COST AND REQUIREMENTS FOR PRODUCTION OF GYROSCOPES FOR A GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A001100110006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 80
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 12, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

TG P D C Cr" D CT
CHA -TS No. 71001
Copy No. 32
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
COST AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF GYROSCOPES
FOR A GUIDED. MISSILE PROGRAM
IN THE USSR
CIA/RR PR-147
12 September 1956
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
DOCUMENT NO. _ /
NO CHANGE IN CI. ASS.
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
COST AND REaUIRE'IENTS FOR PRODUCTION OF GYROSCOPES
FOR A GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM IN THE USSR
CIA/RR PR-147
(ORR Project 3+.596)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report presents a first approximation of the cost, in terms
of dollars, manpower, and floorspace, of the production of gyroscopes
required to support a given (assumed) Soviet program for production
of guided missiles.
The need for a study of precision mechanisms as they apply to
production of guided missiles became apparent when the ORR Contribu-
tion to NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the
Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954, TOP SECRET, was undertaken. One
of the conclusions in that project was that the USSR might not have
sufficient resources, especially in the fields of precision mechanisms
and electronic equipment, to support the program for production of
guided missiles that appeared to be indicated.
Although an all-source study of gyroscopes was made, no direct
evidence could be found that would permit the calculation of estimates
based on Soviet data. As it does in NIE 11-6-54, the methodology for
this report therefore centers primarily around US analogy.
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TO RET
CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 2
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Use of Gyroscopes in Guided Missiles . . . . . . . . .
C. Major Differences Between Gyroscopes Used for Guided
Missiles and Others . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? - ' 6
D. Classification of Gyroscopes . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Technical Classification and Definition o-' Terms 6
2. Other Possible Classification Systems . . . . . . . 7
3. Classification System Used in This Report . . . . . 9
II. US Factors of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
1. Concept Used in This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. Cost of Manufacture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Requirements for Direct Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C. Training and Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 15
1. Skills Required . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ? . 15
2. Background or Previous Training . . . . . . . . . ? i8
3. Training Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 19
D. Requirements for Floorspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
E. Air-Conditioned and Dust-Controlled Area . . . . . . . 21
F. Machinery and Raw Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
G. Time Required to Begin Production of New Models or to 23
Expand Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. To Produce First Unit, Using Production Tooling . . 23
2. To Build Up to Scheduled Monthly Production . . . 24
3. To Double Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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III. Soviet Factors of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
IV.
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B. Number of Gyroscopes Required . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Cost and Requirements for Single-Shift Production . . . 31
1. Cost of Manufacture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2. Direct Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3. Indirect labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34+
4. Floorspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
D. Cost and Requirements for Three-Shift Production . . 35
E. Introduction of Lead Time and Smoothing of Production . 35
F. Maximum Annual Costand Requirements . . . . . . 38
G. Effect of Stable Platform, or Stable Element, Costs . ? 39
H. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . 39
T G
Assumption That the Productivity of Labor Is Com-
parable . . . 43
Lead Time in the Soviet Aircraft Industry . . . . . . . 44
Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Assumption That the Product Is Comparable . . . . . . . 41
Assumption That the Methods of Production Are Com-
parable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . )+2
yroscopes for the Soviet Aircraft Industry . . . . . . 40
Qualifications on the Application of US Factors of Production
to the USSR . . . . , . , . , . . 4o
. . . . . . . . . . .
Appendixes
Appendix A. Comparability of Soviet and US Aircraft Instru-
ments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Appendix D. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
vi -
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Page
1. Typical US Cost of Manufacture per Unit for Various Classes
of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms at Various Rates 14
of Production, 1955 ? ? ? ? ? ? ' . . ' ' ' . ' ' ' ' ' .
2. Typical US Requirements for Direct Labor per Unit for Various
Classes of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms at Various 16
Rates of Production, 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Number of Gyroscopes Required for the Assumed Soviet Guided 29
Missile Program, by Class, 1954-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . '
4. Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor and
Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed Soviet
Guided Missile Program (Based. on Assumption 1), 1954-67 . . 32
5. Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor and
Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed Soviet
Guided Missile Program (Based on Assumption 2), 1954-67 . . 33
6. Smoothed Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor
and Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed
Soviet Guided Missile Program (Based on Assumption 1), 36
1953-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Smoothed Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor
and Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed
Soviet Guided Missile Program (Based on Assumption 2),
1953-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8. US Cost of Manufacture per Unit for Various Classes of Gyro-
scopes and for Stable Platforms at Various Rates of Produc-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. US Requirements for Direct Labor per Unit for Various Classes
of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms at Various Rates of
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . ' ' . ' ' ' 54
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10. Average Floorspace Required per Worker in Production of
;Gyroscopes in Four Typical US Companies, 1955 . . . . . . . -57
11. Soviet Requirements for Gyroscopes for Aircraft, by Class 62
Illustrations
Following Page
1. Orientation of Gyroscopes in Nike . . . . . 8
2. Gyroscope Section of Nike . . . . . . 8
. . . . . . . . . .
3. View of Stable Platform . . . . . . . . . . 8
i
4. Sectioned View of Single-Degree-of-Freedom Floated Gyro-
scope . . . . . . . ' . . . . . .......... 8
5. Simple Amount Gyroscope . . . . . . . 8
6. Simple Rate Gyroscope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. External and Exploded Views of Subminiature Precise Rate
gyroscope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Build-Up Time-for Production of US Gyroscopes . . . 24
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cIA/RR PR-147
(ORR Project 34.596)
COST AND REQUIREMENTS FOR PRODUCTION OF GYROSCOPES
FOR A GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM IN THE USSR*
Suimary
Production of gyroscopes, or gyroscopic systems,** required for a
guided missile program of the magnitude described in NIE 11-6-5)+ should
not place an undue burden upon the precision mechanisms industry of the
USSR. This conclusion has added significance because gyros account
for an important part of the cost of complex precision mechanisms in
guided missiles. It is not known, however, whether or not the gyro
industry of the USSR has expended the economic effort necessary to
meet the requirements of such a guided missile program.
Examination of simple aircraft instrument gyros and other Soviet
equipment has indicated that the USSR has been successful in simpli-
fying designs for production. The reduction of cost through the
simplification of design is offset by the lower productivity of labor
in Soviet industry. Reports by the US automation experts who recently
visited the USSR indicate that the USSR does have some modern, high-
quality machine tools and instruments. This equipment undoubtedly is
available for production of components such as gyros in high-priority
programs for guided missiles. No attempt has been made =~t this time,
however, to quantify the net effect of the differing factors affect-
ing production in the US and the USSR.
If the requirements for production of gyros for aircraft are added
to the requirements for production of gyros for guided missiles on a
single-shift basis, a conservative estimate of the range of the maximum
annual requirements for production of all gyros in the USSR would be
as follows: manufacturing cost, TTS $86.5 million*'* and $121.5 million;
total labor (including indirect), 12,500 and 18,500 persons; and floor-
space, 1 million and 1.5 million square feet. In most years the annual
requirements may be as much as 50 percent less than the higher figures
in these ranges.
* The estimates and con~"lusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 July 1956.
** Hereafter referred to as the gyro, or gyro system.
*** All dollar values are given in US dollars throughout this report.
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Approximately 25 to 35 percent of the workers needed for production
in the gyro industry will require more than 1 year of training. The
hypothetical Soviet program of production of -gyros for guided missiles,
therefore, should require in most years approximately 2,000 highly
skilled persons; and the total gyro program for guided missiles and
aircraft, less than 3,000 highly skilled persons.
The conclusions of this report are first approximations based on
US analogy. Becauseof lack of information, definitive conclusions
based on Soviet datacannot be drawn. The conclusions based on US
analogy, however, are believed to be valid, even though the magnitude
of the estimates may be somewhat in error.
I Introduction.
A. General.
As a first step in determining the requirements for pre-
cision mechanisms inthe Soviet guided missile program, it was de-
cided to study gyros. This decisionwas based on the following
considerations:
1. Gyrosare highly developed precision mechanisms that have
been troublesome in the US guided missile program.
2. Gyros account for a large part of the cost of the precision
mechanisms in guided missiles.
3. Gyros are more homogeneous than the general term preciic::
mechanisms and therefore make a more suitable classification for stud.
Within the US intelligence community there was a widespread ree-
oguition of the importance of gyros as applied to guided missiles, but
there was no readily available reference as to requirements by classes
orcost_of manufacture, either in terms of dollars or in termsof labor
and equipment. This report classifies gyros used in guided missiles
and discusses dollar costs, labor, floorspace, and similar factors in
production in terms of the gyro industry in the US.
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The numbers and classes of gyros required for the illustrative
Soviet guided missile program in NIE 11-6-54, with the major modifi-
cation suggested by NIE 11-12-55, are determined by the numbers and
classes used in similar US missiles. The cost, labor, and floorspace
necessary to fulfill. these requirements are determined by applying US
factors of production. Some of the assumptions implicit in applying
US data to Soviet production are critically examined on the basis of
what is known of Soviet production of similar, although simpler, items.
This report reaches conclusions as to the general magnitude of
the effort required to produce the gyros for a guided missile program.
B. Use of Gyroscopes in Guided Missiles.
The gyro, or gyro system, has a threefold application in
guided missiles. Probably the most common use is for attitude refer-
ence and stability in the autopilot system of the guided missile.
Second, gyros are used for fire-control purposes, such as radar or
infrared seeker stabilization. Third, certain guided missiles with
inertial or partially inertial systems of navigation require highly
precise gyros, or gyro systems, for purposes. of guidance.
It is theoretically possible to design guided missiles without
gyros. In German practice in World War II and in US practice, however,
at least 1 gyro and and usually 3 or more have been used. In fact,
the trend appears to be to increase the number of gyros used in US
guided missiles. For example, the Terrier -- a type of US guided
missile -- now uses two gyros, a roll free gyro and a roll rate gyro.
In order to obtain better performance -- that is, higher altitudes
and longer ranges -- a 1-gyro and 2-accelerometer system is being
considered. The Talos, Nike,* Sparrow I, Bomarc, and Falcon types of
guided missiles are all designed to use four gyros.
For inertial navigation, especially for the longer range guided
missiles, a stable platform,** or stable element, is generally used.
The stable platforms in the US frequently use three single-degree-of-
See Figures 1 and 2, following p. 8.
* See Figure 3, following p. 8.
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'freedom gyros.* The stable platform for the NAVAN system uses 6 gyros,
2on each axis.** -Present practice in the US indicatesan increasing
dependence upon gyros for navigational and stabilizing functions.
The class of gyro, the degree of precision, and other characteristics
required to perform a certain function in a guided missile may vary,
however, depending upon the design and the associated equipment
selected. For example, a single two-degree-of-freedom amount gyro***
mg be used to provide attitude information, or the same information
cld be obtained by the use of two single-degree-of-freedom gyros.
C. Major Differences Between Gyroscopes Used for Guided Mi,-silos
and Others.
There are no substantial differences between the gyros used for
certain types of guided missiles and those used elsewhere -- for
example, in aircraft. Guided missiles such as Petrel, Dove, D-40,
Dart, and -similar types, in which the gyro is used largely for stabil-
ization and in which the speed of flight of the guided missile is
rglatively low and the time of flight short, can and do use gyros that
-ate the same or similar to those used in aircraft. Similarly, certain
types of guided missiles such-as the Matador, Regulus, Snark, an-' siml-
lar glide or pilotless aircraft-type missiles may require certain gyros
* See Figure i+, following p. 8.
The purpose of two single-degree-of-freedom gyros on each axis is
to get greater accuracy with somewhat less precise gyres -- to be
accomplished by mounting a pair of gyros on each axis. One gyro from
e4ch NAVAN pair is used to stabilize the platform at any one time. The
control is periodically switched from one gyro of the pair to the other.
During the time that a gyro is not controlling the platform, it is
caged about its output axis, and the motor excitation is reversed to
bring the gyro up to speed in the reverse dire-ction. When the gyro is
up to speed in the reverse direction, control is returned to it, and
the second gyro undergoes the NAVAN reversal. The reversing of spin
is expected to reduce greatly drift of the stable platform. A report
on guidance systems states, "The NAVAN method of accurately control-
ling the orientation of a stabilized platform is based on the-fact that
t1e undesirable effects of constant or slowly changing bias torques
about the output axis of a gyro can be greatly reduced by periodi-
cally reversing the direction of gyro-rotation." / (For serially
numbered source references, see Appendix D.)
