NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN TRADE 1954-57

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A001000060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1955
• Content Type: IR

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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN TRADE
1954-57
CIA/RR PR-128
21 December 1955
l
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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S-E-
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN TRADE
1954-57
CIA/RR PR-128
(ORR Project 42.536)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
I. Foreign Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. From the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. From Communist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. From the European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Developments, First Half of 1955 . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. With Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. With Non-Bloc Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix A. North Korean Projects Receiving Technical
and Material Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B. Material Aid Received by North Korea
during 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix C. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix D. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix E. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
8
10
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Tables
1. Reported Value of Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid to North Korea,
1954-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Material Aid Received by North Korea from
Communist China, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Material Aid Received by North Korea from
the USSR, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Material Aid Received by North Korea from
Specified Countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1954 . . . . . 19
Following Page
Composition of Material Aid Delivered to North Korea Crom
Communist China and the USSR7 during 1954 (Chart) . . . . . 4
Projects in North Korea Receiving Aid from Inside
the Sino-Soviet Bloc (Map) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Back Cover
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CIA/RR PR-128 S -E -C -R -E -T
(ORR Project 42.536)
NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN TRADE*
1954-517
Foreign trade, always a significant aspect of the Korean economy,
has assumed greater significance in the period since the Korean war,
with unrequited aid (as distinguished from barter trade) comprising
the bulk of North Korean imports. The gains which have been made in
the reconstruction of North Korea since 1953 have been attributed in
large measure to the material aid and technical assistance provided
by the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is estimated that in
1954, North Korea received more than a quarter of a billion dollars
in aid from the USSR, Communist China, and the European Satellites.
By contrast, barter trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc during 1954 was
perhaps a third of this amount, and trade with non-Bloc countries
was insignificant.
I. Foreign Economic Aid.
North Korea's Three Year Plan for reconstruction, which began
in 1954, depends on grants of economic assistance from countries of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Table 1** summarizes North Korean announce-
ments of total planned aid as well as reports of actual deliveries
to date.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 October 1955.
** Table 1 follows on p. 2.
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Reported Value of Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid to North Korea
1954-64
Million US 4
Country Total 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958-64
USSR a/ 250 105 b/ 75 c/ 70 c/
Communist China d/ 325 118 120 c/ 40 c/ 37 c/
East Germany e/ 136 20.6 19.7 16.$ 18 8.75 each year
Czechoslovakia f/ 28 1954 through 1960
Rumania h/ 16 1954 through 1956
Bulgaria 7i/ 5 15.4 g/
Poland j/- Amount unknown; 1954 through 1957
Hungary k/ Amount unknown; 1954 through 1957
760 259
a. 1 (For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E.) Stated
in rubles; conversion rate 4:1.
b. Appears to include technical aid as well as material deliveries.
It is not known whether figures for other countries include technical
aid, but in the case of Communist China it appears that only material
deliveries are included.
c. The allocations after 1954 have been made somewhat arbitrarily,
based on reported deliveries for the first half of 1955.
d.
2/
Stated in yuan; conversion rate 2.45:1.
e.
3/
/
Stated in rubles; conversion rate 4:1.
f.
7/
Stated in rubles; conversion rate 4:1.
g.
Total deliveries from the European Satellites were reported as
$36 million, but country breakdown was given only between East Germany
and the remaining Satellites.
h. 5/ Stated in rubles;
I. c Stated in rubles;
j. 7/ Stated in rubles;
k. 8/ Stated in rubles;
conversion
rate
4:1.
conversion
rate
4:1.
conversion
rate
4:1.
conversion
rate
4:1.
