rates possible in a static population. One mation 'and dissolution of marriages in- diets fertility may therefore be d -
limit is set by the minimum feasible mor- fiuence fertility. A' conspicuous example pressed. Because of the severe calor,
tality. When the average life expectancy is the. pattern of late marriage common ' drain of pregnancy and breast-feed:n ,
is 75 years, 97.3 percent of all women until a generation ago in many Western it is probable that nursing prolon
survive to the mean age of reproduction, European nations. For many years he- amenorrhea more effectively in popul. -
and it is necessary for them to have only fore World War II in Germany, Scandi- tions where the average body fat is ne r
2.1 childApprr?MednR -cl- ease I 99910$/O .o,MAwR 7(9Ef3A,*Ql*AOOEh*0105oooo4ot d for a regular n
0 o
 i
1.%-M Mos"t r spicu us source o c,i
r I ir9T1194AMMON@QGeO"a le; the com-
ferences in f cA }pr ve0fo it leasd"Ir9 ?9 nyly,
st *k
couples today is the deliberate control of greagricultur popu anon,orexamp e, plete reorganization of life represented
fertility by contraception and induced
abortion. In some modem societies very
low fertility rates have been obtained
the total fertility, rate has fallen as low
as 1.5. (in Czechoslovakia in 1930, in
Austria in 1937 and in West Germany
in 1973).
The prevalence of birth-control prac-
tices is known from the direct evidence
of fertility surveys for only a few popu-
lations, and for those only during the
past two or three decades. (The Inter-
national Statistical Institute has begun a.
World Fertility Survey that should il-
luminate present practices'but not those
of the past.) Indications that fertility
was deliberately controlled in past so-
cieties must be inferred from such clues ,
as the cessation of childbearing earlier
among women who married early than
among those who married late. Evidence
of this kind, together with the observa-
tion of a large reduction in the fertility,
of :all married women, indicates that
birth control was common in the 17th
century among such groups as the bour-
geoisie of Geneva and the peers of'
France. Norman Himes, in his medical
History of Contraception, has shown that
prescriptions for the avoidance of birth,
ranging ,from magical and wholly inef-
fective procedures to quite practical
techniques, have been known in many
societies at least since classical Greek
times. A doctoral dissertation at Harvard
University by Basim Musallam has dem-
onstrated that coitus interrupt us, a con-
traceptive method that compares in ef-
fectiveness with the condom and the
diaphragm, was common enough in the
medieval Islamic world to be the subject
of explicit provisions in seven prominent
schools of law. On the other hand,-analy-
sis of parish registers in western Europe
from the 17th and 18th centuries and
observations in less developed countries.
today suggest that effective birth-control
practices are not common in most rural,
premodern societies.
Large fluctuations in fertility, and in
mortality as well, are not inconsistent
with the long period of near-zero growth
that characterizes most of the history of
the population. Although the arithmetic
of growth leaves no room for a rate of
increase very different from zero in the
long run, short -term variations were
probably frequent and of considerable
extent. In actuality the population that
from our perspective appears to have
been almost static for hundreds of thou-
sands of years may well have experi-
must have been vulnerable to changes in
climate, such as periods of glaciation,
and to the disappearance of species of
prey. Once the cultivation' of crops.
had become established the population
could have been periodically decimated
by epidemics and by the destruction of
crops through drought, disease or insect
infestation. Moreover, at all times the
population has been subject to reduction
by man's own violence through individu-
al depredation and organized warfare.
Because earlier populations never ex-
panded to fill the world with numbers
comparable to the billions of the 20th
century, we must conclude that sus-
tained high fertility was always accom-
panied by high average mortality. Sim-
ilarly, sustained low fertility must have
been compensated for by low mortality;
any societies that persisted in low fertil-
ity while mortality remained high must
have vanished. -
In the conventional outline ' of human
prehistory it is assumed that at each
earlier date the average duration of life
was shorter, on the principle that early
man faced greater hazards than his de-
scendants. It is commonly supposed, for
example, that hunters and gatherers had
higher mortality than settled agricul-
turists. The greater population attained
by the agriculturists is correctly attrib-
uted to an enhanced supply of food, but
the appealing inference that reduced
mortality was responsible for this ac-
celeration of growth is not necessarily
justified.