** See Figure 5, following p. 8.
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that have the same or similar characteristics as the gyros required
by modern aircraft. As the performance characteristics of aircraft
increase, the class of gyros required will change. Thus many of the
components of aircraft now being designed must be as good as or better
than the components used in many of the present-day guided missiles.
Despite the similarities discussed above, there are differences
between gyros for guided missiles and other classes of gyros. The most
important differences are as follows:
1. The considerably greater precision required in many gyros
for guided missiles, especially those used for inertial navigation.
2. The ability to withstand a wider range of environmental
factors, especially much higher vibrations, greater shocks or acceler-
ation, and higher temperatures.
3. The smaller size and lighter weight of gyros designed
primarily for guided missiles.
4. The high degree of reliability required on a one-time
In the early designs of many of the US guided missiles, gyros
developed for other applications were used insofar as possible. In
general, however, with the exception of some of the slower, shorter
range guided missiles, the results were not satisfactory, and new
classes of gyros were developed for guided missiles. In some cases
these new classes have been used for aircraft, even though the per-
formance of the new class of gyro exceeds requirements. A US indus-
trial handbook states in regard to one class of gyro:
"... It meets the technical requirements for
fire-control computing at an unusual saving in
cost while simultaneously its use for artificial
damping in aircraft autopilots is economically
justified though its performance is far better
than needed."
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Classification of Gyroscopes.*
1. Technical Classification and Definition of Terms.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
used in technical literature, is based on the freedom from rigid
re~traint of the gyro spin axis.** It can have a maximum of 2 degrees
of freedom, that is, only 2 angular coordinates are required to
sp~cify its orientation exactly. In the usual configuration of gyro
instruments, these 2 angles may be taken as the angular position-of
the 2 gimbals X supporting the gyro element. Thus a gyro supported
in2 gimbals would be a gyro with 2 degrees of freedom, even though
the gyro were subjected to some torques about either or both of the
gimbal axes. A gyro supported in only one gimbal, on the other hand,
would have the position of its momentum vector determined by only one
angular variable and would be called a single-degree-of-freedom gyro,
or :a rate gyro.** Amount gyros normally have 2 degrees of freedom,
and single-degree-of-freedom gyros, or rate-gyros, have 1 degree of
freedom. The amount gyro operates free of any restraint upon the
orientation of the gyro rotor***** other than small torques, whereas
the rate gyros are captive in that the gyro spin axis is forced to
This section draws heavily on the publications listed under
source 31. These publications may be consulted for a fuller discus-
sion of gyroscope theory and a further definition of terms.
See Figure 6, following p. 8.
The meanings of certain technical terms used in connection with
gyros are not matters of universal agreement. For example, one defi-
nition of degrees of freedom is: "A body has as many degrees of
angular freedom as there are orthogonal axes about which it may turn
relatively to the support. Unless it has 3 degrees of freedom (1
being about the spin axes) a gyro cannot be carried without distur-
bance in a craft subject to roll, pitch and yaw." / Under this defi-
nition of degrees of freedom, an amount gyro would have 3 degrees of
freedom and a rate gyro would have 2 degrees of freedom. This report
refers todegrees of-freedom in the sense of the freedom from rigid
restraint-of the gyro spin axis.
**-- A gimbal is a contrivance for permitting a body to incline
freely in any direction, or for suspending anything, such as a compass,
so that it will remain plumb, or level, when its support is tipped.
See Figure 5, following p. 8.
*X See Figure 5, following p. 8.
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move with the movement of the vehicle (guided missile or aircraft).
As their names imply, the amount gyro instruments measure the angu-
lar deviation of the vehicle from reference directions, whereas the
rate gyro instruments measure the rate of change of these angles.
Amount gyros are also called vertical gyros, directional gyros, or
free gyros.
A special class of single-degree-of-freedom gyro is the
so-called "rate integrating gyro." The rate integrating gyro is a
single-degree-of-freedom gyro in which precession* relative to the
frame is opposed by the viscous drag of the fluid in which the rotor
is floated. The total deviation of the gyro around one axis from a
datum line on the base is a measure of the total deviation of the base
around a perpendicular axis from a datum line in space. The rate inte-
grating gyro unit** is basically a device in which the gimbal angle
is restricted to small values because of interfering effects that
appear when the angular momentum vector tilts far enough with respect
to the case, or outer shell, to acquire an appreciable component along
the input axis.* This feature does not detract from using this class
of gyro on stable platforms as the stabilizing element. Single-degree-
of-freedom gyros, with or without the integrating feature, are normally
used on stable platforms in the US.
2. Other Possible Classification Systems.
Gyros may be classified in many other categories, de-
pending upon the purpose to be served. Among the possible criteria for
classification are the degree of precision of the instrument, the
function for which the gyro signals are desired, the size, the type
of power used to drive the rotor, and the character of the input or
output element in intimate association with the gyro element.
Precision is one of the most important characteristics in
classifying gyros used in guided missiles.* A classification based
on precision alone, however, is incomplete. The following character-
istics must be taken into account: sensitivity of readings; ruggedness,
or the ability to withstand shock of acceleration and vibration; weight
Sec
Figuro
6, following p.
8.
See
Figure
)a, following p.
8.
See
Figure
7, following p.
8.
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and size -- light and small enough to fit into the space available;
ability to operate satisfactorily in the ambient temperature range of
the particular application; rapidity of speed-up time, or the time re-
quired for the gyro to get up to operating speed after power is applied;
and availability of the amount and type of power required in the guided
missile.
If gyros are classified on the basisof precision, the as-
sumption must be made that these other characteristics of the gyro are
sufficient for the application desired. Although this assumption may
seem far-reaching, it is not entirely unrealistic. There is generally
a 1igh correlation between precision and sensitivity of readings. Few
prgducers will go to the effort and expense of manufacturing a highly
precise gyro without attempting to put sensitive pick-offs* on it. To
a eertain extent there is a correlation between precision and rugged-
ne4s. The higher precision gyros are frequently floated gyros.**
Because they are floated in a viscous fluid, they are able to with-
stand large shocks and vibrations. With the exception of air-to-air
guided missiles in which size and weight are at apremium, there is
considerable latitude as to weight and size of gyros. Other factors
being equal, however, the smaller, lighter gyro will be selected.
There is a tendency to provide heaters for many gyros and to provide
air-conditioning for certain of the guidance compartments. In fact,
the; temperature of floated rate integrating gyros must be controlled
within narrow limits. The tendency is, therefore, to use equipment
such as heaters and/or air conditioners to maintain temperature-s within
the, operating range rather than to build wider temperature operating
limits into the gyro itself. Speed-up time is important in defense-
type guided missiles, such as the Nike, Terrier, Bomarc, and others,
which must be on standby status. The problem of -speed-up time may be
solved by having an external source of standby power which can be
switched on during an alert status. The nonfloated gyros can be
brought up to operating speedquickly by using a compressed-air or
a powder charge as a motive force or by designing the electric motor
to ?perate when considerably overloaded. This characteristic of rapid
speed-up is of little importance in the offensive-type missiles in
which firing time can be selected in advance. Although the type of
power and the amount of power available in a-guided missile may limit
:See Figures 5, 6, and 7, following p. 8.
* See Figure i+, following p. 8.
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P RATE
GYRO
R RATE
GYRO
ROLL AMOUNT
GYRO
NOTE:
THE GYRO ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN ROTATED
CLOCKWISE FROM THE VERTICAL TO SHOW
DETAIL ON THE MOUNTING SIDE OF THE
P AND R RATE GYROS.
Y RATE
GYRO
Figure 1. Orientation of Gyroscopes in Nike.
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24222 b 8-56
CONFIDENTIAL
RELAY
CABLE CLAMP
Figure 2. Gyroscope Section of Nike.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100110006-9
Figure 4. Sectioned View of Single-Degree-of-Freedom Floated Gyroscope.
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(BEARING FRICTION
& EDDY CURRENT
DRAG WINDAGE)
Figure 5. Simple Amount Gyroscope.
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INPUT AXIS
"I%~DIRECTION OF INPUT MOTION
DASH POT
CENTERING SPRING--4 AMOUNTING FRAME
Figure 6. Simple Rate Gyroscope.
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1w
1.
PICK-OFF END CAP
20.
ROTOR AND HYSTERESIS RING
2.
SNORKEL TUBE
21.
MOTOR STATOR
3.
NULLING LOCK (2)
22.
MOTOR WINDINGS (POTTED)
4.
LEADS (6)
23.
TEMPERATURE COMPENSATOR
S.
GROUND LUG
24.
RATE LIMIT STOP
6.
NULLING RING
25.
BALANCE SCREWS (1-6)
7.
RIVETS (4)
26.
SPIDER (2)
8.
NULLING LAMINATIONS
27.
SPIDER MOUNT
9.
NULLING SEALER
28.
TORSION BAR MOUNT
10.
PICK-OFF WINDINGS (POTTED)
Z.
RATE LIMIT ADJUSTMENT
1l.
PICK OFF STATOR
30.
LIMIT ADJUSTMENT LOCK
12.
PICK-OFF ROTOR
31.
CAP BELLOWS
13.
GIMBAL (MALE AND FEMALE)
32.
EVACUATION TUBE
14.
TORSION BARS (2)
33.
COMPRESSION SPRING
15.
GIMBAL NUTS (2)
34.
BELLOWS
16.
MOTOR SHAFT
35.
CAP HOUSING
17.
BEARING RETAINER (2)
36.
NAME PLATE
18.
BEARING (2)
37.
HOUSING
19.
MOTOR CAP (2)
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TOP SECRET
the choice of existing gyros, there are usually no serious obstacles
to designing a gyro to use the power that is available. There is a
trend in the US to make 400-cycle-per-second, 115-volt alternating cur-
rent available in guided missiles. Some guided missiles such as the
Nike, however, operate on direct current.
A classification based on the function for which the gyro
signals are desired is similar in results to a system based on pre-
cision. This system of classification, based on function, would result
in three major classes: navigational; fire-control, or seeker, stabil-
ization; and attitude stabilization. Generally, navigational gyros must
be highly precise; fire-control, or seeker, stabilization gyros may be less
precise; and attitude stabilization gyros, still less precise.
Classification systems based on size, type of power used,
or the character of the input or output element associated with the
gyro element are too restricted in scope for the purposes of this
report and will not be discussed.
3. Classification System Used in This Report.
The preceding discussion indicates some of the difficulties
in making a simple classification of gyros. By combining precision,
usage, and degree of freedom, it is possible to classify gyros in a
relatively definitive manner which will be useful in evaluating the
economic factors involved in production of gyros. The classification
used in this report is as follows:
a. Highly precise gyros, such as floated gyros for naviga-
tion (single-degree-of-freedom) -- drift rate of 0.1
degree per hour or less.
b. Relatively precise amount gyros for fire control --
drift rate of approximately 1 degree for 5 minutes.
c. Relatively precise rate gyros for fire control -- drift
rate equivalent to approximately 5 degrees per hour
and a dynamic range* of more than 1,000 to 1.
* Dynamic range is the ratio of maximum rate measured in degrees per
second divided by the minimum rate measured in degrees per second.
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d. Moderately precise amount gyros for attitude stabili-
zation -- drift rate up to 1 or 2 degrees per minute.
e. Moderately precise rate gyros for attitude stabiliza-
tion -- simple rate gyros with dynamic range of
100 to 1 or better.
f. Relatively crude amount gyros for attitude stabiliza-
tion -- drift rate of several degrees per minute.
g. Relatively crude rate gyros for attitude stabiliza-
tion -- simple rate gyros with dynamic range of less
than 100 to 1.
It should be noted that in the US the highly precise gyros
used for navigation have been mostly single-degree-of-freedom gyros on
a 'stable platform.* A stable platform, or a stable element, consists of
asuitable gimbal structure which is kept oriented in space, or caused
to maintain a fixed relationship with the earth, by means of gyros and
allied equipment mounted thereon. The platform normally serves as a
base for accelerometers, star-tracking telescopes, or similar equipment.
The platforms considered in this report are stabilized by 3 single-
degree-of-freedom gyros, such as floated rate integrating gyros, and
have 3 movable gimbals. Instead of 3 single-degree-of-freedom gyros,
a_platform could be stabilized with 2 two-degree-of-freedom (.or
amount) gyros.
II. US Factors of Production.
A. Cost.
1. Concept Used-in This Report.
Cost is not a precise term. To the producer of guided
missiles, the cost of the gyro is the price that he pays for the com-
pleted gyro. To the producer of gyros, the cost of the gyro is a
figure which includes labor, materials, amortization of plant and
equipment, developmental expense, administration and general expense,
selling expense, and other miscellaneous expenses. In this report,
the term cost means cost of manufacture. Thus labor, materials, and
See Figure 3, following p. 8, above.
