PETROLEUM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1956
• Content Type: IR

row ease 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PETROLEUM IN COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA/RR PR-145
30 July 1956
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
`UMENT NO. -/
r, P c 17,
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090,
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
WARNING
This material contains irhtbrmation affecting
the National Defense. of the' United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18,. USC, Sees . '793='..ftnd 794,'the trans-
mission og reve1atlon of which in. any manner
to an uYauthoriZed- iespn issprohibited by law.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PETROLEUM IN COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA/RR PR-145
(ORR Project 25.871).
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
S -E -C -R-E -T
FOREWORD
This report discusses selected phases of the petroleum industry in
Communist China from 1949 through 1955. Particular attention has
been directed to the activities in the petroleum industry during 1952
and the first 3 years of the Chinese Communist First Five Year Plan
(1953-57)-
The project, as originally conceived, was designed to provide a
comprehensive report on all phases of the petroleum industry. Intel-
ligence data were so limited, however, that the completed report is,
in effect, a summary of petroleum production and productive capacity
in Communist China, together with a qualitative discussion of the
distribution and consumption phases of the industry.
S -E -C -R -E -T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. First Five Year Plan (1953-57) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B. Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? 7
D. Refining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
E. Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
F. Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. Prospecting and Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
IV. Production . . . . . . . . . 9
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Natural Crude Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
C. Synthetic Crude Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
D. Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
V. Refining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B. Natural Crude Oil Refineries 16
C. Synthetic Oil Plants and Refineries . . . . . . . . 21
D. Production of Petroleum Products . . . . . . . . . 23
VI. Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. Imports of Crude Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Imports of Petroleum Products . . . . . . . . . 28
VII. Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B. Crude Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Page
C. Petroleum Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
D. Future Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
VIII. Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
IX. Supply-Demand Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
X. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . 33
A. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendixes
:Appendix A. Facilities for Storage and Distribution of
Petroleum in Communist China . . . . . . . .
Appendix B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix D. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33
34
35
37
43
65
67
Facilities for the Production and Refining of Petroleum
in Communist China, 1 January 1956 ? ? ? ? . . . . . . 2
Estimated Production of Crude Oil in Communist China,
1949-6o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Estimated Availability of Crude Oil, Refining Capacity,
and Production of Petroleum Products in Communist
China, 19+9-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Estimated Chinese Communist Imports of Cruae Oil and
Petroleum Products from the Soviet Bloc, 1952-55 . . , 27
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
6., Estimated Petroleum Supply-Demand Balance in Communist
China, 1952-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Estimated Annual Consumption of Petroleum Products by
the Chinese Communist Military Forces, 1950-55 . . . . 32
7. Identified Facilities for the Storage of Petroleum
Products in Communist China, 1955
8. Product Yields in Petroleum Refineries in Communist
China, by Product and by Plant, 1955 . ? . . . . . . 53
9. Estimated Availability of Crude Oil, Refining Capacity,
and Production of Petroleum Products in Communist
China, 1949-51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10. Estimated Availability of Crude Oil, Refining Capacity,
and Production of Petroleum Products in Communist
China, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
11. Estimated Availability of Crude Oil, Refining Capacity,
and Production of Petroleum Products in Communist
China, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12. Estimated Availability of Crude Oil, Refining Capacity,
and Production of Petroleum Products in Communist
China, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
13. Estimated Availability of Crude Oil, Refining Capacity,
and Production of Petroleum Products in Communist
China, 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Communist China: Petroleum Producing Areas and Inside
Refineries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Back Cover
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
CIA/RR PR -145 S -E -C -R -E -T
(ORR Project 25.871)
PETROLEUM IN COMMUNIST CBINA*
Summary
Although the petroleum industry in Communist China has made marked
progress during the 19+9-55 period, the country is still critically
dependent on imports of petroleum. In 1955, Communist China was forced
to obtain about 57 percent of total domestic requirements for petroleum
and petroleum products from other countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
The Chinese Communist First Five Year Plan (1953-57) places great
emphasis on a program of petroleum prospecting and exploration and sets
a 1957 goal for the production of more than 2 million metric tons**
of crude oil. It is unlikely that this goal can be reached -- even
with extensive Soviet aid -- and if the goal were reached, the 2 mil-
lion tons would be insufficient to meet the 1957 requirements for
petroleum.
Chinese Communist production of crude oil, from both natural and
synthetic sources, increased from 120,000 tons in 19+9 to 980,000 tons,
in 1955, and production of petroleum products increased from 100,000
tons to 1.1 million tons during the same period. Although these in-
creases indicate that the Chinese Communist petroleum industry has
made remarkable progress during the 5-year period, on a comparative
basis the industry is still underdeveloped. In 1955 the total annual
production of crude oil in Communist China was about equal to daily
production in the US, and the total annual production of petroleum
products by Chinese Communist refineries was about equal to the daily
production of US refineries.
In the 1949-55 period the estimated annual throughput capacity of
the petroleum refineries of Communist China*** increased from 860,000
tons to 1.3 million tons, and the completion of a new refinery scheduled
for construction at Lan-chou will add about 1 million tons of capacity
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 15 May 1956.
Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
Facilities for the production and refining of petroleum in
Communist China as of 1 January 1956 are shown in Table 1, p. 2,
below.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
H
0
5-i
4-1
o \D
Lr\
bQ O\
r
a
f4
r
l
H % ri
4-3
0
Q)
o
U
0
rd
r
l
~
?r-I
cd
~d
O
U
0
04 r1 ro
o
P4
C
-N Cd
04
Cd
U
!
?-H
U (1) ?r -H H
l
U
-1
r- 10000 ~y
N N 0 0
a)
Cd
P4
-,may rd Cd -rl -rl ?r-1 rl H H H rjd~ (d
0 CH 0 -H CH
?r NaPO'~0.'ir OP Cl]
ap hl
.H H -H rq ? -r-q
0 r4 005--i 000
COd d 0 Cd CCdd d d d .~ .~
a a aaaa a
H o Cd
Cam!) U) U) Cd Cd $I ?
W r P4rZ U Aix
w
N
0
cNNn
HH.~H H
o o-H 0 o
a) (D a) v a) a) a) rd rd
rd rd
d
z
4-1 r-i P4 Pq
PPP +) P 0
4a 0 CH O4a 0445-~w
a_c. o~ op oa0
Cd
0 r.
x~
:t- 0 ME Mu O _N
m - M
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 O O
-:I- MNCnO H HN\NO\D \D t- 0 --t ()H
H HHrHi -A HHHH H?` 0
rl O O O L\ CU H \D \O H N O O\ (~') -
Cf\ L(\ U\ U-\-:J- 0 N U!\ U\ tl\ M N 0 H
O 0 O O O O 0 0 0 O O 0 0 O O
H H r-H r! 0 H H ) N co O\ \D - \D r-H
-:I- -:I- - CC) -t M M M M
Cad
away www
r-I r-I r-1 H r- H H H
O Cad
U U
C/I
C. - F+ $4 ;-, ( F4 P F4 rd rl
N W N N N N N Q) N N a) 0
P-1 a aaaa WwP4 P-i
-p {7 -P -P -p -I-) -F' r-H
CO Cl] C) U) C) U) U) U) U) il) ?rl L6
Cd Cd Cd Cd Cd Cd Cd Cd Cd Cd O
a) m a) a) a) a) (D a) a) a)
19
U QI
Z 'Z `F-r' r'zi Z Zi Ti `T > A co 9 U rd Q)
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
to the total, perhaps by the end of 1958. The Lan-chou refinery, which
is to be built with Soviet aid, will have facilities for the production
of aviation gasoline and jet fuel -- products which the present Chinese
Communist refineries do not produce.
Requirements for, and imports of, crude oil and petroleum products
in Communist China increased considerably during the 19+9-55 period,
particularly during the first 3 years of the First Five Year Plan.
Total requirements, increased from 1.3 million tons in 1952 to 2.1 million
tons in 1955, and total imports increased from 950,000 tons to 1.2 mil-
lion tons. In the same period the proportion of total requirements
supplied by imports decreased from 72 percent in 1952 to 57 percent in
1955. Almost all Chinese Communist imports of crude oil and petroleum
products are supplied by countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, primarily
the USSR. Clandestine shipments from countries of the Free World make
up a negligible part of the total.
Although the Chinese Communist petroleum industry has made sub-
stantial progress during the 19+9-55 period, the industry will not be
capable of meeting all domestic requirements in the immediate future.
Progress made thus far has been the result of the rehabilitation and
expansion of existing oilfields and refineries. It is possible that
the program of development outlined in the First Five Year Plan
eventually will make available adequate sources of natural crude oil,
and it is possible -- although unlikely -- that the 2-million-ton goal
for 1957 production of crude oil will be achieved. It is virtually
impossible, however, for the Chinese Communists to construct and put
into operation within the next few years the refineries and transpor-
tation facilities which would be necessary to any degree of self-
sufficiency in petroleum products.
The dependence of the Chinese Communist petroleum industry on im-
ports of petroleum and of petroleum industrial equipment is the major
apparent vulnerability of the industry. Of some consequence, also, is
the concentration of about 50 percent of the facilities for production
of crude oil and about 60 percent of the petroleum refining capacity in
Northeast China.
The petroleum industry in Communist China might be an indicator of
national intentions only to the extent that military preparations might
be revealed by the relocation of facilities for bulk storage or con-
struction of new facilities, precipitant efforts to develop production
of aircraft fuels, markedly increased imports of petroleum products
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S -E -C -R-E -T
that could be identified as military end items, and unusual efforts to
procure petroleum drums or sheet steel for the fabrication of drums.
At the end of 1955, none of these factors was apparent, and the de-
velopment of the Chinese Communist petroleum industry appeared to be
geared to the generally expanding industrial economy of Communist China.
I. Introduction.
Communist China covers an area of about-3-75 million square miles
and, according to the 1954 census, 1/* has a total estimated population
of about 560 million. 2/ The country is divided into nine adminis-
trative regions, as follows 3/:
1. Northeast China**: Jehol, Liaoning, Kirin, and
Heilungkiang Provinces.
2. North China: Shansi and Hopeh Provinces
3. East China: Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang,
and Fukien Provinces
4. Central and South China: Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi,
Kwangtung, and Kwangsi Provinces
5. Southwest China: Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan, and
Sikang Provinces
6. Northwest China: Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, and
Tsinghai Provinces
7. Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region***
8. Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
9. Tibet
For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D.
A large part of the former territory of Manchuria is included in
Northeast China.
xxx Until September 1955, when the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
was formed, Skinkiang Province was part of Northwest China. 1+
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
The railroads which the Chinese Communists took over from the
Chinese Nationalists were located principally in the regions of North-
east, North, and East China. New construction of both railroads and
highways in the western provinces has received considerable emphasis in
the Chinese Communist press. J The inauguration of service on the
new Trans-Mongolian Railroad in January provided a third rail connec-
tion between China and the USSR, supplementing the two existing rail
lines which enter Communist China through Inner Mongolia and North-
east China. 6/
Although Communist China has one of the largest undeveloped supplies
of energy in the world, coal is the only exploited energy resource
which is significant in relation to total world production. / Neither
production of crude oil nor refining capacity in China is sufficient
to satisfy domestic demands for petroleum products. In 1955, total
production of crude oil in China is estimated to have been 980,000
tons, which was approximately equal to the average daily production in
the US. 8/ Similarly in 1955 the annual throughput capacity of re-
fineries in China -- about 1.3 million tons -- was approximately equal
to the daily throughput capacity of refineries in the US. 9/ The
principal sources of raw material for the petroleum industry in China
are the deposits of natural crude oil in Northwest China and the syn-
thetic oil facilities in Northeast China. The crude oil producing
areas and refineries in Communist China are shown on the map.*
.In the 19+9-54+ period the management and development of the petro-
leum industry in Communist China was under the direction of the
Petroleum Administration Bureau, which was subordinate to the Ministry
of Fuel Industries. 10 In July 1955 the Ministry of Fuel Industries
was abolished, and independent ministries were established for coal,
electric power, and petroleum. 11
II. First Five Year Plan (1953-57).
A. General.
The published Five Year Plan includes the first available
announcement by the Chinese Communists of absolute statistics on
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
production of crude oil* and provides a summary of the goals-and
accomplishments of the petroleum industry in Communist China.
The discussion of the petroleum industry in the Five Year
Plan begins with an acknowledgement of the backward condition of the
petroleum industry and closes with the admission that the petroleum
industry is the weakest segment of the industrial economy of Communist
China.
B. Reserves.
The Chinese Communist Plan describes the condition of the natural
petroleum resources (exclusive of resources recoverable from oil shale
and coal) as "obscure" and establishes as a goal for 1957 a "total
petroleum reserve" of 55.18 million tons, 2.8 times the reserves in 1952.
Although the real meaning of the expression "total petroleum
reserve" is not clear from the context, it may represent proved re-
serves.** In US practice, proved reserves are sometimes expressed as
the ratio of such reserves to production for a given year. Except in
the Middle East, where conditions are unusual, such ratios vary between
10 and 30. The estimated 1957 production of natural crude oil, shown
in Table 2*** indicates that such a ratio for China would be about 40.
In view of the relatively high ratio-and of the obstacles which diffi-
cult terrain, inadequate communications, and locations-remote from
sources of logistic support present to orderly and efficient exploration
for oil in Northwest China, the goal of 55.18 million tons of petro-
leum reserves may be too ambitious.
* the following description of the term crude oil appeared in source
12 to assist in the study of the Five Year Plan:
Petroleum is a type of mineral oil which may be either
"natural petroleum" -- created underground by nature --- or
"synthetic petroleum" derived from the processing of coal
or oil shale. Before processing, the petroleum is called
"crude oil." After processing, crude oil is transformed
into "petroleum products."