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There is little evidence to suggest that the nations of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc have coordinated their aid programs, although it appears
likely that some measure of cooperation is being observed by at least
the two primary contributors, the USSR and Communist China, with the
USSR holding the major advisory role to North Korea. Expressions of
gratitude by the North Koreans for material and technical aid, which
reached a peak in the observance of the Tenth Anniversary of the
People's Republic (August 1955), have ranked the USSR, Communist
China, and the European Satellites, in that order, by both the volume
and the tenor of their praise. The North Koreans claimed by August
1955 the rehabilitation of 230 old and the construction of 60 new
industrial establishments of various sizes. 9/ The nature of the
projects, as well as statements by North Koreans, suggest an effort
to attain and surpass the industrial capacity in Korea before
World War II, when 70 percent of industry was located in what is
now North Korea. 10/ The accompanying chart* indicates the compo-
sition of known aid received by North Korea during 1954 from the
USSR and Communist China.
In 1953 the USSR offered a 3-year grant of 1 billion rubles
($250 million) to North Korea, to be split evenly between military
and economic aid. ll/ In separate announcements the North Koreans
stated that during 1954 the USSR delivered "material aid" worth
390 million rubles ($97.5 million) and "material aid and technical
services" worth 420 million rubles ($105 million). 12/ These
statements imply that the value of technical services alone may
have been 30 million rubles ($7.5 million).
Soviet material and technical aid which has been identified
at 35 specific projects is listed in Appendix A. The projects range
from ferrous metallurgy to machine construction plants, and from
consumer goods plants to broadcasting stations. It is possible
that other projects not listed have also benefited from Soviet aid.
The North Koreans have released a detailed report of
deliveries of Soviet aid to North Korea during 1954. From this
report it has been estimated that the value of these deliveries was
* Following p. 4.
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$51 million, of which approximately 75 percent consisted of capital
goods (machinery, transport equipment, and construction materials)
and the remainder of consumer goods (food, clothing, and drugs).*
The 70,000 metric tons of steel that the USSR sent to North Korea in
1954 was one-third of the estimated Soviet exports of steel to Communist
China in that year. 13/ The other important commodity categories of
Soviet aid were machinery and transport equipment.
The North Koreans have frequently lauded the contribution of
Soviet aid to their economic progress and have acknowledged it to be
"one of the positive contributing factors to the attainment of our
victories." 14/ On the other hand, they have not reported the deliv-
ery of military equipment, which was to constitute half of the
1-billion-ruble aid program. The identified deliveries of non-
military aid and of technical services ($58.5 million) represent
about half of the total aid reported for 1954 ($105 million). It is
probable that military deliveries accounted for at least part of
the remainder.
Aid from the USSR before the Korean War was preponderantly
military and consisted of an agreement to equip and train 6 infantry
divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, and 7 security battalions. 15/
A 10-year economic and cultural pact between the 2 countries was also
signed. Under the supplemental provisions of the latter, a Soviet
loan of $40 million provided for the purchase of industrial equip-
ment and raw materials as well as technical assistance for industry
and agriculture. 16/ This loan, however, appears small compared
with the extensive grant the USSR has given to help rehabilitate
North Korean industry during the current Three Year Plan.
Although it is believed that Soviet technical aid to North
Korea is extensive, the number of engineers and advisers serving
the Koreans is unknown. Soviet engineers and technicians have
been reported in such industries as chemicals, textiles, metallurgy,
cement, glass, plywood, electric power, ceramics, and building
construction. 17/ Observers have reported many Soviet civilians in
Pyongyang, including women and children. One such report noted two
3-story buildings, each of which housed 200 nonmilitary Caucasians,
and another stated that 1 in 10 vehicles in Pyongyang carried Soviet
personnel. 18/ With the estimated aid in technical services to
* For a listing of these materials and an estimate of their value,
see Appendix B.
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SECRET
COMPOSITION OF MATERIAL AID
DELIVERED TO NORTH KOREA DURING 1954*
(MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)
CONSUMER
CONSUMER
GOODS
GOODS
FLOW
CAPITAL
GOODS
FIXED
CAPITAL
GOODS
FLOW
CAPITAL
GOODS
FIXED
CAPITAL
GOODS
COMMUNIST CHINA USSR
* For explanation and sources, see Appendix B.