The advent of agriculture produced
only a small increment in the growth
rate; if this increment had been caused
by a decline in mortality, the change in
the average life expectancy would, have
been hardly noticeable. If in the hunting-
and-gathering society the average num-
ber of births per woman was 6.5, for ex-
ample; the average duration of life must
have been?_0 years. If the fertility of the
early cultivators remained the same as
that of their predecessors, then the in-
crease -in the life span required to pro-
duce the observed acceleration of growth
is merely .2 year. The increase in life ex-
pectancy, from 20 to 20.2 years, would
not have been perceptible.
. If one assumes that preagricultural
man had substantially higher mortality
than the early cultivators, it must also
be assumed that the hunters and gather-
ers had much higher fertility. If the
earlier culture had an average age at
by the adoption of agricult e could cer-
tainly be expected to influence both fer-
tility and mortality. There is reason to
suspect, however, that both ital rates in-
creased rather than decreased [see illus-
tration on next page].
Both disease and unpredictable fam-
ine might have increased the death rate
of the first cultivators. Vii age life, by
bringing comparatively large numbers
into proximity, may have p ovided a ba-
sis for the transmission of pathogens and
may have created reservoir of endemic
disease. 'Moreover, the greyer density of
agricultural populations ma have led to
greater contamination of frpod, soil aad
water. Greater density and the more or
less total reliance on crops n ay also have
made agriculturists extremely fulnerable
to crop failure, whereas the unting-and-
gathering culture may have been more
resistant to adversity.
If mortality did increase
duction of agriculture, thei
n the intro-
it is certain
that fertility also rose, and y a slightly
larger margin. The supposition that both
vital rates did increase is s
observations of the fertility
temporary peoples who ma
selves by hunting and Bathe
pported by
rates of con-
intain them-
ring, such as
the Kung tribe of the Kalahari Desert in
southwestern Africa. Nanc
the University of Toronto,
servations'made by her an
league Richard Borshay Le
that Kung women have I
.between births and mod
y Howell of
nalyzing ob-
1 by her tol-
e, has found
ng intervals
rate overall
nation, sug-
se Frisch, is
body com-
to cause ir-
th intervals
y protracted
th lov body
fertility. A possible expla
that the Kung diet yields
position low enough in fat
regular . ovulation. Interbi
may be further prolonged
breast-feeding combined w
weight. If such conditions %~?ere common
among preagricultural socie
tivation of crops could ha
fertility by increasing body
-possibly by promoting the
ing of infants so that mother
in the fields.
Unfortunately these spe
the demographic events th
accompanied the Neolitbi
cannot be adequately test
evidence. Until relatively
the only available indicator!
rates were tombstone insc
ties, the cul-
-e increased
weight and
arlier wean-
s could work
t may have
revolution
d by direct
of mortality
riptions and
CPYRGHT
enced brief pei0g1#31f'~ion#~ease~f/(seadfrmp$te4194A000100500001-0
 CPYRGHT
rov d .or I ease 1.999/0g/02 IA-RDP -01194A000100500001-0
ns. Because the sample of deaths ob-
ed in these ways may not be repre-
ntative, it is not possible to reliably
timate for early periods such statistics
they average duration of life.
he accelerated growth in the world
population that began in the 18th
ntury is more readily understood if the
eas classified by the UN as "more de-
loped" and "less developed" are con-
dered separately.
A general description, if not a full ex-
anation, of the changing rates of in-
ease in the more developed areas since
e 18th century is provided by what
mographers call the demographic
ansition. The changes in fertility and
ortality that constitute the dernoaraph-
transition are in general expected to
company a nation's progression from a
rgely rural, agrarian and at least part-
illiterate society to a primarily urban,
dustrial and literate one. Virtually all
e populations classified by the UN as
ore developed have undergone demo-
aphic changes of this kind, although
timing and extent of the changes
?v considerably.
The demographic experience common
all the more developed countries in-
udes a major reduction in both fertility
d mortality at some time during the
st 200 years. In the 18th century the
an 35 years, and in many of the na-
ns that are now counted among the
re developed it must have been much
ss. Today, almost without exception,
e average life expectancy in these na-
ps is , 0 years or more. Two hundred
ars ago the number of. births per worri-
ranged from more than 7.5 in some
the-now inor?e developed areas, such
the American colonies and probably
ssia, to no more. than 4.5 in Sweden
d probably in England and Wales. In
73 only Ireland among the more de-
loped countries.had a fertility rate that
uld produce more. than three children
r woman, and in most?of the wealthier
tions total fertility was below 2,5.
us virtually all the more developed
lions have, during the past two cen-
ies, doubled the average life expect-
cv and halved the total fertility rate.