** Proved reserves in the US include only the crude oil, natural gas
liquids, and natural gas recoverable from known deposits under existing
economic and operating conditions. 13
*** Table 2 follows on p. 10, below.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
The first Chinese Communist publication of absolute figures for
petroleum was the announced production of 436,000 tons of crude oil in
1952. Previous references to production were expressed as percentages
of selected years. The goal for 1957 was announced as 2,012,000 tons,
4.62 times production in 1952, or an increase of 1,576,000 tons.
The Chinese Communist Plan also uses the term production capac-
ity as distinct from production. The distinction is interpreted to
establish the difference between capability of equipment to produce and
absolute production. It was announced that by 1957 the production
capacity of natural crude oil would be 4.2 times that of 1952, that the
production capacity of synthetic. crude oil would be 2.6 times that of
1952, and that the production capacity of crude oil would increase by
1.52 million tons.
D. Refining.
The Chinese Communist Plan indicated that a new refinery would
be constructed and existing refineries would be restored or expanded.
By 1957 the "oil processing" (refining) capacity would be 2.5 times that
of 1952. It is estimated that the serviceable. capacity for refining
crude oil in 1952 was almost 900,000 tons, and the total capacity
planned for 1957, therefore, would approach 2.25 million tons.
On the basis of Chinese Communist press reports of performance
at various refineries, it is considered unlikely that there are any
unidentified serviceable refineries of significant size in Communist
China. Rehabilitation and expansion of identified refinery facilities
since 1952 resulted in a 1955 refining capacity of about 1.3 million
tons. An additional capacity of 1 million tons annual refining will
therefore be required to reach the estimated goal of 2.25 million tons
in 1957. The Plan refers to the construction of a single new refinery,
and it is believed that the capacity of the new refinery may be about
1 million tons per year. 14/
It would be impractical to export crude oil produced in the
far Northwest. Similarly, it would be uneconomical, even by oriental
standards, to produce crude oil in the Northwest for stockpiling only.
It may be inferred, therefore, that the available refining capacity in
1957 may establish the ceiling on the quantity of crude oil to be
produced.
S -E -C -R -E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
E. Consumption.
The Chinese Communist Plan includes an exhortation to economize
in the consumption of petroleum products and indicates that Communist
China would continue to be deficient in petroleum even if the very
ambitious goals of the Plan should be attained.
F. Construction.
The Chinese Communist Plan includes mention of the construc-
tion of 13 projects by the petroleum industry -- 9 to be completed in
the'5-year period. Two of the 13 projects would be constructed with
Soviet assistance -- one of these two, the refinery at Lan-chou, is
scheduled for completion during the 5-year period.
III. Prospecting and Exploration.
The First Five Year Plan of the Chinese Communists includes, as
part of its program for the petroleum industry, a plan to "carry out
geological prospecting and test drilling in Kansu, Sinkiang, Szechwan,
and Tsinghai Provinces to determine the amount pf petroleum deposits
in those areas." 15/ For the development of this program it was
planned to "utilize new techniques, carry out aerial surveying, improve
combined geological research and geophysical prospecting, undertake
test drills, and carry out geological surveying of natural oil re-
sources fndL7 at the same time, ... Lt] increase the prospecting of
oil shale reserves and reserves of coal which can be used for
liquefaction." 16/
Reports by the Chinese Communist radio and newspapers indicate that
considerable and intensive effort has been directed toward the imple-
mentation of this program. The number of geological personnel engaged
in oil prospecting in Communist China reportedly has increased from
about 18 in the early days of the Communist regime to-several thousand
in 1955. 17/ In 1955, a total of more than 300 petroleum prospecting
teams were operating in China 18/; in 1952 there were approximately 25
teams. 19/ In addition to the increase in the volume of geological
prospecting activity, the Chinese Communists now employ advanced
scientific surveying and drilling methods, including aerial sur-
veys, 20 in numerous areas of China.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
In 1955, geological prospecting was to be undertaken in the five
basins of Chiu-ch'uan, which is located in Kansu Province and contains
the already developed Yumen field; in Tsaidam, Tsinghai Province;
Szechwan, Szechwan Province; and in Dzungaria and Turfan, Sinkiang-
Uighur Autonomous Region. Detailed prospecting was to be concentrated
in the Tsaidam and Turfan Basins as the most promising areas. 21/
Considerable publicity attends the large-scale prospecting for oil
conducted in the Tsaidam Basin in Tsinghai Province. 22/ Work on a
new highway through the northern part of the basin was started in
August 1955 in order to facilitate support of the prospecting for
oil. 23/ In December 1955 the Chinese Communists announced that in
1956, construction would begin on a new railroad from Lan-chou 24
through Sining to the northern part of the Tsaidam Basin. 25/
Available intelligence does not permit the development of a
quantitative estimate of the oil resources which may be discovered in
Communist China. The magnitude of the effort -- in terms of labor and
budget allocations -- directed to exploration and prospecting, however,
suggests favorable possibilities in the areas mentioned. Recent re-
ports indicate that in November 1955, drilling began on the first deep
exploratory well in the Tsaidam Basin 26 and that crude oil of good
quality had been discovered. / Further exploration and drilling
will be carried out at this site in order to reach the main oil
bearing deposit. 28/
IV. Production.
Total production of crude oil in Communist China has increased
from an estimated 120,000 tons in 1949 to an estimated 980,000 tons in
1955, an increase of about 700 percent. Of this quantity, production
of natural crude oil is estimated to have increased from 80,000 tons in
1949 to approximately 530,000 tons in 1955, an increase of 562 percent.
Production of synthetic crude oil is estimated to have increased from
about 40,000 tons in 1949 to about 450,000 tons in 1955, or about 900
percent.
Estimated production of crude oil in Communist China in 1949-
60 is shown in Table 2,* The table shows production from natural and
synthetic sources for each producing location in China for the 1949-57
period and gives forecasts of production of crude oil from natural and
* Table 2 follows on p. 10.
9 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
H0 ~I z
ri~ N p uti
a)
H
o ~I t oII o H
0 w0)
0 a)
O a)
0 L(II 0)1 100
011 P asO
N-II ~ -P
00r'O~ C) \?O"~N- 0
I 01
r-I
0co C S I ~~ ONI O
(O H \O N
0000 01 0 0 01 U" co Lr\ ff-)
rn -1
~I OHHC\J oI ~~ I
Lr\ N O te-' O I M N N M
000rI 01 000 cli 0
N r-i oi N N
0) 0000
rn
H
wcClP 124 ? I, ? a z?i r-I
9
'
SO. 0 _ H?r-I H C! O 0 0 ? H H H H 0 is 4-) H ?HCO'd O+' 0
0
OI 000
O~ H H
0000 0 ro000
r-i
OOH 0
OI
co
-O O U H cd
N I H N -Ci N
C0 co
rII
0NII
?II
v
riw
P H
a) O
a~ 0
'dd ate) w
U a) G
O d r, U
O i-'
?r1 O O
+' H U
?D a) .0 a)
O H a)
O. r+ 4-+ P
O 4-
0 0
CC -P co a)
U O +' 'd
t;. a ,S." d U)
-rq
0
PCIk + H 3 cd H
0
rd a) q U 0 H (1)0)0
O+)3m ~O-O
P ,
d~ N H H 0
N H a+' O O 0 y N
m O\O N FH
H O O O d m
V O 4~ a)
0)1F.H
a) -P 'd
S) a) a)
4 N 4-
U) m O +'
m a) w r{{
i-0)) H 1 P
a) a) 0
Ora _
P, o
u ) P+' 0 F. ' d a ) N ?r0 1"
) 0 P O ~ r o U N (1) N 0+ H (1)
O 'Od a) 'd O LU".
0 r~ a) O 0
O U 0 'd W
yy,, H1 +' (L) (1) 0 0 cd
4p N cd CO w PA S. 4
91 O P P P P a) to
ri F. O ri 0 +' 0 ul\
Q\
H a) O a) m ?.-I '~, O a) r-1 H O (1) r-I
cc U 1 rA H H r-I 4-+ 'd 'd A a) d a) 01 ri
P n9 0)
-P -P -P +' 0 t; a) ' +
0 0 0 0) ri Si a) H 'd ,s", ?rl O ld A 'd N ON)
cd U - td 9 r, 1) O ri
O
U
0 H' a) a)
0 0 F. Fi
.~". ,0 ,1 .0 0 ri 0
4~ +' +~ 4N H w (1) 1 CO H c7 O C)
H
O O P N P~' I H o
O O 0
zzzz ~+?i3 H o
Approved Forltelease 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79 01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
synthetic sources for the 1957-60 period. The grand totals shown in
the table for the 1949-56 period reflect the appl4.catibn of production
indexes claimed by the Chinese Communists to the absolute figure for
production for 1952 announced in the First Five Year Plan.
Although the claims of the Chinese Communists concerning pro-
duction appear to be high, there is no positive evidence to disprove
them. Similarly, the analysis of available plant capacity and ancillary
facilities and services suggests that the fulfillment of the claims
for the years through 1956 is physically possible. On the basis of such
considerations, the Chinese Communist claims concerning total production
of crude oil for the 1949-56 period have been accepted.,
B. Natural Crude Oil.
Chinese Communist claims concerning resources of natural crude
oil indicate that Communist China now has a relatively high potential
for the development of production of natural crude oil -- in contrast
to previous estimates that indicated a very low potential. The pro-
ducing areas for natural crude oil, as well as the sites where prospec-
ting .is now being undertaken, are located in western China, and are
remote from the principal industrial complexes in East and Northeast
China, where the consumption of petroleum products would be expected to
be high. In 1955, natural crude oil was produced at only three loca-
tions in China: Yumen, Kansu Province; Yen-ch'ang, Shensi Province;'
and Wu-su, Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. Production at Yumen
amounted to about 4$0,000 tons, approximately 90 percent of the total
production of natural crude oil, production at Shensi amounted to about
1 percent of the total, and production at Wu-su accounted for the re-
maining 9 percent. Production of natural crude oil in 1955 represented
more than 50 percent of the total production of crude oil in Communist
China.
1. Yumen.
The development of the Yumen oilfield under the Chinese
Nationalist regime began in 1939. 29 Average annual production at
the Yumen oilfield in the 1944-46 period was about 70,000 tons. 30
The indiscriminate exploitation of the oilfield which took place
during World War II resulted in a sharp decrease in production in the
immediate postwar years, but the decrease had been arrested by mid-
1948. 31/ The Chinese Communists began rehabilitation of the oilfield
immediately after they took possession of it, and production is estimated
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
to have been about 110,000 tons in 1950. 32/ Production has increased
gradually since that time, and it is estimated that in 1955, production
at the oilfield amounted to about 480,000 tons. 33/ The Yumen oil-
field has been the only important area of production of natural crude
oil in Communist China and is described in the Chinese Communist press
as the country's largest producer of crude oil. 34/ The principal
producing area is located at Lao-chun-miao, northwest of Yumen, but
t1e oilfield is commonly referred to as the Yumen oilfield and is
under the control of the Yumen Petroleum Administration. 35/
The Chinese Communists have concentrated efforts to de-
lineate and rehabilitate the oilfield and to expand production by
drilling new wells. Frequent references to the presence of Soviet and
Rumanian technicians at the oilfield and to the use of imported equip-
ment indicate both the importance of the effort and Chinese dependence
on foreign assistance. / The most recent project, also undertaken
with Soviet aid, is the project for the repressurization of the oil-
field by the injection of water. 37/ This is consistent with the
Soviet practice of secondary recovery methods to restore and/or to
increaseproduction of -crude oil.
Limited access to the isolated oilfield has delayed the
Chinese Communists in the exploitation of the resources at Yumen.
Until recently the nearest railhead was about 800 kilometers from
the oilfield, and all supplies and equipment for the production oper-
ations were transported by truck. The extension of the projected
Lan-thou - Sinkiang Railroad toward Yumen has helped to accelerate
the-development. Rail service probably will be available to Yumen by
mid-1956. 38 The lack of rail facilities has also restricted the
distribution of the crude oil and refined products produced at Yumen.
Until November 1953 the production of the oilfield was refined at the
local refinery. Since that time, some crude oil has been shipped by
truck to the railhead for shipment to the East. 39/ The capacity to
ship crude oil from the area has, of course, increased as the railroad
approached the oilfield.
The Yumen oilfield will continue to be the principal source
of natural crude oil in Communist China for the next few years and
will assume an increasingly important role in the petroleum economy of
China as transportation facilities are improved. Additional areas
producing crude oil are being developed in the vicinity of Yumen, and
by:1960, production at Yumen may be double production in 1955. 40
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
2. Sinkiang.
The development of resources of natural crude oil in
Sinkiang Province began in 1935 under the joint supervision of the
provincial government and the USSR. 41/ Production was concentrated
at the Tu-shan-tzu oilfield near Wu-su, and in 1942, production was
estimated to be about 20,000 tons. 42/ In 1943 the USSR withdrew
from the joint operation and removed most of the equipment. Only
sporadic and insignificant production occurred in the 1943-50
period. 43/ In 1950 the USSR and Communist China formed the Sino-
Soviet Petroleum Company for the purpose of developing petroleum re-
sources in Sinkiang. The company had virtually no equipment or per-
sonnel, and most of the necessary material for the development of
production was supplied by the USSR. 44/ Production resumed at Wu-su
in 1951, 45/ but the planned production of 70,000 tons for 1957 L6/
indicates the relatively minor contribution of Sinkiang crude oil to
the over-all petroleum economy of China. Production of orrude oil in
Sinkiang will continue to be of local importance only, unless there is
a significant discovery of additional resources of crude oil as a
result of the extensive exploration program in the region.
3. Shensi.
Production of crude oil near Yen-ch'ang in Shensi Province
began in 1907. 47/ Production in 1955 is-estimated to have been about
5,000 tons.* Production in this area is not expected to increase
significantly in the forseeable future and will, therefore, continue to
be of local importance only.