SECRET
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North Korea during 1954, the USSR could have supported possibly 750
to 1,000 technicians in the field.* This figure represents an average
of 3 technicians for each of the 290 projects comprising the bulk of
the Three Year Plan.
B. From Communist China.
In 1953 the Chinese Communists offered an 8-trillion-yuan
($325 million) grant to North Korea extending over a 4-year period
to assist in the rehabilitation of the North Korean economy. 20/
Deliveries of aid during 1954 were stated to have been 3 trillion
yuan ($118 million). 21/
Few specific projects receiving Chinese Communist aid have
been mentioned, although Chinese assistance has been acknowledged
in the construction of buildings, railroad facilities, and light
industries. 22/ North Korean reports of specific materials delivered
by the Chinese Communists during 1954 are estimated to have consisted
of about 45 percent industrial materials (coal, steel, construction
materials, and transport equipment) and 55 percent consumer goods
(food, clothing, and newsprint).** The largest items of aid have
been transport equipment, grain, and textiles.
The North Koreans provided a detailed report of material aid
received from Communist China during 1954. From this report the
value of aid deliveries is estimated to have been $60 million, or
about one-half of the announced aid of $118 million. This discrepancy
has several possible explanations. It is conceivable that the list
of delivered materials was not complete or that the value of materials
was greatly inflated to maximize the size of the Chinese gift. It
is also possible that when troops of the Chinese People's Volunteers
(CPV) were withdrawn from North Korea in 1954, 23/ military equip-
ment was given to the Koreans and its value included in the aid
program.
Chinese Communist personnel in North Korea have included
construction laborers as well as technical advisers. One report
* Estimated on the basis of an average wage for Soviet technical
personnel (20,000 rubles annually), with an allowance for travel and
maintenance of from 10,000 rubles to 20,000 rubles. 19/
** For a listing of these materials and an estimate of their value,
see Appendix B.
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indicated that over 400 Chinese technical personnel have been engaged
in rehabilitation work in North Korea. 24/ A more specific report
stated that Chinese engineers contributed 21,900 man-days (about 70
engineers for 1 year) to North Korean shipbuilding during 1954. 25/
Troops of the CPV have been utilized in the construction of railroad
bridges and facilities and in the construction and repair of major
buildings in Pyongyang. 26/ It does not appear that Chinese services
are included in the value of aid, since most North Korean reports
which refer to the total value of Chinese aid state that "in addition"
China furnished technical advice -- a phraseology not employed when
referring to Soviet aid.
Although the total value of Communist China's aid to North
Korea exceeds that of the USSR, its long-run impact on the North
Korean economy probably is not so great. It appears that a large
proportion of the Soviet contribution is designed for the recon-
struction of basic industries, whereas the greater share of Communist
China's aid is in the form of consumer goods and the rehabilitation
of buildings and transport facilities. Furthermore, it is probable
that the character of technical service rendered by the USSR is
superior to that of the Chinese.
C. From the European Satellites.
The known amount of economic aid which the European Satel-
lites have promised to extend to North Korea over a period of years
is $185 million, of which East Germany will provide three-fourths.
Deliveries during 1954 amounted to $36 million, consisting for the
most part of machinery and equipment but including some consumer
goods.* East German aid to North Korea amounted to $20 million in
1954.
A complete accounting of the East German program has been
reported which indicates that four major projects will be undertaken.**
These projects will account for about 80 percent of the value of
East German aid. The remaining 20 percent will consist of deliveries
of miscellaneous materials and consumer goods. 27/ German techni-
cians evidently will play a vital role in the planning and super-
vision of these projects. It was reported that, by June 1955,
See Appendix B.
See Appendix A.