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plant overhead are included. Excluded are certain legitimate ex-
penses of doing business, such as administration, sales, and develop-
mental expense, which may be substantially incurred outside the
producing firm. For items that are newly developed, the estimate of
the cost may be influenced to a degree by developmental cost. In
general, it is believed that the costs given in this report do not
reflect development to any significant degree.
For the purposes of this report, it was believed that the
cost of manufacture was a more useful factor than total cost or
selling price. In other economies, for example, the economy of the
USSR, the components of the cost of manufacture will tend to be rela-
tively comparable to those in the US. Components of cost such as
selling, administration, and the like, however, may be quite different.
The developmental cost of a particular item is a one-time expense
that ends once the phase of research and development is completed, and
it does not affect the cost of producing additional units of the item.
The omission of developmental costs in this report does not
imply that the development of gyros is not a large item of expense in
a guided missile program, whether measured in terms of dollars or in
terms of labor. The emphasis in this report, however, is on factors
required for production and the cost of manufacture after development
has been completed.
An approximation of the relationship of the selling price
of a single specially designed item and the cost of manufacture of the
same or of a similar item can be gained from the following example.
A recent request for bids on an inertial guidance system for a
medium-range guided missile brought forth bids ranging from $150,000
to more than $700,000. The lowest bidder indicated that the cost
of a guidance system of this degree of precision was divided approxi-
mately as follows: 55 percent for electronics and 45 percent for the
stable platform. The allocation to the stable platform is, therefore,
approximately $67,500 (45 percent of $150,000). The lowest bidder
also indicated that a stable platform of a similar type and degree
of precision would cost $7,500 each to produce at a rate of 100 units
per month. The relationship between the selling price for a single
unit, which includes developmental cost, and the cost of quantity
production -- 100 units per month -- is 9 to 1: that is, the single
unit selling price is 9 times the unit cost of manufacturing the item
in production quantities. The estimated cost of manufacture at the
rate of 1,000 units per month is $5,700 each, a ratio of approximately
12 to 1.
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To be meaningful, cost must be related to the level of
production. The unit cost of manufacture of a specific class of gyro
will be much higher for small quantities than for large quantities.
With very low rates of production the cost of tooling and jigs and
futures must be amortized over a few units. If the tooling is cut
down to take this factor into account, then machinists of greater
skill must be employed to maintain the precision otherwise given by
the jigs and fixtures.
At very low rates of production, jobs cannot be broken
down into their simplest components and assigned to different individu-
al. Instead, each individual must do several tasks, which generally
means that higher skills are required of the workers but that these
higher skills are employed only part of the time. Moreover, switching
from task to task is not so productive as specializing inone task.
As production increases, the total overhead does not in-
crease at anything like the same rate. To produce even very -small
quantities, special equipment is needed to do each of the required
tasks. As production is increased, however, only certain items of
equipment must be increased. Because the total cost of the equipment
is spread over more units, the unit cost decreases. The same argu-
me.t applies to indirect labor involved in production.
Typical costs of manufacture for the various classes of
gyros based on the estimates of producers indicate that the unit cost
of'smanufacture at a monthly rate of 1,000 units per month is approxi-
mately 80 percent, and at a rate of 10,000 units per month, approxi-
mately 65 percent, of the cost at the rate of 100 units per month.*
Although figures on cost generally are not-given for less than 100
uuts-per month, the limited available information indicates that the
cost of manufacture at a rate of 50 units per month is approximately
15p percent of the cost at a rate of 100 to 200 units per month, and
the cost of manufacture at a rate of 10 units per month is almost
300 percent of the cost at a rate of 100 to 200 units per month.
Other information indicates that a volume of 10 units per month would
be' "very costly" without estimating an -amount.
At a rate of production of 1,000 units per month, the range for the
7 !classes of gyros is from 71 to 86 percent of the cost of 100 units
pelt month, with both the median and the mean falling at 79 percent. At
10,000 units per month, the range is from 57 to 69 percent, with the
mean, median, and mode all falling at 63 percent.
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2. Cost of Manufacture.
Table 1* shows the typical US cost of manufacture per unit
of various classes of gyros and stable platforms at various rates of
production. This cost is derived from estimates of the performance
of leading US gyro producers and therefore indicate general trends
for classes of instruments rather than exact figures taken from records.
There is no one criterion for classifying gyros into separate classes
without some degree of overlap. In practice, therefore, the cost of
manufacturing individual gyros ranges from high to low without distinct
breaks because of the varying degree of precision, resolution, rugged-
ness, and other characteristics built into the particular gyro designed
for a particular application. In Table 1 an attempt is made to assign
a specific value representative of the class, based on a range of
values. This table must be used with the caution which should normally
be given to "average" figures.
Table 1 shows that at comparable rates of production the
highly precise gyros for navigation are less expensive to produce than
the relatively precise amount gyros for fire control. The highly pre-
cise class of gyro represented is a single-degree-of-freedom gyro with
only 1 sensitive axis, whereas the relatively precise amount gyro has 2
degrees of freedom: that is, 2 sensitive axes. Likewise, amount
gyros and rate gyros of the same relative degree of precision have con-
siderably different costs of manufacture.
Table 1 does not include data representing the type of
stable platform which is likely to be used in an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) such as the Atlas. The stable platform in-
cluded in Table 1 is the type that might be used with a short-range
ballistic missile or with a cruise-type missile using star-tracking,
ATRAN,** or some other type of aided inertial navigation.
The data presented in Table 1 on relatively crude rate
gyros are limited in scope. The table does not include information
on the gyros used in short-range, short-time-of-flight missiles,
such as the Dart, the D-40, and the like. The D-40 missile, for ex-
ample, uses three sets of air-driven gyros. Each set contains two
Table 1 follows on p. 14.
ATRAN means Automatic Terrain Recognition and Navigation. In
general, it consists of matching of radar returns against a pre-
viously prepared radar map of the route.
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Typical US Cost of Manufacture per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes
and for Stable Platforms at Various Rates of Production a/
1955
1955 US $
50 Units
100 to 200 Units
500 to 1,000 Units
10,000 Units
Class of Gyro
per Month
per Month
per Month
per Month
Highly precise single-degree-of-freedom
(floated) gyros for navigation
2,000
1,335
1,150
g00
Relatively precise amount gyros for fire
control
2,250
1,500
1,250
950
Relatively precise rate gyros for fire control
1,050
700
500
400
Moderately precise amount gyros for
stabilization
1,425
950
750
600
Moderately precise rate gyros for stabilization
525
350
290
240
Relatively crude amount gyros for stabilization
750
500
375
310
Relatively crude rate gyros for stabilization
300
200
150
125
Three-gyro platform, or stable element
11,250
7,500
5,700
4,500
a. For derivation of the figures, see Appendix B, Methodology.
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rotors, one mounted as an amount gyro and the other mounted as a rate
gyro. The expected price of these sets is approximately $100 each at
low rates of production. In the Dart, it is planned to use a powder-
charge-driven amount gyro which spins on its own inertia during the
1-minute flight of the guided missile. This gyro is reported to cost
about $80.
B. Requirements for Direct Labor.
Table 2* shows the typical US requirements for direct labor per
unit for various classes of gyros and stable platforms at various rates
of production. This table is broken down in the same way and refers
to the same gyros as Table 1.** The same limitations which apply to
Table 1 also apply to Table 2.
In the production of gyros in the US, practices differ among
companies in terms of the amount of subcontracting required. In cer-
tain companies the cost of raw materials and purchased parts is rela-
tively high and direct labor hours are relatively low as compared with
cost and labor requirements for somewhat similar gyros produced by
other companies. The labor figures presented here have been adjusted
to take into account differing practices among companies. The number
of direct labor man-hours presented is believed to represent "average"
US practice. US producers usually purchase such items as screws,
nuts, bolts, and other hardware items; bearings; and certain standard
electrical items such as potentiometers,*** glass sealed wires, and
similar items. It is possible that few of these items would be pur-
chased in the USSR, and more direct labor would therefore be required
by the producer of gyros. Statements by Soviet leaders in recent
months indicate that more items should be produced in specialized
plants instead of being produced by the user.
C. Training and Skills.
1. Skills Required.
The production of gyros, as distinguished from their devel-
opment, poses no peculiar problems in terms of skills required. The
amount of skill required in the production of parts is dependent to a
Table 2 follows on p. 16.
P. 14, above.
See Figures 5 and 6, following p. 8.
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Table 2
Typical US Requirements for Direct Labor per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes
and for Stable Platforms at Various Rates of Production a/
1955
50 Units
100 to 200 Units
500 to 1,000 Units
10,000 Units
f G rro
Cl
per Month
per Month
per Month
per Month
ass o
Highly precise single-degree-of-freedom
(floated) gyros for navigation
335
225
185
140
Relatively precise amount gyros for fire
control
34+5
230
185
11+0
Relatively precise rate gyros for fire control
180
125
95
80
Moderately precise amount gyros for
stabilization
285
190
140
110
Moderately precise rate gyros for stabilization
120
80
65
50
Relatively crude amount gyros for stabilization
110
75
55
4+5
Relatively crude rate gyros for stabilization
50
35
25
20
Three-gyro platform, or stable element
1,575
1,050
775
625
a. For derivation of the figures, see Appendix B, Methodology.
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large extent upon the level of production in a particular enterprise.
In development and small-scale production the skill required to produce
parts will necessarily be high because the end product requires parts
manufactured to close tolerances. There are several methods by which
these close tolerances may be attained. One method is to have highly
skilled workers, using general-purpose machines, produce the parts in
job lots. This method is almost invariably used during development
and on small job-lot orders. A second method is to design and build
a jig or fixture for use with the machines. With the help of jigs
and fixtures, semiskilled workers can produce precision parts, assum-
ing that the machine is built to hold to close tolerances. This
method is economically justified if many parts are to be produced. A
third method is to design and build a special-purpose machine to
produce the part. This method, which is economically justified only
for production in very large quantities, allows relatively unskilled
workers to produce highly precise parts. Thus the skill may be re-
quired of the workers or it may be built into the machines.
In the US, many classes of gyros are produced by the
first method. Those that are made in quantity are generally produced
by the second method. It is unlikely that the gyro industry in the
US will ever use the third method because of the multiplicity of de-
signs and the number of companies producing gyros. If designs were
standardized and production limited to 1 or 2 facilities, it is possi-
ble that the third method would be feasible. Without using the third
method, however, the number and complexity of jigs and fixtures can be
increased and the operations broken down into their simplest compo-
nents if the production (demand for the gyros) warrants. Therefore,
in addition to skilled workers who can perform many operations on
numerous machines, the specialist may be developed. The specialist
may be defined as a person trained to handle a particular machine.
The semiskilled worker can perform a limited number of operations on
one or more machines. There is no method of production that will
entirely eliminate the skilled worker in this field. When production
goes beyond the job-lot stage, however, with the aid of jigs and fix-
tures and careful planning of production, the job can be simplified in
such a manner that the majority of the operators may be specialists
or semiskilled workers.*
* An examination of Soviet aircraft instruments indicates that the
USSR is designing for simplicity of production (see Appendix A).
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The -level of skill required in production of parts of gyros
is greater than that required for assembly. In a US plant, for ex-
ample, 20 percent of the workers may be fully skilled; 70 percent,
skilled on 1 machine; and 10 percent, semiskilled. This plant, how-
ever, handles small series production. For larger scale production a
somewhat greaterpercentage of semiskilled workers would suffice.
In assembly operations a large percentage of the workers
are semiskilled. In assembling a certain class of rate gyro in a US
plant, for example, 25 percent of the labor may be unskilled; 65 per-
cent, semiskilled; and 10 percent, skilled. On gyros of moderate pre-
cision and complexity, it was estimated that 20 percent of the labor
could be unskilled; 60 percent., semiskilled; and 20 percent., skilled.
On;high-precision gyros, it was estimated that only about 5 percent
could be unskilled; 55 percent, semiskilled; and 110 percent, skilled.
In assembly work the major factor which varies the amount of skill re-
quired is the amount of test and calibration required by the final
product. The assembly operations themselves depend largely upon man-
ual dexterity but can be learned in a relatively short time.