C. Synthetic Crude Oil.
The entire synthetic crude oil industry in Communist China is
located in Northeast China. The industry was developed by the Japanese
in Manchuria in order to utilize the abundant local resources of oil
shale and coal. In China, production of crude oil from oil shale is
considerably more important than processes for production of synthetic
crude oil from coal. In 1955, production of crude shale oil amounted
to about 95 percent of total production of synthetic crude oil and
more than 40 percent of total production of crude oil in China. Con-
siderable effort has been expended in the rehabilitation of the syn-
thetic oil facilities which existed at the time that the Chinese
* See Table 2, p. 10, above.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Communists assumed control, and it isprobable that these facilities
will be expanded. Synthetic crude oil will continue to be significant
in!the petroleum economy of China, although the proportionate contri-
bution will decrease as production of natural crude oil increases.
1. Crude-Shale Oil.
The principal area for production of crude shale oil in
Communist China is Fu-shun in Liaoning Province, where deposits of oil
shale are estimated to be about 5.5 billion tons. These deposits lie
between the surface soil and the coal beds and must be removed to
penit mining of the coal. 48 The oil shale has an average oil con-
tent of about 6 percent and provides raw material for the shale oil
industry. 49/ Two large shale oil manufacturing plants are located
in:Fu-shun -- Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 1 (formerly the Fu-shun
West Plant) and Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 2 (formerly the Fu-shun
East Plant). 50/ It is estimated that in 1955 the two plants produced
400,000 tons of crude shale oil, about 40 percent of total Chinese
Communist production of crude oil.
Construction of Northwest Petroleum Plant No. 1 began in
1929, and the plant was expanded through the addition of a second
section in 1936. 51/ At the time of the Japanese surrender the plant
consisted of 14+0 retorts for the destructive distillation of oil shale,
including 80 retorts with a capacity of 100 tons of oil shale each and
60 retorts with a capacity of 120 tons of oil shale each. 52 The
reported annual capacity of the plant was about 280,000 tons of crude
shale oil. > The USSR removed some small machinery and equipment
from the plant, but at the time of the Pauley Commission's inspec-
ti9n in 1946 the basic facilities remained. 54 The Chinese Nation-
alists operated Northeast Plant No. 1 at a reduced level until 1948,
when it was lost to the Communists. J51 The Chinese Communists re-
sumed operations at the plant in 1949 and continued the restoration
and rehabilitation-of its facilities. 16/ The plant is believed to
haye been restored to its original capacity in 1953. 1Technical
improvements of facilities may have raised the production capacity of
the plant in 1955 to 300,000 tons of crude shale oil.
Construction-of Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 2 was under-
taken during World War II, and the plant was in partial operation in
1944, when production of about 90,000 tons of crude shale oil was
attained. The facilities at the plant included 60 retorts, each
with a capacity of 200 tons of oil shale. Planned annual production
of the plant was 180,000 tons of crude shale oil. 60 The Chinese
-14-
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S -E -C -R -E -T
Communists were in possession of Northeast Plant No. 2 in 1946, and
it could not be inspected by the Pauley Commission, but it was believed
that the basic facilities were intact. 61/ In May 1953 the Chinese
Communists began the repair and restoration of the plant, which had
remained idle since the Japanese surrender. 62/ Essential reconstruc-
tion was completed in December 1954, 63 but available evidence suggests
,that the plant did not attain its designed operating capacity before
the end of 1955. 64 . Technical improvements are expected to raise the
production capacity of the plant to 200,000 tons of crude shale oil by
1957. L5/
One other shale oil plant exists at Hua-tien in Kirin
Province and is designated by the Chinese Communists as Northeast
Petroleum Plant No. 9. 66/ No recent description of the facilities at
this plant is available but total production in 1955 probably did not
exceed 30,000 tons.* Although this area is of minor importance now,
recent Chinese Communist press reports have claimed the discovery of
rich new oil shale deposits at Hua-tien. 67/
2. Other Production of Synthetic Crude Oil.
Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 6, located at Chin-chou in
Liaoning Province,. is the only plant in Communist China known to have
produced synthetic crude oil from coal in the 1949-55 period. 68/
The plant began operation in 1944 and was operated for only a few months
in that year. 69/ It employed the Fischer-Tropsch process for produc-
tion of synthetic crude oil from coal and had an estimated annual
capacity of 30,000 tons of crude oil. 70 The plant is believed to
have been in operation since 1952 71 and, on the basis of press re-
ports, is expected to attain its original capacity. by 1957.
Recent press reports indicate that the Chinese Communists
are rehabilitating a low-temperature carbonization plant at Chin-hsi in
Liaoning Province, 72 the site of a refinery for natural crude oil,
Northeast Petroleum. Plant No. 5. Northeast Petroleum Plants No. 3 73/
and No. 4, 1=I both of which are located at Fu-shun, and Northeast Petro-
leum Plant No. 8 in Kirin _U/5 may produce synthetic petroleum. Available
information and the lack of claims by the Chinese Communists suggest that
production at these plants is very small. 76/
* See Appendix B.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
D. Natural Gas.
The only identified area of production of natural gas in
Communist China is in Szechwan Province, where production is estimated
to be of local importance only. Some of the natural gas produced in
this area is consumed in the local carbon black plant. 77 Press
reports in 195+ referred to production of natural gasoline from
Szechwan natural gas, but there has been no indication of the -develop-
ment of this process on a commercial scale. 78/
V. -Refining.*
In order to appreciate the magnitude of the refining phase of
the petroleum industry of Communist China, it is appropriate to con-
Sider the crude oil charge capacity in terms of a -daily rate as well
as'in the light of similar capacities in US industry. The principal
refineries in Communist China -- Fu-shun, Yumen, Dairen, and Chin-hsi,
each with a charge capacity of less than 10,000 barrels per day --
comprise 90 percent of the total capacity in China. In the US, refin-
eries of similar size contain only 7 percent of the total capacity, and
refineries with charge capacities in excess of 100,000 barrels per day
represent 50 percent of the total capacity.
The installed capacity for refining crude oil in 1952 was
estimated at about 900,000 tons annually, of which about 35 percent
was allied with the shale and synthetic oil plants. In 1955, such
plants contained about the same percentage of almost 1.3 million tons
of,refining capacity.
Natural Crude Oil Refineries.
1. Yumen Refinery.
A natural crude oil refinery is located at Shih-yu-ho,
Ka4su Province, in the natural crude oil producing area of Northwest
China.
* Detailed plant studies have not been included in this report.
Source 79 includes such detailed information for selected plants in
Communist China.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
The development of refining at Yumen is estimated to have
coincided with the development of production of crude oil beginning
in 1939. The original distillation equipment consisted of shell
stills, 6 batteries of 4 stills each. Three of these batteries were
destroyed by floods in the summer of 1943- LO/ Production of crude oil
at Yumen in the years immediately following 1943 81 suggests that the
distillation capacity of the remaining 3 batteries was about 75,000
tons of crude oil per year.
Information related to the expansion or development of the
Yumen refinery during and since World War II is obscure. It was re-
ported that a topping plant with a crude oil charge capacity of
150,000 tons per year was completed during-1945, 82/ but another report
indicated that a similar unit was installed in early 1947. 83/ The
similarity of equipment and time period involved suggests that both
reports concern the same item. A topping plant with a crude oil
charge capacity of 75,000 tons per year reportedly was installed in the
spring of 1948. 84/ On the basis of the reported installations de-
scribed above, the total annual refining capacity at the time the
Chinese Communists assumed control is estimated at about 300,000 tons.
No further information related to increased capacity for
refining crude oil is available until 1954, although the Chinese
Communist press did report that a cracking unit had been completed in
1950. 85/
Plans to expand the Yumen refinery in 1954 included the
installation of a "crude oil tower." 86/ It was also reported that
the capacity of the Yumen refinery would be increased by 26 percent
in 1954. 87/ The estimated refining capacity in 1953 indicated that
such a percentage increase -- about 75,000 tons -- would raise the
annual crude charge capacity at the Yumen refinery to about 375,000
tons for 1954 and 1955. Two 75,000-ton topping plants were in India
on the way to Communist China at the end of World War II. ?/ It is
possible that the topping plant installed in the spring of 1948 was
one of these two plants. The "crude oil tower" to have been installed
in 1954 may have been the other.
2. Wu-su Refinery.
Very little information is available on the Wu-su refinery,
which is located in the natural crude oil producing area at Tu-shan-tzu
in Sinkiang Province. A small refinery with a crude oil charge capacity,
of about 50,000 tons per year was dismantled by the USSR when the
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Red Army abandoned operations in the area in 1943. It was reported
that by 1951 the Chinese Communists had rebuilt or otherwise de-
veloped refining facilities to process between 30,000 and 50,000 tons
of local crude oil per year. 89/ A cracking unit, probably a thermal
type, supplied by the USSR, was placed in operation at the refinery
in May 1954. It was claimed that this unit would increase gasoline
output about 80 percent. In addition, a coking plant, an asphalt
manufacturing plant, a thermal power plant, and drum manufacturing
and auto repair plants were scheduled for completion in 1955. 90/
It was indicated that construction of these accessory units would
"complete the oil refining department." 91
The total annual crude charge capacity of the refinery is
accepted as about 50,000 tons per year in 1952 and 1953, and as about
70,000 tons in 1954 and 1955 -- on the basis of the report that in
1957 the Sinkiang Petroleum Company would produce such a quantity,
which in turn would "supply the demands of the province." 92/
The relatively small local demand for-petroleum and the
remote location of the petroleum deposits in Sinkiang make unlikely
any further expansion of the refining facilities at Wu-su. It is
probable that any additional increase in production of crude oil would
be-shipped to refineries elsewhere in Communist China, at points
closer to centers of consumption.
3. Yen-ch'ang Refinery.
A small refinery was built at the town of Yen-ch'ang in
Shensi Province in 1911. No particulars are available concerning this
plant, but it is understood to be primitive in design. 93/ The
capacity is estimated to be about 5,000 tons per year, sufficient to
process the negligible local production-of crude oil.
4. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 7 (Dairen).
Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 7, built by the Japanese
before World War II, is located on the southeast shore of Kan-ching-tzu
Peninsula, 2.3 nautical miles north of, and across the Ta-lien Bay
from, the main Ta-lien harbor area. 94
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
In October 1945 the USSR removed selected pieces of re-
finery equipment. 95/ The principal refining equipment that remained
after the USSR had completed cannibalization was a 2-stage crude oil
distillation unit with a crude oil charge capacity of about 200,000
tons per year. 96/
There is no evidence to indicate that any processing
equipment which would increase the crude oil charge capacity has been
installed since the end of World War II. The expansion planned in
1954 97 referred only to the development of facilities for manu-
facturing lubricating oils from Yumen crude oil.
Although the degree of serviceability of Northeast Plant
No. 7 during the 1952-55 period is not known, the plant is estimated
to have a capability of processing about 200,000 tons of natural crude
oil annually during the 1952-57 period.
5. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 5 (Chin-hail.
Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 5 is located about 8 nautical
miles west of the port of Hu-lu-tao, southwest of the town of Lien-shan
on the vest side of the main highway and the Peiping-Shenyang Railroad.
Construction of the plant was begun by the Japanese in 1941
and was about 70 percent completed at the end of World War II. Some
plant equipment was cannibalized or shipped elsewhere, but at the time
the Chinese Communists arrived, the equipment remaining at the refinery
included a topping unit with a crude oil charge capacity of 150,000 tons
per year and a cracking unit with a charge capacity of 35,000 tons per
year. 99
The Chinese Communists did not undertake rehabilitation of
the existing facilities at the plant until 1952, when restoration of
the cracking unit was begun. The cracking unit was completed in Sep-
tember 1953 and operated on charge stock from Northeast Petroleum Plant
No. 1 until the topping unit at Northeast Plant No. 5 was placed in
operation. Restoration of the topping unit began in March 1954 and was
completed in October 1954. The Chinese Communist claim that the
capacity of the restored topping unit was approximately four times the
plant capacity when only the cracking unit was employed 100/ is con-
sistent with these estimated capacities. The completed plant was
described as "one of the largest domestic natural crude oil refineries
in China." 101
- 19 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C--R-E-T
6. Shanghai Refinery.
Early in 1954 the Chinese communist press made several
references to the construction and/or expansion of a refinery in the
Shanghai area. The site was described as an old oil-storage installa-
tion-at which efforts to install simple refining equipment were made in
1950. In April 1954, construction was under way to expand the results
oflthe earlier effort in order to provide a "huge new modern oil re-
finery" 102 which would produce 11 times as much product as in
1950. 103 A cracking unit of unidentified type and capacity is to be
included in the completed plant. 104
Available information on the existence of refining facil-
ities in Shanghai before 1954 is conflicting. The information varies
from reports that deny the existence of any refinery to reports of a
400,000- to 500,000-ton refinery which would exceed-the capacity of any
refinery known to exist in Communist China. A single reference to the
shipment of Yumen crude oil to "refineries in the East and Northeast"
represents the only Chinese Communist implication that operational re-
fining capacity might exist at Shanghai. A related news report
identified the arrival of crude oil from Yumen at the Dairen area, but
there was no such report to indicate that any had arrived at Shanghai.
Although there have been recent news reports of research and develop-
ment activities at the Shanghai Refining Plant, 105 there has been
no reference to the shipment of crude oil to Shanghai and no reference
to the recent operation or production of a petroleum refinery at
Shanghai.
On the basis of available information, it is believed that
there was a small refinery of insignificant capacity at Shanghai dur-
ingthe period from 1950 through 1955. Although the status of con-
struction of new refining facilities at Shanghai is unknown and no date
of completion has been announced, it is estimated that the refinery
will not operate before completion of the rail link to_Yumen and
probably not before the end of the First Five Year Plan.