If the decline in fertility and mortality
d been simultaneous, the growth in the
pulation of the developed countries
-we 1750 might have been modest. In-
Nvise have produced a recurrence of hip h
mortality rates.
Whatever the cause of the initial d
cline in the death rate, there, is no dos t
that subsequent improvements in sa.
Cation, public health and medicine rna e
possible further reductions during ti e
19th century; indeed, the process CO M-
tinues. today. It is equally clear that tl e
reduction in mortality was dependent n
the increased availability of food a d
other material resources. This rise in h --
ing standards was in turn brought abo t.
by the extension of cultivation, par-tic -
larly in the Western Hemisphere, by i -
creased productivity in both agricultu e
and industry
and by the development of
efficient trade and transportation.
The decline in the birth rate that eve -
tually followed the decline in the dea
rate in the more developed countri s
was, with the exception of late-19th-ce -
tury Ireland, almost entirely a decline
the fertility of married couples and'c
be attributed 'directly to the practice f
contraception and abortion. The red -
tion in fertility was not a result of the i -
vention of new contraceptive techniqu s,
however. Among selected Americ
married before 1910, English coupl. s
interviewed in the 1930's and coupl s
surveyed in France and several caste
European nations after World War
the principal method of birth contr 1
was coitus interruptus, a technique th t
had always been available. The bi-
rate declined because the perceiv
benefits and liabilities of having mo e
children had changed, and perhaps al
because the couples' view of the pr -
priety of preventing births had bee a
modified.
Reduced fertility can be consider
one of the consequences of the chars -
teristics by which the mote develope
countries are defined. In an urban, i.
dustrial society the family is no long
the main locus of economic activity, no
are children the expected means of su
port in old age. In an agrarian, preindus
trial society, on the other hand, the fan
ily is a basic economic unit and sons ar,
a form of social security. Moreover, i
the less developed countries the costs o
raising and educating a child are mini
mal; indeed, a child may contribute t
the welfare of the family from an earl
ace. In the industrial society child labo
is prohibited, education is compulsor
and it often extends through adoles
cence. These conditions conspire to dis
here the birth rate as well as the death respite, and improved conditions early courage couples in the more develope
much less than that of most other Euro-
pean nations. The combined population
of the developed countries experienced.
extraordinary growth after 1750, how-
ever, a growth that accelerated until
early in the 20th century. The reason
for the increase in numbers is that the.
decline in mortality has in almost all
cases preceded the decline in fertility,
often by many years [see illustration on.
opposite Pagel.
The decline in fertility in the U.S.,
as in France, began early; it appears to
have been under way by the beginning
of the 19th century. Because of early
marriage, however, fertility in the U.S.
had been veryhigh, so that the excess of
births over deaths was still quite large.
In most- of the other more developed
countries the birth rate did not begin to
fall until late in the 19th century or ear-
ly in the 20th.
Another universal feature of the tran-
sition is a change in the stability of the
vital rates. In the premodern era the high
birth rate was relatively constant, but the
death rate fluctuated from year to year,
reflecting the effects of epidemics and
variations in the food supply. In those
countries that have completed the de-
mographic transition this pattern is re
versed: the death rate remains constant
'but fertility varies considerably.
j`he causes of the event that began the
demographic transition-the decline
in mortality in the late 18th century-are
a. matter of controversy to social and
medical historians. According to one
school of thought, until the middle of the
19th century medical innovations in En-
gland could not account for the reduc=
tion of the English death rate; the prin-
cipal factor proposed instead is an im-
provement in the average diet. Others
argue that protection from smallpox
through inoculation with cowpox serum,
a procedure introduced late in the 18th
century, was sufficient to markedly re-
duce the death rate. They propose that
the further decline in mortality in the
early 19th. century may have been
brought about by improvements in per-
sonal hygiene.