2. Background or Previous Training.
There are three general types of skill required for the
production of gyros: machining ability, manual dexterity, and a back-
ground in electronics. The requirement for machining is common to all
types of metalworking plants. Producers of gyros, however, require ma-
chinists who can work to close tolerances, even closer in many cases
than for watchmaking. In assembly, the major requirement is for manual
dexterity. If a worker has manual dexterity, the actual assembly opera-
tions can be acquired through on-the-job training in a relatively
short time. A background in electronics, such as that of a radio re-
pairman, a ham operator, or the like, is valuable for the testing and
trouble-shooting operations required in the production of gyros.
In the production of gyros in the US, disagreement arises
not as to the types of skills required, but rather as to the best way
to acquire workers with these skills. Among some gyro firms, persons
such as watchmakers were deemed particularly valuable because they were
familiar withhandling small parts, aware of the significance of working
to close tolerances, and had the dexterity and skill acquired in work-
ing with small parts. Other firms seemed to prefer going into an area
in which there was a relatively large supply of potential workers, even
t1ough they were untrained in precision mechanics. These firms would
depend upon selective hiring and on-the-job training to meet their de-
mends, seeming to believe that if watchmakers and the like were hired
they would have to be-retrained.
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In addition to the production and assembly workers pre-
viously discussed, approximately 15 percent more workers are required
as production engineers, foremen, lead men, and the like. These
people require considerable experience and, in some cases, engineering
training.
3. Training Time.
The officials of one US company estimated that they could
go into an area in which there was no experience in precision mechan-
ics -- for example, a farming community -- and could train a labor
force for a new plant (employing 100 to 200 workers) in a period of
from 1 to 1- years. This figure assumes a cadre of 10 or 15 trained
workers to use as lead men and instructors. If the cadre of trained
workers were not available, the time required would be approximately
2 to 3 years.
It was estimated that in US practice, unskilled workers
generally can, by definition, be trained in a few days; assembly
workers require 1 to 6 month's training to become effective; test
and calibration workers, 6 months to 1 year plus some background in
electronics; semiskilled machinists, up to 6 months; machinists skilled
on 1 machine, 6 months to 1 year; and skilled machinists, several
years. Most of the direct supervisory and production engineering per-
sonnel, approximately 15 percent of the total, require considerably
more than 1 year's training or experience. In many cases a degree in
engineering is required.
To summarize the data given above, it appears that of the
workers directly concerned with producing, assembling, and testing
gyros, 10 to 20 percent require 1 year or more training, 4+5 to 55
percent require 6 months to 1 year, and 35 to 50 percent require less
than 6 months. These estimates do not take into account the super-
visory or engineering personnel who would require more than 1 year
of training.
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that, in order
to expand production of gyros, a country must have a relatively small
number of workers to act as a cadre of foremen, lead men, calibrators,
and instructors, and a limited number of machinists capable of machin-
ing to close tolerances. These workers, comprising about 25 to 35
percent of the direct labor required, could be trained over a period
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of time. The training period, however, would have to be somewhat more
than 1 year and, in some cases, several years. The rest of the labor
required for production of gyros could be trained in 1 year or less.
D. Requirements for Floorspace.
The requirements for floorspace for the production of gyros
ae relatively small. An analysis of the information gathered on re-
q irements for floorspace* indicates that 100 square feet of floor-
space per worker** should be sufficient to produce most classes of
gyros. The simpler classes which are produced in large numbers can
b~ built in an area equivalent to 60 square feet per worker. It is
believed that the 60 square feet per worker is about the minimum area
t} at would be consistent with efficient production.***
The preceding discussion is based on a single-shift operation.
Requirements for floorspace which are based on number of workers must
be calculated in terms of the shift employing the largest number of
w~rkers. If three shifts of equal size were to be worked, the floor-
space required would be somewhat more than one-third of the area re-
gi.ired if a_single shift were worked, assuming the same total produc-
t~on. If the total output for 3 workers on a 3-shift basis were 22-
t es that of a single worker's output on -a -single-shift basis --
wiich appears reasonable -- then 40 percent of the floorspace required
for single-shift operations would be required for 3-shift operations
tp get the same total production.
* For the figures underlying this discussion, see Appendix B.
* A typical US plant has facilities consisting of 5,000 workers
and more than 500,000 square feet of work space, an average of 100
square feet per worker. J
*** In a report giving requirements for floorspace for production of
aircraft instruments, J it was estimated that 125 square feet are
required per machine for machining operations; 70 square feet for
assembly, inspection, and test area; plus 40 percent of the above
total for factory services and office area. It was stated, however,
that these were "comfortable" unit-space figures based on space
allowances used by a US company and that these allowances might be
adjusted downward without much difficulty.
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E. Air-Conditioned and Dust-Controlled Area.*
The question of how much of the total production area should
be air-conditioned and dust-free results in varying answers. There
is a problem in distinguishing between the size of the area necessary
for the accuracy and reliability of the mechanism and that desirable
for the efficiency of the workers. In manufacturing to close toler-
ances, changes in temperature cause expansion or contraction of the
material greater than the tolerance permitted. Air conditioning
helps to maintain the necessary constancy of temperature. In final
assembly it is important that dust in the air be reduced as much as
possible because the presence of foreign matter in the completed
instrument may cause failure or excessive wear. Constancy of.temp-
erature also is important in final assembly because of the close fit
of certain parts. It would be possible to produce and assemble rela-
tively imprecise gyros in plants in which only a very small percentage
of the area is air-conditioned and dust-free. In the production of
highly precise gyros, a somewhat greater area should be temperature-
controlled and dust-free. Although it may be possible to produce gyros
in areas that are not so rigorously controlled, the number of rejects,
the amount of trial and error, and the possibility of failure of the in-
strument probably do not justify the omission of air conditioning or
dust control from the point of view of economy or of reliability.
In the production of relatively precise gyros, about 4+0 to
50 percent of the area for producing, assembling, and testing gyros
should be air-conditioned and dust-free. In the production of less
precise gyros, the minimum area which must be dust-free and air-
conditioned is about 10 to 20 percent of the total area.
F. Machinery and Raw Materials.
In general, there are no particular problems in acquiring
machinery or raw materials for production of gyros. The require-
ments for machinery are relatively few, and usually for standard
types. The major qualification is that the machines must be able to
hold to close tolerances; they must be of the precision type. Be-
* Air conditioned means temperature and humidity controlled. Dust
controlled means that measures have been taken to reduce greatly the
amount of dust in the air by filtering and keeping the area under a
slight pressure so that the natural air flow is outward.
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cause the parts to be manufactured are relatively small in size, the
machinery can be small. In addition to the machine tools and machines
which are required to produce parts, balancing machines and consider-
abe electronic or electrical test equipment is needed.
There does not seem to be any type of machinery or equipment
which could cause a bottleneck in production of gyros as a result of
the uniqueness of the source of supply or similar causes, although
some of the electronic or electrical-test -equipment may be a possible
exception. In the US, because it isdifficult to obtain test equip-
ment better than the highly precise gyros now being built, much of the
test equipment must be built by gyro producers for their own use. The
current shortage of test equipment results from the slight demand in
the past for the type of equipment now required. These shortages do
ndt apply for the gyros which are produced on a large scale.
Most of the machinery used in producing gyro parts consists
of standard machine tools. In the US, two general practices are em-
ployed to get the required precision in the production of gyro parts.
one method is to check the various machines being used in a plant and
to select those which hold to the closest tolerances to produce the
palrts requiring high precision. The other method is to purchase equip-
m~nt which is designed to hold to close tolerances. US producers of
gyros tend to use a combination of both methods to gain the required
precision in machining.
In a discussion of critical materials in the building of gy-
rps, a distinction must be made between materials needed in the pro-
duction of moderately precise gyros and those needed in the-production
off' very high-precision gyros to be used in inertial guidance systems.
Ii the production of gyros of moderate precision, there appear to be
n6 really critical materials. Producers of-gyros are continuously
searching for better miniature precision bearings and for materials
fqr the rotor which will not shift its center of gravity. The poten-
tiometer wires have been suggested as a critical item of supply. Other
materials suggested-as critical are stainless steel, magnetic metal,
cadmium, platinum alloys, shellac, aluminum, beryllium, and nickel.
The amounts of these materials required are relatively small, because
m6st of the gyros used in guided missiles weigh less than 5 pounds
and the total weight of many gyros is less than 1 pound. Some gyros,
however, may weigh as much as 9 or 10 pounds.
P
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Although potentiometer wires could be a critical supply item,
synchronous motors may be used as signal pick-offs instead of poten-
tiometers. Thus, through changes in design, possible shortages in
potentiometers could be avoided as a long-run problem. In the US, some
gyros now use potentiometer pick-offs, and others use synchronous
motors of various designs. The shift from one to the other, however,
represents a major change in design which would necessitate changes
in the entire gyro system.
Precision bearings are a critical item in production of gyros.
Through use of floated gyros, however, the critical bearings -- that
is, the gimbal bearings -- can be jeweled pivots with very little
weight on them. The use of air or liquid bearings is another method
of attempting to get an almost frictionless bearing. The gyros being
built for the Redstone missile are of the air bearing type. This
type of gyro has not been produced in quantity in the US and appears
to be still in the developmental stage.
G. Time Required to Begin Production of New Models or to
Expand Production.
1. To Produce First Unit, Using Production Tooling.
The time required to begin production of a new model de-
pends largely upon the quality and completeness of the design specifi-
cations. If the design has been proved and the difficulties in
production worked out in the model shop or in some other facility,
the time required to begin production would be reduced to a minimum.
If, on the other hand, the design is generally proved but still has
to be perfected, then the time required to begin production will be
increased considerably.
It is estimated that it would take approximately 6 months
to begin production with a proved design that has been perfected.
Tooling would take 4 or 5. months, and getting the line operating
properly and the various parts produced in sufficient quantity to
begin assembly would take an additional 1 or 2 months. Thus from the
time the decision has been made to begin production, using produc-
tion tooling, to the time the first unit has been completed, approxi-
mately 6 months may elapse, assuming that there is considerable
pressure to begin production. There have been times when 1 to 12 years
have elapsed before the first unit has been produced with the use of
production tooling. The greater time period resulted partly from
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difficulties in tooling, but mainly from problems arising in produc-
tion based on the original drawings as turned over by the design
engineers. Although the design may have been proved with hand-con-
structed models, considerable change was necessary to set up economi-
cal production tooling. For example, a new plant was opened in an
aea in which there was no experience in precision mechanics. The
gyro to be produced was-a proved design that was in production in
other plants. In this case, it took slightly more than 9months to
produce the first gyro in the hew plant.
The time required to begin production, using production
tooling, may be shortened somewhat if the production engineer works
with the design engineer and can eliminate some of the difficulties
in production in the preliminary stage. Tooling may also be antici-
p,ted, and thus tooling time may be shortened somewhat. This attempted
short-cut may prove costly, however, if the design does not prove
practical, and the tooling already completed must be scrapped.
2. To Build Up to Scheduled Monthly Production.
The total time required to reach a given level of produc-
tion after the first unit is produced is in part a function of the
s hedule of production planned. Figure 8,* for example, indicates the
e$timated build-up time for 2 different gyros in 2 different typical
U firms. The planned level of production was 225 gyros per month in
o 2e case and 250 gyros per month in the other. The curves are very
s~lmilarin shape, with the curve for the simpler gyro being somewhat
steeper. If the planned level of production had been higher, both
curves would have been somewhat steeper. The higher level of produc-
tion would be a function of the larger number of workers employed in
the process.
Other examples of the build-up time required include the
fallowing: During World War II, a typical US firm reached a peak
production of 9,000_gyros per month, 18 months after producing the
first gyro, using production tooling. This particular gyro, however,
wd,s a simple air-driven rate gyro. The more complex, electric-driven
g)-ros probably would take a somewhat longer period to-reach such a
h.gh level of production. This same US firm took 1 year to reach a
monthly rate of approximately 400 relatively precise electric-driven
Following p. 24.
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Month
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Relatively Simple Vertical Gyros
15
25
50
110
160
225
-
Relatively Precise Rate Gyros
3
10
20
40
100
175
250
4 5
Months
6 7 8 9
24223 7-56 Figure 8. Build-Up Time for Production of US Gyroscopes.
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gyros of a type used in certain guided missiles. Another firm took
approximately 10 months to reach a monthly peak of 500 moderately
precise gyros of a type used in guided missiles.
3. To Double Production.
In the US the estimated time required to double production
in an existing plant that had been producing gyros at a certain level
varied from an estimate of 3 or 4 months to increase production from
400 to 800 gyros per month to an estimate of 5 to 7 months to increase
production from 250 to 500 gyros per month. A third estimate was 6
months to increase production from 500 to 1,000 gyros per month.