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80 German engineers were working in North Korea, with 190 more expected,
28/ and that 10 German architects were in Hamhung City in April 1955. 29/
Aid from the other European Satellites is not extensive but
is of the type which will assist in industrial rehabilitation. Czech-
oslovakia's contribution (valued at $28 million) will include an auto-
mobile plant, a machine tool plant, a cement plant, and several hydro-
electric power stations. The value of Poland's program is unknown
but will include the construction of a locomotive and car repair
plant, the reconstruction of three coal mines, and the furnishing of
technical aid. Rumania's contribution of $16 million will build a
cement plant and a plant for producing aspirin and will include deliv-
ery of 10 fishing vessels as well as miscellaneous machinery and equip-
ment. Bulgaria has promised to deliver aid amounting to $5 million,
consisting of consumer goods and equipment for a brick plant. Hungary's
program, of unknown value, will assist in the construction of a
chemical dye plant and a machine tool plant and will include delivery
of instruments and equipment. 30/
D. Developments, First Half of 1955.
Aid deliveries to North Korea during the first half of 1955
continued at approximately the same annual rate as in 1954. The North
Koreans have reported the receipt of nearly $130 million in material
aid from the following countries 31/:
Million US $
USSR x+2.5
Communist China 70,8
European Satellites 16.5
Total 129.8
The commodity breakdown of aid imports in 1955 is not com-
plete, but the types of items reported indicate that the USSR is
continuing to supply primarily industrial equipment, machinery, and
instruments. Communist China is providing raw materials, construc-
tion equipment, and consumer goods. The European Satellites are
sending machinery, instruments, and consumer goods. 32/
It was reported in July 1955 that, in addition to the material
aid from Communist China, "several hundred" Chinese experts and
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technicians were being sent to North Korea. The European Satellites
were reported to be rendering technical assistance in various economic
activities by sending "several hundred" technicians. 33/
II. Foreign Trade.
The magnitude of North Korea's foreign trade during 1953 and 1954
cannot be calculated accurately. It is believed, however, that during
both of these years the tasks of reconstruction have required most of
the indigenous resources available as well as foreign aid contributions.
It is unlikely that North Korean exports have achieved the levels that
existed prior to the Korean War.
A. With Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries.
During the period following 1945 the USSR became North Korea's
major trading partner. The value of trade turnover between the 2
countries increased from $13.9 million in 1946 34/ to $84 million in
1949 and was planned to reach $171 million in 1950. 35/ The pattern
of imports from the USSR during this period breaks down by value as
follows: 50 percent armaments and machinery, 10 percent coal, 10 per-
cent POL, about 15 percent technical services, and 15 percent all
other. More than half the value of North Korean exports to the USSR
before 1950 consisted of cereal grains, fertilizer and other chem-
icals, pig iron, and ingot steel. 36/
North Korea's trade with Communist China (Manchuria) before
1950 was approximately $10 million annually. Imports consisted of
textiles, foodstuffs, and bituminous coal, whereas exports were ferti-
lizer, minerals, agricultural products, and lumber. 37/
Only fragmentary information concerning the size and distri-
bution of North Korea's trade since 1950 is available. These data
are phrased in terms of plan fulfillment and annual percentage changes.
Trade relations with the USSR apparently were formally resumed with
the signing of a trade agreement in March 1954. 38/ The export pro-
gram in 1954 was said to have been overfulfilled by 10 percent. 39/
In the first half of 1955, exports reportedly increased 74.5
percent and imports increased 11 percent over the like period of
1954. 40/ Although it is difficult to assess the scope of these
announcements, they suggest that trade may have been small during
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1953 and 1954 and that the increase during 1955 may reflect renewed
export capabilities due to progress in economic rehabilitation.
North Korea's capabilities for export in 1953 and 1954 prob-
ably were limited. Some of the commodities which were exported in
the period before 1950 were being imported in volume by North Korea
in 1954.* One report indicated that North Korea planned to export
about $20 million worth of agricultural products and mineral ores
to Communist China during 1954. 41/ The trade agreement with the
USSR also included these commodities, and some reports indicated the
actual movement of Korean ores to the USSR. 42/ The export plan for
1954 was reported overfulfilled by 10 percent, and it is possible that
the export of mineral ores and agricultural products to Communist
China and the USSR may have amounted to from $35 million to $45 million.