7. Lan-chou Refinery.
The Chinese Communist press reports related to the new
Lan-chou refinery describe it as the "first of its size in China" and
indicate that the plant will have a capacity of about 1 million tons and
will produce, among other things, aviation gasoline and aviation kerosine
(jet fuel). 106 The planned production of aviation gasoline implies
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
the use of specialized conversion equipment -- that is, catalytic
cracking. Reports indicate that such preliminary work as the prepara-
tion of the ground and the construction of rail sidings was under way
in the last calendar quarter of 1955 and that construction of the
refinery would be under way in 1956. 107
On the basis of US experience, it is estimated that a re-
finery of the type and size implied in the Chinese Communist press
reports would require at least 2 years to complete. Using US exper-
ience as an analogy, the completion of the Lan-thou refinery during
the period of the First Five Year Plan is not probable.
C. Synthetic Oil Plants and Refineries.
1. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 1 (Fu-shun West Plant).
At the end of World War II, refining facilities at North-
east Petroleum Plant No. 1 included distillation equipment with an
annual crude charge capacity of about 440,000 tons.108 Two thermal
cracking units with an annual capacity of about 40,000 tons each were
also constructed at Plant No. 1. 109 There was some minor cannibali-
zation of the plant by the USSR following World War II, and it is
believed that the earlier capacity may have been reduced to about
300,000 tons per year. The restoration of Plant No. 1 was completed
in 1953, and after that year the capacity has been considered as
440,000 tons.
2. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 2 (Fu-shun East Plant).
Facilities for refining crude shale oil were planned or
under construction at Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 2 at the end of
World War II, but there is no evidence that such facilities were ever
completed or operated. Crude shale oil produced at Northeast Plant
No. 2 is refined at Northeast Plant No. 1. 110/
3. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 3 (Fu-shun).
Except for casual references to the manufacture of gaso-
line and kerosine in 1954, there is no available information to
provide an estimate of the current status of Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 3. The plant originally had a capacity for refining
crude oil of about 84,000 tons per year. 111/ In the absence of
S -E -C -R-E -T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
positive information, the contribution of this plant to the petroleum
economy of Communist China is estimated to be negligible, and the
original refining capacity is not included in current estimates.
4. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 4 (Fu-shun).
The origin and current status of Northeast Petroleum Plant
No. 4 is obscure. Although the Chinese Communist press had identified
Northeast Refinery No. 4 (and No. 3), it is conceivable that Plants No. 3
and No. 4 may represent a delineation of the old Fu-shun Coal Liquefac-
tion ';Plant (No. 4) into two sections..
There was a single reference in the Chinese Communist
press to the manufacture of kerosine at this plant, and there have been
several references to the manufacture of coke and carbon black. In
the absence of positive information on the operation of this plant,
its contribution to the petroleum economy of Communist China is con-
sidered to be negligible.
5. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 6 (Chin-chou).
There is little available information on the processing
facilities at Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 6. On the basis of the
estimated c-apacity for production of synthetic oil, it is estimated
that processing capacity was 10,000 tons in 1952 and 30,000 tons in
each year thereafter through 1955.
6. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 8 (Kirin).
No information which describes the current status of
Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 8 is available. No references to this
plant have been noted in Chinese Communist press reports, and the
plant's contribution to the petroleum economy of Communist China is
considered to be negligible.
7. Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 9 (Hua-tien).
There is. no evidence that Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 9,
which is located at Hua-tien, has any refining facilities. There are
reports that the crude shale oil produced at Northeast Plant No. 9 is
refined in the facilities at Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 10. 112
- 22 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
8. Northeast Petroleum Plant To. 10 (Kirin).
Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 10 was designed to operate
in concert with Northeast Plant No. 9. Northeast Plant No. 10 is
reported to have conducted small-scale refining operations' through the
years ending in 1952. 113 The refining capacity for the years after
1952, as shown in Appendix B, is a function of production of crude
shale oil at Northeast Plant No. 9. Estimated increases in production
of crude oil at Plant No. 9 indicate that by 1957, Plant No. 10 may
have a refining capacity of 50,000 tons per year.
D. Production of Petroleum Products.
The variety and quality of refined products that are produced
in Communist China are limited by the types of available raw material
and processing equipment. There is no evidence that either recipro-
cating-engine or jet-engine aircraft fuels are manufactured in China.
Preliminary announcements related to the planned refinery at Lan-chou
indicate, however, that there are plans for production of both types
of aircraft fuels. Except for aircraft fuels and high-grade lubri-
cating oils, the petroleum industry of Communist China can produce a
relatively complete line of liquid and solid petroleum products.
Although crude shale oil produced at Northeast Petroleum Plants
No. 1 and No. 2 represents a large portion of Chinese Communist raw
material, only nominal quantities of such liquid petroleum products
as gasoline, kerosine, and diesel fuel are recovered. Attempts to
produce kerosine-type products have resulted in costly consumption of
treating reagents such as sulfuric acid. As much as 80 percent of the
crude shale oil is recovered in the form of residual fuel, paraffin,
and coke. A portion of the residual fuel oil included in the 80 pdr-
cent represents feed stock for the cracking facilities at Northeast
Plant No. 1. The yield from the cracking process represents an
addition to the gasoline and coke yield from the crude shale oil.
Lubricating oils are not normally produced from the crude shale oil.
There have been reports of the inferior quality of motor gaso-
line and kerosine used in Communist China, but the origin of the
inferior products -- from Soviet or indigenous sources -- is obscure.
The national shortage of petroleum products suggests that products of
low quality would be acceptable to consumers.
- 23 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
Estimated availability of crude oil, refining capacity, and
production of petroleum products in Communist China in 1949-55 are
shown in Table 3.* The estimated product-yield pattern shown in Table
3 isbased on assays of the types of raw material available and on
identified refining facilities. A description of the yield pattern of
refined products at Yumen for the second quarter of 1950 is the single
reference to such information. Because of the lack of information and
because the yield pattern can be varied over a wide range by modifica-
tion of procedures for operating refineries, any estimates of such a
pattern are, of necessity, tenuous.
In the absence of absolute data on production from Chinese
Communist-sources, the available indexes for production of gasoline
and other petroleum products do not yield a consistent series of
estimates of production.
Foreign Trade.
A. General.
In the pre-Communist era, China was a consistent importer of
petroleum andpetroleum_products. In 1937, China imported approximately
900,000 tons of petroleum products. In addition, about 150,000 tons of
crude oil were imported for refining at Northeast Petroleum Plant No.
7 at'Dairen. A small amount of products, about 70,000 tons, was ex-
ported from Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 2 at Fu-shun. 114/ In
1947,, imports of petroleum products amounted to about l.Wiillion tons,
or twice the 1937 imports. 115/ In addition, about 3,000 tons of crude
oil were also imported in 19 for refining at Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 5 at_Chin-hsi. 116/ No petroleum products were exported in
1947- 117/
Imports of petroleum products from the Free World by Chinese
Communists in 1949 and 1950 were at a very low level compared with
imports by the Chinese Nationalists in 1947, 118/ and since the Western
embargo was put into effect in July 1950, no large quantities of
petroleum have been received fromthe Free World. 119 Quantities of
petroleum products smuggled into Communist China through Hong Kong
and Macao have never been significant. 120/
Table -3 follows on p. 25.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For RelaPse
0
H
L(1
O1
H
of
Lr\
ON
r-I
PI
O.
r-I
O0 0 N 'Op 0
CT
C - N O~ N
0 -0
co000CO co 00 00
C\j N
o(DaCC) 00 0 o{0
C- MM r l O1
.......-.~ 0 -0
c0 O O 0CQ co 00
OpoO\ O 0 OLr\NLr\0 0 ..:d-0
C\j
'DDNH? 0 o t-- \10 H M N ~I OlCO
of
N
Lr\
O\
H
0 -0
(Y) Lfl\
M HL- t- \O H Hr~l
\10 0 MO 0 0 N\lD0 Q 00
L--
--t H L co rM -I N rl N vI f\ U\
in 0 -~ CO Q 0
CM) y2; N
01
N ;4 H CO
rn
1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A004.100090001-7
0 0 0
H
Lr\ N
N
H
N Lr\.z'
OOMO
0
OD
01\
J MN
M
.:I
N
0
H
rfM
'-O
O
r(
--' O
H N
H
rl
rj (1) (D G H
H Q
r-I .41
CO
co co
co 0 LC H \l H D 'D O
H N N
Lr\ 01 _:t- 0
t- N ON
(n L r\ 0 { H N
4-1 a)
cd 0 U U N H W w N
'cd ~
~0 n h ()0 v,o to
,9 0
r w CE O
rd ~ 4 e
Approved For Rele se 199/09/26 : CIA OP79-01093A001100090001-7
 Approved F?~ Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
rl
0
U a)
0 r
0 49
0
0
O\
H oo~
0
P1
CH to
a)
N 0
0 0 ?ri 4i a1 Pt
41 $4 O O d
Q OR
O a) 'd O H
0 m to rd o
rd
,d cd H ate) ate) a)
?p . 4 U .
~I cd -N rd
FCCf a) ? rl U)
4-3
PQ m 4-7w rd
4' , O a) 0
w, am mom
rF e~ see J;9@9909/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Approved FO
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
As a result of the embargo by the West, Communist China has
been dependent on the Soviet Bloc for requirements of crude oil and
petroleum products to supplement domestic supplies. Estimated Chinese
Communist imports of crude oil and petroleum products from the Soviet
Bloc in 1952-55 are shown in Table 11.
Estimated Chinese Communist Imports
of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products from the Soviet Bloc a/
1952-55
1952
150 b/
80o c/
950
1953
200
800 c/
1,000
195+
200 1
800
1,000
1955
250 J
1,000 LI
1,200 ~l
a.
b.
C.
d.
Information for 1949-51 is not available.
121
122/
This is based
on requirements for Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 7. 123/
e. This is believed to have remained at the level of 1953.
f. The amount of petroleum imported from the USSR "in-
creased very much" in 1955. 12)+/ It is believed that this
increase amounted to about 25 percent.
g. Rounded to two significant figures. The total
rounded and does not agree with sum of components.
B. Imports of Crude Oil.
Imported crude oil was required for Northeast Petroleum Plant
No. 7 at Dairen, which began operations under the Chinese Communists in
the last half of 1950, and for Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 5 at
Chin-hsi, which resumed operations in 1954. Crude oil imported in the
1950-53 period is believed to have originated on Sakhalin Island and
probably was imported by rail via Sui-fen-ho or by barge via the
- 27 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Sungari River. 125/ Crude oil imported in 1954 and 1955 originated in
the central areas of the USSR as well as in the Soviet Far East. 126/
C. Imports of Petroleum Products.
Available information on Chinese Communist imports of petro-
leum products in the 1952-55 period is insufficient to warrant estimates
by origin and by type of product. In this period the Chinese Commu-
nists produced no aviation fuels and only a few types of lubricants.
All aviation fuels probably were supplied by the USSR, 127/ and lubri-
cants were imported from Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as from
the USSR. 128/ As recently as August 1954, approximately three-fourths
of the lubricating oils and greases offered for sale by the China
Petroleum Company in Sian were of foreign origin. 129/ Such fuels as
gasoI_ine, kerosine, and diesel fuel were imported from the USSR and from
Rumania. 130/
The major portion of the petroleum products imported by Commu-
nistiChina is transported on the Trans-Siberian Railroad from
western USSR and enters China through the-, border stations at Otpor/
Man-;thou-li and Grodekovo/Sui-fen-ho. 13/ Therecently completed
Trans-Mongolian Railroad will provide a shorter alternate route for
the transportation of petroleum products from the USSR to China. 132/
Tanker shipments of petroleum products from the Black Sea area to
China represent-another medium of supply. Shipments of petroleum
products-from Rumania to Chinese ports amounted to about 100,000 tons
in 1954. 133/ In 1955, they dropped to about 50,000 tons, all of
which was shipped directly to South China ports. 134/ Although ship-
ments from the Black Sea to China declined in 1955, the coincident
increase in shipments of petroleum from the Black Sea to the Soviet
Far East suggests that a large portion of such shipments was destined
ultimately for China. 135/
VII. Distribution.
A. General.
Available information on the distribution of crude oil and
petroleumproducts within Communist China is sufficient to provide only
a general pattern. It is not possible to develop quantitative esti-
mates of the movement of petroleum.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Means of transportation by.land historically have been inade-
quote in Communist China. Although inland waterways have served to
distribute much of the imported petroleum within China, the distribution
of indigenous sources of petroleum is dependent principally on land
transportation. In addition to the limitations of local transportation,
the lack of upcountry facilities for bulk storage and the inherent
limitations of tank trucks necessitate heavy dependence on the use of
drums and other types of containers. The long supply routes and the
relatively slow transportation facilities make the demand for con-
tainers a significant problem in the petroleum industry.
The only indigenous crude oil that enters into the internal dis-
tribution pattern in Communist China is that produced at the Yumen
oilfield. Since November 1953, increasing quantities of Yumen crude
oil have been transported from Northwest China to the refineries for
natural crude oil in Northeast China, a distance of about 2,000
miles. 136/ The amount of crude oil transported from Yumen to the
Northeast is estimated to have been from 100,000 to 150,000 tons in
1955. The crude oil was transported from the oilfield to the rail-
head by truck, either in drums or in tank trucks, and thence by rail.
tank cars. 137/ Completion of the Lan-chou - Sinkiang Railroad to
Yumen -- probably by mid-1956 -- will facilitate the transportation of
crude oil from the oilfield. 138/
Imported crude oil is used only in the refineries for natural
crude oil in Northeast China. Crude oil from the central USSR is trans-
ported via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Otpor/Man-chou-li and con-
tinues by rail to the refineries. 139/ Crude oil from Sakhalin Island
can be imported by tanker, by rail, through the border station at
Grodekovo/Sui-fen-ho. or by shallow draft vessel up the Sungari River
to in-transit storage at the river port of Chia-mu-ssu. 140 The
Sungari River route could not be used during the winter season.