The estimates of time required to begin production and to
double production in the US are based on the labor markets in which
the producing firms are located. In order to apply these data to other
economies, it must be assumed that the labor market under consideration
is made up of workers who --,if they do not have the same type of
skills and backgrounds -- have at least a basic familiarity with pro-
duction and machining and a similar aptitude or ability to learn. It
appears that workers in the large industrial centers of the USSR would
meet these qualifications.
III. Soviet Factors of Production.
NIE 11-6-.54 assumed a Soviet program for production of guided
missiles based on estimated requirements of missiles for stockpile and
for maintenance. The phasing of this program was based on estimates
of the earliest time required to develop guided missiles of various types.
It is therefore a possible program based on assumed rates of development
and requirements rather than an actual program based on positive intel-
ligence.
The gyros required to meet this assumed program for production
are estimated below. There are, however, two major problems in an
analysis of this type: (1) the type of guidance system to be used on
the various Soviet guided missiles is unknown, and (2) the comparabil-
ity of US and Soviet production costs and techniques as applied to
gyros is uncertain.
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Until more information is available, Soviet guidance systems
wi4 be assumed to be substantially similar to those being developed
in the US. Even this assumption does not permit a completely firm
estimate of the number and classes of gyros required. Most US guided
missiles are in a developmental stage in which several guidance and
control systems with varying gyro requirements are being considered.
For this analysis, the guidance system requiring the most complicated
gyro system has been used as the US counterpart. In the case of air-
to-qir missiles, two calculations based on two different guidance
sys~ems have been made.
NIE 11-6-54+ uses scaled Corporals as counterparts for SSGM-1-2
andSSGM-2. Because the ground radar and Doppler system used as super-
visory guidance on the Corporal does not appear to be very suitable
fora guided missile with a range of several hundred miles, an iner-
tial guidance system employing a stable platform will be -assumed for
these missiles.
In this section it is assumed that methods of production and
therefore costs, labor, floorspace, and the like are substantially the
same in the USSR as in the US. The calculations, therefore, are based
on 4ounterpart US data and are first approximations, subject to change
as ore positive intelligence concerning the production of gyros in
the USSR becomes available. The section following will discuss some
of the qualifications applying to these assumptions.
Examination of Soviet aircraft instruments indicates selec-
tion by the USSR of methods of production which emphasize rapid
fabrication of parts and rapid assembly J and the apparent satis-
faction of the USSR with a product which may have some minor disad-
vantages in use if there is a gain in production. 1 On this basis,
it is-assumed that types of gyros will be standardized in the USSR.
Standardization of gyros allows for larger series production with
attendant reductions in the cost of manufacture.
Members of the US automation team, who visited the USSR in
December 1955, have reported that in machinery and machine tools the
Soviet machine design and concept were equal to those in the US
machine tool industry, except for perhaps 2 or 3 outstanding US
companies. 10 Moscow University was well equipped with instruments,
which were apparently produced domestically. 1111/ At the Experimental
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and Scientific Research Institute for Metalcutting Machine Tools
(ENIMS*) an automatic balancing machine for balancing the rotors of
electric motors was seen. 12
These reports, together with other reports, physical inspec-
tion, analysis of captured and purchased Soviet equipment, and
analysis of new Soviet developments published in technical journals
suggest that the USSR is capable of building the types of machines
and instruments that are necessary for equipping gyro plants.
In view of Soviet emphasis on heavy industry in recent years,
especially on the production of machine tools and similar equipment,
there should be enough skilled machinists in the USSR to meet the
high-priority requirements for production of gyros without undue strain
on the rest of the economy. Similarly, because the USSR has been pro-
ducing gyro instruments for aircraft and ships for a number of years,
a limited cadre of calibrators and instructors should be available.
With such a supply of labor from which trainees can be selected, a
labor force to produce gyros in numbers could be brought into being
within 1 year.
B. Number of Gyroscopes Required.
Table 3** indicates the number of gyros, by class, that would
be required in the Soviet program for guided missiles assumed in
NIE-11-6-51+. The criteria for classifying the gyros were that the
various gyros would serve the same general purpose and would require
approximately the same degree of precision. Some of the gyros used in
US counterpart guided missiles that have been grouped are admittedly
dissimilar. The amount gyro used in either the Falcon or Sidewinder,
for example, is an integral part of the seeker or radar and thus could
not be replaced by the amount gyro used in the Nike. In fact, on the
basis of present US designs, few if any of the gyros grouped are inter-
changeable. If standardization were adopted as a conscious policy
early in the stage of design, however, many different guided missiles
probably could be designed to use a single gyro. Even if standardiza-
tion by the USSR were not carried out to the extent assumed, the re-
sults would still be approximately correct. In some cases, less
precise gyros might be designed to meet the need, thus offsetting the
somewhat higher costs associated with a lower rate of production.***
* Eksperimental'nyy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut Metallo-
rezhushchikh Stankov.
Table 3 follows on p. 29.
Continued on p. 31.
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Number of Gyroscopes Required for the Assumed Soviet Guided Missile Program, by Class
1954-67
Number of Gyros
in This Class in
Annual Soviet Guided Missile Requirements (Units)
Soviet Guided Missile
US Counterpart US Counterpart
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1
60
1
6
9
9
1
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
Highly precise single-degree-
of-freedom gyros
SS(31-1-1
SSGM-1-2
Regulus 3
C
l (
l
d)
570
1,500
1,800
870
870
870
870
870
870
870
870
870
SS(34-2
orpora
sca
e
3
C
l
l
1,350
4,050
3,150
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1
050
1
050
SACM-2
orpora
(sca
ed) 3
B
675
1,710
330
330
330
330
330
330
,
330
,
330
AS(34-2
omarc 3
Rascal 3
870
2,610
4,350
6,150
6,900
1,860
1,860
SS -3
Atlas
6
510
1,620
600
360
360
360
360
600
2,400
1,320
540
540
540
540
Total
1,350
4,050
3,720
2,550
3 525
3,630
2
250
4
230
8
880
8
520
00
1
,
,
,
,
9,3
0,050
5,010
5,010
SAGr1-1
AA(33-1
Nike
F
l
/Sid
1
3,000
9,000
15,000
15,000
8,000
5,400
5,400
5,400
5,400
5,400
5,400
5,400
400
5
400
5
a
con
ewinder
1
13,400
40,000
61,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
,
20,000
,
20,000
Total
3,
9,
15,
15,
8,
18,800
45,400
66
400
400
25
25
400
25
400
2
400
2
400
4
,
,
,
,
5,
5,
25,
00
Moderately precise rate gyros
Assumption 1 a/
SS(3R-l-l
S"-1
Regulus
Nike
2
380
1,000
1,200
580
580
580
580
580
580
580
580
580
SAC34-2
B
3
9,000
27,000
45,000
45,000
24,000
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16,200
16
200
16
200
ASOM-2
omarc
Rascal
3
2
870
340
2,610
1,080
4,350
400
6,159
240
6,
22 0
,
1,860
,
1,860
Assumption 2
AAGM-l
3
40,200
120,000
183
000
60
000
60
000
60
000
60
000
60
000
000
Total
9,000
27,000
45,380
46,000
25,200
56,98o
136,780
,
200,990
,
80,470
,
81,530
,
83,170
,
83,920
,
78,880
60,
78,880
Relatively crude amount gyros
ASC24-1
A ti
2
1,950
5,850
7,600
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
1,980
a.
ssump
on 1 is that the USSR will use a guidance system for its air-to-air missile requiring one amount gyro and no rate gyros, a system similar to the Sidewinder.
b. Assumption 2 is that the USSR will use a guidance system for its air-to-air missile requiring 1 amount gyro and 3 rate gyros, a system similar to the Falcon.
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Two different estimates are presented for the number of moder-
ately precise rate gyros required, based on different assumptions con-
cerning the Soviet guidance system for air-to-air missiles. Assumption
1 is that this guidance system will be similar to the guidance system
used in the Sidewinder. The Sidewinder has no rate servo feedback
system and consequently requires no rate gyros. Assumption 2 is that
the Soviet guidance system will resemble that of the Falcon. The
Falcon uses fin position control and thus requires three rate gyros
for attitude stabilization. Because of the large number of missiles
contemplated in the assumed Soviet program for air-to-air missiles,
the two different assumptions result in estimates which vary consider-
ably as to the number of gyros required and consequently as to the
cost of the program for guided missiles for gyros.
C. Cost and Requirements for Single-Shift Production.
Table 4* is a summary table giving the cost of manufacture,
the size of the direct labor force, and the amount of floorspace re-
quired for the production of gyros for the assumed Soviet program for
guided missiles, based on Assumption 1: that is, a Soviet counter-
part of the Sidewinder. Table 5** is similar, except that it is based
on Assumption 2: that is, a Soviet counterpart of the Falcon. Both
tables are based on a single-shift production and on the time that the
guided missiles are assumed to be completed.
1. Cost of Manufacture .
The costs of manufacture given in Tables 4 and 5 are the
sums (obtained from Table 3***) of the number of gyros required in
each class. These sums were then multiplied by the cost of each gyro
(obtained from Table 1****). The unit cost used was that given in
the appropriate column of Table 1 or an interpolation of the two
appropriate columns -- for example, 5,000 units would represent an
interpolation between the column for 500 to 1,000 units per month
and that for 10,000 units per month.*****
Table +.follows on p. 32.
Table 5 follows on p. 33-
P. 29, above.
P. 14, above.
Continued on p. 34.
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Table 4
Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor and Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed Soviet Guided Missile Program
(Based on Assumption 1 a)
1954-67
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Cost of manufacture 4.4 34.3 35.6 36.7 29.5 29.5
(million 1955 US $) 8.2 21.6 31.4 28.0 18.3 24.2 40.1 57.7 3
Direct labor
(number of workers) 700 1,800 2,650 2,400 1,550 2,000 3,250 4,700 2,750 2,750 2,850 2,900 2,400 2,400
Floorspace for production 285 290 240 240
(thousand square feet) 70 180 265 240 155 200 325 470 275 275
a. Assumption 1 is that the USSR will use a guidance system for its air-to-air missile requiring one amount gyro and no rate gyros, a system similar
to that of the Sidewinder. This table is phased according to the times that the guided missiles are to be produced. For a smoothed production
program with a lead time, see Table 6, p. 36, below.
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Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor and Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed Soviet Guided Missile Program
(Based on Assumption 2 a/)
1954-67
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Cost of manufacture
(minion-1955 US $) 8.2 21.6 31.4 28.0 18.3 34.4 68.3 101.0 48.1 47.9 49.2 50.3 43.3 43.3
Direct labor
(number of workers) 700 1,800 2,650 2,400 1,550 2,900 5,800 8,600 3,950 3,950 4,050 4,100 3,600 3,600
Floorspace for production
(thousand square feet) 70 180 265 240 155 290 580 860 395 395 405 410 360 360
a. Assumption 2 is that the USSR will use a guidance system for its air-to-air missile requiring 1 amount gyro and 3 rate gyros,.a system similar to
that of the Falcon: This table is phased according to the times that the guided missiles are to be produced. For a smoothed production program with a
lead time, see Table 7, p. 37, below.
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2. Direct Labor.
The number of workers required to produce gyros was calcu-
lated by summing the number of gyros of each class required (obtained
from Table 3*) and the number of man-hours of direct labor required
tobuild these classes (obtained from Table 2**) or by interpolation
ofTable 2 in a similar manner to that shown for Table 1.*** The
total number of man-hours required was divided by 2,300**** to give
the number of workers required.
3. Indirect Labor.
Tables 4+ and 5XXXXX indicate the number of persons required
to'perform the direct labor in production of gyros. US producers of
gyros estimate, however, that the indirect labor force is from two-
thirds as large to the same size as the direct labor force. The cost
figures given in Tables 4 and 5 include the cost of this indirect
labor, but the calculations for direct labor and for floorspace do not.
The total requirements for the labor force therefore should be doubled
for those classes of gyros produced in quantities of 100 unit-s per
month or less and increased by approximately two-thirds for those
classes of gyros produced in quantities of 1,000 units per month or
more. Because office workers and-the like would be included in the
indirect labor force, the addition of 60 square feet of floorspace
per indirect worker should be sufficient.
4-. Floorspace.
The requirements for floorspace were calculated on the
basis of an average of 100 square feet of floorspace per worker, which
appears to be approximately the ratio used in the US for similar types
ofplants. As discussed in the section on US requirements for floor-
space,- this figure could be cut as much as 40 percent to allow only
60square feet per worker.
* P. 29, above.