A third hypothesis is that before the
18th century fortuitous periods of low
mortality were not exceptional, but that
they were followed by periods of very
severe mortality caused by major epi-
demics. According to this view, the late
18th century was a normal period of
JA to began t decline bef r the d o n en a countries from having large families
ase 94AO~1Q0~i9 Qa1i h
 CPYRGHT
cieties soda nor e1ea rm ^
bearing tend to be p etuate t e, t e average uration of l' a in 1 9 r b li m e rate that
the less developed areas has risen from has 'been the norm for mot of man's
u the less developed countries the esti- 32 to 50 years during the past three dec- history. Without doubt th' period of
mated rate of population growth was ades, an increase of 56 percent. During growth will be a transitory episode in
virtually zero until about 200 years ago, the same period the birth rate is esti- the history of the popula ion. If the
when a moderate rate of increase, about mated to have declined by no more than present rate were to be mai tained, the
four per 1,000, was apparently induced 7 to 8 percent. The actual fall in fertility- population would double ap roximately.
by a reduction in mortality [see illustra- is in fact even less, by about 4 percent, every 35 years, it would be ultiplied by
tion on page 47]. The cause of this re- since demographic changes have re- 1,000 every 350 years and y a million
duced death rate is uncertain. Durand duced the proportion of women in the every 700 years. The cons quences of
has suggested that the interchange of childbearing years. (Although the fertil- sustained growth at this pac are clearly
staple foods between regions that had ity of the less developed countries as a impossible: in less than 7 00 years there
previously been isolated might have con- group remains very high, there are some would be one person for a ery square
tributed to population growth in Asia countries where the birth rate has fallen foot on the surface of the a rth; in less
and in Europe as well. In particular the significantly-by from 25 to 50 percent- than 1,200 years the hums population
introduction of the potato into Europe and very rapidly. They include Hong would outweigh the earth; in less than
and of maize and the sweet potato into Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, 6,000 years the mass of hu anity would
China have been cited as possible con- West Malaysia, Barbados, Chile, Cuba, form a sphere expanding at he speed of
tributing factors. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Puerto light. Considering more re listic limits
Since the aggregate population of the Rico and Mauritius. According to re- for the future, if the present population
less developed countries includes many ports from travelers, there has also been is not multiplied by a factor (greater than
large areas that have not been reliably a decline in fertility in China, particu- 500 and thus does not exceed two tril-
enumerated, adescription of the histori- larly in the cities.) lion, and if it does not fall glow the es-
cal course of population growth in these timated population of prea~ icultural so-
countries is subject to much uncertainty. the present rapid growth in the world ciety, then the rate of inc ease or de-
A slight reduction in the average rate of population is a result of a high rate crease during the next 10,00 years must
increase in the latter half of the 19th of increase in the less developed areas fall as close to zero as it w s during the
century, for example, can be attributed and a moderate rate in the rest of the past 10,000 years [.see iIlustr tions on op-
entirely to an estimated zero rate of world. According to projections pre- posite page].
toagrowth
growth ir~ China, and that estimate is pared by the UIv, more than 90 percent Arithmetic makes a retu
efore many
based on;! uncertain data. There is no of the increase in population to be antici- rate near zero inevitable
at is uncer-
doubt; however, that in the poorer na- .pated by 2000 will be contributed by the generations have passed. W
te of b owth
tions rapid growth began in the 1920's, less developed nations, even though a tain is not that the future r
~v large the
1930's and 1940's, and that since World large reduction in fertility in these coun- will be about zero but h
d what com-
\Var II the population increase has ac- tries is expected in the next 25 years. The future population will be a
ortality- sill
celerated dramatically. future course of the world's population bination of fertility and n
range from
The enormous recent growth of the depends largely on demographic trends sustain it. The possibilities
per woman
populations of the less developed nations in these countries. more than eight children
erage of 15
can be interpreted in terms of the demo- The events of the demographic transt-. and a life that lasts an a
two children
graphic transition, but some parts of the Lion provide no sure way of calculating years, to slightly more than
at surpasses
process have been more rapid and more when or how quickly fertility will de- per woman and a life span t
extreme than they were in the industrial cline in the less developed nations. The 75 years.
nations; moreover, the transition is not experience of the industrial world is not
yet complete, and its future course can- a satisfactory basis for prediction. The .