The general direction of flow of petroleum products within
Communist China is from the north to the central and southern areas.
Practically all imported products enter Northeast China,* and domestic
* Use of the Trans-Mongolian railroad will relieve the concentration
of imports of products in the Northeast.
- 29 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
production of petroleum products is concentrated in Northwest and
Northeast China. The small quantity of petroleum which is imported or
smuggled into South China probably is consumed in that area. The
small production of petroleum products in Sinkiang and Shensi-Provinces
is consumed locally and is not distributed generally.
Petroleum products manufactured at Yumen, Kansu Province,
probably are distributed in the Northwest and Southwest regions,
Tsinghai Province, and Tibet -- principally by truck. In addition,
an unidentified quantity ofrefined products is also shippedeast
from Yumen by truck and rail. The total amount available for distri-
bution from this area in 1955 was about 290,000 tons. Imported or
indigenous products which originate in Northeast China probably con-
stitute the principal supply of petroleum for North, East, and Central
China. Products available in Northeast China in 1955 amounted to about
1.7 million tons. These products are shipped via the main north-south
rail line through Peiping to Hankow and Canton to supply the central
area of China, or by water from ports in Northeast China to Shanghai
and to such intermediate ports along the North China coast as Ta-ku,
Chefoo, and Tsingtao. 141/ The large storage facilities at Shanghai
make it an excellent terminal point for products received by rail or
water from Northeast China. From Shanghai these products can then be
distributed to points along the Yangtze River as far inland as Chung-
king. Products received at Hankow by rail from the north can also be
transshipped to points along the Yangtze River. Coastal shipment be-
tween Shanghai and Canton would be subject to harassment by the Chinese
Nationalists, and the quantity shipped by thisroute presumably repre-
sents only a negligible percentage of the total internal distribution
of petroleum products.
D. Future Trends.
The construction of a large new refinery at Lan-chou, at the
hubs of such projected rail lines as the Lan-chou - Pao-t'ou line, the
Lan-chou - Sinkiang line, and the Ch'eng-tu - Paoki line, probably will
eliminate the cross-country shipment of crude oil and will certainly
facilitate the internal distribution of petroleum products. Crude oil
produced in the Yumen oilfields probably will be transported only as
far as the refinery at Lan-chou. The refined products from the Lan-chou
refinery will supply the planned industrial complex in the Lan-chou
area as well as consumers in the Southwest and Northwest regions.
- 30 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
VIII. Consumption.
The principal petroleum products consumed in China before World
War II were kerosine, fuel oil, and gasoline. Imports of kerosine
alone amounted to between 33 percent and 40 percent of total imports.
In 1947 under the Chinese Nationalists, consumption of petroleum
products in China reached a level of more than 2 million tons, more
than double the annual consumption in the 1935-37 period. This large
increase was principally the result of greatly increased imports of
fuel oil, financed in part by the US Government. The shortage of
coal in Nationalist-held territories and the relatively easy supply
of fuel oil through US aid influenced industries and utilities to
convert from coal to oil. The principal products consumed in 1947
were fuel oil, gasoline, and kerosine. The increased consumption of
fuel oil in 1947 represented about 50 percent of total consumption,
and consumption of kerosine remained at approximately the same level
as in the prewar period. 142
. In the first few years of the Communist regime in China, consump-
tion of petroleum products was drastically reduced because of a
shortage of supplies. This reduction necessitated rationing, the use
of substitute fuels, and reconversion to coal for industrial fuel
wherever possible. The minimum annual civil requirements in 1949 and
1950 have been estimated at about 500,000 tons of petroleum products. 14
Available information does not permit the development of estimates
of civil consumption in Communist China by region, by type of product,
or by consuming sector. Estimated annual consumption of petroleum
products by the Chinese Communist military forces in 1950-55 is shown
in Table 5.* The estimated petroleum supply-demand balance in Com-
munist China in 1952-55 is shown in Table 6.**
In spite of the increasing availability of petroleum products for
civil consumption, numerous press references to campaigns for the con-
servation of fuels such as gasoline and diesel fuel 144 and the in-
stitution of kerosine rationing in Liaoning Province 145 indicate
that the requirements for petroleum have also increased. Users of
lamp kerosine increased from about 90 million in 1950 to about 380
million in 1953, 146 and sales of kerosine in 1954 increased 81
percent over sales in 1953. 147 The increase in domestic production
* Table 5 follows on p. 32.
Table 6 follows on p. 33?
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S -E -C -R -E -T
Table 5
Estimated Annual Consumption of Petroleum Products
by the Chinese Communist Military Forces a/
1950-55
Product
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Aviation gasoline
13
31
48
53
52
56
Motor gasoline
20
48
6o
74
84
103
Jet fuel
0
74
95
157
156
170
Diesel fuel
52
81
105
123
142
156
Fuel oil
38
48
84
104
117
137
Lubricants
3
5
7
8
9
11
Total J
130
290
400
-520
-560
63:0
a. 148/
b. The totals are rounded to two significant figures and
may not agree with the sum of components.
of petroleum in the 1950-55 period was insufficient to meet the in-
crease in consumer demand. 149 The First Five Year Plan indicates
that even the production of more than 2 million tons as planned for
1957 will be inadequate to supply the country's needs.
IX. Supply-Demand Balance.
Communist China was dependent on imports of both crude oil and
petroleum products from 1952 through 1955. For purposes of this re-
port, total demand is considered to equal total new supply, and civil
demand is represented by the difference between total demand and
military demand. During the period from 1952 through 1955 the output
of petroleum products from indigenous sources increased by about 125
percent, and the estimated total demand increased by about 60 percent.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Estimated Petroleum Supply-Demand Balance in Communist China a/
1952-55
New supply
Thousand Metric Tons
1953 195+ 1955
Domestic production /
(i
500
710
850
1
100
ncludes yield from the
following quantities of im-
ported crude oil) c/
Imports of
d
(150)
(200)
(200)
,
(250)
pro
ucts J
8oo
8oo
8oo
1,000
Total
1,300
1,500
1,700
2,100
Military requirements d/
Civil
i
x-oo
520
560
630
requ
rements e/
900
990
1,100
1,500
Total
1300
1,500
1,700
2
100
,
a. All quan~_t.ties shown have been rounded to two significant
figures. Totals are derived from unrounded data.
b. See Table 3, p. 25, above.
c. See Table .4, p. 27, above.
d. See Table 5, P. 32, above.
e. Total new supply less military requirements.
X. Capabilities Vulnerabilities and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The domestic petroleum resources of Communist China are in-
capable of meeting the petroleum demands of the economy. Nevertheless,
the petroleum industry has accomplished remarkable results under the
Chinese Communists. Within the short period of Communist control the
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
quantity of domestically produced petroleum products has increased
from; about 100,000 tons in 19+9 to more than 800,000 tons in 1955.
Although the emphasis on industrialization within the total Chinese
economy probably will precipitate increased demands for petroleum,
the ;rapid progress during the past 6 years suggests that China will
become decreasingly dependent on imports to satisfy such domestic de-
mand. Fulfillment of the announced goal for production of 2 million
tons of crude oil in 1957 is considered to be contingent on Chinese
Communist ability to refine such a quantity. On the basis of Free
World experience, it is concluded that the additional refining
capacity required will not be completed by 1957 and that the Chinese
probably will not attain the announced goal. The admission by the
Chinese Communists that the goal for production of crude oil in
1957 would not be sufficient to meet anticipated demand in 1957
implies that, in any case, dependence on petroleum imports will con-
tinue beyond 1957?
The exploration for oil deposits in the Tsaidam Basin may
disclose a potential the exploitation of which would be dependent on
the development of routes of communication to serve the basin. The
speed with which rail communications were extended to serve the Yumen
oilfields -suggests a capability to accomplish the same for the
Tsaidam Basin.
The continued reliance on outside resources for technical
assistance in crude oil exploration and development and the admission
that the USSR will design and provide the equipment for the new Lan-thou
refinery implies limited local capabilities on the part of the Chinese
Communists. The inauguration of programs of academic training, re-
search, and development at Shanghai and the transfer of qualified tech-
nicians within the petroleum industry indicate the possible increase
of,native technological capabilities.
I B. Vulnerabilities.
Communist China is potentially vulnerable in its dependence
oniimports of petroleum and petroleum industrial equipment and facil-
ities. Action which would prevent the movement of any such_petroleum
supplies to China would have an immediate effect on the total Chinese
economy. The economic sanctions imposed by the UN in 1950, however,
have not had such an effect. Except for additional freight costs and
inconveniences, the UN embargo has not worked any apparent hardship
- 34 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
on Communist China. Adequate supplies of petroleum and petroleum
equipment continue to be supplied to China from the Soviet Bloc, and
there have been few noteworthy attempts to procure such items from
Western sources.
The concentration in Northeast China of almost 50 percent of
Communist China's facilities for production of crude oil and about 60
percent of the refining capacity represents an additional vulnerability.
The vulnerability inherent in the extended routes of communications
between the oil resources in Northwest China and consumption centers
elsehwere in Communist China is offset, in part, by the strategic
advantages of such dispersal.
The lack of upcountry facilities for storage of bulk petroleum
and the corollary dependence on containers, rail tank cars, and
trucks for-internal distribution of petroleum imply a vulnerability
to the degree that regional consumers could be isolated from petroleum
supplies.
The deterioration and obsolescence of facilities for the
production and refining of petroleum in the Northeast -- those con-
structed by the Japanese before and during World War II -- are ex-
pected to be manifest during the next few years. If, as is suspected,
the natural crude oil refineries at Northeast Petroleum Plants No. 5
and No. 7 process the high-sulfur crude oils imported from the Ural-
Volga fields, deterioration of equipment through corrosion may be
accelerated.
C. Intentions.
No activities related to the petroleum industry which would
reveal exclusively military intentions have been noted. There are,
however, several activities which, if carried beyond the normal activ-
ity expected in the development of a backward industry, might be con-
sidered indicators of military intentions. These activities are as
follows :
1. Relocation of existing facilities for bulk storage or
construction of new facilities. (Development of such facilities at
locations remote from centers of population or consumption might
reveal purely military intentions.)
- 35 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S -E -C -R -E -T
2. Precipitant efforts to develop production of aircraft fuels.
3. A significant increase in imports of petroleum products
which could be identified as military end items.
4. Persistent attempts to procure large quantities of
petroleum drums or sheet steel for the fabrication of drums.
- 36 -
S-E-C -R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
FACILITIES FOR STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF PETROLEUM
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1. Facilities for Storage of Bulk Petroleum.
Identified facilities for the storage of petroleum products in
Communist China in 1955 are shown in Table 7.* The location of most
of the nonrefinery storage was dictated by the pattern of imports
and distribution established by the operations of foreign oil
companies in China before World War II. These storage facilities
have not been changed significantly since the establishment of the
Communist regime, although changes in the pattern of distribution
have resulted from the increased availability of domestic petroleum
and the import of petroleum from the USSR through Manchuria. Before
the Chinese Communists assumed control, most of the imports of _petroleum
entered the Shanghai area, where about 60 percent of the Chinese non-
refinery storage is located. The Shanghai facilities now serve
principally as intransit storage for petroleum shipped from North-
east China. The lack of upcountry facilities for bulk storage is
emphasized by the fact that there are no identified facilities for
the storage of nonrefinery products west of about 1100 East longitude.
2. Merchant Marine Tankers.
The Chinese Communist merchant fleet includes 1-0 petroleum tankers
with a total capacity of about 16,800 dead weight tons (dwt). These
tankers are used almost exclusively for coastal shipping. No estimate
is available for the number and tonnage of merchant shipping involved
in the coastal and river movement of packaged petroleum products.
The number of tank cars in petroleum service is estimated to vary
between a minimum of 3,000 and a possible maximum of 5,000. On the
basis of an average capacity of 35 tons each, the tank car inventory
represents a capacity of between 100,000 and 150,000 tons of
petroleum.
* Table 7 follows on p. 39.
- 37 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
4.' Petroleum Drums and Containers.
Available information does not permit the development of an esti-
mate of the inventory of, or demand for, petroleum drums and con-
tainers, but the limited availability of facilities for bulk storage,
tankers, and railroad tank cars suggests that there is a large demand
forpetroleum containers.
- 38 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
U) V4
a) ?r4
000000000 0
U- N MN~ H N L N H \10
W W W W W W W W
MMNQ1% \ONOO
0M0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LrI\ 0
HO.NN(NMMr-4-4\x N-zj-
r-1r-I rIr-IrNir1 IOlCD
-Iu'\-IHoco \ON oS
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m.?-- H - - m -zt
4-> 43
P-i
-P P-4
P-1
P-4
a)
N
cad N
Phi
r-I
N
F~
a
-N
0-ri -N--P+
~
?r1
+)
H +3 +.)