** P. 16, above.
*** See III, C, p. 31, above.
* The standard work week in the USSR is now 4+6 man-hours. -Allow-
ing 2 weeks for holidays and vacations would give 50 times 46 or 2,300
man-hours per year.
* Pp. 32 and 33, respectively, above.
} See II, D, p. 20, above.
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D. Cost and Requirements for Three-Shift Production.
Three-shift production is not as efficient as single-shift
production. The probable maximum output of 3-shift production is about
22 times the output of a single shift, inasmuch as time must be allowed
for repair, cleaning, and similar services. Therefore, to produce the
same amount of goods on a 3-shift basis as on 3 single shifts, the
total labor force will have to be increased approximately 20 percent.
If this larger total labor force were to be divided into 3 shifts of
equal size, the total requirements for floorspace would be 40 percent
of the floorspace requirements of a single shift. The effect on the
cost of manufacture is not known. This cost, however, is likely to
increase somewhat. The larger labor force causes an increase in
labor costs. The lower requirements for floorspace and also for
machinery result in a decrease in overhead costs. The lower over-
head costs offset to some extent, but probably not entirely, the
higher labor costs.
E. Introduction of Lead Time and Smoothing of Production.
Tables 6 and 7* were calculated from Tables 4 and 5** by the
introduction of a production lead time and by smoothing the peaks in
production. The basic assumptions which entered into the calculation
of Tables 6 and 7 were: (1) the gyros would be produced approximately
1 year ahead of the time the missiles were to be available and (2)
production of gyros would be scheduled ahead so that no extreme
fluctuations would be necessary. On the basis of the second assump-
tion, some excess production of gyros might occur during 1957-59.
The production of gyros in 1960, however, would not be quite equal
to the number of gyros required by the missiles to be made available
during 1961. The production lead time would be cut to approximately
6 months. By 1962 a production lead time of approximately 1 year
would be regained. The requirements for direct labor were used as
the basis for the smoothing of production in Tables 6 and 7. The cost
of manufacture was calculated from the figures for direct labor on
the basis of $12,000 per man-year.***
* Tables 6 and 7 follow on pp. 36 and 37, respectively.
** Pp. 32 and 33, respectively, above.
The average cost of manufacture per man-year calculated from
Tables 4 and 5 is $12,000. The range is from $11,666 to $12,655.
(Text continued on p. 38.)
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Table 6
Smoothed Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor and Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed Soviet Guided Missile Program
(Based on Assumption 1 a)
1953-66.
Cost of manufacture
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
1965 1966
D(mmiclionb1955 US $) 8.4 21.6 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 33.6 36.0 36.0 36.0 33.6 33.6 28.8 28.8
(number of workeers)ction 700 1,800 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,800 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,800 2,800 2,400 2,400
Floorspace for production
(thousand square feet) 70 180 260 260 260 260 280
300 300 300 280 280 240 240
a. Assumption 1 is that the USSR will use a guidance system for its air-to-air missile requiring one amount gyro and no rate gyros, a system similar to
th
at of the Sidewinder. This table is phased according to the times that the gyros are to be produced. The assumed Soviet aim is to have a i-year lead
for
forcproducti in of gyros. In addition, this table anticipates peak requirements and the prior production and stockpiling of gyros to eliminate extreme
production of gyros and in facilities.
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Smoothed Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Direct Labor and Floorspace for Production of Gyroscopes for the Assumed Soviet Guided Missile Program
(Based on Assumption 2 a/)
1953-66
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Cost of manufacture
(million 1955 US $)
8.4
21.6
31.2
33.6
36.0
Direct labor
(number of workers)
700
1,800
2,600
2,800
3,000
Floorspace for production
(thousand square feet)
70
180
260
280
300
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
42.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 43.2
3,500 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 4,000 4,ooo 4,000 3,600
350 500 500 500 500 400 400 400 360
a. Assumption 2 is that the USSR will use a guidance system for its air-to-air missile requiring 1 amount gyro and 3 rate gyros, a system similar to
that of the Falcon. This table is phased according to the times that the gyros are to be produced. The assumed Soviet aim is to have a 1-year lead for
production of gyros. In addition, this table anticipates peak requirements and the prior production and stockpiling of gyros to eliminate extreme
fluctuation in production of gyros and in facilities.
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1'. Maximum Annual Cost and Requirements.
On the assumption that the USSR would use a relatively simple
guidance system in its air-to-air missile, thus requiring only 1 gyro
per missile, Table 6* indicates that the maximum annual cost of manu-
facture would be $36 million, the number ofworkers engaged in direct
labor would be 3,000, and the floorspace required for production would
be 300,000 square feet. According to Table 4,** the maximum annual cost
of manufacture would be approximately $58 million, the number of
workers engaged in direct labor would be 4,700, and the floorspace re-
quired for production would be 470,000 square feet. Table 4 has been
constructed on the assumption that the gyros would be turned out at
the time needed with no advance production for the purpose of smooth-
ing peaks in production. Table 6 has been constructed on the assump-
tion that production would be leveled and that some gyros would be
produced in anticipation of peak needs. Because of incomplete fore-
sight on the part of planners and possibly because of changes in de-
sign, actual requirements for production probably would fall somewhere
between the amounts indicated in Tables 4 and 6. Some allowance would
haveto be made for indirect labor and for floorspace to accommodate
the indirect labor. A -conservative estimate would place the maximum
annual cost of production of gyros at $50 million, total labor (in-
cluding indirect) at 8,000 workers, and floorspace at 6+0,000 square
feet:.***. It will be noted that all these calculations are-for single-
shift operations. The floorspace requirements could be reduced by
more; than half on a multiple-shift basis, but labor would have to be
increased, and costs of manufacture probably would rise.
On the assumption that the USSR would adopt the more compli-
cated guidance system for its air-to-air missile, it is conservatively
estimated**** that the maximum annual cost of manufacturing gyros
would be $85 million; total labor (including indirect), 14,000 workers;
and;total floorspace, 1.12 million -square feet.
P. 3 , above.
* P. 32, above.
** Indirect labor was calculated as equal to direct labor -- 4,000
workers -- and floorspace was calculated as 100 square feet per di-
rect worker and 60 square feet per indirect worker.
***# This estimate is an interpolation of Tables 5 and 7, pp. 33 and
37,respectively, above, calculated by the same method as the estimate
discussed earlier in this section.
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G. Effect of Stable Platform, or Stable Element, Costs.
Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7* are all based on production of gyros.
The highly precise gyros for navigation, however, are used on stable
platforms, or stable elements. If calculations regarding cost of
manufacture and requirements for direct labor and floorspace were
based on the cost of the stable platforms rather than on the cost of
the gyros going into the platform, $12.5 million, 1,500 workers,
and 120,000 square feet of floorspace would have to be added to the
conservative estimates given in F, above.**
If the USSR were using a more complicated guidance system for
its air-to-air missile (comparable to that of the Falcon) and if --
for missiles which include a stable platform -- the costs, direct
labor, and floorspace factors applying to the stable platform were
used, conservative estimates based on a single shift would be as
follows: maximum annual cost of manufacture -- $97.5 million; total
labor (including indirect) -- 15,500 workers; and total floorspace --
1.24 million square feet. On the basis of the more likely assumption
that a simple guidance system similar to that of the Sidewinder is to
be used, the maximum annual cost of manufacture is approximately $62.5
million, and 9,500 workers and 760,000 square feet of floorspace are
required. It is apparent from the preceding estimates that, because
of the large numbers of missiles involved, the cost of manufacture and
the labor required for moderately precise gyros considerably outweigh
the cost of manufacture and the labor required for the stable plat-
forms. For example, the assumption that the air-to-air missile will
include 3 moderately precise rate gyros rather than no rate gyros
adds some $35 million and 6,000 workers to the annual maximum require-
ments. If the entire stable platform rather than the gyros alone were
included in the assumption, approximately $12.5 million and 1,500
workers would have to be added to the estimate.
Because the preceding estimates are the maximum annual amounts,
in most years the cost of manufacture will be less than $l+0 million,
the requirements for labor less than 6,000 workers, and the floorspace
* PP. 32, 33, 36, and 37, respectively, above.
The maximum additional cost of manufacture would be $15.8
million, and the maximum additional direct labor required would be
870 workers.
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-requirements less than 500,000 square feet. It does not appear,
therefore, that the gyros, in particular, and the precision mech-
anisms, in general, required for the assumed program for guided
missiles will cause an undue burden on the economy of the USSR. The
current status of the gyro and precision mechanisms industries in
the USSR, however, is unknown, and thus the effect of the assumed
program for guided missiles on the specific industries cannot be
precisely evaluated. As previously noted, inasmuch as approximately
65 to 75 percent of the workers required in the gyro industry can
be trained in 1 year or less, the Soviet gyro program should require
approximately 2,000 workers who are highly skilled -- who need more
than 1 year's training. On the assumption that the nucleus of
skilled labor is available, there is no apparent reason why the
gyro industry cannot be expanded to meet requirements which may be
levied upon it if it-is not already of sufficient size. The require-
ments of the gyro industry likewise should not place an undue burden
upon the precision mechanisms industry in the USSR.
I. Gyroscopes for the Soviet Aircraft Industry.
The annual cost of producing gyros for aircraft in the USSR
is estimated to be approximately $24 million, the total number of
workers required to produce these gyros is approximately 3,000,
and the total floorspace required is approximately 250,000 square feet.
If the requirements for the production of gyros for aircraft
are added to the requirements-for the production of gyros for guided
missiles on a single-shift basis, a conservative estimate of the range
of the maximum annual requirements for production of all gyros in the
USSR would be as follows: manufacturing cost, $86.5 million and
$121.5 million; total labor (including indirect),, 12,500 and 18,500
workers; floorspace, 1 million and 1.5 million square feet.
The-additional amounts, both in dollars and labor, indicated
by the requirements of aircraft for gyros, added to the requirements
'ofguided missiles for gyros, would not be of sufficient magnitude
to;change the conclusions reached in H, above.
IV. Qualifications on the Application of US Factors of Production to
the USSR.
The methodology used in III, above, in determining the cost of
manufacture and the requirements for labor and floorspace in the
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production of gyros for a possible guided missile program in the USSR,
based on US analogy, has many disadvantages and opportunities for
error. In the first place, the US factors used may not be entirely
accurate. This is especially true for those items which have not yet
been produced in volume. The US-:factors, however, are based on the
best US estimates available. On the assumption that the US factors
do accurately reflect the US cost of manufacture, there are, never-
theless, a number of qualifications which must be considered. in
judging the probable accuracy of the results of using US analogy in
determining Soviet requirements. In this section some of the assump-
tions implicit in applying US data to Soviet industry will be enumer-
ated, discussed, and qualified.
A. Assertion That the Product Is Comparable.
Although in the estimates given above it was assumed that the
gyros used in various Soviet guided missiles would be comparable to
the gyros used in the US counterparts, there are at least three points
which should be considered in evaluating this assumption. First, the
quantity and quality, or class of gyros, used in a guided missile are
partly a function of the type of guidance system used -- inertial,
star-supervised, ground radio, beam-riding, homing, or other type of
guidance. The type or types of guidance used or to be used in Soviet
guided missile programs are not known at this time. Second, the class
of gyro required is partly a function of the accuracy required of the
guided missile. Here again, the Soviet philosophy as to the accuracy
required of Soviet guided missiles is unknown. Third, even though
the USSR requires the same accuracy for Soviet gyros as the US does for
US gyros, different specifications and tolerances may be levied on
the producer. For example, standards of service life, ease of main-
tenance, finish, appearance, and similar characteristics may be lower
in the USSR than in the US.
It is apparent from the examination of various Soviet aircraft
instruments that the USSR has redesigned many US or European instru-
ments in such a way that they are adequate for the task intended and
also cheaper to produce. In some respects the Soviet design may be
somewhat inferior to that of the instrument from which it was adapted,
but the Soviet instruments are essentially equal to their foreign
predecessors in sensitivity and ruggedness.*
* For a fuller discussion of this point, see Appendix A.
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The Soviet air-craft instruments mentioned above are relatively
simple instruments and cannot be considered equivalent to the classes
of gyros discussed in connection with guided missiles. Soviet de-
signers, however, are ingenious in simplifying designs toreduce the
cost of manufacture. There is no reason to believe that this simpli-
fication of design will not be attempted in the more complicated
instruments. The extent of Soviet success, however, cannot be judged
at this time.