not be predicted. Mortality has dropped history of the WW'estern population.during
precipitously, but fertility has so far re- the past 200 years su~ests that vital
mained unchanged or declined only rates normally fall as a concomitant of
moderately. In the combined popula- . modernization, but it provides no check-
tions of the less developed countries the list of advances in literacy, mortality re-
number-of births per woman is'about 5.5, duction and urbanization that would
and the average duration of life is more enable one to estimate when fertility will
than 50 years, yielding an annual growth fall. In the more developed world there
rate of about 23 per 1,000. Since World are instances of large reductions in fer-
War 11 mortality in the less developed tility in populations that were still rural,
countries has fallen much more quickly mostly illiterate and still subject to mod- ,
than it did in 19th-century Europe, erately high mortality, as in the Garonne
largely because modern technology, and valley in southwestern' France before
particularly medical technology, can be 1S50. In other instances fertility did not
i
imported more rapidly today than it decline until after education was almost
could be discovered and developed 100 universal, the population was mostly ur-
years ago..Insecticides, antibiotics and ban and agriculture had become the oc-
public health measures that were un- cupation of a small minority, as in En-
known.during the European demograph- . gland and Wales.
is transition ai ~gyffrb~Aelease. ~~; ~, ? ~`~66194A000100500001-0
~Tre-irssa~~ elex~e ~..- ~?~?~~?~~~ r~ ~ ~1
 App-roved For Releas ~ ~ 9/? ~ 0100500001-0
_ ~ ~ . ~~~
'C'hese~v~u.lcctions, a. little nzor?e tllccn cc felt/?tIc of the liccc/~tc71 s~ecie,s,
71uc~~? be cc~ell or7 flag c-~~cc4y~ tv Ivn~'-terrra I~ICn7er-icul str.Ibilit3~. This st(cte
of affairs (c~J1~eur?s to ItcLVe Ueel1 rLCh7eVeCl 1(1rb_el}~ b~~ Pe/-sv/IC/l c17vlce
b}- Charles F. 11'cstofl'
~. CPYRGHT
ne result of man's social evolution
has been the rise of a group of
populations living in countries
ommonly described as developed. The
apulations of these countries enjoy bet-
er health, longer life, better education,
eider occupational opportunities and a
rester variety of amenities than the
pulations of less fortunate lands. If
t is true that a thud or a fourth of the
uman race still go to bed hungry ee-
ry night, it is also tnte that a large frae-
'on of a billion people now have access
o a kind of life that hvo centuries ago
vas known to oaly a privileged few.
Understandably the inhabitants of
derdeveloped lands look to the day
hen their own country will cross the
maginary and elusive line that separates
e haves from the have-nots. In 19 i 4,
ensured in terms of the steadily depre-
iating U.S. dollar, that line might be
epresented by an annual per capita in-
ome of something like 5 i 50. Compa-
ablefigures for an inhabitant of the
.S. or Sweden are behveen $4,000 and
5,G00.
If the' line separating the haves and
he have-nots is elusive; it is sharply
yawn in demographic terTrts. In devel-
ped countries the average life espect-
ncy at birth has climbed to more than
t 0 years compared. with about 50 years
'n the underdeveloped countries. ~iitcli
of the difference is attributable to high
infant mortalih?: anywhere from 50 to
more than 250 deaths per 1,000 births in
underdeveloped regions as against fewer
than ?5 deaths per 1,000 in most devel-
oped countries.
The demographic index that probably
has the greatest significance for mankind
in the long run is the rate of population
growth. It too shows a sharp line of de-
marcation behveen the underdeveloped
and the developed regions of the world.
The former have high population growth
rates (averaging ~.5 percent per year).
whereas the latter have rates that not
only are low (less than 1 percent) but
also. are still falling. In fact, among 30-
odd countries that can reasonably be
described as developed, the fertility rate
is at, near or below the replacement level
in the 20 that have SO percent of the
world's total developed population. If
these low fertility rates continue for
two generations; population growth will
.cease and the developed world will reach
zero population growth, .the culmination
of a historical process in which birth
rates slowly fall to the low mabititudes of
the deafer rates achieved some genera-
tions earlier. T?he balancing of-these vital
rates at very low levels can be viewed as
the end of a major demographic transi-
tion, aprocess involving the entire eco-
nomic development and accompam-ing
transformation of social instihttions tlta
can be called for Kant of a better tern
modernization.