+p
Q) U)
-ri
Q
P~
CnCQco ca
ca
H3
O CO C- O \O N
NO--1NH H
MMMN
0 0 0 0 0 0
r-I H NH H H Nr-1
NririrCU'ri
0 0 0 0 0 0 H
mcr)MCfMn')
a) tto
Pi 0
r-q
0 +' cd cd
0U)CD C1]UCO
zF
0
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
O O -' O O'D N- O`O N O\H\,O N- N- N-O O
9 M \O M tM M; H tx) N- M H CO Lr\ L[\ M
bO
Id
N O U
co TN ,H
0 H
E-1 k' 0
4-a U
?rl
U
co
w
rd
Q)
4i
?r-~
UU
H
W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0 H HCO Lr\r-i 0 O\H OOD MM- -Zj- u\u\M
H N..z- MH 0 N Ham---MH H r-I r-I H H H
0 O O O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O O O O
H cCfl (C H NNH NHN NNH NON O H H H H HH H H H H H
H H H rI r-I rI rI H H H H H H H H H H H
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-t 0 L (I\ O\ CO -t Lr\ Lr\ O\ O\ N N- D U-\ \10 _zf tr\ \1O
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LC\ 0 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
\,0 00 CO 00 0 '-0 `0 00 00 O\ a\ O\ M CO (fl M M
-zt - MM(n cr')(Y)M(Y)M(f)MN N N N N -mt
O 0
r{ ?H
0 0
0 a
0
7~--+ U ?ri u
N H U +' U H
tfD 0 -P ?H
'Ell ?H cd O U O P U U P-r
O H
i k a
0 -P 4-1 -H (L) cd ct
dD +' 0 Cd rd rd H N cd
?rr--~ ? -I-' H
o' rl Pi ?rl cd >4 Cd U H ri
1 cd O U) Cd Un cd +> Cu +' CO
P-1 H3` 0 U]E--iU1U]U0
rd s~ CO O
N 4- aCd UA
?rHii CH I N aO i bO +' 0
-P I cd -P H 0 -P
f0+ 0 d 0 m cd - ?ri cd
U ca v!~ Pax H H HE+ U
O'.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
0
0
N
0
+)
a? `o 0
c-\,0 O N
0-1
Lc\
0
0 0
O
0
OO C~
I\ `O N
C-
M N
L(\
0
H
CC)
ON
cd
?d
Cd
Co
0
0
Iq
H
N N
4O 'H
L` O Q)
p ) :
) U) U) Lf\
H rl LC1 ?H
P 4-) O
W W W W W W W W W W W
OO\O\-:t ( N Nt \.OH
N r-i . 0 H M L(\ N --t
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HCOcoOD~ (N(\J~ O (LI L--
H H H r-I H H r I 9 r-II r-q
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O\0 O\~O~O C-MMN Lr\cO
M .z- 0 0 0 N -H r-{ M -z
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OONNN. 000000\ f
MMMMM(\I -t H N--
0 0 0
?ri H ?r-I
0 0 0
0 0 0
U U C)
FH O
1 + +) +)
;,H P-1 P-1 U P
I -P r-I 0 2 ~ H Cd N ri
co O O UW U U]
cd 0
0 c ri
0 ?- 1 IPA
H
?H ?H +
r-i
O z I d PA (L) l: 0
m H
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S -E -C -R -E -T
APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
1. General.
The estimates of production of crude oil shown in Table 2* represent
a synthesis of available information which was obtained principally
from Chinese Communist press and radio announcements and from a few re-
ports from individuals who have been in Communist China within the past
6 years. The estimates are predicated on the achievement of the an-
nounced percentage increases for total production of crude oil, includ-
ing natural and synthetic crude oil. Where necessary, available
information on individual producing locations has been slightly ad-
justed within the limits of the announced total figure for production
of crude oil. Until mid-1955, no absolute figure for production of
crude oil in Communist China had ever been released by the Communists.
The text of the First Five Year Plan, published in August 1955, con-
tained a figure for production of crude oil in 1952. Absolute figures
for production in 1949, 1953, and 1954 were subsequently released.
The announced figures and the concomitant production indexes for
1949-56 were the basis for the estimates for crude oil.
The consistency of information on individual producing locations
from Chinese Communist announcements and other sources tends to sub-
stantiate the estimates of total production, but it must be emphasized
that all of the estimates are based on Chinese Communist claims.
2. Estimates of Total Production of Crude Oil.
Absolute quantities and production indexes described in the following
discussion were obtained from official Chinese Communist announcements.
a. 1 4 -- In 1952, production was 358 percent of production in
1949, 15y
ielding a figure of 122,000 tons for 1949. The absolute
figure announced for production in 1949 was also 122,000 tons. 152/
b. 1950 -- In 1950, production was 203,000 tons, 166 percent of
production in 1949. 153
P. 10, above.
- 43 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
c. 1951 -- In 1951, production was 306,000 tons, 251 percent of
production in 1949. 154/ Production in 1952 was 143 percent of produc-
tion in. 1951, 155/ yielding a figure of 305,000 tons for 1951.
d. 1952 -- An absolute figure of 436,000 tons for production in
1952 was announced in the First Five Year Plan. 156/
e. 1953 -- In 1953, production was 628,000 tons, 144 percent of
productionin 1952. 157/ The absolute figure announced for production
in 1953 was 622,000 tons. 158/
f. 1954 -- In 1954, production was 127 percent of production in
1953. 159/Using a figure of 628,000 tons for 1953, production in
1954 was 798,000 tons. Using the announced figure of 622,000 tons for
1953, production in 1954 was 790,000 tons. The announced figure for
production in 1954 was 789,000 tons. 160
.g. 1955 -- In April 1955 the Chinese Communists announced a plan
to increase production in 1955 by 30 percent over production in
1954. 161/ The petroleum industry, however, was one of -several which
did-not meet the plan for the first half of 1955. 162/ In September
1955, Li Fu-chun, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, announced
that production of petroleum in 1955 would increase by more than 120
percent over that of 1952 and that the production capacity for petro-
leum would "go up over 980,000 tons." 163/ On the basis of 220 percent
of production in 1952, production in 1955 is estimated at 960,000 tons.
Because the planned increase was to be an unspecified amount more than
120 percent and because the absolute figure of 980,000 tons was men-
tioned at the same time, production in 1955 is estimated at 980,000
tons. This represents an increase of about 24-percent over production
in 1954, compared with the planned increase of 30 percent announced
earlier.
h. 1956 -- Production in 1956 is planned at 1.2 million tons, 120
percent of the goal for 1955. 164/
1. 1957-58 -- Fulfillment of the goal for 1957 of about 2 million
tons is considered to becontingent upon completion of the Lan-thou
refinery. Completion of the refinery is now expected after 1957, and
the full effect of such completion is expected in 1959. In the mean-
tine, within the limits of anticipated refining capacity, production
in 1957 may increase over that of 1956 at the same rate as production
in.1956 increased over that of 1955. A similarincrease is expected
in 1958 over production in 1957.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
J. 1959 -- Production in 1959 is expected to coincide with the
effect of the additional refinery capacity at Lan-chou and is expected
to fulfill the goal for 1957.
k. 1960 -- It has been assumed that production in 1960 will in-
crease 20 percent over that of 1959.
3. Estimates of Production of Crude Shale Oil at Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 1.
Estimates of production of crude shale oil.at Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 1 are based on Chinese Communist announcements, on informa-
tion from persons who have visited this plant, and on information
concerning the available facilities at this plant. In the interest cf
internal consistency and in acknowledgement of the discrepancies which
accrue from small errors in basic data, certain minor modifications
were made in the estimates, which were developed by applying general
increases such as "double," "treble," and the like.
a. 1949 -- The designed annual capacity of the "West Section" of
Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 1 was 120,000 tons of crude shale
oil. 165/ It was reported that in 1949 the capacity of the "West
Section" had been restored to about 40,000 tons, one-third of its
operating capacity. 166/
b. 1950 -- In 1950, production of crude shale oil was planned at
twice the level of 1949. 167/
c. 1951 -- In '1951, production of crude shale oil was three times
production in 1949. 168/
d. 1952 -- Production of shale oil in 1952 was reported to be
about 200,000 tons, 43 percent more than production in 1951. 169/
The estimate of 210,000 tons assumes that in 1952 this plant achieved
75 percent of its total capacity of 280,000 tons.
e. 1953 -- This plant reportedly produced at the rate of 280,000
tons per year after May 1953. 170/ Estimated production in 1953 was
270,000 tons.
f. 1954 -- The planned ultimate capacity of this plant was
300,000 tons. 171/ Chinese Communist press reports indicated that
- 45 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C -R-E-T
production at this plant increased in 1954. 172/ In view of the
rate of production in 1953 this plant is estimated to have operated
at or near capacity in 1954 and to have produced about-300,000 tons.
g. 1955-60 -- There has been no evidence-of a planned increase
in the present facilities for producing shale oil.. It is unlikely
that production in this plant will be increased until additional
refining facilities are available in the Northeast.
4. Estimates of Productionof Crude Shale Oil at Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 2.
a. 1949-53 -- Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 2-was not in opera-
tion during this period. 173/
b. 1954 -- Reconstruction of this plant was started in May 1953. 174/
Press reports implied that the-first section of this plant began
partial operation in June 1954, 175/ that the second section was
completed in August 1954, 176/ and that the third section was com-
pleted in December 1954. 177 Because the initial production of
the first section was only about 400 tons per month, 178/ it is
estimated that total production in 1954 did not exceed 10,000 tons.
C-: 1955 -- A press report of January 1955 announced that pro-
duction of Northeast Plants Nos. 1 and 2 in the first calendar
quarter would be 46.4 percent greater than in the first quarter of
1954.179/ Northeast Plant No. 2 was not in operation in the first
quarter of 1954.: Because Northeast Plant No. 1 probably was still
operating at the rate of 280,000 tons* per year, production inthe
first' quarter of 1954 was estimated at 70,000 tons. Production
for the first quarter of 1955 is estimated at about 100,000 tons,
146.4_ percent of 70,000 tons. The estimated total for the 2 plants
for 1955 is, therefore, 400,000 tons, of which 300,000 tons were
produced at Northeast Plant No. 1, leavingan estimated total -of
100,OQO tons for total production at Northeast Plant No. 2 in 1955.
Although reconstruction of Northeast Plant No. 2 was completed in
December 1954, it is believed that the mechanical difficulties which
would'be present during the early period of resumed operations limited
production in 1955 to less than maximum. 180
See 3, f, Appendix By p. 45, above.
- 46. -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
d. 1226 -- It is believed that by 1956 Northeast Plant No. 2
should be capable of producing at the original designed rate of
180,000 tons of crude shale oil per year. 181/
e. 1 7-60 -- Estimated production in 1957 and subsequent years
is based on the planned ultimate capacity of this plant 182/ and
assumes no construction of additional facilities.
5. Estimates of Production of Synthetic Crude Oil at Northeast
Petroleum Plant No.
The Japanese constructed Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 6, employ-
ing the Fischer-Tropsch process for production of synthetic crude
oil. Estimates of production are based on Chinese Communist press
reports and on the Pauley Commission's report of the condition of
plant facilities in 1947-
a. 1949-51 -- The Chinese Communist press reported that this
plant would be restored to one-half its capacity by the end of 1950. 183/
A repatriate indicated that this plant was restored by that time,
but that because of operational difficulties production in 1951
was negligible. 184/
b. 1952 -- Estimated production in 1952 was based on the
estimate for 1953. Actual production in 1953 was 129.2 percent of
plan, 185 therefore planned production was probably about 11,000
tons, and actual production in 1952 could have reached 10,000 tons.
c. 1953 -- A Chinese Communist press report in 1953 indicated
that daily production of crude oil at this plant in October 1953
was 2.1 tons greater than in September 1953 and that the plan for
production was overfulfilled by 5.8 percent. 186/ Total overproduc-
tion in October was, therefore, 65 tons, and planned production for
the month would have been 1,122 tons. Using a monthly production
rate of 1,122 tons for the first 9 months and a monthly production
rate of 1,122 tons plus 65 tons, or 1,187 tons, for the last 3 months,
estimated production for the year is 9 times 1,122 plus 3 times
1,187, or 13,659 tons.
d. 1954 -- The reported average daily production of crude oil
in April 1954 increased 9.9 percent over that of the first quarter,
and daily production of crude oil in May increased 9.2 percent over
-47-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
that:of April. 187/ Based on the daily rate of production of 38 tons
per day from the lastquarter of 1953 (1,187 divided by 31), the daily
rate~for April would have been 42 tons and for May, 46 tons. Total
production in 1954 is estimated as follows:
First quarter (38 tons per day)
3,420
April (42 tons per day)
1,260
May (46 tons per day)
1;426
June through December (1,426 tonsper month)
9,982
16,o88
Confirmation of the estimate of 16,000 tons, based on Chinese Communist
press reports, may be found in the report of a German technician
who visited this plant and reported that production in June 1954
was at the annual rate of 16,000 tons. 188/
e. 1955 -- Crude oil produced during the first 10 months at
this plant exceeded production-in 1954 by more than 3,600 tons. 189/
f. 1956-57 -- The estimate for 1956 is interpolated. The
estimate for 1957-is based on the assumption that this plant will
operate at the designed c-apacity of 30,000 tons 190/ of synthetic
crude oil.
6.i Estimates of Production of Crude Shale Oil at Northeast Petroleum
Plant No. 9.
The production estimates for Northeast Petroleum Plant No. 9 are
based principally on reports from Japanese repatriates and on scat-
tered reports in the Chinese Communist press.
a. 1949-51 -- This-plant, which was smaller and more primitive
than Northeast Plant No. 1, did not operate in 1948-51. 191/ In
late 1951, plans were under way for rehabilitation and expansion of
this plant. 192/
b. 1952 -- Operation of this plant was started in 1552 with
reported production of about 4,000 tons. 193/
c. 1953 -- This estimate was interpolated.