B. Assumption That the Methods of Production Are Comparable.
Examination of Soviet aircraft instruments indicates that the
latest Soviet techniques and methods can be considered comparable to
those used in the US. The Soviet instruments examined revealed that
two basic methods of production had been used. Under the first method
a low production type of job shop, equipped with universal machine
tools, was apparently used to produce an early class of gyro. The
second method is illustrated by an instrument produced in 1951. This
instrument was designed for high-production tooling and large-scale
serial production and utilizes many of the features and advantages
of mass production such as universal machine tools, low skills, and
line-production layout. 13
At the present stage of development in the field of more pre-
cise gyros in the US, both of the methods mentioned above are used.
The job-shop type of production is used for small lot-s or for develop-
mental and perfecting runs. When designs have been perfected, uni-
versal machine tools and line-production layout may be used. Assembly
is'still a bench-type operation. As production increases in quantity,
more use is made of jigs and fixtures, but at the present time US
producers make little use of truly specialized machines and true pro-
duction-line assembly techniques in production of gyros. The cost of
manufacture in the US may be reduced considerably bystandardizing
classes of gyros used so that larger scale production could be achieved.
Tho cost of production given in Table 1* and the labor requirements
given in Table 2,** however, have been estimated on the basis of vary-
in$ quantities of production. Thus the scale of production has been
taken into account in the estimates of cost.
** 11 above.
** P. 16, above.
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C. Assumption That the Productivity of Labor Is Comparable.
The application of US factors of production to Soviet require-
ments in a given field implies that the productivity of labor in the
two countries is equal. For industry in general there seems to be
little doubt that this assumption is false. In intelligence reports
which attempt to compare the productivity of the US and the USSR,
the productivity of labor in various industries in the USSR appears to
be 2/3 to 1/2 or less that of the US. Among Soviet goals is an in-
crease in the productivity of labor between 1956 and 1960:
In industry: not less than by 50 percent, which must
principally be realized through the growth of the tech-
nical equipment of labor and through the introduction of
advanced technical equipment and technology, the all-
around expansion of complex mechanization and automation
of production processes, the modernization of the equip-
ment, the wide-scale expansion of the specialization of
enterprises, and the introduction on this basis-of mass
methods of production, a radical improvement of labor
organization and the liquidation of wastage of working
time, as well as the reduction of labor consumed in aux-
iliary operations. 15
There are several factors which affect the productivity of
labor in industry, including the quantity and quality of the capital
equipment used; the organization of production, both in the entire
economy and in the individual enterprise; and the diligence and skill
of labor in the industry. As indicated in the quotation given above,
the USSR intends to increase productivity in industry in general by
at least 50 percent in the next 5 years by improving these factors.
Reports of the trip by the US automation team to the USSR 16
indicate that in most of the plants visited much of the equipment was
old, production often was not well planned, materials-handling equip-
ment was not widely used, and poor plant layout caused waste motion.
The same team reported, however, that the workers were working harder
than in US plants, that the number of technical workers in Soviet
plants was impressive, that the machine design and concept of many
machine tools seemed equal to those of the US machine tool industry
except for perhaps 2 or 3 outstanding US companies, that the labora-
tories in Moscow University and ENIMS were well equipped with domes-
tically produced instruments, and that the tools were well maintained
and doing a good job.
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In an industry such as that producing precision gyros-for
guided missiles, the high priority of the guided missile program can
be expected to attract (or draft) some of the best workers, machinery,
and managers. Although productivity in this particular industry may
not equal that in the US, it is likely that the difference would be
considerably less than indicated by general indexes.
D. Lead Time in the Soviet Aircraft Indus.
A recent article in an intelligence journal 17 indicated
that_production lead times in production of aircraft in the USSR are
being compressed. Among the factors compressing lead time are the
following:
1. The Council of Ministers may waive state trials and may
order immediate production.
2. Plant managers and design chiefs may speed the develop-
mental cycle by pretooling.
3. The Soviet industrial philosophy calls for a constant high
rate of production of relatively few basic models, constant full em-
ployment, tight control of the industrial labor force, and stability
of the engineer population.
4. There is a great degree of standardization in materials
and accessories.
5. Where possible, new aircraft designs minimize the need
for radical departures from previous production techniques, tools,
and jigs.
6. There is a high degree of coordination and unity of
effort in seeing that component parts are delivered on schedule.
Although the evidence submitted in the article cited above
indicates that at least one model of a Soviet aircraft was produced
in less time than a similar US type from requirement stage to produc-
tion of the first unit, the evidence is still inconclusive as to the
extent that this example -can be generalized.
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If the amount of effort and degree of priority being placed
on a certain type of aircraft in both the US and the USSR are con-
sidered, the comparison of production lead times becomes extremely
difficult and tenuous. There probably would not be a great deal of
difference in lead times if both countries were working with the same
degree of concentration on a given project.
Although the foregoing discussion of lead time in the USSR
applies to the aircraft industry, the gyro industry should face some-
what similar problems and should receive somewhat similar priorities.
The technical problems faced both in the US and in the USSR should be
similar. The production lead times given for US gyro plants* are based
on the assumption of wartime pressure to produce and should be indica-
tive of the lead times required in the USSR under the same circumstances.
E. Recapitulation.
The use of US counterpart information as a basis for determin-
ing Soviet requirements for gyros for guided missiles and for estimating
the cost of manufacture of gyros to the USSR, both in terms of dollars
and of labor, is at best a rough first approximation. The errors that
may result from the assumptions made when using US analogy, however,
tend to be offsetting. As indicated previously, examination of Soviet
aviation instruments indicates simplification of design over counter-
part US instruments with little, if any, loss in functional ability.
These simplifications aimed at increasing producibility may well offset
the apparently lower productivity of labor. Until more definite infor-
mation on the actual differences in US and Soviet factors can be de-
termined, calculations using US factors of production probably will be
the most indicative of the scale of effort required in the production
of gyros to support the assumed Soviet program for guided missiles.
* See II, G, p. 23, above.
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COMPARABILITY OF SOVIET AND US-AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENTS
A recent intelligence report based on a study of several Soviet air-
craft instruments indicates that those of mechanical and electromechan-
ical types that are patterned after foreign instruments are simpler in
design and are more crude in workmanship. The Soviet instruments are
essentially equal to their foreign predecessors in sensitivity and
ruggedness, although they have a shorter life expectancy. 18 The re-
port also noted that few fully machined parts were found. Machining
operations on stampings and castings were numerous but appeared to
have been done only where necessary. Gaskets were used to compensate
for the generally poor finishes in order to meet the functional require-
ments of the instrument. The report concluded that the use of gaskets
may have lowered the cost of manufacture considerably. 19 Loose
tolerances in the stampings and machined parts did not appear to prevent
the construction of a reasonably accurate instrument. 20
A report based on the analysis of a Soviet gyro-optical sight
stated that workmanship on the motor and gyro assembly is about equal
to that on the equivalent US sight. The gyro wheel was excellently
made. In general, the Soviet range potentiometer unit is somewhat
crude in appearance, but it is well made and probably will give more
trouble-free service than the potentiometer used on the US K-14. In
some respects the construction of the Soviet optical sight is inferior
to the US sight. Fungus- and corrosion-resistant coatings are not
used. Machine operations are held to a minimum. With the exception
of the critical optical and gyro components, the techniques for pro-
duction are designed to require only semiskilled labor. The cost of
manufacturing the Soviet sight in the US would be approximately 75
percent of the cost of manufacturing the US sight. 21
The following quotation seems to summarize the situation as to
the adequacy of Soviet aircraft instruments:
The MIG-15 instruments are generally designed
for operational adequacy and low production costs.
In the case of the attitude gyro there has been
some sacrifice in performance caused by the method
of gimbaling. This sacrifice is apparently accepted
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in order to permit a reduction in manufacturing
costs. The operational effect of this drop in
performance may be reduced to insignificance by
pilot adaption to minor inaccuracies in presen-
tation. 22
There is evidence that the USSR is striving for simplification
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METHODOLOGY
1. General.
The calculations in this report are based on information obtained
from the US gyro program. The various gyros for which information
on cost and labor were received are identified in Tables 8 and 9,*
by consecutive numerals. The grouping of the gyros is based on the
class of gyro, the degree of precision, and the use for which the
gyro is intended. Some of the gyros listed were not developed
specifically for guided missiles, but are suitable for use in cer-
tain guided missiles.
2. Cost of Production per Unit.
Table l** in the text is a summary of the information presented
in Table 8. Table 8 presents US costs of production per unit for
various classes of gyros and stable platforms. For each class of
gyro a typical cost of manufacture was derived. For the classes and
levels of production for which sufficient data were available, the
typical cost is an arithmetic mean, modified by known differences in
precision or other physical characteristics and by apparent biases
in estimates as revealed by an analysis of all the data available.
The typical cost of manufacturing 50 units per month was estimated as
150 percent of the cost of manufacturing 100 to 200 gyros per month.
The figure of 150 percent was derived from the few instances in which
the cost of manufacturing 50 units per month was given and from a
few examples of the cost of manufacturing 10 units per month.
The cost of manufacturing relatively crude amount gyros for
stabilization is assumed to have approximately the same relationship
to the cost of manufacturing relatively crude rate gyros for stabil-
ization as the cost of moderately precise amount gyros has to that
of moderately precise rate gyros. The cost of relatively crude
amount gyros, therefore, is derived by multiplying the cost of rela-
tively crude rate gyros by 22.
Tables 8 and 9 follow on pp. 51 and 54, respectively.
P. 14, above.
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3 Direct Labor per Unit.
Table 2* in the text is a summary of the information presented in
Table 9.** Table 9, which relates to the US requirements for direct
labor per unit of production, refers to the same gyros presented in
Table 8,*** and the methodology is the same. Analysis of the data
submitted for certain gyros revealed that there was evidently con-
siderable purchase of parts or subassemblies and that therefore the
d rect labor required was understated. This factorwas given con-
sideration in arriving at the typical requirements for direct labor.
4 Floorspace Required per Worker.
The estimates of total floorspace required per worker in the US
are based on the information summarized in Table 10.****
In the calculations of floorspacerequired in the USSR, estimates
off' 100 square feet per worker engaged in direct labor and of 60 square
feet per worker engaged in indirect-labor were used.
5 Stable Platforms. -
The stable platforms for which factors of production are presented
are not suitable for the intermediate- and long-range ballistic
missiles. Therefore, in making calculations of the cost of manu-
facture and of the requirements for labor based on the use of stable
platforms, the SSGM-3 (Atlas) wasgiven a factor of 3, the SSGM-2
(-$caled Corporal) wasgiven a factor of 2, and all other guided
missiles requiring platforms were given a factor of 1. The platform
for the ICBM is assumed, therefore, to cost 3 times as much and to
take 3 times aslong to build as the platforms for which information
w$.s obtained. These costs apply to models for manufacture and not to
the developmental models, which are necessary before production-line
techniques are possible.*XXXX
* P. 16, above.
** Table 9 follows on p. 54.
*** Table 8 follows on p. 51.
**** Table 10 follows on p. 57.
* Continued on p. 59.
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Table 8
US Cost of Manufacture per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms
at Various Rates of Production
1955 us
50 Units
100 to 200 Units
500 to 1,000 Units
10,000 Units
Class of Gyro
per Month
per Month
per Month
per Month
Highly precise single-degree-of-freedom
gyros for navigation
Number 1
2,225
1,430
960
N.A.
Number 2
N.A.
1,325
1,200
900
Number 3
N.A.
1,250
1,100
850
Typical cost of manufacture
2,000
1,335
1,150
900
Relatively precise amount gyros
Number 4
N.A.
1,500
1,250
950
Typical cost of manufacture
2,250
1,500
1,250
950
Relatively precise rate gyros
Number 5
1,160
730
535
N.A.
Number 6
N.A.
1,2+0 /*
450
373 J
Typical cost of manufacture
1,050
700
500
X00
Footnotes for Table 8 follow on p. 53.
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Table 8
US Cost of Manufacture per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms
at Various Rates of Production
(Continued)
1955 Us
50 Units
100 to 200 Units
500 to 1,000 Units
10,000 Units
Class of Gyro
per Month
per Month
per Month
per Month
Moderately precise amount gyros
Number 7
N.A.
1,000
800
N.A.
Number 8 J
3,705
1,480
950
N.A.
Number 9
N.A.
815
625
500
Number 10
N.A.
850
640
48o
Number 11
N.A.
950
675
575
Typical cost of manufacture
1,425
950
750
600
Moderately precise rate gyros
Number 12
N.A.
300
260
N.A.
Number 13
N.A.