It is probable that the North Korean economy could have provided this
volume of exports, inasmuch as it was announced that the level of
production in state-operated and cooperative industries during 1954
surpassed the 1949 level by 3 percent. 43/ The only other signif-
icant export was North Korean electrical power to Communist China,
estimated at $10 million. 44/
North Korean trade with the European Satellites is believed
to be small. Although trade agreements were signed with East Germany
and Poland in 1952, they appeared to be economic aid agreements de-
signed to support North Korea during the war. 45/ The only known
postwar trade agreement with the Satellites (as distinct from aid
agreements) is one with East Germany, signed 6 March 1955. 46/ It is
believed, therefore, that trade involving North Korean exports to the
European Satellites was insignificant during 1953 and 1954.
If it is assumed that North Korean exports to the Sino-Soviet
Bloc in 1954 were exchanged for imports of a corresponding value,
total barter trade turnover with Communist countries may be tenta-
tively estimated at $100 million. No information is available on
nontrade receipts and payments of North Korea. Adding grant aid to
the estimated barter trade, however, gives an approximate import sur-
plus for 1954 of $250 million. The value of the trade (in million
US dollars) of North Korea with the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1954 may be
summarized as follows:
See the listing of aid deliveries in Appendix B.
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Exports
Imports
Total
Barter trade
50
50
100
Aid
0
250
250
Total trade
50
300
350
25X6A
The North Koreans announced in June 1955 that the Soviet
shares of the Korean-Soviet Marine Company and the Korean-Soviet
Synthetic Liquid Fuel Company had been transferred to North Korea.
Payment will be made by the export of North Korean commodities to
the USSR over a period of several years. On 31 August 1955 an
agreement was signed transferring to North Korea the Soviet share
of the Korean-Soviet Sokao Air Transport Joint Stock Company, which
was described as the last joint Soviet-Korean company in North
Korea. Payment for this company will also be made by the export
of Korean products to the USSR. 47/
specifically banned all commercial exchanges with North Koreans.
B. With Non-Bloc Countries.
There is no indication that non-Communist countries con-
duct organized legal trade with North Korea and some of them have
25X6A
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APPENDIX A
NORTH KOREAN PROJECTS RECEIVING TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL AID
The following projects have been specifically mentioned by the
North Koreans as among those which are being constructed or reha-
bilitated with material and technical aid from Sino-Soviet Bloc
countries. This list is not intended to be exhaustive and prob-
ably does not include all projects receiving such aid.
A.
Projects Receiving Aid from the USSR. 50/
Map* Key
Number
Location
Project
1
Songjin
Steel foundry
2
Kimchaek
Iron foundry
3
Sungho-ri
Cement plant
4
Sup'ung
Hydroelectric power plant
5
Chinnamp'o
Refinery
6
Hungnam
Chemical fertilizer plant
7
Pyongyang
Spinning mill
8
Pyongyang
University
9
Pyongyang
Radio station
10
Pyongyang
Beef packing and canning plant
11
Pyongyang
Bleaching powder manufacturing plant
12
Pyongyang
Underground theater Moranbong
13
Huich'on
Vehicle parts factory
14
Musan
Sugar refinery
15
Madong
Cement plant
16
Kilchu
Plywood mill
17
Pon'gung
Chemical factory
18
Suiho
Power plant
19
Namp' o
Glass factory
See the map, inside back cover.
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Map Key
Number
Location
Project
20
Hwang-hae
Metallurgical plant
21
Kangnam
Pottery plant
22
"Central Broadcasting Station" (possibly
identical to Pyongyang Radio Station)
23
Pyongyang
International Hotel and "other government
buildings"
24
Pukchin
Machine building plant
25
Nakwon
Machine building plant
26
Namp'o
Shipyards
27
Wonsan
Shipyards
28
Ch'ongjin
Shipyards
29
Kimchaek
Shipyards
30
Taeyu-dong
Mines
31
Koksan
Mines
32
Komdok
Mines
33
Musan
Mines
34
Sinpo
Fish cannery
B. Projects Receiving Aid from East Germany. 51/
Map Key
Number
Location
Project
35
Hwang-hae
Iron works
36
Hamhung
Restoration
"A diesel engine
factory"
"A printing combine"
C.