-48-
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
d. 1954 -- The original plan for expansion called for annual
production of 20,000 tons by 1954-. 194/ References to this plant
in the Chinese Communist press in 195+ 195/ suggest -that the goal
may have been fulfilled.
e. 1955-57 -- By May 193 the original goal had been increased
to 40,000 tons per year. 196/ Recent Chinese Communist press reports
of increased availability of rich oil shales in the area suggest
that further expansion may be planned. 197/ An arbitrary increase
of 10,000 tons per year has been estimated for 1955-57-
7. Estimates of Production of Crude Oil at the Yumen Oilfield.
Estimates of production of crude oil at the Yumen oilfield are
based primarily on Chinese Communist claims, substantiated in a few
instances by first-hand reports on the area. It has not been possible
to reconcile all the claims for Yumen with claims for other producing
areas within the estimates of total production. The claims for total
production issued by the State Statistical Bureau have been preferred
over claims issued by local agencies in the individual producing
areas.
a. 1949 -- In 1950, production was reported to be 138 percent
of 1949 production. 198/ The estimate of production in 1950, 110,000
tons, is 138 percent of 79,710 tons.
b. 1950 -- Estimated production of 110,000 tons is based on
the plan for production of refined products in the second quarter. 199/
Another source reported that production of crude oil at Yumen in
1950 was approximately 2,000 barrels per day, or about 100,000 tons. 200/
c. 1951 -- Production in 1951 was 140 percent of production in
1950 201 and 195 percent of production in 1949. 202/ Based on these
figures, the estimate of production in 1951 is 155,000 tons.
d. 1952 -- Production in 1952 is estimated at about 4,000 barrels
per day, or 200,000 tons. 203/
e. 1953 -- Production for 1953 is interpolated as 303,000 tons.
f. 1954 -- In December 1954, it was reported that. production
of crude oil in 1954 was 5 times as great as in 1949. 204/ This
rate would yield an estimate of production of about 400,000 tons.
- 49 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
An alternative estimate of -about 413,000 tons may be developed on
the' basis of a report that production of crude oil as of 21 Decem-
ber 1955 was more than 112 percent of production in 1954. 205/ The
average of these 2 estimates gives an estimate of 406,000 tons for
195.4-
:9- 1955 -- According to a Chinese Communist report, the rate
of production at the end of December 1955 was about 1,300 tons per
day, 206/ which would yield an estimate of-about 474,000 tons for
the year. This estimateincludes an extra.12,000 tons produced'in
the last 9 days, so that the actual plan for the field is estimated
to have been about 462,000 tons. 207/
h. 1956-57 --- The projected estimate for 1956 anticipates an
increase of almost 20percent over production in 1955, contingent
upon the completion of the railroad to the oilfield by mid-1956.
The increase of -30 percent in 1957 over 1956 assumes-the availability
-of'rail facilities throughout 1957.
8.1i Estimates of Production of Crude Oil at Yen-ch'ang.
Estimatesof production at Yen-ch'ang are based primarily on
Chinese Communist sources. Recent information from a repatriate
confirms the relative size of figures on production. 208/
a. 1949-52 -.- Available statistics on production, indicate that
production in these years was less than 500 tons per year. Produc-
tion in 1952 was 167 percent of production in 1950, 209/ and produc-
tion in 1953 was 5.5 times production in 1950. 210/
b. 1953 -- Production in 1955 was 290 percent of production in
1953. 211/Using an estimate of 4,380 tons for 1955, production in
1953 is estimated at 1,510 tons.
c. 195+ --- Production in 1955 was 110 percent of production in
1954. 21 Using the estimate for 1955, production in 1954 is
estimated at 3,982 tons. An independent source reported that produc-
tion in 1954 was about 3,600 tons. 213/
d. 1955 -- The plan for production in 1955 was completed 76 days
ahead of schedule, 214/ and it was planned to produce an extra 900
tons of crude oil during the remaining 76 days. 215/ Based on a rate
of production of 12 tons per day, annual production in 1955 is estimated
at' 4, 380 tons.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
e. 1956 -- This estimate was interpolated.
f. 1957 -- Production in 1955 was to be 80 percent of the plan
for 1957, 216 which yields an estimate of about 5,475 tons for 1957?
Other evidence suggests that no great increase is planned in this
area in the immediate future. 217/
9. Estimates of Production of Crude Oil in Sinkiang.
Estimates of production in Sinkiang are based entirely on Chinese
Communist claims.
a. 1949-50 -- The Sino-Soviet Oil Company was not established
until 1950, 21 / and production for that year is believed to have
been negligible.
b. 1951 -- Production increased 25 times between 1951 and 1954. 219/
Estimated production for 1954 divided by 26 yields an estimate for
1951 of about 1,174 tons.
1952 -- This estimate was interpolated.
d. 1953 -- Production in 1953 was 19 times production in 1951, 220/
yielding an estimate for 1953 of about 22,306 tons.
e. 1954 -- Production in 1955 was planned to be 163.87 percent
of production in 1954. 221/ Using an estimate of 50,000 tons for
1955, production in 195+T is estimated to be 30,512 tons.
f. 1955 -- Total production of crude oil in Communist China is
estimated to be 980,000 tons. By subtracting the estimates for other
producing areas, production in Sinkiang is estimated at about 50,000
tons. This estimate is believed to be consistent with planned pro-
duction for 1957 and with available production indexes.
g. 1956 -- This estimate was interpolated.
h. 1957 -- The goal for production in 1957 was reported to be
70,000 tons. 222
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
10. Estimates of Production of Refined Products.
Product yields in petroleum refineries in Communist China, by
'product and by plant, in 1955 are shown in Table 8.* Estimated
availability of crude oil, refining capacity, and production of
;petroleum products in Communist China in 1949-55 are shown in
Tables 9 through 13.** The scarcity of crude oil assays and the
lack of detailed information on the availability and serviceability
of proces-sing equipment precludes the development of an accurate
pattern of product yields. Similarly, simple modifications in
refinery operating procedures by the Chinese Communists would pro-
'hibit the preparation of probable estimated yields. The estimated.
refinery balance should be considered a representative pattern.
In the absence of the publication of absolute figures for pro-
duction of refined products for any year by the-Chinese Communists,
estimates of production of particular refined products cannot be
(developed on the basis of announced production indexes.
Table 8follows on p. 53.
Tables 9 through 13 follow on pp. 55 through 64.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Re'q
4)
U
-H 4,3
~ cd
d1 r--I
N r~'i
C ?ri ro
eH rd
rd p4 Lr,,\
1i 9 U r1
ri rd
O 0
P-
~i
?ri
M
rd
H
0)
4-3
U
rd
O
Approved For Release 1999/0p/
26 : CIA-RDP79-01 g93A001100090001-7
U-\ 0
U-\ ~ -
N H H O O I O q
H I C0. ,1
"J U ?. r-i
r) bjO 00 Lei
0) 1 cd
-ri
m O
H U l +~
O O U
a) rj
0 CC)
Lr\ N 0 `~ `~ u-\ 0 H 0 I rcl cd rd U)
IQ w
w o NO
~rd LC\ -H
La (1) 1
W -NO\U
C\j U-\ J H 0 I'Cd
0 H U
Owl F i
H I -r1 O r r-I U
P -P
Pa u) 0 0
0
LCI\ N ~Lf\ `l U\ 0 N r-1
N r0-I U-\ Ln r 0
H
rI N N 00 0
H u 0
ri
HriL[\r-IH 0
H
HNN00L\ OI
CO H 0
U -P ?ri
ri U) Lr\
BFI Q-i i) Lr\
rd
0 I
O 4) H Lr\
0 0 O\
0) ri
to O Ul r-I
0) O ?ri 0
F-i P 0 00 H
0) rl .0\.00
?i 0) co - O
Lr\ co > + 0
N cd O d
`T rd +-,~ cH rd
O L(\ r-1 cd Ord ?r1
CQd Spy i r'1-i 0 W N
N 0)0)i L ?r1 O +P
N Pi U
N cd ? cdd
F I Q) N
U N P,
~4 'n (1) tto P LA + LNr\ N
LQ RI ?ri (!)
a) V
( 9 V.g 1A 0'99001-7
 Approve
to
or RRIease V.99/00/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
P -P -P
Cd rd -H cd
,d -ri rd
N
cod C-)
ro-i CH
0 rd
tta 0
Pi
U) .r{ U r-{
01O O
?ri rd rd
Q) a)
rcl
Pi -P
r rrll 4-)O ~O
ri O
P U 4i rd o
~J] sl U P
rd a~rr'a
Q)
U
CH
4-
H
?rl Pi cd U ' P Pi
H 0 Pi (1) Cd
(4 ~>,
01 a) cd
4-1
m N +U+, 0 cad
0 Q0C 0 Pa
0 r4 0 U rc1 +a ~
4-1 U q (1) +D CO 'd
rd
0
PI
rd
rl
0
O
Q)
rd
?rl
H
O
ril
rd~+
id
tt]
r-!
O
(1) rl O +:) ?-4 ~
-H P-1 0
N cd 'd, - m a) U)
ra ?rl ?r+ v) v
Approved
Q) 0
rr-i V, 4-1
() cd c - cad) O a) U -rT l lCQC
H Ei 0 A ~
~ a)
:p P. 9,840 /M CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Rele re 1199 9/26 : CIA-RD979-01093AO01100090001-7
+'
0 co N to CO CO H 00 H \O
o
C)-\ 0 H
a) ^ ri 1
H r1 O\
cd O +P O\
H ri
0
U
0
+' O
?r1 P
rl a)
P.4
r-i CH
rl 0
Ca
O
H
U
O . \O l.(\
1 I co
O .-- \O 0
co N- 0
000 0
.-t 0
M
Ma\u1 ~ ~ 0
H
O\ co - , O\
r-I M \O
~HHOO mI
Q) a) r1 U
4-:) q) 0 rd
ri U O
O14i d Q) 0 Pi
ri w
?r1 U cd tLO U H U] a) ?rl rd O
O rd r'1 9i O O U) y ?r1 E-1
Approved For Relea
O N -H -H 0 O 0 cd N H r0 (1)
$A cr~
e 1999/09,R6 4G'WRDD'79-0t09aA00110009000
0 O\
u,
u1 r 1 H \O
U-\
M N
co
H
N
O CC) CU
0
cocQ
N
\O Lr\
0
co u
co
I
M
1
H
000
H
0
0
O
C\j r1MO c
r
-1 H
O \O .-
Lf\
N
ON OO''\
~
-1 0
H
NH
O\O -f
0
O O uru\
\
H H 0
0
N
('
000
0
c n
O N N O
C
ON ON
0
M
'nI
`
C\j
O U M] a) cd
 Approved, or Frele
Approved F
U
?rl
a)
C)
?r1
Ni
41
U1
U
U]
se 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01 O93AOO11OOO9OOO1-7
rn
N
C\j
- ~
N G\
H O
ri Cr
N N
LD
RICH H
O O H
a) P a)
ii
a)
4-) CH
cd Rc
rd +P
rn a) 0 ri
-P
r-4 (1) U
i rd rc C
W 0 tD
-P P
?1 U P, rt
rd () ?rl
0 10
?r-I -i +-) a) O
rd
rd 4i a) 0 0 +
O O r{ fj O
P, r
cN ccci F~ O N
a O acd +)
U ?rl H 0
?r1 W Pi 0 F-r
0
rd
a)
tcO
cd
rn O
r-i,r-A
-I
rd O v
cad r
a) ?
r Release9~/0
?ri N - H
U) rd ?HH L-\
pI
N
co
\,O
tr\
H Q c P,~ P
-N cd
O d P o d H
r C
a) 0 a) a) -P v r?1 v
EPA U E-i VI
42+? :?CI1R 7.9-O1 O93AOO11OOO9OOO1-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
HI I ~I OO
LrI O m~- 0
Mr~i~~~ (rlml r-i
r1
r-i
0
ri
N o WO H 0
v
rm. ri o m II r-I
v
OOb.000 U 00000 01 0 0
80009 8
N r1 m
WI _* 000_- 0
o N N m
E-I
0 0 0 0 0
N N m
,O ~' 't O o co N 0
Ii ri N
to
0
.N
41
411 N
R .~7
rl
O
O
N
~ ri
U
0
,(r(~j
4-1
~
?
i " O
ii
W
C) R
N
p p ri N
A
l ?
i
0
N
U ~y
1,
r-i
r
o r
r
r~
r
?1
-I
.
O N
'
qi;. W J
bow
u
o o
Firi
H
q
.. q
Approved For FBI
elease 19%9/
Lr\
. u-\ Lr\ 0 m m N
ri ri N
c i 0 0 m ON un co co t -\O L(\ .# I Un rn
N u ri m co
m rI r-i 1Lr\ 1 rii m M
LIN
\O 0 0 m m 1(I\ m m N ~O O\ m 0 m
t H ri L H- N Ii OC) J O C- U-\
wl
.-oooo O
+O y iM O 0 xA4 P4 FOi
26-1:4 C RbP79-01093AOb 110 090001-7
U
 Approved
For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
U
b {v~
~I fl
9i to
O
0 Fi
I)
N
U to
w-OU
In -I
td
Id O
N rl
17
O
1a rl
m
v 0
rl
r1
m O
.rj
d)
n 0
0)) 0
U
00-
H
A 0
0 4-
N
H Ii
a N O
F+ {maqy
O -a!
Lr'
HHH H Vii-)
O _~ r I 0
P
W0 '
O rim
rl f7
44
H 14 M
o P
_ fi v
O\
Id
ri w
0
0 O
o
v v
ai (U d) 0 0
m
14- OJ
N H C\J O W O tf\
aaao~ P.
ri N-f 44- ' F0) w~~
E W E N Ev C"1, 0
to Z
O 'ri y E
0 0 W a)
Approved karRe1dase1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For, elfeAa+RYe 999/Qg/aq~ C~4-RDPjgo~1p9?Q0' 00090001-7
F I I 0 010 N ri ri co N
H li
NI N
0) N a
ri ri H
rAl o-`0, ,rot
NOHON in OHHOrl N~ H N
600 a 400
z z z
0oU\0U\ 0 rirn))-fCO col O\ LrN
O H CN0 0 N H H N N Lr\ N co cli
. 0p ~ u\ u,\ u\ ao Lt\ m ~l 0 v\
N O ri 0 I N V\ N NN u1 0
0 O H 00 0
00 O
r-z
r~l ~&, 0 O O 119 u" r-I G Nr\
0 N N ri NI N
t000 k 0 \ONCVriri NI N
zt -It u\ u\ O a - Oml 0 ti
.