410
322
240
Typical cost of manufacture
525
350
290
240
Relatively crude rate gyros
Number 14
335
200
125
N.A.
Typical cost of manufacture
300
200
150
125
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US Cost of Manufacture per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms
at Various Rates of Production
(Continued)
1955 US $
Class of Gyro
Three-gyro platforms
50 Units 100 to 200 Units 500 to 1,000 Units 10,000 Units
per Month per Month per Month per Month
Number 15
N.A.
7,500
5,700
4,500
Number 16
N.A.
8,720
N.A.
N.A.
Typical cost of manufacture
11,250
7,500
5,700
4,500
a. This figure appears excessive for this quantity. If the output was considered to be 10 units per month, this
figure would be more comparable to the other figures.
b. For 2,000 units per month.
c. This gyro is somewhat more precise than the other gyros in this class. It falls between this class and the
relatively precise amount gyros.
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Table 9
US Requirements '-or-Direet LabDr--per- -Unit-for Various Classes of-Gyroscopes and for--. Stable.. Platforms.
at Various Rates of Production
50 Units
100 to 200 Units
500 to 1,000 Units
10,000 Units
Class of Gyro
per Month
per Month
per Month
per Month
Highly precise single-degree-of-freedom
gyros for navigation
Number 1
384
214
122
N.A.
Number 2
N.A.
235
190
145
Number 3
N.A.
225
185
140
Typical direct labor
335
225
185
140
Relatively precise amount gyros
Number 4
N.A.
230
185
140
Typical direct labor
345
230
185
140
Relatively precise rate gyros
Number 5 183 89 46 N.A.
Number 6 N.A. 311 a* 105 94
Typical direct labor 180 125 95 80
* Footnotes for Table 9 follow on p. 56.
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Table 9
US Requirements for Direct Labor per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms
at Various Rates of Production
(Continued)
50 Units
100 to 200 Units
500 to 1,000 Units
10,000 Units
Class of Gyro
per Month
per Month
per Month
per Month
Moderately precise amount gyros
Number 7
N.A.
225
180
N.A.
Number 8
632
253
111-1
N.A.
Number 9
N.A.
162
115
90
Number 10
N.A.
155
110
82
Number 11
N.A.
167
120
95
Typical direct labor
285
190
11E0
Moderately precise rate gyros
Number 12
N.A.
75
60
N.A.
Number 13
N.A.
87
68
55
Typical direct labor
120
80
65
50
Relatively crude rate gyros
Number 114
58
31
15
N.A.
Typical direct labor
50
35
25
20
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Table 9
US Requirements for Direct Labor per Unit for Various Classes of Gyroscopes and for Stable Platforms
at Various Rates of Production
(Continued)
Three-gyro platforms
50 Units 100 to 200 Units 500 to 1,000 Units 10,000 Units
per Month per Month per Month per Month
Number 15
N.A.
1,050
775
625
Number 16
N.A.
1,088
N.A.
N.A.
Typical direct labor
1,575
1,050
775
625
a. This figure appears excessive for this quantity. If the output was considered to be 10 units per month, this
figure would be more comparable to the other figures.
b. This gyro is somewhat more precise than the other gyros in this class. It falls between this class and the
relatively precise amount gyros.
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Table 10
Average Floorspace Required per Worker in Production of Gyroscopes
in Four Typical US Companies a/*
1955
Square Feet
Company
Remarks
Production
Assembly
Total
A
Rate of production of 100 units per month or
less
Rate of production of more than 100 units
per month
B
Relatively simple gyro
100
30
65 b
Gyro of average complexity
100
)+0
70 b
Complicated, highly precise gyro
100
80
g0 b
C
D
Gyro of average complexity at a rather high
rate of production
At production rates of 100 to 200 units per
month
(1) Attitude gyro of average complexity
(2) Simple rate gyro
(3) Combination of (1) and (2), above
* Footnotes for Table 10 follow on p. 58.
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115
75
90
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Table _..10_.._
Average Floorspace Required per Worker in Production of Gyroscopes
in Four Typical US Companies
1955
(Continued)
Square Feet
Company Remarks Production Assembly Total
D (Con-
tinued) At production rates of 500 units per month
(1) Attitude gyro of average complexity 90
(2) Simple rate gyro 60
(3) Combination of (1) and (2), above 75
a. The figures in this table may not be entirely comparable. The figures for Company A
are average requirements for floorspace to be applied to both direct and indirect labor.
The figures for Company B presumably do not include space for such common facilities as
washrooms, cafeterias, and similar services and do not make allowance for large- or
small-scale production. The figures for Company D are calculations based on total floor-
space required and thus should include all the ancillary services.
b. The total is for direct labor, calculated on the basis of 50 percent production and
50 percent assembly, which is close to the breakdown for figures on gyro personnel of the
company.
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TOP
6. Cost of Manufacture and Requirements for Labor for Aircraft Gyros.
The US Air Force estimates of the number of aircraft produced in
the USSR in 1955 by types L4/ were rounded and used as the basis for
the quantities of gyros required. From other US Air Force reports, 25/
some of the gyro instruments used in Soviet aircraft were determined.
This information, together with US practice, was used to fit require-
ments for aircraft gyros into the system of classification used in
this report.
The following data or assumptions were used:
a. Fighters use the following three gyro instruments:
(1) AGK-47b, a combined artificial horizon and turn and
bank indicator, equivalent to a relatively crude amount gyro.
(2) PDMK-3, a remote indicating compass which includes a
DGMK-3 directional gyro unit, equivalent to a relatively crude amount
gyro.
(3) NS-23, a .computing sight which includes a rate gyro,
equivalent to a relatively crude rate gyro.
b. All-weather fighters are assumed to require the equivalent
of one relatively precise amount gyro for radar stabilization.
c. Trainers are assumed to use the same instruments as
fighters, excluding the sight. Two-thirds of the trainers are assumed
to require dual instruments.
d. Transport aircraft are assumed to have dual sets of in-
struments similar to fighters and an autopilot which would require
the equivalent of two relatively crude amount gyros.
e. Commercial/utility aircraft are assumed to have one set
of flight instruments similar to fighters.
f. All bombers are assumed to have dual controls and auto-
pilots. There is a requirement, therefore, for the equivalent of
six relatively crude amount gyros.
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(1) Light bombers are assumed to require, in addition, 2
relatively precise amount gyros -- 1 for bombsight purposes and 1 for
Fire-control purposes.
(2) Medium and heavy bombers are assumed to require 1
stable platform system for blind bombing purposes and 1 relatively
brecise amount gyro for fire-control stabilization, in addition to
he flight instruments indicated above for bombers in general.
g. It is assumed that an additional 20 percent of each class
cif gyro will be required for spares.
Table 11* indicates the number of gyros required for Soviet
aircraft, by class of gyro.
Soviet cost of manufacture was calculated on the basis of
the information in Tables 1** and 11. The values used from Table 1
were obtained by interpolation of the proper columns. Thus:
b
Class
Cost
per Unit
Total
er
Lum
5,000
Relatively crude rate gyros
$ 175
$ 875,000
000
0
33,000
Relatively crude amount gyros
350
,
11,55
00
4,000
Relatively precise amount gyros
1,375
5,500,0
-600
Stable platforms
10,000***
6,000,000
Total
$23,925,000
Soviet requirements for direct labor were calculated from
Tables 2**** and 11 in the same manner as the cost of manufacture
was calculated. Thus:
* Table 11 follows on 'p. 62.
** P. 14, above.
XXX This platform is assumed to be somewhat simpler than the
platform given in Table 1, p. 14, above.
x** P. 16, above.
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Number
Class
Man-Hours
per Unit
Total
5,000 Rel
atively crude rate gyro
s
30
150,000
33,000 Rel
atively crude amount gy
ros
50
1,650,000
4,000 Rel
atively precise amount
gyros
205
820,000
600 Sta
ble platforms
1,500*
900,000
Total
3,520,000
On the basis of each person working 2,300 man-hours per year,
to obtain the above figure for total direct labor would require 1,520
workers. On the basis of an equivalent number of man-hours for in-
direct labor, a total of approximately 3,000 workers would be required
to produce gyros for aircraft in the USSR.
* This platform is assumed to be somewhat simpler than the platform
given in Table 2, p. 16, above.
61
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Table 11
Soviet Requirements for Gyroscopes for Aircraft, by Class
(1)
(2)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ft
Number of
Each
G
Number of Aircraft
Produced
Number of Gyros
for Production J
Spares b
,
Total _!
ro
Class of G
Type of Aircra
yros
y
1
4
ooo
4,000
800
5,000
Relatively crude rate gyros
Fighter
,
crude amount gyros
lativel
R
Fighter
2
4,000
8,000
1,6oo
8
y
e
Trainer
4
1,000
4,000
00
Trainer
2
500
1,000
200
Transport
6
600
3,600
720
Commercial/utility
2
500
1,000
200
Bomber
6
1,700
10,200
2,040
27,800
5,560
33,000
Relatively precise amount gyros
for fire control
Fighter
6oo
6oo
4
120
480
Light bomber
2
1,200
00
2,
Medium and heavy
500
100
bombers
3,500
700
4,000
Stable platforms
Medium and heavy
1
500
500
100
600
bombers
a. Column 3 times column
b. Twenty percent of column 5.
c. Rounded.
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GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Little is known about the precision machine industry, in general,
or the precision gyro industry, in particular, in the USSR. The
location of several plants producing gyro aircraft instruments or
marine gyro compasses is known, and some of these instruments have
been examined. Information relating to these plants is slight, how-
ever, and information concerning the development and production in
the USSR of the more precise types of gyros necessary for a guided
missile program is almost nonexistent. Any information concerning
Soviet production of gyros suitable for guided missiles will be use-
ful in filling this major gap in intelligence.
Within the framework of this report, the major gap is information
concerning the cost of manufacture and the labor required to produce
the highly precise gyros and stable platforms used in medium- and
long-range ballistic missiles. This gap is largely a result of the
lack of experience in US production of this class of gyro or platform.
Further collection, which is being undertaken, should aid in filling
this gap in the near future.
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SOURCE REFERENCES
This report is based largely on information received from US producers
of gyros. Therefore, much of the material is not specifically documented.
The majority of the sources referred to are completed intelligence
reports, technical reports published by producers of gyros, or reports
published by missile contractors. All sources are evaluated RR 2 unless
otherwise indicated.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other sources
A
- Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
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2. US Time Corporation. Subminiature Precision Rate Gyroscopes,
Technical Data Handbook SA78A-2, New York, nd, p. 1-1. U.
3. $ell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. Guided Missile System, XSAM-A-7,
Missile and Booster, Missile Guidance Section, G-S-15660 Main-
Ftenance Notes, vol 11.2, revised 15 Oct 53, 2d printing, sec VIII.
C.
Bulova Research and Development Laboratories, Inc. Characteristics
Required in Gyroscopes for Guided Missiles with Special Reference
to Dove, Petrel, Meteor D-40, Sidewinder, Talos and Terrier Missiles,
Final Report Under Contract NOrd-13 95, Task I, Flushing, N.Y.,
Mar 54, p.. Iv-1-8. c.
Draper, C.S., Wrigley, W., and Grohe, L.R. The Floating Integrating
;Gyro and Its Application to Geometrical Stabilization Problems
on Moving Bases, 24-27 Jan 55, IAS Preprint no 503, revised printing,
New York. U.
4. Bulova Research and Development Laboratories, Inc. (3, above),
p. IV-2. C.
5? Aerophysics Development Corp. Summary Report on the Dart Anti-Tank
Missile, Phase III, April 1, 19 to February 1, 1955, rpt no
-1003-3-R5G, Part 2, 1 Feb 55, Appendix III, p. 3. C.
6. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company, Aeronautical Division.
ADC107 11-53, Honeywell Gyros, Apr 55. U.
7.
25X1A
8.
9.
10.
11.
25X1A
12.
13.
14.
Ibid., p. 47. S.
Ibid., p. 27. S.
"US Experts Laud Soviet's Industry," New York Times, 20 Dec 55. U.
., p. 5,, encl 5. C.
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STATSPEC 15.
25X1A2g 16.
25X1A 17.
25X1A2g 18.
New York Times, 20 Dec 55. U.
Ibid., 1 Jan 56. U.
Russia: An American View of Red Industry," Iron Age, 9 Feb 56,
P- 53-56. U.
"Automation in Russia," Instruments and Automation, vol 29, no 4,
Apr 56, p. 679-682. U.
19. Ibid., p. 61.
20. Ibid., p. 70.
25X1A2g 21.
22.
23.
25X1A2g
25.
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