'SOMALIA COMES OUT OF ITS SHELL, ' BY JAMES MACMANUS. THE GUARDIAN. 19 MARCH 1975.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100410001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 10, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

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CPYRGHT
Somalia
comes out of its shell
JAMES MACMANUS reports from Mogadighu on t-malia's debt to Moscow
SOMALIA'S military coup of
October 21, 1969, ended nine
i ears of democratic but chaotic
post-independence Government
and introduced a period oi4
r.orous political and economic
change that few outsiders were
encouraged to examine.
Five years later, President
Siyad BaTre's military Govern-
ment is beginning to spread its
11 logs amid quickening interest
ui the country's international
loyalties, territorial ambitions,
and internal politics.
There are two main reasons
~chv Somalia is now ctiming out
or its shell, as an observer in
the capital Mogadishu put it.
rstly, drought has decimated
the by?stock herds that made
lip the backbone of the
economy and brought famine to
around one million people -
one-fifth of the population if
the forecast returns from the
recently completed census
prove correct. This has meant
the need for continuing large
scale international aid.
Secondly, Somalis is sensitive
to charges of Soviet satellisa-
t.ion that have followed the
h,avy inflow of Russian arms
and advisers. Throu.,h the
~npreme Revolutionary Cmtn-
r ?l. an all-military body, Presi-
ri'nt Siyad has pursuer] a Has-
sic brand of Moscow Marxism
since he came to power. Notices
in every Government office pro-
claim that "scientific socia-
lism" is Somalia's chosen
answer to its poverty.
This, combined with a long-
., indink Russian commitment
to create a modern Somali army,
has brought a large Soviet con-
tingent to the Horn of Africa.
Although an Islamic country,
Somalia is a bridge between ,
black and Arab Africa and the
Mogadishu Government is
understandably anxious to
demonstrate to both that it
owes Moscow thanks, but not
thraldom.
At it happens, the largest aid
project is a Chinese roadbuild-
ing programme which will run
along the inverted arrow-
shaped border with Ethiopia.
But no one, not even the
Dergue in Addis Ababa, is
drawing cold war corollaries
from that scheme.
Russia's military options in
Somalia will in any case he
limited by the country's acute
sensitivity to the appearance,
let alone the substance, of out.
side control. ThP Russian
Embassy in Mogadishu is well
aware that its 1,500 personnel
are not particularly popular
with the Somali people. When
a Moscow football tAam visited
Somalia last year the Embassy
directed its residents to attend,
by choice, only one of the three
matches to be played. The fear
was that if the entire Russian
community turn ed up at every
match the effect might be a
little overwhelming for the
home fans rather than the
home team.
Russians are also ordered off
the streets of Mogadishu during
periods of tension to avoid
popular abuse or physical
attack. The fear is well
founded : during the last Rus-
sian " vanishing act " in
January an Italian was mis-
taken for a Russian and
stabbed in Mogadishu.
The occasion was the execu-
tion of ten Moslem religious
eld,,rs who saw the pagan hand
of Marxism in a Government
announcement that equal
inheritance rights were to be
given to Somali women, Presi-
dent Siyad Barre announced
the order in a speech on
January 10 which attempted to
show that the new women's
rights did not violate the tradi-
tionally subservient rate
reserved for women under the
Islamic faith.
Tw?enty.three of Mogadishu's
conservative sheikhs, or
preachers, held that the order
transgressed the spirit, if not
the letter, of the Koran, and
were foolish enough to say so
during prayers in the city's
mosques. The Government's
swift response was not helped
by the midair collision of two
Russian M.iG jets ,ever the capi-
tal on the morning of the exe-
cutions, January 23. A number
of People saw divine retribu-
tion in the resulting deaths (at
least 10) and destruction of
homes as one of the jets fell
into the city.
The executions revealed the
efficiency of Somalia's security
apparatus (the sheikhs were
arrested within hours of their
mosque statements), as well as
the Government's ruthless
behaviour towards dissident,
and ,the u?ncomffortable fact that
there is some opposition,
although muted, to the politics
of "scientific socialism.'
The executions shook Somalis
and Arab diplomats in Mogadi-
shu. In some quarters the roll-
ing out of the firing squads was
taken as a sign that the Presi-
dent is still unsure of his ;posit
Lion, The speed and efficiency
with which the military has
consolidated its revolution,
however, points to a different
conclusion : that the Major-
Generai's total control of his
Country's power structure led
to a needless demonstration of
authority.
Internally the Government is
driving hard toward political
goals with an enthusiasm that
if anything has been deepened
by Somalia's economic plight.
A seven-month " crash pro-
gramme " of student help in
rural areas sent 35,000 Somali
teenagers into remote areas to
teach the new Somali script
replacing a purely oral tradi-
tion, to the nomads who make
up SO per cent of the country's
population.