Projects Receiving Aid from Hungary. 52/
Map Key
Number
Location
Project
37
Pyongyang
Weights and measures factory
38
Pyongyang
Railway station building
39
Pyongyang
"Assistance with two public buildings"
1+0
Pyongyang
Designs for the following:
Art school
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Map Key
Number Location Project
41 Medical college
42 State Art Theater
43 Musical institute
44 Kusung Machine tool mill
"Assistance with a chemical plant"
D. Projects Receiving Aid from Czechoslovakia. 53/
Map Key
Number
Location
Project
45
Huich'on
Auto accessories plant,
46
Huich'on
Machine building factory
47
Changjin
Power plant
48
Pujun
-Power plant
49
Huich'on
Power plant
E. Projects Receiving Aid from Poland. 54/
Map Key
Number
Location
Project
50
West Pyong- Railway factory
yang
51
Anju
Mines
52
Sinchang
Mines
53
Aoji-dong
Mines
54
Wonsan
Railway factory
F. Projects Receiving Aid from Rumania. 55/
Map Key
Number Location
Project
"Plans and survey for cement factory"
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G. Projects Receiving Aid from Bulgaria. 56/
Map Key
Number Location
Project
"Technical aid in construction of a wood-
working factory"
"Improvement of equipment in the lumbering
field"
H. Projects Receiving Aid from Communist China. 57/
Map Key
Number Location
Project
55 Nampo Glass factory
56 Pyongyang Repair of major buildings
57 Mangyongdae School
"Construction of 16 railway bridges"
"Construction of railway facilities and
laying of track"
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APPENDIX B
MATERIAL AID RECEIVED BY NORTH KOREA DURING 1954
A. Communist China to North Korea. 58/
The items shown in Table 2 have been reported by North Korea as re-
ceived from Communist China under the aid program during 1954. In order
to obtain values, prices per unit have been applied on the basis of
world prices, which were then adjusted by knowledge of Sino-Soviet Bloc
prices and the characteristics of the commodities. Flow capital goods are
those nonconsumer goods which must be transformed physically before they
can yield any service. Fixed capital goods are those nonconsumer goods
whose physical form does not change significantly in the course of their
service.
Material Aid Received by North Korea
from Communist China
1954
Commodity
Amount
Price per Unit
(us $)
Total Value
(Thousand US $)
Grain (metric tons)
130,000
100
13,000
Soybeans (metric tons)
30,000
125
3,750
Meat (metric tons)
3,000
1,000
3,000
Cotton (metric tons)
3,900
250
979
Canvas shoes (pairs)
610,000
3
1,830
Blankets (units)
50,000
5
250
Newsprint (metric tons)
4,000
100
400
Cotton fabric (million meters)
42
0.25
10,500
33,709
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Material Aid Received by North Korea
from Communist China
1954
(Continued)
Commodity
Amount
Price per Unit
(us $)
Total Value
(Thousand US $)
Flow Capital Goods
Coal (metric tons)
650,000
10
6,500
Coke (metric tons)
36,000
10
360
Pig iron (metric tons)
22,000
70
1,540
Finished steel (metric tons)
30,000
120
3,600
Cement (metric tons)
131,000
20
2,620
Sheet iron (metric tons)
2,000
100
200
Lumber (metric tons)
42,000
10
427
Total Flow Capital Goods
15,247
Fixed Capital Goods
Locomotives (units)
70
30,000
2,100
Freight cars (units)
1,382
6,000
8,292
Passenger cars (units)
109
10,000
1,090
Motors (units)
265
500
132
Turbine pumps (units)
420
280
118
Total Fixed Capital Goods
11,732
Total Nonconsumer Goods
26,979
Grand Total
6o,688
B. USSR to North Korea. 59/
The items shown in Table 3* have been reported by North Korea as
received from the USSR under the aid program during 1954. The value
of these North Korean imports was obtained in the same manner as the
value of imports from Communist China, as shown in Table 2.