~efore one predicts too confidenth
that the end of the demograpiti
transition is in sight, however, one mus
recall that the same was predicted one
before, back in the I930's when th
rates of population growth in the Indus
trialized Countries of the world ha
reached all-time lows. That the next gzn
oration of parents did not exactly follo~
the script of the demographers is nor al
too clear and .has proved a continuitr?
source of embarrassment to the experts..
Fratn one point of view the fact tha
the demographic transition appears to b
entering its terminal stages a generatio
later than vas predicted could be re
garded as uo more than a slight interru
Lion in a long historical process. On th
other hand, the "baby boom" that oc
tarred in many of the developed coon
trees during the late' 1940's and subse
quent nears has already added mor
than 10 percent to .the populations o
those countries: nearly 100 million mor
people who are no~v themsel~ es reachin
the age of parenthood and tivho consti
tote an enormous potential for a sc'con
babe boom. At the beginning of ~VorI
~\'ar II the combined population of th
then developed world-thc U.S., Europ
(including all the U.S.S.R.), Canada
Australia and i~e~v "I_ealand-stood. a
about 720 million. If the expectations o
derriographers had materialized, th
i
d
h
d
"
"
te page,
uce
e pppo;
a detail. of which is repro
on t
LE DIOULIti DE LA GALETTE,
was painted by Pierre _luguste Renoir in i.?,"i6. It suggests, among ninny other things. the Population of these Countries Coda
~cbod life of the healthy, well?fed inhabitants of a developed .country. The ,Moulin de Ia w.ould bc. around,S=15 miiliou Instead n
Galette, Fa free tran,lation might be the Ca!:c DIiII) was an opcn?air e;tablisltment where the Currently estimated 5)-l0 million.
Renoir went on Sunday. He dieliked w-orkinp with professional models, and so he recruited One can disagree about the List o
ruodal3 here. Tti.o of them ~+}w ticere sisters ap ear in the right t'oreground. TI:e other prim- cotuttries that can be described as cle
cipnl fiap~r~Eiail~Ee,?loFt~q~~k'Qa+~8d1 ~?~/A.41~~hc ~#A;~~F~t7?ta'b~'h9~AA?Qs~O.0~a00~AQ~l~ses of this amcl
 CPYRGHT
I aye selected 31 nation, representing ~ "If current tirends continue...," is pat- of the downward movement for live
~r~ ua increase
ost of .the cony t
b lancin at the variations over a pe- to er t i v t? :.t i crease ui
v loped countries of the. avorld, inclucl- Y g g England ~.t,td ~1`ales from ~.2 irtlts per
i. ~; all the nations of Eastern Europe,
trs Portugal, Spain, Greece, Japan and
I rael. I have omitted Venezuela and
. r,~*,entina, ~vh%ch hay e per capita grass
tional products substantially higher
t an the poorest of the I'~~uropean co~n-
'es (Portugal and Yugoslavia), because
eir vital statistics are incomplete. The
it-rich countries of the :Middle East are
so excluded because they still lack
ost of the characteristics of industri-
lized nations in spite of their high per
apita gross national products. Hong
'one, which has a population of about
.5 million, could probably also qualify
oday as a developed country but its rec-
rds too are inadequate:
It is appropriate to concentrate on fer-
' 'ty and ignore mortality> because death
ales are uniformly low in the developed
otmtries; thus population growth in the
a~`regate depends mainly on the future
nurse of fertility. I have selected the
"total fertility rate" from among various
alternative measures because it suns-
- marines several demographic dimensions
simultaneously in a single number that
has familiar properties: the average num-
ber of births per woman. More precisel;-,
the total fertility rate can be regarded as
the average number of births women
would have as they pass through to the
end of their childbearing years provided
that they continue to reproduce at_ the
obsen-ed rates for women at different
ages as determined for any given year.
If the total fertility. rate persisted at ap-
proximately-2.1 births per woman, what
demographers refer to as replacement
fertilit}', then each generation would
merely replace the next and eventually
(after the effects of the disproportion-
ately larger numbers of young people
due to past growth dirriinislted} bir,h
rates ~voulcl equal death rates ar,d the
population would stop gro