The sucdess of the exercise
is not just that the wandering
pasturalists appear to have
grasped M least the essentials
of the written Latin alphabet,
but that a bridge has been
thrown between urban socia-
lism and a backward and frag-
mented rural population. This
opens the way for the next step
in the Supreme Council's pro-
gramme '- the creation of a
nationwide political party to
disseminate the principles of
" scientific socialism."
The delay in fornLing a party,
which elsewhere in Africa has
seen as the first step in
e application of socialism, is
largely due to the President's
personal belief that his coun-
try nen were sickened by what
he judged to be the political
feuding and corruption that
attended the old multi-party
system.
There seems little doubt that
the Supreme Revolutionary
Council is going for a broad
based Popular party rather than
a -centralised elitist structure
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CPYRGHT
on the CongoBrazzaville lines.
The former invariably leads to,
and depends on, the establish-
ment of a personality cult
around an identified leader.
Sudh a process is well under
way in Somalia. It is hard to
escape Sayid Barre's avuncular
gaze from posters and pictures
in liagadiabu. The dangers in
this approach are that Somalia
has evolved a remarkably egal-i-
taria.n society whose lack of
tribal hierarchies, although not
od tribalism, has been imposed
by the need to survive together
in a harsh and unproductive
terrain.
The push for an overall poli-
tical structure has already led
to a rash of orientation centres
throughout the country down to
village level. At open air even-
ing sessions, traditional music
is interspersed with lectures
and speeches on agricultural
development, health pro-
grammes, and basic Marxism.
Drought as much as revolu-
tionary ideology has dampened
the old tribal divides between
the two main Somali groups -
the sedentary Sab agriculturists
in the South, and the wander-
ing nomadic Saanaale pastltra-
lists in the rest of the country.
Although both have a common
Somali heritage, and only
slightly different versions of
the spoken language, their
differences found political
expression in rival parties after
independence. Feuding between
the groups, and between a host
of lesser clans proved a con-
siderable obstacle to notional
unity at the ,time of -the merger
between the British and Italian
sectors of the country.
Tribalism is a taboo word in
the new Socialist Republic, but
it remains a problem as is
shown by the carefully
balanced clan representation on
the Supreme RevolutionA'y
Council. It is an open question
whether the President's increa.
singly personalised leadership
and doctrinaire politics will
speed the process of national
integration.
questioned is the use to which
the President will put his mili-
tary machine in terms of Soma-
lia's well documented claim on
the old northern frontier
district of Kenya, the Ogaden
triangle in Ethiopia, and
French Somaliland centred
on the port of Djibouti.
While the expensively
equipped armed forces might
he a cautionary reminder to her
neighbours of Somalia's new
found military strength. the
Government has repeatedly
made clear that it will pursue
territorial claims through diplo-
matic channels.
Even if the council were col-
lectively seized of the desire
to take the disputed territories
by force, the Russians have a
logistic stranglehold on the
army. Counting Somalia's new
tanks and planes is a fruitless
exercise unless one is prepared
to speculate on how many could
be effectively deployed for any
length of time.
Due to the hot and inhospita-
ble terrain and around the
Horn of Africa, any armoured
military adventure would
require the kind of back-up
support which only the Rus-
sians could provide. MoscOw
has maintained a strict neutra-
lity on Mogadishu's claims to
a " greater Somalia." The
stance has been hardened by
the removal of the Ethiopian
Emperor and the arrival in
Addis Ababa of a Socialist ili-
tary regime.
The Somalis have high be
that the ruling military cou cis,
in Ethiopia will soon see s nse
and negotiate about the fu ire
of the Ogaden which is a1 ost
exclusively populated by So all
nomads. Leaving aside the er-
guye's violent response to ri-
trean nationalism, this is sh-
ful thinking. Traditional a ity
between Somalia and Eft )pia
cuts a good deal deeper an
the present very approx ate
alignment of the two counties'
Socialist philosophies. ! No
amount of discussion will
change the fact that the Ethio-
pian Government does not want
the Somalis loser to the cen-
tral Ethiopian plateau than can
be helped.
This attitude does not m
to have dawned on Mogadishu
yet but when it does the
response is unlikely to be any-
thing else but dipla atic.
Somalia simply has too any
economic problems even to con-
template armed force against
her neighbours. The drought
has drawn the Government into
a resettlement programme for
the stricken nomads that pro-
mises to be enormously expen-
sive : that is another reason
why the President is looking
for help abroad while he
deepens the foundations for his
Socialist State at home.
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.CPYRGHT
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 7, 1975
Soviet Reported Stock-Piling Missiles'
At Af ri can B ase'f or Indian ocean Ships
By DREW MIDDLETON s e t8RAEL
,. _ IRAs
C erase JORC .N!
sav the Soviet Union is stock calm
sites in East Africa in a iarg f VGY?1
newly built naval-support in P
stallation at Berbera, Somali
These so-called cruise mi
siies a :e belicvcd intended fo
the surface ships and subm
raines of the Soviet squadro
deployed in the Indian Ocea
T;:e squadron, whose strengt
is said to vary from 10 to I
(ships, is active in the Arabia
Sea, the section of the India
Ocean east of the entrance t
the Persian Gulf.