* Table 3 follows on p. 17.
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Table 3
Material Aid Received by North Korea
from the USSR
1954
Commodity
Consumer Goods
Food (metric tons)
Grain (metric tons)
Flour (metric tons)
Shoes (pairs)
Drugs (metric tons)
Cloth (metric tons)
Wool (metric tons)
Price per Unit Total Value
Amount (us $) (Thousand US $)
550 200 110
6,000 100 600
50,000 135 6,750
20,000 5 100
350 5,000 1,750
60 1,000 60
1,500 1,600 2,400
Total Consumer Goods
11,770
Flow Capital Goods
Cement (metric tons)
1,000
20
20
Pipe (metric tons)
36
150
5
Iron (metric tons)
5,525
70
387
Zinc (metric tons)
50
600
30
Sulfur (metric tons)
500
150
75
Aluminum plate (metric tons)
54
600
32
Chemicals (metric tons)
2,300
200
460
Fertilizer (metric tons)
126,860
50
6,343
Steel (metric tons)
69,46o
140
9,724
Oil (metric tons)
3,809
50
190
Aluminum wire (kilometers)
171
20
3
Electric wire (kilometers)
73
20
2
Wire cable (metric tons)
16,500
200
3,300
Sheet tin (metric tons)
62
200
12
Lumber (carloads)
370
320
118
Brick (carloads)
5
400
2
Glass (carloads)
1
10
Ammonium nitrate (metric tons)
1,200
92
110
Total Flow Capital Goods
20,823
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Material Aid Received by North Korea
from the USSR
1954
(Continued)
Price per Unit Total Value
Commodity Amount (us $) (Thousand US $)
Fixed Capital Goods
Horse carts (units)
1,000
200
200
Shapers (units)
15
3,000
45
Drill presses (units)
3
10,000
30
Winches (units)
15
1,000
15
Compressors (units)
4
10,000
40
Turbine pumps (units)
7
300
2
Railroad equipment (metric tons)
24,000
250
6,000
Belt conveyors (kilometers)
56
20
Scrapers (units)
4
500
2
Busses (units)
150
10,000
1,500
Tractor parts (units)
17,000
2
34
Boxcars (units)
336
6,000
2,016
Passenger coaches (units)
141
10,000
1,410
Horses (units)
18,000
75
1)35
Vehicle cranes (units)
19
8,500
Motors (units)
113
750
85
Rails (metric tons)
25,000
100
2,500
Trucks (units)
762
2,500
1,905
Farm tools (metric tons)
300
500
150
Machines (units)
309
1,000
Total Fixed Capital Goods
18,466
39,289
Grand total
51,059
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C. European Satellites (and Mongolia) to North Korea. 60/
The items shown in Table 4 have been reported by North Korea as
received from various countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than
the USSR and Communist China during the year 1954. Because of the
vagueness of the original reports, it is impossible to assign any
values to these imports.
Table 4
Material Aid Received by North Korea
from Specified Countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1954
Country Commodity
Albania 9,000 tons of pitch
Railway equipment
Building materials
Steel rods and pipes
Czechoslovakia 50 Skoda busses
12 winches
10 motors
5 compressors
3 excavators
9 diesel and gas generators
Iron wire
Sheet iron
Machine tools
Tractors
Sowers
Plows
Cotton cloth
Medicine
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Table 4
Material Aid Received by North Korea
from Specified Countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
195+
(Continued)
Country Commodity
Railway equipment
Railway rolling stock
Machine tools
Medicine
Electrical equipment
Motor cars
Newsprint
Gasoline
Tractors and bulldozers
Textile goods
1,000 tons of meat
10,000 leather coats
6,056 horses
9,106 goats
7,156 fleece sheep
427 milk cows
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APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed in this report has been one of compilation
of statements both from overt Sino-Soviet Bloc sources and from US
intelligence reports. The statements varied in scope from announce-
ments of over-all value of aid to reports of the movement of individ-
ual items, and from them it was possible to derive a reasonably accu-
rate estimate of the total aid program to North Korea, as well as
its general composition, and to make a rough approximation of the
probable level of barter trade.