H N N
ri 0
0 Id
o ,9
13,
a-- N m wri a s +~ H r-i 0
-
p y, +> H m N H 't1 0 O d
ri 41 ul ri ,R pq
O 'd rd-I ~V~y$~ r~- rpl N . j W 0
0 rai t-~0 rI o-S7.1 0 0.077 4 0 r 01 (Yi N Fai
Approved For Release 1999/bgI J c A-R'bP79-01093Aod11 db090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
4 O
443
O ~H
~IPgii p
O -cd 0
+H U
v~
W
41
C 9
0
A
a
4
U
'd
q
M H
H O
L
H
U
0
4-
zoo
z?
(~
C)
0
+'
4
m A
r0-1 ~,-I
C)
.7
z~
'd
1
09
I N
M p
0
41
LN
0
a C
19 a
o
0
N
w~
o ~
4 H
WO 4
O O
ci'd
N m
~a;
r-I
?)
H o
M
m cd
+~ff
0
oo
U
Id
Gl
r I
pNp~~
N
N O
N C
'd
r~i o
O
H
rNl yrUyl
O,
-P M,
H O
a Id
4' N
W U)
02
I'll -N N U
I., P4
0 019 P; ~j
~O?'
11 -
N H N O 'd be ro4) Otis
PI W f4O+~'d u W
rl N -7' M ~ PI 113
A ~ q J m H ,~-i r-1 RI A)
r 0 1 A 41 0
P P p td N O O +) A
S H E O'
0
Approved ov Rble%rse+999/09/26: CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO0110009,0001-7
ri
O
41
O
P,
+-
m
m
0-4NNN- ml
H
N
r-I
OO boOO 0 cO0HOo0 NI M 0
CI)
P
N N
.al
0 0 0 0 0 u\ CO L(\ L N-co LI it 0
N m m oo m 1 1 H LrI -1 m
N atl QJ 0 O a~O I rI O\
El
N co 00 ri N N
rI Ii A ri
000SO o ~bOo~ M 0
v ~~v
z zzz
o\
00000 0 00000 01 0 0
o N
'O000\OO 0 C-NNri N rf N
N
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 0 0
O H
U N
11
0 Lr\ 01,
cqdp
900 o
[~ N
u-\ O
N
N
r1 N U'
P0 0
p
11 U'\
O U O\
O
0 0
0 \O
cd
E
Sri
d
)
+0
F
E-A
Approved For R
Wp ti T 8 I O
4!; 1 ?~ 0 .~' O~\ 8 0 0 0 93 I'D 0
L-- N
v\\O \00~
H NI m U
\ N 'T+ 0 ?d ,1{bo
AI\~{~~ V ~py O ri N a N U y,
O OI O Fri ,c] N 9 ni 1, U rl i-i
ri -P m ri A +~ r1 m m ,1 2'J 0 rdCy O O
-ri
UJ O N td d 1 o C~7 .'Y,O'Qaa E 03 0 0)
lease 199/0 w: `CIRlP79-01093A0tI 10090001-7
 Approved or Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Lr\ N p ON O
'd U1
?. 0 O C-
O
,~+ywz
ri H
(1)) o a
dv mH
4-4 0 4)
R - 0
41
H, ?
qq
O cd O ?d
a' H b W
4)~ z m~
VI, ti
N +' +? O
0 (a
Wig F- ~ +^^~
4) ~{, a3
I?-I 0 N ?H
? '0-F
v cd +' O
0 + d
z a`di A
43
H
N 0 aa))0->1
r-I
Id o
O
>00
4'
?
P
4-
4)
-
do 'Od
(4v
If'
P, O
A
-~
H [[N)~
?
}
4
4H
0
Ld
4))
a) 4.
~
4)
U
W
+'
Ry ?H H
P u
0
4
H
m
y J
O
?do
?4)o
a)
a) rl
U
U
U
-N H
N
E +>
U
? (O
vv
-fw
y U O U
a, i~ o q
H 0
N H4i W
~o? -N0 0
H O 'd N N
a p401 *, 1O oCN P 03 C\j _:t
al d -OH +3 ' +~ +3
am0 ++ m m a (d 0 'd 0
N rO1N 0 Lr\
AW
N +'i-I O w
a a w m{{ fJ o~ 0 40-
11 ',r-I N -f 27+rl N ?ri CO
HH~Hq ?' -,H to 43 U AH
p
H
HHH yy
b v' y N O
?d m L7 'd rl
v a) 0 a) ?H O N a) a)
VV 0 HUH?~ H V Ul
Approved
/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For 7-.8 Iea~ s t 99/09/26 :IA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
tko (DIN
I Z O Lrl 0-, Ol 8 0 0 0 0 N- N
Approved For R
H
9I
O NO m0 0 00 n Nc-co
Lr\
H rl
a)
00 bD00 0
0 - N 0
ri H H
.1 0 li 0 -t u, rl H O N -# I -H -t
40 40 00
? z z z
1
00.-00 u\
co N m M
.f O.#Nm 0
Lr\ N N N 000
N O M Nrl l0 O H N
~N
ri rl H H
O O O N c 00
- -- u1
?HH 18
0 0
i
r r1
000 O _ ,- N c NI
-H CY) rIl
W z
00000 0 00000 010 0
00000 0
c co N O N
Lr% I ~ 0 -:t I
H M M
co 01MMN ~ tUl\ U\
co MM r1N N~ M 0
W N
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 010 0
ri
O O O N
M M
co m \D
N m cn
bO
0
f] N 4.
1 u
4 Id
PI 0 0 P1~ 1~ b1r O w " 9
pp?1 m m h~
., .' 4 H rH "A O . rl ~ U 3
rl +- O rl ppo p .0 rl O N ,-i d O O 0
O pi rd N rl 9 11 rOi aOi O 0 E" ed 0 r~i
O P' .r0i '0T rl .rf7i 0 C0J .YO. A a 0.~i aOd f
lease 199b/OW ' rCRbP79-01093A&'0"110
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
4) qj
4~ 40
?O
P 4
d W
Ppp~ +
4i to +-+ u O
Y
Approved
u r
?i CI
~ ,s] a3 O
d O 0 atl
4- 4- H
v~v
rn 0) -H 4~
V) O W M ,c4y1
0
14-
m8
OF, N
H~ NO
O U q
C; 41) Id'
rI n
"0
N FU
LrI
0
U O w ZO z
:d v R +yyyy~ p
0
Pi Q~ - v W m g
b
41 q o3 v m N 0. ?d
moo"
in
-ri H411 0
rn0vz-p
z v a
m mw
o ~
u q
0 A ad
11 41
A41
o ?oR? CM z`S upo A
cd ~d i ++ 03 +> ?D m O cd
niHccv aro '0) 4- moIr\
al p u w r1 ,n
wwao ~q1 O 4
P U 3 w
H N .# H Pa 4 ?r~i cO
'H 0 "0
~i~~imoow}'w?wA
P E-4 E-A 0' E-1
U]U]U]H +~UHr~l C1 ?d Cnm
or.Rel#asgP~V,9/.09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
ai-,Q Ub NrIM 00 v1 ,qM
q
+' o
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX C
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The outstanding gap in intelligence disclosed by research for
this report is the general lack of information from sources other
than the Chinese Communist government and press. This lack of in-
formation precludes validation of Chinese Communist claims. Par-
ticular gaps exist in the matter of production of petroleum products,
geographical and sectoral consumption of petroleum products, and
petroleum stockpiles and inventory changes.
Although continuing research may fill certain gaps such as
estimates of the details of consumption, other gaps would not be
closed by additional research unless additional information becomes
available.
- 65 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX D
SOURCE REFERENCES
STATSPEC
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
sources
A - Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a
staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a
staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary.'.;
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. CIA. CIA/RR 33, The Economic Development of Communist China
through 1957, 30 Apr 5 , p. 15. S.
2. Ibid., p. 14. S.
3. NIS 39, China, sec 62, Fuels and Power. Dee
4.
- 67 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
5. CIA. CIA/RR-MR-39, Geographic Intelligence Review, Apr 54,
P. 1. C
STATSOE
7. NIS 39 (3, above), p. 1. S.
8. Swain, Paul, and Gibson, Ray G. "World-Wide Oil Report,"
Oil and Gas Journal, 26 Dec 55, vol. 54, no 34, p. 141.
U. Eval. RR 1.
9. Ibid.
X10. CIA. FDD Summary no 216, 16 Sep 54, p. 38. C. Eval. RR 2..
STATS P'E
12. CIA. FDD Translation no 478, First Five-Year Plan of People's
Republic of China, 12 Oct 55. C. Eval. RR 2.
;13, 'CIA. CIA/RA ORB Project 25.470), Petroleum Terminology,
31"May 55, P. 15- C-
14. CIA. FDD Summary no 902, 23 Apr 56, p. 55. C. Eval. RR 3.
15. CIA. FDD Translation no 478 (12, above), p, 35. C.
Eval. RR 2.
16. Ibid., p. 36. Eval. RR 2.
17.
25X1A
23. Ibid.
24.
STATSPEC
25.
26.
27. CIA. FDD Summary no 817, 10 Feb 56, P. 38, info 18 Dec 55
C . Eval. RR 3-
28. Ibid.
- 68 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
25X1A
25X1 A29 32 .
STATSPEC 33
STATSP
34. State, Hong Kong. Survey of China Mainland Press
p. 22. U. Eval. RR 3-
35. CIA. FDD Summary no 255,
STATSPEC
36.
25X1A
29 Oct 54, p. 28.
CIA.^,FDD Summary no 579, 13 Jul 55, p. 27, info 14 May 55-
C. Eval. RR 3.
25X1A
.
2 - n o May
39. CIA. FDD Summary no 295, Dec 54, P- 44
C. Eval. RR 3.
STATSPEC 40.
25X1A2g
41.
25X1A2g
CIA. FDD Summary no 176, 2 Aug 54, p. 2d, into L jun 74.
C. Eval. RR 3-
37- CIA. FDD Summary no 313, 15 Dec 54, p. 41, info 8 Sep 54.
- 69 -
Kai-yung King. "Chinese oil output One-fortieth Her Consump-
tion," The Oil Forum, Apr 49, p: 165-168. U. Eval. RR 2.
Kai-yung King, opo cit. (30, above).
C. Eval. RR 3.
STATSPE
38.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 25X1A2g
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
25X1A 989,
100-.
101.
25X1 A 102.
103.
loo.
105.
106.
25X1A2g
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., IR-239-54, 11 Feb 54, Oil Production in China,
25X1A2g="
108.
log.
25X1 A2g llo.
111.
112.
117. NIS 39 (80, above), p. 62-22. S.
118. CIA. CIA/RR PR-17, Petroleum in the Soviet Bloc, sec III-A,
Summary no 225 (35, above).
817, 10 Feb 56, p. 32, info 18 Dec 55. C. Eval. RR 3.
754, 14 Dec 55, p. 13, info 23 Oct 55. C. Eval. RR 3.
902 (14, above).
731, 25 Nov 55, p. 15-16, info 30 Sep 55. C.
113. Ibid.
25X1A 114. NIS 39 (3, above), p. 62-74
115. Ibid., p. 62-21. S.
116.
25X1 A2gL19 .
Ibid.
CIA. FDD Summary no 263, 8 Nov 54+, p ? 39. C C. Eval. RR 3.
Ibid., no 229, 29Sep 54, p. 37, info 8 Apr 54. C. Eval. RR 3.
CIA. FDD
;Ibid., no
no
Ibid., no
.Ibid., no
Eval. RR
120. Ibid.
121.
25X1A2g
S-E-C -R--E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 25XApp~roved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
139
140.
25X1X7
25X1 A2g141.
FDD Summary no 780 (137, above), p. 59-60. C. Eval. RR 3-
142. NIS 39 (3, above
143. Ibid.
144. CIA. FDD Summary no 676, 4 Oct 55, p. 27. C.
STATSPE
145.
149.
25X41 A2g
25X1A
29 Feb 5b, p. C. Eval. RR D.
CIA. FDD Summary no 313 (151, above).
Ibid.
Ibid.
CIA. FDD Translation no 478 (12, above), p. 19.
State, Hong Kong. Current Background, no 292, 15
3 U. Eval. RR 3.
V. .
25X1A
STATSP6'
162.
CIA. EIC-P-10, Military Consumption or Tletro.Leum cts,
151.
152--
CIA. FDD Summary no 579 (146, above).
CIA. FDD Translation no 521, Statistical Data on t!coriumj,,
Cultural, and Educational Development in China, 1949-54,
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
C. Eval. RR 3.
Sp 54,
158. CIA. FDD Translation no 521 (152, above).
15?.
__ ry^
itin_ r.TA. FDD Translation no 521 (152, above).
163
164.
165.
25X1A2g
- 74 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 25X1X7
FOIAb%Rroved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
25X1A2g
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001100090001-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
SECRET
PETROLEUM PRODUCING AREAS AND REFINERIES
YEN-CH'ANG,
S,....` LAN-CHOU
REA
TSAIDAM BASIN Un er Constru ion t Cheng chow i' ndfruction
~,,,,,~J l ~ Planned Paochi~~` I1[! I _ ?,
I ^- N A N king $};ANGHAI
H
COMMUNIST CHINA
Sedimentary basin with promising oil prospects
P Petroleum refinery
S Synthetic oil plant
--- Railroad
Railroad, under construction or projected
6,0
LES
SECRET
SZECHWAN
BASIN &I
K'unniing)
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01100090001-7
 Approved For Release I 9 , Pffl 1093AO01100090001-7
Approved For Release 199P/091-2!r jj-94 093A001100090001-7