Now that the Soviet squa
ron is assured of rapid resu
plying of its cruise missiles,
militery analyst said, the Ru -
sians and their Arab friend
from Iraq to southeast Yeme
could in an international crisi
control the exits from the Pe
sign Gulf and from the Sue
(Canal-Red Sea supply line t
The missiles are believed t
(range from the SSC-1, with
(range of 200 miles, to the S -
Inn mile
!wT_~ ,i41i range cii
The death of King Faisal. ti
(strongly anti-Communist rul
of Saudi Arabia, the steady flo
of sophisticated Soviet wea -
ons to Iraq, Syria and rim, t
CPYR-GHT
ronautics experts, on the way
t the United States to evaluate
e F-15 for combat in the Mid-
e East, was turned back and,
gotiations on the sale of the
f ghter have been suspended, i
Ford Administration has
so portedly discouraged a
isit t Washington by Shimon
Gres, Israel's Minister of De-
r rase, who was expected to.
ush or early delivery of the
ance and for progress toward
dea for a high-performance
ghte aircraft.
Cri cs of the situation with-
i th Defense Department ar-
ue hat while the Soviet.
nio continues to ship ad-
anc weapons systems to
rab ountries and to build up
own military presence in
he a ea, the United States de-
fies r:ns to Israel.
Th say that this policy, if
onti ued, would place both
srae and the United States in
n a' '(:ward military situation
n th event of another Arab-
srae war. As it is. the critics
aid, the accumulation of So-
-et nd Arab military strength
n t area offers the Soviet
nio strategic options that
oul be serious challenges to
i oth Israel and the United
i Late in another war.
erican planners say that
hey assume that there would
C!c'?ade of Israel and R
ew oil embargo in another
tar.
A senior official put the
ues on: What would happen
15 t e Iranians defied the
bloc ade and attempted to ship
il* t Israel, and the Soviet
squa ron closed the Persian
ulf route to Iranian or other
tank s intended for Israel?
Russians, the official
insis ed, have the military
stre th "on the spot" to en-
forc a blockade.
M itary planners say they
are also concerned over the
tutu policy of Iraq toward
her neighbors on the Gulf.
The: assert that, with.Soviet
Tin. Now York limn/April 7, 07,
Sovi t missiles at Berbera (1) for ships In nearby sea
(2) eportedly worried some U.S. officials. They also
cite possible plans of Iraq (3) in Persian Gulf area.
auu Uw ua .. :......... ... .-n_-._
tions between Israel and Egy, t surface missile, whose sale aol
has led some officials to gal- Israel has been approved by
of a prewar, rather than a pos Congr ss. The Lance can be
war. situation. I armed with either a conven-
`l these officials say that a -I tional r a nuclear warhead and
thriugh there may be diplomat ? has a range of well over 130
arms ,,h_p:nents to Israel, a Isra 1 regards the Lance pri-
Imilitary fact is that Israel marll as a combat-support
Lhe only Middle Eas err. coup wea but its deployment by
with fitness p'werful enou the Is eli armed forces would,
to hair:: ce Arab strength a d to so a extent, balance the
deter the Russians. deplo ent of the longer-range
Military sources said th t! SCUD missiles that the Soviet
P.merican weapons now bei gi Union is furnishing to Egypt
tivith} : `d from Israel, evident yl,and S ria and, in Syria's case,
to infl,_ence her Government oa`mann by Russian crews.
1l resume negotiations with Egy t, Altl ugh Israeli teams have
are those most necessary to a~been eceiving training in the
snit t~tr -'bzlsnce, use o the Lance at American
' Ore is the Lance surface-t -iibases, actual deliveries of the
weapon are being delayed. Pen
tagon sources said the delay
was part of Secretary of State
Kissinger's attempt to force Is-
rael to reconsider her negotiat-
ing position with Egypt.
cquisition of the Lance
The acquisition,
is said to be more immediately
;important to Israel than the
,purchase of the Air Force's F-
15 Eagle an ultramodern fighter
designed to win quick air su-
Iperiority over a battlefield.
The Israelis believe they need
the F-15 or a comparably ad-
Ivar..ced fighter to counter the[ advantage of any new crisis
Soviet Mig-2.1 fighters now sup- to ove south against Kuwait
plied to Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. These two
The Phantom F-4, a proved but rich oil-producing countries, it
elderly fighter, is the present was noted, have maintained
Israeli mainstay. cios economic tics with the
I A tears of Israeli pilots and, Unit d States and, while anti-
cal" Arab nations.
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