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APPENDIX D
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The most significant gaps in intelligence on North Korean foreign
trade are those relating to the total value of barter trade, its
specific composition, and its distribution among Sino-Soviet Bloc
countries.
Other gaps exist with respect to the identity and amounts of non-
trade payments (needed in estimating North Korea's balance of pay-
ments); the specific identity of all materials and services provided
under the aid program, including the amount of military deliveries;
the method of valuation of aid deliveries; and positive evidence of
a coordinated effort on the part of Bloc nations to rehabilitate the
North Korean economy.
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APPENDIX E
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
sources
A
- Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff offi-
cer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
FOIAb3bl
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02
PROJECTS
IN NORTH KOREA
RECEIVING AID FROM
THE SINO-SOVIET. BLOC
1-34 Projects from USSR
35-36 Projects from East Germany
37-44 Projects from Hungary
45-49 Projects from Czechoslovakia
50-54 Projects from Poland
55-56 Projects from Communist China
O 25 50 75
MILES
O 25 50 75
KILOMETERS
4. Sup'ung-dong Hydroeletric Power Plant
19. Suiho Power Plant
52. Sinch'ang Mines
P79-01-',06,3-AG O41OOG?68 ?1 O
13. Huich'bn Vehicle Parts Factory
45. H6ich'Sn Auto Acessories Factory
46. Hulch'6n Machine Building Factory
Sinch'ang1 1 Taeyu-dong
If 1Makwon
7. Pyongyang Spinning Mill
e. Pyongyang University
9. Pyongyang Radio Station
Pukchinl HUich'6n!
24. Pukchin Machine Building Plant
Kus6ng
1 44. Kustng Machine Tool Mill
10. P yongyang Reef Packing & Canning Plant
11, P yongyang Bleaching Power Manufacturing Plant
12. Morarbong Underground Theater
22. Central Broadcasting Station
23. International Hotel & other Government Buildings
37. Pyongyang Weights &-Measures Factory
:
38. Pyongyang Railway Station Building
39. Assistance with 2 public buildings '
40. Design for Art School
41. Design for Medical School
42. Design for State Art Theater
43. Design for Musical-Institute
50. West Pyongyang Railway Factory
56, Repair of major buildings
51.Anju Mines
Anju _
-- Madong
15. Madong Cement Plant
5. Chinndmp'o Refinery
19. Nampo Glass Factory
26Nampo Shipyards
55. Nam-p'o Glass Factory
SDngho-ri
31. Koksan Mines
121. Kangnam,dong Pottery Plant
20. Hwang-hoe Metallurgical Plant
35. Hwang has Iron Works
27. WSnsan Shipyards
54. W6nsan Railway Factory
K O:' R E A
t~rv~
49. Hdch'Sn Power Plant
I
H6ch'6n
148. Pukl6n Power Plant
Changjin
147. Changlin Power Plant
34. Sinp'o Fish Cannery
Sinp'o
1
I
(-USSR
USSSR
Aoli-dong' ` ^
53. Aoli -dangMines
~u
san Sugar Refinery
~
^^ "'^^^
san
us
KdmdAk
132. KSmd6k Mines
Hamhung }Pon'gung
17. Pon'gung Chemical Factory j { HTngnaro
6. Hungnam Chemical Fertiliser Plant
S6ngjinI
2. Kim Cheek Iron Formicary
28. Ch'binginn Shipyards
29. Kim Cheek Shipyards
SEA OF JAPAN
Koksan
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